SEX AND CULTURE
By the same Author
SEXUAL REGULATIONS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOUR
Y. J. L.

OPTIMAE HVIVS OPERIS ADIVTRICI
LIMANDO EXPOLIENDO
THE writing of this treatise was originally completed in 1932; but there were several reasons why it should not be published immediately; and I put it away, and wrote an Abstract of it. This Abstract, entitled Sexual Regulations and Human Behaviour (Messrs. Williams & Norgate, Ltd.), was published in October 1933. The little book was offered as a mere summary of a future volume; and the complete work is now presented.

If I may judge from the nature of the welcome extended to the Abstract, some readers may be disappointed to find that so large a part of the complete treatise is devoted to uncivilized peoples. I too have a greater personal interest in the ideas and behaviour of civilized societies; and, if I had been concerned with the mere proving of a thesis (in the sense in which the word is understood by those who adopt comparative methods), I should probably have dismissed uncivilized societies with the eclectic summary that is usually given to them, and confined my serious discussion to some highly selected historical data. But I have not tried to prove a thesis, and have none to prove; I have merely conducted an inquiry; and in such a case the importance attached to any society, civilized or uncivilized, must be in proportion to our knowledge of it. I wish to emphasize this. When I started these researches I sought to establish nothing, and had no idea of what the result would be. With care-free open-mindedness I decided to test, by a reference to human records, a somewhat startling conjecture that had been made by the analytical psychologists. This suggestion was that if the social regulations forbid direct satisfaction of the sexual impulses the emotional conflict is expressed in another way, and that what we call 'civilization' has always been built up by compulsory sacrifices in the gratification of innate desires. The psychologists arrived at this conclusion after inquiring into the nature and causes of mental disturbances; they made no attempt to fortify it by a reference to cultural data; so I decided to investigate the matter. I began in all innocence; had I realized how greatly, as the result of my work, I should have to revise my personal philosophy, I might even have hesitated to begin at all; I was so far from desiring to illustrate a personal conviction that I always struggled against arriving at the conclusions which the evidence appeared to force upon me; and I continued to work, resisting every temptation to speak, until I was satisfied that I could find no exception to the apparent rules. I then collected so much of my material as seemed necessary and advisable. This treatise is the result.

I have had to omit many uncivilized societies which at first I proposed to include because I found that our information concerning them did not reach the standard of adequacy that I decided to adopt. Thus I have excluded the Australian aborigines, and also many Bantu and American
Indian peoples of whose culture I made a preliminary examination. I discuss the SE. Solomon Islanders (Melanesia), but have not regarded our knowledge of the other Solomon Islanders as good enough to justify their inclusion. The same remark applies to most of the Melanesians of New Hebrides and New Guinea. My list of Polynesian and Micronesian societies also is shorter than I should like it to have been. It includes the Maori, Samoans, Tongans, Tahitians, and Gilbert Islanders; and I mention the Hawaiians; but I make no reference to the Hervey (Cook), Ellice, Marshall, Pelew, Marquesas, and Caroline Islanders. No people are more fascinating than these; but our information concerning them is scattered, scanty, and of doubtful reliability. The quality of African ethnography, too, is uneven; and though it was disappointing to have to exclude such societies as the Bari, Kavirondo, Konde, Bushongo, Bambala, and Ibo- and Edo-speaking peoples (to mention a few of the African societies which at first I proposed to include and later decided to omit), I was not impressed by the quality of the available evidence in regard to their behaviour. I also studied the Veddas, Todas, Oraons, and other famous peoples of India and Ceylon, but did not feel able to place the requisite value upon our knowledge of them. I have included twenty-eight American Indian societies; and in their case my choice has been exercised in an apparently arbitrary manner. From my original list I have deleted the names of the Ahts (Nootka), Kwakiutl, Kootenay, Cheyenne, Delaware, Seminole, Mohave, and some Shoshonean units; but there is no doubt that our knowledge of some of these tribes is equal to that of the Lillooet, Shuswap, and Thompson, all of which I have included. The reason is that among the American Indians there was an intense variety within the cultural pattern (in my sense of the word), and I was anxious to examine as many societies as I could in order to see if there was a change in the cultural pattern itself. A protracted search failed to reveal such a change; but the result of it was that when I collected my material on the American Indians I was somewhat embarrassed by its quantity. Some societies, like those of the Haida, Ojibwa, Dakota, and Crow, could not possibly be omitted, for they were of vital importance and our information concerning them is comparatively good; and from the remainder I simply chose such a number as might be considered representative.

In all I discuss eighty uncivilized societies, and from the nature of their cultural behaviour make my first induction. In the cultural behaviour of the omitted societies there was not, so far as my knowledge goes, any item that militates against that induction; and I mention the fact of their omission in order to inform the critical reader that my inquiry has actually covered a slightly wider field than that covered by the printed treatise.

As to civilized societies, our comparative ignorance of social history is such as to preclude inductive reasoning concerning the greater part of it. This cannot be too often or too emphatically stated. I have even gone so
far as to say bluntly, in my first note, that researches based on historical evidence alone cannot claim to be exhaustive. In saying this, I am thinking particularly of social regulations and conventions; and I confess that I view with alarm the current habit, deplorably widespread among historians and antiquarians, of assuming that the regulations and conventions that prevailed in a century of which we have direct knowledge prevailed also in a preceding or in a succeeding century, of which we may have no direct knowledge at all. Whenever our knowledge is complete, we find that in any vigorous society the method of regulating the relations between the sexes was constantly changing; and, unless there is direct evidence, it is wrong to assume that in any such society social laws were ever static and unchanging, even for three generations.

My inductive survey of civilized societies is limited to the Sumerians, Babylonians (to twentieth century B.C.), Hellenes, Romans, Anglo-Saxons, and English. I also make a few references to the Arabs (Moors), and a deductive suggestion about the Persians, Macedonians, Huns, and Mongols. The brevity of the discussion is chiefly due, as I have said, to the comparative scantiness of our knowledge of other ancient societies; but I also felt that if I descended into too much detail, the significances I wished to convey would be obscured. For these reasons I have refrained from discussing many societies which I should like to have discussed. Thus the Cretans, Hittites, Assyrians, and Hindus have been entirely excluded. I make a passing reference to the early vigour of the Teutonic peoples, but the subsequent lethargy of, for instance, the Visigoths, the Lombards, and the Merovingian dynasty, is not even mentioned. Teutonic law, indeed, is only described in its relation to Anglo-Saxon customs. I have also thought it better to omit any reference to the rise of the Sassanids, to the age of Heraclius, and to those other great changes that took place in western Europe, north Africa, and western Asia after the fall of the Western Roman Empire and before the Mohammedan conquest; and I have tried to avoid unnecessary controversy by cutting short the presentation of the Roman evidence as soon as I have summarized the legal changes that took place between the traditional foundation of the consulate and the principate of Augustus. Of the events of the next three centuries I merely offer a general indication; my reasons for doing so are stated or implied in the text. As for the Venetians, Portuguese, and Spaniards, I have done no more than hint at the apparent reason for the uneven energy they displayed at different times; and I have left the reader to judge for himself the relevancy of my conclusions to the historical careers of the Prussians, Dutch, French, and other modern societies. The sacrifice of some of this material was painful; but I thought that if I included it, the inductive character of my work would be violated, or at any rate imperilled.

In the cultural behaviour of the societies I have mentioned there was nothing, so far as my knowledge goes, that conflicts with the conclusions I have drawn; and at a later date I may seek to remedy some of the omissions.
In the meantime I cherish a hope that if any historical student is impressed with the facts presented here, he will test my judgements by a reference to the cultural career of a society which comes within his expert knowledge. Since I have been so bold as to include our own society within my survey, I should like to utter an early warning against a too literal application of any conclusion, either in a reforming or in a die-hard spirit, to any contemporary society. My own opinion on this important subject, given for what it is worth, is implicit in my final sentences.

In presenting the evidence I have made every effort to be accurate and concise, but in spite of care, and much rewriting, errors may have crept in. Should any be found, I shall be glad to have them pointed out. The treatise is not short; yet in some places it is extremely compressed. It would, indeed, have been much easier to write it in seven volumes than it has been to write it in one. This may explain, though it cannot extenuate, many of the inelegancies that I myself find in it. My one aim has been to express myself in such a way as to leave no doubt as to my exact meaning. I hope that the second and third chapters will be useful for the purpose of reference. There is certainly no need for any one to read them from beginning to end. They, as well as the bibliography and index, are designed to help those who wish to study human societies as dynamic units. I doubt if a comparative student will get much assistance from them; but if he browses in the notes he may find something to suit him. The notes contain many facts of which there is no hint in the index. Throughout the survey I have used or quoted the native terms, and have drawn up the index in such a way as to encourage their use.

The book is divided into three parts: text, notes, and appendices. In the text I relate the bare facts, and then interpret them without permitting myself to stray from the main argument. In the appendices the facts are expressed in a summary or symbolic manner. The notes have a twofold character. In the first place, I cite the authorities for the statements made in the text, compare and analyse any conflicting evidence, and elucidate obscure passages. I regard this part of the book as important. The time has surely passed when we can accept as authoritative a statement made by a single authority, and omit to consult, or at any rate to quote, the other authorities on the subject. The books and articles referred to are those which I have carefully read and compared. Secondly, I have used the notes both to support my submission that uncivilized societies can only be classified according to their rites, and to point out some of the confusions and misunderstandings that appear to have been caused by the current method of translating native terms. I am dismayed when I think of the errors into which we seem to have been led by the vague use of such terms as 'high god', 'spirit', 'god', 'demon', 'evil spirit', 'godling', &c.; and there is no doubt in my mind that the man who uses them without referring to the native term that they are supposed to represent runs the risk of being superficial, if not definitely misled.
It was only after much consideration that I adopted the system of separating the notes from the text. The system has one disadvantage: the serious student must continually turn from one part of the book to another. But my notes are extensive; and if I had placed them at the bottom of each page, as is sometimes done, I should have split up the text in a most displeasing manner. Moreover, my subject is such as may arouse the interest of the general reader as well as that of the specialist; so I have wished to make the book as readable as I could. I fear that I have been compelled to tease the reader's eye by the insertion of many small reference numbers, but in the last two chapters, which are more likely than the others to be read consecutively, I have tried to reduce the inconvenience of the numbers by placing most of them at the end of paragraphs instead of at the end of sentences. Throughout the second and third chapters the text is freely peppered with numbers; but that, I think, does not matter so much. The general reader is unlikely to study these chapters very closely, and the specialist will already have been hardened to the irritation that the numbers are apt to cause.

I can best describe the general plan of the text by explaining how the book came to be written.

It was in 1924 that after ten years of intellectual laziness, five spent in war, five in commerce that involved some travel, I decided to devote myself to the study of human affairs. In the course of my subsequent reading I came across the old Sumerian laws, the Hammurabi Code, the newly published Hittite laws, and the laws of Manu, and was much impressed by their character. At that time the work of the analytical psychologists was still the subject of spirited debate; and from my study of these ancient records, read in the light of Hellenic and Roman history, there emerged a suspicion that in their conjectures about 'civilization' the psychologists might be right. And the more I studied historical societies the more confident I became that the facts might support their theories. But I perceived that I could arrive at no safe decision unless I included uncivilized as well as civilized societies within the scope of the inquiry I decided to undertake. So, after summarizing some of the historical evidence in two short papers, I went up to the University of Cambridge in order to inquire into the relation between sexual opportunity and cultural condition among uncivilized peoples. When I first consulted some of the original authorities on uncivilized ideas and behaviour, I began to despair; for it seemed that little sense could be made of the evidence. The current language of social anthropologists did not always appear to be exact, and I could not see my way to believe, in regard to uncivilized thought, many statements that some social anthropologists appeared to accept without question. I had lived at close quarters with some uncivilized men, and I frankly doubted the reliability of much evidence that seemed to have satisfied my predecessors. Fortunately, in my first frame of reference (which contained thirty-seven columns), I had included the
peoples’ rites as well as their beliefs; and gradually from this mass of data there emerged the coincidences described in my first three chapters. These were indeed impressive; but I realized that I should not be able to understand either the different kinds of cultural behaviour or the reason for the apparent coincidences unless I could gain some knowledge of the ideas that prompted the behaviour; and it was in this manner that I was accosted by the phenomenon that is commonly, but so misleadingly, called ‘the evolution of religion’. My argument in that connexion constitutes the greater part of my fourth chapter; and, in order to avoid the dangers incurred by the practice of selecting instead of stating the facts, I have been careful, in this part of my work, to examine the evidence afforded by each one of my eighty societies, even though some of it is of such a quality as to have no real value.

In the course of my exposition of the cultural data I have had to make many adverse comments on some anthropological writings; but I can honestly say that I have confined my remarks to those writings which run the risk of being commonly and uncritically accepted at their face value. I have not gone out of my way to refute any opinion which bore no relation to my problem; and I hope that the criticisms I have made will be understood as springing only from a desire for greater exactitude and lucidity. I usually found that a good deal of preliminary work was necessary before any description of uncivilized ideas and behaviour could be accepted as reliable evidence.

After analysing and drawing some conclusions from the anthropological evidence, I proceed, in the second part of the fourth chapter, to outline the opinions of competent psychologists in regard to the effects of compulsory continence. Trained psychologists will find that this part of my work is very elementary. They may be amused, too, by the shameless audacity of a man who approaches his problem from an out-and-out behaviouristic point of view, and then asks the analysts for assistance. But I have no apology to make. I do not believe that human societies can be classified in any other way than according to their behaviour; thus a behaviouristic approach was forced upon me; and the whole point of my argument is that reasoning from other data the analytical psychologists have conjectured the facts to be as I have found them.

It is commonly supposed, I believe, that when compulsory checks have to be placed on the sexual impulses some form of neurosis is inevitably produced. If by neurosis we mean abnormality, this opinion is not supported by the facts. There is a sense in which all civilized persons suffer from a neurosis, but it is usual to apply the word to the nervous condition of maladjusted persons. In recent years great stress has rightly been laid on the number of such persons in our society, and, indeed, in any branch of the white civilization; but we must not forget that the number of successful adjustments is much greater. Some of these successfully adjusted persons are just as neurotic, in the dictionary sense of the term, as
those whom we call maladjusted; but their abnormality happens to be of a legal nature. On the instrument of human behaviour some notes are called normal, others abnormal, some eccentric, others criminal. In each case the difference is not of kind but of degree; and the limits are arbitrarily fixed by each society. Just as respectable misdemeanours are committed by most of us who are not imprisoned as criminals, so each one of us is guilty of a form of behaviour which, if exaggerated, would produce the nervous condition medically diagnosed as neurosis. When compulsory continence is intense, some persons seem unable to adjust themselves to their cultural environment; but we must not allow our sympathy with them to conceal the existence of those who have succeeded in adjusting themselves. And we must not forget the relative character of our judgements. The evidence is that in the majority of cases compulsory continence produces social energy; only rarely does the consequent derangement of the nervous system lead to what is technically called neurosis.

In my fifth chapter I present my final conclusions and place the cultural process in what seems to be its proper relation to the biological and universal processes. Our forefathers did not always preserve a clear distinction between these three processes, and I have tried to introduce some order into the chaos produced in their minds by the controversies that accompanied the submission of the Darwinian hypotheses. Here again I have not begun the chapter by stating my final conclusion. I have led up to that conclusion gradually, and only reach the last stage of my argument in the last two paragraphs.

The treatise, then, is nothing more than it pretends to be; it simply contains the results of an inquiry, and an interpretation of the facts that the inquiry revealed. I have made no attempt to erect a grand theoretical edifice; I have merely dug the foundations on which an edifice may later be erected. The temperaments of some thinkers will incline them to accept the conclusions I have drawn. These will not care a jot for my laborious proofs, and may even claim that I can tell them nothing that they did not know before. They are entitled to their opinions. The temperaments of others will be strongly opposed to my conclusions. These will wish to examine the proofs very closely; and it is for them that I have written. For their sake, too, I have preserved a rigorous distinction between the facts and my interpretation of the facts.

Those who have lent a ready ear to the more exaggerated claims that have been based on the Uncertainty Principle in physics may shy at my unrepentant determinism; but at present I do not propose to add to what I have said in para. 175 and n. 646. There are signs that in regard to the alleged spontaneity of the electron calmer views are beginning to prevail than was the case two years ago; so it may be that no serious dispute will arise; but it is always well to be forearmed. Let me say, then, that I acknowledge, and even emphasize, the free will of individual human beings; I am prepared to accept, if I must, the spontaneity of the individual
electron; these things do not affect the doctrine of determinism as I understand and define it; and I shall not contemplate the making of any further defence unless in the opinion of competent thinkers the position I have taken up seems likely to be rendered untenable by further researches into electronic behaviour.

To a mind that is unaccustomed to the methods of scientific research, the facts, as presented, may appear over-simplified. The reason is that I have refused to publish them until I felt that I understood them. If any one should hesitate to accept the Chart of Evidence (Appendix I) because its contents are too satisfactory, my reply is that truth is usually a simple thing. If an alleged truth appears complicated, the probability is that we understand it imperfectly. And I believe that much of the hazy, apparently abstruse, science that is current to-day only appears to contradict this view of truth because some research students, eager to produce results, make a premature disclosure of their data. The association of pre-nuptial chastity and what I have called the deistic cultural condition has been known to me since 1929; and I will confess to having written a short paper on the subject; but I recalled the manuscript before it was published. By the spring of 1930 I had tumbled to the existence of a compulsory irregular or occasional pre-nuptial continence, and after a few more months had completed the Chart of Evidence as it now appears; then I toyed again with the idea of publication, but eventually decided to withhold the Chart from the public eye until I felt I really understood its meaning. I know that it is usual to present the results of a long research in a series of short papers, and that it is dangerous to break a convention; but I cannot be persuaded that the Chart would have been welcomed, or even considered, unless at the same time an interpretation had been placed on the evidence it contains.

To assist a reader to understand better than would be gained by reading the book from the beginning to the end, I have not hesitated to summarize, and even to repeat, the argument in what I considered to be the appropriate place. My suggestion is that after reading the first chapter, and so much of the second and third chapters as may be necessary to understand the technique of the inquiry, the reader will find it easier to study para. 152, and then to proceed straight to the end, returning afterwards to study the details of the evidence. Para. 158 also is a useful summary for those who wish to take a still shorter cut. But one point must be emphasized: in considering the contents of the last chapter it is vital to distinguish between what I have called the first and second primary laws (paras. 160, 174). They are both distinct and dissimilar. If they are discussed at the same time, endless confusion will result.

Briefly stated, my final conclusion is that the cultural behaviour (as defined) of any human society depends, first, on the inherent nature of the human organism, and, secondly, on the state of energy into which, as the result of its sexual regulations, the society has arrived. According
to the amount of continence they compelled, the sexual regulations adopted by human societies in the past divide themselves into six classes. These have produced six distinct states of energy, three lesser, three greater. All the uncivilized societies were in one or other of the three states of lesser energy; civilized societies have always been in one or other of the three states of greater energy. Each of the three states of lesser energy produces a definite cultural condition; I call these cultural conditions zoistic, manistic, deistic. Only one of the three states of greater energy produces a definite cultural condition, rationalistic; the other states of greater energy are those of expansive and productive energy. A deistic society can display expansive energy, but not productive energy, unless it first becomes rationalistic. If a rationalistic cultural stratum retains its energy for about one generation (the records do not justify a more definite statement), its cultural tradition seems to be augmented by an element I have called human entropy. Just as the second law of thermodynamics, or the Law of Entropy, appears to reveal the Direction of the Universal Process, so this new element appears to reveal the Direction of the Cultural Process (hence its name); and so long as the stratum continues to display great energy its cultural behaviour changes in the Direction of the Cultural Process. If, however, its energy decreases, its behaviour changes away from the Direction. So far as my knowledge goes, no stratum can be shown to have moved in the Direction for more than one-half of a generation after the appearance of human entropy. The possibility of its doing so must appeal to the imagination of any speculative philosopher.

In connexion with the inherent nature of the human organism my use of the word ‘conception’ should be explained. I do not use it as a psychologist but as a social scientist. I note the invariable reaction of men to the ‘unusual’, but make no attempt to explain or analyse it. When I say that human culture (as defined) appears to be founded on the conception of the strange quality (or power) that is manifest in anything unusual or beyond comprehension, I merely mean that this seems to be the least common denominator of the four cultural conditions. I am far from suggesting that in the minds of all men there is, or was, a clearly formulated idea of that quality or power; yet my use of the word conception may imply that in my opinion this is, and was, so. I have been unable, however, to think of any other simple manner of expressing myself; so I hope that the word, although unsatisfactory, will be allowed to pass as a useful method of describing a state of mind that plainly exists and existed.

No one but myself is responsible for the methods I have adopted or for the conclusions I have drawn; but I am indebted to many scholars for help and encouragement. I could not have included either the Amazulu or the Basuto within my survey if Mr. J. Y. Gibson, of Pietermaritzburg, and Mr. F. H. Dutton, of Maseru, had not been so kind as to supply me with some unpublished information on certain points. I thank them for their great trouble. And I should have been unable to take advantage of
their expert knowledge if Mr. R. U. Sayce, Lecturer in Material Culture in the University of Cambridge, had not written to them on my behalf. My warm thanks are also given to the Rev. Dr. D. S. Oyler, who sent me a valuable manuscript containing some important information on the Shilluk.

My difficulties in regard to the ideas and behaviour of some other uncivilized societies have been reduced by Professor T. C. Hodson, the Rev. E. W. Smith, Dr. J. H. Hutton, and Dr. L. S. B. Leakey. Each of these gentlemen was kind enough to answer a number of questions that I put to them. I have learnt much, too, from my conversations with Mr. J. H. Driberg. Mr. B. L. Hallward, Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge, has assisted me in many ways; and I value greatly the sympathy and advice I have received from Dr. A. C. Haddon, late Reader in Ethnology, from Dr. S. A. Cook, Regius Professor of Hebrew, and from Dr. A. B. Cook, Professor of Classical Archaeology, all in the University of Cambridge. When I was studying Sumerian and Babylonian law and history, Dr. R. Campbell Thompson, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford, was always ready to place his knowledge at my disposal and to advise me in my reading. My thanks are also due to Mrs. Doris Dingwall, who pointed out, at an informal meeting held in University College, London, in May 1932, a deficiency in my definition of the word ‘temple’. As a result of her valuable criticism I was able to increase the precision of my language by making a slight amendment.

During my residence in Cambridge I was fortunate enough to enjoy the privileges of a Fellow Commoner of Peterhouse. It is a pleasure to record my appreciation of the kindesses extended to me by the Master and Fellows.

In 1931 I presented to the Board of Research Studies in the University of Cambridge a dissertation on the subject of this book. Dr. R. R. Marett, Reader in Social Anthropology in the University of Oxford, and Mr. F. C. Bartlett, Professor of Experimental Psychology in the University of Cambridge, acted as referees. I learnt much from their criticism, and am grateful to them for their subsequent encouragement.

The manuscript was revised January–March 1933. The final paragraph was expanded, and a few notes added, in March 1934.

J. D. U.

LONDON

26 May 1934
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CHAPTER I

THE FRAME OF REFERENCE

1. The Inquiry. Among both civilized and uncivilized peoples there is a close relation between sexual opportunity and cultural condition, and I have thought it worth while to conduct a detailed inquiry into the matter. The results of my inquiry, and the conclusions I have drawn from the facts, are presented in the following pages.

In submitting them for consideration I am conscious not only of the voluminous nature of the evidence which I shall ask the reader to examine, but also of the established opinions which are current to-day in regard to sexual regulations. These opinions may be said to be either dogmatic or theoretical. Those who adhere to dogmatic opinions claim that their conclusions are founded upon a supernatural sanction; but since this supernatural sanction is not recognized by all men, it follows that those who hold the dogmatic opinions cannot speak with authority except to those who, by recognizing the sanction, inevitably subscribe to those opinions already. The theoretical opinions are held by those who have rebelled against the dogmatism of the former party; they substitute an alleged rationalism for the supernatural sanction of their opponents. Yet their conclusions have no greater validity, for they do not always succeed in excluding the personal factor from their submissions; and when they attempt to justify their opinions by a reference to human records they have a tendency to substitute conjectural hypotheses for rational inductions, and to submit a collection of apt illustrations as proof of their individual theories. In dealing with such subjects as sex and culture these methods are disastrous; so I have endeavoured both to devise a technique by means of which the personal factor may be avoided, and to adopt a procedure which will approach, so far as possible, the methods of the chemist and the physicist. In this manner I hope to have safeguarded myself from premature and superficial conclusions. I am not unmindful of the handicaps that must be suffered by a student of human affairs who seeks to emulate the methods applied to the more exact sciences; yet I am persuaded that, if the study of human affairs is to be raised above the level of mere opinion (which is always subject to the time in which it is expressed), there must be a radical change in the methods which have been adopted in the past. So I propose to devote this chapter to the consideration of method and to the formulation of exact definitions.

When a chemist conducts an inquiry into the behaviour of two chemical elements he does not express any personal opinion about the reaction; he accepts it as part of their inherent nature; and he publishes his formula in the language which is common among chemists. After this has been done
he may subject his material to a closer analysis; he may solicit the aid of other scientists in order that the natural constitution of the elements may be examined more minutely; but the observation and acceptance of the original fact preceded this research, and the ultimate reason for the observed behaviour is hidden in the ultimate nature of the physical universe.

It is the same, I submit, in the study of human affairs. If, as the result of extended researches into human records, certain cultural factors are found to be coincident with certain social factors, we must first collect, classify, and present the evidence; we must then sift it as finely as possible in order that we may make some intelligible suggestion concerning the manner in which the phenomena are connected. After this has been done we may solicit the aid of the psychologist and of the biologist in order that a concerted endeavour may be made to arrive at an agreed conclusion; but the acceptance of the original evidence must precede this subsequent discussion. We cannot bask in the sunshine of theory before we have plunged into the cold waters of fact. Moreover, the ultimate reason for the observed behaviour will always remain undisclosed, being hidden in the ultimate nature of the human organism. Our individual opinions concerning the relation between the factors are irrelevant. If we attempt to intrude our personal bigotries we shall deprive ourselves of the power of appealing to the unaided human reason.

The experimental chemist, however, enjoys many advantages which are denied to the social scientist. A chemist can communicate his results by means of eloquent symbols which will express his meaning in a precise and economical manner; the student of human affairs is compelled to state his evidence in words of common currency and must preface his inquiry by the formulation of an exact technical language. A chemist can squeeze his symbolic equation into a page, devoting the remainder of his treatise to a discussion of its meaning; the social scientist must tread a long and weary path of monotonous exposition, postponing his interpretation until the whole of the evidence has been presented and elucidated. This is the only reliable method. The illustration of a personal theory by the citation of numerous examples is indecisive, for in this manner many opposing, and even contradictory, theories could be (and indeed have been) 'proved'.

A third advantage which the chemist enjoys is afforded by the nature of the material on which he works. When he has published his formula concerning the behaviour of two chemical substances every other chemist can test the truth of his conclusion by means of a simple experiment. There is no limit to the amount of the evidence, for there is no limit to the number of experiments. As a result of these experiments the conclusion may be formed that so long as nature remains uniform the observed reaction is inevitable. Now a limitation of sexual opportunity always is, and so far as I know always has been, accompanied by a rise in cultural condition; but from a bare study of the facts alone it is impossible for me to say that the coincidence is inevitable, for I am precluded from conducting a series of
experiments by means of which the truth of the assertion (or prophecy) might be tested. Furthermore, I cannot say that the statement is true of every society which exists or has existed, for the evidence is not available on which such a declaration could be based. All I can do is to include in my survey as much evidence as is reliable, and to defer a final conclusion until the whole of that evidence has been presented and agreed. And this is what I propose to do.

2. The Material. The material which is available for an inquiry into the relation between sexual opportunity and cultural condition is of two kinds, historical and anthropological. It is usual to regard social history and social anthropology as separate subjects, but the distinction between them, I trust, is a temporary separation and not a statutory divorce. Indeed, my suggestion is that social history and social anthropology are the upper and lower portions of the same stream of knowledge. For the purposes of study we may erect a temporary dam between them, but if we do not remove it when occasion demands we shall find that the waters of our study will not arrive in the open sea of acceptable conclusion; they will waste their energies on an unfertile land which can produce nothing but indecisive judgements. At the same time the division is more than an academic convention. So far as this inquiry is concerned, the historical and the anthropological facts are of a totally different character. In the records of history we can observe the changes that occurred in the cultural condition of a society as century succeeded century; the study of social anthropology reveals a number of simpler peoples, scattered all over the world, occupying different positions in the cultural scale. The historical law-codes and other appropriate data tell us of the changes that the members of historical societies made in their methods of regulating the relations between the sexes; but we must study the sexual regulations of uncivilized societies in a different manner, comparing the rules which operated in one society with those which prevailed in another society. In the one case we compare the condition of a society with the condition of the same society in a previous or a subsequent epoch; in the other case we compare the condition of one society with the condition of another society in the same epoch. In the one case we move through time, in the other case through space. If we were to concentrate on the historical facts we should disregard the larger part of the evidence. If we confined our researches to uncivilized peoples, the most important societies would be excluded from the survey. Some of the historical evidence, however, is exceedingly fragmentary; it can be employed only as corroborative material for a conclusion which has been based on other and more complete evidence. I shall summarize the more important and more reliable historical facts in the final paragraphs of this book; but in order that the very considerable material may be managed more easily I propose to make my inductions from the anthropological evidence alone. In this manner,
moreover, I shall preserve the conventional distinction between social history and social anthropology.\(^1\)

To some scholars this may appear somewhat arbitrary. May I quote, then, what an eminent physicist has said in reference to scientific method? 'Everything', he declares, 'is linked with everything else. We may, however, choose our own range of study. We may concentrate on a certain small patch or we can take a broad survey. By the one method there is limitation of breadth; by the other method we run the risk of being superficial. If both breadth and depth are attended to by the same individual, they must be attended to at different times. It is not possible to work them concurrently.'\(^2\)

3. Definition of 'Cultural Condition'. The sense of the word 'culture' is somewhat extensive. It is used to denote social customs, religion, literature, art-forms and sciences, methods of government and manufacture, means of communication, types of houses, and all practical industries. We speak of 'culture-contact' when we refer to the meeting of societies of which the 'culture' differed, and of 'culture-diffusion' when we allude to the fact that people who travel do not absorb the 'culture' of those among whom they settle, but preserve some portion of their own, so that the 'culture' of both parties is affected. The so-called cultural Ages, the Neolithic and the Palaeolithic, for example, or the Aurignacian and the Magdalenian, have their various types of 'culture' which are used as evidence of the evolution of human 'culture'.

It is obvious that the application of so protean a word must be strictly limited before it can be said to possess any single precise meaning. To arrive at this limitation I will state a few general facts in regard to uncivilized peoples.

The work of Frazer, van Gennep, Driberg, and Malinowski has demonstrated that the members of uncivilized societies feel that they are surrounded by certain forces or powers. In times of sickness or distress, at planting and harvest, when rain is needed or comes too much, at birth, adolescence, marriage, and death, and on every occasion of importance, these forces or powers make themselves manifest. Their needs, if any, must be satisfied in the proper manner, in the proper place, by the proper person, and at the proper time.

Under certain circumstances some savages consider that they can control the course of nature by rite and spell, compel the wind and the weather, and ward off dangers from themselves, their cattle, and their crops. They think that they can persuade the earth to bear fruit and the beasts to multiply. At least, that is the manner in which the various rites have been interpreted; but we must remember that the magical ceremonies are not miraculous as well as magical, and it is this simple fact which makes me doubt if we have always understood correctly what was in the native mind. As Mr. Driberg has said, magic is not all-powerful; if it were, the savage
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would not work at all. The truth seems to be that the savage conducts the rites which seem to us so futile and so complicated because he regards them as being both necessary and efficacious. To him they are necessary because the powers that surround him must be attended to, and efficacious because if the proper rites are performed by the proper person, in the proper place, at the proper time, there will be nothing to fear.

We must not go beyond the evidence and maintain that such savages are ignorant of all natural law. They may not conceive of nature as an assembly of orderly activities which follow one another in a determined order; but they have a very clear idea of what is usual and unusual in their limited world. The Melanesians of whom Professor Malinowski has written possess a sea-lore as rational and as consistent as our own; but they believe that incantations must be sung when a canoe is being made. Their methods of agriculture are based on logic and experience, and they always plant at the right season; but in their opinion the powers in the universe must be attended to while the planting is being carried out. They believe that magic is indispensable to success, and among such people the domain of the sacred (or the dangerous) so permeates the profane (or the ordinary) that nothing can be undertaken without attention being paid to the powers which are manifest therein.

The stimulation and control of the sun, sky, and earth, however, are only part of the business of life; or to put the matter in another and more accurate way, it is not only in the sun, sky, and earth that the powers are manifest. The great events of every person’s life, birth, adolescence, and death, are also times of peculiar danger and immense significance. Therefore on these occasions also certain social ceremonies must be performed which are equally necessary and equally efficacious. Inevitably every man and woman must pass through these crises, and, as an insulation against danger, and as an injection of power for the negotiation of future difficulties, certain ceremonies must be performed in the proper manner, by the proper person, in the proper place, and at the proper time.³

Lastly, it is usual for an uncivilized man to assume that an illness which does not yield to the simple treatments which are based on his stock of herbal or medicinal correctives can be explained only by the assumption that some malignant power is working against him, or that some hitherto friendly power has been angered by his neglect. He must have recourse, therefore, to the man who can withdraw, control, or influence that power, or who can advise concerning its identity.

I have stated these beliefs in general terms in order that the words might apply, so far as possible, to all uncivilized societies. We can sum the matter up by saying that to the members of every uncivilized society a certain power (or powers) manifests itself (or manifest themselves) in the universe, and that steps are taken to maintain a right relation with it (or them).

Now the evidence is that different societies conceive of these powers in different ways and adopt different methods in their efforts to preserve a
right relation with them. The manner in which the powers are conceived, and the steps which are taken to maintain this relation, constitute the cultural condition of a society in the sense in which the phrase is used throughout this treatise.

Two comments are necessary.

In the first place, I am aware that the meaning which I attach to the term 'cultural condition' may seem unduly limited. It is, indeed, narrower than I originally intended. When I embarked on these researches I included social and political organization within its scope. I had observed that usually the societies which were in what I shall call the deistic cultural condition were organized as monarchies; and it seemed desirable to make more detailed inquiries into the matter. But the bold enterprise had to be abandoned. If uncivilized methods of social and political control are to be analysed and classified, we must first collect and survey the facts; we must know whether a man's influence depended on his birth or on his personality, and whether he exercised his authority over the members of a certain social group or over the inhabitants of a certain territory. These are simple and fundamental distinctions. In the appropriate literature, however, the word 'chief' has been employed in an extremely vague and inexact manner. Few writers attach to it any single precise meaning, and the evidence is of such a poor quality that a long argument is often necessary before its meaning can be elucidated. Seldom is it possible to say whether chieftainship was individual, social, or political. Sometimes a man has been called a 'chief' because he took the lead at a particular crisis.

The same remarks apply to the use of the word 'king'. The details of the available evidence would have to be evaluated and compared before we could be certain that our classifications were reliable. Sometimes the term 'Paramount Chief' is applied to a man whom other writers would call 'King'.

Under such circumstances I had no option but to limit the meaning of 'cultural condition' until the necessary material shall have been subjected to a closer scrutiny.

I am convinced that the relation which appears to exist between monarchical institutions and the worship of gods in temples is more apparent than real; but I do not see how we can draw any definite conclusion from the coincident facts until we have defined our terms. Equally am I convinced that the method of government which a society adopts at any time is controlled by the same necessity as its cultural condition. The evidence on which this opinion is based, however, is historical rather than anthropological.

Secondly, the cultural condition of a society must not be confused with its religion. This is most important. It is true that, if we were to extend our definition of 'religion' to its full limit, among some peoples the two phenomena would coincide almost exactly; but some cultural details, such as the cure of sickness and the control of the weather, which under these conditions would have to be included as an integral part of 'religion', are
not included as such by the members of all societies at all times, and it is vital that our definitions should be applicable to any society at any time. How many twentieth-century thinkers would assent to the suggestion that their pathological methods or their methods of weather-control were part of their religion? To a modern mind it sounds meaningless and incredible. That is because our cultural condition has changed. Some of our forefathers would have assented.

Such an extended use of the word 'religion', therefore, might be justifiable as an academic definition, but it would be extremely inconvenient in practice. It is very difficult, even for the most accurate thinker, to employ such an important word in a sense different from that to which he has been accustomed. The habits of years and the convictions of the mind cannot be changed thus easily. It is, in fact, extremely irritating to be compelled to remember that a writer is using an everyday word in a sense wholly peculiar to himself. So far as possible such words should be avoided, I think, as technical terms. Usually a technique can be devised which will permit the use of some other satisfactory terms which enjoy a less universal currency and which are subject to less individual interpretations.  

4. Criticism of Categories based on 'Beliefs'. The cultural condition of any uncivilized society, then, is determined by its answers to two questions:

1. What powers manifest themselves in the universe?
2. What steps are taken to maintain a right relation with them?

My first submission is that it is impossible to classify uncivilized societies according to their 'beliefs'; they can be classified only according to their rites. This opinion is the opposite to that which is usually held. It is fitting, therefore, that I should state my reasons for discarding the more usual classifications.

If we classify our societies according to their beliefs, without reference to their rites, we are relying on evidence the trustworthiness of which, for several reasons, is extremely doubtful. In the first place, an uncivilized man, and even a civilized one, finds it extremely difficult to state the precise nature of his creed. I have lived and travelled among such different races as the Ethiopians, Somalis, and non-Amharic-speaking peoples of modern Abyssinia (commonly called Gallas), and I am confident that any declaration which they may have made to me was by no means an accurate representation of their genuine beliefs, which indeed they were quite unable to formulate. I do not think that a European peasant or an American artisan could give me a complete account of his beliefs, and I do not see that we can expect a Melanesian or a Bantu to perform a mental feat which is admittedly beyond the power of many of our own citizens. Thus the only method by which we can obtain any knowledge of an uncivilized creed is by asking direct questions. The unreliable character of the answers to these questions is my second reason for suspecting the evidence. Generally speaking, uncivilized men and women are more tactful than truthful. They
are anxious to make a good impression on their distinguished visitor, and are extremely careful not to cause him pain or displeasure. The result is that they give those answers to his questions which they think he would like to hear. At the same time they are always ready to punish a lack of sympathy by an intentional deception. If they consider that their questioner will use his knowledge to their disadvantage they will cheat him by giving him false information. Moreover, even under the most favourable conditions, a man of undeveloped mentality quickly tires of a subject, and then he is likely to say anything which will secure his escape from an irritating conversation. As I plod through the vast literature which has accumulated during the last fifty years in reference to the beliefs of uncivilized men I seem to detect many signs of these mental gymnastics. I suspect that occasionally our authorities have been misinformed. Many protests have been made against the employment of direct questions; yet they remain a current method of obtaining information. The absurdity of the method has been recognized; but its temptations are not always resisted.

My third point is that even if an observer succeeds in collecting sufficient data to justify a description of 'beliefs', it is likely that his own personality will be reflected in his report. His conversations with the natives will place in their minds a measure of his own beliefs and he will interpret their words in terms of his own thought.

The former difficulty has been well stated by Callaway. 'Nothing is more easy', he says, 'than to inquire of heathen savages the character of their creed and during the conversation to impart to them great truths and ideas which they never heard before, and presently to have them come back again as articles of their own original faith, when in reality they are but the echo of one's own thoughts.' If we add the possibility that the observer may have reported the native belief in terms of Christian thought, either unconsciously, or to show that Christianity is not unique in some of its tenets, or to prove that the Christian system is a universal truth of which all men still retain some knowledge, the confusion becomes so great that I doubt if the evidence can be said to have any real value.

There is a fourth difficulty, too, and I wish to discuss it at greater length. Let us suppose that an observer has succeeded in extracting from the natives an accurate account of their personal creed; let us further suppose that he has succeeded in reporting that creed without any intrusion of his own individual philosophy: in what terms will he state his facts? If he follows the example of ninety-nine per cent. of our authorities he will speak in terms of 'spirits', 'gods', and other such entities. These words were being employed long before Tylor formulated his theory of 'animism'; indeed, Tylor's hypotheses were founded upon such reports; yet in my view they are scientifically inadmissible. The native terms have been translated in a manner which has concealed the natives' attitude towards their world, and it is my further submission that the vast majority of native terms cannot be accurately translated into a civilized tongue. Modern equivalents do not exist.
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If the view be adopted that all classifications which are based on 'beliefs' are inherently misleading, it follows at once that such terms as 'animism' and 'animistic' must be discarded; and the following pages will be understood more easily if the conception of 'animism' is banished from the mind. When we begin to extract those facts which will facilitate a final interpretation of the relation between sexual opportunity and cultural condition, we shall have to consider the Tylorian hypotheses in greater detail. Here and now I will state some of the reasons why, in my view, native terms cannot be translated into our language.

The main points of my criticism can be tabulated thus:

1. If we translate a native term 'spirits' or 'spiritual beings', we create the impression that different powers are manifest in different places. We often find that the native uses the same word to denote the 'spirit' in each place; that is to say, the same power is manifest in different places.

2. Sometimes a savage will apply a singular or collective word to 'the dead'. If we must translate the word, 'the dead' most nearly approaches the native meaning, assuming that the natives employ the term in those contexts in which we use a substantive and not an adverb. If we render this term 'spirits of the dead', we may create the impression of an individual survival which is not part of the native conception.

3. Often the word which we translate 'spirit' is used in an adverbial context. It seems, then, that the savage may conceive of a character or of a quality. Our translation represents him as conceiving of an entity.

4. Often the same word is translated both as 'spirit' and as 'god'. If these English words are to be accepted as alternative renderings, it follows that neither of them has that precise meaning which it is desirable that a technical term should possess.

5. Sometimes the natives employ the same term to denote various circumstances or phenomena for each of which we use a separate word. If we translate the native term by the word which we should use under similar circumstances, or in a similar reference, we create the impression that he distinguishes what actually he confuses. Sometimes we find that a native word of this description is translated 'God', 'god', 'deity', 'godling', 'spirit', 'ghost', 'guardian spirit', 'malignant demon', or by these or other words in their plural forms. We are then told that the members of that society believe in 'gods', 'spirits', 'ghosts', &c., and their rites are classified as 'spirit-worship' and 'ghost-worship'; but the dual nature of the practices has been created by our translations. To the native they are one and the same thing.

6. The members of different societies often employ the same word to denote the power in the universe. Usually we translate this word by the same English equivalent, e.g. 'god'; we then assume that all the societies conceive of the power in the same way. This is not a justifiable conclusion. Sometimes a study of their rites reveals an astounding variety.

Methodologically these submissions are important, so I propose to
illustrate each of them by a single example. In all cases, however, a number of instances could be cited. I shall speak in the past tense, for the native conceptions are being rapidly modified under white influence.

5. Some Unacceptable Translations. 1. The Tlingit 'yek'. In the opinion of the Tlingit Indian, we are told, 'All nature is animate and the spirit of any being can become the genius of any man who thus acquires supernatural powers. These spirits are yek.'

From this statement it would be legitimate to conclude that the Tlingit were 'animists'. A subsequent report, however, shows that this opinion would be erroneous, and, according to Mr. J. R. Swanton, due to our 'European lineage'. 'Most Indian Languages,' he remarks, 'or at any rate the Tlingit, do not have a true plural, but have usually a distinctive and occasionally a collective. Instead of thinking of so many objects they think of one. The sea-spirit is the ocean of supernatural energy as it manifests itself in the sea, the bear-spirit as it manifests itself in the bear, the rock-spirit as it manifests itself in the rock, &c.' Thus, whereas we should be tempted to conclude from the previous report that different powers were manifest in different places, actually the same power was manifest in each place. The Tlingit did not believe in 'spiritual beings'; they saw in the world the manifestation of a single power, yek.6

2. The Nilotic 'jok'. The Lango, we are told, were of the opinion that after his funeral the soul of a dead man became 'merged in jok'. When this happened the soul ceased to have any individual existence so far as the survivors were concerned. The Dinka are said to have had a somewhat similar belief. The spirit of a recently deceased man was called atiep, but sometimes it was spoken of as 'a jok'; 'this term', Professor Seligmann says, 'is generally reserved for the spirits of long dead and powerful ancestors'. 'Jok are more powerful and energetic than atiep.'

Now jok was a singular word: to say 'jok are more powerful' is therefore ungrammatical, and misrepresents the native conception. Sir James Frazer offers 'ancestral spirits' as a fair rendering of jok, and remarks, 'In the Dinka language jok signifies not a great God, but a spirit of a dead ancestor.'

Now jok, a singular word, might possibly be translated 'the dead', although I am not satisfied that it was substantival in all contexts; 'spirits of the dead' would be a possibly legitimate but inherently dangerous rendering; but 'a spirit of a dead ancestor' cannot be correct, for it suggests an individual survival (as jok) which was not part of the Dinka belief.7

3. The Banks Island 'vui'. According to the Dictionary of the Mota Language the word vui meant 'a spirit' or 'any big thing': thus, of a boy much grown, ne vui gai, 'you exceeding fellow', gai being vocative; vui lama, 'exceeding large'. In such contexts the word is clearly adverbal. We are told also that 'whenever some impressive touch of natural awe comes upon the native mind it apprehends the presence of some haunting
vui'. Is it not possible that in this case a native adverb has been changed into an English substantive? It seems to me that the native may have applied the term vui, 'exceeding' (adv.), to every place which impressed him, and that Dr. Codrington inferred that whenever the term vui (adv.) was used, the native believed a vui (subs.) to be present. We are so accustomed to thinking in terms of entities that we have always assumed that a native thinks in a similar manner.

There is some evidence that my conjecture may not be wide of the mark, for when we compare the translations in Dr. Codrington's dictionary with those in his monograph we can trace the manner in which he transformed the adverb into a substantive. In the dictionary the phrase ne vui gai is rendered 'You exceeding fellow'; but in the monograph the English equivalent is 'He is a vui to be sure'. Does not this suggest that Dr. Codrington, the author of both translations, was puzzled by the adverbial meaning of vui and that the substantival rendering was due to what Mr. Swanton calls 'European lineage'? In another passage Dr. Codrington says: 'Men have declared that they have seen something with no definite outline, grey like dust, vanishing as soon as it was looked at. This must have been a vui.' This statement seems to be a mere assembly of answers to direct questions.

4. The Angami 'terhoma'. Dr. J. H. Hutton translates this word as 'spirit', 'spirits', 'deities', 'a god'. He has been kind enough to explain to me that the context alone shows whether the singular or plural should be employed. Professor T. C. Hodson informs me that the form of the word denotes 'heap', 'mass', 'crowd'.

It is accurate, therefore, to render terhoma either as 'spirit' or as 'spirits'. We must assume that it is equally legitimate to employ 'a god' or 'gods' as its English equivalent. In that case, if we employ the old terminology, the Angami Nagas must be said to have been both animists and polytheists, and those words lack the exact meaning which it is desirable that technical terms should possess.

5. The Sea-Dyak 'petara'. The Sea-Dyaks were of the opinion that many things in the world were petara. The word is said to have been of Sanskrit origin; but for our present purpose its origin is immaterial. Archdeacon Perham, who is our best and almost our only authority on Sea-Dyak beliefs, employs a capital P throughout his description. The capital, however, seems to belong to Perham rather than to petara.

Among Archdeacon Perham's renderings or interpretations of petara are:

(a) 'Petara is God and corresponds in idea to the Elohim of the Old Testament.'

(b) 'There are many Petaras.' (These anglicized plurals are not uncommon in anthropological literature. Nothing shows more clearly that the word has been given an English rather than a native meaning.)

(c) 'One man has one Petara, another man another.'

(d) The phrase o kite petara is rendered 'O ye gods'. This, according
to Perham, is 'unmistakable evidence that polytheism must be regarded as the foundation of Sea-Dyak religion'. Compare (a).

(e) 'Of the white man it is said, "They are Petara"'.

(f) 'Petara may be one particular being and may include a multitude of gods.'

(g) 'Petara is their own shadow projected into higher regions.'

(h) 'Petara are innumerable.'

Those who have read a quantity of anthropological literature of a certain kind will remember other native words which have been maltreated in a similar manner.

Archdeacon Perham proceeds: 'When the inconsistencies are pointed out, all he [i.e. the Sea-Dyak] says is that he does not understand it, that he simply believes what his forefathers have handed to him.' Yet it seems to me that it is the Archdeacon who is responsible for the inconsistencies. If we cease to translate the term into our language and to intrude our thoughts into the Sea-Dyak mind, we find that he applied the word petara to certain people, certain natural phenomena, a man's shadow, and perhaps his soul. The obvious conclusion is that in his opinion all these things possessed a common quality which he called petara. What could be more reasonable or consistent?

6. *The Maori 'atua'*. If we had to confine our researches to such material as Tylor was compelled to employ, we should obtain an equally strange idea of the Maori 'beliefs'.

According to Brown, 'they have a multiplicity of gods, and each man has an atua of his own to whom he ascribes all the evil which may happen to him'. Angas, however, prefers another translation: 'They believe in invisible spirits called atuas.' (I have already commented on these anglicized plurals.) Colenso states that atua was 'a malignant demon'. Shortland is confident that atua were 'the spirits of the dead'. Polack agrees with him but uses the singular. Maning speaks of atua as a 'familiar spirit', while Tregear says 'they believe in demons and spirits . . . there are no guardian spirits'.

Is it not obvious that the Maori did not believe in any of these European things, but simply in the manifestation of a single power, which they denoted by the untranslatable word atua? Have we not confused the meaning of the word with the phenomena to which it was applied?

The word atua was common to most Polynesian societies; 'god' is the usual rendering. The result is that all Polynesian societies have been credited with the same conception of atua; and then we have concluded that they were all in the same cultural condition. But just as when a bargee uses the word 'god' I cannot believe that he is expressing the ideas which a philosopher associates with the term, so it would be rash to assume that the Maori idea of atua was also that of the Tongans. Their methods of maintaining a right relation with atua were, as we shall see, entirely different.
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There is reason to believe, then, that some pagan creeds have not been accurately described. Indeed it is doubtful if we can discover the nature of any uncivilized belief apart from the rite which is based upon it, for a native cannot explain his ideas and we cannot trust his answers to our questions. Even if a native has succeeded in imparting his beliefs it is doubtful if great reliance can be placed upon a white man's description of them, for there is danger that the report will either contain some articles of faith which are the echoes of the observer's thoughts or be influenced by the observer's individual temperament. Furthermore, even if an observer has obtained a correct idea of the native opinions, and has described them without any subjective intrusion, the report cannot be used as a basis of classification, for in all probability the English words in which it is expressed not only misrepresent the native ideas, but also lack the precise meaning which technical terms should possess.

For these reasons I discard all classifications which have been based on 'beliefs'.

6. By their rites we shall know them. Let me summarize the position.

According to the terminology which is adopted in this treatise, the cultural condition of a society is determined by its answers to two questions:

1. What powers manifest themselves in the universe?

2. What steps are taken to maintain a right relation with those powers?

We have seen that it is impossible to accept the answers which have been given to the first question. We are compelled, therefore, to base our definitions on the answers to the second question; that is to say, the only reliable method is to classify human societies not according to their ideas but according to their behaviour.

The following terms will be employed in the senses which are hereinafter attached to them. I must beg that their significance be remembered.

There are four great patterns of human culture: (1) zoistic, (2) manistic, (3) deistic, (4) rationalistic. ¹²

Only a few civilized societies have been in the rationalistic cultural condition. All uncivilized societies can be placed in one or other of the remaining three classes. Before defining them I must explain that the words zoism, manism, and deism will not and cannot be used to denote the 'beliefs' of those societies which were in the zoistic, manistic, and deistic cultural conditions. The conceptions of uncivilized people cannot be simplified in that manner. In place of those convenient but misleading substantives I shall employ some circumlocutory expressions which will represent the native opinion more accurately. These expressions will be introduced and defined in their appropriate place (paras. 67–9).

7. Zoistic, Manistic, Deistic. The main question, 'What steps are taken to maintain a right relation with the powers in the universe?' can be subdivided according to (a) the place in which the rites were carried out,
(b) the human agency which rendered them efficacious. For the present we shall concentrate on the place. The agency will be discussed later (para. 65).

1. A study of uncivilized peoples reveals that some of them erected temples and that some of them did not. If the members of any society erected temples in their efforts to maintain a right relation with the powers in the universe, that society was in the deistic cultural condition.

When we analyse the rites of any society, then, the first question which we must ask is, 'Did these people build temples?' If the answer is in the affirmative, they were in the deistic cultural condition. If the answer is in the negative, they were not in that condition. People who are in the deistic cultural condition carry out their rites in temples through the agency of priests.

The last sentence does not qualify the original definition, but completes it. Unless a society erects temples, ex definitione it cannot possess priests. Only thus, I shall submit, can we distinguish effectively and accurately between a magician and a priest.

I define a temple as a roofed building, other than a grave-house, in which the power in the universe manifests itself and which is specially erected and maintained in order that a right relation may be preserved with that power, the building being such that a man can stand upright inside it.

2. A study of uncivilized peoples reveals that among those societies which did not build temples there were some which paid some kind of post-funeral attention to their dead. Such people were in the manistic cultural condition.

If, therefore, we receive a negative answer to our first question, we must put a second question: 'Did these people pay some kind of post-funeral attention to their dead?' If the answer is in the affirmative, they were in the manistic cultural condition. If the answer is in the negative, they were not in that condition.

3. Some societies neither erected temples nor paid any kind of post-funeral attention to their dead. All such societies were in the zoistic cultural condition. We place in this class all those societies concerning which we receive negative answers to the questions I have just mentioned.

Within these cultural patterns there is always an intense variety.

Usually the rites and ceremonies of manistic peoples are called 'ancestor-worship', but throughout anthropological literature the term has been applied to a multitude of practices that differed in both meaning and intent. No word has been employed more variously, and the resulting confusion has been increased by the use of such words as 'propitiation', 'conciliation', and 'sacrifice', which not only lack precise meaning, but also beg the most important question. Some attempt must be made, therefore, to introduce order into the chaos; and I shall devote the next paragraph to a description of the principles by which the rites of manistic societies will be analysed and classified.
8. Ancestor-worship: an analysis. An almost bewildering variety of opinion is said to exist, and to have existed, concerning the fate of a dead man's soul. After the appropriate funeral rites have been performed the 'soul' may proceed near or far, westward, eastward, or downward. It may hover in the vicinity of the grave, in the house in which its original owner once lived, in his cattle-kraal, or in the dwelling-place of his heir. It may take up its residence in a particular tree, in any tree of a particular species, in a forest, in a rock, or in some other natural feature. It may transfer itself to an animal. It may possess a person and make him ill or even transform him into a magician. It may be remembered for a few short weeks, for a generation, or for generation after generation. It may lose its individuality and become merged, as it were, with all other souls into one united whole. It may live again in a newly-born child. And apparently all or any of these things may happen to the same soul at the same time in the opinion of the same person.

I confess that I accept some of these 'beliefs' with reservations. As we have seen, a native sometimes uses the same word in those contexts wherein we employ different words. For instance, he may apply the word which we translate 'ghost' to the peculiar quality which is manifest in some particular tree. We rationalize this 'belief' by saying that the ghost is in the tree, but I sometimes doubt if the report does not contain as much inference as fact. It is so very easy to confuse the meaning of a word with the phenomena to which it was applied. Many cases of this confusion will come to our notice during the course of our survey; they constitute another argument against the acceptance of any translation unless the native term is given.

It is obvious that any attempt to classify manistic societies according to their beliefs concerning the dead would be futile, for even if the reports were absolutely reliable we should be faced with such diversity of opinion that a rigid definition could not be formulated; but we can classify them according to the methods which they adopted in their efforts to maintain a right relation with the dead; that is to say, the manistic cultural condition subdivides.

The task of framing the definitions which apply to these subdivisions is simplified by the inclusion of the historical societies within their scope. The technique has already been devised by the late Dr. L. R. Farnell, whose terms I adopt and adapt.

Dr. Farnell has suggested that 'we should distinguish between ancestor-cult, hero-cult, and general religious tendance of the dead'. In a somewhat similar manner Mr. W. Crooke once remarked: 'The distinction between the worship and the placation, or tendance, of the dead is one of great importance which many of our travellers and observers have failed to appreciate. There are cases in which the dead are worshipped, but those of placation and ministration are much more numerable.'

In that passage Mr. Crooke is employing the word 'worship' in the same
sense as Dr. Farnell uses the word 'cult'. I shall employ the latter term. I doubt, however, if we can divide 'cult' into 'ancestor-cult' and 'hero-cult', if we mean to distinguish by those terms the attention paid to an individual who was a blood-relation from that paid to one who had been a notable citizen. If the necessary evidence were forthcoming, I think we should find that among uncivilized peoples 'cult' was always 'hero-cult', never 'ancestor-cult'. But the classificatory nature of the relationship terms complicates the subject. There is no instance of 'ancestor-cult' among the eighty societies with which we are concerned. Among them *cult* was always *hero-cult*.

As 'tendance' Dr. Farnell has mentioned specifically only 'general religious tendance of the dead'. He makes no reference to the tendance of individual ghosts. The latter, however, is a common phenomenon among uncivilized peoples.

While, therefore, I adopt Dr. Farnell's terms in an attempt to analyse those rites and practices which have been loosely defined as 'ancestor-worship', I find it necessary to adapt them to their new purpose. In performing this office I shall endeavour to preserve the general sense attached to them by their originator.

'Tendance', as I use the term, includes all those post-funeral rites which are regarded as services due from the survivors to the dead in general or to an individual ghost in particular. 'Cult' consists of the attention which is paid to a particular ghost, either directly or through the agency of a third party, on those specific occasions when the assistance of the ghost is required in order that something may be accomplished which is beyond the power of a living human being. If a rite is performed because its omission would offend, that is tendance. If a man approaches a ghost in order to secure the removal of an affliction, it may be tendance or it may be cult; it depends whether the ghost is held responsible for the injury or not. All those practices which can be included under the heading of *do ut abeas* are tendance, but all genuine *do ut des* is cult. In order to be certain that a *do ut des* rite is genuine, we must be sure that the ghost is in no way blamed for the misfortune, but has been approached in order to secure its alleviation.

The difference between the ideas which impel the rites is clear. On the one hand, it is thought that the dead can and will be troublesome if their needs are not satisfied, but that they will refrain from active interference in mortal affairs if the survivors carry out their duties towards them. In such cases the dead man is not credited with the ability to perform any task which is beyond the power of living men; the rites performed in his honour come under the heading of *tendance*. On the other hand, a dead man is conceived not only as possessing greater power than living men, but also as ready to exercise it on their behalf if he is approached in the proper way by the proper person. The attention paid to such a ghost is *cult*. 
In applying these principles to our material we must remember that the distinctions are made for the purposes of study. In actual practice tendance and cult blend, the one with the other. Moreover, such words as 'pro-
piation', 'conciliation', and 'sacrifice' beg the important question of the
power of the ghost. They lack any single precise meaning and cannot
be employed either in exact definitions or as technical terms.

The affirmative character of a petition, of course, cannot be accepted as
evidence of cult. For instance, when the Ashanti place food, saying 'Let
your family have health', the rite is not cult. Such cries, we are told, are
really negative in character. 'Give us long life' means 'Do not send disease';
'Give us children' would be more accurately phrased 'Do not make us
barren'. And so on.

There are some methods of dealing with ghosts which are neither
tendance nor cult. They are particularly common when affliction is
ascribed to ghostly visitation. For instance, if a ghost has 'possessed' a
person, it is sometimes possible to lure it into a pot and to 'lay' it by
throwing the pot away. We also find that certain people beat the bushes,
shout, and make other noises in order to frighten a ghost away, and that
they regard these measures as efficacious. In such cases there is no pro-
piation, for the ghost is not appeased by the bestowal of its due; it is
merely regarded as a nuisance of which the world can be easily rid. I
include such practices under the heading 'Controlled by Magic'. They
are not evidence of the manistic condition.

It will have been noticed that I have applied the epithet 'post-funeral'
to these rites. The qualifying adjective is important. Many uncivilized
people place food in or on the grave during the funeral ceremonies; some-
times such attentions have been reported as 'ancestor-worship'; but they
usually have a different significance from that contained in the term
'worship', and in my view it is a misnomer. I do not propose, however, to
discuss this important subject. I content myself with the declaration that
I do not include a rite as either tendance or cult unless there is direct and
irrefragable evidence that it takes place after the funeral ceremonies have
been completed.

9. The Treatment of Affliction. A classification of the causes of affliction
is as impossible as a classification of any other 'belief'. Indeed the same
criticisms apply to alleged beliefs about sickness as to alleged beliefs about
the power in the universe and the fate of the 'soul'. A multiplicity of causes
often exists in our translations, but was not present in the native mind.
There is no need to repeat what I have said in that reference.

I classify the methods of treatment under three headings:
1. Magic—including all treatment and/or protection by spells, charms,
amulets, &c.
2. Transference and/or Exorcism—including all those rites the object of
which is to exorcize the disease or its cause from the sufferer, or to transfer
it to a pot, animal, tree, or other place. The counter-spells popularly called 'exorcism' come under the heading of Magic. See 1.

3. Priest—including all those cases in which a sufferer approaches a temple in order to expiate his sin, or to consult the oracle, or to receive treatment from the medium of the god.

I propose, in the first part of my survey, to devote some attention to the sub-question, 'Through what agency?' but it is first necessary to introduce some technical terms. In our original authorities there is some lack of uniformity in the use of such words as sorcerer, thaumaturgist, wizard, warlock, witch-doctor, magician, shaman, seer, diviner, medicine-man, &c. In this treatise I employ 'wizard' to denote the man who inflicts disease, 'medicine-man' for the man who cures it, and 'diviner' for the man who diagnoses or prophesies. These are the three great classes of magic, so far as the treatment of sickness is concerned. It is possible, of course, for the same man to act as wizard, medicine-man, and diviner. In some societies this was always the case. In other societies men specialized. I use the term 'magician' to denote any man who practises magic, whether his art be black or white.

10. The Control of the Weather. The last criterion by which we assess the position of any society in the cultural scale is the method by which it endeavours to control the weather. Here again it must be remembered that the question is not 'Whence comes (e.g.) the rain?', but 'What steps are taken when rain is needed or comes too much?' We are concerned not with the belief but with the rite.

There are five different kinds of weather-rites among uncivilized peoples: (1) They may approach a temple and request a god to send them rain. (2) A sacrifice may be made to a dead man who is thought to be withholding the rain. (3) The people may rely exclusively upon the services of their own rain-makers or rain-stoppers in whose powers they may have complete confidence. (4) A Magical Fraternity may perform a single grand ceremony. (So far as I know this practice was confined to the American Indians who inhabited the southern states of America.) (5) All the members of a social group may assemble and sing or dance.

The second, fourth, and last of these methods are comparatively rare, and I exclude them from my two main categories, which are:

1. Magician—including those rites which are carried out by a magician or a company of magicians in order to exert direct influence on the elements;
2. Priest—including only those cases in which the temple is visited with a request for aid to the god or his duly accredited representative.

11. The Frame of Cultural Reference (Uncivilized Peoples). We have now completed our preliminary definition of 'cultural condition'. As I have said, the term is given a more limited meaning than I originally intended, but the meaning is as broad as the material permits.
Eighty societies will be examined in turn according to the above-mentioned principles, and the evidence entered on a chart in the following manner:

**THE FRAME OF CULTURAL REFERENCE**  
(UNCIVILIZED PEOPLES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Cultural condition</th>
<th>Treatment of affliction</th>
<th>Method of weather control</th>
<th>Treatment of ghosts</th>
<th>Temples and priests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z (zoistic)</td>
<td>Magic</td>
<td>Priest</td>
<td>Magician</td>
<td>Controlled by magic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M (manistic)</td>
<td>Transference and/or</td>
<td>Priest</td>
<td>Priest</td>
<td>Tendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D (deistic)</td>
<td>exorcism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cult</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Column 1.* The letter Z (zoistic), M (manistic), or D (deistic) will be entered according to the cultural condition of the society.

*Columns 2–6, 10.* A plus sign (+) or a minus sign (−) will be inserted according to the evidence.

Thus, if the members of a society erected temples according to our definition of the word ‘temple’ (para. 7) a plus sign will be entered in Col. 10. If they are reported to have approached a temple when they needed rain, a plus sign will appear in Col. 6. And so on.

One of the great advantages of Cols. 2–6 consists in their anticipation of logical but mistaken conclusions. Thus, if a plus sign appears in Col. 10 it would be reasonable to expect a plus sign in Cols. 4 and 6. The expectation would not be fulfilled. For example, the Bakitara and Samoans were in the deistic cultural condition, but they seem to have relied almost exclusively on their rain-makers when they needed rain, in spite of the fact that they erected a temple to a rain-god.

In some instances the evidence is doubtful or indecisive. For example, certain rites have been called ‘exorcism’ by our authorities but do not come within the definition which I have placed on the word. We also find instances in which a rite was conducted by some of the members of a society in some places, but which cannot be said to have been a general cultural trait. Doubtless in many cases the fault lies in the quality of our information; but when a definite decision is impossible I shall enter a
minus-plus sign (±) instead of a definite minus or a definite plus. The minus-plus sign denotes either that the evidence is indecisive or that according to our present information the rite was irregular.

The minus-plus sign does not imply a cultural evolution or a change in cultural condition; its appearance does not mean that the custom or rite was being gradually introduced. It refers solely to the indecisive character of the available evidence or to the irregular character of the rite.

A question-mark (?) means that the evidence is doubtful.

**Columns 7–9.** These three columns reveal the character of the post-funeral rites, a plus sign or a minus sign indicating that the practices were 'Control by Magic', 'Tendance', or 'Cult', according to the meanings attached to those terms (para. 8).

Sometimes a minus-plus sign will have to be inserted in one or other of these columns also, for the evidence has not always been expressed in exact terms. Sometimes, indeed, a report concerning 'ancestor-worship' can be evaluated only with difficulty.

In all cases the sign 0 denotes No Evidence. It is hard to discover a large number of societies concerning which our information is complete.

By the use of this chart we shall be able to see at a glance the cultural condition of any uncivilized society, the culture of which has been recorded upon it. The more familiar it becomes, the more useful it will appear. I shall discuss the entries at greater length when I analyse and evaluate the evidence which has been collected and communicated (paras. 141–52). Here I wish to note, first, that the evidential value of the signs is unequal, and, secondly, that we must be careful to distinguish between those minus signs which represent definite cultural facts and those which may merely denote a lack of information. The evidence contained in Cols. 2–7 is of such a kind that a minus sign may merely mean that a rite has not been described in the available literature. In some cases negative evidence is definitely available, but in other cases a minus sign denotes that the rite has not been reported; and it is at least possible, though perhaps improbable, that if our authorities had made further inquiries they would have learnt the existence of, and therefore reported, the rite to which any of these columns refer. Of course if there is a minus sign in Col. 10 there cannot well be a plus in Col. 4 or in Col. 6, for if temples were not erected the people could not have approached them in times of stress; to this extent a minus sign in these columns may be regarded as representing a cultural fact; but even under these conditions it is not important for its own sake, for it is merely a repetition of the minus sign in Col. 10. Moreover it is possible, as I have said, for a plus sign to occur in Col. 10 and for a minus sign, or a minus-plus sign, to appear in Col. 4 or in Col. 6.

Again, a minus sign in Col. 5 may denote that in the opinion of the society no magician could make rain; but it may mean that the observer has merely reported his failure to notice any rain-makers; and this failure may have been due not to the absence of rain-makers but to the paucity
of the observer’s knowledge and experience. The same remark applies to
the minus signs in Col. 3. Some of the members of some societies may
have carried out certain rites which would have come within my defini-
tion of Transference and/or Exorcism, and these rites may not have been
reported. Upon these minus signs, therefore, no absolute reliance can be
placed.

The minus signs inCols. 8 and 10, however, are of a totally different
character. It is on them that our classifications are based; they are exact.
As a study of the following chapters will reveal, I do not enter a minus
sign in Col. 8 unless there is direct and irrefragable evidence that there was
no tendance of the dead; thus I regard a minus sign in that column as a
foundation on which we can base an argument. As for the minus signs in
Col. 10, if the members of any society erected temples, I consider that a
reliable observer would have mentioned the fact; so, since I have been
careful to include within my survey only those societies concerning which
our knowledge seems reliable and adequate, I regard a minus sign in this
column also as definite evidence. In some cases we are told that there
were no temples; in other cases the negative statement is not made; but in
either case, I submit, we can argue from the absence of temples. Usually
the negative evidence, if not explicit, is implicit.

The nature of the signs in Col. 9 depends, to some extent, on the value
attained to the appropriate literature, which often is vague indeed, but
in most cases, I think, sufficiently clear. The reader must judge for him-
self whether or not in the subsequent chapters I have attached a fair value
to it.

It must be remembered that the chart merely reveals the general pattern
of a culture. As I have said, there is always a variety within the pattern.
Every human society has a character of its own; its culture is a unique
product. Its members are warm and wayward human beings; their habits
are peculiar to themselves. Societies that are in the same cultural condition
do not necessarily possess identical customs; their customs merely con-
form to a general pattern. Hitherto uncivilized peoples have been studied
almost exclusively from an evolutionary or from a comparative point of
view. A rite that existed in one part of the world has been compared with
a similar rite that existed in other parts of the world; and for the purpose of
the comparison it has been lifted from its context and described in great
detail. In this manner the variety within the pattern has been so emphasized
that the general pattern has been obscured. We have not been able to see
the wood because we have concentrated our attention on a particular tree.
In the following pages we shall be concerned with the general pattern of a
culture and not with the intense variety of the rites. Simply, we wish to
know whether certain rites were or were not carried out.

There is another reason why the general patterns of uncivilized culture
have been overlooked. It concerns the meaning of the words ‘primitive’
and ‘civilized’.
12. The Meaning of 'Primitive' and 'Civilized'. In current literature the word 'primitive' is used in a double sense; and much confusion, both in thought and in expression, has been created thereby. In the first place, it is used to denote any society which is not civilized; but the word 'civilized' also lacks precise meaning, and concerning the preconceptions which are contained in our use of that word I shall have something to say later (para. 159). Here I am concerned only with its negative aspect, 'primitive'.

In order to understand the nature of certain phenomena which existed in the early history of some 'civilized' societies (the so-called 'survivals'), we have studied the culture of uncivilized peoples in the hope that we might find among them a mature growth which might elucidate the original character of the dead root surviving in historical records. The search for a parallel has been carried out regardless of racial, cultural, and geographical considerations, and we have concluded that any society which afforded the desired illustration was less developed than the historical peoples. Each of these societies having been accepted as an example of less developed culture, the impression has been created that a number of human societies exists in the world which, being less developed, may conveniently be called 'primitive'. Then by an unjustifiable extension of thought we have allowed ourselves to conclude that, since all of them are classified as 'primitive', all of them must be in the same cultural condition. From some points of view there is no objection to the loose classification; but a very different idea of 'primitive' culture is obtained if, instead of comparing a custom from one part of the world with a similar custom from another part of the world, we compare the whole cultural condition of one society with the whole cultural condition of another society in the same part of the world. Then it is abundantly clear that 'primitive' societies occupy many different positions in the cultural scale.

The word 'primitive' is used also in another sense, being applied to that hypothetical organism, primeval man. Two unfortunate conclusions have been the result, their effect upon our reasoning being aggravated by the preconceptions to which I have referred. First, we assume that less developed societies occupy a position in the cultural scale half-way between that of primeval man and that of 'civilized' man. Secondly, having decided (for no apparent reason) that the cultural advance from primeval man to 'civilized' man proceeds in well-marked stages which follow one another in a determined order, we apply to less developed societies such epithets as 'more primitive', 'most primitive', &c., according as their ideas differ from our own and approach more nearly to those which we credit to primeval man. Thus hypothesis is heaped upon hypothesis. In actual fact our evolutionary theories are usually nothing but hypotheses concerning the possible history of some Hellenic or Roman institution, for the classical tradition is so strong that we still tend to regard the Hellenes and the Romans as the first civilized men who lived upon the earth; and as for our double use of the word 'primitive', it seems to have arisen out of
the reaction which took place in the middle of the nineteenth century against the ideas inherent in the story of the Garden of Eden. The old theory of human degradation is indeed untenable; but it would be a grave mistake to proceed to the opposite extreme and to maintain that no undeveloped society was degenerate. The truth seems to be that when first we met them some simpler peoples were less developed and that others were in decline, but it will be impossible for us to distinguish the former from the latter until we have devised more exact terms of reference than those which we have hitherto employed. Moreover, whenever we use such words as 'degenerate' and 'decadent' we tend to make a moral judgment; and usually when a historian remarks that a society was 'advanced' or 'developed' he is comparing the period which he is studying with that in which he is living. In both cases there is a subjective intrusion which must be rigorously excluded from our inquiry.

For these reasons I consider that it is inadmissible to speak of any society as 'primitive', or 'more primitive', or as 'civilized', 'more civilized', or 'less civilized', for all these terms lack precise meaning. There is only one way out of the difficulty caused by their rejection. First, we must publicly deprive them of any meaning at all; then we must adopt other words to take the place they used to occupy. In most of those contexts in which it is customary to use the epithet 'primitive' I shall employ the word 'uncivilized'. When I speak of 'civilized' societies I refer only to the following sixteen historical peoples: Sumerians, Babylonians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Hellenes (3), Persians, Hindus, Chinese, Japanese, Sassanids, Arabs (Moors), Romans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons (i.e. ourselves). According to my terminology any society not included in this list was 'uncivilized'.

It is a rough, arbitrary classification. The cultural condition of some uncivilized societies was, of course, higher than that of some of the civilized peoples.

Other new technical terms that I employ will be introduced and defined as the course of the inquiry demands.

13. The Meaning of 'Higher' and 'Lower'. On the grounds that a rationalistic society has more control over its environment than a society which is in any other cultural condition, I call the rationalistic cultural condition the 'highest' cultural condition. Since all those societies which have been rationalistic were deistic in the years immediately previous to the change in their cultural condition, the deistic condition occupies the second position in the cultural scale. A number of deistic peoples also carried out some form of tendance and/or cult. The manistic cultural condition is therefore higher than the zoistic cultural condition. But it is possible for a zoistic society to become deistic without being manistic, and changes may take place from any one condition to any other condition without reference to a determined order.

So much for the definitions which we adopt in the study of uncivilized
culture. A similar service must now be performed for the sexual regulations of uncivilized men.

14. Definition of Marriage. We are so accustomed to the idea that a husband and wife must confine their sexual qualities to one another that we are apt to assume that when a man has sexual access to a woman she must therefore be his wife. This common mistake has been responsible for many quaint submissions in regard to the marriage customs of uncivilized men. Some students have tried to persuade us that what they call 'group-marriage' is not only a recognized institution in many parts of the world, but also one of the earliest forms of marriage in the history of the human race. It would be inconceivable, were it not a fact, that such a small error should lead to such extravagant conclusions. The only evidence for the existence of 'group-marriage' is the simple fact that some uncivilized societies permit other men in addition to her permanent economic partner to have sexual access to a woman. The confusion between marriage and sexual access has been so great, indeed, that such phrases as 'sexual communism' and 'sexual promiscuity' have been freely employed as synonyms for 'group-marriage'.

It is well to remember, then, that the limitation of sexual activity to married persons is a civilized phenomenon, and, so far as civilized societies are concerned, the study of their sexual opportunity is almost identical with a study of their marriage customs. The members of uncivilized societies have different views on the matter. An inquiry into the nature of their sexual regulations, therefore, must cover a wider field.

It is dangerous, and always misleading, to generalize about the customs of uncivilized men, for those customs vary between wide limits; but if a generalization be permitted in order to introduce a sense of proportion we may say that their marriage rules are an insignificant part of the evidence which we have to consider. It is the economic side of married life which is important to most savages. When a man is young, he may, and often does, form temporary liaisons with the girls who are physically attractive to him; it is even possible that he will not concern himself about their attractions if they are ready to satisfy his desires; but he will not select his wife on the same principles. Usually the industry and character of the young woman is the deciding factor. Similarly, parents who are seeking a husband for their daughter will judge a man by his qualifications as a hunter or by his wealth. It is exceedingly rare for a savage to marry a girl in order that he may taste her sexual qualities, and if we apply the terms 'husband' and 'wife' to men and women who are permitted to have sexual intercourse we make nonsense of the facts as they have been reported and can be observed. There were very few uncivilized societies who compelled a girl to confine her sexual activity to one man throughout her life; these societies, as we shall see, occupied the highest position in the uncivilized cultural scale. I do not know of a single case in which a man was compelled to limit his
sexual qualities to one woman; this custom has been in force only in some civilized societies. Those societies which have maintained the custom for the longest period have attained the highest position in the cultural scale which the human race has yet reached.

I have not been able to find a satisfactory definition of 'marriage', but submit the following:

Marriage is an economic and sexual relationship between one or more men and one or more women, based on those customs which the members of a society have seen fit to adopt in order to regulate the relations between the sexes.¹⁷

¹⁵. Comments on the Evidence. In a previous paragraph (para. 4) I have remarked that it is difficult for an observer to report the 'beliefs' of a society without a certain amount of subjective intrusion; the value of what he has written is to some extent autobiographical. The same criticism applies to descriptions of sexual conduct. Just as our observers have concentrated on beliefs rather than rites, so they have tended to describe the sexual conduct of the natives rather than their sexual regulations. Such reports have little value.

Some writers attempt to whitewash the native. According to their accounts the savage may be a savage, but at any rate he is a moral savage. I do not know what exact meaning is attached to the word 'moral', but I suspect that a moral judgement varies according to the judge and according to the tradition in which the judge was reared or against which he has reacted. Would a modern writer, for instance, give the same account of the Arreoi Society as was written by the early travellers and missionaries to Tahiti? The latter condemned the sexual conduct of that Society in no uncertain terms; yet its members behaved in a manner which some modern reformers would like all white men and women to emulate. Sometimes we read that 'chastity is held in high esteem', or that 'the girls are modest and beautiful, the majority chaste'. Such statements have a high romantic interest but lack precise meaning.¹⁸

The opposite tendency is apparent in the writings of the early travellers and missionaries. The statements of the latter concerning the licentious behaviour of the native women, true as they may be, are not always free from a desire to paint the heathen in lurid colours; and while the travellers may have had the same, and other, reasons for remarking on the receptive character of the pagan females, we must not forget that the attitude of a native towards a white man, especially on a first acquaintance, is not by any means the same as the attitude of the same native towards a member of his or her own tribe.

Some of our authorities have neglected to distinguish between pre-nuptial and post-nuptial conduct, and have caused a great deal of confusion by their vague use of the word 'chastity'. Usually when a missionary uses the word chastity he refers to post-nuptial conduct: a chaste wife is a constant wife; an unchaste woman is a woman who has left one man in
order to live with another man. In the majority of cases, when a missionary says that the native women were unchaste, he merely means that adultery and divorce were frequent. The travellers use the term in various ways. If they were well acquainted with the customs of the natives about whom they were writing (which is rare) they usually meant the same thing as the missionaries meant. If their knowledge of the people were more superficial, the fact that the women repelled the advances of the white sailors would cause them to say that the women were chaste. There is a complete absence of uniformity in the use of 'chastity' among modern writers, who, however, employ the word freely.

Sometimes the manner in which a report is written definitely conceals the actual facts. For instance, concerning the Omaha tribe of American Indians, A. C. Fletcher and F. La Flesche remark: 'Men and women were on a moral equality. Tribal custom favoured chastity, and those who practised it stood higher in public esteem than those who did not.' J. O. Dorsey makes a similar statement. The girls, he adds, were not allowed to go to a dance unless their mothers accompanied them and no woman would ride or walk with any man but her husband. It would be possible to quote these two passages and to conclude from them that the Omaha women were compelled to be continent; but nothing would be more false. Elsewhere Mr. Dorsey says: 'Sometimes when a youth sees a girl whom he loves, if she be willing, he says to her, "I will stand in that place. Please go thither at night." Then after her arrival he enjoys her and subsequently asks her in marriage. But it was different with a girl who was petulant or who had refused to listen to the suitor at first. After lying with her, he might say, "As you struck me and hurt me, I shall not marry you."' 

Thus the deduction which might have been made from the first two passages is disproved by the third. And we must not be misled into thinking that marriage in our sense of the word followed a pre-nuptial intimacy. Mr. Dorsey uses the word 'marriage' in reference to any sexual union, and in the above context the word merely denotes a temporary cohabitation.

An instance of a particularly intricate character comes from the Gilbert Islands. When a bride joined her husband she was required to be virgin intacta. As soon as the marriage had been consummated the senior female members of the groom’s family inspected the nuptial mat for the proofs of her virginity. The prevailing system of land tenure, however, prevented some girls from securing economic partners; such a girl was called nikiranroro, 'remnant of her generation'. She was sexually free. Now our reports concerning the pre-nuptial regulations of the Gilbert Islanders conflict, for some of them refer to the wives of whom virginity was demanded, and others confine their remarks to the conduct of the women who could never possess husbands. The sexual activities of the nikiranroro so impressed and repelled the early missionaries and travellers that they neglected to make detailed inquiries; thus they do not mention the demand for pre-nuptial chastity which was discovered only by a more careful and less
emotional observer. Usually the early writers refer to the *nikiranroro* as 'prostitutes'; indeed 'prostitute' has been offered as a *translation* of the word *nikiranroro*, so careless have we been in our efforts to understand the meaning of native words. We owe a great debt to the modern writer who has corrected the blunder.\(^{29}\)

Another pitfall for the unwary is the confusion between pre-nuptial pregnancy and pre-nuptial intercourse. Sometimes we are told that the latter was definitely forbidden, when the real fact was that the natives objected to the birth of a pre-nuptial child. Mr. Briffault was the first to point out that when a girl is punished for bearing a pre-nuptial child her seniors do not necessarily disapprove of her sexual activity.\(^{21}\)

These examples will illustrate the uncertain nature of some of the material, and the need for exact definitions. I will state the meaning I attach to the various terms which I employ.

16. Definition of Sexual Opportunity. By 'sexual opportunity' I mean the opportunity which is afforded to a man or a woman to gratify a sexual desire. Sometimes the sexual regulations prevent such satisfaction; the impulse must be checked or the offender will be punished. The sexual opportunity has then been limited.

The phrase can be elucidated by two examples.

Let us suppose that two societies, A and B, living side by side in the same geographical environment, regulated the relations between the sexes in a different manner. In the first case, A, every girl had to be *virgo intacta* when she was married. In the other case, B, every young girl was allowed to indulge freely in any sexual activity she desired. It is clear that the young females of A were compelled to check many an impulse which would have been readily gratified had they been members of B. Their sexual opportunity, therefore, was less than that of the B girls. A limitation was also imposed upon the A males, for the young females of B would be available not only to the young B males but also to the older B men; thus all the males of B, feeling a desire, would be able to satisfy it, but it would have had to be contained if they had been members of A. The sexual regulations of A, therefore, afforded to all its members a more limited sexual opportunity than those of B.

Secondly, let us suppose that in one society, C, a husband was in exclusive possession of the sexual qualities of his wife, and that in another society, D, each husband possessed sexual rights over the wives of a number of other men. There are many occasions, such as sickness, child-bearing, &c., when a man cannot have intercourse with his wife; under such circumstances the married males of C would be compelled to restrain a desire which would have been satisfied if they had been members of D. Similarly, men are often away at the chase or on a journey or an embassy; under such circumstances the married females of C would be compelled to check their desires in a manner which would have been quite alien to the experience of
the D females. Thus the regulations of C would afford a more limited sexual opportunity to its members than those of D.

Our task is to classify uncivilized societies according to the sexual opportunity which was afforded to their members. We shall consider the subject under three heads: (1) exogamy and prohibited degrees, (2) pre-nuptial regulations, (3) post-nuptial regulations.

17. Exogamy and Prohibited Degrees. So far as we can tell, complete sexual opportunity has been denied to every man and to every woman. In every human society known to us there are always some women to whom a man cannot have access and some men who are denied to every woman. Some societies are reported to have employed a system of plain exogamy, i.e. compulsory marriage and sexual intercourse outside the social group. Others have preferred a system of prohibited degrees. In many cases there was a combination of exogamous groups and prohibited degrees.

There is a lack of uniformity, however, in the use of the word 'exogamy' and the so-called classificatory system of relationship introduces some complications into the interpretation of the words 'prohibited degrees'. These difficulties preclude a satisfactory analysis of the available evidence. For instance, the word 'exogamy' as originally employed by McLennan denoted compulsory marriage outside the social group, all other unions being permissible; but in recent literature we read of a man being a member of two exogamous groups. This is either a careless statement or a new use of the word 'exogamy'. I am not satisfied that the confusion between sexual intercourse and marriage to which I have already referred has not been the cause of some false deductions in regard to exogamic regulations, but I do not propose to discuss the subject. In assessing the sexual opportunity of the eighty tribes with which we are concerned I shall take no notice of the limitations which were imposed by these prohibitions. In one form or another they were common to all of them. When, therefore, I say that the members of any particular society were pre-nuptially sexually free, I shall mean that their pre-nuptial sexual opportunity was limited only by their exogamic regulations and/or their prohibited degrees. The existence of these ordinances is assumed throughout.

18. Definition of Pre-nuptial Chastity. If we are to decide whether or not a society insisted on pre-nuptial continence, we must have concrete evidence of the fact. Otherwise we shall be at the mercy of unreliable and incomplete evidence. Fortunately the savage is of the same opinion. When he insists that his bride shall be virgo intacta, he demands, or rather his womenfolk demand, that the tokens of her virginity shall be visible on the nuptial mat. I accept the same criterion. The test of pre-nuptial chastity, so far as this treatise is concerned, is a demand for those signs. The demand for the tokens of virginity is the only admissible evidence that a society insisted on pre-nuptial chastity.
§ 19. Irregular or Occasional Continence. The pre-nuptial regulations of some societies, however, cannot be accurately included in these two categories. Sometimes we find that although the females were pre-nuptially free, those who had been betrothed were compelled to confine their sexual qualities to their future husbands. It is clear that in such a case the sexual opportunity of a betrothed girl was limited, and that the other males were compelled to check an impulse to possess her. If the regulation had not existed, both parties would have been able to satisfy a desire which under those circumstances had to be contained. They were constrained, therefore, to practise what may be called an irregular or occasional continence.

Another complication concerns pre-nuptial pregnancy. There were, as I have said, many societies which, while permitting pre-nuptial intercourse, forbade or punished pre-nuptial pregnancy. In some cases a woman used an abortifacient or her child was killed as soon as it was born; nothing more was said or done. In other cases more serious notice was taken, the man responsible for the condition of the pre-nuptially pregnant girl being compelled to atone for his action in a manner which was considered suitable to the occasion. Some societies compelled him to marry the girl, that is, to pay the amount of her bride-price; other societies were content to inflict a fine, usually payable in cattle or live stock. (The amount of the fine might or might not be subtracted from the bride-price if he eventually married the girl.) Sometimes the man’s responsibility was limited to the care of the girl during the period of her pregnancy and to making some provision for the rearing of the child. Again, he might be brought before the elders who would prescribe an appropriate punishment.

My suggestion is that if the male members of any society were subject to such laws they would check an occasional impulse which would have been indulged if they had been members of a society which did not saddle a man with his responsibility for a pre-nuptial child. They would hesitate sometimes, I think, before risking the loss of the cattle which they loved so much. That is to say, such regulations would impose an irregular or occasional continence.

If, then, the sexual qualities of a betrothed girl were reserved exclusively for her future husband, or a man was fined or otherwise punished for pre-nuptial fatherhood, I shall enter a minus-star sign in the column marked ‘Pre-nuptial Chastity’. A minus-star sign denotes that pre-nuptial sexual
intercourse was permitted, but other regulations existed imposing an irregular or occasional continence.

I must beg that the meaning of these signs—plus, minus-star, minus—be remembered. They are of paramount importance. The evidence is that the pre-nuptial sexual opportunity is the chief factor in deciding the cultural condition of a society.

Now for the post-nuptial regulations. They are a little complicated.

20. Sexual Rights of a Clan-brother. I have already mentioned that the sexual qualities of a wife or husband might be shared with other men and women. There was an extreme variety in the choice and rights of such individuals. Usually all the different customs have been classed together as if they were identical; in actual fact each case seems to have had its own peculiar characteristics. In some instances all the members of a clan had a mutual interest in their wives; in other cases the privilege might be extended only to the members of the same age-set. On the other hand, sexual access might not be the indisputable right of any man, but a privilege voluntarily extended to certain favoured individuals. The Banyankole of Uganda (para. 36), the Masai of Kenya Colony (para. 88), and the Chukchee of north-eastern Siberia (para. 55) are respective and appropriate instances of societies which had adopted such customs. Many more could be cited.23

These arrangements, as we have seen (para. 15), would increase the post-nuptial sexual opportunity both of the males and of the females; thus, their existence is the first point which arises when we begin to consider the question. If no such custom existed, then the sexual opportunity of the females depended in some measure on the punishment of adultery and on the facilities for divorce. That of the males will be discussed in the next paragraph.

The question of adultery is difficult. The reports concerning its punishment among uncivilized peoples do not always represent the universally recognized statutes of an organized society. In most uncivilized societies there was, in fact, no regular punishment; each case seems to have been decided on its merits. Indeed, in many cases the matter seems to have been left to the individual husband. And it is doubtful if any particular society can be said to have regulated the matter in any particular manner. Customs varied between such wide limits that we cannot generalize. Economic considerations also complicate the subject: for instance, in some tribes an old man who possessed several young wives would not object to the young men having intercourse with them so long as the young women remained in his house and continued to work for him.24

Sometimes, however, we find a case in which a woman, who had been married as a virgin, was compelled to confine her qualities to her husband throughout her life, he on his part being allowed to have access to other women beside herself, whether or no they were his permanent economic partners. Under such circumstances the sexual opportunity of the female
was considerably reduced. In fact it was the same as that afforded to a woman who was a member of an absolutely monogamous society. When, therefore, we begin to assess a post-nuptial sexual opportunity the existence of such regulations is the second point which must be considered.

But the matter is not so simple as it may appear. In the first place, there is no doubt that the sexual regulations of some uncivilized societies had changed just before we knew them. Indeed, in the period to which our information applies, they were sometimes in a state of flux. Just as the Roman woman enjoyed a greater sexual liberty under the *ius gentium* than under the *ius civile*, and the Athenian woman of the fourth century B.C. was subjected to less rigorous customs than her great-grandmother who had lived in the fifth century, so also after the reign of Mutesa the Muganda wife seems to have ceased to tolerate the old restrictions (para. 166). Again, in the ancient Sumerian records we can trace a relaxation of the ancient regulations in regard to adultery, and it is also clear that by the end of Hammurabi’s reign the Babylonians in their turn had modified their opinion of the offence; in a similar manner, so far as we can judge from the available evidence, the inhabitants of the Friendly Islands (para. 47) had changed their outlook and, by the end of the eighteenth century, had ceased to administer their ancient punishments. If an observer had visited Rome in the first century B.C., he would have found that some families retained the old customs in their full rigour and that other, and more ‘modern’, families had adopted the new ideas. I suspect that this was the case also in Uganda and Tonga. We cannot say definitely that it was so, but there is sufficient evidence to necessitate a suspension of judgement.

Secondly, a considerable amount of our information applies to those societies which for some time had been subjected to Christian influences of one kind or another. Sexual regulations are affected very closely by those influences, and usually, ironical as it may appear, the regulations are thereby loosened. If, in pagan times, adultery on the part of the women has been effectively prevented by the infliction of a stern punishment, such as death, a more tolerant attitude is introduced when Christian influence becomes paramount. Then infidelity, instead of being prevented, is merely forbidden by ethical precept, and becomes more common. Sir Basil Thomson has emphasized this point in reference to the Fijians (para. 29). Other examples could be cited.

Thus the available evidence is extremely uncertain, and I doubt if great reliance can be placed upon it. Indeed, after perusing a great quantity of the appropriate literature and studying the subject in all its aspects, I feel that we have still a great deal to learn about the attitude of the savage towards adultery. Considerable evidence is available which would help us to assess the post-nuptial sexual opportunity of the females, but it requires very careful handling.

21. *Sexual Rights over a Wife’s Sisters.* Sometimes we find, especially
among the American Indians, that a man was granted sexual access to the younger sisters of his wife either at once or as they matured. There are also cases in which a bride was accompanied by her younger sisters when she joined her husband. So if we are to assess the post-nuptial opportunity which was afforded to the males of any uncivilized society, it would appear that we ought to inquire whether or not these rights were extended to them.

Sororal polygamy and the sororate have been discussed at considerable length in comparative literature, particularly by Mr. Briffault and Sir James Frazer respectively. Both these investigators suspect that a connexion existed between those institutions and 'group-marriage'. For our purpose, however, they are unimportant. In the first place, I do not put a high value on the evidence. It seems possible that we may have been misled by our translations of the classificatory terms of relationship. Secondly, I am not persuaded that our evolutionary theories have not promoted the customs to a position which is out of proportion to their native significance; and, as I have said, the hypothesis of 'group-marriage' is founded upon a careless confusion between sexual access and marriage. Thirdly, I doubt if any man in any society were permitted to receive more than one daughter unless the girls' parents were satisfied that he could support them; and it is probable that in any case such a man would have been a polygamist, whether or no sororal polygamy was the social rule. Since, so far as post-nuptial sexual opportunity is concerned, the important point is whether or not a man were compelled to confine his sexual qualities to one woman, it does not matter whether his wives were sisters, own or classificatory, or whether they were not. I have thought it well, however, to mention the customs, for no study of uncivilized sexual regulations would be complete unless they were discussed.

Speaking generally, it is safe to say that a member of a savage society could possess as many wives as he chose and could secure, whether they were sisters or not. In fact, a man's wealth was often estimated by the number of his wives. Moreover, the produce of their labour increased his wealth. In a few cases, such as among some of the tribes which lived in Assam, the possession of more than one wife was not the rule; but among these tribes divorce seems to have been so easy and frequent that no man can be said to have been subject to any post-nuptial sexual limitation.

Thus it is impossible to compare the difference in post-nuptial sexual opportunity which was afforded to the males of different uncivilized societies, for there are no data on which a comparison can be based. We can compare it only with that which was afforded to the males of some of the civilized societies.

If, then, the sexual qualities of the married men and women of any society were not shared by other persons, the remaining evidence in regard to post-nuptial opportunity applies only to the women. We have already discussed the sexual opportunity of the wives; now we must consider that
of the widow. Then we shall have examined the sexual regulations which control a woman's sexual activities throughout her life.

22. The Fate of the Widow. The question of a widow's fate among uncivilized peoples has been much confused by the point of view from which we have studied the question. Instead of asking, 'What is the fate of the widow?', we have said, 'Does the levirate exist?' Thus the extreme variety of the customs has been obscured.

They can be arranged in four classes. First, the widow might automatically become the wife of her deceased husband's heir, brother, nephew, or son. (But no man inherited his own mother.) Secondly, it might be the duty or the right of the younger or of the elder brother to take care of her; the man then possessed the product of her labour. Thirdly, she might be free to return to her own people if she or they refunded the bride-price which had been paid for her. This custom, which is very widespread, seems to confute the suggestion that the levirate is a relic of 'group-marriage' and to indicate that economic considerations were uppermost in the native mind. Fourthly, she might be free either to remain single or to remarry, as she preferred.

Now if a widow had no choice concerning her fate, her sexual opportunity would be less than it would have been if she had been free as soon as her husband was dead. Moreover, her absolute freedom would increase the opportunity of the married and the unmarried males, for she who might have been forbidden to them would be accessible.

For the purpose of this inquiry, therefore, the only information we require is an affirmative or a negative answer to the question of her free choice.

23. The Completed Frame of Reference. Let us summarize the position. The sexual opportunity of uncivilized men and women can be assessed by the answers which are received to eight questions:

1. Was there a demand for the tokens of virginity when a girl was married?
2. Was a betrothed girl compelled to confine her sexual qualities to her future husband?
3. Was pre-nuptial fatherhood punished?
4. Were the boys and girls sexually free (outside the exogamic regulations and/or the prohibited degrees)?
5. Did other men share the sexual qualities of a man's wife?
6. Was a wife compelled to confine her sexual qualities to one man through her life?
7. Was a husband granted access to his wife's sisters?
8. Was a widow sexually free?

Having collected the evidence under these eight headings, and tabulated the results, we should be able to see at a glance the nature of the sexual
opportunity of any society. Five columns could be added to our Frame of Reference, thus:

THE FRAME OF REFERENCE
(UNCIVILIZED PEOPLES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Cultural condition</th>
<th>Treatment of affection</th>
<th>Method of weather control</th>
<th>Treatment of ghosts</th>
<th>Sexual regulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural condition</td>
<td>Magic</td>
<td>Transference and/or exorcism</td>
<td>Priest</td>
<td>Magician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this chart a plus sign or a minus sign could be entered in Cols. 12 and 13 according as a man was, or was not, in exclusive possession of his wife, and was, or was not, granted access to his wife’s sisters. A minus sign or a plus sign in Cols. 14 and 15 would indicate a wife’s or a widow’s freedom or lack of freedom. But, as I have said, the pre-nuptial sexual opportunity seems to be connected more closely with the cultural condition of a society than the post-nuptial opportunity; the post-nuptial regulations are apparently unimportant unless the members of a society insist that a bride should be a virgin when she joined her husband. I propose, therefore, to omit Cols. 12–15 until the information to which they refer becomes necessary to the progress of the inquiry. Thus the Frame of Reference we shall use consists of eleven columns only.

24. The Method. If the reader will refer to Appendix I, he will find that I have completed the Chart of Evidence. The chart reveals the cultural condition and the pre-nuptial sexual opportunity of the eighty uncivilized societies with which we are concerned, the entries being made in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and definitions. A study of the chart reveals the following facts:

A plus in Col. 11 coincides with a plus in Col. 10 and a D in Col. 1.
§24  THE FRAME OF REFERENCE

A minus-star in Col. 11 coincides with a plus (or minus-plus) in Col. 8 and an M in Col. 1.

A minus in Col. 11 coincides with a Z in Col. 1.

That is to say, among these eighty societies the three great patterns of uncivilized culture invariably accompanied the three patterns of pre-nuptial sexual opportunity. Thus:

1. If a society permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom, it was in the zoistic cultural condition. Conversely, all the zoistic societies permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom.

2. If a society adopted such regulations as imposed an irregular or occasional continence, it was in the manistic cultural condition. Conversely, all the manistic societies had adopted such regulations as imposed an irregular or occasional continence.

3. If a society insisted on pre-nuptial chastity (in my sense of the term), it was in the deistic cultural condition. Conversely, some of the members of all the deistic societies demanded the tokens of virginity as proof that a girl was *virgo intacta* when she was married.

My submission is that on such evidence a social scientist is compelled to induce that there is a close relation between sexual opportunity and cultural condition among uncivilized peoples.

The eighty societies were chosen by me out of the vast number which have been mentioned in comparative literature. The only criterion present in my mind was the existence of adequate and reliable information. I have no doubt that other names could be added to the list; and so long as the evidence is satisfactory both in quality and quantity additional data are welcome. At the same time, I must confess that I have experienced great difficulty in finding even eighty societies concerning which our knowledge seems adequate and trustworthy. Indeed I am not sure that I have not been too generous in my judgements; I am far from satisfied with the quality of some of the evidence. I have thought it well, however, to make the survey as wide as my knowledge permitted.

I am confident that any further researches will confirm the original result. The relationship between the two phenomena is, I believe, so close that if we know the sexual regulations of a society we can prophesy the general pattern of its cultural behaviour. Conversely, if the general pattern of the behaviour is communicated to us, we can prophesy the general character of the sexual regulations. Indeed the conclusions of this book can be tested in a practical manner. If the sexual regulations of some uncivilized societies with which I am unfamiliar are related in the form of authoritative replies to the eight questions tabulated in para. 23, I am ready to prophesy the general pattern of their culture, and to abide by the result.

By producing the completed Chart of Evidence at this early stage, I hope to have shown that the study of human affairs can be based on the same principles as any other science, and that the form of reasoning employed
in the more exact sciences can be employed also in the study of human affairs. Having shown that an induction is possible, and having bound myself by its results, I proceed to describe the customs and culture of each society, stating in words the evidence which in the chart is represented by symbols. First, however, I wish to make sure that the method which I adopt is clearly understood.

Although we can apply inductive methods to the study of human affairs the nature of the material imposes certain limitations upon us. When a chemist discovers that the admixture of two chemical elements produces a certain result he can test the accuracy of his conclusion by conducting an experiment. Moreover, other chemists can conduct the same and other experiments. And the success or failure of these experiments is the final argument in the acceptance or rejection of the original conclusion. Now in the study of human affairs no experiments are possible. We cannot test the validity of our induction by creating a number of human societies and then extending to them a varied pre-nuptial sexual opportunity so that we may observe the cultural results. If we could do so, we should not need to debate the matter any further, for the results of these experiments would be the final argument for the acceptance or rejection of the inductive conclusion. Since, however, such methods are out of the question, we must find some reasonable explanation for the observed coincidences; and for the experiments which a chemist would conduct under similar circumstances we must substitute an interpretation of the facts. After the facts have been recited, therefore, I shall make some suggestions which will explain why, for example, the association of pre-nuptial chastity and the worship of gods in temples is not only rational but also apparently inevitable. At the same time I distinguish between the facts and the interpretation of the facts, for it is only in this manner that other students of human affairs will be free to consider the evidence from an inductive point of view.

I propose to devote a separate paragraph, or two separate paragraphs, to the consideration of each society, and shall describe its customs and culture as simply and as economically as I can, banishing to the notes all comments on and elucidations of the available evidence. First, I shall compare the customs and culture of societies which lived in the same geographical environment and which were of the same racial extraction; and in the course of my exposition I shall adduce more evidence (if that be needed) in support of my claim that classifications based on beliefs alone are untrustworthy and that human societies can be classified only according to their rites. After a short excursion, during which some more definitions will be formulated, I shall proceed to a general survey, arranged geographically. When this survey has been completed the whole of the anthropological evidence will have been recited, and the entries in the chart will have been justified.

The fourth chapter will be devoted to an analysis and assessment of this evidence. Then, in order to make sure that my interpretation of the facts
is a likely one, I shall quote the opinions of competent psychologists in regard to the psychological effect of a reduction of sexual opportunity. We shall see that their conclusions, based not on cultural but on psychological data, support the suggestions I shall have made. In the fifth chapter I shall state the whole conclusion in general terms, including within the survey the customs and culture of the most developed historical societies.
CHAPTER II
SELECTED EVIDENCE

25. *The Plan of the Chapter.* First, I will describe the sexual opportunity and cultural condition of a few selected societies from these geographical areas: Melanesia, Africa, North America, Polynesia, Assam, and Siberia. I will take them in that order.

The Melanesian societies are those of the Loyalty Islanders, Tannese (New Hebrides), New Britons (Bismarck Archipelago), South-east Solomon Islanders (Ulawa and Sa'a), and Fijians.

A. SELECTED EVIDENCE FROM MELANESIA

26. *Pre-nuptial Regulations of the Loyalty Islanders and Tannese.* In the Loyalty Islands pre-nuptial children were regarded as evil portents. If a girl became pregnant before marriage she employed some method of abortion. No social condemnation, however, was incurred either by the father or by the mother of the child, and promiscuous intercourse before marriage was permitted. It was the same with the Tannese. 'Promiscuous intercourse between the sexes is allowed,' says Cheyne. According to Mr. Humphreys, 'sexual laxity before marriage was not frowned upon'. He adds that both infanticide and abortion were common, so it is possible that in Tanna also pre-nuptial children were condemned.

27. *Pre-nuptial Regulations of the New Britons.* In New Britain we find a slight but important difference, a limitation being placed on the conduct of a betrothed girl which would compel an occasional continence both on her part and on that of all the available males. Natural children were killed, and there was no special condemnation, we are told, 'of any occasional act of unchastity'; but after betrothal 'any interference with the betrothed female was strongly reprobated'. As we shall see, those societies which insisted on the display of the tokens of virginity were not usually in the habit of making inquiries into the past conduct of any woman who had not been betrothed; so the limitation which the New Britons placed upon the conduct of a betrothed girl may be regarded not unfairly as being the first step towards a demand for pre-nuptial chastity. It is worth while, therefore, to describe in some detail the customs which prevailed.

There were several different methods of arranging a betrothal; customs varied even in adjacent districts. As there seems to have been constant hostility between the various social groups, we could hardly expect them to be uniform in their habits. Moreover, the reports cover a very wide area. Dr. Brown employs the title *New Britain* as an inclusive name to denote the whole of the Bismarck Archipelago: 'There is little difference',
he says, 'between the manners and customs of the people living in the large islands of New Britain and New Ireland, and for all practical purposes the inclusive name of New Britain will be sufficient.\(^{34}\)

According to Romilly, the parents arranged the marriage, and the boy paid for the girl by sending to her parents the produce of his labour; but the girl's consent seems to have been essential, for even after the lad had fulfilled his obligations she could refuse to go away with him.\(^{35}\) Such refusals are said to have been common;\(^{36}\) but in such cases the girl's parents seem to have resorted to some method of compulsion. Usually they could devise some means of encroaching upon her liberty of choice.

The betrothal of children by their parents was the usual method of arranging a marriage,\(^{32}\) but Dr. Brown reports a custom whereby the lad approached a girl direct. If she consented, 'he forbids her to any one else, and she is called his webat'.\(^{38}\)

It is difficult to imagine a more explicit case of the reduction of sexual opportunity. The limitation was not great, and chastity was neither regarded nor demanded; but the sexual activities of a webat were hampered in a manner which was never experienced by a Tannese maiden, or by a girl in the Loyalty Islands. The regulations imposed a curb upon the instincts, a webat being compelled to check any impulse which she might feel towards any other man than her betrothed. In a similar way the male members of the society were obstructed in a manner which a Tanna man would not have understood.

28. Pre-nuptial Regulations of the South-east Solomon Islanders (Ulawa and Sa'a). The South-east Solomon Islands is the only part of that group of islands concerning which our information is adequate and reliable. In that area betrothed girls were still more carefully guarded. Dr. Codrington remarks: 'They consider themselves much stricter at Sa'a';\(^{39}\) and, according to Dr. Ivens, a betrothed girl, 'if convicted of unchastity, might be strangled'.\(^{40}\)

A betrothed girl was forbidden to indulge in any sexual activity prior to her marriage, and only the rigidity of our definition prevents us from concluding that pre-nuptial chastity was demanded of her. Whereas in the Loyalty Islands a girl could have intercourse with any man outside the prohibited degrees and indulge her instincts as and when she was inclined, and whereas in New Britain a betrothed girl was compelled to confine her sexual qualities to her betrothed, the maidens of Ulawa and Sa'a were forbidden even to their future husbands. Indeed, it is probable that a betrothed couple had never met.

Arrangements were made on a lad's behalf when he was about 12–14 years old. The bargain, according to Mr. Hopkins, had a completely social character; there was no question of the girl's consent or of the lad contributing towards the bride-price by the product of his labour. On a later occasion the group which received payment for a girl would obtain a
wife from the group which paid for her; and this reciprocity was an important social factor: ‘Accounts of unfailing accuracy were kept in the heads of the groups concerned.’ A girl from a distance was preferred, and a part of the bride-price was paid as soon as the preliminary negotiations had been completed. In these the young man had no part: ‘I don’t know’, a young man confessed, ‘which of the girls they will buy. . . . They will settle it.’ Thenceforth the girl was adi, taboo. She paid sundry visits to the mother of the lad, who took careful notice of her disposition. If she turned out to be sulky or lazy, the marriage did not take place; but if no fault was found with her, the contract was sealed by the display of the whole of the bride-price, hune ha’a. Thenceforward the girl was hu’e, a married woman. Miss Coombe says that neither the bride nor the bridegroom was present at the final scene.41

Thus the South-east Solomon Islanders were as strict as they could be without insisting on a display of physical proof. For an example of the latter in Melanesia we must turn to the Fijians.

29. Pre-nuptial Regulations of the Fijians. A Fijian girl wore two plaits of hair, tombe, which hung down behind her ears. They were the signs of her virginity, and were cut off on her wedding day. This ceremony was an important part of the celebrations, and had a special name, veitasi.42 The girl was carefully examined in the privacy of the house by the women of the bridegroom’s family. Should it appear that she had no right to wear the plaits, her family was put to shame at the marriage feast: ‘By a slash of the knife the carcasses of the pigs were so mutilated as to intimate in the grossest imagery that the bride had had a history.’43

The importance which the natives attached to pre-nuptial continence is emphasized by Sir Basil Thomson who describes how the old native laws broke down under the influence of Christianity. ‘There is a mass of evidence’, he says, ‘that in heathen times the majority of the girls were virgin until they married.’ In later years the tombe were worn by many unmarried girls who had no right to them.44

We are not told specifically that virginity was not demanded except when a girl had been betrothed; indeed, marriage among the Fijians does not seem to have been a matter of mere transfer of wealth in compensation for the loss of the woman. Nor are we told whether or not, in the event of a girl’s failure to pass the test, the bridegroom’s people had the right to cancel the match. Apparently not; but a girl who was not virgo intacta on her wedding-day might be killed.45

Under such circumstances a pre-nuptial child was, of course, a deep disgrace.46 Irregular unions, contracted without the proper ceremonies, were despised. Fison says that the offspring of an eloping couple was not regarded as a full member of society. A base-born boy was rebuked if he asserted himself over-much. ‘Let not your voice be heard,’ they used to say to him. ‘As for your mother we know nothing of her. We
did not eat at her marriage feast, nor did we make presents to her kinsfolk for her.' Similar sentiments have not been uncommon among some civilized societies.

Such were the pre-nuptial regulations of these five Melanesian societies. They represent a kind of ascending scale towards pre-nuptial chastity. Diagrammatically, the customs can be represented thus:

| Loyalty Islanders       | —               |
| Tannese                | —               |
| New Britons            | —               |
| South-east Solomon Islanders (Ulawa and Sa’a) | * |
| Fijians                | +               |

It is not possible to show, by means of these symbols, the relative severity of the customs which had been adopted by the inhabitants of Ulawa and Sa’a. Only the general pattern of their pre-nuptial regulations can be indicated: Irregular and Occasional Continence.

The cultural condition of these societies varied from zoistic to deistic.

30. Cultural Condition of the Loyalty Islanders. The Loyalty Islanders had no temples, and no post-funeral attention was paid by them to any dead man. ‘The spirits of the departed’, Mrs. Hadfield remarks, ‘were not supposed to exhibit any malicious propensities towards mortals.’ The Loyalty Islanders were therefore in the zoistic cultural condition.

The power in the universe was haze. The word haze seems to have been used in those contexts in which we should use a substantive, adjective, or adverb. This is clear from the following sentence: ‘A haze was any object which had been made haze, nyi haze, or endowed with supernatural power, by the ite tene haze’, that is, by a person who was or possessed haze. Usually such a person was an aged individual who received material rewards from the people for exercising his or her magic power. By virtue of his haze, a tene haze could inflict disease or kill at a distance; he could neutralize the effect of his own destructive charms; he could also cure any sickness; and if he did not consider that he had been adequately paid for his services, he could and would cause a relapse. In all cases the efficacy of his ministrations depended solely on the haze that he possessed. So great, indeed, was the respect paid to a tene haze, and so completely was haze the exclusive concern of these islanders, that when a man who had possessed haze died, every one was anxious to secure some part of his person in order to possess some of the magic power which was inherent in every part of it. Would-be wizards contended for the eyes, the toe-nails, and the bones.

The only method which was adopted to cure a stubborn disease was the unassisted ‘magic’ of the tene haze; the Loyalty Islanders did not distinguish between a wizard, a medicine-man, and a diviner. Indeed, it is doubtful if they would have understood wherein the difference lay, for a tene haze
could act, by virtue of his haze, in any of those capacities. In a similar way 'the sun, the wind, and the rain were all more or less under the control of certain sorcerers who were easily prevailed upon, by gifts of food, to use their power and skill'.\textsuperscript{52} Faith in the power of these magicians was so implicit that in answer to the question 'Who made the flowers?', the natives replied, 'Our old men.'\textsuperscript{53}

31. Cultural Condition of the Tannese. Similar customs prevailed among the Tannese. They had no temples, nor did they consider it necessary to propitiate the dead.

The power in the universe was uhngen (uhgen), which Messrs. Gray and Ray compare with the haze of the Loyalty Islanders.\textsuperscript{54} Among the latter people a magician was called tene haze, but we are not told the term which was used by the Tannese. A wizard was yolmuruk (muruk = 'witchcraft').\textsuperscript{55} but this seems to have been a descriptive rather than a distinctive term, and to have been applied to a magician who was actually engaged in anti-social practices. The sense of all the reports demands the assumption that no distinction was made between a wizard, a medicine-man, and a diviner.\textsuperscript{56} Yolmuruk was not the term which was used to differentiate between a magician and an ordinary man.

The source of magic power was the possession of a magic stone. A Loyalty Islander would have called such a stone haze; and although this is not stated specifically, it is probable that a Tanna man would have called it uhngen. Just as a Loyalty Islander credited the magicians with having manufactured the flowers, so a Tanna man considered that the man who possessed a magic stone could multiply the fruits of the earth. Gray remarks: 'Ask who makes the bread-fruit, fish, yams, &c., and the answer would be "So-and-so". "How does he do it?" "Uhngen!"'\textsuperscript{57} The inference is that the stones were magically powerful because they were uhngen. Every department of nature was subject to the control of a special stone, and therefore of a special man: thus one could make yams grow, another could produce rain, a third could make the sun shine, and so on.\textsuperscript{58} 'If a rain-charm does not succeed,' says Mrs. Watt, 'it is because some one is making doses of sunshine.'\textsuperscript{59}

32. Cultural Condition of the New Britons. Things were slightly different in New Britain. There were no temples, but the people paid some kind of post-funeral attention to their dead. Apparently the practices were somewhat irregular, and the information is only vaguely stated by our authorities; but it would not be out of harmony with the facts to describe the customs as an incipient tendance.

The natives considered, at least in some areas, that they could control a ghost by magic. Thus if they thought that the ghost of a man had remained in, or was revisiting, the place where he had lived during his lifetime (opinions seem to have differed concerning the length of the period
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during which such visits could continue), it could be speedily routed by beating the bushes and making other noises. Sometimes, however, or in other places, a slight placation was necessary. If, for instance, a man had been killed by a member of a neighbouring group, his house was kept intact and food was placed for his ghost; the murderer was caught, killed, and cooked. (If the guilty individual could not be found, any member of his social group would serve equally well.) The people then ate some of the flesh; the ghost also partook. Honour having been satisfied, they beat the bushes, shouted, and made other noises in order to frighten the ghost away.

Moreover, ‘sacrifices’ were made to the dead. Invariably the recipient was a deceased member of the family, and the native name of the offerings, wairok tebaran, reveals the nature of the practices. The phrase meant ‘to cause the ghost to go or leap away’. That is pure tendance; but the attention seems to have been neither usual nor regular (it may have been both usual and regular in some areas), and it is doubtful if in all cases it was continued after the funeral feast. Perhaps the rites, like the reports, were vague and uncertain.

Epidemics could be averted by the utterance of spells, and the native term for a wizard, tene agagara, is translated ‘professor of magic’. This does not necessarily mean that he acted also as medicine-man, but the magical profession does not appear to have been subdivided. I have been unable to discover whether or not the tene agagara practised the spasmodic exorcism which is said to have existed.

The magicians were in full control of the forces of nature. When they failed to produce the desired result, however, they did not maintain that some other magicians were working against them. If a man tried to stop the rain and failed, he announced that the particular rain against which he was striving did not belong to any one, pi tara dat mai, ‘it was made with us’.

This acceptance of natural events without further inquiry, and the implied differentiation between the rain which was made by the rain-maker and the rain which was in the world when the New Briton arrived, militate strongly against the Tylorian theory of primitive thought.

There is a great difference between the ideas of these men and those of the Loyalty Islanders and Tannese. The information is not as clear as we should like. This is partly due to the fact that Dr. Brown, our best authority, after translating tebaran both as ‘spirit’ and as ‘ghost’, has attached a final s to the word, thus forming a kind of anglicized plural, tebarans. There does not appear to be any plural form of the word in the New Britain language, and the anglicization of the word may have led to some confusion in the description of the native culture. Moreover, many of the author’s inferences have been recorded as facts. But two things are plain: the men of New Britain practised (1) a kind of incipient tendance, (2) a form of exorcism in their treatment of affliction. It is in these two rites that their behaviour differed from that of the other two societies which we have
described. The ceremonies which were carried out by the men of Ulawa and Sa’a reveal a still greater variety.

33. Cultural Condition of South-east Solomon Islanders (Ulawa and Sa’a). There were no temples in the South-east Solomon Islands, but the inhabitants practised both tendance and cult. Compared with the New Britons, indeed, their rites were complicated, and they decorated their sacred places by erecting altars and walls.

Dr. R. H. Codrington’s masterly survey of Melanesian culture applies to the Banks Islands, three of the New Hebrides, and the Solomon Islands. Speaking generally of the whole region, with special reference to their conception of ‘magic power’, the term for which in the Banks Islands was mana, Dr. Codrington observes: ‘It is the belief in this power, and in the efficacy of the various means by which spirits and ghosts can be induced to exercise it for the benefit of men that is the foundation of the rites and practices which can be called religious.’ After reading this passage, if we were not careful, we should assume (1) that the word mana was used on all the islands concerning which Dr. Codrington wrote, (2) that the methods which were adopted to secure the power were the same throughout that area. Both assumptions would be false.

In Ulawa mana occurred in metathetic form, nanama, ‘to be powerful’, nanamanga, ‘power’, ‘force’. At Sa’a the word was saka, ‘hot’, ‘pungent’, the contrary being waa, ‘cold’, ‘spiritually weak’. It was to the saka ghosts that there was paid the attention which must be included, I think, as ‘cult’.

Dr. Codrington noticed the difference between the various rites which were carried out on the different islands, and was surprised by it. ‘There is a very remarkable difference’, he says, ‘between the native of the New Hebrides and the Banks Islands to the east, and the natives of the Solomon Islands to the west; the direction of the religious ideas and practices of the former is towards spirits rather than ghosts, the latter pay very little attention to spirits and address themselves wholly to ghosts.’

As I am unable, for reasons which I have already stated, to accept ‘spirits’ as an accurate or convenient translation of a native term, this passage means no more than that some of the societies were in a different cultural condition from others. It is extraordinary that Dr. Codrington should have considered such differences ‘very remarkable’. The fact reveals the powerful preconceptions with which the study of uncivilized peoples has been approached. And although he not only observed but also emphasized the differences between the Banks Islanders and the Solomon Islanders, Dr. Codrington seems to have assumed that all the Solomon Islanders were in the same cultural condition. At any rate, this seems to be the only possible explanation of a slight but important disagreement in the meanings and use of the words which have been translated ‘ghost’.

The inhabitants of the other islands in the Solomon group denoted the
soul of a living man and the soul of a dead man (i.e. ghost) by two different words. Thus in Florida the tarunga of a living man became a tindalo at death; in San Cristoval the aunga was changed into an ataro. But 'it must not be supposed', Dr. Codrington remarks, 'that every ghost becomes an object of worship. The ghost who is to be worshipped is the spirit of a man who in his lifetime had mana in him; the souls of common men are the common herd of ghosts, nobody alike before and after death.'

The Sa'a term for a powerful ghost was li'oa, which Dr. Codrington compares with the tindalo of Florida and the ataro of San Cristoval. In another passage, however, he equates another word, akalo, with those terms, and the contradictory nature of his report is allowed to remain unnoticed. Either, then, Dr. Codrington has blundered, or the men of Ulawa and Sa'a used two words in those contexts where the inhabitants of the other islands employed only one. The latter alternative seems to be the correct one; and we may conclude that Dr. Codrington was prevented from noticing the fact because obviously he expected that the ideas of all the people would be the same. Akalo was the term which was applied to those deceased members of the komu (kindred) who were deemed worthy of attention; li'oa denoted a specially powerful ghost. That is to say, whereas on the other islands all the ghosts to whom attention was paid were equally ranked by the survivors, the men of Ulawa and Sa'a divided the inhabitants of the nether world into two separate classes. The character of the rites which were paid to them varied according to the status of the ghost in whose honour, and to appease whose anger, they were performed. The attention paid to an akalo seems to have been tendance; often the rites in honour of a li'oa too were tendance, but sometimes they seem to have been cult. The former seem to have been confined to the members of the kindred; the latter, when partaking of the nature of 'cult', were in honour of a distinguished dead citizen who had been eminent in some department of human activity, and whose assistance was desired on behalf of living men who were not related to him either by blood or by marriage. We shall find that these coincidences hold good for every case of 'ancestor-worship' which comes within our survey. Cult was always hero-cult.

When a man died the first task seems to have been to decide whether any relic of him, a lock of hair, a nail, or a tooth, should be preserved. 'The name given to all relics of deceased persons chosen for preservation was mangite.' If a relic were preserved, it was placed either in a special relic-case inside the house, in a separate relic-house which was reserved for the purpose, or in some other place. The latter seems to have been the custom when a li'oa was concerned; the relics of ordinary household ghosts were placed in the relic-case in the corner of the room. Thus the method of disposing of the relics seems to have corresponded to the manner in which the original owners were regarded.

Near the relic-cases in the houses offerings were placed on various
occasions, such as in times of sickness.\textsuperscript{76} Sometimes first fruits also were offered there.\textsuperscript{77} One kind of sacrifice was called \textit{toto akalo}, the words referring to the removal of the ghostly anger, ‘to a ghost who is appeased by the sacrifice’; for an \textit{akalo} would make a man ill if he neglected his duty towards it, or ate something which belonged to it. In all these cases the attention was a form of tendance.\textsuperscript{78}

It was different with the ghosts (\textit{li'o}a) of those important people whose relics had been placed in the canoe-houses, in wooden figures of fish or on special rock-altars.\textsuperscript{79} They were not only propitiated in order that their anger might be appeased; sometimes their assistance was demanded on behalf of their ‘owner’. Every \textit{li'o}a was owned by a man who alone knew the proper method of approaching it; this knowledge gave power to his incantations and assisted him in all his undertakings.\textsuperscript{80} The name of the relationship between a \textit{li'o}a and its ‘owner’ was \textit{iusi}, ‘twin’; thus the permanence of the association is emphasized. A mere \textit{akalo} was said to \textit{ta'eli}, ‘possess’, a person, or \textit{awasi}, inspire him.\textsuperscript{81} Unfortunately, the reports which we possess concerning the native terms for those who attended to the desires of the ghosts are most unsatisfactory,\textsuperscript{82} but the following passage will illustrate the general attitude towards a \textit{li'o}a: ‘The supernatural power abiding in the powerful living man abides in his ghost after death, with increased vigour and more ease of movement. After his death, therefore, it is expected that he should begin to work, and some one will come forward and claim particular acquaintance with the ghost. If his power should show itself, his position is assured as one worthy to be invoked and to receive offerings, till his cultus gives way before the rising importance of one newly dead, and the sacred place where his shrine once stood and his relics were preserved is the only memorial of him that remains. If no proof of his activity appears, he sinks into oblivion at once.’\textsuperscript{83}

If, on the other hand, and the point is important, there was ample proof of his power and of his willingness to exert himself if he were approached in the proper manner, then his cult was handed on by his ‘owner’. ‘It sometimes happens’, Dr. Codrington says, ‘that the man who has offered the sacrifices dies without having fully instructed his son in the proper chant or invocation with which the \textit{li'o}a ought to be approached. The young man who succeeds is then afraid to go there often and begins a new place, taking some ashes from the old sacrificial fire-place to start a new sanctuary.’\textsuperscript{84}

When a man makes elaborate preparations to remove the shrine of a ghost to whom he has never paid any attention, but whose ministration he has inherited, we are justified in concluding that his object is not to ward off the anger of the ghost, but to secure its power for the performance of deeds of which he is incapable single-handed. Such attention comes under the heading of \textit{cult}.

Probably the ‘sanctuary’ which Dr. Codrington mentions in the above-cited passage is the same as what Dr. Ivens calls an ‘altar’, an outer-circle of stones (\textit{li'iheu}) containing an \textit{ora}, sacrificial fire-place.\textsuperscript{85} Since the offer-
ings which were made to an *akalo* were usually placed beside the relic-cases, it is possible, indeed probable, that these ‘altars’ were erected only to *li'oa*.

‘Ghostly action’ was predicated as being the most frequent cause of sickness. It is impossible to tell if the diviner was engaged exclusively in that capacity, for the reports are not exact. A troublesome *akalo* was exorcised, *tola akalo*; if a *li'oa* had caused the trouble, an offering had to be made.

The power of an incantation, *sarue*, resided neither in its words nor in the power of the man who uttered it, but in the name of the ghost which concluded it. ‘It was the knowledge of the names of these ghosts, coupled with the right to approach them, that gave the power.’ In a like manner the incantations that controlled the weather were dependent on the power of the ghost (*li'oa?*) to whom they were addressed, the form of words having been handed down from magicians who had achieved fame in the control of the elements and who had died long ago.

These rites are very different from the unassisted magic of the Tannese and Loyalty Islanders. The men of Ulawa and *Sa'a* were outstanding also in other ways. Mr. Hopkins calls them ‘the most virile of the South Solomons’, while Dr. Codrington observes: ‘In the Melanesian Islands the inquirer seeks in vain for antiquity. *Sa'a* is a remarkable exception. They can remember eleven generations back.’

34. *Cultural Condition of the Fijians*. When we turn to Fiji these differences become accentuated. In those islands nearly every town and village possessed at least one *(m)bure*, temple. The word *(m)bure* meant ‘house’; *bure ni sa* was the name of the Bachelors’ Hall. According to Hazlewood the full name for a temple was *bure kalou*, ‘god-house’. No pains were spared in the erection of a ‘god-house’ or temple; it was built on a separate mound of earth and approached by a winding path or a steep slope. But ‘nothing like a regular or habitual reverence’ was practised. Sometimes the temples were allowed to fall into ruin and might be left unoccupied for months.

In these buildings, specially erected for the purpose, the Fijians maintained a right relation with the more important powers in the universe, the *kalou-vu*, ‘ancestor-gods’. The Fijians were therefore in the deistic cultural condition.

Each *kalou-vu* was served by at least one *(m)bete*, priest, and often, indeed usually, by more than one. No one could approach the god except through the agency of his priest who was possessed by his deity when he gave utterance to the god’s word. The theory seems to have been that such divine inspiration could take place only in the *(m)bure*, but in some areas, at any rate, a stranger could consult the god at any place where the *(m)bete*, priest, happened to be. Although a *(m)bete* could only serve, or be inspired by, his own special *kalou-vu*, there was no definite priestly order. If a man could demonstrate that he was capable of becoming ‘possessed',
he was accepted without further training or question. The profession is said to have been hereditary, but this cannot have been a universal custom, for we are told that any man was qualified who could ‘shake well and speculate shrewdly’.94

Our information concerning their treatment of disease is scanty and vague. Curative counter-spells and exorcism seem to have been the usual methods; we are not told the identity of the man who was consulted. The (m)bete, priest, is said to have been a ‘doctor with a good practice’,95 but Williams, who is our authority for the statement, uses the word ‘doctor’ in a very indefinite sense. He may mean that the (m)bete was often consulted concerning the cause of a stubborn sickness. According to Sir Basil Thomson the power of divination, ndaukinda, was confined to the priests. Yet this may not be correct, for if we follow M. Rougier, we must conclude that ninety per cent. of the cures were revealed in dreams to the dastradra, who was a professional dreamer.96 M. Rougier says also that ‘le prêtre est bien différent du sorcier et magicien, et ceux-ci peuvent ne pas être prêtres’.97 By ‘sorcier’ I presume that M. Rougier means the wizard; he may refer to the medicine-man when he says ‘magicien’; but it would be wrong to force into M. Rougier’s words an exactitude which is foreign to his meaning. Moreover, anti-social practices were by no means beneath the dignity of a Fijian (m)bete. A (m)bete did not utter effective charms over a severed portion of the intended victim’s body, for, in the opinion of a Fijian, no such charm was effective in itself. The (m)bete charmed a relic by the power of his kalou. ‘By him’, i.e. the kalou, ‘was the charm made effective.’98 Williams states that the priest of Tokelau, whose sacred grove was at Mabuku, would ask his god (kalou-vu) to deal out death and destruction to the enemy of a supplicant.99

We hear nothing of rain-makers or wind-dispersers in Fiji. The elements were thought to be under the control not of men but of gods. When rain was needed, the priest of Ndengei returned from an interview with his god not only dripping with water, but also bearing a promise that rain would fall in all districts after two or three days. On one occasion, when the priest of Wailevu had invoked his god in the usual way without success, he slept for several nights exposed on the top of a rock, without mat or pillow, hoping by this means to melt the hard heart of his obdurate deity; and the people of Tīlīva, when they were suffering from a drought, crawled to their priest on their hands and knees, carrying stones and long vines. ‘The vines are for you to eat,’ they cried; ‘the stones are for strengthening the base of your temple. Let our gifts be accepted, and procure us rain.’100

There is no need to emphasize the difference between this method of trying to procure rain and the magic of the Loyalty Island rain-maker with his magic hase-stone. The facts speak for themselves. Every Fijian, of course, did not approach the same god when he wanted the weather to change; the inhabitants of each district repaired to the temple of their own kalou-vu.
The kalou-vu were not the only powers which were honoured by the attention of mortals; the kalou-yalo also were the recipients of spasmodic 'sacrifices'. Ultimately the kalou-vu and the kalou-yalo were identical, the distinction between them being one of degree and emerging more clearly in some districts than in others. The former were men who had become gods (usually they are considered to have been the originators of the clans), and their names were remembered for generation after generation. The kalou-yalo were the ghosts of more recently deceased fathers and grandfathers. 'If my father died, he was my kalou, and kalou of the whole clan also,' declared one informant; but a kalou-yalo could, and sometimes did, become a kalou-vu. Indeed there was often considerable confusion between them.

This, I think, explains the amazing generalities which obscure the sense of many passages in our earlier authorities, and it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the ambiguities are intentional. The researches of Mr. Hocart show that his predecessors need not have strained after a clarity which was not present in the mind of the Fijian. Generally speaking, a kalou-vu was invoked publicly, e tumba, and in his temple, while the people administered in private, e eale, to the inferior kalou-yalo. This, at any rate, was the case among the Waimaeo people. Their ancestor Nggamau had a temple; so had each of his sons; they were the kalou-vu. The more recently deceased members of the community, who were considered sufficiently powerful to be propitiated, were the kalou-yalo.

The attention which was paid to a kalou-yalo, usually at the grave-side, seems to have consisted both of tendance and of cult. We are told that family ghosts would not trouble their surviving relations provided that their needs were attended to. Sometimes they made their presence known by rattling a can which was suspended from the central beam of the house. Threats and abuse were common on a death-bed, and even the mighty Ndengei is reported to have declared, when dying, 'I will be with you to trouble you'. Sometimes offerings on behalf of a sick child were placed in the small house, (m)bure, which was erected over a grave, but it is impossible to say whether such 'sacrifices' come under the heading of do ut abeas ('Here is what you want') or of do ut des ('Please cure'). Some of the family dead, however, were regarded as having a greater power than the living, for a dead great-grandfather is said to have made a charm effective. After a long vigil at the grave-side of his dead father, too, a man had been made invulnerable, presumably by virtue of the power of his father's ghost.

Among the Fijians, therefore, we find both tendance and cult, as well as the worship of gods in temples.

35. Summary and Chart. Such was the cultural behaviour of these five Melanesian societies. The Loyalty Islanders and the Tannese, who allowed complete sexual freedom, erected no temples and paid no attention to the
ghosts of their dead; in times of distress, whatever its nature, they consulted the same person, *tene haze* (or *uhngen*), the man or woman who possessed *haze* (or *uhngen*). Among the New Britons, whose regulations imposed a slight check upon the sexual impulses of both sexes, there was an irregular tendance of some deceased kinsman; a spasmodic exorcism was one method of healing sickness. In Ulawa and Sa’a, where the sexual regulations were stricter than in any other part of Melanesia except Fiji, the natives practised both tendance and cult. Moreover, the power of a man’s ‘magic’ depended not on the possession of a stone which manifested a wondrous power, but on the quality of the ghost which he ‘owned’. Exorcism was a usual form of treatment of disease. Finally, the Fijians, who insisted on pre-nuptial chastity (that is, who demanded physical proof that the bride was a virgin), not only conducted both tendance and cult, but also erected temples in honour of the powers manifest in the universe.

Unfortunately the information in regard to the medical profession is poor and often contradictory; but the methods which the various societies adopted in their efforts to control the weather reveal diverse attitudes towards the physical universe. The Loyalty Islanders relied exclusively on the power of a magician, *tene haze*; the men of Ulawa and Sa’a consulted a man who was able to solicit the aid of some powerful ghost (*li’oa* or *big akalo*); the Fijians crawled humbly to the temple, with gifts for the priest of their god.

The Loyalty Islanders and the Tannese were zoistic; the New Britons were manistic; the South-east Solomon Islanders also were manistic; the Fijians were deistic.

Diagrammatically the facts can be stated thus:

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<tr>
<th>Society</th>
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<th>Treatment of affliction</th>
<th>Method of weather control</th>
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<th>Pre-nuptial chastity</th>
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<tr>
<td>Loyalty Islanders</td>
<td>Z</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tannese</td>
<td>Z</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Britons</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(Ulawa and Sa’a)</td>
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<td>Fijians</td>
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§36

B. SELECTED EVIDENCE FROM AFRICA AND AMERICA

We will now compare the sexual regulations of the Baganda, Bakitara, and Banyankole, who lived respectively in central, western, and southwestern Uganda.

36. Sexual Regulations of the Banyankole, Bakitara, and Baganda. These three tribes are said to have been of the same racial extraction, and in discussing them I propose to include certain details of their post-nuptial regulations.

The Banyankole abominated pre-nuptial children, but did not object to pre-nuptial sexual intercourse. If a girl conceived before she was married she confided in her mother, and they endeavoured to procure an abortion. ‘There were several methods of doing this.’ If their efforts were successful, nothing more was said; but an unmarried girl who bore a child was expelled from her home, or worse. We are told that sometimes the father of the child was killed, but this may have been an extreme case. He does not seem to have been compelled to marry the girl, or to have been fined. The girl was regarded as the chief culprit, for she could have prevented the catastrophe. Consequently, all girls were carefully watched.

In a similar way, if an unmarried Bakitara girl had intercourse with a man, ‘and no result followed’, nothing was said; but if she conceived, the man was pressed into marrying her. He was also fined. ‘There was no idea of a sexual union being wrong so long as there was no conception.’ Both among the pastoral and the agricultural clans an aunt accompanied the bride to her new home; this aunt witnessed, and even directed, and if the girl was shy gave a practical demonstration of, the consummation. When she departed, ‘she took with her the barkcloth which bore the signs of the girl’s virginity’. ‘These signs were eagerly looked for by her parents.’ Among the agricultural people, ‘if it was found that the bride was not a virgin, her husband cut a hole in the barkcloth and sent it thus. If he so desired, he might send the girl back to her parents, and demand the return of the marriage fee’. It appears that the tokens were demanded only when the girl had been betrothed before puberty; but there is no explicit statement to that effect.

Among the Banyankole and the Bakitara a husband shared the sexual qualities of his wife with his clan-brothers.

A Muganda demanded physical proof that his bride was a virgin. After the consummation he sent back to her parents the barkcloth on which she had lain, and if the primitiae were not forthcoming, he cut a round hole in it: ‘This was a stigma upon the guardians who had not taken proper care of the girl.’ We are not told what action he could take in the event of her frailty. Post-nuptial regulations among the Baganda were strict. A Muganda wife was not allowed even to converse with strange men. The women’s quarters were guarded by a trusty servant; no one
could enter without the husband’s permission. A husband who even suspected his wife was entitled to torture and even to kill her, and her people would take no active steps on her behalf unless they could prove that she was blameless. Even then they were usually satisfied by the receipt of a small payment.¹¹⁵

Thus these three African societies were in three different categories so far as sexual opportunity was concerned. The Banyankole insisted neither on the tokens of virginity nor on exclusive sexual rights after marriage; the Bakitara and the Baganda demanded the tokens, but whereas the Kitara wife, like an Ankole wife, was common to her husband and his clan-brothers, a Uganda wife was compelled to confine herself to one man. The sexual opportunity of the Ankole woman was greater than that of a Uganda woman both before and after marriage; and although the Kitara woman enjoyed the same freedom after marriage as the former, she was expected, like the latter, to be a virgin when she was married. In Melanesia, as we have seen, an occasional or irregular compulsory continence accompanied the manistic condition and a demand for the tokens accompanied the deistic condition. The phenomena were associated in Africa also.

37. Cultural Condition of the Banyankole. The Banyankole were manistic. They built no temples, but they paid some attention to the ghosts (mizimu) of their dead. ‘It was only the ghosts of men who were universally feared’; and the ghosts of those who were more recently dead received more attention than those who had escaped from the barriers of the flesh at an earlier date. The heir of a recently deceased man erected a small shrine near his bed and placed thereon the milk of the cows which he had dedicated to the ghost. Another shrine was set up at the kraal gate where offerings were made when a medicine-man announced that they were necessary. If the ghosts of other relatives required offerings, a separate shrine was erected for each one of them. Sometimes there were as many as forty shrines at a kraal gate.¹¹⁶

Offerings were made in time of trouble or distress. Do ut abeas was the character also of those offerings which were made at kagondo, a special place in the Mugabe’s (‘King’s’) kraal ‘devoted to the shrines of past rulers’, frequent offerings being made there when occasion arose. The gist of the action was ‘This-cow-I-give-you-and-in-return-please-cause-me-no-more-trouble’.¹¹⁷

The Banyankole considered that rain could be controlled by their rain-makers, abaizi be nzura, who belonged to the agricultural clans, as did also the carpenters, the smiths, and the smelters. The blood of a sacrifice was poured over the fetishes (bayembe?) which were placed in a specially prepared shrine, of which no details are available. Incantations, suitable to the occasion, were then uttered. And the people thought that in this manner they compelled the rain to fall or to cease falling, and raised or dispersed a wind.¹¹⁸
The causes of affliction were revealed by augury, but the magician that diagnosed a case acted purely as a consultant, the remedy was applied by another practitioner. The former was a mfumu (pl. bajumu); but this man's fees were too high for poor people, so they consulted an omulaguzi. A troublesome ghost was removed by force, smoked out, exorcized or transferred to a goat, the magicians of Ankole considering that such misimu were completely under their control. The exorcism or transference of the ghost, however, did not cure the sufferer; it merely rendered the patient capable of receiving the medical treatment which his symptoms demanded and which had been ineffective owing to the presence or activities of the ghost.

38. Cultural Condition of the Bakitara. The chief powers which manifested themselves to the Bakitara were bachwezi (sing. muchwezi). Canon Roscoe calls them 'a misty and somewhat bewildering collection of beings'; and mentions nineteen of them by name. 'To these bachwezi, he says, 'the people generally turned for help.' Each clan had one particular muchwezi to whom its members applied in times of stress, but some bachwezi enjoyed a wider reputation, the influence of others being confined to certain localities. Each muchwezi had one or more representatives, bandwa (sing. mandwa), whom Canon Roscoe calls 'priests'. Either they were mediums themselves or they were accompanied by mediums whose utterances they communicated to the people. Each muchwezi had a principal shrine where his mandwa dwelt. The office is said to have been hereditary.

The Bakitara erected temples to some of these bachwezi. Thus they were in the deistic cultural condition.

The Kitara temples have not been described, and do not appear to have occupied a very prominent place in Kitara life. Only a few of the bachwezi, indeed, were regarded so highly as to be accorded the honour of a separate building; most of them were less sumptuously equipped. Wamala, an ancient king and 'god of plenty', had a temple near the king's residence; the temple of Ndaula, god of small-pox, was in the vicinity of the royal tombs; to the temple of Lubanga, god of healing, which had a strong stockade of growing trees, both the pastoral and agricultural people resorted for help in time of sickness; a pair of twin goddesses, Mulindwa and Nginawhiva, had a temple in the royal enclosure and cared for the health of the royal house; and when the people wanted a change from rain to sunshine or from sunshine to rain, offerings were sent to the temple of Munume, who was thought to control the weather.

The power of the bachwezi was variously assessed. This is revealed especially in the attitude of the people towards the weather. Apparently Munume's ability to effect the desired change was not rated so highly as that of the rain-makers, who claimed to regulate, by the aid of their 'fetishes' (bayembe?), every variety of sky-activity. Both the Mukama...
(King) and the people were convinced that the claim was just, and took appropriate steps to put their convictions into practice. If the rain-makers failed to produce a needed shower, they were seated in the sun, fed on well-salted liver, and, when tortured by thirst, told to obtain a drink by rain, or die. Similarly, if they failed to stop an excessive downfall of rain, they were compelled to drink great pots of rain-water, with the result that they often became ill, but 'work harder and stop the rain' was the only comfort that they received.\footnote{125}

It was the same with the treatment of disease. Some people may have gone to the temple of Lubanga, but the usual ministrants were the medicine-men. Unfortunately, the native terms for the various branches of the magical profession are not given. The cause of a stubborn sickness was discovered by an augur who divined by examining the entrails of an animal. Prominent among the diviners were the mulaguzi we enkoko, who acted as advisers to the Mukama, and the mutaka wa manda, who announced whether or not the moment was propitious for a cattle raid. All diviners were specialists, the remedies which they recommended being applied by other magicians. The diviners, together with the rain-makers, constituted the superior class of magicians; there was also an inferior class who were satisfied with smaller fees. The latter acted also as diviners; they also sold the power to get rich; wizards were included in their number.\footnote{126}

A case of ghostly possession was treated according to the identity of the ghost. If the ghost was that of a member of the sufferer's clan, it was transferred to a goat or to a woman; then the patient was treated according to his symptoms, afterwards being given an amulet as a protection against that particular ghost. The transference or exorcism of the ghost did not cure the illness; it merely rendered the patient capable of receiving the proper medicine which previously had been applied in vain. The goat or the woman to whom the ghost was transferred became sacred to the ghost. If, on the other hand, the sickness was due to a hostile ghost, that is, to a ghost of a man who had been a member of another clan, the medicine-man lured it into a pot by the smell of savoury meat and then burnt the pot; or he smoked the ghost out of the sufferer, chased it round the hut, and, having caught it, took it away.\footnote{127}

All these methods imply the power to control a ghost which need not be propitiated in any way and which apparently was not regarded as being a very powerful entity; but all ghosts could not be dealt with in such a cavalier manner. If a man had been of some consequence in life, and the medicine-man considered that his ghost might be dangerous, his heir built a shrine near his own bed and dedicated certain cows to the ghost, the milk of these cows being placed on the shrine. 'If the ghost was neglected, or any member of the family did something of which he did not approve, he would manifest his displeasure by causing illness or death among the people or the cattle.'\footnote{128}

Thus, in addition to paying attention to some bachwezi in temples, the
Bakitara also made offerings to those deceased members of the family or clan who had been most influential when they were alive, the ghosts of the members of other clans being under the control of the magicians. The attention which was paid to the family dead was tendance. Apparently the bachwezi themselves had once been famous men.

39. Cultural Condition of the Baganda. The Baganda also were deistic. 'The national gods had temples appointed for them by the King on hill-tops and estates on the hill-sides often extending down into the valleys. The head man of the clan was appointed to the charge of the temple estates. In many cases the same man was chief priest (kabona) and responsible for the safety and good conduct of the slaves and cattle of the god. In some temples there were as many as four priests. The duty of the chief priest was to receive all persons who came to seek an interview with the god; he took their offering from them and announced them to the god, stating what they had brought and why they had come. The priest interpreted the oracle which was given through a medium."

This is the only mention of the Kabona which I can find, and I am not clear whether the word means 'priest' or 'chief priest'; probably the latter, for only one man could be held finally responsible for the administration of the estates; but Canon Roscoe says that some gods had 'four priests', so in his report he must translate another Bantu word also by the English word 'priest'. The word cannot be mandwa as might be expected (Canon Roscoe translates mandwa 'priest' in his reports on the Bakitara and Banyankole), for we are told that each lubare, 'god', chose one person, and only one, to be his mandwa or 'medium'; so the difficulty cannot be solved. The mandwa became 'possessed'; this was regarded as an unmistakable sign of divine influence. 'When a man or woman first got into that condition he or she was said to be kwasa, 'married to the god'; subsequent possessions were called kuwasa ku mutwe, 'being seized by the head.'

The temples in Uganda were conical in shape, with thatched roofs. The more important of them had a court. A temple that was so equipped could not be entered by an ordinary person, who was allowed, however, both to approach and to enter any temple that did not possess a court. A number of young virgin girls were attached to most of the temples; their duties were to guard the perpetual fire which was burning and to keep the building clean. They were replaced at puberty by younger girls. Of the balubare, 'gods', four were pre-eminent: Mukasa, god of plenty; Kibuka, god of war; Kaumpuli, god of the plague; and Musoke, god of rain. There were many other balubare of varying power and reputation. Some were national gods, some were clan gods. Most of them seem to have had temples.

The attention which was paid to a lubare through the agency of the mandwa, who spoke with the voice of the lubare, was the most important of all Baganda rites, especially for the Kabaka, 'King'. The
observances of ordinary people, however, were directed more particularly, or at any rate more regularly, towards the ghosts (mizimu) of the dead. ‘Possibly’, Canon Roscoe says, ‘the most venerated class of religious objects were the ghosts of departed relatives . . . the belief in ghosts, both malevolent and benevolent, was firmly held by all classes’. The treatment of ghosts varied from control by magic to cult. Since the ideas which compel the people to perform these various ceremonies reveal diverse conceptions of the powers of ghosts, it is fair to conclude that the reports refer to different families or to different districts, and that no particular rite can be assumed to have been universal. It is probable, indeed, that just as all the social strata of a rationalistic society are never rationalistic, so among an advanced people like the Baganda some classes would be higher in the cultural scale than others.

If a ghost were haunting a family and causing illness a medicine-man (presumably the musawo) would be fetched that he might capture it. By the power of his mayembe, ‘fetish’, he would entice the ghost into an empty vessel and then throw it away. ‘The ghost would be annihilated.’ On the other hand, in other districts, or among other families, a shrine was erected near the grave. ‘Each well-provided shrine had its fireplace, and its supply of firewood . . . beer was placed inside,’ for ghosts, in the opinion of a Muganda, suffered from cold and thirst, and their needs must be attended to. Ghosts were also annoyed if their graves were neglected. It was thought that a ghost attached itself specially to the jawbone, and sometimes the jawbone of a noted chief (the head of a clan?) had a special shrine built for it by his clan. The jawbones of dead kings were placed in special temples and attended by bandwa, mediums. Thus there seems to have been a kind of sliding scale in the paraphernalia of ghost-worship: some ghosts were exorcized by a simple form of magic; in honour of other ghosts small shrines were erected at the graveside; others still were granted special temples where ceremonies were carried out for many generations after the man’s death. The ghosts of ordinary people were approached only in times of danger or of sickness, but a chief ‘might occasionally make a feast for the ghost of a relative’. In return for this attention the ghost would cause the king to show him favour. The former attention was tendance; the latter seems to have been cult. The majority of the balubare appear to have been either dead kings, or famous men and women.

The medicine-men, basawo, were very influential; ‘the priests and the mediums had very little power in comparison with them’. This reminds us of the Fijians who are said to have ‘laughed at a priest and trembled at a wizard’; but in the case of the Baganda there seems to have been a cultural change before the arrival of the white man. King Mutesa (fl. c. 1850) ‘changed the status of the gods and reduced the power of the priests from its unique position’. It is possible, therefore, that some of the duties which in later days were performed by the medicine-men, basawo, were in former days part of the priestly responsibility. In Canon Roscoe’s time the basawo
practised every form of magic art, diagnosed, prescribed, exorcized, manufactured fetishes (bayembe), sold amulets (nsiriba), and created those objects which were used to work kulogo (witchcraft). Yet the dominance of the basawo was not complete. If the king fell ill, 'all the skill in the land was at his disposal and all the priests of the gods of the land came together to diagnose his disorder'. Similarly, if a plague ravaged the country, the great god Mukasa was consulted, and 'especially in cases of sickness did men resort to a medium'. Canon Roscoe does not mention a specific god of healing.

We hear nothing of any rain-makers; the elements were regarded as being controlled not by men but by gods. Musoke, the god of rain, was one of the four great gods, his character being described as 'celestial'. He was approached through the agency of a woman who became a goddess (lubare?) when she died. Mukasa and another lubare also, Gulu, were connected with the weather, the former being credited with the power of controlling storms, the latter being sometimes held responsible for inclement weather.

40. Summary and Chart. Such was the cultural condition of these three African societies which lived in Uganda. The Banyankole built no temples, and did not insist on pre-nuptial chastity; but their pre-nuptial regulations were such as to compel occasional continence. They were in the manistic condition. The Bakitara and the Baganda demanded the tokens of virginity; they erected temples to their gods. The pre-nuptial sexual opportunity was the same in both societies, and both were in the deistic condition, but whereas a Baganda husband enjoyed exclusive sexual rights, a Kitara man shared the sexual qualities of his wife with his clan-brothers. Thus both his and her post-nuptial sexual opportunity was greater than that of a married Muganda, and often the latter would be compelled to check an impulse which the former was able to gratify. In a coincident manner the temples of the Bakitara played a less prominent part in the lives of the people; they were less well cared for, and their equipment was less elaborate, than those of the Baganda. Moreover, every Kitara muchwezi did not possess a temple. 'The advance in religious ideas among the Baganda is great', Canon Roscoe observes, 'though the clans still retain their veneration for ghosts, and indeed raise them to a much higher position. The ritual of the worship of the gods has become elaborate, and the huts of the priests assume the dignity of temples. In these, together with the priests, reside mediums, who are able to hold communications with the gods and to give oracles, especially in cases of sickness. In the position of the national gods we see a great change, since four gods are singled out to meet the particular needs of the nation.'

When rain was wanted, or came too much, the Banyankole relied solely upon their rain-makers. The Bakitara had a weather-god, Munume, but they did not have the same faith in him as in their rain-makers. The
Baganda had no rain-makers; their god of rain, Musoke, was one of the four chief gods.

The methods which they adopted in their treatment of sickness have not been described as fully as we could wish, and it is often doubtful which native word is being translated as ‘priest’ or as ‘medicine-man’. The Bakitara seem to have neglected Lubanga, their god of healing, and at one time the power of the priest (kabona? mandwa?) among the Baganda was much greater than it was at a later date. The same words, e.g., mayembe (‘fetish’, though sometimes ‘god’) and mandwa (‘medium’, and often ‘priest’), were used by all three tribes, but in different contexts and with a different significance.

The Banyankole paid post-funeral attention only to the ghosts of recently deceased men and then only when the medicine-man advised. The Bakitara honoured some famous leaders who lived long ago. The Baganda had a longer memory still; they worshipped the ghosts of kings who are said to have died nine hundred years ago.

Diagrammatically the facts can be stated thus:

**SELECTED EVIDENCE FROM EAST AFRICA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Cultural condition</th>
<th>Treatment of affliction</th>
<th>Method of weather control</th>
<th>Treatment of ghosts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Magic</td>
<td>Transference and/or exorcism</td>
<td>Priest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baganda</td>
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41. Pre-nuptial Regulations of the Yoruba and the Ibibio. When we turn to Western Africa the association of pre-nuptial chastity with the deistic cultural condition is again illustrated. Once more, too, we find that those regulations which compel an occasional continence were coincident with the manistic cultural condition. I will compare the Yoruba and the Ibibio.

Among the Yoruba, girls of the better classes were usually betrothed when they were children. Virginity in a bride was of paramount importance, and physical proof was demanded. A female member of the groom’s family
displayed the tokens to the assembled company at the wedding feast, and the cloth was carried to the parents of the bride who exposed it to the view of every passer-by. If the primitiae were not forthcoming, there was considerable trouble. The girl might be tied up and beaten, and forced to name her lover; her husband could repudiate her and demand the return of the bride-price he had paid. No man was allowed to visit his future bride except under supervision.\textsuperscript{139}

It was different among the Ibibio. As a general rule, the Ibibio girl also was betrothed when she was young; she went into a fatting-house just after her first menstruation or 'at the coming of the small breasts'; but she was allowed to visit her betrothed, and on these occasions sexual intercourse, if desired, was taken for granted. If, however, any other man had sexual relations with her, the man to whom she was betrothed had the right to refuse to marry her and could demand the return of the money he had paid. Whether he exercised these rights or not, he imposed a fine upon the girl's lover.\textsuperscript{140} These regulations are similar to those which prevailed among the inhabitants of New Britain (para. 27); the cultural behaviour of the two societies was also similar.

\textbf{42. Cultural Condition of the Ibibio and Yoruba.} The Ibibio built no temples, but they paid some post-funeral attention to their dead. 'With every Ibibio', Mr. Talbot remarks, 'the worship of his ancestors is one of the most important factors in his life. The dead, ekkpo, and the jujus are almost equally revered'. Mr. Talbot, however, confines himself to the descriptions of Ibibio 'beliefs', and neglects to describe the rites which were carried out in honour of the dead, so it is impossible to say whether they came under the heading of tendance or of cult. Ekkpo (singular or plural?) are said to have been represented by posts about a foot high; sometimes in the case of a chief these were surmounted by a skull, and placed either on the verandah or in a little shrine. We are not told any more details. It seems that ghosts were not considered to be very powerful, for juju medicine was sufficient to protect a man from their activities. The burning of the corpse was also an effective method of preventing a ghost from doing any mischief. The idea seems to have prevailed that the ghost was attached to the corpse in some way or other, for the discovery of a hole in the ground near a grave explained several mysterious thefts, the hole being regarded as the road by which the ghost had travelled.\textsuperscript{141} We are told also that a ghost which haunted a house could be exorcized by a 'diviner' or 'clairvoyant'.\textsuperscript{142}

It seems, then, that there was some tendance of the dead, but apparently, too, some ghosts could be controlled by magic.

The control of the weather seems to have been in the hands of 'doctors'. We are not told the native term, and we must infer that a rain-maker was consulted in time of drought. His methods are not described.\textsuperscript{143} Nor are those which were adopted in the treatment of sickness. The word 'doctor'
is used to denote the wizard, the medicine-man, and sometimes also the diviner; but in some places the *abia idiong* seems to have carried out a diagnosis. Mr. Talbot calls him a 'magician-priest', but he does not define what he means by the term. Apparently ghosts could cause sickness, but the matter was easily remedied; the people simply dug up the corpse and burnt it. We are not told how they identified the culprit, or whether they continued to dig up corpses and to burn them until the sick man recovered. Unfortunately, although the literature on the Ibibio is extensive, our knowledge of their practices is limited. I can do no more than record that they were manistic.

The Yoruba, who insisted on pre-nuptial chastity, maintained a right relation with *orisha* in special temples through the agency of a well-organized priesthood. Some temples were situated in groves of trees; that of a tutelary deity of a town was usually built in the central square of the town. The temples were circular huts with clay walls and grass, thatched roofs. Almost invariably they contained images. I can find no description of any particular temple. The paraphernalia of Obatala, 'Lord of Visions', 'Lord of the White Colour', 'Protector of the Town Gates', were always painted white. The city of Ifa was sacred to Odudua, goddess of the earth (though sometimes she is referred to as if she were masculine). Her chief temple was at Ado. Elegba, the phallic divinity, had a noted temple in a grove to the east of Badagry.

The priests were organized into powerful orders, those of Ifa being of the highest rank, those of Obatala and Odudua of the lowest. Each order had several grades. The office is said to have been hereditary in the family, and applicants underwent two or three years' novitiate in a seminary, after which they were consecrated, and each man's name was changed. No priest could serve any other god but his own. 'If a Yoruba priest of Shango were to consult Ifa', Sir A. B. Ellis remarks, 'there would be as great a commotion as there would be if a Roman Catholic priest were to attempt to preach in a Baptist Chapel'.

The priests of Ifa seem to have controlled all religious observances. It was only through their agency that a man could learn what he must do to please the gods, or what he had done to displease them. The priests of Ifa were called *babalawo*, and alone possessed the power of divination. Among their regular duties were (1) to announce the identity of the ancestral ghost that was thought to animate a new-born child, (2) to make sacrifices on its behalf to Ifa and Elegba, (3) to fix the date of a wedding and to give counsel concerning a contemplated marriage, (4) to ascertain the cause of death and to purify the survivors.

I have been unable to discover what steps were taken by the Yoruba when they needed rain. Their methods of treating sickness, too, have been described in a rather cursory manner; but the general nature of the practices is clear. Application was made to Sanyin, a special medical *orisha*, 'god'. We are not told if any temples were erected to Sanyin. His emblem was
a bird perched on an iron bar. The priests of Ifa were also consulted, probably for the purpose of diagnosis. We are told that there were also 'good doctors' and 'bad doctors'. These terms, which are not defined, may refer to medicine-men and wizards respectively. There is no mention of exorcism, or of any illness being caused by ghosts. Very little, if any, attention was paid to ghosts.

This absence of 'ancestor-worship' is important. 'Ancestor-worship', Mr. Talbot says, 'prevails less among the Yoruba than in any other tribe in Southern Nigeria.' Sir A. B. Ellis states that attention to the dead had been 'relegated to an inferior position in consequence of the greater power and sway of the gods generally worshipped'. He further remarks: 'The Yoruba has more independence of character than the Tshis, Gas or Ewes, and is in all respects socially higher. Without saying that the Yorubas are more intelligent we can safely say that their intellect is more cultivated. The asperities of savage life are softened, and at the present day they are certainly the leading people in West Africa.'

43. Pre-nuptial Regulations and Cultural Condition of the Aztecs. A limitation of sexual opportunity was accompanied by a higher culture also among the inhabitants of North America. In the next chapter I shall discuss twenty-eight tribes of American Indians; we shall find that the coincident facts are the same as those which we have already reviewed. Here I wish to record the bare facts of Aztec life. Once more we have to record the coincidence of a demand for the tokens of virginity with the deistic cultural condition.

When an Aztec child was about five years of age, it was sent to the priests to be educated; from that time onwards a boy or girl lived in one of the seminaries attached to the temples. The sons of the nobility were not allowed to leave the temple except either to be married in accordance with their fathers' wish, or to go to the wars. The place in which their sisters were educated was guarded day and night by old men 'to prevent any intercourse between the sexes'. 'The daughters of nobles who entered the seminaries at an early age remained there until taken away by their parents to be married.' In some places proof of a maiden's virginity was required on the morning after the consummation of the marriage. If her chemise was found to be stained with blood it was placed on a stick and exhibited before the eyes of the passers-by; a procession was formed and the relatives danced their delight; but if the chemise was unstained, tears and lamentations took the place of rejoicing; abuse and insults were heaped upon the bride, and her husband was at liberty to repudiate her.

The organization of the Aztec church was very elaborate. Each god had his own priests and 'perhaps the most venerable ecclesiastic' was the high priest of Quetzalcoatl. 'The life led in the colleges or monasteries of either sex was uncommonly rigid and austere.' Rain gods abounded and every god in the Aztec pantheon was 'in some manner or other connected with
the rain-cult',\textsuperscript{158} Tlaloc (sometimes called the Tlalocs) was the chief rain-god. Quetzalcoatl also was regarded in one of his phases as 'the deification of a rain-making priest'. The priests of Tlaloc were second in rank of the whole priesthood, and formed 'a large and composite body'.\textsuperscript{159} The people possessed a great knowledge of herbal treatment, anatomy, and surgery. All these things were in the hands of the priests. We are told that the Asclepius of the Nahuan peoples 'was embodied in the persons of Oxomoxipactonatl and Tlatecuinxochiaocaaca, who were traditionally the inventors of medicine and the first herbalists among the Toltecs'.\textsuperscript{160} I should accept the statement more readily if their temple were described. So many 'beings' or 'powers' have been compared to Asclepius that even a slight acquaintance with the literature compels a distrust of the parallel. Only seldom do we find that the so-called 'god' was equipped with a temple and a priesthood, like the Hellenic divinity; and before we can accept the comparison we must have irrefragable evidence that this was the case.

\textbf{44. Summary and Chart.} We have now examined the sexual opportunity and cultural condition of eleven uncivilized societies, five Melanesian, five African, and one Central American.

In our examination of the five Melanesian societies we found that they ascended in the cultural scale if their pre-nuptial opportunity were limited, the zoistic condition accompanying pre-nuptial sexual freedom, the manistic condition accompanying a compulsory irregular or occasional continence, the deistic condition accompanying pre-nuptial chastity. We found also that the higher subdivision of the manistic condition (cult) was coincident with a more stringent irregular or occasional continence, and that the lower subdivision (tendance) accompanied those regulations which, although they must be included in the same category, did not entail the same self-denial. In Uganda we found three societies of the same racial extraction living in a similar geographical environment which regulated the relations between the sexes in three different ways. Their cultural condition also differed, the manistic condition again accompanying a compulsory irregular or occasional continence, the deistic condition accompanying a demand for the tokens of virginity. Moreover, the elaboration of the means whereby a right relation was maintained with the powers in the universe was seen to be coincident with a more limited post-nuptial sexual opportunity. On turning to Western Africa and Central America we again found that the people who insisted on pre-nuptial chastity were in the deistic condition, and that the manistic condition accompanied a compulsory irregular or occasional continence; but none of these three societies was more than cursorily examined. Our knowledge of the Ibibio, indeed, does not warrant a more exact study.

Diagrammatically the customs and culture of the Ibibio, Yoruba, and Aztecs may be stated thus:
I now propose to proceed westward and to compare three Polynesian societies, the Maori, Samoans, and Tongans. The inhabitants of Polynesia are in many ways the most fascinating people with whom we have to deal. They had a long and interesting history before we knew them, and we must remember that a society which was deistic at the time to which our information refers may or may not have been deistic in the past, and that a society described to us as manistic may have worshipped gods in temples in a previous epoch. The facts at our disposal represent the cultural condition of these three societies at about the end of the eighteenth century; and we may not assume that they apply to any other era.

C. SELECTED EVIDENCE FROM POLYNESIA

45. **Pre-nuptial Regulations of the Maori.** Among the Maori, pre-nuptial intercourse was usual, and by no means reprehensible. The sexual freedom of the young men and women who were not betrothed was limited only by the prohibited degrees, which were not extensive. It was common for the female to make the first advances. A betrothed girl, however, was *taumou*, and no man except her betrothed was permitted to have relations with her. There was an old New Zealand proverb: ‘Those on whom a *taumou* has been placed, do not interfere with them.’ Unfortunately there is no evidence on which we can base any opinion in regard to the prevalence of *taumou*.

It will be noticed that these pre-nuptial regulations afforded to the Maori the same sexual opportunity as was enjoyed by the New Britons (para. 27), who employed the word *webat* under those circumstances in which the Maori used *taumou*, and by the Ibibio of Southern Nigeria (para. 41),
whose customs were similar but have not been so minutely reported. We shall see that the cultural condition of the Maori conformed to the same pattern as that of the other two societies whose identical position in the cultural scale we have already noted.

46. Pre-nuptial Regulations of the Samoans. The Samoans had different customs. At a Samoan wedding there was a public or private demand for the tokens of virginity. The marriage of a chief's daughter took place in the village square before the assembled people; her virginity was tested publicly by the chief (presumably her own father) who inserted two fingers into her vulva. The Samoan name for this rite was o le auanganga. The crowd eagerly awaited the trickling of the blood, which was greeted with prolonged cheers. If, however, the girl failed to pass the test, her father and her brothers would rush upon her with clubs and 'despatch her in an instant'. 'Every memorial of her life was destroyed and abhorred, her very name forgotten from the traditions of the tribe.'

The marriage ceremonies of the common people, Turner tells us, 'passed off in the house, and with less display, but the same obscene form was gone through'.

Apparently, however, it would be a mistake to conclude that the young people were actually as continent as these customs indicate. Unfortunately, the reluctance with which the early missionaries speak of sexual conduct, and their anxiety to present the sexual behaviour of pagan societies in an unfavourable light as possible, is reflected throughout the literature. Indeed the prevailing customs and institutions have been described in such vague terms that sometimes there is great doubt concerning the exact meaning of the reports. Turner remarks: 'Chastity was ostensibly cultivated by both sexes, but it was more of a name than a reality. From their childhood their ears were familiar with the most obscene conversation, and as a whole family, to some extent, herded together, immorality was the natural and prevalent consequence. There were exceptions, especially among the daughters of persons of rank, but they were the exceptions, not the rule.'

It is difficult to assess the value of such a statement. 'Chastity' is a word which can be variously interpreted. In the reports concerning the Samoans it is employed as a synonym for 'continence', 'celibacy', and even 'morality', and the missionaries had such a horror of divorce that often, indeed usually, they refer to post-nuptial conduct when they employ the term. Nor are modern writers more careful. Miss Mead discusses the sexual conduct of the Samoan girls at the present day, and observes that 'Christianity has introduced a moral premium on chastity'. 'The Samoans', she adds, 'regard this attitude with reverent but complete scepticism, and the concept of celibacy is absolutely meaningless to them.'

 Doubtless, if the early Christians tried to persuade the Samoans of the
sinful nature of all sexual activity, they were speaking in a manner which was 'absolutely meaningless' to a Samoan, and the Samoans' experience of white men may have caused them to receive such opinions 'with complete scepticism'; and since celibacy may have been upheld as a most desirable condition, Christianity may be said to have introduced 'a moral premium on chastity'; but we cannot conclude that Christianity therefore introduced the idea of continence among a people who had previously indulged their instincts as and when they were inclined. Yet this is what Miss Mead implies in the first sentence I have quoted, and her use of the word 'chastity' is responsible for a confusion which becomes plain only when the whole passage has been read and re-read.

The terrible punishments which were meted out to frail young women in Samoa must have caused them to place many a check upon their impulses, and the existence of the virginity test proves that pre-nuptial chastity existed among them in the sense in which the phrase is used in this treatise. At the same time, in the passage above quoted, Turner definitely mentions 'daughters', and it is plain that in spite of his uncertain phraseology (obscene conversation does not deflower a maid) he is referring in his use of the word 'chastity' to pre-nuptial as well as to post-nuptial conduct. I do not regard his remarks, however, as indicating anything more than that the Samoans did not live up to the reputation which he himself had given them in other passages. On the whole we must conclude, I think, that although the demand for the tokens was still both regular and universal when first the white men arrived, the stringency of Samoan sexual regulations was being relaxed in the years immediately prior to their arrival.

47. Pre-nuptial Regulations of the Tongans. Professor Westermarck has cited the Tongans in the same chapter of the same book both as an example of a society that demanded pre-nuptial chastity and as an example of one that allowed free pre-nuptial intercourse. And unless a rigid definition is placed on the word 'chastity', and great care taken to ascertain whether the writer is referring to pre-nuptial or post-nuptial conduct, the appropriate literature certainly appears to contain many contradictions. Professor Westermarck, however, has not quoted all the available authorities; and whereas the statements which are said to support the latter opinion are of a vague and indefinite character, the evidence for pre-nuptial chastity is abundant and clear. Yet among the Tongans, as well as among the Samoans, an erstwhile rigidity appears to have been relaxed just before the white man arrived in the Friendly Islands.

Sir Basil Thomson remarks that 'in Tonga the nuptial mat was paraded from house to house'. This is the only passage to which Professor Westermarck refers in connexion with pre-nuptial chastity. Other authorities, however, confirm the somewhat attenuated report. According to Vason, who lived as a native on the islands for some years after he had arrived in the ship Duff with the other members of the first mission, the young women
of the better classes 'pride themselves on their virginity, which they call tahanee; and as the token and ornament of that state, their hair is suffered to remain uncut before marriage'. Throughout his book Vason seems to take it for granted that the girls were continent until their wedding day; he clearly regarded virginity as the normal condition of a pagan bride. Indeed he mentions the case of a girl who was not married until she was twenty-three years old. She was expected to be a virgin and did not disappoint her guardians.\textsuperscript{169}

Mr. Collacott is even more explicit. After describing the details of a marriage ceremony, he remarks: 'One other ceremony remains, that connected with the bride's virginity. The man who has married a maiden prepares a large basket of food which he presents to her parents. He also gives them the mat bearing the sign of her virginity.'\textsuperscript{170} It is clear, then, that if the tokens were available, the fact was celebrated; and the practice of sending the nuptial mat to the bride's parents suggests that the husband whose wife was not a maiden and who took no action in the matter had overlooked something which at one time every one had regarded as important and which some people still emphasized. Mr. Collacott continues: 'Elderly female relatives sleep with the newly married, and if an old woman interested in the maiden suspects that her credentials are not as sound as they should be, she may preserve her reputation by a little pious fraud.'\textsuperscript{171} This clinches the matter. The fact that the 'pious fraud' was practised shows that the austere demands of pagan society were not always satisfied (the influence of Christianity would abolish the custom, not reduce it to an absurdity); but there would have been no need to practise the fraud at all if at one time the girl's virginity had not been an item of vital importance.

The conclusion that the stringency of the sexual regulations was being relaxed before the white missionaries arrived also follows from Mariner's account of these islands which was edited, and apparently written, by John Martin. All the remarks concerning Tongan 'morality' apply more particularly to post-nuptial conduct; but Mariner takes pains to point out the difference between Tongan theory and Tongan practice, a difference which George Vason also emphasizes.\textsuperscript{172} The Tongans, therefore, must be regarded as having demanded pre-nuptial chastity, but in their case a tendency to depart from ancient custom seems to have been greater than in the case of the Samoans.

48. The Revolution in Hawaii. Before describing the cultural condition of these three Polynesian societies it is convenient to emphasize the changing character of Polynesian culture. The best example of the revolution which was taking place in some of the Polynesian islands just at the time when the white men discovered their existence comes from Hawaii. So complete was the downfall of the old order in Hawaii during the reign of Riho-riho (Liho-liho), that it is doubtful if we shall ever know the precise conditions which prevailed before that king put an end to the old ceremonies and
customs. When the first missionaries arrived in 1820 the people are said to have had no religion at all; Riho-riho had abolished it in the previous autumn. The *marae* had been destroyed, the priesthood abolished, the ‘idols’ overthrown.

Curiously enough, the vexed question of the relations between the sexes was the occasion of the revolution. Riho-riho was debarred by *tapu* from eating with or from the same dish as the women. One day, at a public feast, he went and sat among them and joined in their repast: ‘The *tapu* is broken’, went the cry; and the old days were done. But even before this remarkable incident had occurred there had been in private many a departure from ancient custom, and the king was only abolishing, in a formal and public manner, a tradition which had long been discarded in private. ‘Many chiefs’, we are told, ‘had been impious enough to eat at the same board and of the same food as their wives before the caste of sex had been broken by Riho-riho.’

The state of flux into which Hawaiian affairs had been reduced at a time previous to that to which our information applies makes it impossible for me to include them in my list of societies concerning which our knowledge is adequate and reliable; but the events which I have just described encourage me to think that I am not wrong when I suggest that both the Samoans and the Tongans were departing from their old customs. When discussing the cultural condition of the Polynesians we must describe it as it is reported to us, but he would be a rash man who opined that Polynesian culture was a fixed phenomenon. Whatever may have been their cultural condition in a past age, the Maori, when first we knew them, were manistic. The Samoans and Tongans were deistic.

49. *Cultural Condition of the Maori.* The Maori built no temples; but they paid some kind of attention to the ghosts of their ancestors which may be termed a nascent tendance. Information, however, concerning the rites is sadly lacking. The most explicit statement which I can find is this: ‘If one met a *kehua*, ghost, you had only to offer it some cooked food and it would instantly disappear, for ghosts disliked cooked food.’ It is not very helpful. It seems to be clear that a *kehua* could be malevolent, but in that case its activities could be controlled by charms and incantations; and as a rule the recital of the proper incantations at the funeral was regarded as a sufficient protection against future ravages. We are told that the family dead were placated, but no details are available concerning the method of placation. ‘The general notion about ghosts was that of indistinctness.’ Figures of wood and stone were manufactured, and these are said to have represented ancestors; but the rites which were carried out in their connexion have been reported only scantily. Perhaps the practices were equally uncertain.

The power which manifested itself in the universe was *atua*. The word has been variously translated, and I have recited already (para. 5) some of
the meanings which have been attached to it. Others abound. I cannot think that the word has, or can have, any single English equivalent. According to Colenso, whose unfinished lexicon proves him to have been the greatest authority on the Maori language, the Maori applied the word to any strange or unaccountable phenomenon; to anything ugly or disagreeable; to any uncommon animal or common animal of unusual power; to any artificial production, or secretly powerful thing, beyond Maori comprehension, such as a watch, magnet, or compass; to any sickness, disease, or pain (of a strange, unaccountable character?); to any destroying cause, animal, or thing; and to any covetous, ill-natured person. The word was applied also to the white man and to the various articles of his equipment.

It is reasonable to suppose that all these things, and many others, contained in the eyes of the Maori some common quality; and yet our authorities have translated atua as ‘spirit’, ‘demon’, ‘god’, ‘ghost’, ‘idol’, ‘deified spirits of ancestors’ in the plural of these terms, and in other ways. It is easy to see how a white visitor, accustomed to expressing his thoughts in terms of ‘spirits’ and ‘gods’, would be misled by the native use of the word, and we can understand the difficulties which he would experience in distinguishing between the meaning of the word and the multifarious phenomena to which the natives applied it; but it is doubtful if this plea excuses the complete absence of scholarship which characterizes the reports. Maori ethnography is the example per excellence of the uncertainties and misunderstandings which, in my view, must accompany any attempt to divorce the belief from the rite.

A man who possessed this strange quality (for ‘quality’ seems to be the word by which atua can be best described) was said to be the waka, or kaupapa, ‘vessel’, or ‘carrier’, of atua. A right relation was maintained with atua by means of offerings. Unfortunately, the available descriptions of these rites are few and vague. Apparently any one could make his own offering, but as a rule the ceremony was carried out by a tohunga at a tuahu, the character of the offering depending on the nature of the occasion. Such occasions were war, cultivation, sickness, witchcraft, fishing, bowling, &c. Thus, when a man went fishing, ‘he might cast aside the first fish as an offering; a lad’s first eel or first bird was similarly devoted, and first-fruits were deposited at a tuahu’. The tuahu was not a building of any kind. It was simply a secluded spot or ‘small open space in a bush or grove’, chosen by a tohunga. Usually a tuahu was allowed to remain in its natural state, but sometimes a rough unworked stone, or several such stones, was placed as a mark. Occasionally a small rough platform, tiepa, was erected, on which offerings were placed. The local stream, spring, or pond also was used as a place of offering, and then was called wai tapu.

The treatment of a sickness which did not yield to the simple remedies which were part of the common stock of Maori knowledge was in the hands of the tohunga. Literally the word meant ‘a skilled person’, the tohunga consulted in cases of affliction being a man skilled in karakia,
incantations.\textsuperscript{189} We are informed that the Maori adopted no other method of cure than the recital of karakia. Yet I find that the word ta\textit{hu}t\textit{a}ku has been translated ‘exorcism’.\textsuperscript{190} The power of a karakia depended on the \textit{mana} of the person by whom it was pronounced.\textsuperscript{191} As would be expected from the literal meaning of the word, a \textit{tohunga} occupied himself with many things: ‘He could restrain the malignance of evil spirits, destroy the power of witchcraft and hold converse with the gods: he could likewise enchant, bewitch, destroy his enemy by his spells and control the power of nature.’\textsuperscript{192} In this passage the same Maori word, \textit{atua}, has been translated both as ‘evil spirits’ and as ‘gods’.

A \textit{tohunga} also controlled all forms of sky-activity. By the power of karakia, incantations, he changed the course of the sun and affected its power, created floods or caused them to subside, raised or dispersed the wind, quelled a storm, calmed the ocean, and lengthened or shortened the day.\textsuperscript{193} All forms of magic art were performed by a \textit{tohunga}, who could act as wizard, medicine-man, weather-monger, or diviner.\textsuperscript{194}

\section*{50. Cultural Condition of the Samoans.} The Samoans, on the other hand, erected temples in which they maintained a right relation with \textit{aitu}, the power which manifested itself in the universe. Thus they were in the deistic cultural condition.

The word \textit{aitu} has been variously translated as ‘spirit’, ‘god’, ‘ghost’, and in other ways, and seems to have been applied to anything beyond Samoan comprehension.\textsuperscript{195} The Samoan term for a temple was \textit{faleaitu}, ‘house of \textit{aitu}’. We are told that some temples were also called \textit{malumalu}, ‘residence of \textit{aitu}’, but a \textit{malumalu} was a place where \textit{aitu} was manifest, such as a house or tree, rather than the house which was erected in order that a right relation with \textit{aitu} might be maintained.\textsuperscript{196} The temples (\textit{faleaitu}) were built on platforms and were usually round or elliptic in shape. Their height is said to have varied according to the respect in which the \textit{aitu} was held. We possess a detailed description of one such building, probably the last specimen which survived. It had a stone-paved floor, and its stone roof was supported by stone columns.\textsuperscript{197} The man, or priest, through whose agency \textit{aitu} was approached, was called \textit{taula-aitu}, ‘anchor of \textit{aitu}’. A \textit{taula-aitu} seems to have belonged to one of four classes, according to the status of the \textit{aitu} which he served.\textsuperscript{198} He displayed the usual symptoms of ‘possession’ when he uttered oracles, such communications being given both in the temple and elsewhere. There does not appear to have been any priestly order; members of the profession underwent no special training.\textsuperscript{199}

Dr. Brown says that ‘traces of ancestor-worship were few and indistinct; what appears certain is that ancestor-worship had gradually given place to the worship of a superior order of supernatural beings’.\textsuperscript{200} Some practices are reported which, if they had been observed elsewhere, e.g. in Africa, might have been reported as ‘ancestor-worship’, but I can find no description of any regular and universal rite which can be definitely included either
as tendance or as cult. The Samoan term for ancestors (but not ghosts) seems to have been tupu'aga.

The methods by which the men of Samoa tried to control the weather were various: sometimes they went to a temple, at other times they indulged in practices which imply a faith in the power of human beings to control the elements without divine assistance. In a similar way, the sick were sometimes carried to the temple of an aitu who enjoyed a reputation for the performance of miraculous cures; at other times the taula-aitu, 'priest', would treat the patient in a manner that can only be described as pure magic.

51. Cultural Condition of the Tongans. The inhabitants of the Friendly Islands erected special 'god-houses', or temples, the native term for which seems to have been fale-tapu, 'sacred house', or fale-lotu, 'house of supplication'. The houses', Mariner says, 'are built in the usual style, but generally somewhat more care is taken, both in building them and keeping them in good order, decorating their enclosure with flowers, &c.' In these buildings a right relation was maintained with otua, or some present or past manifestation of otua. The Tongans, therefore, were in the deistic cultural condition.

All otua were known by special names which in all probability had once been borne by living Tongans, and it would not be out of harmony with the available evidence if we concluded that the foundations of Tongan culture were laid in 'ancestor-worship'; but although some of our authorities state that the graveside of a dead man was a place of supplication, the occasions of such approach, and the methods which were adopted, have not been described in detail. I can find no mention in the appropriate literature of any rite which can be definitely classed as tendance or as cult.

The native term for priest was taula, or, more accurately, taula-otua. Every taula-otua had an assistant, or attendant, feao, who presented the suppliants and kept the temple in good order. A taula-otua underwent no special training, nor was there any organized priestly order. The man simply displayed the usual symptoms of 'possession', and this appears to have been his only qualification.

When the Tongans desired a change in the weather, they went to a temple and sought the favour of some otua. The inhabitants of different districts relied on different gods to perform this miracle, and sometimes a god, e.g. Aloalo, was approached, not because the people were suffering from inclement and unfavourable weather, but with a request that he would preserve its seasonable character. Rain-making magicians are not mentioned by any of our authorities, who describe the rain-gods at some length.

All forms of sickness and disease were ascribed to otua, or to some present or past manifestation of otua. When a man was ill he went to a temple and consulted a priest. No other method of treatment is mentioned.
Sometimes a patient was taken from one sacred house to another before he arrived at the sacred house of the particular *otua* who was responsible for his affliction.212

52. *Summary and Chart.* Such were the essential features of Maori, Samoan, and Tongan culture. The Samoans and Tongans differed from the Maori in erecting temples wherein they maintained a right relation with the powers in the universe. When a Tongan was ill he was taken to such a sacred house. A sick Samoan sometimes went to a temple, at other times he was attended by a priest who invoked the power of his god, but whose healing power does not always appear to have been dependent on divine assistance. A Maori *tohunga* relied exclusively on his *karakia*, incantations.

The Maori thought that they could control the elements by means of magic words. The Tongans, when they were afflicted by unfavourable weather, approached an *otua* in his temple through the agency of the *taula-otua*, priest. The methods adopted under similar circumstances by the Samoans must be placed in the cultural scale in a position half-way between those of the Maori and Tongans.

The cultural condition of the three Polynesian societies may be stated diagrammatically thus:

**SELECTED EVIDENCE FROM POLYNESIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Cultural condition</th>
<th>Treatment of affliction</th>
<th>Method of weather control</th>
<th>Treatment of ghosts</th>
<th>Temples and priests</th>
<th>Pre-nuptial chastity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoans</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+                  ++</td>
<td>+                  ++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Samoans and the Tongans demanded the tokens of virginity, and their cultural condition conformed to the same pattern as that of those Melanesian, African, and American societies which had adopted the same custom. The Maori, on the other hand, allowed a girl who had not been betrothed to indulge in free pre-nuptial intercourse, a betrothed girl, *taumou*, being expected to confine her sexual qualities to her betrothed.

The cultural behaviour of the Maori differed from that of the Samoans...
and the Tongans, and was similar to that of those Melanesian and African societies whose pre-nuptial regulations afforded a similar sexual opportunity.

Thus it is becoming clear that (1) in a similar geographical environment a higher or lower cultural condition accompanies a lesser or a greater sexual opportunity, (2) in different geographical environments a similar cultural condition accompanies a similar sexual opportunity.

D. THE NAGA TRIBES OF ASSAM AND THE PALAEO-SIBERIANS

The remaining evidence to be submitted in this chapter will illustrate the difficulties which attend any attempt to classify uncivilized societies according to their 'beliefs'.

We are fortunate enough to possess some detailed information concerning four tribes which inhabited the Naga Hills of Assam, the Ao, Angami, Sema, and Lhota Nagas. A varying sexual opportunity seems to have been afforded to their members; their cultural condition also is said to have differed; but the facts have been so stated that we can form no definite opinion concerning the details of the variation.

Three Palaeo-Siberian societies also, Chukchee, Koryak, and Yukaghir, have been the subject of detailed inquiry, but instead of describing the social and cultural condition of these people in the simplest possible manner our observers, as the result of their researches, have formulated a theory in regard to the evolution of 'primitive' culture in general, and have used the data which they have collected to illustrate the truth of those theories.

If I were to omit these seven societies from my survey, I should lay myself open to the charge that I had excluded a number of uncivilized societies concerning which our information is considered by some scholars to be adequate and reliable. Their inclusion is advisable for this reason alone; but I fear it will merely reveal the difficulties that arise when 'beliefs' are described instead of rites, and when certain English words, possessing no single precise meaning, are employed as technical terms.

53. Pre-nuptial Regulations of the Ao, Angami, Sema, and Lhota Nagas. Among the Æos sexual intercourse before marriage was usual. Ordinarily a girl was 'pretty free with her favours', and 'probably' had a series of lovers, usually one at a time. The Semas, however, did not allow 'that freedom of sexual intercourse usual to unmarried girls in most Naga tribes'.

The care that was taken of the Sema girl, Dr. Hutton says, was 'partly due to the desire not to damage her value in the marriage market', but he does not tell us what happened to her if she escaped the vigilant eye of her
parents. I can find no mention of any punishment. Dr. Hutton concentrates his attention on sexual behaviour and neglects to describe the sexual regulations, and it is sometimes difficult to know whether he is stating a fact or making an inference. It is possible that he makes an inference when he states that a girl’s value in the marriage market was reduced if she had indulged in sexual intercourse, for he proceeds to add that ‘the fine for an adultery with a girl of position is much higher than that for a similar affair with a daughter of a man of none’. Are we to understand that the parents of a girl invariably fined the man when the fact of their intercourse was discovered? Or did this apply only to betrothed girls? If the fine were an established institution, my submission would be that the insistence on its payment would result in a man’s checking a desire which, if no fine would be incurred, he would have satisfied; but the above-quoted sentence is scanty evidence on which to base such an opinion, and I can find no other reference to the fine which is mentioned thus casually. Moreover, if the girl’s marriage price were affected by the fact of her intercourse, is it not possible that the loss which her parents thereby sustained would be balanced by the fine which they may have received? If we are to accept the cupidity of the parents as the cause of her alleged continence, we must make sure that they lost by their daughter’s frailty; and this is just the point which is not clear.

If I am right in suspecting that Dr. Hutton’s suggestion concerning the girl’s market value is an inference rather than a fact, then his opinion that a Sema girl was more continent than an Ao girl may be derived from his observation of their sexual behaviour rather than from his knowledge of their sexual regulations. This, indeed, seems to be the case, for after noting the difference between the tribes he adds: ‘This is not to say that the unmarried Sema girl is invariably chaste, but she is a good deal more so than the girl of any neighbouring tribe.’ From this passage it is not clear whether a Sema refrained from intercourse because she was not so inclined or whether she was compelled to contain herself because her elders desired it. The report concerning the marriage price suggests that the latter reason was the real one, but I can find no record of any punishment being meted out to a girl who indulged; and, since the whole object of this inquiry is to discover whether the social regulations did or did not prevent a girl from satisfying her impulses as and when she was so inclined, it is vital that definite information on this point should be forthcoming.

I should conjecture (and it is a mere conjecture) that the Semas insisted on their betrothed girls confining their sexual qualities to their betrothed, and that any man who had any intercourse with the betrothed of another man was fined, her future husband demanding that the bride-price be reduced by a similar amount. Such customs would fit the apparent facts, but we are not told that this was the case, and we have no right to come to any conclusion which does not follow from the facts as they have been reported.
Dr. Hutton is even less precise in his description of Angami practices. 'The Angami woman before marriage', he says, 'is given a great deal of liberty, though the extent to which she takes advantage of this has possibly been exaggerated.' As the monographs on the Semas and the Angamis were published in the same year, this insistence on Angami sexual behaviour suggests that our author may have concerned himself exclusively with Sema sexual behaviour also and neglected to study the Sema sexual regulations. Dr. Hutton proceeds: 'While the Ao girl is bound to admit men to the girls' house at night, chastity before marriage prevails among the Semas where the marriage price of a girl is reduced at least 50 per cent. by the fact of her having had an intrigue. The Angamis would seem to fall somewhere between the Aos and the Semas.'

The evidence on which the three societies are placed in an ascending scale in this remarkable passage is not related. It is impossible to accept the statement that 'chastity before marriage prevailed among the Semas', for in other passages (already quoted) we are told that the Sema girls were not pre-nuptially chaste; and I confess to some lack of confidence in an observer who can make such a definite statement on grounds which he must have known were insecure. It is plain that the Sema girl was not compelled to be a virgin when she married; it is also plain that she was not chaste in any exact sense of the word; yet it would be possible to extract the above phrase from the text of Dr. Hutton's monograph in order to show the existence of a state of affairs which a more detailed acquaintance with the facts would prove to be false.

On the whole I would conclude that the sexual opportunity enjoyed by the Aos and the Angamis was the same, and that the sexual opportunity of the Semas was less than that of the other two tribes. The degree of limitation among the Semas, however, cannot be assessed. It is quite impossible to say what the Lhota regulations were.

54. Cultural Condition of the Ao, Angami, Sema, and Lhota Nagas. The inhabitants of the Naga Hills did not erect special buildings in which they maintained a right relation with the power which manifested itself in the universe. Therefore they were not in the deistic cultural condition.

This is the one certain fact which emerges from a study of the literature. No other question can be answered with confidence. Mr. J. P. Mills and Dr. J. H. Hutton, who are our authorities on the culture of these tribes, are disciples of Sir E. B. Tylor and Sir James Frazer, and it is plain that the course of their inquiries (one feels that they inquired rather than observed) was influenced, if not suggested, by their acquaintance with the published works of these two great anthropologists. For the reasons which I have stated (para. 4) I am unable to accept the word 'animistic' as an accurate or convenient classification of uncivilized culture; thus my study of these monographs is considerably embarrassed. 'What are these spirits whose goodwill the Ao so untiringly seeks?' asks Mr. Mills. He assumes
that we shall accept without question his use of the words 'spirits', 'goodwill', and 'seeks'; but I am by no means persuaded that they do not express his inferences rather than the facts. Among the Angamis, Dr. Hutton observes, there is no 'very clear distinction between magical and religious rites'; again, 'religious ceremonies, as practised by the Semas, are propitiatory rather than magical'. I am at a loss to understand what meaning can be attached to these announcements. The words 'magical', 'religious', and 'propitiatory' have not yet been defined in the rigid manner which is essential to a scientific classification, and even if Dr. Hutton was clear in his own mind concerning the exact meaning which he attached to them, I have still less faith in the certainty of the evidence by means of which he places the Angamis and the Semas in different categories. 'The religion of the Lhota', says Mr. Mills, 'is of that type which is vaguely termed Animism.' The term is vague indeed, but would Mr. Mills's account of Lhota customs and practices have been precisely as he wrote it if his mind had not been influenced by the hypothesis of Animism?218

The power which manifested itself in the universe seems to have been tsungrem (Ao),219 terhona (Angami),220 and teghami (Sema).221 The reports concerning the Lhotas have been expressed less definitely.222 All these words, and others also, have been variously translated 'spirit', 'god', 'deity', or 'godling', or by the plural of these terms. If a study of Naga social regulations had revealed the fact that an equal sexual opportunity was afforded to the members of all tribes, the difficulty of separating the inferences from the facts in regard to their culture would have caused me to exclude the Naga tribes from this treatise; but as it is possible that the sexual opportunity of the Sema was less than that of the Ao and of the Angami, their inclusion is vital and necessary. When, however, we ask if they carried out any post-funeral rites in honour of their dead, and, if so, when, where, and through what agency, it is impossible to obtain a definite answer.

Among the Semas there may have existed some rites of the same nature as those to which I have previously applied the term 'nascent tendance'. The Semas appear to have considered that the kitimi ('ghost', but the translation is uncertain) remained for three days (?) in the neighbourhood of the house. Sometimes steps may have been taken to retain it for a longer period. The reason is obscure; and although the question of food in connexion with a ghost is important, we are not told whether or not any food was placed in the house. It seems, however, that a returning warrior used to throw aside a piece of meat for the ghosts of the men he had slain. Apparently, the 'spirits of the dead' (kitimi) were regarded also as being responsible for death. Whether, as seems to have been the case, this opinion was the Naga method of describing a tiresome and significant episode which these Nagas regarded as a regrettable part of every man's life, or whether a man's death was thought to be due to kitimi anger, which might
be appeased, is not clear. I can find no mention of any rite which was carried out in order to appease kitimi anger, and the phrase 'responsible for death', therefore, may be an over-statement of a vague conception. Yet the placing of meat for the benefit of ghosts of dead enemies is a definite action which suggests that unless the needs of the ghost were satisfied, misfortune would ensue.\textsuperscript{223}

Concerning the Angamis, we are told that the condition of a man after he is dead is a matter concerning which 'the average Angami troubles his head very little'. The only approach to a post-funeral rite which I can find is this: 'A dead man's drinking-cup is frequently, if not usually, hung up where he usually kept it filled with liquor, in case he may return for refreshment, and in some cases the horn is occasionally refilled, until the memory of the dead has passed away.' In that sentence it is difficult to separate the inference from the fact. I am uncertain whether the memory \textit{qua} memory of the dead would cause the filling of the cup, but in view of the apparent rarity (yet implied frequency) of the filling the point is unimportant. At any rate, I doubt if this slight indication can be accepted as evidence of tendency, for the filling of the cup was not a duty which the living owed to the dead. Moreover, Dr. Hutton emphasizes the fact that the Angami 'neither knows nor cares' what happened after death to himself or to any one else.\textsuperscript{224}

When we turn to the Aos, the difficulties increase, and may be insuperable. Dr. Hutton has added an abundance of footnotes to Mr. Mills's monograph in one of which he refers to his own suggestion that 'in the Naga Hills' there was 'an intimate connexion between the dead and the fertility of the soil'. The suggestion was made in a small paper which he wrote in 1923 after he had inspected some carved monoliths at Jumuguri, Assam, and in which he makes an attempt to explain 'the connexion between stones set up to perpetuate the memory of the dead and the stones erected to assist the fertilizing functions of nature'. This connexion, he considers, 'becomes clear enough, if the souls of the dead are themselves identified or confused with the reproductive powers of nature'.

I am not concerned with the merit of this conjecture. In some societies the same native word has been translated 'nature-spirits' and 'spirits of the dead'. Many examples of this will be given in the next chapter. Since the natives denoted by the same word those phenomena which we distinguish by the words 'spirits' and 'ghosts', it is clear that there must have been, in their opinion, a 'connexion' between them. Indeed, I protest against the translation which has introduced the distinction. In the opinion of such people there was no distinction at all between 'spirits' and 'ghosts'; the dual nature of the conception has been created by our translations. Dr. Hutton does not quote the native words which he translates 'the dead', 'spirits', 'fertilizing functions of nature', &c., and so I cannot tell if these observations apply to the people he is discussing. I have mentioned the matter because, in the note which I have quoted, he seems to regard the
connexion between the Dead and Fertility as a demonstrated fact, and to consider that the idea prevailed among all the tribes which lived in the Naga Hills. It is, therefore, a noteworthy fact that in the monographs on the Angami, Sema, and Lhota Nagas, which were written before Dr. Hutton went to Jumuguri, there is no mention of any rite or ‘belief’ which could be interpreted as even implying that there was any ‘connexion’ between the Dead and Fertility. So when, in a monograph on the Aos, Dr. Hutton adds a note to Mr. Mills’s text that ‘as he has endeavoured to show elsewhere’ there was an ‘intimate connexion in the Naga Hills between the dead and the fertility of the soil’, we must study the text with the more care because the monograph concerning the Aos was written after the visit to Jumuguri. Mr. Mills states categorically that ‘it is held by all very strongly that the abundance or failure of the crops depends largely on the favour of the dead’, but I have been unable to find the evidence that caused him to arrive at that conclusion. Most of the references to the alleged connexion between the dead and fertility have been written by Dr. Hutton. I can find no mention of any rite which would indicate that tendance or cult was a cultural phenomenon among the Aos.

The rainfall seems to have been adequate in the Naga Hills and the control of the weather was probably of little moment. The methods which were adopted in cases of sickness and affliction conformed to the same pattern throughout the hills: the ‘medicine-man’ of the Ao, the Sema *thumoni*, and the Angami *themuma* acted as wizard, medicine-man, or diviner. These practitioners seem to have operated by the power of *tsungrem*, *teghami*, and *terhoma*. The same remarks apply also to the Lhota *rotsen*, who was ‘possessed’ by *potso*. Nothing more than this can be safely said, for the long and detailed discussion of magical rites and practices has been much confused by the endeavours which our authorities have made to interpret rather than to describe. Moreover, the use of a number of different English words—‘god’, ‘gods’, ‘deity’, ‘deities’, ‘spirit’, ‘spirits’, ‘evil spirits’—to denote *tsungrem*, *terhoma*, *teghami*, and other words, does not assist the elucidation of the facts.

Yet, in Dr. Hutton’s opinion, there was some difference between the cultural condition of the Semas on the one hand and of the Aos and Angamis on the other hand, for he considers that whereas among the former there was no distinction between ‘magical’ and ‘religious’ rites, ‘religious ceremonies as practised by the Semas are propitiatory rather than magical; direct magic seems to have more or less disappeared from the regular ceremonies’. The facts are not stated on which this opinion was based, and even if we assume that Dr. Hutton is using the words ‘magical’ and ‘religious’ in the sense in which his master, Sir James Frazer, uses them, the word ‘propitiatory’ still lacks exact meaning. Moreover, even if this word also were rigidly defined, there would still remain the insuperable difficulty concerning the origin of the information. I am unable to understand how we can rely, as a basis of research, upon any facts other than the
place, occasion, and agency of the rites, and, though I do not doubt that Dr. Hutton had good reasons for his opinion, I must pass over the evidence. It is, however, a reluctant sacrifice, for the evidence has been patiently and laboriously collected, and conveniently published. It is interesting to know that the society which may have afforded a lesser sexual opportunity to its members occupied, according to the definitions which other anthropologists adopt, a position in the cultural scale higher than that of the other societies which extended a greater sexual opportunity; but I am reluctant to cite the phenomenon as a fact, for I am convinced that we can classify uncivilized peoples accurately only according to their rites. A long and careful study of these monographs has deepened the conviction.

55. *Pre-nuptial Regulations of the Palaeo-Siberians.* Sir James Frazer has remarked: 'The relations between the sexes among the Koryak are much stricter and, judged by our standards, more moral than among the Chukchee and other neighbouring tribes. Girls are expected to remain chaste before marriage and the custom is on the whole observed. It is deemed shameful if a girl is found with child before marriage. Young men will not serve for such a frail one. She is sent away into the wilderness to bring forth in pain and sorrow the fruit of her sin; and she kills the poor babe and buries it in the earth or in the snow.' We are told also that the Koryak differed from the other tribes in exhibiting a 'tendency to monotheism.'

Thus we seem to be confronted again by a perfect example of a reduction of sexual opportunity accompanied by what many students would call a higher cultural condition; and it would be simple to quote the above opinions and to leave the matter there, trusting in the high authority of those from whom they emanate; but the reader who had the temerity to consult the original works of reference would receive a different impression of Palaeo-Siberian culture from that which is afforded by these extracts. The Nagas of Assam seem to have differed both in their sexual opportunity and in their cultural condition, but since the evidence in regard to the former was based on a study of sexual conduct, and since the reports concerning the latter were confined to 'beliefs', we found that it was impossible to decide exactly wherein the differences lay. Among the Palaeo-Siberians also there is alleged to have been a difference both in sexual opportunity and in cultural condition, but an analysis of the evidence shows that in regard to the former the facts do not support the conclusion, and in regard to the latter a classification according to 'beliefs' has once more obscured the nature of the practices. Indeed, Sir James Frazer has never employed his eloquent pen to so little scientific purpose. Moreover, Mr. Waldemar Jochelson has applied the word 'monotheism' to a 'belief' which cannot justly be so termed if the word is to retain any exact meaning.

The Koryak do not appear to have allowed a lad sexual access to the girl for whom he was serving, but there is no report of any punishment being
meted out to any couple who indulged their impulses. In olden times cohabitation out of wedlock is said to have led to a family feud, but I am not persuaded that the sexual act caused the feud. It seems more probable that the girl’s father was angry because the man had not performed those duties which represented the Koryak method of obtaining a wife. Pre-nuptial pregnancy, as Sir James remarks, was condemned, but the girl was not punished or stigmatized, and no action seems to have been taken against the father of the child. No inquiries seem to have been made concerning his identity, and there is no reason to think that any girl refrained from sexual intercourse owing to the social condemnation of pre-nuptial children. If she happened to bear a child before she was married, she simply went away before she gave birth to the monstrosity. Nothing more was said or done. There was no demand for the tokens of virginity; and if we apply the word ‘chastity’ to such customs we shall deprive another English word of any precise meaning. As compared with the Chukchee women, the Koryak women are reported to have been somewhat prudish in the matter of dress. We are told that they would not strip to the waist, as the Chukchee women did, in order that their limbs might be free from the inconvenience of clothes when they were at work. But it was only ‘amongst strangers’ that they were so particular; and as we are specifically informed that the Koryak men waged an active struggle ‘against the disintegrating influence of the Russians’, it is apparent that the relative prudery of the Koryak women was merely a protest and protection against the invading white man. It cannot be understood as suggestive of greater care for ‘chastity’ than that displayed by the Chukchee women. Yet this is what is implied by the manner in which the phenomenon has been described.\textsuperscript{234}

Among the Chukchee, natural children were on a complete social equality with those born in wedlock. In fact, Mr. Bogoras found it very difficult to discover whether a child was what he calls ‘legitimate’ or not. And I can well imagine that the Chukchee would be puzzled at the nature of his inquiries, for they were a people among whom it was possible for a woman to nurse at one and the same time her baby and her infant husband. The conception of what we call ‘chastity’ was quite unknown to them. There was, indeed, no word in their language for girl; \textit{yep ayaakeleen}, ‘not yet put in use’, was the term applied to a young female who had not experienced her first menses.\textsuperscript{235}

Among the Yukaghir the young men and women indulged in sexual intercourse as soon as the impulse was awakened in them. At the first signs of puberty a girl was given a separate sleeping-tent, and she entertained there as many lovers as she liked.\textsuperscript{236}

56. \textit{Cultural Condition of the Palaeo-Siberians.} The report that the Koryak exhibited a ‘tendency to monotheism’ is even more misleading than the statement concerning the ‘chastity’ of their girls. The latter was founded on a \textit{fact} of a definite character; but the former rests on a less
secure foundation. Indeed, it seems to be no more than a personal interpretation by the observer of answers which he received to his direct questions.

The word ‘monotheism’ has been applied to an alleged ‘belief’ in an old man who lived in the sky with his wife and children. In Mr. Jochelson’s monograph this old man is credited with the power, which he did not exercise, of sending famine and abundance, but his chief claim to remembrance seems to have lain in the reported conviction that he taught the Koryak the proper incantations against ‘evil spirits’. In Miss Czaplicka’s opinion, the conception of this ‘Supreme Being’ is the result of contact with members of the Russian Orthodox Church. ‘That the Koryak conception of the Supreme Being’, she says, ‘is not indigenous, or at least not very old, may be judged from the very vague account of his nature and qualities which was all that Mr. Jochelson was able to obtain.’

Miss Czaplicka’s opinion is worthy of record, but she has employed, I think, the least powerful argument. She perceived that Mr. Jochelson’s report on Koryak beliefs was inaccurate, but she retained her faith in our ability to classify uncivilized societies according to their beliefs. I have already given (para. 4) my reasons for regarding all such classifications as untrustworthy. Mr. Jochelson’s monograph on the Koryak contains all the faults to which I called attention, and which in my view are inherent in the method. Actually the question of Koryak ‘monotheism’ does not arise, for the evidence upon which the report is founded is unreliable.

The Koryak were zoistic. They erected no temples and paid no post-funeral attention to their dead. Each family employed its own kamak (wooden charm, or charms), as a protection against affliction and against kala, ‘evil spirit’. For this reason each family is said to have had its own shaman. It is impossible to discover the native meaning of the words that denoted the power (or powers) in the universe.

The Chukchee also were zoistic. They saw around them the manifestation of a power which they called vaïrgin. According to Mr. Bogoras the word signified ‘substance’ or ‘acting force’, but he translates it as ‘being’. Every large natural feature and species of animal is said to have possessed etin, which is translated ‘master’ or ‘owner’, but every etin, or manifestation of etin, seems to have been also kele. Mr. Bogoras considers that kele meant ‘evil spirit’, and this would be comprehensible were it not for the fact that kele was also vaïrgin. The word for ‘magic power’ was enen, a shaman being enenlit, one who possessed enen. The power was acquired personally and could not easily be transferred. The enenlit seems to have acted as wizard, medicine-man, and diviner. Incantations were the only defence against the troubles of human life. We are told that the more incantations a Chukchee pronounced over a charm, the more powerful he thought it became.

All the above words, vaïrgin, etin, kele, and enen, are translated as ‘spirit’, and sometimes it is impossible to tell what native term Mr. Bogoras is
translating when he uses the word 'spirit', for the native terms are not always quoted. Moreover, the study of his monograph is not rendered easier by the fact that when he was among the Chukchee he formed a simple theory concerning the first development of the religious concepts among primitive or primeval men. The theory is placed at the commencement of the second part of his book 'in order to make what follows easier to understand'. No post-funeral rites were conducted by the Chukchee in connexion with the dead.

The Yukaghir neither erected temples nor paid any post-funeral attention to their dead. Thus the Yukaghir also were zoistic. They have been under Christian influence for more than two centuries, and their conceptions, Mr. Jochelson says, are 'no more than a vague shadow or a faded image of their ancient religion'. The 'master' or 'owner' of an outstanding natural feature was pogil, which seems to have corresponded to the Chukchee etin. The equivalent of the Chukchee vairgin was, perhaps, pon; but the report is very confused. A magician worked by the power eiti (= Chukchee enen); he (or she) bewitched, cured, and divined. A magician could also control 'evil spirits', kurul and yuoye, the former corresponding to the Koryak kala and the Chukchee kele.

Climatic conditions in north-east Siberia are such that the control of the weather was not a matter which concerned the inhabitants.

57. Chart of Selected Evidence. I append a Chart (p. 82) of the Selected Evidence which has been submitted in this chapter.
## Chart of Selected Evidence

### (21 Societies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Cultural Condition</th>
<th>Treatment of Affliction</th>
<th>Method of Weather Control</th>
<th>Treatment of Ghosts</th>
<th>Temples and Priests</th>
<th>Pre-Nuptial Chastity</th>
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<td>1. Loyalty Islanders</td>
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CHAPTER III
GENERAL SURVEY
A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

58. The Plan of the Chapter. In the last chapter we compared the sexual opportunity and cultural behaviour of a few selected societies of the same racial extraction, living in a similar geographical environment. We found that a reduction in sexual opportunity was accompanied by a rise in cultural condition and that certain cultural patterns were coincident with certain patterns of pre-nuptial sexual regulations. These coincidences are true also of the remaining fifty-nine societies. It does not matter to which branch of the human race they belonged, or in what geographical environment they lived: if they permitted pre-nuptial freedom, they were zoistic; if their regulations compelled an irregular or occasional continence, they were manistic; if they insisted on pre-nuptial chastity, they were deistic.

I shall divide the survey of these fifty-nine societies into six sections: (1) Melanesia and New Guinea, (2) Eastern Africa, (3) South Africa (Area of Profound Mystery), (4) African Matrilineal Societies, (5) American Indians, (6) Miscellaneous Societies. The recital of the relevant facts will justify the entries in the Chart of Evidence (Appendix I) from which we made our original induction (para. 24), and by devoting a separate paragraph to each society I shall endeavour to preserve the integrity of its culture; but, in order to avoid the dull monotony which is the salient feature of the evidence, I propose to facilitate an interpretation of the facts by a gradual elucidation of the available data. So far as sexual regulations are concerned we shall continue to confine our attention to pre-nuptial regulations, for if the members of any society permit pre-nuptial sexual freedom the character of their post-nuptial regulations does not seem to affect their behaviour: if the young men and women have been allowed to satisfy their impulses as soon as they reach puberty, their mental processes have been shaped already into a zoistic mould; if they have been compelled to suffer an irregular or occasional continence, their mental processes have been shaped into a manistic mould; if pre-nuptial chastity (in my sense of the word) has been the rule, the mental processes have been shaped into a deistic mould. Later we shall discuss the post-nuptial regulations of those societies which insisted on pre-nuptial chastity; but the discussion will have nothing to do with a rise in the cultural scale, for, as I have indicated (paras. 21, 22), none of the uncivilized societies had adopted such regulations as would reduce the post-nuptial sexual opportunity of the males to any appreciable extent. Indeed, among the eighty societies with which we are concerned, there was not a single case in which pre-nuptial chastity was succeeded by a rigid monogamy. This combination has been adopted
only by some of the civilized societies; and those civilized societies which have afforded the most limited post-nuptial opportunity have exhibited the highest culture. The whole of human history does not contain a single instance of a society which has advanced to the rationalistic condition unless its females have been born into an absolutely monogamous tradition; nor is there any example of a group which has retained its high position in the cultural scale after less rigorous customs have become part of the inherited tradition of all its members. When marriage is a compulsory lifelong association of two equal partners, and a woman knows no man except her husband, and a man knows no woman except his wife, sexual opportunity is reduced to a minimum. (Compulsory celibacy does not limit sexual opportunity. It attempts to deny sexual activity. Its effect upon cultural condition is devastating.) A study of historical peoples reveals the fact that those societies which have adopted such customs as most nearly approach this compulsory lifelong association (which has never yet been achieved), and who have retained their rigid laws as to sexual conduct for the longest period, have advanced in the cultural scale to the highest position which any human society has yet reached.

Thus it is not with sexual regulations so much as with cultural details that we shall be concerned when we embark on an elucidation of the evidence. In fact, there is only one slight matter in regard to the former which need be mentioned. I will deal with it at once. I will also explain what I mean by ‘Area of Profound Mystery’.

59. Societies which were both matrilineal and matrilocal. I have framed my definitions of pre-nuptial sexual opportunity upon the answers to three questions: (1) whether or not, outside the exogamic regulations and the prohibited degrees, the young males and females were permitted complete sexual freedom; (2) whether or not, by limiting the sexual qualities of a betrothed girl to her betrothed, or by fining or punishing the father of a pre-nuptial child, or by insisting on other customs of a similar character, the elders compelled an irregular or occasional continence; (3) whether or not the tokens of virginity were demanded when a marriage was consummated.

A social objection to a pre-nuptial child seems to have arisen from the fact that the child belonged to no definite social group. This objection prevailed in some patrilineal patrilocal societies and in some matrilineal patrilocal societies, but I do not know of a case in which the members of a matrilineal matrilocal society insisted on the destruction of pre-nuptial children. The demand for the tokens of virginity is also a matter on which such people would have no decided opinion. Moreover, I cannot imagine their tolerating the reservation of a girl to her betrothed.

(By a matrilineal society I mean a society in which a child is a member of its mother’s social group. The term, as I use it, does not refer to succession or to inheritance.)

It is plain, then, that when we come to consider the regulations of a
matrilineal society in which the husband went to live among his wife’s people, the criteria we have adopted may be valueless. Under such conditions I must be content to relate the facts as they have been recorded. Fortunately, among our eighty societies there is only one case in which there is a complete lack of data, that of the Khasis of Assam; their pre-nuptial sexual opportunity cannot be assessed. All the other societies, matrilineal or patrilineal, matrilocal or patrilocal, can be classified according to the above criteria. It is superfluous to remark that the evidence in regard to the culture of the Khasis cannot be accepted as supporting or opposing any interpretation of the facts which may be submitted. I have thought it well, however, to include so famous a tribe within the scope of my inquiry.

60. The Area of Profound Mystery. If we draw a line due south from the northern end of Lake Nyasa, and another line due west, and extend these lines until they reach the southern and western coasts respectively of the African continent, we shall have marked off that part of South Africa which I call the Area of Profound Mystery. Here were the old kingdoms, Luena and Lunda, which are famous in ancient literature but about which we are so ignorant; they were noted for their ‘debased and immoral’ life, and for their great woman chiefs. Here also were the Barotse, who have migrated in recent historical times, and other famous tribes whose customs and institutions are little known. Here are the ruins of Zimbabwe, and of other buildings of a similar character; and hither the Arabs penetrated a few hundred years ago. Within this area, too, Chaka once operated, and who is ignorant of the revolutions which he caused in Zulu life and in Zulu sexual behaviour? The Hottentots and the Bushmen, too, lived here; and what do we know of them? So many and so great changes have taken place in the area south and west of our lines that we cannot be surprised at the contradictory nature of such facts as are known to us, and there seems to be little hope that our certain knowledge will ever be increased.

Of the societies that lived in the Area of Profound Mystery, I discuss the Awemba, Baila, Baronga, Basuto, and Amazulu.

61. Comments on Uncivilized Culture. The meagre descriptions which we possess of uncivilized customs may be compared to a sudden and rather indifferent snapshot of a runner whose starting-point and destination are unknown to us. We have a glimpse of him as he proceeds, but we do not know whether he has always been running or whether he will continue to run. Moreover, we do not know why he is running. He may always have proceeded along the same path; on the other hand, he may have followed a devious route. Previous to the taking of the photograph, indeed, he may have turned round and travelled in an opposite direction. We cannot tell. The only reliable evidence we possess concerning him is an instantaneous, almost unexpected, coup d‘œil.

The culture of uncivilized people was inherited by them from their
forefathers, and if we attempt to look back along the stream of time we shall grope in a thick fog of uncertainty. This culture had been affected by a multitude of forces of which we are ignorant. Moreover, it changed and changed again, sometimes partially, sometimes completely. The changes may have affected the whole society; on the other hand, a few individuals may have attempted a futile revolution. The subversion of the old order may have been completed in a few generations; contrarily, the culture of the society as a whole may have remained, after a period of stress and to all outward appearances, exactly as it had always been. Every human society, civilized or uncivilized, is essentially a dynamic unit; uncivilized culture, like civilized culture, is by no means a fixed phenomenon.

To this continual ebb and flow we may apply the term ‘evolution’, but we must remember that when we use the word in this context, we mean that hitherto human culture has been in a state of flux. This state of flux is not necessarily permanent; indeed, there is reason to believe that under certain circumstances the cultural destiny of any given society can be controlled. Such control, however, will not be possible until we have formulated a scientific knowledge of human affairs, for it is only in that manner that we shall discover the laws which govern the display of mental and social energy, and so the change from one cultural condition to another. To this subject I will return (paras. 159, 160, 175). Here and now my point is that we shall not gain a scientific knowledge of human affairs unless we eliminate all personal opinion and philosophy. For this reason we must cease to employ the word ‘evolution’ in any sense which illustrates, or has been dictated by, a personal theory.

Many students of human affairs appear to have assumed that the evolution of human culture is an orderly progression which proceeds in well-defined stages from a definite point, and I do not exaggerate when I say that, employed in this sense, the word ‘evolution’ is the bugbear of social anthropology. The idea seems to be that primitive or primeval man was placed at the starting-point, and that all human societies have proceeded for a certain distance along a road of progress. Usually a rider is added to the effect that, in the opinion of the modern white man, the race of modern white men has progressed farther along that road than any other race of men; thus the modern white man may claim to be the chosen instrument of the evolutionary forces. It is a comfortable philosophy; unfortunately it is not based on facts. We do not know anything about the culture of primitive or primeval man (in my sense of the word ‘culture’) and it is unlikely that we shall ever discover its nature. If we place that hypothetical organism at the foot of a cultural ladder at the top of which stands twentieth-century white man in self-assumed glory, and then arrange uncivilized societies on the intermediate rungs, we shall make nonsense of the facts as they have been reported and can be observed. All we can say definitely is that human culture can be divided into certain patterns. These patterns do not follow one another in any determined order; they
merely repeat themselves in history and in uncivilized life. The change from one pattern to another is the result of a change in ideas: the world and its attributes are conceived in a different manner; opinions alter; new conceptions oust the old notions. As a result of this change in opinion, activities are revolutionized; and, since the definitions of the cultural patterns are based on activities, a change in the cultural pattern must necessarily follow. The new opinion is neither more true nor more false than the old opinion. It is still a mere opinion. It represents what the members of the society believe at that particular time. And just as the physicist studies the behaviour of material things, and translates into scientific language the necessity which controls that behaviour, so the social scientist, having studied the various opinions of men, and the behaviour which is based upon them, endeavours to translate into scientific language the necessity which governs a change in those opinions. The opinions of the modern white man are not free from the influence of this necessity, and, far from being the criteria by which we can judge the opinions of others, they form part of the material on which the social scientist works.

The English words which in the past have been employed to represent the opinions of uncivilized men and women—'spirit', 'evil spirit', 'demon', 'sprite', 'god', 'deity', 'divinity', 'Supreme Being', &c.—not only lack precise connotation, but also carry with them a meaning with which they have been endowed, at least in part, by the tradition inherited from our forefathers. The reader who has perused the notes on the last chapter will have appreciated the difficulties which have arisen from such translations. In our endeavour to present native thought in our own language, we have not only broken the fundamental laws of exact scholarship, but have also introduced, sometimes accidentally, sometimes almost wilfully, a totally erroneous impression of uncivilized culture.

In the first place, exceedingly learned but inherently dangerous comparisons are sometimes made between the conceptions of uncivilized men and those of the Hellenes, Romans, Egyptians, and Babylonians. Technical terms from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* have even been submitted as modern equivalents of native terms. West African culture has been stated in this romantic manner and affords a good example of what I mean. The Ibibio words *ndenn* and *mbiam* have been spelt with capital letters, as well as in the lower case, and we are not told the evidence which would justify such phrases as ‘Mother of God’ (applied to *ete abossi*) and ‘First Cause’ (applied to *obumo*). The native term which is rendered ‘wicked ghost or devil’ is not quoted, and such words as ‘doctors’, ‘magician-priest’, &c., are employed freely without definition.248

Secondly, in some of the most reliable monographs, different English equivalents of the same native word are used in different passages. Canon Roscoe does not quote the native word which the inhabitants of Uganda used in reference to natural phenomena, and which he translates ‘spirits’. He renders the Bantu word *manáwa* both as ‘medium’ and as ‘priest’;
and sometimes it is impossible to tell whether he is referring to the same man or to different men. The alternative renderings are given in different books, and in different passages of the same book. *Mayembe* is 'god', 'fetish', and 'shrine', and, if we are not careful, we shall conclude that the natives used three different words when actually they used one word. When Canon Roscoe uses the English word 'god', it is often far from clear whether he is referring to lubare, muchwesi, mayembe, or muzimu.249

The difficulties which arise from this defective material will be apparent. I wish to accord all possible praise to those enthusiastic workers who have done their utmost to discover and to record the facts of uncivilized life, and my criticism of their published works does not imply anything but the profoundest regret that those facts have not been stated in a manner which, in my view, is vital to a proper understanding of the subject. Fortunately, such scholars as J. H. Driberg and E. W. Smith have stated in a more succinct and accurate manner the cultural details of those African tribes about which they have written, and as a result our study of those tribes is facilitated; but on the whole African ethnography is not of a very high quality. There are, indeed, very few uncivilized societies which have been studied in that detailed manner which we must demand if we are to elucidate the nature of a cultural change. All our eighty societies afford evidence for the original induction, but only a quarter of that number can be discussed when we begin to interpret. Three conditions are vital to a detailed study of the ideas of an uncivilized people: the first is the quotation of native terms; the second is the explanation of the context or contexts in which those words were used; the third is complete open-mindedness on the part of the observer.

The last is a matter on which I have already commented. Some observers have been determined to fit their conclusions to a more or less generally accepted frame, and, as one plods through their writings, it often seems that they decided upon the nature of the frame before they collected the evidence on which their conclusions were to be based. The Tylorian 'animism', indeed, has received such a wide and popular currency that I must refer to it once more before the common basis of the zoistic, manistic, and deistic cultural patterns can be appreciated.

62. 'Animism' again. It was part of Tylor's theory that 'spirits' were invented by primitive man as an explanation of natural phenomena. The existence of 'spiritual beings', he considered, had been divined by the human reason. 'The savage theory of the universe', he remarks, 'refers its phenomena to the wilful action of pervading personal spirits. Spirits are personified causes.' Sir James Frazer accepted and extended this theory. In a recent work which no doubt reflects his considered opinion, Sir James suggests that when animism is replaced by polytheism, 'the unlimited number of indwelling spirits is gradually reduced to a limited pantheon believed to control the various departments of nature': 'After
man had peopled with a multitude of individual spirits every rock and hill, every tree and flower, every brook and river, every breeze that blew and every cloud that flecked with silvery white the blue expanse of heaven. . . .²⁵¹ There is no need to finish the quotation. The point I wish to make is that among the eighty societies with which we are concerned there is no evidence that 'every rock and hill', &c., was peopled with an indwelling spirit. Indeed, it is certain that these uncivilized men did not think in that manner. The ubiquity of 'spirits' is a false inference from the fact that the word translated 'spirits' was applied to many unusual, supernatural, uncomprehended natural phenomena. To the undeveloped intelligence of the savage these outstanding phenomena seem to have possessed a common quality. It is the word which denoted this quality which cannot be translated into a civilized tongue. No civilized equivalent exists.

The conception of and reaction against the strange quality in anything unusual or beyond comprehension seems to be the basis of all human culture, civilized or uncivilized. And any one who possesses this key to the understanding of human conceptions will not be surprised, indeed he will predict, that whenever there is an advance in the knowledge of the physical universe, a revolution in ideas must necessarily follow. The word which uncivilized men used to denote the quality in anything unusual or beyond comprehension was used in a variety of contexts. It was applied to an unusual or uncomprehended sickness as well as to unusual natural phenomena. It was also used in reference to a corpse or the dead or ghosts or some ghosts. (The evidence in connexion with the dead is a little complicated.) It was also applied to an unusual man, to a man in an unusual condition and to a man of unusual ability.

I will re-examine the societies which we discussed in the last chapter and restate their culture in the light of these observations. From this examination the Banyankole, Bakitara, Baganda, and Ibibio will be omitted, for, as I have already said, the terms which they employed have been neither elucidated nor translated in a consistent manner. The Nagas and the Palaeo-Siberians also must be excluded, because (1) the manner in which they used their words has not been elucidated, (2) their culture has been recorded in the light of foregone conclusions which I find unacceptable.

In my re-examination of the remaining societies I will discuss separately (1) the power in the universe, (2) the place in which it was manifest, (3) the agency through which a right relation was maintained with it.

63. The Power. To any question which the Tannese could not answer they replied, 'uhngen'. The term was applied to anything which was beyond the comprehension of a Tanna man, e.g. a watch. The Loyalty Islanders used haze under similar circumstances. The two words, indeed, are said to have possessed an identical meaning. Usually uhngen is translated 'God'. Mrs. Hadfield renders haze both as 'spirits' and as 'evil
spirits'. Possibly the latter is an inference from the fact that the Loyalty Islanders applied the word to certain forms of sickness. The native use of the New Briton word tebaran has not been described. We are told no more than that tebaran was 'in caves, wells, rivers, and some parts of the roads'. It would be interesting to know how the natives identified those parts of a road where tebaran was manifest. I conjecture that if anything unusual happened at any particular spot, the place was immediately tebaran. Tebaran has been translated as 'spirits' and as 'ghosts'.

In the South-east Solomon Islands the natives used akalo in reference to the souls of the dead and to the power which was manifest in certain natural phenomena: thus akalo ni mataea, akalo of the sea. Akalo also denoted 'weirdness', and was applied to anything weird. 'Weird' is a good word, for it suggests the influence which an unusual or incomprehensible phenomenon would have exercised upon the minds of the inhabitants.

To the Fijians 'spirits' were manifest 'in every remarkable spot', but nowhere else. They owed their presence 'to the unusual appearance' of, e.g., a rock or tree. 'If anything mysterious were to happen in connexion with a rock or tree', it was constituted as 'divine'. The native word was kalou. Kalou denoted anything superlative, marvellous, or beyond Fijian comprehension.

Among the Yoruba the word orisha was applied to white men (and their possessions?), to anything sacred or holy, and to the power which was worshipped in a temple. I have already discussed the Maori atua (para. 49). It was applied to anything strange or unaccountable; to anything ugly or disagreeable; to any uncommon animal, or any common animal of unusual power; to any artificial production or secretly powerful thing beyond Maori comprehension, such as a watch, magnet, or compass; to the white man and to the various articles of his equipment. The Samoan aitu was used in similar contexts, being used in reference to the white man's ships as well as to the power which was worshipped in a temple. The Tongan equivalent was otua. Anything beyond Tongan comprehension, such as a cuckoo clock, was otua.

These words were also used in reference to the dead or some dead men. Mr. Ray remarks that in the Loyalty Islands 'a ghost or departed spirit was also sometimes called a haze'. Mr. Ray clearly considers that in this connexion the natives were thinking of an entity, but I am not satisfied that the 'a' in 'a haze' is not an inference, due to the animistic theory. The fact seems to have been that certain corpses or ghosts were haze, simply. The Tannese uhngen also was applied to the dead. Both these societies were zoistic. By the manistic New Britons and South-east Solomon Islanders tebaran and akalo were applied to dead men. The deistic Fijians used kalou in reference to the dead and to the power which was worshipped in a temple. The Yoruba word orisha has been translated
'deified departed one'. This use of *orisha* is important, for the Yoruba are said to have conducted few rites in honour of the dead. The Maori *atua*, the Samoan *aitu*, and the Tongan *otua* were used in reference to the dead.

It is plain that there is no English equivalent for these words, and henceforward I shall take no notice of the translations which have been made, unless they are necessary to the exposition of the facts. It may be taken for granted that most of the native words have been rendered as 'god', 'Supreme Being', or 'spirits'. In place of these misleading and inaccurate substantives I shall submit (paras. 66–8) some new descriptive terms by means of which the nature of the native 'beliefs' may be more conveniently denoted.

64. *The Place.* The places in which the Loyalty Islanders and the Tannese carried out their rites have not been described. Nor are we told in what places the New Britons conducted their ancestral tendance. In the South-east Solomon Islands (Ulawa and Sa’a) the offerings to *akalo* were made in the places where *akalo* was manifest, i.e. in the relic-cases in the houses, in the special relic-houses, *tawat*, in the canoe-house, or in a special 'altar' or 'sanctuary'. These were 'cut-off' places (Lat. *templum*; Gk. *temenos*), forbidden to intruders. The Fijian and Samoan temples were called respectively 'house of *kalou*’ and 'house of *aitu*'. That is to say, the Fijians and Samoans maintained a right relation with *kalou* and *aitu* in a *kalou-, or *aitu*-house or place. In a similar manner the Maori maintained a right relation with *atua* in an *atua*-place, that is, in a place where *atua* was manifest, an ‘unusual’ place; they called it a *tuahu*. Such a place was *tapu*, because *atua* was manifest there.

A right relation, then, seems to have been maintained with the 'unusual' in an 'unusual' place; thus the common basis of the three cultural conditions is becoming apparent. The development of the altar and the temple, in fact, can be traced to a common source, the conception of 'something unusual'. These items of divine equipment, however, have had a very different history, and their association in modern times must not allow us to confuse them. Uncivilized people were always careful to distinguish them; and the course of their individual development is not difficult to follow; but an inquiry into the matter is handicapped by the manner in which hitherto uncivilized culture has been studied. Observers have concentrated on 'beliefs' to such an extent that sometimes they have forgotten to describe the place whither the natives went in order to conduct a rite; seldom have they inquired how the place was chosen. I shall discuss the subject more fully in a subsequent paragraph (para. 151).

65. *The Agency.* A Loyalty Island magician received his power from his magic stone, which was called *haze*. The reports, however, are a little confused, for, although in some passages a *haze*-stone seems to have been
any stone of unusual shape, apparently a stone could be made hase by a man who was haze. In the latter case we are not told how the man came to be in that condition. In Tanna a magician acted by means of uhngen. We are told that the New Briton magician received his power from ‘spirits’; we may conclude therefore that he was a magician because he possessed tebaran, or something which was or contained tebaran. In the South-east Solomon Islands no magician could act by his own unassisted power; he depended upon the akalo that he owned. So also in Fiji, where the possession of or by kalou was the factor which decided whether a man was a priest or not. The Yoruba priests went through a special course of training in an organized seminary, but their final acceptance depended on their ‘possession’ by orisha. The power of the Maori tohunga, ‘skilled man’, was ascribed to his possession of or by atua. So long as he manifested that power, he was mana. Likewise the Samoan taula-aitu and the Tongan taula-otua were ‘possessed’ by atiu and otua respectively.

The double use of the English word ‘possess’ will obscure the argument unless we take care to distinguish between the possession of e.g. atua and being ‘possessed’ by atua. In the former case no difficulty arises, for the facts are plain; the man was credited with the possession of ‘unusual’ power either because he had given practical proof of his ability or because he was the owner of an ‘unusual’ stone or other article. In the latter case we must distinguish between the fact which was observed and the observer’s interpretation of it. The fact was that the man writhed and foamed in a manner which we, having been brought up on the Jewish Bible, associate with the phrase ‘he hath a devil’; and I suspect that sometimes an observer may have had this phrase so much in his mind that he concluded at once that this was what the natives meant. But it is at least possible, I think, that in such cases no possessive agent was in the native mind and has been invented by us, being the result of our interpretation of the native words. Of course the natives may have thought that such a man was ‘possessed’ by atua because he was obviously ‘unusual’ and because they therefore had to invent the agent which they hypothesized as responsible for all unusual things; but it would be interesting to know whether they said ‘He has (or is) atua’, or whether they said ‘Atua’, simply. If the latter was the case, the possessive agent has certainly been created by us. And I am inclined to think that this is true of zoistic societies. The evidence, however, such as it is, must be accepted as it stands.

A magician, or priest, then, seems to have been simply a man who possessed or was possessed by the power in the universe. This subject also is fully discussed in a later paragraph (para. 147).

Sometimes it is said that the priest developed out of the magician, and at one time I myself believed this to be the case. I approached the subject from the usual pre-conceived ‘evolutionary’ point of view, and was puzzled by what appeared to be a difficult problem. It was not long, however, before I perceived that the difficulty lay not in the problem but in our
method of stating it. I now understand that no such development has taken place. The idea has been read into the facts, not out of them. The truth seems to be that the priest and the magician are one and the same person, operating in a different place, living in a different cultural pattern.

What is the essential difference between a priest and a magician? A magician employs his own instruments which he himself has selected and possibly has rendered powerful; he can use those instruments when and where he likes. The equipment of a priest is used also by his colleagues; usually he utters his oracle in the temple. In a number of cases the reputation of a magician is gained by trial and achievement, or by his succession to magical instruments which have already proved themselves powerful when a previous owner possessed them; his power lasts as long as it is manifested. The priest’s power, on the other hand, is permanent and abiding; sometimes he owes his position to his membership of a special group or clan. The power of the magician is peculiar to himself; that of a priest is shared by all the other priests who serve the same god.

Another difference has been suggested, and is often emphasized. It is claimed that whereas a magician controls his power, a priest conciliates or supplicates a power greater than he is. The distinction is nice, and appeals to a logical cultivated mind; but it is quite unacceptable, for it is based on criteria which are unascertainable.

Let us suppose that we travel to a distant land and live among an uncivilized people. How could we judge whether a man were a magician or a priest? It would be impossible for us to answer the question by studying only the conceptions of the natives, for there is no reliable method of becoming acquainted with them (para. 4). We could not trust the answers to our questions, for there is no reason to think that the natives could make an intelligible reply. Even if they succeeded in communicating to us some parts of their creed, we should have to be careful lest we reported their replies in a manner which was influenced, if not controlled, by the tradition in which we ourselves had been trained. As a matter of actual fact, we could not carry out a field research if we adopted such an inconsequent method of inquiry. We should have to watch the actions of the man and judge him, in the first instance, by his equipment and by his methods. Since, then, we judge whether a man is a magician or a priest according to the place and manner in which he acts, the development of the priest from the magician is a matter which cannot arise. The priest is a magician who is a member of a deistic society. Indeed the priest and the magician are one and the same person operating in a different manner and in a different place. The source of their power is identical, the possession of or by the power in the universe.

The conception of ‘evolution’ which some scientists have been determined to read into human affairs has been responsible for other suggestions in regard to magicians which are equally unacceptable. It has often been said that as a society proceeded up the cultural scale, or ‘evolved’, the
various magicians became organized into separate orders, wizards, medicine-men, diviners, rain-makers, &c. Unless this mistaken view is corrected without delay, it will be impossible to understand correctly the nature of a change from the zoistic to the deistic cultural condition, or from the latter to the rationalistic condition. I therefore propose to devote a few pages to its consideration.

In support of his submissions in reference to the evolution of sacred kings out of magicians, Sir James Frazer has remarked: 'Social progress, as we know,'—and here is explicit evidence of the pre-conceived idea—'consists mainly in a successive differentiation of functions. . . . Magicians or medicine-men appear to constitute the oldest artificial or professional class in the evolution of society. As time goes on, and the process of differentiation continues, the order of medicine-men is itself subdivided into such classes as the healers of disease, the makers of rain, and so forth.'

Although Sir James produced no specific example of such subdivision, and was content to notice the 'general trend' of the supposed evolution, this hypothesis at first seemed so probable that at one time I assumed its truth. In support of what I then considered a truism I collected all the available evidence from the records of the eighty societies with which I decided to concern myself. It soon became apparent, however, that Sir James Frazer's plausible conjecture was only another attempt to rationalize the facts of uncivilized life. Just as I had been disillusioned in regard to the classification of simpler peoples according to their beliefs, so also was I compelled to abandon the idea that the various branches of the magical profession were differentiated as a society ascended in the cultural scale. Just as a study of native terms had revealed that the ubiquity of 'nature-spirits' was a false inference from an inaccurate translation, so a study of the terms employed to denote the various branches of the magical profession showed that the alleged differentiation had not taken place.

I append, so far as they are available, the native terms which were used in reference to the wizard, the medicine-man, and the diviner by the twenty-one peoples with whom we dealt in the last chapter. The letter Z, M, or D after the name of each society refers to its cultural condition (Z = zoistic, M = manistic, D = deistic).

For the meaning of 'wizard', 'medicine-man', and 'diviner', see para. 9.

I must apologize for the imperfect character of the Table. The numerous uncertainties illustrate the difficulties that face a student who desires to know the native terms which his author is translating.

Leaving aside for one moment the comparison between the wizard and the medicine-man, the most cursory examination of the entries shows that the diviner is not always differentiated from the medicine-man in the most advanced societies. In Tonga and Samoa the taula-otua or the taula-aitu acted in both capacities; they were deistic people. Among the deistic Yoruba, on the other hand, all diagnoses and predictions were made by the priests of Ifa. The three Uganda peoples, Bakitara, Baganda, and
### Table of Native Terms denoting Various Types of Magicians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loyalty Islanders (Z)</th>
<th>Tannese (Z)</th>
<th>New Britons (M)</th>
<th>SE. Solomon Islanders (Ulawa and Sa’a) (M)</th>
<th>Fijians (D)</th>
<th>Bakitara (D)</th>
<th>Baganda (D)</th>
<th>Banyankole (M)</th>
<th>Ibibio (M)</th>
<th>Yoruba (D)</th>
<th>Maori (M)</th>
<th>Tongans (D)</th>
<th>Samoans (D)</th>
<th>Ao Nagas (Z)</th>
<th>Angami Nagas (Z)</th>
<th>Lhota Nagas (Z)</th>
<th>Sema Nagas (M?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wizard</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(By aid of mbete (priest) vaka-ndrainihau (?))</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>By aid of lubare</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>‘Doctors’</td>
<td>‘Doctors’</td>
<td>‘Priests’</td>
<td>By aid of otua</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Apparently any one</td>
<td>themuma</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medicine-man</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(tene agagara)</td>
<td>mbete</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>basawo (pl.)</td>
<td>bafumu (pl.)</td>
<td>‘Doctors’</td>
<td>‘Doctors’</td>
<td>‘Priests’</td>
<td>taula-otua</td>
<td>taula-aitu</td>
<td>‘Cp. Sema thumomi’</td>
<td>themuma</td>
<td>ratsen</td>
<td>thumomi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diviner</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘medicine-man’</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Banyankole, distinguished between the magician who diagnosed a malady and the medicine-man who administered a cure; their cultural conditions varied. The manistic Maori seem to have distinguished between the various kinds of tohunga, but I doubt if we could say that among them the branches of the profession were clearly differentiated. It is more probable that the qualifying term was merely descriptive of those activities for which the tohunga, ‘skilled man’, was famed at the time to which the report refers. A man who was a tohunga makutu, ‘wizard’, on Monday could quite easily and logically be called tohunga matakite, ‘diviner’, on Thursday, if he had made a successful prediction on Tuesday.

No sense can be made of this evidence if we approach it with the idea of social evolution in our minds; the facts cannot be rationalized by applying civilized logic to their interpretation; and we cannot generalize. In many societies, if a man announced that he would make rain, and rain then fell, he was henceforth regarded as a rain-maker. If he had been a healer of disease before this successful début, he then enjoyed a double reputation; but a man famed as a healer might cease to be regarded as a magician at all if his charms failed to effect the desired cure. On the other hand, a chance success by an amateur might cause his immediate promotion to a high position in the magical fraternity. In other societies, which were in the same cultural condition or stage of social evolution, a rain-maker might not lose his reputation if he failed to produce the desired result, for he might announce that other magicians were stultifying his efforts by creating doses...
of sunshine. In some deistic societies, moreover, certain weather-gods might retain their illustrious names in spite of their manifest impotence, because their failure to control the elements according to the wishes of the people would be ascribed to the intentional or involuntary sin of the supplicants, although the success of a petition would be hailed as positive proof of the god's power.

By selecting such evidence as conforms to the idea of social evolution and overlooking the facts which conflict with it, a case can easily be made out for the theory that a differentiation of the various branches of the magical profession takes place as a society advances up the cultural scale; but if we select a number of societies and tabulate the words which the natives used, the fallacy of the hypothesis is soon revealed.

As an illustration of his submission Sir James Frazer quotes the fact that the Todas called the wizard and the medicine-man by different names, pilikoren and utkoren, respectively. The differentiation between the wizard and the medicine-man, however, is not a distinction of the same character as that between the medicine-man and the diviner or the rain-maker. It is not a professional distinction. When a society makes a definite line of demarcation between the wizard and the medicine-man, it merely distinguishes between maleficent and beneficent activities.

In some societies the men who inflicted disease were not distinguished from those who cured it, and a magician who possessed the power of healing was equally ready to employ his art in the infliction of an ill which he also had the power to prevent. In these cases witchcraft was one of the ordinary risks of life. In other societies, which were in the same cultural condition, the two arts were separated; there was a continual struggle between the two schools. In a third class of societies, witchcraft was utterly condemned. If a man was suspected of having been engaged in anti-social practices, he was tried, and, if found guilty, condemned and often killed.

Examples of each type could be cited from all over the world, and it seems impossible to make sense of the facts by pre-supposing a social evolution of the type Sir James Frazer had in mind. For instance, in East Africa the possibility of witchcraft was a risk which every Kikuyu or Kamba considered to be part of his everyday life, but by the Baganda and the Bakitara witchcraft was utterly condemned. The Banyankole, however, did not punish the practice. From some points of view the social condemnation of witchcraft seems to be evidence of cultural advance, but the scholar who carried out a detailed research in order to make an authoritative pronouncement on the subject would have to be very careful about his definitions. For example, although the Baganda condemned witchcraft, a Muganda who wished to inflict injury on his enemy both could and would visit a priest who would ask his god to curse the applicant's enemy. Similarly, a Tongan who was suffering from anti-social impulses would request the aid of an otua through the agency of the taula-otua. In Fiji a wizard could act either by his own power or by the power of kalou, and
openly flaunted his responsibility for a death at the funeral of his victim. All these three societies were in the deistic cultural condition.

I mention these facts in order to show that they do not fit any of the evolutionary frames to which we have delighted to attach them. The differentiation of the various branches of the magical profession is not evidence of social advance, and when a society advances up the cultural scale such differentiation does not necessarily take place. The condemnation of antisocial magical activity which in certain parts of the world seems to be characteristic of societies that are more culturally advanced does not appear to have been due to the cultural advance. It was the method rather than the practice which was condemned, for in the most advanced societies antisocial impulses seem to have been indulged, though in a manner which differed from the usual methods of the wizard.

In my examination of the remaining fifty-nine societies I shall not inquire if the medicine-man was distinguished from the diviner or from the rainmaker; I shall simply record what in the native opinion constituted the source of the magical or priestly power. It will be clear that the magician and the priest are one and the same person, operating in a different place and living in a different cultural pattern. The source of their power was the possession of or by the power manifest in the universe.

We are now in a position to formulate some new definitions by means of which uncivilized conceptions may conveniently be described. I must beg that they be regarded as mere descriptions and not as classifications. It is impossible to classify uncivilized societies according to their beliefs.

66. Dead Level of Conception. If the members of a zoistic society applied the same word to (1) the power in the universe, (2) a corpse, ghosts, or certain ghosts, (3) the source of magic power, I shall say that they were at a **dead level of conception**. The Loyalty Islanders and the Tannese were at a dead level of conception.

No society can be at a dead level of conception unless it is zoistic, but it is possible for a society to be zoistic without being at a dead level of conception.

Throughout the literature some difficulty arises in connexion with the word translated 'ghost'. We are not always told whether it was applied to all ghosts or only to special ghosts. If it were applied only to special ghosts, we are not always informed how the selection was made. If it is reported to have been applied to all ghosts, we can never be sure that the alleged fact is not an inference from its application to special ghosts. Apparently there is no certain solution of the difficulty and we must make the best use of the evidence which we possess. I conjecture that in most cases the word was applied to the corpse and/or to the ghost of an 'unusual' man. To this point I will return (para. 149).

67. Confusion between the One and the Many. Sometimes a manistic society employed the same term in reference to (1) the power in the universe,
(2) ghosts, or certain ghosts, and did not distinguish between an individual ghost and 'the dead'. I shall say that the members of that society were guilty of a confusion between the one and the many.

The source of magic power has no place in deciding whether this descriptive term is or is not applicable.

68. Temporary Distinction between the One and the Many. If the members of a manistic society used one term to denote a man who was recently deceased, and another term to denote 'the dead', or if they tended a recently deceased man only for a short time, and for not more than two generations, I shall say that they made a temporary distinction between the one and the many.

This term applies to the Maori and to the inhabitants of Ulawa and Sa'a (SE. Solomon Islands).

In this case we judge by the native words or by the native rites.

69. Permanent Distinction between the One and the Many. If the members of a manistic or deistic society remembered an individual dead man for more than two generations and paid some post-funeral attention to him during the whole of that time, I shall say that they made a permanent distinction between the one and the many. This applies to the Fijians.

In this case we judge by the words and the rites, the dual criterion being necessary so as to avoid the confusion which might arise in reference to the so-called 'mythological heroes'. Apparently these were remembered for more than two generations, but no post-funeral attention was paid to them.

I have defined these descriptive terms with care because in the next chapter I wish to separate the societies that distinguished certain phenomena from those that confused them. I also wish to assess the contribution which an extension of memory has made to a change from one cultural pattern to another. The general reader, however, need not trouble to remember any of the descriptive terms except the first. The three other terms have only a technical interest. The important facts are these, namely, that in some cases a dead man was not remembered at all; indeed he may not have been buried, so little did the people care about him when he was dead. In other cases a dead man was remembered for a little time, and then was forgotten, becoming merged, as it were, in 'the dead'. In a third class of societies the cult of a dead man was continued for generation after generation. We have seen an example of these differences among the three Uganda tribes. Many more will come to our notice.

70. Native Brains. In the preceding paragraphs, I have spoken of uncivilized men and women as 'undeveloped', and have assumed that if their mentality were to be developed, they would become, or at any rate that they are capable of becoming, rationalistic. It is convenient, and apparently necessary, to produce some evidence in support of this assumption.

For my own part I cannot think that it can be disputed by any one who
has had personal experience of life among uncivilized men; but Professor Lévy-Bruhl has published an opinion to the contrary, so I must submit some evidence in support of my assumption.272

Professor Lévy-Bruhl has maintained that the institutions, customs, and beliefs of primitive people imply a mentality which is ‘oriented differently from our own’. ‘By designating it “prelogical”’, he says, ‘I merely wish to state that it does not bind itself down, as our thought does, to avoiding contradictions’.

If by ‘prelogical’ Professor Lévy-Bruhl merely meant that sometimes the native thinks and acts illogically, there would be no point in commenting upon his suggestion, for no one would gainsay such a commonplace; but when he says that the native mind is ‘oriented differently from our own’, he seems to imply that the mentality of uncivilized peoples is of a totally different character from our own, whereas the truth seems to be that it is of a similar character but undeveloped.

Professor Malinowski seems to have been referring to the opinions of the learned French anthropologist when he said: ‘My experience in the field has persuaded me of the complete futility of the theories which attribute to the savage a different type of mind and different logical faculties. The native is not “prelogical” in his beliefs, he is a-logical, for belief in dogmatic thinking does not obey the law of logic among savages any more than among ourselves.’273 Concerning the Loyalty Islanders Mrs. Hadfield has remarked: ‘They are certainly not wanting in mental equipment.’274 Mr. A. I. Hopkins states that the Solomon Islanders ‘have brains and ability with which in due time they may assimilate and not merely copy a higher culture than their own’.275

According to Professor G. Elliot Smith, ‘we know the Australians to be a people of far greater mental power and initiative than the extreme simplicity and crudeness of their material culture would suggest’.276 But a definite piece of evidence has a greater value than the most insistent declaration, so I make the following quotation: ‘The Australian aborigines possess natural qualities which render them capable of civilization. Their general intelligence is quite up to that of the European. An Aboriginal School took the highest place among the National Schools for three successive years. A full blood Aboriginal made quite a name for himself as a scientific inquirer. He was not only a student of Newton; he was also the author of a very practical invention for improving sheep shears by combining curvilinear and straight movement.’277 M. Junod says that he was amazed at the rapidity with which the native brain worked, and he expresses his astonishment at the power of memory which the Baronga exhibited.278 Mr. Gouldsbury and Mr. Sheane state explicitly that according to their experience ‘the Bantu is not hopelessly deficient in logical faculties and reasoning powers’. ‘Up to the age of puberty’, they declare, ‘black children educated with white show much the same intelligence.’279 Duff MacDonald anticipated the conclusions of Professor Lévy-Bruhl, and answered
them before they were written. 'Many facts which I shall lay before the reader', he declares, 'will seem so strange that he may doubt whether these savages have the same minds as Europeans, whether they reason or think in the same way at all. After a man has placed himself in their circumstances, however, and has tried to see and feel as they do, he will understand all their strangeness. He will even see that it would be still more strange if their reasonings and conclusions had been different.'

The American Indians cannot be omitted from this paragraph, because it is well known that their intelligence was keen and logical. They now take their part in modern American life as white men, and are members of modern legislative assemblies. I do not suggest, of course, that membership of a democratic assembly is *prima facie* evidence of a developed and cultivated mind, but the fact will illustrate my contention that there is no inherent difference between the mind of an uncivilized man and the mind of a civilized man. Peter Jones mentions an Ojibwa who passed first class out of Cobourg College and wrote original poems.

Concerning the Hawaiians and Tahitians, Ellis has said: 'That their mental powers are not inferior to those of the generality of mankind has been more fully shown since the establishment of schools... they acquired the first rules of arithmetic with an equal facility [as the reading of books]... they certainly appear to possess an aptness for learning and a quickness in pursuit of it.' Who will doubt, if he knows New Zealand, that Elsdon Best was right when he declared that 'the Maori is mentally acute and possesses keen powers of comprehension'? 'Quickness in learning', he adds, 'is a marked native characteristic.' The same verdict has been pronounced concerning the inhabitants of other Pacific Islands. For instance, Sir Basil Thomson writes: 'Fijians educated in Sydney have been proved to be equal to the average; Tongan boys who have never left the Islands write shorthand and solve problems in higher mathematics.

The evidence is the same from all over the world. The mentality of uncivilized man is of the same type as the mentality of civilized man, and those who maintain that it is possible to develop a mentality by mere education alone would do well to reconsider their position in the light of the facts revealed in this treatise.

This, however, is not the whole of the evidence.

We have many examples of the power of reason being applied by 'primitive' men to their own institutions. Mutesa, the famous Muganda king, took an intelligent interest in a wide range of subjects, and delighted in theological and philosophical discussions. He changed the status of his own gods and introduced other reforms into his society. Finau, a ruling Tongan chief, made no attempt to hide his disbelief in the established institutions of his people, and suffered for his openly expressed doubts. The revolution in Hawaii to which I have referred (para. 48) was the outcome of a genuine rational scepticism, and the lady who was discovered as a stowaway on Captain Cook's second voyage was certainly an incipient
rationalist. ‘She laughed’, Forster tells us, ‘at the prejudices of her countrymen with all the good sense of a citizen of the world.’

Similar examples of a rational unorthodoxy could be cited from many other areas, but I am content to submit these meagre illustrations of a point which no field-worker would hesitate to grant. One further comment, however, is necessary. A cultural advance is never uniform throughout a society. It is seldom that all the members of a rationalistic society are rationalists. Indeed many members of such a society lag so far behind their fellows that their cultural condition can be compared to that of the peoples whom we call uncivilized. When Sir James Frazer speaks of ‘simple folk’, he refers not only to savages and primitives in the popular sense of those terms, but also to the less enlightened members of civilized societies. Professor H. J. Rose has remarked that ‘the British and Welsh countrysides preserve for those who have eyes to see them very many customs and prejudices which pre-suppose savage mentality’. Professor W. McDougall puts the matter in clear terms when he says that ‘the interval between the modern man of scientific culture and the average citizen of our modern states is far greater than that between the latter and the savage’.

There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that the mentality of uncivilized peoples is different from our own; on the contrary, they are capable of full development if and when the conditions are satisfied which renders such development possible. Moreover many members of our own society exhibit the same tendencies as those which, when observed among dark-skinned men and women, are said to illustrate the theory that the mentality of the latter is ‘oriented differently from our own’.

71. Summary of the Foregoing. I will summarize the contents of the foregoing paragraphs.

1. The evidence afforded by a study of the remaining fifty-nine societies will be submitted in the same manner as that of the twenty-one societies discussed in the last chapter, but an attempt will be made to elucidate those cultural details which will assist an interpretation of the observed phenomena.

The sexual regulations of some matrilineal matrilocal societies cannot be fitted to the frame of reference which I have adopted; thus their culture will not assist an interpretation of the facts. Many other societies also will have to be excluded when we discuss the meaning of the evidence, for either their culture has been fitted to an unacceptable frame or the contexts in which they used their words have not been explained.

In Africa there is a geographical area which is ethnographically mysterious.

2. Human culture can be divided into definite patterns which are based on a study of human behaviour; i.e. on rites. There is an intense variety within these patterns. A change in a cultural pattern is due to a change in ideas. Behaviour changes when opinions alter.

3. The basis on which human culture appears to rest is the conception
of, and reaction against, the strange quality in anything unusual or beyond comprehension. Opinions change concerning the nature of the something-beyond-comprehension, and then a revolution takes place in regard to (a) the conception of the power in the universe, (b) the place in which, and (c) the agency through which, a right relation is maintained with that power.

I apply the following descriptive terms to the conceptions of uncivilized men and women: Dead Level of Conception; Confusion between the One and the Many; Temporary Distinction between the One and the Many; Permanent Distinction between the One and the Many. Of these the first is the most important.

4. The word ‘evolution’ cannot be employed in reference to human culture unless it refers to the ebb and flow of the whole cultural process. Hitherto human culture has been in a continual state of flux, but there is not, and there never has been, any ‘evolution’ in the sense of an orderly progress which proceeds in well-defined stages from a definite point. Uncivilized societies cannot be placed upon the intermediate rungs of a cultural ladder between primeval man and twentieth-century white man.

There is no evidence that the magical profession has ‘evolved’ into separate orders as the culture of a society advanced. The priest has not been ‘evolved’ out of the magician. The source of magical and priestly power is the same, i.e. possession of or by the power which is manifest in the universe. The difference between a magician and a priest lies in (1) the nature of the power, (2) the place or places in which they operate, (3) their equipment. Since we can never obtain a certain knowledge of (1) apart from (2), (2) is the only criterion by which we can distinguish the two men.

5. By virtue of their inherent nature the members of the uncivilized societies discussed in this treatise possessed and possess the capacity to achieve the highest culture. The less enlightened members of our own society are on a similar cultural level.

B. MELANESIA AND NEW GUINEA

72. Banks Islanders. We are told that among the Banks Islanders ‘considerable laxity of intercourse between boys and girls undoubtedly existed, and unchastity was not very seriously regarded’. W. H. R. Rivers says that it was usual for the girls to make the first advances. When an unmarried girl wished to have sexual relations with a certain man, she communicated her desires to his paternal aunt. Pre-nuptial children (nat gaegae, child of the thicket) are said to have been rare, but abortion and infanticide were common.291

The power in the universe was vui. The word seems to have denoted anything big or weird. Thus, gai was a vocative meaning ‘You fellow’, but ne vui gai, ‘You exceeding fellow’; lama meant ‘large’, but vui lama ‘exceeding large’. Dr. Codrington states that ‘whenever some impressive touch of natural awe comes upon the native mind it apprehends the presence
of *vui*. When a native saw 'some new or wonderful foreign work' he cried *vui*. Whenever *vui* was present, *mana* was manifest.292

*Vui* was also in certain stones or animals: 'Any man may find a stone for himself, the shape of which strikes his fancy, or some other object, an octopus in his hole, a shark, a snake, an eel, which seems to him something unusual. He gets money and scatters it about the stone or on the place where he has seen the object of his fancy.' The place was then *rongo*, sacred', owing to its association with *vui*. Or a man might happen on a boulder or on a rock, and, struck by its appearance, he would conclude that *vui* was there: 'The stone was then *rongo*, and the place in which it lay was *rongo*; the man constituted himself the master of the sanctuary; it was his *marana* within which none but himself or those brought in by him could come.'293

Most men had such a stone or such a sanctuary. The man who possessed it was *mana*, and became rich and influential; his neighbour would hear of his success and come to him in order to obtain a share of his power; he might hand on his knowledge to a successor. There was no priestly order, no sacred building, no public ceremony. The place where the man made his offering was also called his *tano-oolo*, the place of his offering. The distinction between the *marana* and the *tano-oolo* is not made clear.294

The magician, *gismana*, was a man who possessed a *vui* stone or a *marana*. To such a man application was made in times of stress and sickness. He assisted his fellows by manipulating his *vui* on their behalf. The idea that *vui* which was in certain places and things could be extracted by the owner of that place or thing was the basis on which the whole life of the Banks Islanders was organized.295 A ghost was *tamate*, but there was no tendance or cult,296 though perhaps in the inheritance of a *marana* we may see the germ of the cult that existed in the South-east Solomon Islands (para. 33).

The weather was controlled by *vui* stones. Certain round stones brought sunshine; other stones made rain; others again collected or dispersed a wind. The inhabitants had implicit belief in the power of those who possessed these stones, and on one occasion a party of indignant citizens attacked the village of a sun-controller because he was causing a drought.297

Thus the Banks Islanders, who permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom, were in the zoistic condition; but they were not at a dead level of conception. The word *tamate*, which is translated 'ghost' (sing.), seems to have been used under such circumstances that other observers might have translated it as 'ghosts' (pl.) or even as the dead'. We have no right to conclude that this was one of its meanings, however, and I make the observation in order to point out that the choice of the singular or of the plural renderings is sometimes due to the character of the observer more than to the native usage.

73. Trobriand Islanders. No difficult problem arises from the study of the Trobriand Islanders. Professor Bronislaw Malinowski has described
their culture and their customs so fully and so fluently that they have become a locus classicus of social anthropology. ‘Everything which vitally concerns the native’, we are told, ‘is accompanied by magic; all economic activities have their magic; love, welfare of babies, talents and crafts, beauty and agility—all can be fostered or frustrated by magic; disease, health or death are also the result of magic or of counter-magic.’

Professor Malinowski defines magic as ‘an attempt to govern the forces of nature directly by means of special lore’: ‘It is a specific power, essentially human, autonomous and independent in its action.’ I have been unable to discover the native term for magic power, which is said to have been derived from the possession of spells, which could be transferred to a successor: ‘This [magic] power is an inherent property of certain words, uttered by the man entitled to do it through his social traditions and through certain observances which he has to keep. The words and acts have this power in their own right, and their action is direct and not mediated by any other agency. Their power is not derived from the authority of spirits or demons or supernatural beings. It is not conceived as having been wrested from nature. The belief in the power of words and rites as a fundamental and irreducible force is the ultimate basic dogma of their magical creed.’

Success in all economic pursuits depended upon the performance of effective magic: magic dominated the kula, the system of barter conducted with the inhabitants of adjacent archipelagoes; a special gebobo magic had to be sung when the gebobo or main cargo compartment of a ship was being made; the kaloma spells had to be recited when the people fished for the spondylus shell; the lilaua, a bundle of representative trade goods, had its special song; ka'ulana'i was the magic of safety; savyugu denoted the songs that had to accompany the lashing of a canoe. And so on.

In a similar manner, all misfortunes of an incalculable or unusual character were thought to be due to sorcery. Anti-social activity of any description was balubwalata, a generic term which covered ‘all forms of evil magic and witchery’. It made pigs run from their owners, alienated the affections of a lover, made a canoe sluggish in the water, afflicted garden produce, and caused rain and famine. A great deal of trouble was caused to the other magicians by the activities of the boaga'u, who indulged in balubwalata. There was no tendance or cult: ‘They are completely devoid’, Professor Malinowski says, ‘of any fear of ghosts, of any of those uncanny feelings with which we face the idea of a possible return of the dead; all their fears and dread are reserved for black magic.’* There were no temples.

Concerning the pre-nuptial sexual regulations of the Trobriand Islanders, Professor Malinowski has written at length. Boys and girls were initiated into the mysteries of sexual life at an early age; it was not long before they were carrying on regular amours. Both sexes were in the habit of organizing expeditions (ulatila, male; katuyausi, female) in search of amorous adventures; adolescents entertained their sexual partners in the bachelors’ hall. Such pre-nuptial alliances were usual, but the parties were not allowed to
The girl who was delivered of a pre-nuptial child was regarded with disfavour, but she was not punished. As a rule such a child was adopted by a married member of her family, the identity of its mother being kept as secret as possible. Contraceptives were rarely used, Professor Malinowski says, but abortion seems to have been practised. The dislike of pre-nuptial children is said to have been due to their fatherless condition. The islanders were matrilineal, but marriage was patrilocal.304

Thus the Trobriand Islanders were in the zoistic condition; and they permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom.

Before passing on to New Guinea I wish to notice an important contribution which Professor Malinowski has made to the study of social anthropology by insisting that the Trobriand Islanders possessed a certain amount of empirical knowledge. Such common troubles as coughs, colds, aches and pains, which may have been contracted by exposure, over-eating, over-strain, or bad food, were not regarded as due to supernormal causes. Similarly no spells were recited over the little canoes which were paddled only in the calm sea or in the lagoon, for these did not face the supernormal dangers of the open sea.305 In the same way, when we were discussing the treatment of sickness among the three Uganda societies, the Bakitara, Baganda, and Banyankole (paras. 37–40), we saw that they did not assume the anger of a ghost unless the sickness did not yield to treatment. Moreover, the propitiation or transference of the ghost did not heal the disease; it removed the supernormal cause.

This point is important, for it reveals the fact that the methods of treatment which the Trobriand Islanders adopted were based on the amount of knowledge they possessed or had inherited. Their faith in their medicine-men was due to nothing but their ignorance. I do not deny that this faith may have assisted their recovery, but I submit that the limited knowledge they possessed prevented many recoveries that might have been made if that knowledge had been more extensive.

It is worth noting that the Trobriand Islanders regarded the disease or death of a pig as disease or death, simply, that is, part of the inherent nature of things; but they considered that a grave human disease or a human death was due to sorcery.306

74. Kiwai Papuans. Among the Kiwai Papuans, who lived at the mouth of the Fly River in Papua (British New Guinea), young lovers used to meet, especially at night. It was regarded, Dr. Landtman says, ‘as the natural course of things that sexual intimacy took place between lovers when they had a chance’. This sexual freedom seems to have been unlimited, but since no girl could marry a boy who did not possess a sister whom he could give in exchange for her, parents were inclined to watch over their daughters ‘with extreme care’. This exchange of daughters was a common method of arranging a marriage, and if, as happened sometimes, a couple had the temerity to arrange their own marriage, a fight always took place between
the girl’s people and the boy’s people. I can find no definite report in regard to pre-nuptial children.\textsuperscript{307}

The pre-nuptial regulations of the Kiwai Papuans therefore, though they permitted pre-nuptial freedom, appear to have been such as might have resulted in a reduction of sexual opportunity if these ideas of parental control, based on economic considerations, were to have been put into practice. There seems to have been present among these natives the germ of the idea that a betrothed girl should confine her sexual activities to the man whom her parents had chosen for her. The Kiwai Papuans were in the zoistic cultural condition, but not at a dead level of conception. They used a different word to denote ‘something unusual’ from the one they used in reference to a ghost; and just as an irregular or occasional continence might have been compelled without any undue revolution in the social order, so the nature of some of their rites suggests that they could have been manistic without any undue revolution in their ideas.

Dr. Landtman remarks: ‘They have no systematized ideas as to the supernatural world in which everybody believes, and no priests. No public cult exists; no prayers are said or offerings made in which a larger or smaller group of the population participated. The conception of spiritual things differs somewhat from one group, or even individual, to another. Practices and observances vary still more.’\textsuperscript{308} ‘The common name for anything mysterious’ (these are Dr. Landtman’s own words) was ebihare (obihare, obisare); ‘any inexplicable noise’ also was ebihare; sometimes sacred objects and medicines also were called by that name.\textsuperscript{309} ‘An animistic interpretation’ is given to the word by Dr. Landtman, and this inference may have been responsible for the character of the report concerning the alleged ‘Collected Groups of Land Beings’, etengena (same, Daudai), ororarora (Kiwai Islands), the latter being said to have been ‘the common name of a rather indefinite group of beings’.\textsuperscript{310} It is clear that these words have not been translated literally, but since we are not told the contexts in which they were used, we can draw no definite conclusion about them. Perhaps the conceptions differed in different districts. Anyway, ‘every man was his own priest and also sorcerer’. Other people joined in his simple rites so long as it seemed to be of any avail to do so, the details of those rites being revealed to him in dreams. If he failed, his companions tried some other form of magic.\textsuperscript{311} Magic, indeed, was all-powerful. Such activities as agriculture, hunting, harpooning of dugong and turtle, fishing, and fighting had to be accompanied by the proper incantations and observances. And it was as possible for a man to destroy another man’s luck as to ensure his own.\textsuperscript{312}

The usual word for ‘ghost’ was oboro; another word for ‘ghost’, marakai (markai), was applied also to white men. The phrase oboro-tama, ‘skin of oboro’, i.e. clothes, however, suggests that oboro was not applied exclusively to the dead, for apparently it was used in regard to native apparel as well as to the more extensive garments of the white man. Yet another
word, **urio**, is translated as ‘ghost’, though usually as ‘soul’; so it seems that the full native usage of these words, as well as of *etengena* and *ororarora*, is not known to us.\(^{313}\) The living could always control the dead by means of simple magical expedients. No warrior feared the ghost of a man whom he had killed, and although the dead were capable of giving advice in dreams (most Kiwai magical observances seem to have been revealed in dreams) there was no tendency. Sometimes pieces of food were cast aside for the dead, but such attentions were individual, irregular, and impulsive; they were not carried out for any particular purpose.\(^{314}\) Yet the germ of the ideas which prompt tendance appears to have been present, for the ghost of a man who had been killed by a crocodile was called *sibara-adi*ri. In order to lay this fearsome thing, ‘the people built a small hut at the place where the man met his death and put fire inside’.\(^{315}\)

The cause of sickness was a matter which the people seem to have been reluctant to discuss. An illness which was not due to natural causes was ascribed to sorcery or to ‘spirits’. I have already pointed out that in Dr. Landtman’s report a number of different words are translated as ‘spirits’ and that their native meaning is uncertain, so it is impossible to say what word the natives used or to discover the other contexts in which they used the word which they applied to a sickness. We must simply accept the report as it is written. ‘Spirits’ could be kept away by beating drums or by placing a *gope* in front of the house. A *gope* was a piece of wood on which a human face had been designed: *gope* he look; he watch; sick he no can come’. Internal diseases were treated by methods of a ‘magical character’. Witchcraft was *givari*. The *givari dobo* acted as wizard and as medicine-man, each *givari dobo* having his own particular methods. ‘All the big men’ were *givari dobo*. Perhaps that is why they were ‘big men’.\(^{316}\)

Various ‘medicines’ were employed in weather-control. Sometimes an old practitioner was entrusted with this important work, but each department of weather-control had its specialist, though his operations were not always as simple as that of the magician who dispersed the rain-clouds by speaking through a hole in a banana leaf.\(^{317}\)

75. **Mafulu**. Instead of pursuing an easterly course along the southern coast of Papua, and examining the tribes in geographical order, I propose to dart straight across the Gulf of Papua into the mountainous interior. The Mafulu were a tribe who lived there at a point due north of Port Moresby and due east of the mouth of the Fly River.

Dr. A. C. Haddon has expressed the opinion that the Mafulu ‘are essentially a Negrito people, modified to some extent by Papuan and possibly Papuo-Melanesian influence’.\(^{318}\) The evidence concerning their cultural condition, scanty though it is, is important. It is yet another instance of the coincidence of pre-nuptial sexual freedom and the zoistic cultural condition.

Among the Mafulu, Mr. Williamson says, unmarried boys and girls ‘are allowed to associate together, without any special precautions to prevent...
misconduct, and a good deal of immorality exists’. ‘It may certainly be said that sexual morality among men, women, boys, and girls is very low.’ I can find no mention of their attitude towards pre-nuptial children. Sometimes a couple were betrothed as children, but the event did not reduce their sexual opportunity. 319

These people neither erected temples nor paid any post-funeral attention to their dead. Mr. Williamson does not give the native words which he translates ‘spirit’, ‘ghost’, and ‘magic man’; but he tells us that ‘any place which has something specially peculiar or unusual in its appearance is likely to be regarded as the abode of a spirit’. The people seem to have paid no attention to such places except by walking quickly when they passed them and by throwing down a piece of grass which had been plucked for the purpose. As soon as a person was dead, all the men of the village shouted. ‘The shout frightens away the ghost.’ ‘There are no prayers, incantations, or other ceremonies for the purpose of placating or intimidating or in any way influencing the ghost.’ The dead are said to have become a plant sometimes, or a shimmering light on the ground. 320 Perhaps the truth was that the Mafulu applied the same word to some dead men, to certain plants, and to strange light-effects.

Very few incantations seem to have been used by the Mafulu except when they went hunting or fishing; these were of a spasmodic and impulsive character. The ‘magic man’, whose power came from ‘spirits’, was thought to be responsible for ‘all serious ailments occurring up to certain ages’. The same men also attended the sick, employing for this purpose stones or ashes which had been charged with the magic of their spells. The usual protection against affliction was a charm or an amulet. 321

The ‘magic man’ who dealt in weather-control merely prophesied the probable behaviour of the weather. The people, we are told, did not ‘expect him to prevent or bring about rain or in any way hold him responsible for the weather’. 322

76. Purari. We return to the coast. The culture of the Purari, and especially that of the Koriki, one of the four tribes which constituted the group, possessed many individual characteristics. Fascinating though these peculiarities are, they must be passed over, for they represent that variety within the pattern which is an integral part of all uncivilized life but with which we are not concerned. The Purari were zoistic, but there was current among them the germ of those ideas which seem to be responsible for the change to the manistic condition. Fortunately, our chief authority on Purari culture, Mr. F. E. Williams, speaks throughout in native terms. His excellent monograph was written in order to describe Purari life as he found it. He was not concerned with fitting Purari culture to any theoretical frame.

The power in the universe was *imunu*, a word which Mr. Williams makes no attempt to translate. Sometimes it was qualified according to the place
of manifestation: thus, *irimunu, imunu* of the bush, *erimunu, imunu* of the water, *kaieimu, imunu* of the sky. 'Although he uses these suggestive names', Mr. Williams observes, 'the sensible adult does not believe the universe to be peopled with a multitude of creatures or spirits called *imunu*. On the whole it is safe to regard the word *imunu* as adjective rather than substantive. It stands for a quality or a blend of qualities.' 'The essential feature of the complex', Mr. Williams says, was that the native was in touch 'with some power which he does not understand and admits that he does not understand.' The *imunu*-quality was manifest in 'certain tangible objects' which were 'admittedly beyond his understanding'. Such objects exhibited 'a dangerous potency'. 'The attributes of sacredness, secrecy, and preciousness are', Mr. Williams thinks, 'possibly derivative.'

In these passages Mr. Williams is stating in plain terms that the fundamental basis of Purari conceptions was the 'something-beyond-comprehension' which I have already suggested (para. 63) is the basis on which the three uncivilized cultural conditions rest.

The Purari considered that the dead were of no account: 'When a man is dead and gone, he is done with.' A man 'dies finish'.324 Yet there was one curious custom which must be noted, namely the Kairi ceremony, so called after the man who was reputed to have instituted it. It is reported to have been general throughout the Purari, but it has been observed only among the Koriki.

Some few months after the first burial, the skull of a dead man was exhumed and carried to the house of a relative. The head was kept in the back of the house and a bowl of food might (but this is uncertain) be placed near it for a short time. The food is said to have been for the *a'avaia*, 'soul' or 'ghost'. When it was decided to hold the Kairi ceremony, all exhumed heads were taken to the *ravi*, men's house; they were decorated and then placed in a row. A great feast was held and food was offered to the heads; pigs and dogs were slaughtered once more when the skulls were reinterrred. Then the ceremonial leader cried: 'Depart now for good and all. Never return to our village. All these bodies of pigs and dogs are for you. Now I bury you under the ground. You are done with for ever.'

I do not think that we should be wrong if we interpreted this action as evidence that the idea which might have promoted tendance existed. The custom cannot be called tendance, for the offerings were not definitely post-funeral; nor was it practised universally; but it seems only a short step from the Kairi ceremony to placing food upon a platform or in a grave-house. The ceremony is noteworthy also because it provides a valid instance of a new rite which was introduced into a society by a single individual.

The treatment of sickness consisted of either common-sense cures or magical performances. Special objects, *ruimunu, imunu* of the palm spathe, were used as charms to defend pigs against disease. The wizard, *ivavi*, does not seem to have been feared greatly; the people were indifferent to the
fate of their body refuse and clippings. Opinions varied concerning the cause of death, which might, or might not, be due to ivavi. The dapu, medicine-man, indulged in magical cures which seem to have been invented ad hoc, and the Kaieimunu (the word was applied to some wicker-work figures as well as to the sky; see n. 323) might reveal the cause of a stubborn sickness, and even bring it about.\(^{326}\)

If rain held off, a keen gardener would belabour a large tree (imunu-tree?) with a stick, and continue daily until rain came; this method of rain-making had never been known to fail. Professional rain-makers were rare (Mr. Williams was acquainted only with three), and for the most part the Purari seem to have thought that rain and sunshine came of their own accord. Rain-making seems to have been regarded as an affliction rather than a blessing, for we read that 'rain-making was not a common charge; should there be a downpour, a man does not leap to the conclusion that it has been precipitated by some vile sorcerer'.\(^{327}\)

The zoistic Purari are said to have 'severely deprecated loose conduct in unmarried girls', but 'there was certainly opportunity for sexual gratification placed before the young men'. Youths visited their betrothed at night. I can find no statement concerning pre-nuptial children, but abortifacients and contraceptives, both magical and mechanical, were common. The report, however, may apply only to married women. We are told also that 'the unmarried girl was allowed no loose conduct', and that no unmarried girl was allowed to take part in the amina ceremony, during which married people had sexual relations with pre-arranged extra-matrimonial partners. Probably the phrase 'the morals of the Purari were very lax' refers to this ceremony. It is not definitely so stated, but it seems that unmarried girls who were betrothed usually confined their sexual activities to their betrothed. Child betrothals were common.\(^{328}\)

The reported care of the girls is not evidence of occasional compulsory continence, but it is clear that a girl might have been required to reserve herself for her betrothed without any undue revolution of the social order.

77. Koita. Among the Koita, who lived in the neighbourhood of Port Moresby, girls were 'habitually unchaste'; continence was almost unknown. Many girls received their lovers at night in their parents' houses, and although it was customary for the youth to take his departure before daylight, nothing but a little chaff resulted if he over-slept. Marriage was neither suggested nor desired by either party. A proposal of marriage might be made by the girl, and her lover might assent; in that case, the nocturnal meetings continued. If, however, the boy did not wish to marry, he assented at the time and then sent his special friend, henamo, to say that he did not desire to marry after all. As a rule, sexual relations then ceased. Illegitimate children were rare, and, although abortion was practised, it was less common than might have been supposed.\(^{329}\)

The word for 'soul' was sua. When a man was sick or died, his sua left
him. If the proper funeral rites had been carried out, the *sua* of a dead man was absolutely harmless. No post-funeral attention was paid to any dead man, and after the final feast a surviving brother cried: 'We have eaten for and in remembrance of the dead. Now let us worry no more about him since he has ceased from among us.'330 There were no temples.

A power called *tabu* is said to have been manifest in certain places, which were identified by the occurrence of sickness or death after camping, eating, sitting, or urinating there. *Tabu* is reported to have existed also in a hill surrounded by dense jungle, in certain snakes, in a snake-hole, and in a large tree. The reports, however, are scanty. Charms and magic stones created fertility, assisted love affairs, and controlled the weather; they also assisted all forms of hunting and fishing.331

The incantations which were sung over a sick man constituted his cure. The native terms for 'sorcerer' and 'medicine-woman' are not given. If the labour was difficult, and the ordinary methods of treatment had failed, a medicine-woman attended a confinement.332

Thus the Koita were pre-nuptially sexually free, zoistic, and in no way remarkable. We will pass on to the Mailu, who lived along the coast still farther east.

78. Mailu. Among the Mailu the young boys and girls were free to choose their lovers. No girl, we are told, was a virgin when she was betrothed. The custom of having a lover was *vivi*; usually the girl took the initiative. Marriage was neither expected on the one side nor intended on the other. Professor Malinowski passes a more gentle judgement on the native conduct than does the Rev. W. J. V. Savile, and it is from him that we learn of the blame which attached to a girl who changed her lover too often. He says also that as soon as a girl was betrothed her sexual activities ceased until actual marriage. Illegitimate children appear to have been rare, but contraception and abortion are said to have been common.333

The Mailu maintained a right relation with the powers in the universe (apparently these were rather vaguely conceived) by means of spells, *uura*. The power of the spell was the basis on which their practices were founded: 'Apart from the spell practical magic is ineffective.' Each individual possessed his own spells for his fishing, gardening, and hunting; he handed them on, with their *tapu* attached to them, to a successor. The rainfall seems to have been adequate and regular, and I can find no mention of weather magic. Mr. Savile, however, emphasizes the part which the 'unknown' played in Mailu life.

The people had to observe *gora* and *sora* (*tora*), social and individual *tapu*. The former included those things forbidden by the will of man as well as those interdictions that rested upon a supernatural sanction. The nature of those sanctions among the Mailu is somewhat obscure. One of the main purposes of the more common forms of *gora* seems to have been to protect the fruit of a cocoa-nut tree over which an individual possessed
exclusive rights. The word *sora* (*tora*) was also applied to the things forbidden to the owner of a particular spell. The efficacy of the spell depended upon the observance of these taboos.\(^{334}\)

The native words for 'soul' and 'ghost' are uncertain; at any rate, they are variously reported. 'Whether or not the natives are afraid of the dead,' Professor Malinowski remarks, 'at least immediately after death, must be left open'; but he was told, he says, 'unanimously and emphatically', that ghosts were 'absolutely innocuous'. Mr. Savile also is explicit on the point: 'Ghosts of the dead are apparently unknown to our people.' 'We know nothing of ghosts,' the people declared, 'they belong to another world.' Thus there was no tendance and no cult. If, indeed, the Mailu had had any such intention, they had ample opportunity to put it into action, for two or three months after burial the head was cut off from an exhumed corpse and placed in a basket which was kept in the house. While it was there it was affectionately regarded but not propitiated or conciliated.\(^{335}\)

According to Mr. Savile, 'all sickness and death was attributed to *barau* or *karaveni* ', the wizard and the witch. No care, however, was taken of body refuse or clippings. The counter-magic of the *vara*, medicine-man, was called *capu*; like the *barau*, the *vara* relied upon spells. It is interesting, and perhaps important, to note that the man who was *vara* to the members of his own clan was *barau* to the members of another clan, and vice versa.\(^{336}\)

It is such facts as these which militate strongly against the idea of social evolution which I criticized in para. 66. The fact that the Todas applied different terms to the wizard and the medicine-man has been quoted by Sir James Frazer in support of the idea that a differentiation of the various branches of the magical profession takes place as a society evolves. The Mailu also used separate words for the two men, but the words did not denote two branches of the magical profession. The activities of a *vara* were the same as those of a *barau*.

Thus the Mailu were another zoistic people, and once more we have to note the coincidence of that cultural condition with pre-nuptial freedom.

The last New Guinea society with which we deal is that of the Orakaiva. The Orakaiva inhabited the northern district of Papua.

79. *Orakaiva* (*Binandele-speaking tribes*). Mr. F. E. Williams has written his reports on the Orakaiva from the point of view of Government Anthropologist. Admittedly it is his duty, as Government Anthropologist, to assist 'the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants', and it is incumbent on him, if such are his views, to state a case for native peasant proprietorship, and even to declare that Christianity should be introduced in 'a very plastic and adaptable form'; but from the point of view of a student who wishes to learn the character of the native culture it is unfortunate that in his study of the Orakaiva Mr. Williams discarded the methods he adopted so successfully in his monograph on the Purari. That excellent monograph is a model of exact description
based on personal observation; Mr. Williams was content to record the results of his researches without theorizing about them; but in his reports on the tribes which inhabited the northern division of Papua he has interlaced his inferences with the facts. Interpretation of 'mental attitudes' accompanies, and almost replaces, the bare record; and a clear understanding of Orakaiva culture is almost impossible.

This is particularly the case with the passages in which Mr. Williams describes the attention which may have been paid to the dead. These rites are of vital importance to us, and a mere description of the native practices would be difficult enough, for they are baffling and puzzling; but when we have to extract the facts from a maze of psychological interpretation the task is unenviable. Mr. Williams tries to 'account for a belief'; he makes little attempt to describe either the belief or the rite based upon it. He describes 'the mental and moral attitude towards the dead'; the rites which were conducted in honour of the dead are only implied or mentioned en passant. These rites may have deserved the label 'hocus-pocus' which Mr. Williams attaches to them, but it is important to know exactly what they were, and I am not sure that it is possible to separate the inferences from the facts. Nor am I alone in doubting whether the precise truth has been reported. Mr. Williams himself seems to realize that the character of his statements has been influenced by his interpretations. For instance, we are told that when a man was dead, he was sovaï. For this reason the word sovaï is translated both 'ghost' (sing.) and 'spirits of the dead' (pl.); we are told also that sovaï was conceived as (1) immaterial but retaining human characteristics, (2) taking the concrete form of a beast, reptile, or fish, (3) a semi-human monster inhabiting the bush; but, Mr. Williams adds, 'it might be nearer the truth to say that there are imaginary monsters, fiends, hobgoblins, to whom the name sovaï was extended, and who are thus identified with the spirits of the dead'. The confession is welcome, for it reveals that Mr. Williams was conscious of having confused the meaning of sovaï with the phenomena to which it was applied, but I confess I cannot estimate the amount of inference which the report contains. Can it be merely that the word sovaï was applied to the dead (or a corpse), to some animals, and to some quality which was manifest in some natural phenomena? Has the application of sovaï to a dead man caused Mr. Williams to translate it as 'ghost' and then to conclude that all the other phenomena to which it was applied were 'identified' with the dead? I confess to grave doubts on the matter, and these doubts are increased when I read that most of the sicknesses which were ascribed to 'ghosts' were caused by sovaï in some animal form. Can it be that the sickness was sovaï, simply? The application of the same term to different phenomena does not involve their identification, and though Mr. Williams declares that the beliefs were 'confused and indefinite' I am not sure that the confusion does not exist only in his translations and interpretations.

During recent years the northern district of Papua has been the scene of
spasmodic outbursts of religious fanaticism. Newly invented cults (products of an individual mind, be it noted) have spread like a prairie fire, and have been extinguished with all speed by an active Government. Nineteen years ago the baigona-cult (snake-cult) was in vogue; the influence it exercised was still apparent when Mr. Williams visited the area. One of the salient points of the baigona-cult was that 'a great variety of animals and reptiles were held sacred'. We are not told the native word which is translated 'sacred'. It may have been sovai, for apparently the baigona magicians were the only men who could cure a sickness which had been caused by sovai; they expelled it from the body. When the baigona-cult was stamped out by the Government another cult, the taro-cult, arose from its ashes and spread in its turn. The taro-cult was inaugurated by a man who claimed to be possessed by the 'spirit of the taro' and the cult is reported vaguely as the 'worship' or 'placation' of the taro. The native term for the 'spirit' of the taro was asisi (atiti), which is also translated as 'soul', 'shadow', or 'double'. When it was applied to a man it is said to have referred to the double which was seen, or had experiences, in dreams.

Such are the bare facts in regard to these two cults. Now Mr. Williams says that (1) the converts to the taro-cult changed its significance and transformed it from a 'worship' of the taro into the worship of the 'spirits of the dead', (2) the word asisi was supplanting the word sovai as the term for 'ghost'. But there are difficulties. The word sovai was used only by the Aiga tribe (whom Mr. Williams seems to have known better than the other tribes); in Binandele the word was binei, Wasida entahi, Hunjara siango. The taro-cult originated near the mouth of the Mambari River in the Binandele country. Every native must have known that atiti was the Binandele form of asisi and that binei was the Binandele form of sovai. How then can Mr. Williams say that asisi was supplanting sovai? If Binandele influence were responsible for supplanting an Aiga word, surely the new word would have been binei, not asisi. Again, is it not curious that the converts to a new cult should change its significance in the manner which Mr. Williams suggests? Can it be that his translations are responsible for this strange phenomenon? I have suggested that sovai did not mean 'ghost', and that it was merely applied to the dead, as well as to some animals and other phenomena. Thus I am inclined to accept his statement that asisi was supplanting sovai, but not as meaning 'ghost'. I think that his suggestions (1) that asisi was changing its meaning into 'ghost', (2) that the taro-cult was changing its form and becoming a worship of the dead, are both inferences from a false translation of sovai as 'ghost'.

These comments will illustrate the amount of inference and interpretation which is contained in Mr. Williams's report. The following description of Orakaiva culture is offered, and should be received, with reserve.

After a corpse had been exposed on a sloping platform, bahari, it was placed in a grave, use. Then 'an elderly man' exclaimed: 'Go now . . .
where there are neither mosquitoes nor marsh-flies, but where there are taros and pigs. Send us pigs and send us taros and we shall make a feast in your honour.' After the final mortuary ceremony the chief man of the village cried out the names of all the recently deceased men and bade them go down into the sea and turn into sovai creatures, crocodiles, sharks, or water-snakes. We are not told the native words of this speech, and I cannot tell how much inference the report contains, but 'after this, the sovai' (here meaning 'ghosts') 'would be afraid to remain in the neighbourhood'.

This suggests that the living controlled the dead by mere word of mouth, but I have found a passing reference to two practices which suggest a nascent tendance. (1) Peni—some young men used to perambulate the village carrying a pig on a pole or some cooked food in a dish. They beat drums as they proceeded. At every house they either laid the pig for a moment on the verandah or left there a morsel of cooked food. It is said that this ceremony was designed to placate sovai, which were thought to be haunting their old homes. We are not told whether the custom was regular and universal, or whether it was carried out only after a display of sovai malignancy. 'In the main', we are told, 'it was only the more recently deceased dead who were thought to frequent the village.' (2) The following casual mention of a rite, which might be important, accompanies a photograph: 'Both in the gardens and in the villages may be seen small platforms, harau, of food offerings, sometimes with miniature ladders of the most fragile construction, to assist the sovai in climbing up.' We are not told whether the practice was regular or whether Mr. Williams came across an isolated instance and was impressed by it.

On this evidence, did the Orakaiva practise ancestor-tendance? I confess that I am unable to answer the question. I incline to a tentative affirmative. I can extract from the reports no more reliable facts in regard to the treatment of the dead.

The weather was controlled by magic, but no magician could affect the sunshine or the rain which had been manufactured by a fellow worker; his powers were limited to the control of the natural elements. Sometimes garden magic and other forms of magic were revealed in dreams by the dead. As a rule the failure of any crop was attributed to witchcraft. Sickness, ambu, is said to have been regarded as intrusive, so the methods of treatment were necessarily expulsive. A sickness due to witchcraft (inta, kai, saruka) could not be cured by counter-magic; the wizard had to be prevailed upon to relent. 'Natural' illnesses were treated by the Orakaiva in as 'natural' a manner as their conceptions of the natural allowed, but, as I have already said, only a baigona could treat a person who was afflicted by sovai. Usually, we are told, it was the sovai animals, which the baigona wizards had made sovai, which caused such affliction.

In regard to sexual matters, Mr. Williams discusses sexual conduct rather than sexual regulation and has described the conduct of the Orakaiva in exceedingly vague terms. Some checks seem to have been placed upon
the young people, but I am unable to say what they were. 'Young people do not give their passions an entirely free rein' is as explicit a statement as I can find. During the initiation ceremony, we are told, 'morality is loosened'. The phrase is not helpful. Apparently there was some promiscuous intercourse between the men and women who had been initiated on a previous occasion. The following passage also applies to this subject: 'There is no actual prohibition against sexual freedom before marriage but it is nevertheless regarded as the proper thing to abstain.' Mr. Williams considers that it is at least 'partly true' that unmarried boys and girls slept together 'for nothing'. 'I am convinced', he says, 'that a great deal of the love-making, even the sleeping together, is innocent.'

Maybe; but we can hardly evaluate the sexual opportunity of the young people from such declarations.

I will summarize the information which is afforded by a study of these eight societies.

80. Summary and Chart. Let us leave the Orakaiva on one side for a moment and consider the other seven societies, Banks Islanders, Trobriand Islanders, Kiwai Papuans, Mafulu, Purari, Koita, and Mailu. Pre-nuptial sexual freedom was permitted among them, and they were without exception in the zoistic cultural condition; that is to say, they neither erected buildings in which they maintained a right relation with the powers in the universe, nor paid any post-funeral attention to the dead. This is the one definite fact which emerges from an analysis of the facts.

It would be wrong, of course, to conclude that the pre-nuptial regulations of all these societies were identical; they merely conformed to the same pattern. The evidence is not sufficiently exact to warrant a closer analysis. At the same time, indications are not lacking that some differences existed between them. The system of early betrothal and girl-exchange which was in vogue among the Kiwai Papuans may have caused the young people to place some checks upon the impulses which they might have indulged if the relations between the sexes had been regulated in a different manner; and it is plain that the Purari girl, and therefore also the Purari boy, was not afforded the same complete sexual opportunity which was enjoyed, for instance, by the Mafulu youths. The strength of this evidence is not great, and we cannot place these two societies in a different category from the others, but if I were asked to select from these seven societies those which showed signs of reducing the pre-nuptial sexual opportunity of their members, I should choose the Kiwai Papuans and the Purari. And then, from the knowledge which these researches have afforded me, I should predict that in all probability their customs would reveal signs of a cultural advance in the sense in which I am using the term.

(Parenthetically, I think that the indefinite character of our knowledge in regard to the sexual regulations of uncivilized peoples is due, in no small measure, to our tendency to study only sexual conduct. Most natives are
sufficiently quick-witted to realize that a white man is not reluctant to make a moral judgement, and, though we may not be flagrantly censorious, there are few of us who can discuss sexual conduct with complete detachment. The native is soon conscious of this mood, and the paucity of our information may be due to a reluctance on the part of the native to discuss the matter with those whose standpoint is so different from his own. If our inquiries were to be directed towards regulations rather than conduct, we should not only increase the quality of our data, but also find, I think, that we possessed some valuable evidence which was capable of more exact classification.)

It would be equally wrong to conclude that the cultural practices of these seven societies were similar because they were in the same cultural condition; they merely conformed to the same pattern. Here again the evidence could have been more minutely examined if the actions of the natives had been described at greater length and if their opinions had been less fully interpreted and adjudged. Yet it is possible to select from the seven societies those of which the reported practices were of such a character as to reveal where the differences in those practices lay. It is to the Kiwai Papuans and the Purari that I refer. If the ideas that prompted the attention which the Kiwai Papuans paid to sibara-adiri, and which were responsible for the inauguration of the Kairi ceremony among the Purari, were given a slightly extended operation, probably there would ensue such post-funeral rites as would have to be classified as tendance. No such ideas were current among the Mafulu, for instance, who experienced no sexual checks of any kind; and though I have no desire to emphasize the importance of these vague indications the coincidence is sufficiently remarkable to deserve mention.

It is noteworthy that the Mafulu should regard the body of a 'chief' (the term is too vague to justify the omission of the inverted commas) as worthy of a special ceremony. If Mr. Williamson has interpreted its meaning correctly, the custom might be a good starting-point for an inquiry into the identity of those men who have been the subject of post-funeral attention. I suspect that in the majority of cases there has been tendance only of those men whose manner of birth, life, or death was in some way supernormal. The attention which the Kiwai Papuans paid to sibara-adiri supports this suggestion. I discuss the subject later (para. 149).

None of these societies was at a dead level of conception; but the words applied to the dead (or to corpses) are confusing; and there is no information concerning the contexts in which the words were used. Moreover there is some danger that the meaning of a word may have been confused with the phenomena to which it was applied. Bad translations also complicate our studies. The descriptions of Banks Island culture, for instance, have been confused by the employment of such question-begging terms as 'sacrifice' and 'prayer'; and we do not know the contexts in which the word tamate was employed. I suspect also that the Trobriand Island word
baloma may have been used under a variety of circumstances of which we are ignorant. The Kiwai oboro and the Purari a’avaia cannot be elucidated without further evidence. It seems doubtful whether the translation of the Koita word sua as ‘ghost’ is accurate, if by that term we understand the new identity which is thought to be assumed by a man after death.

It is only among the Banks Islanders and the Purari that the term is given which reveals the source of magic power. This was vui and imunu, respectively. In each case the word was applied to ‘something-beyond-comprehension’. Among the Trobriand Islanders and the Mailu, of whom Professor Malinowski has written, the possession of spells gave their owners magic power; but we are not told the word which the natives applied to the power which the spells contained. Similarly, the knowledge revealed to him in a dream must have possessed in the eyes of a Kiwai Papuan a power for which he had a name; but the word is not given. No information of any certain character is available on this point concerning the Koita and the Mafulu.

Only in three cases can we come to any definite conclusion concerning the nature of the power in the universe. In each case the power was manifest only in anything unusual or supernormal, i.e. Banks Island vui, Kiwai ebihare, and Purari imunu. In the opinion of the Mafulu, too, ‘spirits’ existed only in places which were ‘specially peculiar or unusual’.

In regard to the Orakaiva, who are in many ways the most interesting people of the eight, there is only one observation to make: more evidence is required. The interpretation of mental attitudes which has obscured the facts on which it was based; the casual mention of such important rites as those connected with the harau; the revolutions caused by the successful inauguration of the baigona-cult, and its successor, the taro-cult; the strange conclusions submitted to us concerning the use of the words soeai and asisi; the differences which seem to have existed between the four tribes, Binandele, Aiga, Wasida, and Hunjara; the fact that most of the available information appears to apply almost exclusively to the Aiga, whereas the new cults seem to have originated among the Binandele; the scanty reports concerning the pre-nuptial regulations of the various tribes—all these things, and many more, necessitate a suspension of judgement. This is peculiarly unfortunate, for the Orakaiva may be a living instance of a society which is changing its cultural condition as the result of a spontaneous outburst of energy on the part of a minority of its members. They are of terrific anthropological importance; and no doubt we shall be given, in due course, more details concerning their rites and regulations, together with a description of the place in which, and the circumstances under which, the evidence was obtained. As it is, I incline to think that they exhibited a nascent tendance. The verdict, however, is subject to revision.

The control of the weather does not seem to have been a matter of great moment to the people of Papua, but this opinion may be a false deduction
from the somewhat fragmentary nature of the evidence. In order to create rain, wind, or sunshine the Banks Islanders relied on *vui* stones, the Trobriand Islanders on 'magic'.

The facts may be stated diagrammatically thus:

### MELANESIA AND NEW GUINEA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Cultural condition</th>
<th>Treatment of affliction</th>
<th>Method of weather control</th>
<th>Treatment of ghosts</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Magic</td>
<td>Transference and/or exorcism</td>
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<td>Banks Islanders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trobriand Islanders</td>
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<td>Kiwai Papuans</td>
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<td>Mafulu</td>
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<td>Purari</td>
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<td>Mailu</td>
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C. EASTERN AFRICA

81. *Comments on the African Evidence.* The comments which I have made in regard to the nature of some anthropological material must not be misunderstood. They are born of a conviction that social anthropology can be a more exact study; any criticism I may make must be interpreted in the light of a desire for greater precision both in thought and in expression. One of the outstanding characteristics of Oceanic anthropology is the intensive study of limited areas; in this manner Oceania has become the most important of all anthropological areas. The sound technique adopted by the Cambridge Expedition to the Torres Straits, the genius of R. H. Codrington, and the enthusiastic, scholarly enterprise of such energetic organizations as the Polynesian Society, are the foundations on which a mass of reliable material has been assembled. Oceanic culture is complicated, but the student who is willing to plod through the literature can learn its character. Unfortunately the same remark does not apply to many other parts of the world.

When we turn to Africa, for instance, we are confronted with a very different state of things. There are few African tribes which have been
studied with the care and patience which have been bestowed upon the Trobriand Islanders, the Purari, and the Kiwai Papuans; Africa has not yet secured its Dr. A. C. Haddon, who will energize its field-workers, advise concerning expeditions, and encourage despairing observers; and although Sir A. B. Ellis played the part of a Codrington to the Gold and Slave Coasts, the remainder of the continent was not blessed by the attention of an early and scholarly interpreter. Of the twenty-one African societies with which we are concerned, only a few are really well known. Indeed sometimes we must rely upon the testimony of those who did not speak the language of the people about whom they have written. Native conceptions have been separated from the rites based upon them; these conceptions have been described in the language of Christian philosophy; in some cases native incantations have even been translated into the rhythm and phraseology of a Christian evangelical hymn-book. I do not deny the value of this literature. My point is that it has a romantic rather than a scientific interest.

African religion is popularly known as 'ancestor-worship'. The verdict is neither more true nor more false than most generalizations about uncivilized peoples. Strictly speaking, however, the term 'ancestor-worship' enjoys a wider currency than the facts warrant. In Africa, as in Melanesia, the people occupied varying positions in the cultural scale, and, though the majority of our twenty-one African societies were in the manistic condition, there were several examples of deistic, and one of zoistic, culture. The idea that the religion of the African was a form of 'ancestor-worship' has become so common that these differences are sometimes overlooked. There is, indeed, a great danger that a rite will be described as 'ancestor-worship' simply and solely because it takes place in Africa. Moreover, the alleged ubiquity of ancestral practices has caused some writers to apply the term to certain parts of the burial ceremonies, which, if they had been observed in any other part of the world, would almost certainly have been called by another name. Sometimes we read of a 'developed ancestor-worship'; but no attempt is made to define the word 'developed'. It is imperative, therefore, that the definitions which we have formulated should be remembered and applied.343

Since we classify our societies according to their rites, there will be no need to describe, or even to notice, those nebulous conceptions of otiose 'Supreme Beings' which have been credited to the Bantu mind. The mere fact that no rites were conducted in their honour excludes them from the scope of this treatise. I make, however, some comments on them in the notes.

Of the twenty-one societies, the Banyankole, Bakitara, Baganda, Ibibio, and Yoruba (paras. 37–9, 41–2) have been discussed. The remaining sixteen will be studied in three groups:

1. Eastern Africa: Shilluk; Dinka; Lango; Akikuyu; Akamba; Nandi; Masai.
2. *Area of Profound Mystery*: Awemba; Baila; Baronga; Amazulu; Basuto.

3. *Matrilineal Societies*: Wayao and Anyanja (near Lake Nyasa); Dohomans and Ashanti (West Africa).

The native terms are easy to remember. The most important words in the study of the first group were jok (*jwok*), *mulungu*, and *ngai*.

82. *Shilluk (Shullas)*. The Shilluk, or Shullas, were a remarkable people; their customs are of great importance. They were manestic, yet almost deistic.

The manner in which the Shilluk *ret*, ‘king’, succeeded to the leadership of the society, and the strange way in which he was killed lest he should become old and decrepit while holding the reins of office, have played a large part in Sir James Frazer’s submissions concerning the ‘divine king’ and the ‘dying god’; but there is reason to believe that the cult of the *ret* had not the importance in Shilluk life which sometimes it has been credited, and we must consider the practices of the society as a whole if we are to estimate accurately its cultural condition.344

The power in the universe was *jwok*. The word is said to have been applied to sickness, a sudden or violent death, and ‘any being with more than natural powers’. In reference to *jwok*, the Shilluk used the word *lamo*, ‘to conjure’; thus an exertion of magic power or influence is implied. In reference to their dead *ret*, however, they employed the term *kwacho*, ‘to ask for, to beg’; this implies a cult of the dead. The term for a magician was *ajwogo*, ‘one who was dependent on *jwok*’. According to Professor Westermann, it was through the agency of the *ajwogo* (pl. *ajwuk*) that the people approached Nyakang, and other dead *ret*. The *ajwogo* could procure or prevent rain, protect cattle by charms, heal sickness, ‘perform miracles’, and kill men by witchcraft. When possessed by *jwok*, an *ajwogo* ‘became ecstatic’.345 Professor Seligman states that the *ajwogo* ‘have in them the spirit of dead kings’. (In spite of the fact that *ajwogo* possessed a plural form, *ajwuk*, Professor Seligman often employs the singular form in a plural context.) Throughout the literature on the Shilluk we read of ‘the spirits of dead kings’ and ‘the spirits of the dead’, but our authorities never quote the native word which they are translating.

A comparison of Professor Seligman’s report with that of Professor Westermann suggests that the word was *jwok*. This conclusion is supported by Professor Seligman’s remark that ‘the entry into the body of the spirit of their kings was the commonest cause of sickness’. Usually, as we have seen, the cause of sickness was thought to be *jwok*, and it seems almost certain that when Professor Seligman speaks of ‘the spirit of dead kings’ he is referring to *jwok*.346

Usually the *ret*, who used to be an autocrat, is called a ‘king’. It is preferable, however, to speak of the *ret*, simply. Nyakang is reputed to have been the first *ret*, and since his day there are said to have been twenty *ret*, representing eleven generations. The grave of a *ret* was called *kengo*, as
opposed to that of a commoner, which was roro. The word kengo was applied also to the house erected over the grave of a ret, and, moreover, to the other houses of a similar character erected in honour of the ret in other villages and districts. In all kengo, the power of the dead ret was thought to be manifest.447

Thus the cenotaphic kengo was a building which was specially erected for the maintenance of a right relation with the dead ret. Since it was known to the natives as a ‘grave’, and not as a ‘god-house’, it does not come within our definition of the word ‘temple’; but clearly it is a border-line case, and the Shilluk kengo is an important link in the chain of evidence which reveals the development of the temple from ‘something unusual’. A kengo was always kept in good repair, whether it was a real ‘grave’ or not; no one was allowed to enter its enclosure except those who took care of the building and kept it clean. It was like an ordinary house, but smaller and more slender, though larger and more elaborate examples were not unknown. Nyakang and his son Dag are said to have possessed more kengo than the other ret, but every ret seems to have been honoured by attentions at his kengo. Since, however, the researches of our authorities have not been exhaustive, it is impossible to say over how large an area the cult of any particular ret extended.448

The people who looked after the kengo are reported to have been (1) old women, (2) wives of the dead ret, (3) bang ret (pl. oting ret), servant or servants of the ret. The women seem to have been the only permanent personnel. The bang ret was prominent because the dead ret was manifest in him. We have seen that the ajwogo was a person who became ecstatic, was ‘possessed’ by a dead ret, and acted as the agency through which the people approached the ret. According to Dr. Oyler, the bang ret also, ‘servant of the king’, was ‘possessed’ by a dead ret. ‘The beginning of the possession’, he says, ‘is indicated by hysteria. When a person first shows these signs, they send for a recognized servant of that king. The spirit is able to tell the people what king he represents.’ If the patient was curable, the spirit was said to have been ‘driven out’; but if the possession was complete and permanent, measures were taken to initiate the man ‘into the order of the servants of the king’. We are not told what those measures were, but they are immaterial, the point being that the power of the ajwogo and of the bang ret had an identical origin, jwok. Thus the source of magical power among the Shilluk was the possession of or by the power in the universe. The difference between an ajwogo and a bang ret seems to have been this: they were both ecstatic, but while the cause of the ecstasy of the former was said to have been jwok, simply, the cause of the ecstasy of the latter was the possession of his body by the ‘spirit’ (jwok) of a particular dead ret.

The identification of the two men follows also from their activities. The ajwogo protected the cattle, treated sickness, and ‘performed miracles’; the bang ret cast birds out of people, divined by cowrie shells the identity
of the ‘spirit’ (jwok) which was drawing away the spirit of a sick child, held converse with the family dead, transferred sickness to a sheep which then was placed in the river and carried away by the current, and killed the sacrifices which were offered to the dead ret at his kengo. His chief work, indeed, was to cure disease, and the passage in which this statement occurs is worth quoting verbatim: ‘An indication of the fact that the power of Nikawg [i.e. Nyakang] among the Shilluk is not as great as their professions would indicate is furnished by comparing the servants of the king with the witch-doctors. They work along the same lines, but the power of the witch-doctors is greater. The chief work of the servants of the king is to cure disease. The so-called cures are nearly always of a magical nature.’

Nyakang, Dag, and the other dead ret, but especially Nyakang, were approached in times of sickness and stress, when a drought caused the cattle to die and the crops to fail, and at harvest time; but the attentions paid to them and the petitions addressed to them were neither paid nor addressed to them exclusively. Other powers also manifested themselves to the Shilluk, viz. ‘the ancestors and the dead chief of the village’. These were regarded by many members of the society as equally deserving of sacrifices and equally able to grant the desired boon. In fact, Nyakang appears to have been merely primus inter pares. First-fruits may have been reserved for him; offerings may have been made to him in times of sickness and distress; food may have been placed in his kengo; but ‘similar offerings were made to the other kings and might be made to an ancestor’.

Tendance seems to have been usual and regular. Dr. Oyler says: ‘Food was placed often on the grave of a deceased person to appease or reward the dead. Sometimes food was placed in the house of the deceased. Food was not placed on the grave for a long period except on the grave of strong leaders and kings. In the case of kings they are fairly regular in taking food to the graves. In the case of ordinary people they usually only remember to take them when they are asking for help. When the dead are hostile they may be appeased by having honour shown to their memory. Practically all their prayers are addressed to the spirits. Prayers are largely addressed to the dead kings. They have the right to pray to the dead chief. They can pray to a deceased person and other relatives.’

I think that the curious phraseology of those sentences reveals the truth of Shilluk culture. Some people did one thing, some did another. They paid attention to their ancestors, and to their great leaders who were dead, as well as to their dead ret; and they made a permanent distinction between the one and the many. The attention paid to ancestors was perhaps tendance, but that paid to Nyakang and other ret seems to have been also cult.

These remarkable people did not insist on the tokens of virginity; an old man of the tribe estimated that only one or two out of every ten brides were virgins when they were married; but pre-nuptial sexual freedom was not permitted. Any man who caused a girl to become pregnant before
she was married was fined, whether she was betrothed or not. If she was betrothed, a heavier fine was inflicted. Even a betrothed man could not have intercourse with his future wife as and when he liked: ‘he must produce witnesses to testify that it had been voluntary on the part of the girl and that her parents had not objected’. Unfortunately we are not told what happened if the parents did object. If children were sick when they were young, the mother was accused of having had pre-nuptial relations with another man than her betrothed.352

The following statement is a fair summary of the regulations. ‘Pre-nuptial free intercourse as it exists among the Dinka and Nuer is not permitted. Among the Shilluk woman is respected and excesses are not permitted. All breaches of the rule of chastity, in the married state or otherwise, are punished.’353

83. Dinka. We do not know much about a group of tribes called the Dinka, but I have included the people in this survey because they afford a good illustration of a manistic society which made a temporary distinction between the one and the many. The Dinka inhabited a large area which stretched from a point 300 miles south of Khartoum to a point within 100 miles of Gondokoro; to the west they extended to a point many miles west of the Bahr-el-Ghazal province. In the available reports the English word ‘spirit’ seems to be used as the equivalent of more than one native word (e.g. atiep and jok); the native word jok is translated by several different English words; and a great deal of confusion has been caused by this method of presenting the evidence. The following summary is as lucid and concise as I can make it.

The part of a man that left him when he was asleep was called atiep. When a man died his atiep was thought to frequent the house and village wherein he had lived. No post-funeral offerings were made to an atiep unless they were demanded in a dream. The atiep of a father or of a mother would appear in a dream and ask for food; then a pot of dura flour and fat was placed in a corner of the hut. The Dinka thought that if this duty was neglected, the atiep would cause sickness. In order that such misfortune might be prevented the family dead were tended; but the rites of tendance were not carried out for any extended period; the Dinka remembered their family dead only for a short time. Professor Seligman says: ‘Atiep are’—sometimes atiep is translated by him as a plural word—‘at their strongest immediately after death; they become gradually weaker and may be safely forgotten.’ Another word which has been translated ‘spirits of the dead’ is jok, but since jok was a singular word, the plural of which among the Lango (para. 84) was jogi, and among the Shilluk (para. 82) jswuk, ‘the dead’ is a preferable English equivalent. ‘Sometimes’, we are told, ‘the spirit of a recently dead person is spoken of as a jok, but this term is usually reserved for the spirits of long dead and powerful ancestors.’ The word iok was applied not only to the powerful dead but also to sickness, child-
ness, death, and misfortune, to 'the spirit of the founder of any clan',
and thus, presumably, to any Dinka hero or great man. Shrines were built
for atiep and for jok, but this was done only when a demand for such atten-
tion was made in a dream. In the villages near the Shilluk country 'a few
roughly trimmed sticks were thrust into the ground from which hung a
number of beads, gourds, and fragments of sheep bones'. Apparently
these were erected to jok; we are not told how the places were selected.
Sometimes the shrines consisted of a trunk of a small tree; in some of the
Tain villages a hole was dug which was filled with mud, and in the mud a
pair of horns was fixed. Such a buor is said to have been made for the atiep
of a father, 'not only to propitiate the spirit of the dead but as a resting-
place for the spirit (atiep)'. Sometimes a hut was erected over a grave, but
this practice was uncommon, the only attested instances being those erected
over the graves of the four sons of the Dinka hero, Deng-dit (lit. 'Great Rain').
Shrines were erected to Deng-dit in many places, those at Luang Deng,
Luong Ajok, and Lau being the most famous. Near these shrines the
rain-making ceremonies took place. If Deng-dit appeared in a dream (but
not otherwise), a 'sacrifice' was made, but the attention paid to Deng-
dit was neither so regular nor apparently so efficacious as that paid to jok,
'and in some cases', Professor Seligman says, 'in which the appeal was
nominally made to Deng-dit, its form seems to imply that he has been
confused with the jok'. This confusion between Deng-dit and jok was
apparent also in the offerings at a buor. 'There is often the greatest con-
fusion', we are told, 'as to whether these buor are built for Deng-dit or for
the jok; in fact, the two are often spoken of as if they were identical.'

Thus the Dinka made offerings to three separate powers, atiep, jok, and
Deng-dit. Atiep was the 'spirit' of a dead relation who was forgotten after
a little while; jok is said to have been 'the powerful dead'; Deng-dit was a
dead hero. But the dead hero and jok were confused, and sometimes it was
impossible to tell to which of them an offering was made. Moreover the
word jok, which was applied to, and has been translated as, 'the powerful
dead', was applied also to sickness and affliction.

Sometimes a Deng-dit shrine had a special keeper; apparently it was to
this man that the hero appeared in a dream. We are told neither his native
title nor how he succeeded to his post. He may have been a tiet, for this
term was used to denote a man who could communicate with atiep and jok.
The power of a tiet, we read, was 'due to a spirit, always, we believe, to an
ancestral spirit, that is immanent in the tiet', that is, to atiep and/or jok.
The chief occupation of a tiet was to diagnose the cause of sickness; usually
this was due to jok, atiep, witchcraft, or some intrusive cause. The native
terms for wizard and medicine-man are not quoted. The treatment of
disease seems to have consisted of counter-magic, extraction of the foreign
body, or an offering to atiep or jok.

I am not clear whether the reported rain-making ceremonies were
annual festivals, or whether they were carried out only when rain was late
or came in too small quantities; but the rain-maker was an important institution, and, as a rule, seems to have volunteered to die for his people rather than grow old and incapable. Another hero, Lerpiu, is reported to have been addressed when rain was needed, thus: 'Lerpiu our ancestor, we have brought you a sacrifice; be pleased to cause rain to fall.' This address is mentioned only casually; it may have been do ut abeas. The native words are not quoted.354

In regard to sexual regulations there is little reliable evidence. The Dinka do not appear to have objected to pre-nuptial pregnancy; a pre-nuptial child belonged to its mother's father until she married, when it accompanied its mother to her new home. In some groups the husband was not necessarily the father of the child. We are not told whether or not, in these groups, the real father was punished in any way, but in the groups of whom Captain Cummins has written, sexual intercourse 'with an unmarried woman was punished by confiscation of the man's property and the girl became his wife without further ceremony'.355 It seems unlikely that in other groups the procreative male would have been allowed to escape punishment, but information for the whole area on this important point is lacking. We must conclude that such regulations existed as compelled an irregular or occasional continence; there are not enough data for a more exact pronouncement. There was no demand for the tokens of virginity. We have seen (para. 82) that some pre-nuptial intercourse was permitted which was forbidden among the Shilluk.

84. Lango. The power which manifested itself to the Lango was jok. Mr. J. H. Driberg is too good a scholar to attempt to translate a word which clearly has no English equivalent. 'Anything strikingly unusual or supernatural in character', he says, 'is commonly attributed to jok.' An abnormal child was atin ajok, a child with jok quality; whirlwinds and eddies were jok. jok was always being found in new places. If a village headman dreamed that jok was in a certain tree, the tree was tabu: 'The tree having become sacred and possessing jok, the headman then approaches it to obtain advice. He goes to the tree at dawn, alone and unattended, and standing at a safe distance asks the tree's advice and counsel.' Perhaps the tree would demand a shrine. 'This is then built under the tree, a diminutive hut consisting of a grass roof supported on four posts about one foot high, the hut being no more than eighteen inches in diameter.' Food and drink were placed in this abila. There was no 'nature-worship'. The tree was not sacred qua tree, but because jok was manifest there: 'No shrine was ever built without divine instruction.' People would come and sit at a jok resort, and virtue would be afforded them. Such a place might have its special ministrant and owner. For instance, a man called Wot Odur possessed a shrine on Mount Agoro. The pilgrimages to the spot ceased when he died.

jok had various manifestations. Thus, min jok was associated with
hunting, fishing, and rain-making; jok adongo with trees, jok lango with sickness, jok orongo with human souls, and so on; but 'the subdivisions of jok in no way affect the oneness of the conception'. The same power was manifest in every case. Jok was also dangerous; and no one must approach a jok-place too closely; thus, 'All hills are vaguely connected with jok, and for this reason villages are never built on hills.' Abnormal, superlative events of every description were connected with jok; rich harvests, unseasonable weather, diseases, accidents, failures, losses, and tribulations were due to jok or to the neglect of jok, or perhaps were jok, simply. But a man could keto jok, 'frustrate jok', by common forms of magic.356

The tipo was that part of a man which had adventures in dreams. A tipo did not descend into the grave when a person was buried. It was often harmless, especially if the funeral ceremonies had been carried out in the proper manner. Occasionally, however, it was malevolent. When this happened, the term chyen also was applied to it, but the two words seem to have been used indiscriminately. 'After the funeral ceremonies the tipo becomes merged into jok, but does not entirely lose its personality, at least for a considerable period. It either fades away, becoming one with jok, or else, though merging into jok, continues to retain its individuality as an ancestor-spirit and demands that an abila, shrine, be built for it.' The tipo shrine was identical in appearance with the shrine which was built for jok. The tipo (chyen) took up its residence therein, and from time to time offerings of food, beer, &c., were made, the tipo making its requirements known to its descendants either personally, by calling them at night, or by 'inflicting minor misfortunes'. This attention was paid only to those immediate ancestors who demanded it either by appearing in a dream or by inflicting sickness, killing live stock, or destroying crops. It was discontinued after the death of the man who built the shrine.

A malicious tipo (chyen) could be laid by being caught in a pot which then was buried in a swamp; in that case the tipo was finished with for ever and became at once 'an integral part of jok'; its malpractices ceased forthwith. On other occasions the body of a man whose tipo insisted on haunting his heir was disinterred and reburied in a swamp without further ceremony. This method also disposed of the danger for ever.357

Thus the Lango were in the manistic condition, carried out an irregular tendance of the dead, and made a temporary distinction between the one and the many. They did not consider that all ghosts needed attention; nor was it always necessary to conciliate a troublesome ghost by offerings of food and beer; sometimes it could be controlled by magic.

The ajok, wizard, was severely condemned by society, and if caught was punished and even killed. The ajoka, 'seer, diviner, medicine-man', was consulted in time of stress. He or she revealed the identity of the tipo which was the cause of the trouble, and gave advice concerning the steps which should be taken to appease it. He or she could be possessed by jok, and then became ecstatic. When a ghost was laid it was the ajoka who
carried out the ceremony. It will be noticed that both *ajok* and *ajoka* are compounds of *jok*. Pure magical means were also adopted to cure and prevent disease.  

Every five years there was a special ceremony, *aworon*, the main purpose of which was to instruct the young men in the mysteries of rain-making. It lasted three days, and the youths were taught also 'the duties of citizenship, the lore of hunting, the art of fighting, and the traditions of their race'. The actual rain-making ceremony which took place every year was called either *lamo kot*, 'to consecrate the rain', or *myelo kot*, 'to dance the rain'. Some individuals were credited with the power of controlling the elements, and a special title was applied to such a person, *won kot*, 'owner of the rain'. Apparently any old man could be accused of withholding the rain. Should the rain ceremonies fail, an *ajoka* was consulted.

By this time we are becoming so familiar with the coincidence between the three patterns of uncivilized culture and the three patterns of pre-nuptial sexual regulations that the reader may have decided already the manner in which the Lango dealt with what we call the 'sex question'. The pre-nuptial regulations of the Lango compelled an irregular or occasional continence. There was no demand for the tokens of virginity; pre-nuptial intercourse, *luk*, was 'often preliminary to marriage'. *Luk* was not so serious an offence as adultery; it was, however, an offence, 'compoundable by the payment of cattle or goats to the injured party, the girl's guardian'. If pregnancy resulted, the amount of the fine was increased; this payment secured for the man the option of marrying the girl. If he married her, the sum was reckoned as part of the bride-price, but he secured the child only if he married its mother. Little opprobrium was attached to *luk*; no stigma was attached to the pre-nuptial child or to its mother.

If we may assume that Captain Cummins's statements (para. 83) apply to the Dinka generally, it seems possible that the Dinka took a more serious view of pre-nuptial pregnancy than the Lango did, for the Dinka inflicted a heavier fine upon the father of the child. Thus it may be permissible to argue that a Dinka might hesitate on an occasion when a Lango would indulge. In that case we can place the Lango, Dinka, and Shilluk in order of decreasing pre-nuptial sexual opportunity, for we have already seen (para. 82) that the Shilluk regulations were more strict than those of the Dinka. The value of these comparisons, however, is not high.

85. *Akikuyu*. The Lango, Dinka, and Shilluk are linguistically classified as Nilotic. Our next two societies, Akikuyu and Akamba, are Bantu. They were in a similar cultural condition. I propose to discuss the Akikuyu in a summary manner and the Akamba at greater length.

Among the Akikuyu pre-nuptial chastity was neither demanded nor expected. Kikuyu parents disapproved of pre-nuptial pregnancy, but a pre-nuptial child was permitted to live. The father of such a child was fined ten goats, but for any second child born under similar circumstances
a smaller compensation, say five goats, was all that was required. The man could always marry the girl by paying the usual bride-price; in that case no fine was imposed. The girl was not punished in any way, and the interest of the parents was purely material.\textsuperscript{361}

The powers in the universe were ngai and ngoma. Usually ngoma is translated as 'spirits of the dead'. Ngai was responsible for, or to put the matter in more accurate terms, the word ngai was applied to, anything superlative or supernormal, riches, rain, thunder, healthy children, good wives, death, illness, and cattle disease; and also to the sun and Mt. Kenya, which to the Kikuyu mind were 'all the same thing'. Fig-trees, mugumu, are said to have been 'dwelling-places' of ngai: that is to say, ngai was manifest in fig-trees. So also were ngoma, who were 'like ngai'. Food and drink were placed near such trees by passers-by. We are told that ngai and ngoma were confused by the natives, so it is impossible to say whether the offerings were made to ngai or to ngoma, 'spirits of the dead'. Clearly the rites cannot be definitely classified as 'ancestor-worship'. It is plain, however, that the Kikuyu confused the one and the many.\textsuperscript{362}

(The confusion between ngai and ngoma has been reported by W. S. and K. Routledge in the passages to which I have referred, e.g. 'Drink offerings were made to ngoma as well as to ngai. It is a little difficult to say at times for whom the sacrifices were intended. Possibly the distinction was not always clear to the natives.' Dr. L. S. B. Leakey, however, has informed me in conversation that the distinction was always clear to them. I am therefore in a quandary. As Dr. Leakey has not yet published a report on the Akikuyu, whom he knows so well, I think that we must make the best use of the material which is at the moment available, but probably it would be wiser to disregard the Kikuyu evidence when we interpret the data. There is one difficulty which future publications may solve. The word ngai, it is agreed, was an importation from the Masai, but the Akikuyu must have used some other word in some of those contexts before they took over the Masai word. For my own part, I should expect that this other word was ngoma and that the Akikuyu were at a dead level of conception; but there is no direct evidence. It would certainly be dangerous to think that a new conception, as well as a new word, was borrowed from the Masai.)

The choice of a sacred tree, muti mugu, 'tree of magic power', i.e. a ngai tree, seems to have been in the hands of 'certain notable medicine-men'. I cannot find the native term for a 'place of sacrifice', which would correspond to the Kamba ithembo (para. 86). A sacrificial fire was termed ichua. A tree was the usual 'place of sacrifice', but some village shrines existed. These sometimes consisted of three stones, each weighing 30–40 lb. The ceremonies performed thereat might be communal or private.\textsuperscript{363} The Akikuyu did not fear their dead. Only leading citizens were buried; the bodies of ordinary people were thrown out to the hyenas. Perhaps this is the reason why hyenas are reported to have contained, or to have been called, ngoma.\textsuperscript{364}
The power of the medicine-man, mundu mugu, came from ngai, or was due to his possession of ngai. He diagnosed the causes of affliction, purified those who had become defiled, thahu, as the result of ‘sin’, and manufactured charms both to cause and to prevent affliction. In the available literature he is variously called ‘clever man’, ‘wise man’, and ‘man of God’. The anti-social activities of the mundu mugu seem to have been different from those of the mirogi, wizard; but the distinction is not explained. Witchcraft, oro gi, was regarded as one of the ordinary risks of life. No Kikuyu rain-makers are mentioned by any of our authorities, and their failure to quote the native terms in regard to the Kikuyu attitude towards the elements detracts from the value of their statements.

86. Akamba. The pre-nuptial sexual regulations of the Akamba were of the same pattern as those of the Akikuyu, but they inflicted a lesser fine on the father of a pre-nuptial child. The amount of this fine is variously reported; usually it appears to have been a goat. Apparently this was the only check to absolute sexual freedom (outside the exogamic regulations). Pre-nuptial pregnancy was disliked, but not punished; girls in that condition usually resorted to abortion. Youths visited their lady-loves at night, but no Kamba insisted on receiving his satisfaction from the same girl on every occasion. If a man entered the hut of his lady-love and found that her bed chanced to be occupied by another woman, he does not seem to have objected or to have considered it unusual. Nor did the Akamba inflict any definite punishment on the man or woman who broke a sexual taboo. Intercourse between brother and sister (own or classificatory?) was not punished; the parties merely had to be purified from the defilement caused by their indulgence.

Though it is clear that, so far as sexual opportunity is concerned, we must place the Akamba in the same general category as the other four African tribes which we have just examined, it can scarcely be said that their regulations demanded the same continence as was experienced by the latter. I have already noted that some evidence exists by means of which we can arrange the Lango, Dinka, and Shilluk in that order according to the degree of limitation imposed upon them. Following the same course of reasoning we can place the Akikuyu below the Lango, for whereas the father of a pre-nuptial child was fined ‘cattle and goats’ among the latter, the penalty among the Akikuyu was only ten goats. The Akamba practice seems to have varied, and though in some places the fine was only one goat, the evidence is not sufficiently exact to warrant our placing the Akikuyu and Akamba in two separate categories according to the degree of the sexual limitations which were imposed upon them. Moreover, these tribes gradually merged one into the other and in some places there must have been such real convergence that some practices cannot be said definitely to have belonged to the one or to the other.

I do not wish to over-emphasize the comparative evidence, the value of
which is not great, but it would not be out of harmony with the facts to present the pre-nuptial sexual opportunity of these five societies in this order of limitation, commencing with those whose members suffered the least serious checks: (1) Akikuyu and Akamba, (2) Lango, (3) Dinka, (4) Shilluk.

The Akamba cannot be classed as zoistic, but they were only just manistic. They confused the one and the many. In fact, they were in precisely the same cultural condition as their neighbours, the Akikuyu. Just as the latter are said to have confused ngai and ngoma, the power in the universe and 'the spirits of the dead', so the Akamba definitely confused mulungu (ngai) and aimu. They used these terms under precisely the same circumstances as those under which the Akikuyu are said to have employed the former words. In some parts of the country ngai was substituted for mulungu. The word aimu is the same as misimu, which was used by the Bakitara, Baganda, and Banyankole to denote 'ghosts' (paras. 37–9).368

The confusion between mulungu (ngai) and aimu, which is apparent in every passage in which the native terms are quoted, is reported in such explicit terms as this: 'In spite of the fact that there really exists a difference between mulungu and aimu, the expressions are often used indiscriminately; mulungu—ngai is used in the same sense as aimu.' Moreover we read such phrases as 'mulungu, viz. the aimu', and 'mulungu, i.e. the aimu'. That is to say, there was little difference in the Kamba mind between the conceptions which we denote by (a) the power in the universe, (b) 'the spirits of the dead'. Thus any attempt to separate them is absurd and misleading.369

Mulungu (ngai) was manifest in high mountains, the sun, a multitude of 'solitary places', and in some trees, especially fig-trees. Mulungu is also said to have meant 'luck, good fortune, chance'. If a 'prophetess' (the native term is not given) dreamt that ngai was in a tree, the tree was sacred; a small hut was erected on the spot. This accords with the Lango practice (para. 84), but in the reports on the Akamba the hut is not described. A man with the power of divination said that '(his) ngai had taught him'. An offering made to ngai or aimu on a journey is reported as having been made to 'some well-known deceased caravan leader'.370

A place where ngai or mulungu or aimu was manifest was called ithembo. There were many ithembo; and since it was not possible to tender offerings to mulungu in the sun or on high mountains, it is not surprising that an ithembo was often a fig-tree. Indeed 'practically every large tree and grove' was an ithembo, in addition to those revealed in a dream as being of that character. In fact, 'at the sight of or on meeting anything new or unusual the Akamba generally offered sacrifices'. Offerings were also made at the grave of a medicine-man or other prominent person. None of the so-called private and public sacrifices to mulungu (ngai) can be distinguished or separated from the sacrifices to aimu; and although many of our authorities have made an attempt (often a ludicrous and pathetic attempt) to mark off Kamba 'ancestor-worship' from the attention to mulungu (ngai), they
always confess that the Akamba insisted on confusing them. In this connexion, however, it must be remarked that although some of the natives may have been conscious of the separate existence of the *aimu*, 'spirits of the dead' (and it is impossible to tell how far the rationalizing inferences of our authorities have influenced their final statements), the 'spirits who have existed for a time are believed to disappear and to be replaced by new ones, which vanish in their turn'.

The man who treated affliction was the *mundu mue*, the so-called 'wise man', who manufactured protective charms, prophesied, told fortunes, pronounced whether or not the time was favourable for sowing and reaping, prescribed for and treated sicknesses, and gave advice in all the perplexing situations of life. He must not be confused with the *mundu mwoi*, the anti-social wizard, whose activities he countered by his white magic. 'Incorrigible witches' are said to have been put to death, but witchcraft was regarded as one of the ordinary risks of life; no *mundu mwoi*, male or female, was interfered with unless he or she was a public as well as a private danger. Every one was careful to hide his clippings. The power of the *mundu mwoi* seems to have been learnt from a living practitioner, although sometimes a dead magician's grave would be opened up by an aspirant and part of the dead man's flesh used as 'medicine'. The reports concerning the origin of the power of the *mundu mue* have not been accurately expressed, but it is plain that any one whose manner of birth was abnormal was immediately marked down as a future *mundu mue*. We are told also that a medicine-man acted 'by the help of *aimu*', and prophesied when he was possessed by *aimu*. Since *aimu* = *mulungu* (*ngai*), magic power seems to have come from or to have been due to *mulungu* (*ngai*). We have already seen that a man divined by virtue of *mulungu* (*ngai*), and when Mr. Dundas says that the *mundu mue* had a 'familiar spirit', and adds that 'apparently he can also commune with this spirit', the native word translated 'spirit' must be *mulungu* (*ngai*). There were no rain-makers in Ukamba. Rain is said to have been called *mulungu* (*ngai*).

87. Nandi. Before summarizing the most interesting and important evidence afforded by these five African societies, I propose to discuss the Nandi and the Masai. Usually these tribes are classified as Nilo-Hamitic, together with the Turkana, Suk, Dodotho, Dindinga, and other tribes of which we know very little. Perhaps monographs on the latter people will be forthcoming in the future; in that case we may hope that their culture will be described from a more objective point of view than has been the case with the Nandi. Indeed, if the Nandi had not already gained a certain anthropological reputation, I should have excluded them on the grounds of inadequate information.

Sir Claude Hollis, who is our chief authority on the Nandi, did not ask himself, 'What powers manifest themselves to these people? How do they
maintain a right relation with these powers?’ He seems to have asked ‘What is their name for God?’ The beliefs of the Nandi, he tells us, were ‘vague and unformulated’. He adds: ‘The supreme deity was Asista, the sun, who dwells in the sky. He created man and beast and the world belongs to him; prayers are addressed to him, he is acknowledged to be a benefactor and the giver of all good things, and offerings are made to him in return.’

For a ‘vague and unformulated’ belief this is very good indeed. I wish I could feel that it had been formulated by the Nandi and not by Sir Claude Hollis.

Sir Charles Eliot also seems to doubt if we can accept the statement at its face value and is by no means convinced that Sir Claude has interpreted his data correctly. ‘Though we are told’, he remarks, ‘that he [Asista] created man and beast and that the world belongs to him, yet when we examine the myths collected by Mr. Hollis, we find instead of this general statement a number of inconsistent legends which have a rude and primitive air.’ In reference to the proceedings described as ‘sacrifices’, Sir Charles observes that ‘it is not clear that the animal is in any way offered to asista’. Moreover Mr. Huntingford has maintained that asista was not the only ‘supreme deity’. Apparently that honour must be accorded also to cheptalil and chepopkoiyo. ‘Guardian’ has been tentatively suggested as a possible rendering of chepopkoiyo.375

Thus the alleged offerings to asista cannot be accepted as an undeniable fact, and when we examine the so-called ‘prayers’ of the Nandi, bad scholarship reduces Nandi culture to chaos. The ‘prayers’ were uttered when a cow was milked or a beast bled, when a child’s middle incisors were extracted, when pots were baked, when the warriors were away from home, when a child was four months old, and on various other occasions. The first word of the ‘prayers’ which have been reported is usually, but not invariably, asis; we are left to conjecture that ‘prayers’ were offered also to other powers. In that case their recipients, I presume, would have to rank beside asista as ‘supreme deity’, in the sense in which Sir Claude Hollis uses the term. It is in the translation of the specimens we possess that the scholarship is questionable. After spitting at the new moon, the Nandi sometimes said, nyo arawanni nemie, ‘come moon good’, tukua lakok ak tuka, ‘cover-for-us the children and the cattle’; similarly, at dawn they sometimes cried, asis tukua lakok ak tuka, which is precisely the same phrase except that asis, ‘sun’, has been substituted for arawanni, ‘moon’; but we are asked to believe that whereas the former ejaculation was a mere song (‘O kindly moon, thy influence benign, Withhold not from our children and our kine’), the latter was a prayer to a supreme deity (‘O God, do Thou Thine ear incline, Protect my Children and my Kine’).

Nor is this an isolated example. The Nandi used to say, asis, iuiitech, and also moionnni iuitwech lakwanni. The phrases are translated respectively as ‘God, protect us’ and as ‘O Stomach, protect for us the-child-this’. Sir Claude has not seriously suggested that when the Nandi ‘prayed’ to
their own stomachs on behalf of their unborn children, they regarded their stomachs as ‘God’; yet it appears that there would be an equal reason for calling moionni ‘God’ as there is for rendering asista in that manner.376

Sometimes the Masai threw a twig to the new moon and cried, ‘Give me long life. Give me strength.’ Similarly, the Nandi would cry to the sun, ‘Give us health. Give us strength.’ Sir Claude Hollis is our authority for both these reports. In the former case the words are translated literally as an ejaculation; in the latter case we are invited to believe that the cry was a prayer to a Supreme Deity.377

Thus it is impossible to say what powers manifested themselves to the Nandi; nor have we any reliable information concerning their rites. Apparently they were manistic. Sometimes offerings were made to oiik (sing. oiindet), ‘ancestor-spirits’, but few details are available, and we do not know the area over which any practice extended. It seems to be clear that some form of spasmodic tendance existed, but there is not enough information to warrant a more exact opinion.378 The scanty reports suggest that illness was thought to be due to witchcraft, ponik, or to the anger of oiik. In the latter case the ghost had to be conciliated.379 Rain-makers, uik (sing. uindet), existed, but they seem to have been powerless to cope with a protracted drought.380 We are not told how a man became a magician.

The Nandi allowed their unmarried girls to visit the warriors in their huts and to live there with them. The only checks to unfettered intercourse seem to have been the objection to pre-nuptial pregnancy and the fine of an ox imposed on the father of a pre-nuptial child. The ox was given to the child’s maternal grandfather. The father of the child killed the ox, took away the head, and left the carcass to the injured parent. Usually pre-nuptial children were killed at birth; a woman who bore such a child was not allowed to look into a granary; it was thought that she would spoil the grain. Some girls tried to commit suicide if they found themselves pregnant before they married.381

88. Masai. The sex life of the Masai has been the subject of much comment. During the period of their service in the warrior class the members of each age-group lived in a special village, manyatta, which was occupied by them exclusively. Normally each warrior was accompanied by his mother, his sisters, and half-sisters, and when a warrior was so inclined (which was, we are told on native authority, ‘very, very often’) he invited one of these girls, sister or half-sister of a member of his age-group, to sleep with him. Her consent seems to have been taken for granted, and the method adopted in the arrangement of these chance affairs shows how lightly they were regarded. A few warriors gathered outside the village and called to any girls who were in sight, saying, tasiikutu. Then each of the girls selected one of the party, and her selection bound her to go and sleep with him that night. No girl was allowed to refuse the invitation to
choose a lad, unless she was menstruating or had already engaged herself

to another lad for that particular night. Between the young warriors and

the young girls, in fact, there was free sexual intercourse, and it is difficult

to see how any circumstances could arise under which a young Masai

would be compelled to check his impulses. The girl may have been

betrothed when she was young; she may have taken to herself what is

quaintly termed a ‘permanent lover’; but these things made no difference

to her conduct. She not only could, but she did, change her lover as often

and as freely as she liked; and if we may judge from the method of selection,

it would appear that no lad was particular concerning the identity of the

girl who gratified his desire.

No uninitiated girl was allowed to bear a child; she must either induce

abortion or be initiated at once. In the latter case the man responsible for

her condition (we are not told how he was identified) had to pay the costs

of the ceremony and give the girl’s father a heifer and some beer. The

payment does not appear to have been regarded as a fine for placing the

girl in such a position; the man is said to have paid the heifer ‘because he

had prevented the father from having the honour of the feast of her initia-

tion’. This, of course, may merely be the native way of wrapping up an

unpleasant truth in smooth words; the statement has little value as evidence.

The payment is mentioned by only one of our authorities. The man was

not expected to marry the girl.

The power in the universe was ngai. If no attempt is made to translate

this untranslatable word, the conception is clear and comprehensible.

According to Hinde, ‘Ngai embodies their apprehension of power beyond

human faculties of coping with. Thunderstorms, rains, the telegraph, a

railway engine, are all referred to as ngai; and the word represents the

incomprehensible of which they are vaguely conscious.’ Thomson states

that Mount Kilimanjaro, and an active volcano, Donyo Engai, were also

ngai, or ‘places’ of ngai. ‘I was ngai’, he adds, in a passage that has become

famous. ‘My lamp was ngai. Ngai was in the streaming holes. In fact,

whatever struck them as strange and incomprehensible, that they con-

ceived had some connexion with ngai.’ The opinion of Sir Claude Hollis

seems to be that ngai was associated with the supernatural, and since

‘supernormal’ expresses more exactly the native meaning as he describes

it, we may conclude perhaps that in Sir Claude’s opinion the natives

associated ngai with the supernormal.

The Masai did not allow ordinary people to die in the village. They

dragged them out into the bush as soon as they showed signs of decease,

the corpses being devoured by hyenas and vultures. Some people were

buried, however; medicine-men, rich men, old men, and women past child-

bearing are mentioned as being accorded the honour of burial. The reports

do not agree on the matter. No notice was taken of ghosts, menengai;

death seems to have been regarded as complete annihilation. There was

no tendance and no cult. Sickness was due to witchcraft or to ngai; the
power of the medicine-man was *ngai* or due to *ngai*. No rain-makers are reported.

Thus the Masai were not only zoistic but also at a dead level of conception. Of the seven societies we have just discussed they alone permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom.

89. *Summary and Chart.* The cultural facts of these seven societies may be stated diagrammatically thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Cultural condition</th>
<th>Treatment of affliction</th>
<th>Method of weather control</th>
<th>Treatment of ghosts</th>
<th>Temples and priests</th>
<th>Pre-nuptial chastity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shilluk</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinka</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lango</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akikuyu</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akamba</td>
<td>M</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi</td>
<td>M</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masai</td>
<td>Z</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

From a summary of their culture the Nandi must be excluded. Our limited knowledge of their customs shows that they conformed to the rule that the manistic condition is accompanied by irregular and occasional limitations, and *vice versa*, but no further conclusion can be safely drawn. We are left with the Masai, Akikuyu, Akamba, Lango, Dinka, and Shilluk.

We have seen (paras. 84, 86) that the Shilluk sexual regulations were the most stringent. The freedom enjoyed by the Masai places them at the other end of the scale. So far as pre-nuptial sexual opportunity was concerned, the remaining tribes occupied a position between the Shilluk and the Masai; and if the evidence is sufficiently reliable to warrant a conclusion, we may say that the Dinka afforded a lesser sexual opportunity than the Lango, and that the Lango afforded a lesser opportunity than the Akamba and the Akikuyu. The last two tribes cannot be separated.

Their respective positions are thus: (1) Shilluk, (2) Dinka, (3) Lango, (4) Akikuyu and Akamba, (5) Masai.
The power that manifested itself to the last four societies was in each case the quality or power which was exhibited by the something-unusual and the something-beyond-comprehension: to the Masai, ngai; to the Akikuyu, ngai; to the Akamba, mulungu (ngai); to the Lango, jok. The Dinka word jok had various meanings but only one has been reported; it has then been translated 'spirits of the dead'; but the word was used in other contexts also (e.g. the 'spirit', jok, of the clan, sickness); and we are ignorant of its real native purport. The Shilluk used the word jwok in reference to 'any being of more than natural powers'. Since the word 'natural' cannot be accurately used in reference to any uncivilized people, perhaps we may be allowed to substitute the word 'normal' in that context.

In every case the source of magic power was possession of or by ngai (Masai), ngai or mulungu (Akamba), ngai (Akikuyu), jok (Lango), jok (Dinka), and jwok (Shilluk). In all the tribes except the Masai, who paid no kind of post-funeral attention to their dead, a magician is also said to have been possessed by, or to have held converse with, 'the dead' or 'a ghost'. Thus the various methods which have been adopted by our authorities to describe the relation between the magician and the source of his magic power do not conceal the identical character of that source.

Since the Masai are not reported as carrying out any rites (they seem to have howled more than they celebrated) the question of the place in which they carried out their rites does not arise. The place where the Akikuyu and the Akamba maintained a right relation with ngai or mulungu was simply a place where ngai or mulungu was manifest, that is, any place of an unusual or supernormal character, or any place which, according to a dream of a magician, a ngai-man or a mulungu-man, was a ngai- or a mulungu-resort. It was the same among the Lango; their rites were carried out in a jok-place, or any place which, according to the dream of a magician, a jok-man, was a jok-resort.

Thus the reaction to the 'unusual' or the 'something-beyond-comprehension' is the basis on which rested (1) the conception of the power in the universe, (2) the choice of the place where a right relation was maintained with that power, (3) the agency through which the rites were carried out. This simple conception of the world has changed into what we call 'ancestor-worship', and if we are to understand clearly the nature of the change from the zoistic to the manistic pattern, we must be able to trace the line of thought which manistic natives must have followed when they began to institute such attention as the Lango paid to a tipo, ghost, or as the Dinka paid to an atiep and to a hero like Deng-dit. The Shilluk cult of their dead ret must be directly explicable from the same premises. Thus a more detailed examination of the important evidence from Eastern Africa seems to be desirable.

The Masai denoted 'the dead' and/or 'corpses' by menengai, a compound of ngai. (The prefix men- has not been explained.) The Akamba employed a different word, aimu; moreover they confused aimu with ngai (mulungu);
but they must have distinguished the dead from the power in the universe in a vague kind of way, for otherwise they would scarcely have used two words to denote them. Yet they did not distinguish one dead man from another dead man, for they conducted their rites in honour of *aimu* (or *ngai* or *mulungu*) and not in honour of an individual dead man. Even when they resorted to the grave of a dead magician, their object, as is clear from their actions, was not the dead man as an individual but the *ngai* which had been manifest in him.

(The Akikuyu are said to have confused *ngai* and *ngoma*, but it has been said also that they distinguished them. I omit them, therefore, in considering this point.)

The Lango, on the other hand, made a temporary distinction between the one and the many, that is, between an individual *tipo* and *jok*. We express this temporary distinction by saying that the individual became ‘merged in *jok*’, but I suspect that we may be reading into the facts a mental process which was not present in the native mind. The bare fact seems to have been that a dead man was remembered and then forgotten. When he was forgotten, he may have been *jok* either because he had possessed *jok* when he was alive or because *jok* was applied to corpses. On the other hand, neither of these alternatives may be the correct one. It seems to me that our conclusion may be an inference from an answer which a native gave to a question on a matter which had not previously occurred to him. Just as a question about some inexplicable phenomenon would be answered by the word *jok*, because it was in that manner that they conceived of inexplicable things, so also the Lango may have used the word in answer to an inquiry concerning the ultimate fate of the *tipo*. The matter may not have occurred to them before the white man brought it to their notice. Thus the phrase may have been used in the sense of our careless and uninterested ‘I don’t know’. This is a pure conjecture on my part, and there is no fact on which it is based. It would be interesting, however, to learn from an accurate and scholarly observer like Mr. Driberg the manner in which he came to the conclusion that the *tipo* was ‘merged into *jok*’.

The Lango did not always regard a *tipo* as worthy of tendance. Just as they could *keto jok*, ‘frustrate *jok*’, and ward off the danger which was inherent in *jok*, so they could frustrate a troublesome *tipo* by some common form of magic. The very fact that they conceived of the *tipo* shows that they made a distinction which was not made by the Akamba, who in their turn distinguished what the zoistic and sexually unencumbered Masai always confused. The Lango distinction, however, was not preserved for more than one generation; the man who built an *abila* to his father did not hand on his shrine to his son. Lango memory was active but short. The only recorded case of an individual who was remembered as the source of trouble or power is that of Atida, who appears to have been a noted female *ajoka*, magician, probably a rain-expert. A living female *ajoka* claimed to
be her representative, but she did not honour Atida by the performance of special rites.

When we turn to the Dinka, we find that these differences are accentuated. Though the ordinary dead were tended only by the succeeding generation, the Dinka hero, Deng-dit, ‘Great Rain’, was remembered and tended by many subsequent generations. His shrines were fairly permanent (we do not know how permanent); sometimes they were cared for by a special keeper who took over his charge from a predecessor. The Lango Atida and the Dinka Deng-dit indeed seem to be social phenomena of a similar character, the difference between them being that the cultural advance of the Dinka had affected the manner in which such remembrance was expressed, and also, apparently, the length of that memory. Yet there was no Deng-dit cult, in the sense in which I am using the word ‘cult’. Unless Deng-dit appeared in a dream and demanded an offering, no notice was taken of him. The only difference between him and the other dead men was that, for some reason or other, he had been remembered.

Among the Shilluk there was a definite cult of the dead ret (kings), the earliest of whom are said to have lived no less than eleven generations ago. The Shilluk were also the only tribe to make a permanent distinction between the one and the many. The place where they maintained a right relation with Nyakang and his successors was at their graves (kengo), but the energetic Shilluk were not content to build a simple house (kengo) over the grave; they also erected other kengo to their heroes in places where they had not been buried; and the use of the word kengo in all three contexts—grave, house over the grave, cenotaph in other areas—shows that fundamentally there was no difference between the rites conducted at the graves and those at the cenotaphic kengo. Now the Akamba, who allowed their young people to indulge much more freely in pre-nuptial sexual intercourse than the Shilluk did, continued their vague propitiation of ngai under fig-trees, and did not think that it was worth while to erect any monument over the graves of their great men. The Shilluk, on the other hand, who refused to countenance such sexual behaviour, remembered and honoured their tribal hero and his successors, and gave other evidence of their social energy by erecting cenotaphs to him in other areas. They even decorated the walls of these buildings with paintings.

The Shilluk also tended their more recently deceased ancestors, but, unlike Nyakang and his successors, these were not regarded as capable of bestowing benefits. There seems to have been a definite cult of Nyakang (in my sense of the word ‘cult’) and it is natural that under these conditions the power in the universe, jwook, should be neglected, for Nyakang could control it. The reports concerning the relation between Nyakang and jwook have not been accurately expressed, and, indeed, the matter is at first very puzzling, but, as I remarked when discussing the Shilluk customs, there is reason to believe that Nyakang had been (or had possessed) jwook when he was alive. I suspect that if the Lango were to institute a cult of the dead
in addition to their ancestral tendance, we should find that they would remember some of their great *tito* (*jok*-men) for a longer time, and that the attention to these great *tito* would oust *jok* from direct participation in the Lango ceremonies. This, I believe, is what has happened among the Shilluk, and we must beware of calling *jwok* one of those otiose sky-gods with the conception of which the African mind has been credited. The title of the magician, *ajvogoo*, is evidence that fundamentally the Shilluk conception of *jwok* was the same as the Lango conception of *jok* or the Akamba conception of *mulungu*.

Arranged, therefore, in order according to the extent of their development from a dead level of conception, these societies place themselves thus: (1) Shilluk, (2) Dinka, (3) Lango, (4) Akikuyu and Akamba, (5) Masai; that is, they are in the same positions as in the scale of the limitation of sexual opportunity.

90. Preliminary Evaluation of the Foregoing Evidence. This short examination of East African behaviour will not mar, I trust, the distinction which I am anxious to preserve between the facts and an interpretation of those facts. I am still engaged in stating verbally the facts which are represented symbolically in the Chart of Evidence (Appendix I), from which our original induction (para. 24) was made, and that induction will not have been justified until the facts have been stated in words; but, in order that the very considerable material may be handled more easily and that an interpretation of the evidence may be facilitated, it is convenient to make a preliminary evaluation of the evidence which is accumulating in regard to the native ideas.

I have already remarked (para. 61) that it is impossible to accept any account of uncivilized ideas unless, first, the native terms are quoted, and, secondly, the native usage of those terms is elucidated. Some of the material on which we have been compelled to rely does not reach this standard, and the societies to which it refers afford little evidence concerning the nature of a cultural change.

Out of the thirty-six societies which we have discussed eleven must be included in this category: Ibibio; Aztecs; Ao, Angami, Lhota, and Sema Nagas; Chukchee, Koryak, and Yukaghir; Orakaiva; Nandi.

Of the remaining twenty-five, ten were zoistic: Loyalty Islanders; Tannese; Banks Islanders; Trobriand Islanders; Kiwai Papuans; Mafulu; Purari; Koita; Mailu; Masai. The information afforded by a study of these ten societies reveals the basis on which uncivilized culture rests, but, except in the case of the Kiwai Papuans and the Purari, it will not assist us when we try to understand what happens when, for example, a zoistic society becomes manistic or deistic, or when a manistic society becomes deistic or zoistic. Of these ten societies the Kiwai Papuans and the Purari (paras. 74, 76, 80) are the most important, for the ideas that prompted them to perform certain of their rites were of such a nature that their logical
extension and application would have changed the culture from the zoistic to the manistic pattern. Moreover, these natives have been studied carefully, and our information concerning them fulfils the two requirements I have mentioned.

It is from the other fifteen societies that we can obtain the information which reveals the nature of a cultural change. Nine were manistic: New Britons; South-east Solomon Islanders (Ulawa and Sa’a); Banyankole; Maori; Shilluk; Dinka; Lango; Akikuyu; Akamba. Six were deistic: Fijians; Bakitara; Baganda; Yoruba; Samoans; Tongans. Of the eighty societies with which we are concerned, these fifteen societies are among the most important. Together with the manistic Wayao (paras. 97–8), and the deistic Dahomans (para. 99) and Ashanti (para. 100), they afford the whole of the evidence which is available for a detailed discussion of the nature of a cultural change. The information concerning the remaining zoistic societies will help to reveal the foundations on which human culture rests, and our study of other manistic and deistic societies will afford corroborative evidence of the conclusions; but these three African matrilineal societies, in addition to the above-mentioned fifteen societies, are the only ones concerning which our knowledge is sufficiently reliable to warrant a detailed argument being based upon it.

I will summarize the reasons why the eleven societies—Ibibio; Aztecs; Ao, Angami, Lhota, and Sema Nagas; Chukchee, Koryak, Yukaghir; Orakaiva; Nandi—must be excluded from the final argument.

The Ibibio (paras. 41, 42) were manistic, and they compelled an irregular or occasional continence; but although in the reports concerning them the native words have been quoted sometimes, the native usage of those words has not been elucidated, and their culture has been described in such terms (para. 61) as render the native usage almost impossible to understand.

Concerning the Aztecs (para. 43) we do not know more than that they were deistic.

The culture of the Naga tribes of Assam (paras. 53, 54) has been fitted to an ‘animistic’ frame of reference; their sexual regulations have not been described. We are assured, on the one hand, that the Semas afforded a less extended pre-nuptial sexual opportunity to their young men and women than did the Aos, Angamis, and Lhotas, and, on the other hand, that according to the definitions which some anthropologists adopt, the cultural condition of the Semas was higher than that of the other tribes; but those definitions do not possess any single precise meaning, and since they are based on ‘beliefs’ I am unable to accept the evidence on which they are based. Furthermore, when I ask if the Nagas conducted any post-funeral rites in honour of the dead, I find that the subject has been complicated by an hypothesis concerning the relation between ‘the dead’ and ‘fertility’ which Dr. Hutton advanced after his visit to Jumuguri. There is no need to repeat what I have said in that reference.
The Palaeo-Siberians (paras. 55, 56) are next on the list. They permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom, and were zoistic; but in their case, although the native terms have been quoted, the native usage of those terms has not been elucidated. Indeed Mr. Bogoras and Mr. Jochelson have employed their data to illustrate their personal theories concerning the evolution of the ‘beliefs’ of ‘primitive’ men. The sexual opportunity and the cultural condition of the Koryak are said to have differed from those of the Chukchee and Yukaghir, but an examination of the evidence reveals that the alleged differences did not exist, the conclusion being due (1) to a false inference from the destruction of pre-nuptial children, (2) to the loose phraseology which seems to be unavoidable in any classification of ‘beliefs’.

I have already discussed (paras. 79, 80) the Orakaiva at considerable length. It is plain that we require more evidence before we can classify either their rites or their sexual regulations.

Concerning the Nandi (para. 87) we know little, and the value of what we know has not been increased by the manner of the reports. The native usage of the native words has not been described.

Thus, although the reports on these eleven societies provide evidence for the original induction (para. 24), the evidence is not of such a quality as will help to elucidate the nature of a cultural change.

The same remark applies to the evidence which is available concerning four of the next five societies, which lived in the Area of Profound Mystery, the Baila being the exception.

D. THE AREA OF PROFOUND MYSTERY

91. Awemba. The first mysterious thing about the Awemba is their sexual regulations. It is generally agreed that the society was founded as the result of a migration to the Tanganyika Plateau from Lubaland, a certain Chitimukulu, a son of a Luban chieftain, having been forced to flee from his own country because he had been intimate with one of his father’s young wives. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the Awemba were governed by his seventeenth successor, Chitimukulu Chitipankwa. Since the succession was in the female line, each ruler being succeeded by his brother or by his sister’s son, it is impossible to estimate the period which had elapsed since the original Chitimukulu journeyed eastwards, for we cannot tell how many generations are represented by the seventeen rulers. Usually the successors of Chitimukulu are called ‘kings’, but I have not been able to find the native word translated ‘king’; nor are we told the Bantu for ‘son of God’, a phrase applied to the ‘king’. Perhaps leza is the word which is ‘God’.

To a female member of the two ‘royal’ clans sexual freedom was extended; she could choose any man as her consort, and he could not refuse her. Moreover, if no child was born within a year of their mating, the consort was dismissed. This sexual freedom was not enjoyed by the female
members of the other clans. In Africa such differences between the sexual opportunity of the 'royal' females and of the ordinary females were not uncommon. In the kingdoms of Uganda and Dahomey, for instance, the princesses enjoyed a similar freedom to that afforded to the Wemba princesses, but ordinary girls in Uganda and Dahomey were compelled to be *virgines intactae* when they married; and it is curious that only in deistic societies do we find a parallel to the Wemba regulations. There were differences in detail between the regulations of these societies; for instance, the Uganda princesses were not allowed to bear children; but no such disparity between the conduct of the various females existed among such tribes as the Akikuyu and Akamba of Kenya Colony, or among the Wayao and Anyanja of Nyasaland; and the facts suggest that the regulations of the royal clans were those of the Luban tribe of which ChitimuKulu had been a member before he misbehaved. If this conjecture be correct, then it may follow (1) that the Luban society had been in the same cultural condition as the Baganda and Dahomans, i.e. deistic, (2) that the political organization of this society was similar to that of these deistic societies, for deistic societies are distinguished not only by their habit of erecting temples but also by their peculiar political organization, which may be loosely termed monarchical. (Zoistic societies have no such political organization; usually their 'chiefs' are social elders or magicians.) Thus the freedom extended to the Wemba princesses (but to no other females) suggests that the founders of the tribe were at one time members of a society which was in a higher cultural condition than that in which we found the Awemba at the end of the nineteenth century. At that time they were manistic,\(^3\)

Concerning the regulations which controlled the behaviour of the Wemba tribe in general, we do not know much. There is some reason to believe that these had been relaxed before any record was made. For two complete generations indeed the natives had been subject to the white man's influence and teaching. Now the application of cultivated standards to uncultivated people does not always produce the result which most white men expect. Generally speaking, if native law and custom effectually limited the sexual opportunity of the women, the practice of the white man's preaching results in the extension of that opportunity, for the white man merely forbids by ethical teaching what native custom has prevented; and usually after a few years of white influence many sexual impulses can be gratified which previously had to be contained. As Cullen Gouldsbury has remarked, 'no one is quicker than the native to notice the slackening of the old bonds'; and he emphasizes the revolution which was effected in Wemba society by the knowledge that 'the white man would not enforce upon women marriages which were repugnant to them'. We continually read such sentences as these: 'Since the British occupation adultery has become very common'; 'The marriage customs were formerly very strictly observed'; '... the growing laxity in the observance of the marriage tie ...'.

\(^3\)See for instance, the regulation of the Wayao, which forbids remarriage, as well as the somewhat similar custom of the Baganda, and other regulations which were observed by the Baganda. 

\(^3\)See for instance, the regulation of the Wayao, which forbids remarriage, as well as the somewhat similar custom of the Baganda, and other regulations which were observed by the Baganda.
These remarks apply more to post-nuptial than to pre-nuptial regulations, but the stringent character of the original regulations is always implied. I do not discuss the desirability of the changes that were evidently taking place. My point is that the sexual opportunity of the Awemba towards the end of the nineteenth century may have been much greater than it had been when the natives were autonomous.\textsuperscript{388}

The precise character of the native regulations is obscure. Our knowledge of Wemba practice, indeed, is extremely imperfect, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the definite limitations which were placed upon the young men and women. If an elder married sister died or became incapable, the man who had paid a bride-price for her could demand a younger sister in her place. This may have had some influence on the parental attitude to pre-nuptial intercourse; but the custom is not unique, having prevailed in other societies also. There was also a quaint custom whereby a father was compelled to pay a goat as compensation to a lad who had refused his daughter’s offer of marriage.

The available accounts of the methods by which a wife might be obtained do not agree. If we follow Mr. Coxhead, we must conclude that Wemba marriages were often, if not usually, matriloclal. The lad went to work in the house of his future father-in-law. At first he was on probation, but was allowed access to the girl. If he was not satisfactory, she was taken from him and he was sent away. Mr. Coxhead states that any uninitiated girl who bore a child would be driven from the village, together with her lover: ‘The child would not be molested in any way.’ We are not told what happened if a girl became pregnant after initiation but before marriage. Presumably the matter was unimportant.

According to Mr. Sheane, however, a bride-price was paid sometimes; and the parents surrendered their daughter to the lad as soon as the price had been paid in full. Meantime, the girl was reserved for him, being carefully guarded in a special hut apart from the rest of society. There was evidently a very close relation, so far as these natives were concerned, between the bride-price and the girl’s sexual qualities, for, if the man succeeded in effecting an entry into the hut in which she was confined, he was not required to pay any of the bride-price that might be outstanding.

Summarizing this evidence, we may say that possibly at one time Wemba regulations were very strict. This, however, may apply not to pre-nuptial but to post-nuptial customs. Our knowledge in regard to the former is limited, and may refer only to recent times. The young men and women seem to have been subjected to such regulations as would have imposed a compulsory occasional continence, but the nature of those regulations is obscure. According to one account, a betrothed girl was reserved for the lad who had paid, or was paying, the bride-price.\textsuperscript{389}

The Awemba were in the manistic cultural condition.

The powers in the universe were \textit{leza}, \textit{milungu}, \textit{mulenga}, and \textit{mipashi}. \textit{Leza} is a word which was current also among other Bantu tribes. It is
difficult to understand how the evidence, such as it is, can be scientifically handled, or even admitted, for, as I have said (para. 4), there is no reason to suppose that a Bantu can describe his 'beliefs' with any more exactitude than a European peasant can, or that a white man can report those beliefs without a certain amount of subjective intrusion. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that no rites were performed in honour of leza.\(^{390}\)

The word *mulungu* seems to be a plural form of *milungu*, which we have already met among the Akamba (para. 86), and which we shall meet again among the Wayao and Anyanja (paras. 97, 98). In the appropriate literature 'they', i.e. the *milungu*, are called 'local guardian spirits' or 'nature-spirits', but this interpretation is not acceptable even to its originator, who adds: 'It seems safer to conjecture that the *milungu* are the *mipashi* of very ancient chiefs exalted to the state of *milungu*, "Gods'.' The sudden transition from 'nature-spirits' to 'Gods' in this declaration is allowed by its author to pass without comment, and he does not relate the evidence on which he relies when he associates the *milungu* with the dead. The opinion, however, is interesting, because among the other three tribes to which I have referred *mulungu* was definitely applied to the dead, and it seems possible that the plural form of the word may have been introduced by the white man, who hitherto has been accustomed to regard 'primitive' men as believing in a plurality of evil spirits. There is no evidence that the Awemba used a plural form of *mulungu*. Indeed the only evidence that the alleged *milungu* were 'nature-spirits' is that 'they resided in the hills, mountains, and rivers'. I do not conceal my suspicion that the word *mulungu* was applied to such outstanding natural phenomena by the Awemba and that under the influence of the 'animistic' theory we have decided that *mulungu* meant 'spirit'. Then, since *mulungu* was applied to many different phenomena, the Awemba have been described as believing in 'spirits', *milungu*. The animistic interpretation of uncivilized culture has sunk so deep into our consciousness that we are apt to jump to a conclusion which further researches might invalidate. No attention seems to have been paid to the alleged *milungu*.\(^{391}\)

*Mulenga* is called 'chief of the *milungu*'; thus inference has been piled upon inference. I am unable to separate them from the facts. *Mulenga* seems to have been applied to the ghost of a white man who is reported to have come from Lubaland. He was credited with being the father of albino children and with causing affliction. No rites seem to have been celebrated in his honour, and I suspect that his name may have been derived from *mulungu*. In fact, since he was a white man, I should expect him to be so described.\(^{392}\)

The *mipashi* were the 'spirits of the dead'. These were the object of such rites as the Awemba conducted. Usually they are divided into two classes, dead chieftains and the deceased members of the family. A chief, or leading member of the royal clan, was buried in a special place, Mvoruli. A hut, which was afterwards furnished, was erected over his grave, and
two wives, whose duty was to provide the ghost with food and beer, remained there. We are not told how long they stayed; perhaps not long, for when the headman of Mvaruli village used to visit the hut, the reports imply that it was deserted. If the headman dreamed of the dead man, he went to the hut and made obeisance as if to a living chief, taking with him on these solitary visits offerings of beer and tobacco which had been prepared by the women caretakers. If there was a drought, and divination revealed that the ghost of a chief was responsible, human and/or animal sacrifices were made.\textsuperscript{393} No shrine was erected over the grave of an ordinary man, who was tended in the hut in which his descendants lived. If he appeared in a dream, a sacrifice was made to him, the dream being regarded as a sign that he needed attention. 'For a religious Wemba man', we are told, 'the cult of the spirit [sing. \textit{sic}] of his nearest relations is considered quite sufficient. Out of these spirit relatives a man will worship one whom he considers as his special familiar, for various reasons. For instance, the diviner may have told him that his last illness was caused because he had not respected the spirit of his uncle; accordingly he will be careful in future to adopt his uncle as his tutelary spirit. As a mark of such respect he may devote a cow or a goat to one of the spirits of his ancestors.'

I have quoted that sentence verbatim because it is fairly representative of African ethnography. I make no attempt to elucidate it.

Thus there seems to have been some kind of tendance, but no cult, among the Awemba. In some cases particular ghosts were singled out for special treatment; but the occasion of the rites, the place in which, and the agency through which, they were carried out, have been imperfectly recorded. Tendance, however, was not the only manner in which a ghost was dealt with. The exhumation of a dead body would finally dispose of the ghostly power.\textsuperscript{394} The ghosts of suicides, wizards, \textit{waloshi}, and murderers, \textit{viwa} (\textit{noa}), were specially feared, but a medicine-man-diviner, \textit{nganga} (pl. \textit{bashinganga}), was able to drive away their evil influence after he had enticed them into a circle of powdered camwood.\textsuperscript{395}

We are not told the source of magic power. There is no further information about the control of the weather.\textsuperscript{396}

92. \textit{Baila}. From the uncertainties of these vague reports we pass to the consideration of the Baila, who lived along the Kafue River, above the Middle Zambesi. Their customs and culture have been described in one of the most magnificent monographs which we possess. The Baila, indeed, rank beside the Lango and the Purari as one of the few tribes concerning whom an adequate knowledge can be gained without the necessity of comparing numerous and conflicting authorities one with another. The fine quality of the three monographs of which these three tribes have respectively been the subject is a good augury for the future of social anthropology.
There was no word in the Ila language for 'virgin' and no case of such pre-nuptial continence was known; but a girl who became pregnant before initiation was utterly condemned. Her child was a monstrosity which was immediately destroyed. If its father was discovered, he was fined one or two head of cattle; the girl herself ran the risk of being sent away into the forest that she might fall a prey to wild beasts. If an initiated girl conceived by a man other than her betrothed, her betrothed would either claim damages or demand a release from his bargain. In the latter case every effort was made to induce her lover to pay the bride-price and marry her. Should he refuse to do so, he was expected to supply the young mother with some of the necessities of life and thus 'help rear the child'.

The Baila, therefore, had adopted such regulations as would compel an irregular or occasional continence. The Baila were in the manistic cultural condition.

The powers in the universe were mizhimo, ghosts, and leza. The word muzhimo (pl. mizhimo) is said to have been applied to all ghosts. 'Theoretically, we are told, 'their number is indefinite. All the deceased members of a man's family are his mizhimo, but in practice it is mostly only those who have recently passed over that are thought of.' Just as all living men were subject to moods, so the tempers of mizhimo were unreliable: 'Any omission to do them reverence will be visited on your head or on the head of some one dear to you.' It was necessary, therefore, to placate them by offerings. As a general rule, a circle of sticks, mabwabwa, was planted round the grave; these took root and grew, and in a few years time there was often a grove of trees to mark the place: 'Over the grave and within the circle of sticks, a small hut is erected, consisting simply of a few short uprights and a roof of grass. Sometimes these 'temples' are situated other than over the graves. It is at these temples that offerings and prayers are made to the ancestral spirits.'

Such, at any rate, is the published report, but there are some puzzling details, for we are told in other passages that in every native hut there were 'sacred places' on either side of the main doorway and at the base of the central pole. Since it seemed improbable that the family mizhimo would be individually tended both in the hut and at the graveside, I communicated with Mr. E. W. Smith, who has been kind enough to write to me as follows: 'It is, I should say, a general rule to plant a circle of sticks around the grave but certainly not all graves are found surrounded by mabwabwa. Sometimes the sticks do not take root and grow; sometimes they are neglected, cattle overrun them, &c. More care is taken when the grave is of a chief or other important person, and probably if the matter were gone into it would be found that the existing mabwabwa marked the graves of notable people.'

This is an important qualification of the report contained in the published monograph. It is clear that the Baila remembered and paid attention to
the more recently deceased members of their immediate family, but, whereas all graves were not tended, the graves of notable citizens were preserved in such a condition that a 'sacred grove', which became part of the inherited tradition of subsequent generations, was formed. It is doubtful if in later days all these groves were associated with the individuals whose burial had occasioned their planting, but certain mizhimo enjoyed a greater permanence than the majority. Mr. Smith and Mr. Dale submit a list of twelve of these 'demi-gods', as they call them, three of whom were pre-eminent, Malumbe, Munyama, and Shimunenga. Apparently all three men were immigrants. In most communities, however, the great mizhimo to whom attention was paid were not those who were the most ancient: 'They lived so long ago that the people prefer others who were more recently in the flesh among them.' In each district there was a sacred isaka (isoko) which was sacred to some well-known muzhimo.\(^{400}\)

An examination of the occasion on which and the place in which attention was paid to the various mizhimo reveals that these attentions partook of the nature of tendance. When a Mwila had been successful in a hunt, he threw morsels of meat on every side in order that none of his mizhimo might feel neglected. Conversely, if he was unsuccessful, a diviner would probably discover that a deceased member of his family was angry. Ghostly displeasure was manifest also in sickness. In both cases offerings of food and drink were placed on either side of the doorway, according to the identity of the ghost responsible for the affliction. The family mizhimo were kept in a good temper also by having their names given to spears, canoes, slaves, or dogs.\(^{401}\) These family mizhimo, however, had no power outside the family circle, and it would not be out of harmony with the evidence to say that a ghost was credited with the power to cause trouble only to those who had been subject to his authority during his lifetime. Thus the headman of a village would tend his ancestors not only on his own behalf but also on behalf of the whole settlement. Within the small hut which was built inside the mabwabwaa, a pot was sunk into the ground as a receptacle for beer offerings. Unfortunately, the manner and occasion of the rites which took place at the mabwabwaa have not been described in detail. Apparently the headman was the agent; presumably he was also a descendant of the dead man; so it is possible that he repaired to the mabwabwaa under those circumstances in which more ordinary people made offerings within the hut in which they lived. The only reported occasions on which an offering was made on behalf of the community were (1) the removal of the village to a new site, (2) at the maize harvest. The sense of other passages, however, suggests that other offerings were made on other occasions which have not been related.\(^{402}\)

The mabwabwaa of the greater mizhimo, such as Shimunenga, were tended more elaborately. The sticks had grown into trees; thus a grove of considerable dimensions had been formed. A regular custodian was on duty; his office seems to have been hereditary. We do not know how the original
appointments were made, but perhaps the immediate descendants made sure that one of their number tended their illustrious relation in a manner suitable to his reputation. Offerings were made by this custodian, who was the only man who dared to penetrate the grove. The specific occasions of the offerings have been mentioned only casually, but the beginning of the sowing season and the killing of a lion seem to have been events which were always celebrated. The custodian was assisted in his duties by ‘mediums’ who fell into a trance and revealed the will of the dead man or the cause of his displeasure. I cannot single out any one of these attentions as being definitely cult, but the available data are not considerable, and it is exceedingly difficult to be certain on the point.403

The term leza was associated particularly with the weather and sky-activity. No temples were erected to leza; no offerings to leza are reported. A more noteworthy conception was musamo, a mysterious power, dangerous to handle, which was employed by magicians. Mr. Smith and Mr. Dale dwell upon the subject at great length, and they consider that it is ‘at the basis of the Baila conception of the world’. They call musamo ‘hidden, mysterious, super-sensible, pervading energy powers, potencies, forces’, and state that ‘it is especially strange, unusual things, uncommon sights, new-fangled habits, strange foods, and ways of doing things that are regarded as manifestations of the hidden powers’. All strange, unusual things were tonda, taboo.404 It was their ability to manipulate this power which differentiated the banganga, medicine-men, the basonzhi, diviners, and the balozhi, wizards, from ordinary men. In the treatment of sickness there was no trace of exorcism or transference, even when a ghost was responsible; it was merely necessary to satisfy the desires of the neglected ghost. Other treatments were by musamo, ‘medicine’, ‘magic power’.405 Rain was connected with leza, ‘but the rain-making process’, we are told, ‘is definitely dynamistic in character; they employ the mysterious powers in musamo to compel the rain to fall’.406

93. Baronga. Among the Baronga, the young boys and girls used to indulge in gangisa immediately after puberty. The word gangisa is derived from ganga, ‘to choose a lover’. In a manner which is reminiscent of the Masai tasiuki (para. 88), each girl was requested to choose her mate; and apparently she could not refuse to do so. Pre-nuptial pregnancy seems to have been condemned, but we are not told the procedure which was adopted when a girl gave birth to a pre-nuptial child. ‘If this happens,’ M. Junod says, ‘the parents will say: “You have spoiled our daughter. You must buy her in marriage.”’ The compulsion implied in this passage, however, does not seem to have been a general characteristic of Baronga life, for apparently the man could refuse, in which case the child belonged to the family of its mother. Nothing further seems to have happened.

I can find no statement in regard to the prevalence of abortion or contraception among unmarried girls; indeed the whole report concerning
pre-nuptial regulations is very unsatisfactory. It would be strange if a society which regarded pre-nuptial pregnancy as the ‘spoiling’ of a girl did not have a recognized punishment for the man who was responsible, but M. Junod does not seem to have inquired into the economic details. Probably some regulations existed of which we are ignorant.407

The Baronga were manistic.

The sumptuous language in which their ‘ancestrolatry’ has been described does not conceal the lowly character of their rites. M. Junod’s book is a romantic picture of Bantu life rather than a cold scientific monograph, and it is difficult to separate his inferences from his facts. ‘Any man’, he says, ‘who has departed this earthly life becomes a shikwemba, a god.’ He then divides these ‘gods’ into ‘national gods’ and ‘family gods’, and informs us that the offerings to these divinities were individual and national. The former concerned a man and his immediate descendants; the latter concerned the whole clan. The words ‘clan’ and ‘nation’ are used interchangeably.

I am not satisfied that the so-called ‘national offerings’ were not simply the offerings made to dead chiefs by their descendants. I think that their ‘national’ character may be an inference. Just as all the members of the clan had been subject to the authority of the ‘chiefs’ when they were alive, so any untoward affliction for which the ordinary ghosts were not held responsible may have been ascribed to the ghosts of the ‘chiefs’. We are requested to distinguish also between ‘simple offerings’ and ‘sacramental ones, accompanied by the famous tsu’; and many other expressions are employed which on a first acquaintance are very impressive. Indeed, an unwary student runs the risk of being profoundly affected by the strange mysterious religion of this (according to M. Junod) brilliant but misguided people. The promise of this highly-coloured picture, however, is by no means fulfilled. The ‘famous sacramental rite, tsu’, was simply ‘an emission of saliva’. The man spat. The augur priest who plays so prominent a part in the reports was merely the eldest brother, who performed the sacrificial duties on behalf of the members of the family: ‘There was no sacerdotal caste.’ And an examination of the rites themselves reveals that the ‘worship of the gods’ consisted of common forms of tendance in which the Baronga sometimes confused the one and the many, and sometimes distinguished them.

The offerings consisted of ‘most of the things which rejoice the heart of a human being’, that is, food, tobacco, drink, or pieces of cloth. Sometimes an animal was killed; but here a Muronga was apt to cheat, for after he had killed a chicken, he might ask the ghost to accept ‘this ox’. The precise character of the offering depended upon the advice tendered by the diviner, who also informed an applicant where he should make his offering. A diviner was not always consulted, however; if a man dreamt of an ancestor in an unpleasant manner, he proceeded at once to hang some tobacco on the wall or to pour some beer outside the door. There was, in fact, no
special or recognized place where psikwembu were tended. The place
which M. Junod calls the ‘altar’ was a small pot on the ground outside the
settlement, or a tree, the identity of which was discovered by divination, or,
in the case of a magician’s offering, a forked branch of a special kind of
tree. On some occasions, gifts were placed on the graves. The agent
through whom the offerings were made was usually, as I have said, the
eldest brother, but the sense of many of the passages suggests that a man
often made his own offering in a place which he himself had selected. The
intentions of a Muronga, however, are not always made clear; and the vague
nature of the report is especially noticeable in the value of the offerings,
which at first appears to be in the highest degree important; but a more
careful perusal of the facts shows that a gift to a ‘national god’ might be
merely a sucked thorn. At other times, we are told, ‘all that is given to the
gods is a small amount of saliva emitted in pronouncing a sacramental
sound’.408

The word tilo seems to have been used by a Muronga in much the same
contexts as the Nilotic jok and the Kamba mulungu. It was applied to the
sky, sickness, death, and ‘certain great cosmic phenomena, more especially
those of a sudden and unexpected nature, rain, storms, death, convulsions,
and the birth of twins’. M. Junod usually translates tilo as ‘Heaven’, thus
selecting as the meaning of the word one of the many phenomena to which
it was applied, besides being guilty of an unjustifiable subjective intrusion
when he substitutes ‘Heaven’ with a capital H for ‘the sky’. The possess-
sion of certain charms, maringo ta tilo, is said to have promoted a man
to the rank of ‘magician of Heaven’, but the plain fact seems to have been
that in some unexplained manner tilo was manifest in the charms, their
possessor becoming a tilo-man.409 A rain-maker is described as a man
‘having the power of Heaven’, that is, he also possessed tilo. There does
not seem to have been any difference between such a magician and a man
who possessed jok or ngai. ‘The power of the rain-makers’, we are told, was
‘enormous’.410

When we turn to the treatment of sickness we are confronted by many
difficulties for which M. Junod is personally and directly responsible.
When he is describing Ronga ‘religion’ he translates shikwembu as ‘god’,
but when he speaks of the causes of affliction, ‘spirit’ is the English equiva-
 lent which he adopts. These ‘spirits’ were not Ronga ghosts; they were
Zulu ‘spirits’, or the ‘spirits’ of some other tribe. Apart from this, sickness
seems to have been ascribed to tilo or to witchcraft. We are not told how a
tilo-affliction was diagnosed or treated. The power of the wizards,
baloj, was counteracted by a mungoma who could also make rain, divine,
and influence, if not control, tilo. We are not told how a mungoma obtained
his power. The baloij seem to have inherited their ‘evil eye’ from their
mothers; their activities do not appear to have been socially condemned.
The Baronga possessed a very considerable knowledge of herbs and
anatomy; apparently the nanga was a man who confined his attention to
94. Amazulu. Our next society is the Amazulu. Their pre-nuptial regulations were very queer; but it must be remembered that Chaka introduced many changes into the social life of the tribe. We do not know what customs prevailed before he lived. Probably the reports refer to a fairly established tradition which had been suddenly modified by that amazing chieftain, who did not live long enough, however, to eradicate the whole of the ancient lore.

In answer to my question, 'Are children and young people, up to the time of marriage, allowed full latitude in which to indulge in any form of sexual excitement and play?' Mr. J. Y. Gibson answers, 'No'. In fact, he says, if the bridegroom discovered that his bride was a virgin, 'a head of cattle, in addition to the ten of lobolo, is given as an honorarium to the bride's mother'. 'This is omitted if the woman is not a virgin, the liability to reparation having fallen upon her seducer.' This accords with the report of McLean, who states, however, that the fine (sometimes three or four head of cattle) was inflicted only in a case of pre-nuptial pregnancy. A pre-nuptial child belonged to its father if he paid two or three head of cattle for its upbringing; otherwise it belonged to its maternal grandfather or to its mother's guardian. McLean adds: 'The seduction of virgins and cohabitation with unmarried women are not punishable by Kafir law, neither does any disgrace attach to either sex by committing such acts. This promiscuous intercourse of the sexes is, however, subject to certain rules and customs.' McLean does not state what these rules and customs were. Perhaps he was referring to the exogamic character of the isibongo, clan, or to hlobonga. The word hlobonga was applied to a certain form of pre-nuptial sexual intercourse between a young boy and girl. Father Bryant states: 'It is the common custom among Zulu natives that a betrothed pair indulge in frequent surreptitious, though unconsummated, intercourse. The practice, though technically unlawful, is nevertheless universally connived at, even by the girl's parents; but it is only so tolerated between a couple who have been properly affianced in accordance with native custom.' This is confirmed by Mr. Gibson who, in answer to my question: 'Do the people condemn pre-nuptial pregnancy but overlook pre-nuptial sexual intercourse?' replies, '(1) Yes. (2) Partial intercourse called hlobonga is not reprobated; this precludes penetration or seminal emission.' Father Bryant differs from Mr. Gibson, however, in stating that hlobonga was confined to betrothed couples. Mr. Gibson also says, in answer to a further question, that, after a girl was betrothed, continued hlobonga with an earlier lover was not reprobated.

The conflicting character of this evidence may be due to a variety of practices, but the nature of the subject renders a detailed inquiry very
difficult. In another context Father Bryant remarks: 'A girl having consented to become the sweetheart of any young man, the latter may send to her covertly, asking her to pay him a secret visit in his kraal, where she will, according to custom, pass two days and nights, closely kept out of sight of strangers, in the young man's hut, having throughout the time sexual intercourse with him, and leaving again on the third day. The action, when occurring between two duly betrothed parties, is connived at.' This seems to contradict the opinion I have already quoted, and we must conclude, I think, that the young couples were not always satisfied with hlobonga but indulged in pinga, full sexual intercourse. At the same time there must have been a fairly high standard of continence, for Mr. Gibson says that the test of virginity was applied if a bride demanded it 'in answer to a doubt expressed or implied concerning her purity'. On the other hand, a special term existed, u(lu)ngqoyingqoyi (lit. 'delicious food'), which small girls, when out alone and seeing a boy, called out to him, the words being intended as an enticement to come to them for sexual purposes.412

I have quoted this evidence in full so that its intricate nature may be appreciated. I suggest that according to the best of our information the Amazulu regulated the pre-nuptial relations between the sexes in such a manner as to impose upon them an irregular, occasional, but perhaps quite considerable, continence. It is not possible, however, to gauge the extent of these limitations.

The Amazulu were in the manistic cultural condition. Several native words are reported to have been applied to a dead man, itongo, idhlozi, isituta, &c. It is probable that at one time their meanings varied, but it is not now possible to make any appreciable distinction between them.413 Ghosts were supposed to be manifest in certain snakes; the word used in this connexion was always idhlozi, and perhaps we shall make certain that we have separated inference from fact if we say that idhlozi was applied to certain ghosts and to certain snakes. Yet clearly the ghost and the snake were identified by some of the Amazulu, for a case is reported by Callaway of a man who observed a snake on a grave, and said, 'I have seen him to-day, basking in the sun.' No attention was paid to any snake qua snake.414

The Amazulu did not pay any attention to any ghost except that of the head of the family or that of a chief. Such ghosts were tended spasmodically, and were held responsible for all afflictions that were not ascribed to witchcraft (abatakati). In the former case an animal was killed, and the mere killing is said to have been sufficient to effect a cure; but if a family ghost, itongo, was still troublesome, a specific sacrifice might be made to a dead chief in order that he might compel it to stop its ravages. Normally, however, the sacrifices to a chief were made only by his successor.415 Ghosts also caused trouble to their descendants by appearing in dreams; usually a sacrifice would produce a cessation of these activities, but some-
times a sacrifice was not considered necessary; the ghost was simply 'laid', and that was the end of the matter.\textsuperscript{416}

There appears to have been no specific place where amatongo were tended; as a rule, the sacrificial animal was killed in the kraal; but the graveside was continually associated with a dead man; and, if a village was moved, the ghost was transferred to the new district by a special rite, the original burying place losing its sacred character.\textsuperscript{417}

Amatongo could reveal medicines in dreams, but a Zulu magician, nyanga, would be careful to distinguish between his own medicines and those revealed to him in that manner. Like the Maori tohunga (para. 49), the word nyanga literally meant 'skilled', or 'a skilled person'; thus, according to Callaway, inyanga yokubola, one skilled in smiting the divining rods, a diviner, inyanga yemiti, skilled in medicine, inyanga yensimbi, skilled in metal-working, a smith. A nyanga was consulted in every difficulty; he possessed all the magical arts, besides being able to counteract the influences of those who practised takata, witchcraft, to which was assigned everything abnormal not assigned to the amatongo.\textsuperscript{418}

The elements were controlled by the particular nyanga who was skilled in that department of magical activity. He could turn back the hail, send away the lightning, make or prevent rain, and hasten or retard the sunshine. Sometimes, however, the ruling chief seems to have considered that a drought was due to the anger of his predecessor, and then a sacrifice was made; but, even when this was done, the rain-makers also were approached. Leslie states that every rain which fell was called after the rain-maker who had created it, 'So-and-so's rain', and that the people killed the nyanga who withheld a needed shower. McLean says that they killed also an inefficient rain-maker.\textsuperscript{419} We are not told the source of magic power except in so far as it was due to the possession of 'medicine'; but it seems that some diviners, whom some authorities call angoma, could be 'possessed' by an itongo and then were able to identify a wizard.\textsuperscript{420}

95. Basuto. The Basuto are the fifth and last tribe from this area. We know very little about them. The evidence in regard to their pre-nuptial regulations is poor, and even conflicting. I will state what has been reported.

According to Casalis, the parents exercised a strict vigilance over their daughters for fear that they should be obliged to accept a disadvantageous bargain. From this we may conclude that either pre-nuptial intercourse or pre-nuptial pregnancy was socially condemned. It was probably the latter which was condemned, for Mabille remarks: 'Every man has his mistress and every woman her lover. It is punished by a fine of two head of cattle if a girl is seduced without becoming pregnant and six if she becomes pregnant.' Mabille also states that on certain festive occasions 'young men and girls play together at very improper games which often end disastrously'. MacDonald too regarded pre-nuptial intercourse as
usual, for he states that the expert knowledge of abortifacients was the only reason why illegitimacy was rare.

It seems, then, that pre-nuptial intercourse was usual, and that pre-nuptial pregnancy was rare and condemned; but this is not the whole story. ‘Should the bridegroom’, Mabille says, ‘find out that his bride is not a virgin, he at once rises, walks out at dawn, and drives the cattle to the fields. The bride is taken back to her village and the cattle returned.’ We are not told whether this was a normal practice or an isolated case. The report seems to conflict with Mabille’s other statements. Perhaps the groom acted in this manner only if the girl had been betrothed as a child. Unfortunately we have very little information in regard to the method of acquiring a wife. All we are told is that the lad had no voice in the matter; his father arranged everything on his behalf; but since the father seems to have taken no action in the matter until his son intimated his desire to marry in the usual Suto manner by failing to milk the cows, betrothals cannot have been negotiated between children. Moreover, the father chose only a lad’s first wife, and Mabille’s report may apply to those that were subsequently secured. Mr. Dutton is not helpful. He says, ‘A girl who was found by her husband on the first night not to be a virgin was returned to her people: Tokens were not displayed. I have never heard of a case where a girl was returned to her own people for not being a virgin, but in the old days the penalty was that her parents had to return the cattle which they had received for her, to their disgrace and loss.’ Since no case was known to him, I am unable to say how he knows that a girl who was not a virgin was returned. It is unlikely, of course, that the parents would have returned the cattle unless they received back the girl, and since the tokens were not demanded we must conclude, ex definitione, that pre-nuptial chastity was not demanded; but the limitations placed upon the sexual activities of the young people were evidently considerable, and the Basuto must be included in the category ‘Irregular and occasional continence’. We cannot say more than that. I am inclined to think that our authorities have confused pre-nuptial intercourse and pre-nuptial pregnancy, and that a groom objected only if he found that his bride had borne a child. But possibly this is an erroneous conjecture.\[^{421}\]

The Basuto were in the manistic cultural condition. There was no special place where the balimo, ‘ancestral-spirits’, were tended. ‘It can hardly be said’, Mr. Dutton remarks, ‘that ancestors are worshipped: they are merely placated when trouble arises.’ Beer was offered to the family dead at every harvest. If a person dreamt of the dead, their appearance in the dream meant that the ghosts were calling, and a goat was slaughtered to placate them. Sacrifice was offered also when divination revealed that a ghost was responsible for a sickness; the animal would be killed by the paternal or the maternal uncle of the sufferer, according to the identity of the ghost. This seems to have been the only occasion on which an individual dead man was distinguished from the family dead. Molimo,
the singular form of balimo, was rarely used by the natives until the missionaries employed it to denote the Christian God. 'The singular form was not generally used before the time of the missionaries', Mr. Dutton says, 'as the spirits seem to have been regarded as a family rather than a particular individual spirit. They do not trouble their heads very much about other people's dead. They are nothing to them.'

Sickness was due to balimo or to boloi, witchcraft. All our authorities agree about that. Mr. Dutton adds that it might be due also to breaking a taboo or to having done anything unusual: 'A Mosuto who found a strange-looking fossil said he was afraid to bring it home in case sickness broke out and people would say it was his fault for bringing it into the village.' The wizard moloi (pl. baloi) charmed food, foot-prints, and body refuse; against these secret criminals the ngaka employed his powers of divination. The ngaka had a recognized and honoured place in society and 'was the chief's right-hand man to whom everything unusual was referred'; but 'people might use the services of a ngaka to harm an enemy who might be innocent of boloi'. The ngaka seems to have been taught his trade, which consisted of the magic which made the herbal treatment efficacious and of throwing the divinatory bones. Martin, however, makes this report: 'Certain children are selected, in infancy or early childhood, to be made doctors. Their poor little bodies are cut, and various "medicines" rubbed into the wound which bestow powers of divination, of healing, and of witchcraft upon the children.' I do not place a high value on the statement.

The killing of a sacrifice did not actually cure the sickness for which balimo were held responsible (as is alleged to have been the case among the Amazulu). Casalis says that the sacrifice merely rendered efficacious the medicines prescribed by the ngaka.

Rain and other forms of sky-activity were under the control of ngaka, but apparently the Suto practitioners were rather inefficient. In the case of a prolonged drought the people went in a troop to the hills: 'They kill every wild thing they see and smash everything. Anything they kill is disembowelled and the entrails thrown into streams.' Mr. Dutton says that he knows nothing of any spirits associated with places: 'The Basuto do not regard natural phenomena as possessing particular power.'

96. Summary and Chart. Such were the customs and culture of five societies which lived within the Area of Profound Mystery. The facts are stated diagrammatically on the next page.

I have placed a question-mark in Col. 3 in reference to the Baronga because, although he continually speaks of 'exorcists', M. Junod has described no rite which can be accurately included in that category.

The evidence is that the culture of these five African tribes conformed to the rule that a compulsory irregular and occasional continence is accompanied by the manistic cultural condition. We can say no more than that.
The quality of the evidence is not high; the whole area had been in a state of chaos for many years before the white man arrived; and there is reason to believe that some, if not all, of these societies were in a degenerate condition. Mr. Dutton writes: ‘The Basutos came from warmer and more fertile lands before arriving in Basutoland, presumably driven out by more powerful races. Just before the advent of the European they had suffered from internecine wars of a severity hitherto unknown. Starvation and cannibalism had been rife and their orderly ceremonies impossible to maintain. Family life had been broken up. If an inference is allowable in this connexion, it would be that such ancient customs as are described here were already showing signs of degeneration at the time when the earliest observers took note of the traditions, and that in some time past institutions, such as marriage, were much more solemn and binding.’

This is an important pronouncement. We must accept the reports as they stand, and make no attempt to reduce them to an order which would be only superficially satisfactory. Cultural changes were occurring at the time to which the reports refer, and we do not know what those changes were.

In regard to pre-nuptial sexual opportunity the Awemba and Amazulu seem to have placed some limitations on a betrothed girl; from these limitations an unbetrothed girl was free; but apparently the practices among the former were not uniform, while in regard to those of the latter there are many complications. I do not know if the reforms of Chaka were responsible for the practice of hlobong, and I cannot explain the contradictions in the reports. It is extraordinary that under certain circumstances a Zulu girl should have demanded a virginity test; the custom suggests that a general demand for the tokens may have been a Zulu

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The quality of the evidence is not high; the whole area had been in a state of chaos for many years before the white man arrived; and there is reason to believe that some, if not all, of these societies were in a degenerate condition. Mr. Dutton writes: “The Basutos came from warmer and more
practice which had fallen into desuetude. On the other hand, Chaka may have been responsible for the introduction of an idea which had not been universally adopted. The vague manner in which our authorities speak of 'chastity' in reference to the Basuto does not warrant a suggestion in its connexion, but, unless the confusion between pre-nuptial intercourse and pre-nuptial pregnancy has transformed inferences into facts, the idea of a virgin wife must have been sometimes present in the native mind. If there were any reason to suppose that there had been, at any time, a widespread demand for the tokens of virginity among these tribes, I should be inclined to submit that at some remote period they had been in the deistic condition; this suggestion might be made also on the strength of the Wemba political organization, to which I have already referred (para. 91); but the hypothesis is wrecked by other lines of argument.

I do not know, and am not competent to judge, whether or not the words used by a society can be regarded as evidence of its origin and history, but it is interesting to note that the terms which these tribes used to denote a magician were very similar, while the words which have been translated 'spirits of the dead' were various. Thus the Wemba magician was nganga, Ronga nanga, Ila nganga, Zulu nyanga, Suto ngaka; these words seem to have had a common origin; but the words for 'spirits of the dead', Wemba mipashi, Ronga psikwembo, Ila mizhimo, Zulu amatonga or amadhlozi, Suto balimo, cannot be so understood. If we accept the hypothesis that the Bantu tribes migrated, say a thousand years ago, from the neighbourhood of Lake Chad, we might possibly argue that they possessed a common word for magician at the time of their dispersal, but no common word for the dead. In that event the lack of a common word for the dead might be understood as an indication that at that time they did not conduct any ancestral rites. We might further suggest that the introduction of the various terms which were applied to the dead was due to a subsequent adoption of post-funeral rites, each separate tribe introducing a different word into its language. These suggestions, however, conflict with the idea of degeneracy, for they seem to involve a change to the manistic from the zoistic, not from the deistic condition. In fact, the more we analyse the available data, the more mysterious they become.

A dissimilarity is apparent also in the manner in which the five tribes buried their dead. The Basuto and Amazulu did not bury any corpse except that of a chief. The Awemba buried their chiefs in a special place, and, unlike the Basuto and Amazulu, erected huts, which they afterwards furnished, over their graves. It is possible that the Baronga also built little huts over the graves of their leading citizens, but this is an inference from a solitary photograph in M. Junod's book. No huts seem to have been found when the cemeteries were inspected, and it is unfortunate that M. Junod should have been content to submit a photograph of such an important cultural item without making any other reference to it. The Baila not only erected huts over the graves of notable men, but also planted
a circle of sticks, *mabwaba*o, around it in such a manner that a sacred grove was created in a few years.

The source of magic power is not related except in the case of the Baila, whose *musamo*, ‘medicine’, ‘magic power’, was manifest ‘especially’ in strange, unusual things. Among the other four tribes, a recipe or a rite is said to have been revealed in a dream or to have been taken over from another practitioner. The Suto *ngaka* is said to have been consulted when some unusual event took place or when some one suffered from an unusual sickness.

We now turn to the consideration of our last four African societies. Two, the Wayao and the Anyanja, were Bantu; two, the Dahomans and the Ashanti, are usually classed as Sudanic. All four were matrilineal; their pre-nuptial regulations varied; the former pair were in the manistic, the latter pair in the deistic condition. We know very little about the Anyanja, but the other three tribes are important. They will be added to the list of societies (para. 90) the cultural details of which supply the best evidence concerning the nature of a change from one cultural condition to another.

### E AFRICAN MATRILINEAL SOCIETIES

97. *Wayao (Ajawa) and Anyanja—Pre-nuptial Sexual Regulations.* I propose to discuss the Wayao and the Anyanja together. First I will describe their pre-nuptial sexual regulations.

The Wayao were late-comers to Eastern Shiré. When they settled along the south-eastern coast of Lake Nyasa, the area was already occupied by some of the tribes which are included as Anyanja. The latter were a vast unwieldy group which inhabited the whole of the Shiré highlands, as well as the western, southern, and eastern shores of the Lake. The culture of these two stocks was very similar, and there is a distinct possibility that some Yao customs and practices have been credited to the Anyanja, and *vice versa*. In some cases such transference can easily be detected, and, since on both the groups it is the same writers who are our chief authorities, it is doubtful if they can be separately discussed. We know more about the Wayao, however, than about the Anyanja; indeed it is possible that the former are the only Nyasaland tribe concerning which our information is adequate and reliable. Both the Wayao and the Anyanja were matrilineal; a child belonged to the social group of its mother. Brother succeeded brother; failing a brother, a sister’s son inherited.⁴²⁸ Marriage was matrilocal; it was rare for a woman to leave her own village. There was no bride-price.⁴²⁹

‘Over nearly the whole of British Central Africa’, Sir H. H. Johnston remarks, ‘chastity before puberty is an unknown condition, except perhaps among the Anyanja.’ He does not state the evidence on which he relies, and we cannot conclude that the pre-nuptial sexual opportunity of the
Anyanja was less than that of the other tribes. Definite evidence, in fact, is lacking except in the case of the Wayao.

Among the Wayao, Dr. Stannus says, a man who had relations with an unbetrothed girl was in no way blameworthy, she being held responsible for her own actions. Such intercourse, indeed, was exceedingly common and lightly regarded. According to MacDonald, no man would pass by a solitary woman, and she, on her part, would not refuse him; but any one who was intimate with a betrothed girl was guilty of a crime which was punishable, and often was punished, by death. The word used to denote betrothal was applied also to a man's action in selecting a piece of ground for hoeing: he reserved it for his own exclusive use. The effect of this sexual limitation can be estimated by remembering that it was a common practice to betroth a girl when she was a baby. Thus the Yao regulations inflicted an irregular and occasional continence.

Apart from Sir H. H. Johnston's declaration to which I have already referred, there is little evidence concerning the Anyanja customs. We are told that a man who seduced a virgin had to pay two pounds or marry her at once, but we are not told why he was fined. He cannot have been punished for the actual sexual act, for 'promiscuous intercourse before puberty was common' (Stannus). Nor can the punishment have been inflicted for having deprived a girl of her virginity; indeed, the Anyanja were more likely to have applauded, for the defloration of a virgin wife was a matter which a husband always delegated to a friend. And the danger of pregnancy cannot have constituted his fault, for 'child-birth out of wedlock was no cause for reproach'. Plainly, then, certain ideas of which we are ignorant were in operation among the Anyanja. I can find no other evidence.

98. Wayao and Anyanja—Cultural Condition. The Wayao were mistic. The powers which manifested themselves in the universe were mulungu and lisoka (pl. masoka). All the complications which have arisen over the meaning of the former term can be directly traced to an attempt to translate Yao into English or to express in Yao an English conception. Mr. Hetherwick is quite clear about the native use of the term: 'Mulungu is regarded as the agent in anything mysterious.' Again, 'It's mulungu' is the Yao exclamation on being shown anything that is beyond the range of his understanding.' Dr. Stannus says: 'In reply to many questions to which the native has no answer, he will practically use our English phrase, "God knows", and with about as much meaning; "mulungu made it so".' I do not know how far inference is associated with fact in these statements, as the native terms for 'agent' (Hetherwick) and 'made it so' (Stannus) are not given. Happily Mr. Hetherwick throws some light upon the mystery in another passage. 'The missionaries have adopted it [i.e. the word mulungu], he says, 'as the term for God. But the untaught Yao refuses to assign to it any idea of being or personality. It is to him a quality
or faculty.' So far, indeed, was *mulungu* from being an entity that when the 'untaught Yao' was being taught to use his own words in a new sense he began to speak of the *mulungu*, 'Mr. God'.

The word *mulungu* was used also in other contexts. According to Mr. Hetherwick, it denoted 'the aggregate of the spirits of all the dead'; he emphasizes this meaning of the word by printing the phrase in italics. MacDonald confirms this report, and says that *mulungu* was 'a spirit formed by adding all the departed spirits together'. Elsewhere he states: 'The spirit of a deceased man is called his *mulungu*, and all the prayers and offerings of the living are presented to such spirits of the dead.' Thus *mulungu* was applied to anything unusual or beyond Yao comprehension, to 'the dead', and to the individual spirit of a dead man. The latter use of the word may, or may not, be an inference from the fact that it was applied to 'the dead'.

According to Mr. Hetherwick, the vital force in a man (but not in any other animal) was *lisoka*, soul, shadow. It was the *lisoka* which had adventures or appeared in dreams. When a man died his *lisoka* left him 'and went to *mulungu*'. 'To pray to such a spirit', Mr. Hetherwick says, 'is described as *kulomba mulungu*, to worship *mulungu*, never *lisoka* in this case.' At the same time, whenever little boys passed the village shrine, they whispered *masoka* in a warning tone. Thus sometimes a ghost was called *mulungu*; sometimes the word *lisoka* also was employed. The village shrine was the grave of the village chief or headman, over which a hut was built. 'The hut itself', Mr. Hetherwick says, 'is built of the usual native materials enclosed within a strong grass fence. The roof is of grass laid on a framework of bamboo, and is generally covered with long strips of white or coloured calico. On the ridge or apex of the roof are fixed a couple of flags or an umbrella or two. One wall is usually left open so that the interior is easily seen. Within, from the bamboo rafters, are suspended handkerchiefs, cloths, bunches of beads, &c., all offerings to the *mulungu* of the dead headman. A raised platform or mound of earth in the centre marks the spot where the grave was made.' We are not told the native term for this hut. Apparently such honours were paid only to notable men: 'Only the graves of chiefs or headmen are thus treated as shrines of worship. The burying place of slaves and common people lies away in the thick bush, where only the rank grass or the thickest of old trees mark the spot. No offerings are ever taken there.' Just as the word *mulungu* was used in reference to the dead in general, so the offerings were made not to any particular dead man but to 'the dead'. 'The man that makes an offering', Macdonald says, 'regards himself as giving a present to a little village of the departed which is headed by its chief.' Sometimes, however, a man might be remembered as an individual, for 'very frequently a man presents an offering at the top of his own bed beside his head'. A man might pay direct attention to his own father in this manner, whether his father had been a headman or not.
Certain dead men were remembered by name, and were associated with certain mountains, but as a rule it was only the more recently deceased who were remembered. ‘The chief of a village will not trouble himself about his great-great-grandfather; he will present his offering to his own immediate predecessor.’ Again, ‘People residing in a village worship their deceased chief, but when their present chief dies he will become their principal god.’

I have described the Yao opinions in detail because the reports, when first they are read, are extremely puzzling. It is not until we cease to rationalize the Yao ideas and begin to speak in native terms that they become clear and comprehensible. The Wayao saw in the world the manifestation of a power *mulungu* which they associated with anything which was unusual or beyond their comprehension. They applied the word also to ‘the dead’, thereby confusing the one and the many. Indeed they did not remember a dead man for more than one generation, except in certain cases. Generally speaking, offerings were made to ‘a little village of spirits’, i.e. to *mulungu*.

The circumstances under which these offerings were made show that they came under the heading of tendance. The attitude towards the dead, Dr. Stannus says, was that of ‘Do us no harm, do not vent your wrath upon us’. ‘There may have occurred much sickness and the people conclude that the pest has come to remind them that they have not been attentive to their dead chief. The grave house is rebuilt, a pot is sunk into the ground, and beer is poured in, and around about heaps of flour are placed.’ Similarly, Macdonald states that ‘all the offerings are supposed to point to some want of the spirits’. The occasions for these offerings were sickness, drought, and any other affliction. Offerings were also made if the dead man appeared in a dream and before a journey was undertaken. The nature of the offering is said to have been decided by the *mchisango*, the woman who was possessed by *masoka* and revealed their will. She is to be distinguished from the *jua singanga*, the medicine-man who dealt in herbs and charms and countered the activities of the *msawi*, wizard.

‘Medicine’ could be made from a still-born child, various plants, hyenas, and in other ways; it is possible that the common quality they possessed was none other than *mulungu*. In times of drought, as I have said, the headman usually made an offering to his predecessor; but MacDonald also states: ‘In the south of Africa the power of rain-making has been claimed completely by the rain-doctors; even here the sorcerers have a great power.’ I can find no other evidence.

When we consider the poor quality of African ethnography as a whole, I think we must admit that our knowledge of the Wayao is considerable; but as soon as we turn to the Anyanja we experience great difficulties. Probably the details of Anyanja culture have been lost for ever; we can merely note its general pattern. At the same time it must be admitted that if our authorities had quoted the native terms which they translate ‘spirit’, and had taken care to state the place whence their information was derived,
and the tribe to which it refers, our study would have been greatly facilitated. As it is, though the records are said to apply to the Anyanja generally, most of the details seem to have been collected near the southern coast of Lake Nyasa. This is precisely where Yao influence seems to have been greatest.\[444\]

The power mulungu manifested itself also to the Anyanja, and, apparently, to all their related tribes, but our authorities do not state the contexts in which the word was used. The most definite explanation (or interpretation) which I can find is: ‘All that pertains to the spirit-world.’ It is impossible to discover what the Nyanja usage was. ‘God’ is the usual translation.\[445\] I should say that probably the word was used to denote ‘the dead’ in a mass; for we are told that attention was paid to mulungu either at the foot of large trees or at a kachisi, the hut which was erected over the grave of a leading citizen. The offerings to a deceased headman also were made in these places; thus it is reasonable to suppose that there was some doubt whether the offering was for mulungu or for mizimu, ‘spirits of the dead’. In other words, there seems to have been the same confusion between ‘the dead’ and the power in the universe as that which existed among the Wayao and some of the tribes in Kenya Colony and southern Sudan. Offerings were made in times of stress or when the dead man appeared in a dream.\[446\] Ghosts are never mentioned as a cause of affliction; sickness is said to have been due to mfti, witchcraft, or to mulungu. It is impossible to make any sense of the reports concerning the magicians.\[447\] Apparently they could control the elements, but in time of drought an offering was made to a dead chief at his kachisi.\[448\]

The association of the ‘unusual’ with ‘medicine’ or ‘magic power’ has been reported by Dr. Stannus in an interesting passage. Speaking of the various emotions which the natives exhibited, he says: ‘What might surprise a white man does not have the same effect on the native. It is something new to him and may be extraordinary, but it is caused by some particular ‘medicine’ having been used.’\[449\] Unfortunately, Dr. Stannus does not give the word which the native applied to this ‘medicine’. I suspect that it was mulungu.

Thus both the Wayao (or Ajawa, as they are more correctly but less usually termed) and the Anyanja were in the manistic cultural condition, and, while permitting pre-nuptial intercourse, had adopted such regulations as imposed an irregular and occasional continence. The Wayao regulations are fairly clear, and were similar to those of the New Britons (para. 27), Ibibio (para. 41), and Maori (para. 45). The Anyanja customs have been less accurately reported.

We turn to the great West African kingdoms, Dahomey and Ashanti.

99. Dahomans. I do not propose to discuss the organized religious prostitution which existed among the Dahomans. I shall merely note the general pattern of their culture and then pass westward to Ashanti. The
Dahomans were in the deistic cultural condition; they also demanded the tokens of virginity.

The consummation of a Dahoman marriage took place while the marriage feast was being celebrated. The groom soon reappeared, bearing the cloth which had covered the couch. Great were the rejoicings if the primitiae were forthcoming; and in order to protect the bride from a false accusation, a young girl was concealed in the bridal chamber. Her duty was to seize the discoloured languti, and deliver it to the bride's friends. If, however, the bride was found to have been unchaste, 'great parlance' ensued. The husband could demand the return of the bride-price, together with the value of all the presents he had made; the girl might be sent back to her parents. A bride who passed the virginity test successfully stayed with her husband for a week, returned home for a few days, and then went back to her husband as a permanent wife. The man who had intercourse with a betrothed girl or with an unmarried girl was either enslaved or compelled to pay a fine equal in value to the bride-price which was or would have been demanded.450

As soon as we find such an authenticated case of such rigorous nuptial regulations we find also an example of a society which worshipped gods in temples. Sir A. B. Ellis, whose scholarly survey of the west coast of Africa is the best available summary of Dahoman culture, has compared the beliefs of the Ewe-speaking peoples (Dahomans) with those of the Tshi-speaking peoples (Ashanti) as follows: 'Instead of a thousand different villages possessing each a god, each of whom resembles all the others in general attributes and functions, but is believed to be essentially separate and individual, we find on the Slave Coast the same gods, worshipped under the same name, in every town and in every considerable village, represented by images modelled on a common plan and possessing in every case identical attributes and functions.' The gods whom Ellis includes as 'general deities' are Khebioso (So), god of lightning; Legba (Elegba, Lekpa), a phallic deity; Dso, god of Fire; Huntin and Loko, gods of the silk-cotton and poison trees; Aizan, protector of markets, public places, and doors of houses; Anyiewo, the rainbow god; Hoho, tutelary deity of twins; and Sapatan, god of small-pox. But neither Skertchley nor Burton agrees with this list. According to Skertchley, the four gods who enjoyed a general reputation were Khebioso, god of lightning; Atinbodum, god of healing; Hu (Wu), 'the Dahoman Neptune'; and Danhgbwe, the python-god. Burton says that the last three were the Whydah triad whose worship spread throughout Dahomey so that 'men now forget their first habitat'. Both Skertchley and Burton state that the silk-cotton and poison trees were sacred to Atinbodum merely because they were employed by the priests of that god in averting and curing disease. Curative qualities are credited to them also by Ellis, who in his turn acknowledges that Danhgbwe, which he spells Danhgbi, was a prominent deity, 'the embodiment of wisdom and earthly bliss'.

There are many other discrepancies also in the reports concerning the extent of the area in which the various deities were recognized; and their conflicting nature is a warning to those who would (a) classify as 'more developed' those deistic societies whose gods were worshipped throughout the country, (b) place a society with a number of local deities in a lower position in the cultural scale. At first sight the conclusion is logically sound, but there is a complete lack of reliable evidence on which it might be based. We can no more classify deistic peoples by their beliefs about their gods than we can analyse manistic societies according to their beliefs about their ancestors. If we make any such attempt, a mountain of misleading hypothesis will be erected on the quicksands of uncertain and unreliable evidence.\textsuperscript{451}

We must concentrate, then, on the Dahoman rites. The evidence is not considerable. It is an extraordinary fact that, while our authorities will devote page after page to a discussion of 'beliefs', they seem to have paid very little attention to the shrines and temples which they were seeing every day. The temple which impressed the earlier travellers was the temple of Danhgbì at Whydah. It was a large circular hut with a conical roof and was more elaborately furnished than the more common temples mentioned by Ellis, who says that 'the temples themselves are nearly always small huts, circular in shape, and so low that a man cannot enter without bending nearly double'. As was natural in a military kingdom, Bo, god of war, was honoured greatly, and 'perhaps worshipped more than any other god'. Temples to Bo were erected 'at every turn-gate and cross-road'.\textsuperscript{452} The local gods could be addressed directly by individuals, but the general deities had to be approached through the agency of a priest. The priests of each god were a distinct sect. The applicant spent his three years' novitiate in a male seminary, being trained to dance, to recite the chants, and to carry out the general ceremony of religion. The god declared his acceptance of the candidate by 'possessing' him. The man who trembled and foamed at the mouth was enrolled immediately; his name was changed. The number of priestesses was very large; indeed every fourth woman is said to have been connected with the service of the gods; and every town contained at least one institution where the young girls were trained for three years in religious chants and dances. The priestesses of Danhgbì, however, were on a different footing; they underwent no special training, any 'possessed' woman becoming a member of the organization.\textsuperscript{453}

The native word translated 'god' is \textit{vodu}, which was used in the same contexts as the Tshi \textit{bohsum} and the Yoruba \textit{orisha}, being applied to anything 'sacred', as well as to white men. A priest was \textit{voduno}, a priestess \textit{vodusio}, a temple prostitute \textit{kosio}. Ellis says that \textit{voduno} meant 'one who stays with \textit{vodu}', but the importance of 'possession' in deciding whether or not a man could attain to the rank of priest suggests that 'one who has (or is) \textit{vodu}' would be a more accurate representation of the facts, even if it
were a less exact rendering of the native word. The derivations which are submitted, however, are not always trustworthy, for, as Sir James Frazer has noted, 'all such interpretations rest rather on conjectures and assertions of the natives than on exact philological investigation'.

The graves of dead kings were tended by females called tansino; human sacrifices were offered regularly. The tansino invoked the dead king on behalf of his living descendant, and the sacrifices are regarded as having had a double purpose: they were an acknowledgement of benefits already received and they swelled the ghostly retinue of the deceased man. The victim was consecrated by a priest (details are sadly lacking) before being slain. The attention paid to the family dead was less sensational but more interesting. 'It is the custom', Ellis says, 'to have the skulls of the family dead exhumed after a few years and placed in earthen pots which are carefully kept in the corner of the house. The dead are appealed to for advice and assistance before these skulls.' The words 'appeal to' beg the question of the power of the ghost, and we cannot definitely classify these rites as cult; but there was one kind of attention to the dead which seems to have been cult. The 'soul' of a man was called luwo, and, when he died, luwo became noli. The funeral ceremonies were designed to quieten the noli, which wandered about until it could become the luwo of a newly-born child. It was supposed to reside in the head, and Burton quaintly remarks that 'the Dahomans practise the worship of their own heads, in order to obtain good fortune'. Ellis states that 'a noli often becomes the family protector and sometimes even of small communities; he sometimes has his shrine, occasionally his image, and so really becomes a god of a sub-order'.

Sickness might be caused by a malevolent noli, which under these conditions was called abonsa; apparently it could be kept out of the house by the sacrifice of a fowl which was hung head downwards in the doorway. The ghostly theory of causation was adopted, however, only after the 'all-powerful medicine' had failed to effect a cure.

The treatment of sickness was in the hands of the priests, those of Atinbodum being the most important and most numerous; they could avert or cure any sickness. The priests of Anyiewo and Sapatan also were capable of interviewing a noli (abonsa) which was causing trouble. Direct witchcraft was not greatly in vogue. The power of a charm depended on the power of the vodu which was instilled by the voduno; amulets, vosesao, possessed no virtue until they had been blessed by a voduno.

Weather-controlling ceremonies have not been described, and the seasons in Dahomey seem to have been fairly regular; but Bowman states that Danhgb (Dangbi) was invoked 'in excessively dry and barren seasons'.

100. Ashanti. It is very strange that, whereas the white man was constantly in Dahomey in the early years of the eighteenth century, no Englishman had visited Coomassie until T. E. Bowdich went there in 1812.
T. Dupuis lived in the country for a short time after Bowdich had left, but he did not describe any of the native customs in his *Journal*. Dupuis had a very poor opinion of the natives, and conversed almost exclusively with the Mohammedan converts, of whom, even at that early date, there seem to have been a great number. Moreover, missionary enterprises were initiated as early as 1839, the state and prospects of Christianity on the Gold Coast being the main subject of John Beecham's competent book.\(^{459}\) Thus the Ashanti had been in contact with Asiatic and European culture for at least three generations before any systematic record of native customs was made.

The Ashanti are not so interesting a people as the Dahomans, and the asperities of savage life do not appear to have been as softened among them as among the Yoruba. In recent years their laws and customs have been the subject of an extended inquiry by Capt. R. S. Rattray, who has published the results of his researches in four volumes; but in spite of this we can only judge the general pattern of Ashanti culture. The details, especially those which are reported in later publications, represent a variety within the pattern which may be the result of alien influences.

It was usual for parents to betroth their daughters very soon after, and sometimes before, they were born. The payment of the *aseda* granted exclusive sexual rights, but the man could not possess the girl before she was formally handed over to him in marriage. She was then expected to be *virgo intacta*. Ellis says: 'If he finds that she has been unchaste, he can repudiate her and can recover both the head money he has paid and the expenses he has incurred. Should, however, a husband make an accusation of this nature without foundation, he is called before the principal men of the village by the father of the bride who produces the tokens of virginity, and the husband is then bound to pay damages for defamation, while the wife may, if she pleases, repudiate him without having to return the head money.' A girl who was not betrothed in her youth was paraded in the street as soon as she was marriageable; this 'public advertisement of her charms' seldom failed to produce suitors. She also was subjected to the virginity test, and if successful she again paraded the streets, 'accompanied by a number of young girls who sing songs in her honour'. A man who seduced a virgin was compelled to marry her, or, if her parents would not consent to the marriage, to pay the amount of the bride-price. In the latter case the girl was sexually free.\(^{460}\)

The Ashanti were in the deistic cultural condition. I have already quoted (para. 99) Sir A. B. Ellis's comparison between the Ashanti and Dahomans. Speaking of the Tshi-speaking peoples in general he says: 'Every local god has some recognized place of ordinary abode. There is the house in which his image, stone, drums, and other appurtenances are kept, which is called the house of the god.' Capt. Rattray remarks in reference to Ashanti temples: 'Every Ashanti temple is a pantheon in which repose the shrines of the gods.'\(^{461}\) Unfortunately, no description of a native temple
is available, and most of the illustrations which are included in Capt. Rattray’s books show traces of Christian and Mohammedan influence; but, if we may judge from a solitary photograph of a temple of Ntoa near Tano Oboase, the temples on the Gold Coast were conical thatched huts, with a low entrance. It is impossible to say how numerous they were.\(^{462}\)

The priests and priestesses do not seem to have been organized into definite orders. Ellis says that they were readily distinguished by their long uncombed hair, necklaces, and general equipment. Novices went through a three years’ course of study and training, and during that time slept ‘in the temple beside the shrine of the god’. Although a priest was attached to a special god, his training seems to have been directed more to the arts of divination and other forms of magic than to anything else. He was admitted after he had become ‘possessed’ by the god. When a man wanted to consult a priest, he did not go to the temple; the priest visited him.\(^{463}\)

The words which the Ashanti used to denote the powers in the universe were various, and have been variously translated. The most important were *suman*, which was applied to amulets and charms, and *bohsum* (*obosum*), which was applied both to the place where a power was manifest and to the power itself. The usual rendering is ‘god’, the word ‘fetish’ having been dropped by common consent. Like the Tshi *vodu* and the Yoruba *orisha*, *bohsum* was used as a noun and also as an adjective, meaning occult, mystic, sacred: thus, *bohsum prah*, the sacred Prah, *bohsum eppoh*, the mysterious sea. According to Capt. Rattray, the word for priest, *okomfo*, was derived from *akom*, ‘possession’, but as in an earlier publication he says that he himself was called *okomfo*, ‘possession’ may not have been an indispensable qualification. Besides, *akom* can hardly have been the real root; for *bonsam komfo* was a ‘witch-doctor’, who was also called *bayi komfo*. According to Christaller, *okomfo* was a general term which included *obosomfo*, possessor of *obosom*, i.e. diviner, and *osumanfo*, possessor of *suman*, i.e. charmer. Since, however, *obosum* and *suman*, as well as many other words, have been translated ‘spirit’, ‘god’, and ‘fetish’, it is impossible to tell which word the natives employed under the various circumstances, for in the course of their narratives our authorities do not always quote the native terms. The real native usage is, and is likely to remain, unknown.\(^{464}\)

Sir A. B. Ellis states that ‘each town, village, or district has its own local spirits or gods’. The chief Ashanti god was Tano (Tando). Sir Arthur seems to have regarded him as the indwelling spirit of the river of that name; Capt. Rattray says that his name was also Ta Kora. ‘Ta is a contraction of Tano’, Capt. Rattray adds; then he mentions Ta Kese, Ta Toa, Ta Kuntum, Ta Kivesi, Ta Yao, Ta Kojo, Ta Kofi, and other gods. If all these gods were forms of Tano, Tano would seem to have been a species rather than an individual; but he was addressed as ‘You whose song sounds even to Mecca’, so his character is not a matter which we need discuss. It is evident that in later days he was identified with some Mohammedan conception.\(^{465}\)
When a man died his kra became a sasa (sisa) until it was reborn. The sasa could inflict disease and misfortune, and was tended for a long time after death. The funeral rites were a propitiation of the sasa: 'Do not make us barren'; 'do not send disease', and other forms of do ut abenas, were the object of the gifts that were placed on the graves. There were various festivals of the dead; but the reports concerning them are conflicting. There seems to have been a form of cult in addition to the tendance which is well attested; a definite opinion on the matter, however, cannot be expressed until the reports have been further elucidated. It was possible for a powerful suman or for a priestly spell to ward off or dispel a malevolent sasa.466

The causes and treatment of disease have not been described in detail; the names of the various practitioners are also very confusing. A case of witchcraft seems to have been treated by the bonsam okomfo; but the priest, okomfo, was often consulted. The sumanni (pl. sumankwafo) dealt only in suman, charms, but he is said to have been also a herbalist: 'His medicines are not efficacious because of their anti-toxic qualities, but because of their magic properties.' Other names for specialists were oduruyefo, dunsei, and dunsefo. The sasabonsam seems to have been the sasa of a wizard; but the subject has been complicated by the inferential nature of much of the evidence. Some medicine-men maintained that the mmoatia, fairies, revealed to them their cures; otherwise, the source of magical or priestly power seems to have been the possession of or by obosom, or of suman.467

I have been unable to find any description of the methods by which the Ashanti tried to control the weather.

101. Summary and Chart. These facts, which speak for themselves, may be stated diagrammatically thus:

**AFRICAN MATRILINEAL SOCIETIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Cultural condition</th>
<th>Treatment of affliction</th>
<th>Method of weather control</th>
<th>Treatment of ghosts</th>
<th>Temples and priests</th>
<th>Pre-nuptial chastity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural condition</td>
<td>Magic</td>
<td>Transference and/or exorcism</td>
<td>Priest</td>
<td>Magician</td>
<td>Priest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayao</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyanja</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomans</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashanti</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Ashanti are marked with an asterisk (*) as they are the subject of the chapter.
There is no need to expound the meaning of this chart. Cols. 4, 6, 9–11 tell their own story. The evidence is the same from all over the world; the three different cultural patterns accompany the three different patterns of pre-nuptial sexual regulations.

I do not propose to summarize the culture of these four societies in the manner which hitherto I have adopted. Instead of doing so, I wish to draw attention to certain aspects of Yao behaviour.

Mulungu was the quality which was manifest in anything mysterious or beyond comprehension. The word also denoted, we are told, 'the aggregate of the spirits of the dead'. When an offering was made at the hut which was erected over the grave of a dead chieftain it was made to mulungu, and to mulungu as 'a little village of departed spirits'; but the word lisoka (pl. masoka) also was used in reference to a dead man, though not, apparently, in reference to the rite which was conducted in his honour. Little boys, when they passed the grave, murmured 'Masoka'.

Thus the Wayao confused the one and the many, but they almost made a temporary distinction between them. It is plain that if their ideas had continued to develop along the lines on which they seem to have been progressing, they would have paid attention to an individual lisoka, just as the Lango (paras. 84, 89) paid attention to an individual tipo. At the same time, they would have continued to make offerings also to mulungu, just as the Lango also paid attention to jok. The word jok was used by the Lango in precisely the same contexts as the Wayao used mulungu. Thus it would appear that an extension of Yao memory would transform Yao conceptions into a replica of the Lango conceptions. The ghost of a dead chief, at the time to which our information refers, always became an object of attention as soon as he died, when his predecessor, who had been honoured by offerings hitherto, became neglected; but it seems possible that if there had been a further extension of Yao memory a dead chief would have been remembered for a longer period; then we should have had a number of shrines, dedicated to a number of men, at which rites were regularly conducted. Then the Yao conceptions would have been a replica of the Shilluk conceptions.

We shall add the deistic Dahomans and Ashanti, and the manistic Wayao, to the fifteen societies mentioned in para. 90; then we shall have a total of eighteen societies the cultural details of which will reveal the nature of a cultural change.

We now proceed to the consideration of the so-called Indians who inhabited the North American continent. The survey will conclude with the discussion of seven miscellaneous societies. This evidence will hardly elucidate the nature of a cultural change, but it will—

1. illustrate the rules in regard to the coincidence of the three patterns of uncivilized culture with the three patterns of pre-nuptial sexual regulations;
2. support the suggestion that human culture is founded upon the concept of something-unusual or beyond-comprehension;
3. afford corroborative evidence of the conclusions concerning the nature of a cultural change which will be based on a study of the eighteen above-mentioned societies.
I will state the facts as shortly as I can, but, as some of the material is intricate, a certain amount of detailed discussion will be unavoidable.

F. AMERICAN INDIANS

102. Comments on the Evidence from North America. In our study of the American Indians we must rely either on the writings of the early travellers or on modern field-work in the reservations. The writings of the travellers are valuable documents, but they have many deficiencies. It is remarkable that, with certain notable exceptions, the travellers should invariably have described what they were told rather than what they saw. They tell us what the natives thought, but they seldom mention what the natives did. We can extract from their writings very few descriptions of native rites, but they are always ready to entertain us with a discourse on the 'Great Spirit'. The Rev. J. O. Dorsey corrected the error which was responsible for that mistaken theory, and his distinguished name will always be associated with Siouan ethnography; but other and more misleading interpretations of Indian 'beliefs' have been substituted in later times for a fallacy which after all was natural to an untrained mind. Some modern writers have even propounded theories concerning the nature of primitive religion in general which have been founded not upon a study of the manner in which the natives used their words but upon those vague translations which I have criticized in the preceding paragraphs and in the notes attached to them.

The work of Dr. Paul Radin is a notable example of this estrangement of theory from fact, and it seems possible that he would have experienced great difficulty in expressing in the Indian language the conceptions which he has credited to the Indian mind, for those conceptions seem to be the property of the English words which have been submitted as equivalents of the native terms. American Indian ethnography, indeed, has suffered more than is usual from an attempt to render native words in a modern language. Such words as 'medicine', 'mystery', 'existence', 'spirits', 'deities', 'totem', 'guardian spirit', 'supernatural being', &c., jostle one another on the anthropological page in a bewildering variety, and it needs a special effort of the imagination to remember that all these terms, and many others, are often English equivalents of the same native word. Moreover, such phrases as 'apparently lofty conception' are employed with both freedom and regularity in reference to some alleged Indian belief, and our authorities seem to have been unaware that such a report has only an autobiographical value; it merely reflects the individual opinion of the author. Furthermore
the word ‘deities’ has been applied to a number of mythological tricksters whose names occur in some native legends but in whose honour no rites were performed.\footnote{168}

It will be apparent that many difficulties must arise from this defective material, and although some native terms have been carefully elucidated, such elucidation is the exception, not the rule. If we did not possess the writings of Professor R. H. Lowie, of Messrs. J. R. Swanton, C. Hill-Tout, and W. J. McGee, of the Revs. J. O. Dorsey and S. R. Riggs, and of Peter Jones, the missionary, we should know very little concerning the meanings which the Indians attached to their words.

The first fact, then, to be faced by any student of American Indian culture is the incomplete character of any report which does not quote the native terms and elucidate the native usage. Unfortunately, in a few cases, I shall have to rely upon reports which do not altogether reach a standard of reliability; the reader will be able to adjudge the misconceptions which might easily arise if all the evidence were of the same character.

In the main, our two leading questions can be answered readily, but as soon as we begin to inquire into the nature of the native rites we are in difficulties. The travellers neglect them; and modern students have not had an opportunity of observing them in their original environment. Their information was collected either in the reservations or among a Christianized population. Thus the available data are scanty. Moreover, most of the better known and more elaborate ceremonies were post-Columbian. Mr. J. W. Mooney seems to have placed a correct interpretation upon some of the amazing ceremonies which were introduced after the white man had settled in the country. Mr. Mooney remarks: ‘When the native lies crushed and groaning beneath an alien yoke, how natural is the dream of a redeemer who shall return from exile or awake from some long sleep to drive out the usurper and win back for his people what they have lost!’ From the seventeenth century onwards a series of messianic revivals occurred among the American Indians, the latest of which, the so-called Ghost-Dance Religion, has been studied in great detail and reported with care and accuracy, Mr. Mooney himself being responsible for this great contribution to human records. The underlying principle of the Ghost-Dance was the idea that soon the time would come when the whole Indian race, living and dead, would be reunited upon a regenerated earth. The movement seems to have started among the Delawares in 1762, but preachers soon arose throughout the plains, each apostle and believer filling in the details according to his mental capacity or his ideas of bliss. The teachings of Ganeodiyo, ‘Handsome Lake’, among the Five Nations in 1800, and of the Apache, Nakaydaklinni, some eighty years later, seem to have had a similar character.

Another elaborate ceremony which has received a great deal of attention from modern observers is the so-called Sun-Dance, which was performed by some of the Plains Indians in times of special distress. We do not know
if the sufferings which the white man inflicted on the natives were responsible for many of its details. All the information is modern, though some early travellers have reported certain rites of a similar character.

Such rites as these do not come within our scope, but, if we subtract them from our store of knowledge, very little remains. There are but few Indians who now speak the old language, and it is doubtful if they can tell us much about their forefathers. Indeed it seems possible that the culture of these natives will have to be studied in the same manner as the culture of any other ancient society, that is, by the patient collection, comparison, and evaluation of all the available material. The writings of Lewis and Clark, Keating, Schoolcraft, Adair, James, Carver, Gregg, and their peers will have to be treated as we treat Herodotus and Polybius. It is not likely that we shall be enlightened by any further researches such as Professor Lowie has carried out among the Crows. Such careful, scholarly interpreters are rare; the material on which they can work is rarer.

We suffer from similar handicaps when we begin to inquire into the matter of sex. Just as observers have concentrated on 'beliefs' and have neglected the rites, so they have been content to describe the sexual conduct of the natives instead of their sexual regulations. I have commented already (para. 15) on the autobiographical character of this kind of field-work. We must make the best use of the data which are available.

When all these considerations are given their due weight we cannot be surprised that in a learned volume, entitled *The American Indian*, which contains 419 pages, Professor Clark Wissler devotes only 2 pages to the relations between the sexes, 14 to ritualistic ceremonies, and 6 to mythology (under which title he includes 'religion'). The remainder of his valuable treatise concerns material culture and linguistic classifications.

In the course of his survey, Professor Wissler remarks that 'the number of social groups in the New World is so large that no one can hope to hold in his mind more than a small portion of them'. I have selected twenty-eight North American tribes according to the quantity and quality of our information. I hope that the selection may be considered representative. First we shall decide whether a society was deistic, manistic, or zoistic; then we shall try to understand the meanings of the words which the natives used in reference to the power in the universe. I shall also describe, so far as is possible, the methods which they adopted in the disposal of the dead.469

I divide these twenty-eight societies into three groups, and shall consider them in a rough geographical order. The first group includes the Tlingit of Alaska, Haida of Queen Charlotte Islands, Salish Tribes of the Interior, Salish Tribes of the Coast, Nez Percés and Klallam of the States of Oregon and Washington, and the Dene (Tinneh).

1. Indians of the North-West

103. *Tlingit*. The social customs and laws of the Tlingit, Mr. Swanton says, permitted 'great looseness in sexual relations'. He does not state
whether the looseness was pre-nuptial or post-nuptial. He may have been referring more particularly to the latter, for if a wife had sexual intercourse with a clan-brother of her husband she was not guilty of adultery in the Tlingit sense of the word. In fact, she was allowed to have ‘legitimate lovers’ or ‘assistant husbands’, as our authorities quaintly term the clan-brother who gratified her desires when her husband was away, and fetched wood and water for her when he was at home. A child was a member of the social group of its mother; marriage might be matrilocal or patrilocal. I find no reference to pre-nuptial pregnancy.470

The Tlingit erected no temples, and paid no post-funeral attention to their dead; thus they were in the zoistic cultural condition.

The power in the universe was yek. The word has been variably translated, but there is no English equivalent. ‘This supernatural energy’, says Mr. Swanton, ‘must be carefully differentiated from natural energy, and never confused with it. A rock rolling down hill or an animal running is by no means a manifestation of supernatural energy, although if something peculiar be associated with these actions, something outside of the Indian’s usual experience of such phenomena, they may be thought of as such.’ In other words, yek was manifest in something-unusual or beyond-Tlingit-comprehension. If a man wished to become a magician, he sought yek in the woods and mountains. If this method failed, he spent a night with the corpse of a dead magician, and placed one or two of its teeth in his mouth; in this manner virtue, yek, was afforded to him. The difference between a magician, ichth, and an ordinary man lay in the yek that he possessed.

There were compounds of yek according to the place of its manifestation: thus, takiyek, land-yek, tekiyek, sea-yek, and so on. The word kiyek (kinayek) was applied to ‘the spirits of braves who had fallen in battle’, i.e. the powerful dead.471

The corpse of an ordinary man was burned, but the dead body of a magician was placed in an elevated grave-box on the shore; there it was visited by aspirants to magic power. When a man in a canoe passed the place, he threw some tobacco into the sea, just as the Masai (para. 88) cast a stone when they passed the grave of a ngai-man; but in this case, we are told, the man would shout, ‘Do not let me perish. Do not let the wind blow strongly on me.’ The fact that the offering was cast into the sea shows that it was not a form of tendance, and the rite can be compared with the offerings made in other parts of the world at any place where the something-beyond-comprehension was manifest. Dead magicians inspired terror: ‘No one would eat anything near the places where their bodies lay for fear of being taken seriously ill.’472

Usually sickness was attributed to witchcraft. A magician was capable of inserting yek into an inanimate object; he also charmed body clippings and images of his enemies which he had manufactured for the purpose. His activities were regarded as one of the ordinary risks of life, but, if he
was caught, he was tied up and left without food or drink until he agreed to withdraw and scatter the ‘medicine’. 473

I can find no report about the control of the weather. Alaska is hardly a country in which the problem would arise.

104. Haida. There were no pre-nuptial regulations among the Haida which imposed any check upon the sexual impulses. Parents usually betrothed their children at an early age and a betrothed lad went to work for the parents of his betrothed until he succeeded his maternal uncle. If his marriage was delayed, he contracted a temporary union with another girl with whom he lived ‘until his proper wife was ready’. In other words, the Haida permitted ‘free love’, and had adopted what is often called ‘companionship marriage’. Poole says that a man took a wife on a month’s trial; if the arrangement was not satisfactory, she returned to her people. ‘The females’, he says, ‘cohabit promiscuously with their own tribe.’ The Haida were a matrilineal people; marriage might be matrilocal or patrilocal. We are not told what happened if a girl became pre-nuptially pregnant. 474

The Haida also were zoistic. The power in the universe was sgana or skil, the former being of the Skidegate, the latter of the Massett dialect. Mr. Curtis translates skil as ‘supernatural being’, and says, ‘Almost every spot with any unusual feature was the home of a skil.’ In other words, the word skil was applied to an unusual natural feature. According to Mr. Swanton, the word sgana was qualified according to its place of manifestation: thus sgana qedas, sgana in the ocean, woods, lakes, and streams; sins sganaqwaq, sgana in the sky; quaint sganaqwaq, sgana in trees, &c.

Mr. Swanton says that his interpreters liked to render sgana ‘power’: ‘The syllable sga seems to be the essential part, and to be the same as we have in sgaga, the word for “shaman”’. In another passage he says that a ‘shaman was one who had power from some supernatural being, sgana, who “possessed” him’. Mr. Swanton adds that ‘sgana also means killer-whale’; and it is plain that in spite of the efforts of his interpreters to translate sgana ‘power’ Mr. Swanton insisted on regarding it as an entity. When, therefore, the word sgana was applied to a killer-whale he was compelled to conclude that the word meant ‘killer-whale’. In a similar manner Mr. Curtis remarks that ‘those who died by drowning became killer-whales’. It seems probable that both statements are inferences from the application of sgana (adj. or adv.) to the dead and to killer-whales. 475

The corpse of a magician, sgaga (Swanton) or saagga (Harrison), was not placed in a box as was usual in the case of an ordinary man. It was carried into the forest to a place selected by the shaman himself. ‘There he was laid dressed in all his doctor’s attire and with all his charms around him.’ Steps were taken to secure his ‘power’ for his descendants. 476 Sickness was thought to be due either to the activities of the wizard, stao (Swanton), stawa (Curtis), who charmed body refuse or clippings; or to some intrusive supernatural (? sgana) element which was extracted by the sgaga, who
acted by the power of *sgana*.\(^{477}\) According to Dawson, the *sgaga* could manufacture a fair wind.\(^{478}\)

105. *Thompson*. Mr. James Teit is our only authority on the Thompson or ‘Knife’ Indians. His monograph is noticeable for the absence of native words. The Thompsons were in the zoistic condition; they erected no temples and paid no post-funeral attention to their dead.\(^{479}\) Unfortunately their sexual regulations have been reported in such a vague manner that we cannot tell what in their pagan condition they had permitted and what they had forbidden or punished. They had long been Christians, when Mr. Teit was among them. He seems to apply the word ‘wife’ to any temporary sexual or economic partner.\(^{480}\) The burial customs, particularly of the Lower Thompsons, had changed under the influence of the Christian priesthood.\(^{481}\)

‘They believe in the existence of a great many mysterious beings’, says Mr. Teit. ‘Spirits’ are said to have existed in such places as high mountains, certain lakes, grisly bears, and ‘fish of peculiar shape’. We are not told the word which is translated ‘mysterious’. I suspect that the same unknown term is translated ‘guardian-spirit’ and ‘spirits’. It was applied also to ghosts, to heaps of rocks, to a dead man’s (or should it be a dead magician’s?) hair, to bones and teeth, to adolescent girls, and to the male and female genital organs. ‘Animals that had no mysterious power did not become guardian-spirits of men.’\(^{482}\)

It is clear that the Thompson conceptions were of the same pattern as those of the Tlingit and of the Haida. If it were possible to separate inference from fact, we should probably find that they applied a certain word to anything supernatural and to the dead. This same word, perhaps, was also the so-called ‘guardian-spirit’ which was the source of magic power.\(^{483}\)

The one definite report concerns the control of the weather. Certain high mountains were credited with the possession of ‘supernatural power’; if a person with ‘a strong guardian-spirit’ pointed a stick at such a mountain, it would rain. If rain came in too great quantities, a man followed the sun’s course with a small stick which had been held in front of the fire, and said, ‘Now then, you must quit raining, the people are miserable. Mountains, become clear.’\(^{484}\) I suspect that in these cases the same native word has been translated both as ‘supernatural power’ and as ‘guardian-spirit’.

106. *Shuswap*. The criticisms I have passed on the reports concerning the Thompson Indians apply also to those on the Shuswap, who were also called the Atnah or Carrier Indians. Dr. Boas, who visited the people before the ‘nineties, says that ‘the ancient customs have almost entirely disappeared, as the natives have been Christianized by the Catholic missionaries’. Mr. Teit says that their culture was the same as that of the Thompsons. The available data are not considerable.
It appears that the children were carefully watched until adolescence, and that ‘all pubescent lads and some girls made pictures with paint on rocks during the middle or towards the end of their training period’. ‘Most of these pictures’, Mr. Teit adds, ‘were representations of objects seen in their dreams, and the painting of them was supposed to hasten the attainment of a person’s manitou or other desires.’ After the training was over, no taboo seems to have been placed on any sexual activity to which the parties might feel inclined.\footnote{485}

The Shuswap were zoistic. ‘Spirits’ or ‘mysteries’ existed in high mountains, certain lakes, bogs, marshes, and other dangerous places; the same word was applied to epidemics and to an unaccountable sickness which did not yield to immediate treatment. The difference between a magician and an ordinary man seems to have consisted in the power of his ‘guardian spirit’. No more than this can be said. I suspect that the native word translated ‘guardian spirit’ was the same as the word translated ‘spirits’ and ‘mysteries’; but Mr. Teit does not quote the native terms.\footnote{486}

A number of varied ‘beliefs’ concerning the rain have been mentioned by our authorities, but I have not been able to find any report concerning the manner in which the Shuswap attempted to control the weather.\footnote{487}

107. \textit{Lillooet}. Mr. Teit is also one of our authorities on the Lillooet Indians who occupied an area to the south of the Thompsons, but in this case we possess also the results of Mr. C. Hill-Tout’s researches. Mr. Hill-Tout sometimes quotes the native terms.

On reaching puberty a young girl was isolated in a small lodge made of fir branches and bark; she remained in isolation for a period which varied from one to four years, according to the whim of her parents. From one to three years later she was married; she would be about 16–20 years old. We are not informed definitely whether or not she was permitted to have love affairs in the period which elapsed between the end of her isolation and her marriage, but as marriage, divorce, and all other relations between the sexes seem to have depended on mutual consent, perhaps we may conclude that she could gratify her impulses if she so desired. There is no report in regard to pre-nuptial pregnancy. Among the upper tribes every youth went forth to the woods to seek his \textit{snam}, ‘guardian spirit’, but among the lower tribes an ordinary youth did not possess \textit{snam}; only those youths who desired to excel in some particular activity underwent the period of isolation. Usually a man married when he was about 20 or 30 years old; I think it is safe to conclude that he did not remain continent until he reached that age. Since pre-nuptial chastity was not a social obligation, and no customs existed which imposed an occasional or irregular continence, it seems to follow that if a couple were attracted to one another they could satisfy their mutual desires.\footnote{488} The evidence, however, is uncertain and scanty.

The Lillooet were zoistic. Dr. F. Boas has said: ‘The essential trait of
the religious beliefs of these tribes is connected with the acquisition of guardian spirits. All animals and objects possessed of mysterious powers can become guardian spirits. Objects referring to death, such as graves, bones, teeth, and also natural phenomena, such as blue sky, east and west, and powerful animals, could become guardian spirits of shamans. Warriors had weapons and strong animals for their guardian spirits; hunters, the water, the tops of mountains, and the animals they hunted. As I have said, the word for 'guardian spirit' among the Lillooet was *snam*. Thus *snam* was applied to 'animals and objects possessed of mysterious powers', to certain natural phenomena, and to the dead; it was also the word for magic power. In Mr. Hill-Tout's report we read of 'my *snam*', and the 'loss of *snam* power'. We are told also that 'men were always formally addressed by their hereditary mystery or *snam* names'. The power of a magician depended on the *snam* which he possessed; he could both cause and cure sickness; but since the Roman Catholic priests had converted the people before our authorities made their inquiries, shamanistic arts had ceased to be practised publicly. The ancient methods of burial also were no longer used at the time to which the reports refer; it is therefore impossible to say whether or not in the olden days magicians were buried in a different manner from ordinary people. We are told, however, that twins used to be placed in fir-trees; and since twins are often an unaccountable supernatural event, it may be that supernormal people were disposed of in an unusual manner. There is no satisfactory report in regard to the control of the weather.

108. *Coast Salish*. We do not know much about the Salish tribes which lived along the south-western coast of Canada. I can do no more than record that they were zoistic. Concerning their sexual regulations also we are sadly ignorant. In no single case are we told the native method of dealing with a case, e.g., of pre-nuptial pregnancy, and though the young people seem to have behaved as they liked after puberty, we are not definitely told that they were sexually free. Even if we were told so, it is doubtful if we could accept the report, for the people have been Christianized for a very long time. Indeed, over thirty years ago, the Salishan towns possessed their bandstands, public halls, two-storied cottages, and other equipment associated with the white man's arrival in a country not his own. If Mr. Hill-Tout, our best authority on the Coast Salish, had not quoted the native words in his reports, and had not distinguished between the English translation of a native word and the phenomena to which it was applied, I should have passed to the east of the Rocky Mountains without further delay; but I wish to note what he says about *sulia*, the word which he adopts as a kind of generic Indian name for 'guardian spirit'.

The *sulia*, which is variously termed the 'personal totem', 'hereditary totem', 'tutelary genius', and 'guardian spirit', is compared by Mr. Hill-Tout to *snam, manitu, wahabe*, and other similar conceptions. We have
already seen (para. 107) that *snam* was used as an adjective and as an adverb, and although *sulia* is always translated as if it denoted an entity, it is clear that the Salish regarded it as a quality: ‘The object itself was not the *sulia*, only the form, so to speak, under which it manifested itself to its protégé.’ Among the Coast Salish only magicians and men skilled in some form of human activity possessed *sulia*; and when Dr. Boas says that ‘twins had supernatural powers’ he is undoubtedly attempting to express in our language the fact that the natives applied the word *sulia* to twins. Moreover, it is probable that the *sulia*-quality was manifest also in some natural phenomena, for we are told that the forest, air, and sea were full of ‘mysteries’. We are not told the native word which is translated ‘mysteries’; but surely it was *sulia*.

Sickness is said to have been due to witchcraft and/or to the absence of the soul; but I should require an assurance that inference had been separated from fact before I accepted the latter report. The various tribal units used different words to denote their magical practitioners. The words have been variously translated, but clearly they correspond: Lkungen *siova*, ‘witch’, *squnaam*, ‘shaman’; Skeelis *sevwa*, ‘witch’, *cwolan*, ‘doctor’, *sivel*, ‘ghost-layer and magician’; Siclatl *sawva*, ‘witch’, *siyaikeutl*, ‘doctor’, ‘seer’. We need attach no importance to the use of the word ‘ghost-layer’ in reference to the Skeelis *sivvel*, for there is no mention of any ghostly activities, and there was no tendance. The Skeelis seem to have used three distinct terms in reference to the dead: *tesmesteuqsetl*, ‘the spirit people’, *selaa vita*, ‘the departed’, and *tespolakwetsa*, ‘(? the) corpse or ghost [i.e. apparition]’. The first was used to distinguish the dead from the living; the second was applied to the newly dead; the third needs no elucidation.495

I cannot find any report in regard to the control of the weather.

109. *Klallam*. According to Dr. Erna Gunther, who worked among the Klallam in recent years, ‘girls are carefully chaperoned by their mothers and female relatives’. She adds that her informant ‘gave two modern instances where girls did not live up to this old tradition’. From this report it would be easy to conclude that sexual lapses, if not punished, at any rate were socially condemned; but this was far from being the case. We are put on our guard by Myron Eells, who remarked in 1886 that ‘in regard to chastity they also improve’. George Gibbs states that the idea of chastity in pagan times was entirely wanting. Cohabitation preceded marriage; unmarried girls could behave as they liked provided that they did not become pregnant. In that case they used an abortifacient.496

The Klallam were in the zoistic cultural condition. ‘The practical part of their religion’, says Myron Eells, ‘is a compound of shamanism and spiritism, called in Chinook jargon *tamanous, tamahnoun* or *tamananous*, and the word expresses their idea so completely that it has been adopted into English, for the word expresses a combination of ideas for which we have no exact English equivalent. *Tamanous* is a noun and as such refers to any
spiritual being. It is also used to express the work of influencing any of their spirits by incantation. The word is also an adjective, and as such is used to describe any stick, stone, or similar article in which spirits are at times disposed to dwell, and also any man, as a medicine-man, who is supposed to have more than ordinary power with these spirits; hence we often hear of tamanous-sticks and tamanous-men. It is likewise a verb, and to tamanous is to perform the incantations necessary to influence these spirits.'

We are not told the word which is translated 'spirits'. If, as I suspect, the word is tamanous, what shall we make of this sentence: 'Tamanous is a noun, and as such refers to any spiritual being'? If we substitute the native term for 'spiritual being', the sentence reads: 'Tamanous is a noun and as such refers to tamanous'. Such confusions are not uncommon in anthropological literature; too often have they been overlooked by somewhat credulous students.

We are not told how the Klallam differentiated between a tamanous-feature and a non-tamanous-feature; but since the word was applied to supernormal men, I conjecture that it was applied also to supernormal things. It has been translated also as 'guardian-spirit'; a youth was sent out into the woods in order to find (his) tamanous. Eells remarks: 'The Indian tamanouses for what he wishes very earnestly. Hence they tamanous for wind, for gambling and to cure the sick or cause sickness.' A man who had more tamanous than other men was a magician. Hale translates tamanouses, 'luck', 'fortune', 'magic', 'sorcerer'.

Apparently in older times there were different forms of burial. Eells says that some people were buried in the ground; sometimes 'the body was placed in a box which was put in a canoe, and the canoe placed in the forks of two trees and left there'. Eells regards these habits as representing different 'ages', and uses the word in a vague evolutionary sense; but it seems possible that ordinary people were buried in the ground, and that magicians, tamanous-men, were placed in trees. According to Dr. Gunther, food was burned for the ghost two days after a funeral. Only magicians could see a spook; they were able to control it.

110. Nez Percés. Concerning those staunch friends of the white man, the Nez Percés, our knowledge is a little more extensive. Mutual consent seems to have been the controlling factor in all sexual relations. Sometimes', Professor Spinden says, 'a delinquent girl of whom her lover tired was turned over by him to a party of his friends. Abortion was uncommon. A child born out of marriage was considered a disgrace to the girl's family, and if the offending man was known, it was considered to constitute marriage.' This, however, was no hardship, for divorce was simply a matter of separation or of elopement with a different partner.

The Nez Percés were zoistic. A child went away into the hills at about ten years of age in order to obtain a 'guardian spirit'. The native term is
not given, but the power of a magician seems to have depended on the power of his 'guardian spirit'. During the period of solitary vigil, songs were revealed in dreams, and these songs 'descended through the family'. 'Some had a right to sing ten or fifteen songs in the Guardian Spirit Dance; there seems to have been a certain amount of protection and aid derived from this second-hand interest.' Magicians handed on these songs to their successors, and thus fine weather could be produced. 'The funeral ceremonies were simple', we are told, 'and are but little known.' The magician attended as a professional practitioner, and his duty was to 'lay the ghost'; he performed this important task by blowing smoke into the four corners of the house. Madness was considered to be due to ghosts: 'Ghosts were held responsible also for the death of children. It was believed that the ghost would hold his hand over the child's face and thus smother it. In order to resuscitate the child it was necessary for two or more medicine-men to determine which ghost was responsible, and then go to the grave of that ghost and try to recover the child's breath. Often, however, the shamans could not determine which ghost was responsible, in which event the child remained lifeless.' The native term for 'ghosts' is not given.

This is the first definite report that we have found in reference to ghostly activity among the American Indians. It is interesting that it should occur among a people who, if they could identify him, made the father of a pre-nuptial child marry the woman who bore it.\(^500\)

111. Dene (Tinneh). Our chief authority on the Dene is Father A. G. Morice, who has placed his unrivalled knowledge of the people at our disposal in a number of scattered papers. Father Morice devotes most of his attention to the material culture of the Dene, their methods of transport, mode of life, and trading activities. Perhaps this is because the natives did not carry out any rites in an endeavour to maintain a right relation with the powers in the universe. They were zoistic. 'They made no sacrifices', Father Morice says, 'worshipped no deity and had no definite cultus, unless we dignify with that name the shamanism which obtained among them.' The only phenomenon which impressed them was the unusual or the unaccountable: 'The Dene mind sees mystery everywhere irrespective of its intrinsic value or peculiar make, the native instinctively attaches more or less unaccountable qualities to some mechanical device, weapon of the chase or fishing implement that has, perhaps accidentally, proved successful.' The native term for 'mystery' is not given, but the conception seems to have been of the usual character. The power was also manifest in twins.

Every notable citizen had a 'guardian spirit', which afforded him 'power'. 'It is while dreaming that they pretended to communicate with the supernatural world, that their shamans were invested with this wonderful power over nature, and that every individual was assigned his particular nagwal
or tutelary animal genius.\textsuperscript{501} It was by the power of his ‘familiar genius’ that the Dene magician, nelhgen, worked. Usually he is called a ‘conjuror’, and credited with the control of ‘spirits’, but I suspect that the same native word has been translated ‘familiar genius’, ‘spirits’, ‘mystery’, and ‘guardian spirit’. Various epithets, such as curative, preventative, inquisitive, malefic, operative, prestidigitative, and prophetical, have been applied to the activities of the nelhgen. The powers he possessed in the eyes of his fellow citizens have been summarized thus: ‘His services were called into requisition in time of famine, to prevent tempests, procure favourable winds, hasten the arrival of salmon and ensure its abundance, but more generally in case of sickness which they believed to be concrete and always due to the presence or ill will of spirits.’\textsuperscript{502}

In regard to the sexual regulations of the Dene Father Morice has relied in a very large measure on the experience of Samuel Hearne, a servant of the Hudson Bay Company, who travelled through north-west Canada in 1769–72. Various methods of obtaining a wife seem to have prevailed, and the moral character of the women has been variously assessed. Such estimates have no scientific value. It is plain that there was a complete absence of sexual restraint; many stories of incest are related; even the prohibited degrees were not obeyed. ‘So far from laying any restraints on their sensual appetites’, Hearne says, ‘as long as youth and inclination last, they give themselves up to all manner of even incestuous debauchery.’ Marriage was mere cohabitation, and a wife was always liable to leave her partner for a stronger man.\textsuperscript{503}

\textbf{112. Summary and Chart.} Such were the customs of these nine societies. The facts are stated diagrammatically on the opposite page.

All these societies were in the zoistic condition: they neither erected temples nor paid any kind of post-funeral attention to their dead. The Nez Percés are reported to have credited the ghost of a dead man with the power of direct influence in human affairs, but they conducted no tendance and were of the opinion that a magician could control any ghost.

In regard to the sexual regulations of the nine societies the information is poor. It would be easy to read into the reports what probably lies between the lines, but exact statements are available in four cases only, those of the Haida, Klallam, Nez Percés, and Dene. I think, however, that a minus sign can confidently be placed in the Pre-nuptial Chastity column in reference to Tlingit. Concerning the Thompson, Shuswap, Lillooet, and Coast Salish, there is no precise information.

In their description of the Tlingit, Haida, Lillooet, Coast Salish, and Klallam, our authorities have quoted, or mentioned, the native terms. I will summarize the salient details.

The power, or quality, yek, which manifested itself to the Tlingit, was manifest in ‘something peculiar’ or ‘something outside the Indian’s usual experience’. This is explicitly stated by Mr. Swanton, who corrects Dr.
Boas's report that to the Tlingit 'all nature was animate'; the alleged ubiquity of 'spirits' was a false inference, due to 'European lineage', from the fact that the word translated 'spirits' was applied to unusual or supernatural things.

There were two dialects of the Haida language, the Skidegate word *sgana* corresponding to the Massett word *skil*. *Skil* is the word which is translated 'spirit', *skil* being manifest only in an 'unusual feature'. The meaning of these words seems to have been confused with the phenomena to which they were applied. Mr. Swanton's interpreters tried to translate the word *sgana* as if it referred to a quality or power, but Mr. Swanton decided that the conception must be an entity, 'spirit'. When, therefore, he heard *sgana* applied to the killer-whale, he was compelled to conclude that the word was a noun meaning 'killer-whale' instead of an adjective and/or adverb applied to that animal. A lesser man would have omitted the fact from his report. Let us then respect Mr. Swanton for not having suppressed what must have seemed a peculiar problem. Similarly, when Mr. Curtis tells us that some men became killer-whales, he is probably making an inference from the fact that *sgana* was applied both to the dead and to killer-whales. Thus it is probable that *sgana* was applied to the dead by the Haida, just as by the Tlingit a compound of *yek, kinayek*, was applied to dead 'braves'.

A Haida magician was a man who possessed *sgana*, a Tlingit magician being a man who possessed *yek*. In the former case, the man is said to have been possessed by a 'supernatural being, *sgana*'; in the latter case he went to the woods to secure a 'guardian-spirit', *yek*, or collected his *yek* from

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a dead magician or yek-man. In both cases the source of magic power was
the possession of or by the power in the universe.

Among the Lillooet the word *snam* was used (1) substantively—‘my
*snam*’; then it is translated ‘guardian spirit’; (2) adjectively—‘*snam* powers’;
then it is called ‘supernatural power’; (3) as a method of differentiation
between a magician or skilled man and an ordinary individual. It was
applied also to the bones and teeth of dead men, and to graves. In the last
case it seems possible that the word was used only in reference to dead
magicians, for one of the methods of securing *snam* was similar to the
Tlingit custom of acquiring *yek* by touching or by possessing some part of
a *yek*-man’s corpse.

The word which corresponded to *snam* among the Coast Salish was
*sulia*. We are definitely told that the animal which became a ‘guardian
spirit’, i.e. *sulia*, was not important as an animal; it was *sulia* because it
manifested *sulia*, ‘mystery’ or ‘power’. Just as *snam* was applied to super-
normal phenomena, so also *sulia* must be the missing word which is trans-
lated ‘mysteries’ and ‘spirits’. There is no report of *sulia* having been used
in reference to a corpse or to the dead.

The Klallam *tamanous* was used (1) substantively; then it is translated
‘spiritual being’; (2) verbally, denoting the method of influencing spirits;
(3) adjectively; then it was applied to the places where ‘spirits’ were sup-
posed to dwell and to the magician who controlled ‘spirits’. It has been
translated also as ‘lucky’, ‘magic’, ‘fortune’, and ‘sorcerer’. There is no
record of *tamanous* being applied to a corpse or to the dead.

Thus these Indian tribes saw in the world the manifestation of a certain
power which they called *yek, sgana (skil), snam, sulia*, or *tamanous*, according
as they were born into a Tlingit, Haida, Lillooet, Coast Salish, or Klallam
tradition. This quality or power was manifest in supernormal phenomena,
and in anything outside their normal experience or beyond their compre-
hension. It was a dangerous power, yet an advantageous possession. Usually
it took the form of an animal, which was identified by its appearance in
visions or dreams. The animal had no virtue in itself; it was merely a
manifestation of the power. It was by the power of *yek, sgana, snam, sulia,*
or *tamanous* that the Indians tried to cope with the problems of human
existence. By its aid they thought they could change the weather, cure
sickness, and bewitch their enemies.

The native terms have not been quoted in reference to the Shuswap, Nez
Percés, and Dene, but it is plain that their ideas were of the same pattern
as those of the other societies. The Shuswap saw ‘spirits’ in ‘certain places’,
and it is safe to conclude that, if we knew the native terms, we should find
the same word was applied to (1) something unusual, (2) supernormal
power. This is probably true of the Thompson also, but Mr. Teit mentioned
the word *kwalus* in the obscure passage quoted in n. 484. I conjecture that
*kwalus* can be equated with *yek, sgana, snam, sulia*, and *tamanous*.

In regard to the control of the weather, the lacunae in the evidence are
considerable. No report is available in reference to the Christianized Shuswap, Lillooet, and Coast Salish. There is, however, a statement to the effect that the Thompson considered that they could control the elements by magic, and, since we are assured that the Lillooet and Shuswap customs were the same as those of their neighbours, we may perhaps assume that they were of the same opinion. The Tlingit lived in such an environment that the question would not arise.

I have tried to note if there was any difference in the methods of burial of (a) magicians, (b) ordinary folk, but there is little reliable evidence. Christian influence had become paramount among the Thompsons, Shuswap, and Coast Salish before their culture had been recorded; the Nez Percé customs, we are told, are ‘little known’; the same remark applies to the Dene. Two different forms of burial were practised by the Klallam, but we are not definitely told that the one was adopted for tamanous-men and the other for ordinary men. The Lillooet may have treated the corpse of a snam-man in a different manner from that of an ordinary man, but this opinion is hypothetical and deductive. The only precise information concerns the Tlingit and the Haida; in both cases a special form of burial was afforded to yek- or sgana-men; their resting-places were considered to be particularly dangerous and powerful.

Our second group of American Indians consists of tribes which inhabited the central area of the North American continent. We shall discuss (1) the Algonquian Ojibwa, Blackfeet, and Arapaho, (2) Iroquois, (3) the Siouan Dakota, Omaha, Hidatsa, Mandan, Crow, and Winnebago.

2. Indians of the Plains and Great Lakes

113. Ojibwa. The deceptive character of any report which confines itself to the mere conduct or appearance of native women is well illustrated by the literature on the Ojibwa. ‘There is great reserve manifested by the young females’, says Peter Jones, ‘and not to maintain it would be to lose the spotlessness of their character.’ He seems to imply that pre-nuptial sexual intercourse was a social offence; but there was no objection to it at all. A girl’s young lover, however, seldom became her husband. ‘It is not true’, Keating observes, ‘that men visit the cabins of those whom they wish to marry, and commence their intercourse by nocturnal assignations; the young men will frequently resort to this, but never when they wish to take a woman as a wife. When a mere passing intrigue is their object, they usually carry it on at night.’ The young females, he says, ‘do not hesitate to have recourse to abortions’.504

The Ojibwa were zoistic; they built no temples and paid no post-funeral attention to the dead. They thought that if they dreamed about a dead man the vision was a prophecy of their own approaching death. The corpse of an ordinary man was interred in a grave over which poles or sticks were erected lengthwise, to the height of two feet, on which again were placed
mats to protect the body from the rain. An old man exhorted the ghost to depart quickly. If there was a widow she leapt about on a zigzag course, in an endeavour to run away from the ghost; in the evening steps were taken to frighten it away. More honour was paid to 'distinguished men' than to ordinary men: their bodies were wrapped in cloths, blankets, or bark, and raised on scaffolds.\(^{505}\)

The power in the universe was munedoo, which Jones translates both as 'spirit' and as 'god'. 'Any remarkable features in natural scenery or terrific places', he states, 'become objects of superstitious dread and veneration, from the idea that they are the abodes of gods: for instance, curious trees, rocks, islands, mountains, caves or waterfalls.' He cites the case of Old Jack, whose hunting-ground lay near a very imposing tree which was 'taller than any others within view'. Old Jack 'dreamed or fancied that this tree was to be his munedoo or god, who would grant him and his family long life and success in hunting. He and they made periodical visits to it, bringing with them the best of the game they had taken and offering the same at the foot of the tree.' This is very like the manner in which a Lango man would dream that jok was in a certain tree (para. 84).

The sun, moon, and stars were munedoo; the word was applied also to certain animals 'which they conceive to possess supernatural powers—such as wolf, fox, toad and all venomous snakes'. There were no 'regularly appointed priests': 'The pow-wows, conjurors and gifted speakers act for them.' By 'conjurors' Jones means the magicians, who had their own 'personal or familiar gods', which they obtained through fasting. 'All the time they notice every remarkable event, dream or supernatural sound, and whichever of these makes the most impression on their minds during their fast suggests the particular spirit which becomes their personal munedoo as long as they live, and in all emergencies and dangers they will call upon him for assistance.'\(^{506}\)

It would be difficult to attain a more complete description of native usage. If we substitute the native word munedoo for 'spirit' and 'god', the facts are separated from the inferences. The Ojibwa applied the word munedoo to anything supernormal; they credited such phenomena with 'power' which they tried to secure for themselves. 'By the agency of these munedoos', Jones adds—but the anglicized plural is odious; 'By the agency of munedoos', then—'they pretend to have the power of bewitching one another, performing extraordinary cures, foretelling future events, vanquishing their enemies, and charming the pretty Indian girl they intend to marry.' By the power of munedoo they also controlled the wind and the storms, increased their vegetable produce, and achieved success in hunting and fishing. In fact, the education of a young lad consisted in learning all the mysteries of munedoo-manipulation, in fasting, feasting, offerings, songs, dances, and incantations. A magician was mide, wabeno, or jessakld, the first-named being the most important. The Society of the Mide, in fact, was a very powerful organization.\(^{507}\)
114. Blackfeet. The proper name of the so-called Blackfoot tribe was Siksika, the latter word being derived from *siksinam*, 'black', and *ka*, the root of *ookatsh*, 'foot'. The tribe was a confederacy of the Siksika or Blackfeet, the Kainah or Bloods, and the Piegan. The whole society is popularly known as the Blackfoot tribe or Blackfeet.

Professor Clark Wissler is our most modern authority on the Blackfeet. He remarks: 'To all appearances virginity is held in great esteem and extreme precaution is taken to guard the girls of the family. They are closely watched by mothers and married off as soon as possible after puberty.' The words 'extreme precaution' seem to imply that the social regulations of the Blackfeet inflicted at least an occasional continence on the young people, but this was far from being the case. It was pre-nuptial pregnancy, not pre-nuptial intercourse, to which the Blackfeet objected. Professor Wissler adds: 'For a girl to become pregnant is regarded as an extreme family disgrace.' There was a complete absence of any regulation which might have prevented the young men and women from behaving as they liked. Boys intercepted the girls by day; by night they entered the *tipi* in which the girls slept, such conduct being condoned and approved by the parents. The male lover, in fact, enjoyed unusual liberties. Professor Wissler was puzzled by this difference between Blackfoot conduct and the alleged Blackfoot customs, and he expressed his uncertainty by inserting the words 'to all appearances' in the sentence I have quoted. Probably the apparent confusion of pre-nuptial pregnancy and pre-nuptial intercourse explains the following statement: 'Thus while great pains are taken to safeguard the young girls, boys are, if anything, encouraged to break through the barriers.'

The Blackfeet were in the zoistic cultural condition; they neither erected temples nor paid any kind of post-funeral attention to their dead.

Burial-places were feared greatly. Professor Wissler says that interment in the ground has been practised only recently, and that tree-burials used to be common; but 'a person of some importance was placed in a *tipi* on some high place'. Ghosts seem to have been credited with the power to twist a person's mouth and affect the speech, but I am not persuaded that the report may not be the outcome of inference, for these are the symptoms of fright which a Blackfoot is said to have always suffered near a corpse.

There is no precise account of the words in which the Blackfeet expressed their attitude to the world. A magician was a man who was skilled in the handling of 'bundles'; most men owned some kind of bundle. Professor Wissler defines a bundle as 'any object or objects, kept in wrappings when not in use, guarded by the owner according to definite rules and associated with a ritual containing one or more songs'. He does not give the native word. It may have been *natosio*; at any rate, that was the Piegan word; Grinnell has *natoye* and *natos*. In Piegan *natosio* was applied also to a medicine-man. Grinnell, however, calls him *ninampskan*, and adds: 'No one among the Blackfeet appears to have any idea as to what the word
means.' By 'medicine' and songs they both cured sickness and controlled the weather.\textsuperscript{510}

I can find no satisfactory report concerning the source of magic power. It is clear that it was contained in bundles, but apparently there were other methods of securing it. The native terms are not quoted.

115. *Arapaho*. Among the Arapaho, who seem to have been more emotionally affected by the pagan messiahs than almost any other tribe,\textsuperscript{511} courtship entailed sexual knowledge. 'The Arapaho were not at all strict', Mr. Curtis states, 'especially at the great tribal gatherings, when the old people would counsel the young women and girls to give themselves up to the young men.' The chief tribal gathering was the Sun-Dance: Professor Kroeber says that when this was being celebrated 'the young people were told to amuse themselves'. Women had to consent if they were approached, and social conventions forbade jealousy. Elopement was not uncommon; sometimes girls were abandoned on the prairie.\textsuperscript{512}

The Arapaho also were in the zoistic cultural condition. A very queer opinion which they held was that the ghosts of loud and vigorous people were absolutely harmless, but that those of quiet, timid people were likely to be noisy. They did not concern themselves, however, about the dead after the property of these had been burnt and some cedar-wood had been placed on the fire. The corpses of magicians and ordinary people were treated in the same manner; but our knowledge of the pagan customs is evidently imperfect, for Mr. Curtis remarks that 'contrary to the usual custom of the prairie tribes, the Arapaho buried their dead in the ground', and pertinently adds: 'In their habits of dress, camping, making war and gaming, the Arapaho were a typical Plains tribe.'\textsuperscript{513}

'Supernatural power' was sought by fasting in lonely places, and certain leaves and roots which had been specified in dreams were gathered; these were placed in a 'medicine' bag and then employed in the treatment of sickness. These bags corresponded to the Blackfoot 'bundles' (para. 114); among the Arapaho they could be purchased and inherited. The term which the natives applied to them is not given; it may have been *haataana*, which in a rather remote passage is said to have been applied to a woman's menses and to have meant 'supernatural', 'mysterious', 'medicine'. Sometimes sickness is said to have been regarded as being intrusive; treatment was by suction, or by songs and herbal mixtures. 'Every man who received a vision in his fasting became a medicine-man, that is, one who by magic could expel mysterious illness.'\textsuperscript{514}

I have not been successful in my search for an explicit statement in regard to weather control.

116. *Iroquois*. Under the general title Iroquois I include the confederation which is often called Five Nations, comprising the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca.
The Iroquois are a famous nation, and so much attention has been paid to their history and to their warlike achievements that their culture has been somewhat neglected. Moreover, they were an example of that type of social organization which is often loosely termed 'matriarchy', and a large number of writers have concentrated on this aspect of Iroquoian life. They have discussed such questions as descent, succession, inheritance, and the personnel of the tribal councils, but have omitted to describe those items which come within our definition of 'culture'. It is almost impossible, in fact, to extract any definite cultural facts from the vast literature which has accumulated in reference to the Iroquois, and the few facts which have been reported refer to post-Columbian rather than to pre-Columbian practices. It is doubtful if these represent genuine pagan customs. In the first place, the Iroquoian confederacy was one of the earliest groups of American Indians with which the white man was in close contact. It was known to Europeans in the early sixteenth century; missionaries were working among the natives in the early seventeenth century. Thus the pagan customs may have been considerably modified before any record was made. Secondly, about 1800 a Seneca named Ganeodiyo, 'Handsome Lake', was hailed by the Iroquois as a new religious teacher, and there can be no doubt that his teaching, perhaps a mere reaction against white influence, had a considerable effect on native life. Thus the arrival of the white man created, from two different points of view, a new variety within the cultural pattern; and it is this new variety to which the available data appear to refer.\textsuperscript{515}

Lewis Morgan emphasizes the danger that Jesuit influence may have modified the ancient rites of the Iroquois, and although we are informed of the existence of 'spirits' of the winds, earth, thunder, corn, &c., the native terms are not given. There are reported to have been six pagan festivals, Maple, Pearling, Strawberry, Green Corn, Harvest, and New Year, but it is doubtful if we can successfully separate the indigenous rites from those which were a mere Iroquoian version of Christian ceremonies. This is the variety within the pattern to which I have alluded.\textsuperscript{516}

I can do no more, therefore, than record the cultural pattern of the society (zoistic). Witchcraft was generally practised and was recognized as one of the ordinary risks of life. I cannot find an adequate description of the treatment of sickness. Before the coming of the white men the dead seem to have been placed on a scaffolding erected on poles. When the body was decomposed, the bones were placed either in the dead man's house or 'in a small bark house erected for their reception'. 'Unless the rites of burial were performed', we are told, 'it was believed that the spirits of the dead wandered for a time upon the earth in a state of great unhappiness.' I do not know if the latter opinion was due to white influence. There is no report of any difference between the treatment of a dead magician and that of any ordinary dead person. The native customs are imperfectly known.\textsuperscript{517}

This is the total of the definite evidence; and we cannot discuss the
nature of the power in the universe, *orenda*, owing to the peculiar nature of the available reports. The Iroquoian conception has been employed as the basis of a native theory concerning the origin and development of religion, and its character is not clear from the descriptions. A native writer, Mr. J. N. B. Hewitt, in a paper entitled ‘Orenda and a Definition of Religion’, says: ‘That life is the property of every body whatsoever is a postulate fundamental to the cosmologic philosophy of savage man.’ I do not know what precise meaning can be attached to the word ‘life’ in that context (is ‘life’ offered as a translation of *orenda*?), but I am quite sure that among the seventy-nine other uncivilized tribes with which this treatise is concerned there is not a single example of a ‘cosmologic philosophy’ of that character. The opinion I have quoted smacks of an ‘animism’ which has been learnt in the white man’s lecture-hall. ‘Spirits’ have indeed been reported by some writers as being ubiquitous, but, as we have observed and shall continue to discover, this alleged ubiquity is a false inference from an inaccurate translation of a native term; and I feel that Mr. Hewitt may have written his paper on ‘A Definition of Religion’ with a preconceived and wrongly-conceived white man’s theory in his mind, employing the conceptions of his own tribe as an illustration of what he meant. I will state the Iroquoian conceptions as he has reported them and then point out the reason why I do not think they can be accepted at their face value.

*Orenda*, which Mr. Hewitt translates also as ‘magic potency’, existed, according to his account, in everything. A shaman, *rarendiowanan*, was a man whose *orenda* was great; a fine hunter, *barendiio*, also possessed *orenda* which was superior to that of an ordinary person; if a *barendiio* was successful at the hunt, his *orenda* was said to have been greater than that of the animal he had slain; a victory in any game or contest was due to the superior *orenda* of the victor. And so on. This is quite clear and logical, but we may notice that the phenomena to which *orenda* is said to have been applied were superlative or supernormal. A fine, successful hunter, but not an ordinary or unsuccessful one, had *orenda*. This seems to suggest that *orenda* was manifest not in everything but only in supernormal things. Mr. Hewitt then says that ‘this subsumed magic power’ which was called *orenda* by the Iroquois was called *wakan* by the Siouans and *manitou* by the Algonquians. Now we have already seen that *manitou*, or *munedoo*, as it is variously spelt, was manifest only in something unusual or something beyond comprehension; in the next paragraph we shall see that the Dakota employed the word *wakan* in the same contexts. We must conclude, therefore, either (1) that Mr. Hewitt has made a false comparison, for, whereas *orenda* is said by him to have been possessed by everything, *wakan* and *manitou* were manifest only in supernormal things; or (2) that the Iroquois employed the term *orenda* in the same manner as the Dakota used *wakan* and the Ojibwa used *munedoo*, but Mr. Hewitt had been so influenced by the white man’s theories that he reported *orenda* as being ubiquitous. The difficulty is real, and no solution is at hand.518 I incline to the latter opinion.
The pre-nuptial sexual conduct of the Iroquois has been the subject of much discussion, but, as I have often pointed out, sexual conduct is not a matter with which we are concerned; it is even doubtful if the reports in its connexion have any scientific value. It is certain that among the Iroquois there was a complete absence of any regulation which might have compelled a pre-nuptial continence. The influence of women in the counsels of the confederacy was reflected in the arrangements of their marriages. The females, indeed, seem to have been in complete charge of all matrimonial arrangements. A young man was often mated with an old woman or a widow, on the supposition, we are told, 'that he needed a companion experienced in the affairs of life'; but doubtless it was a less worthy motive that sometimes compelled the arrangement. In a case of adultery the woman was regarded as the sole offender. The males did not seek the company of the females unless they were impelled by sheer physical necessity. Indeed, 'physical necessity' is the phrase which Morgan applies to the Iroquoian idea of a mating. 'The male sought the conversation and society of the males', he adds, 'the female the companionship of her own sex. Between the sexes there was but little sociality. When the unmarried of opposite sexes were brought together there was little or no conversation between them.' Sexual relations themselves, as Morgan puts it, were 'purely animal'.

117. Dakota. From the uncertainties of Iroquois culture it is a pleasure to turn to the Dakota, the most extensive of the Siouan tribes, whose customs and language have been carefully studied. The Dakota were zoistic; and I propose to discuss the word wakan (wakanda) before describing their sexual regulations. Wakan has been the subject of much comment in comparative literature; many theories which purport to explain its meaning have been presented. With these we are not concerned. The sole questions are: In what senses did the Dakota employ the term? To what phenomena did they apply it?

Mr. W. J. McGee and the Rev. J. O. Dorsey are confident that the word cannot be translated 'Great Spirit'. Miss Fletcher also considers that the rendering is inappropriate, even definitely misleading. Mr. J. R. Swanton, it will be remembered (para. 5), declared that the Tlingit yek could not be accurately translated 'spirits'; such a translation was due to the 'European lineage' of the observer. In a similar but more emphatic manner Mr. McGee criticizes 'the Great Spirit fallacy'. His opinion is worth quoting in full. Wakanda, he says, 'is rather a quality than an entity': 'thus, the sun is wakanda, not the wakanda or a wakanda, but simply wakanda; among the same tribes the moon is wakanda, and so is thunder, lightning, the stars, the winds, the cedar and various other things; even a man, especially a shaman, might be wakanda, or a wakanda'. Mr. McGee adds that 'places of striking character were considered wakanda'; 'the term was used indiscriminately as substantive and adjective, and with slight modification as
verb and adverb'. Then he makes this important declaration: 'Manifestly a term so protean is not susceptible of translation. Manifestly, too, it cannot justly be rendered "spirit", much less "Great Spirit", though it is easy to understand how the superficial enquirer, dominated by definite spiritual concepts, handicapped by unfamiliarity with the Indian tongue, misled by ignorance of the vague prescriptorial ideation, and perhaps deceived by crafty informants or mischievous interpreters, came to adopt and perpetuate the erroneous interpretation.'

The evidence, then, is that wakan was applied by the Dakota to anything unusual or striking, and to magicians. According to the Rev. S. R. Riggs, wakanda was the verbal form of the word, 'to reckon as sacred, to worship', the substantival and adjectival forms being wakan, which he translates 'a spirit' (subst.) and 'spiritual, sacred, consecrated, wonderful, incomprehensible' (adj.). The same meanings are given also in Riggs's later dictionary, in which W. J. Cleveland has added the following explanatory comment to the entries: 'Mysterious, incomprehensible, in a peculiar state, which from not being understood it is dangerous to meddle with, hence the application of the word to women at the menstrual period, and hence also arises the feeling that if the Bible, Church, Missionary, &c., are wakan, they are to be avoided, shunned, not as being bad or dangerous, but as being wakan.'

Thus wakan was (1) the power which was manifest in something supernormal or beyond comprehension, (2) the power which was possessed by a magician, (3) a dangerous force which must be shunned.

The dead were either buried in the ground or exposed on scaffolds in trees. It is impossible to say whether or not the adoption of the former method was due to white influence. When a body was placed on a scaffold, the bones were collected at the end of a year and finally mourned over. There are many Dakotan tales of ghostly apparitions, but there was no tendency. The Sun-Dance was a great institution: it was performed after a bad winter or at the time of an epidemic. Sometimes sickness is said to have been regarded as intrusive; in that case it was sucked out. The magicians, wakan-men, could also cure or bewitch by virtue of their wakan and the wakan of their songs. Carver emphasizes the influence which these men possessed, but adds, rather quaintly, that the Dakota used to 'reason with great acuteness on the causes and symptoms of many of the disorders which are attendant on human nature'. I do not doubt their reasoning powers, but the Dakota do not seem to have reached any profound conclusions.

We are given a description of weather 'beliefs', but I have failed to find an explicit statement in regard to the Dakotan method of weather control. The social regulations of the Dakota permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom; and the manner in which the statements are made reflects the individual temperaments of the observers. The Rev. S. R. Riggs says that 'the intercourse of young men with maidens is not always open and honourable, but the public sentiment of
a Dakota community, while it does not prevent much that is illicit, makes it more or less dishonourable, especially for the girl. The dishonour, however, seems to have lain rather in the possible pregnancy than in the sexual activity. Carver states that 'young warriors that are thus disposed seldom want opportunities for gratifying their passions' and that 'the lover is not apprehensive of any check or control in the accomplishment of his purposes if he can find a convenient opportunity for completing them'. 'It is said', he adds, 'that young women who admit their lovers on these occasions take great care, by an immediate application of herbs, with the potent efficacy of which they are well acquainted, to prevent the effects of these illicit amours becoming visible.'

118. Omaha. I have already discussed (para. 15) the reports concerning the pre-nuptial regulations of the Omaha and have drawn attention to their deceptive character. The evidence has been stated in such a manner as might lead us to suppose that social restraints were placed upon the sexual conduct of unmarried girls; but there was, as a matter of fact, no compulsory pre-nuptial continence: if a young couple were attracted to one another, they had every opportunity for gratifying their mutual desire. I will repeat the statement which I have quoted in the above-mentioned paragraph: 'Sometimes when a youth sees a girl whom he loves, if she be willing, he says to her: 'I will stand in that place. Please go thither at night.' Then after her arrival he enjoys her, and subsequently asks her of her father in marriage. But it was different with a girl who had been petulant, or had refused to listen to the suitor at first. After lying with her, he might say, 'As you struck me, and hurt me, I will not marry you.' Then she could be sent away without winning him for her husband.'

As I have also pointed out (para. 15), too much emphasis should not be placed on the report of subsequent marriage, for the word is applied by our authorities to any form of cohabitation. Parental consent was not necessary to an Omaha union, which took place as and when the contracting parties desired. The lack of such consent, however, is said to have made things uncomfortable sometimes, and this is easily understood, for a young husband was expected to work for his father-in-law for a year or two when he was first married. Most Omaha fathers seem to have asserted their rights.

The Omaha were zoistic. Usually they buried their dead on a hill-top; there is no report of any difference in the treatment of a dead magician. Food was placed on the grave and a fire was kept burning for four nights, after the expiry of which the ghost was considered to have reached its final destination. No more attention was paid to it. In cases of sickness, which, we are told, might be intrusive or due to witchcraft, treatment was rendered efficacious by the pronouncement of mystic formulae and spells.

I have not been able to find any precise statement concerning the Omaha methods of weather control.

The power in the universe was wakonda. The word was applied to 'any-
thing mysterious or inexplicable, be it an object or occurrence'. It was applied also to the particular shell, pebble, or animal which was the special 'medicine' of any individual, to the thunder, and to the mythic monster. When he was young, a boy had to fast: 'When he fell into a sleep or a trance, if he saw or heard anything, that thing was to become a special medium through which he could receive supernatural aid.' We are not told the native term for this 'special medium', which some anthropologists would call 'guardian spirit'. I suspect it was wakonda, but according to Dorsey the word for 'sacred' was waqube. Men who had visions of the same object formed themselves into societies.526

119. Hidatsa, Mandan, Crow. The culture and customs of the Hidatsa, Mandan, and Crow tribes have often been described in the same publications, so I will deal with them in a single paragraph. They may have differed from all the other Siouan tribes in reckoning descent in the female line. Their close association is emphasized throughout the literature, and it is plain that a general statement which has been made in reference to, e.g., the Mandan, may apply equally to the Hidatsa and/or Crow. So far as I can, however, I will describe what has been reported in reference to each individual tribe.

Both Professor Lowie and Mr. Curtis emphasize the sensual character of the Crows and the lax nature of their sexual regulations. There was a complete absence of pre-nuptial chastity. Young men prowled at night and entered the lodges of the girls they coveted; couples went off to the mountains with sexual partners who were chosen simply for the trip; and abundant opportunities were afforded for general philandering. Every man had the privilege of treating his brother's wife with the greatest familiarity; a young woman could take any liberty with her elder sisters' husbands. A common method of punishing an adulterous wife, we are told, was to compel her to submit to the embraces of a fellow clansman. There was a recognized ceremony in which men 'threw away' their wives; and it was considered churlish to refuse a wife to any man who desired her. The Hidatsa employed two separate words in reference to a mating, kidahe and vahe. The former was used in reference to a temporary affair or an elopement; the latter was applied to a more regular union which had the blessing of the parents on both sides. Virtue was scarce, we are told, among the Mandans; wives were exchanged at certain social gatherings. The grades in Mandan society were the same as among the Hidatsa, membership of any special grade being acquired by payments to the members who were willing to sell the privileges: 'The surrender of the purchasers' wives to the sellers formed a conspicuous feature.'

I have mentioned these post-nuptial customs because in this manner the general character of the sexual regulations can be assessed. The reason why the Crow regulations have been reported at greater length than those of the Hidatsa and Mandan is because the society of the Crow has been
more ably and more minutely observed. We read in reference to the Mandans that 'virtue was held in great esteem', or that 'the women are beautiful and modest'; it might be tempting to conclude that this alleged behaviour was the result of social regulations. Nothing would be farther from the truth. Dorsey says that 'Mandan customs resemble those of the Dakota and other cognate peoples'. He also states that the Crows and Hidatsa were identical in their habits.\textsuperscript{527}

Thus there was a complete absence of pre-nuptial sexual restraint among these three tribes, which were in the zoistic cultural condition; they neither erected temples nor paid any post Funerary attention to the dead. 'Ancestor-worship in any form is totally lacking', Professor Lowie has stated in reference to the Crows. Mr. Curtis repeats the report in reference to the Mandans. The dead are said to have been placed on scaffolds, but burial in graves was becoming common at the end of the nineteenth century, probably owing to European influences. There is no report of any difference in the treatment of the powerful dead.\textsuperscript{528}

The power in the universe was \textit{maxpe} or \textit{maxpa} (Crow), \textit{mahopini} or \textit{maxopini} (Mandan), and \textit{mahopa} or \textit{maxupa} (Hidatsa). These words were used in the same manner and under the same circumstances as the Dakotan \textit{wakan} (para. 117). The Crows applied the term \textit{maxpe} to a number of different phenomena. Professor Lowie states: 'What makes it possible to group together so heterogeneous an assemblage of beings as the sun, the thunder-bird, the mythical dwarf, and a hundred and one others who may appear in visions, is that they possess \textit{maxpe} powers and are able to transfer it; this and this alone is the badge of their divinity.' Again, 'The application of the term \textit{maxpe} suggests that it is primarily an expression of power transcending the ordinary.' Similarly, Messrs. Will and Spinden say that the Mandan \textit{hopini} was associated with the 'unaccountable'. Matthews states that \textit{mahopa} was 'the Hidatsa equivalent for those terms in other Indian tongues which are usually translated 'Great Spirit''. It was applied to anything 'of a very wonderful or sacred nature', and meant 'to be mysterious, sacred, to have curative powers, to possess a charm; incomprehensible; spiritual'.\textsuperscript{529}

Success in life among the Crows depended on the \textit{maxpe} which a man proved that he possessed; any man could become a magician, his reputation depending on his results. Moreover, if a man were successful in any walk of life, he would be credited with \textit{maxpe}. Such powerful men were called \textit{batse maxpe}; they differed, Professor Lowie says, 'not in kind but merely in degree from others who had successfully sought visions'. We must beware, in fact, of concluding that the application of a separate term implies social segregation; those who were \textit{batse maxpe} did not constitute a separate order in society. Professor Lowie warns us that such a conclusion would be as false as the recognition of a distinct class of warriors in a tribe where every one strove to achieve martial fame. Similarly among the Hidatsa and Mandans men who possessed \textit{mahopa} and \textit{mahopini} were magicians who
cured diseases and controlled the weather. Many, if not all, methods of
treatment were revealed in visions, and two medicine-men were able to
effect a cure when a single man might fail, for thus the maxpe (mahopa,
mahopini) power was doubled.

Weather-mongers received power from visions; any one could gain a
reputation for power over the elements by a practical proof of his ability.
Catlin says that among the Mandans a rain-maker operated only once; after
that he rested on his laurels. The sacred objects which had been revealed
in a dream were contained in bundles or bags which could be purchased
from the original visionary and even at third hand; but it was not only
visions which gave maxpe. Certain medicine-rocks (called bacoritsitse by
the Crows) were selected by their appearance and adopted as the finders'
medicine.\(^{530}\)

120. Winnebago. Our chief modern authority on the Winnebago tribe
is Dr. Paul Radin. I have already referred (para. 102) to some of his
writings, and I approach the results of his field-work with extreme caution.
My criticism of Dr. Radin's methods is directed against his method of
translating native terms. It seems to me that he has translated the Winne-
baggo words into our language and then credited the Indian with those
ideas which he himself associates with the English equivalents. This is
abundantly clear from his monograph on the Winnebago: 'In the Winne-
baggo language', he says, 'the four words most commonly used in speaking
of the spirits are wakan, wakandja, xop and waxopini. Wakan seems exactly
equivalent to our word "sacred'', while wakandja means thunder-bird. In
all likelihood it originally meant "he who is sacred" or something like that.'
Is it possible to consider such a pronouncement as an accurate description
of Winnebago usage? What are those 'spirits' in reference to which the
two words are alleged to have been used? What is the Winnebago term
for them? And surely wakandja was applied to something or some one
who was wakan; only for this reason was it applied to the thunder-bird
of Winnebago folk-lore. The word cannot mean 'thunder-bird', as Dr.
Radin clearly believes, for he adds that it 'originally' meant 'he who is
sacred' (i.e. wakan). I do not know what 'originally' means in that context.
Does it refer to the Winnebago use of the term wakandja before Dr. Radin
decided that it meant something else? I cannot tell; and apparently Dr.
Radin is not interested in Winnebago usage; so he adds carelessly, 'or
something like that'.

Dr. Radin goes farther than this. After stating that wakan 'seems exactly
equivalent to our word "sacred"', he remarks: 'Wakan also means snake, for
the snake is a holy animal among the Winnebago.' Surely it would be
inconceivable, had we not proof of the fact, that such a crime against
scholarship could be committed. Just because a snake was wakan, must we
believe that wakan meant 'snake'? In our language the word 'fast' may be
applied to a motor-car, runner, horse, or any other thing which moves
quickly, also to a dye or a knot or anything secure; it may also denote a period of abstinence. If Dr. Radin were to write an anthropological report on English culture, would he say: 'The word fast meant motor-car, runner, horse, dye, and knot'?²³¹

The Winnebago were in the zoistic cultural condition. At the time to which our reports refer they seem to have buried their dead; but sometimes scaffolds were employed. 'The graves of chiefs and distinguished men', we are told, 'are sometimes enclosed with fir trees.' Men and women fasted in order to secure 'medicine' or 'guardian spirits'; by the power of 'medicine' they cured the sick and inflicted suffering on their enemies. The native terms are not always quoted, but 'medicine' and 'guardian spirits' seem to be translations of *wakan*.

Absolute faith was placed in the power of the magicians, who treated the sick by means of incantations, 'accompanied with the drum, rattle and whistle'.²³² I have been unable to discover a precise statement in regard to the control of the weather.

Whilst she was in her menstrual lodge, a girl received lovers. No Winnebago was restrained in his love affairs by any social ordinance.²³³

### 121. Summary and Chart

Such were the customs and culture of these ten American tribes. Diagrammatically the facts may be expressed thus:

**AMERICAN INDIANS OF THE PLAINS AND GREAT LAKES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Cultural condition</th>
<th>Treatment of affliction</th>
<th>Method of weather control</th>
<th>Treatment of ghosts</th>
<th>Temples and priests</th>
<th>Pre-nuptial chastity</th>
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<td>Crow</td>
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<tr>
<td>Winnebago</td>
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I do not propose to summarize the facts at great length, as they speak for themselves.
Our authorities have introduced great difficulties into the study of these American Indian societies by confusing the meaning of the native terms with the phenomena to which they were applied. This is particularly noticeable in the reports on the Blackfeet, Arapaho, and Winnebago; and clearly when Dr. Radin says that *wakan* meant ‘snake’ or ‘thunder-bird’ he has been deceived by his own translations. Mr. Curtis definitely tells us that in their reports on the Blackfeet our observers have confused the meaning of *natosio* with the sun, the medicine-man, and other people and things included by the Blackfeet in that wide and untranslatable category (n. 510). The same remark may apply in a lesser degree to the Arapaho *baataana* (n. 514), but in the main the Arapaho terms have not been quoted. Professor Lowe, in his report on the Crows, states that ‘what makes it possible to group together so heterogeneous an assemblage of beings as the sun, the Thunder Bird, the mythical dwarf, and a hundred and one others who may appear in visions is that they possess *maxpe* powers’. ‘This, and this alone’, he adds, ‘is the badge of their divinity.’ These phenomena were important only because they were *maxpe*.

The native usage of the Ojibwa *munedoo*, Dakota *wakan*, Crow *maxpe*, Hidatsa *hopa*, and Mandan *hopini* is clear. Each of these words was applied to something supernormal or incomprehensible.

Miss Fletcher and Mr. La Flesche state that the Omaha *wakonda* permeated all things; a similar report has been made by Mr. Hewitt concerning the Iroquoian *orenda*. If the former are absolutely correct in their statements, and have made no inferences from the observed facts, it seems to follow that the Omaha conceptions differed from those of the other Siouan tribes. Yet we continually find that all the Siouan terms are equated. Either, then, the equations are false, or Fletcher and La Flesche have inferred the ubiquity of *wakonda* from its application to strange, unusual things. They tell us definitely that the word was used in the latter sense, and they produce no evidence of its application to anything else; so, on the whole, I think that we are justified in concluding that the Omaha *wakonda* was used in a similar manner to the other Siouan terms, e.g. the Dakotan *wakan*, and that Miss Fletcher and Mr. La Flesche, possibly under the influence of the animistic theory, have made a common but serious mistake in maintaining that the power permeated all things (n. 526).

I cannot suggest that Mr. Hewitt, an Iroquoian, has made a similar mistake in reference to *orenda*, and under the circumstances I do not think that we are justified in coming to any definite conclusion about the word; but Mr. Hewitt placed himself in an awkward dilemma when he compared the Iroquoian *orenda* with the Dakotan *wakan* (para. 116), and, because I believe that his position may be due solely to his acquaintance with the theories of the white man, I cannot accept his submissions at their face value.

The information in regard to weather control is scanty. Definite evidence is available only in five cases. In every one of these cases the
elements were thought to be under the control of the munedoo-, natosio-, hopa-, hopini-, maxpe-powers of the munedoo-, natosio-, hopa-, hopini-, maxpe-men. Perhaps the same 'medicine' was employed under similar circumstances by the members of the other five tribes.

The burial customs are imperfectly known.

Here, then, were ten societies which imposed no checks upon the adolescent impulses of their members. They were in the zoistic condition. When we possess sufficient reliable information to warrant an opinion, we find that the basis of their culture was the mysterious quality which was manifest in something unusual or beyond comprehension. By the power which they credited to any of its manifestations they controlled the weather, cured the sick, prevented misfortune, conquered their enemies, and preserved themselves from danger. They recognized the existence of no other power, and had complete faith in the ability of the men whom they credited with its possession.

3. Indians of the South and the South-east

122. Comments on Pueblo Culture. Our third group of American Indians consists of nine societies the culture of which differed in certain details from that of the nineteen societies which we have just discussed. Here, however, I am using the word 'culture' in the indefinite sense in which it is usually employed. Our first group of American Indians consisted of tribes which were not only in a similar cultural condition in our particular sense of the term; their culture also conformed to the same pattern in most senses of the word 'culture'. The same remark applies also to the second group. The tribes in that group were without exception zoistic; their culture was also similar in many senses of the word 'culture'. Moreover in the available literature the impression of cultural uniformity has been preserved by a uniform method of translating the native terms. Thus the words which the tribes of the north-west used to denote the power in the universe, such as snam, sulia, and tamanous, are usually rendered 'guardian spirit'; while the writers who have travelled among the Plains Indians have used 'God', 'Great Spirit', &c., as equivalents of the native terms. And, however inaccurate these translations may be, the correct impression has been conveyed, viz. that the native conceptions were similar.

When we turn to the consideration of the tribes which lived in the southern and south-eastern states of North America, a different situation confronts us. There was great variety within the cultural pattern in our sense of the word 'culture', but the cultural pattern was the same; that is to say, although in our cultural scale the position of the next nine societies was the same, in the indefinite and popular sense of the word 'culture' their culture was extremely varied. Moreover the impression of extreme variety has been preserved by the fact that in the available literature similar native conceptions have been variously presented in English.
It is imperative, therefore, that the meaning of the terms which we employ should be remembered, and, for the sake of lucidity and at the risk of over-statement, I will repeat some of the definitions.

We classify our societies as (a) Deistic, (b) Manistic, (c) Zoistic; and the bases of the classification are (a) the existence of temples: a temple is a roofed building, other than a grave-house, in which the power in the universe manifests itself and which is specially erected and maintained in order that a right relation may be preserved with that power, (b) the conduct of post-funeral rites in honour of the dead, (c) the non-existence of temples or of post-funeral rites. Within these patterns there is always an intense variety. In the preceding paragraphs we have also inquired into other cultural details in order that the evidence might be sifted as finely as possible before we attempt to interpret the coincidence of these three cultural patterns with the three patterns of pre-nuptial sexual regulations.

If these definitions are carefully borne in mind, the study of the following nine societies will be greatly facilitated. They are:

1. Hopi, Zuni, Sia. These societies are three of the so-called Pueblo tribes. They represent three distinct linguistic stocks, Shoshonian, Zunian, and Keresan.

2. Navaho and Apache, who are inseparable, being united by blood and language.

3. Chickasaw, Creek, and Natchez, these being usually classed as Muskogean.534

4. Pima.

We shall consider them in that order. When we have discussed the Pima, we shall have travelled in an almost direct geographical line from Alaska, the habitat of the Tlingit, down the north-west coast as far as the States of Washington and Oregon, through the Plains and past the Great Lakes to the southern states of America, and finally to Mexico, where we meet the deistic Aztecs, whose cultural pattern we have already noted (para. 43).

Some preliminary observations in reference to Pueblo culture are advisable. The word pueblo was applied by the Spaniards to those Indians who lived in permanent stone or adobe houses. The word has been adopted as an inclusive technical term to denote the tribies which inhabited that area. They represented several distinct linguistic stocks, but they shared many characteristic cultural traits. These traits represent the variety within the cultural pattern to which I have referred. Fascinating though they are, they are outside the scope of this treatise, and I do not propose to discuss them. Moreover, even if a consideration of these traits were necessary to a cultural classification, it is doubtful if our knowledge is sufficient to warrant an opinion concerning their indigenous character, for we do not know the original nature of Pueblo culture. We only know that alien influence has created a new variety within what I am calling the cultural
pattern. In 1883 Mr. A. F. Bandelier remarked: 'The present condition of the Pueblo Indians is not their original one, but has been much affected by their connection with the Europeans for more than 300 years. Any study of their customs, mode of life, beliefs and traditions, if not constantly checked by what is known of these features as they were three centuries ago, will therefore give but imperfect and in most instances illusory results. Many implements and instruments in use to-day, however primitive they may appear, are of modern date; others, of ethnological importance, formerly used, have become forgotten; language has been modified and the religion is a mixture of Christian beliefs with an older creed. Even the secret rites of the Indians are not absolutely pure; and as to their historical traditions, the events of the uprising of 1680, and of the reconquest, have become so mixed with anterior recollections that one not familiar with the early documents relative to New Mexico must be exposed to serious mistakes.' Mr. Bandelier adds that in later years the house-life was very different from that of the sixteenth century: 'Then there was a strict separation of the sexes. The women and children alone occupied the houses, the men slept in the estufas.'

Our ignorance of Pueblo culture is attested also by another observer. Capt. T. G. Bourke has remarked, in reference to Apache religion: 'It contains fewer obscene suggestions of the Phallic worship once prevailing among all the inhabitants of Arizona and in our own generation practised openly by the Zunis, who have orgies so disgusting that the merest allusion only is permissible, while the Moquis [i.e. Hopi] until the last decade indulged in bestiality and abominations.'

It seems, then, that not only do we possess very little accurate knowledge of Pueblo rites but that we are ignorant also concerning two of the very factors, family and sexual regulations, with which this inquiry is particularly concerned. Furthermore, our authorities in their descriptions have not quoted the native terms which they translate. So we can record only the pattern of the culture. The other six tribes also will have to be discussed in a very general manner.

In describing what has been written concerning the Hopi I shall rely more particularly on the evidence which has been collected from the village of Oraibi. Oraibi was the most conservative, as well as the most important, of the Hopi settlements. In 1629 it became the seat of the Spanish Franciscan Mission which was destroyed in the revolt of 1680, to which Mr. Bandelier referred in the above-quoted passage. 'The people of Oraibi', we are told, 'are far more conservative in their attitude towards the whites than the other Hopi, an element in the tribe being strongly opposed to civilisation.' If, then, we possess any reliable information concerning Hopi culture (and this is a matter of some doubt), it is probable that it comes from Oraibi.535

123. Hopi. Undoubtedly the Hopi are the most fascinating of all American Indian tribes. They were an agricultural people and are said to
have carried out a great number of ceremonies in connexion with the powers which were manifest in the sun, rain, and other natural phenomena. From harvest to planting, and from planting to harvest, their calendar was crowded with fixtures. Almost every month possessed a ceremony in which the supernatural or supernormal forces were personified and dramatized. The actual celebrations varied annually, and each clan possessed its own peculiar variety. The Hopi seem to have been a collection of social groups which gathered together from many different directions, each group contributing its own quota to the complex ceremonial; they had also borrowed a mass of different practices from other Pueblos. This medley has been further modified by Christian influence, the people having been nominally Roman Catholic for a long time.

The vast literature which has accumulated about these interesting men and women is concerned chiefly with the details of these various ceremonies; but it is seldom that we are told a definite fact which is without a trace of inference or interpretation. Such words as 'gods', 'supernatural beings', 'divinized ancestors', 'sun-worship', 'fire-worship', and other compounds of 'worship' are used freely; but rarely are we told the native word or words which they represent. Moreover very few white men, except the Rev. H. R. Voth, seem to have spoken the Hopi language; and Mr. J. W. Fewkes, our chief authority on the subject, is fully conscious of the unsatisfactory nature of the terms which have been employed in describing the Hopi culture. 'In the use of the words gods, deities, and worship', he says, 'we undoubtedly endow the subject with conceptions which do not exist in the Indian mind.' 'Worship, as we understand it', he adds, 'is not a proper term to use in the description of the Indian’s methods.'

The so-called 'ancestor-worship' is important, for the classification of the Hopi depends upon the rites which are included under this general title. The word translated 'spirits of the dead' seems to be katchina; but katchina was applied also to the masks worn at the katchina ceremonies; the word has also been used to denote the ceremonies themselves. When Mr. Fewkes speaks of Hopi 'ancestor-worship', he is referring to 'the cult of the Katchinas, spirits of the dead, or other members of the clan'. 'As it is supposed', he says, 'that human beings that have died and now live in ghostly communities have greater powers to aid the living, they are appealed to and influenced by magical processes and they are conjured from time to time to return to the village and aid their descendants.' 'There exists also a belief that is strictly aboriginal—having originated independently of white influence, although possibly somewhat modified by it—that the spirits of the dead return to earth either to vex or to bless mankind; "the breath-bodies" of those that have passed on revisit the pueblo and are represented by masked personations called Katchinas which are past members of the tribe.'

I fear, however, that such words as 'appeal to', 'greater powers to aid
the living', 'vex or bless mankind', 'revisit the pueblo', are inferences in justification of which no rites are reported. In the first place, similar masked dances and societies of masked dancers existed in Melanesia, especially in New Britain, Banks Islands, and New Hebrides. In Papua every society seems to have used equipment of a similar character. There is nothing unique about the Hopi Katchina, if we consider it as a masked ceremony. Secondly, Mr. Fewkes's words suggest that the masks were thought to represent actual men who had once lived; but in another passage he says, 'In an ancestor-worship of this kind no personality appears, no particular ancestral individual or named ancestor is represented; in fact, a Katchina is a generalized mythical conception which cannot be accurately identified, and is quite unlike the ancestor among the natives of the Old World, where this worship is a most prominent feature.' At other times he refers to the Katchinas as 'ancestral personages', 'clan ancients', 'spirits of the dead', 'divinized ancestors' who lived 'in mythic times'.

We read: 'When a child arrives at years of discretion, it is customary to impart to him the knowledge of his relationship to supernatural beings. Up to that time the child has been taught to believe that the personations of Katchinas are gods. It is deemed necessary to impart to youths the fact that the priests who personate these beings are their own relatives.' Thirdly, although Katchina ceremonial constituted 'fully one half of Hopi ritual', there is not a single mention of any rite which suggests or implies that the Katchinas were 'appealed to' in any way. The whole of Hopi ritual was an attempt to control the powers in the universe.

When we examine the burial rites, we find that the Hopi paid no attention to the ghost of a dead man after he was buried. There was no tendance and no cult. The dying were deserted by their friends; when they were dead, they were buried in graveyards. 'The graveyards are not', Voth says, 'marked or enclosed or taken care of in any way whatsoever; it not infrequently happens that either the wind-storms blow away the sand, exposing the bones, or currents of water from the high mesas break their way through the burial places and carry them away.' When the survivors departed from the graveyard, they drew a line across the path as they went, in order to prevent the ghost from returning to his native village. A bowl of food was placed on the grave, and after this had been done the hikosi, breath or soul, finally went away. No more attention was paid to it.

The power in the universe was associated with 'mystery'. The native term is not given. The sun and the rain which were chiefly responsible for the growth of the crops 'were not understood'. 'Each was a mystery.' Mr. Fewkes describes Hopi 'worship' as 'the effort to be in harmony with the power behind nature'. 'A fundamental belief is that men, animals, material objects, sky, earth, fire, water, everything, possesses magical powers. Idols likewise share this power.' The man whom Mr. Fewkes calls 'priest' was a man who, in Mr. Fewkes's words, 'by magic may compel a supernatural to do as he wishes': 'Instead of asking the Sun-God to send
rain, the priests show by actions and gestures what is desired.' In other words, the magicians thought that they controlled the elements by magic. They 'convey their desires to the sky-god by sympathetic magic', Mr. Fewkes quaintly remarks; that is to say, they controlled by magic the 'mystery' in the sun and sky.\(^{543}\)

The reports in regard to sickness are scanty. The Hopi believed firmly in the power of wizards and witches. A herb-doctor was *tukikya*, but the real ministrant was the medicine-man, *positaka*, 'eye-man', so called because he could see the disease in his patient. In pagan times the medicine-men were organized into *poswimi*, societies. We are not told the native word for 'priest', so we do not know if he was also *positaka*. The so-called priests were simply ceremonial leaders and not 'privileged persons'. The office was not hereditary.\(^{544}\)

Marriage among the Hopi was matriloc. A girl chose her own husband and then informed her parents. If she were dissatisfied with him, she told him to go away. If he were miserable at any time, he packed up his goods and departed. There were no superstitions in regard to the menses. As soon as a girl reached puberty, she was sent away to the house of her paternal aunt, where she ground corn for three days behind a curtain. 'Opportunities were not lacking for a young man to meet the girl of his choice.'\(^{545}\)

124. Zuni. The customs of the matrilineal Zuni were similar to those of the Hopi. Marriage was matrilocal; the woman's title to the house in which she lived with her husband was absolute. Apparently a couple could mate very early, and frequently girls were married two years before puberty. The word 'marriage' is applied to any cohabitation. Professor Kroeber says: 'Divorce, if it may be called such, for it is nothing more than a separation, is as easy as marriage; more facile, in fact, for a young girl still under parental influence.' Thus the Zuni permitted their young boys and girls to mate as they desired. Their post-nuptial regulations were equally lax: 'There is much in Zuni life', Professor Kroeber adds, 'that our standard code would denounce as loose. Most men and most women of middle age have been married to several persons.' Both contraception and abortion are said to have been practised freely.\(^{546}\)

The Zuni erected no temples in which the power in the universe manifested itself and which were specially maintained in order that a right relation with this power might be preserved. More elaborate attention was paid to the corpse of a rain-maker 'and other officials' than to that of an ordinary person. Only the bearers accompanied a corpse to the grave, the actual interment being regarded as a disagreeable business. The ghost of a dead man was supposed to hover about the village for four days and nights and then to depart. During those four days the door and hatchway of the house were left ajar. Some sections of the community threw food into the fire. All such attentions ceased after the fifth day.\(^{547}\) There was a
firm belief in witchcraft; its practitioners seem to have been prominent members of society who played a leading part in the festivals. The treatment was herbal and magical. A great ceremony, hlahewe, was performed for making rain; the rain-makers acted also as diviners of thieves. Each of them possessed an ettone, a collection of hollow reeds ‘which came from the undermost world’, wrapped up in cord and decorated with beads. The native terms for the powers in the universe are not given.  

125. Sia. The Sia were a Pueblo society of the Keresan linguistic family. They have disappeared almost entirely. We do not know very much about them. According to Mrs. Stevenson, who is almost our only authority, marriage was matrilocal. There was a complete absence of pre-nuptial chastity, the idea of which was quite foreign to the Sia consciousness. The parents of a girl were both fond and proud of their daughter’s pre-nuptial children, and a man who married a woman with two or three children felt the same attachment for them as for his own. Their actual father also remembered them and continued to give them presents. The unmarried and the married lived together in complete promiscuity; no husband resented his wife’s having children by another man. (Some of these customs, we are told, may have been due to the decrease in population.)

The Sia did not believe that the ghosts of the dead could return to earth after they had reached Shipapo. The journey took four days. No more attention was paid to the ghost. Since they did not erect any temples, the Sia were zoistic. Sickness was ascribed to witches and wizards, ‘and to the anger of certain animals, even insects’. Mrs. Stevenson does not quote the native terms. Treatment was purely magical. There were eight magical fraternities, each apparently owning its own particular rain-ceremony.  

126. Navaho and Apache. Our next two tribes, Navaho and Apache, will be considered together. They belonged to the same linguistic stock (Athapascan) as the Dene (para. 111), and ‘have been’, Mr. Curtis says, ‘more or less in proximity ever since they have been known in history’. Probably, indeed, at one time the Navaho and Apache were almost as undivided a group as the Apache were in later days, when their united front was a source of so much embarrassment to the organized armies of the white man; but the very fearlessness, cunning, and resistance which have made the name of the Apache a household word have prevented any adequate study of their culture. Our knowledge of the tribe is meagre. We know more about the Navaho—the American Bedouin, as he has been called; but in their reports our authorities seldom quote the native terms. When they do so, they disagree, perhaps because they were obliged to work through interpreters.  

I can do no more than record the general pattern of the culture. Both tribes reckoned descent in the female line, and, among the Navaho,
marriage was matrilocal. 'If I and the hogan (house) do not suit you', a Navaho wife might say to her husband, 'go elsewhere.' Pre-nuptial children were treated in the same way as those which were born after a woman had settled down in a recognized economic union with an individual man. She might already have borne one or two children by another man; her husband treated them as his own. An exchange of gifts, or a gift to the woman's relations, was the only formality necessary to regularize a chance mating; any couple could live with one another at any time. Among the Apache, the female was usually the aggressor in sexual activity; mutual consent was the only consideration.\textsuperscript{551}

Neither the Navaho nor the Apache erected temples; and they paid no post-funeral attention to the dead. The Apache buried their dead in caverns, clefts of rocks, or in holes which had been caused by the removal of a rock or the stump of a tree. Sometimes, however, dead infants were placed in a tree cradle; it was thought that owls came and took the ghost away. Sometimes the Navaho placed a corpse in the side of a cliff; in the case of a protracted illness, they carried the dying man to a place outside the village and built a brush fence round him; sometimes they dug graves, or placed the body in the hogan, which they pulled down forthwith; sometimes the corpse of a child was placed in a tree. 'In none of these burials', Shufeldt says, 'do any ceremonies ever seem to be indulged in by the Indians.' We are not told whether or not the different methods of burial were adopted for different people.\textsuperscript{552}

Magical ceremonies, dances, and songs played a leading part in Navaho and Apache life; magicians were the most influential men. Any one could be a magician if he could dream dreams, see visions, interpret strange occurrences, and give a plausible answer to any inquiry. There was a general fear of witchcraft and fear of the 'unknown'. Unfortunately, our best information concerning the Apache was secured only with difficulty from an interpreter, and, though it is usually supposed that we know more about the innumerable 'gods' of the Navaho than about those of the Apache, our authorities seldom quote the native terms. Indeed more than one native word seems to have been translated as 'god'. It is impossible to make an intelligent summary of the reports, or to extract from them any definite statements in regard to Navaho rites. It was by 'medicine' that the Navaho controlled the weather, and caused and cured sickness. Nothing more can definitely be stated.\textsuperscript{553}

127. Chickasaw. We pass on to the Muskhogean societies. Mr. J. R. Swanton has collected most of the available data concerning the Chickasaw. Adair speaks of the 'constitutional wantonness' of the young men and women, and says that a couple could 'bed together' on trial, and continue or discontinue the experience according as their fancy directed them.\textsuperscript{554}

The Chickasaw were zoistic. They built no temples and paid no post-funeral attention to the dead. When they had placed their dead on scaffolds,
they shouted and made other noises in order to dispatch the soul on its journey. When the corpse had decomposed, the bones were collected and interred 'in a very solemn manner'. Such, at any rate, is the report. I am not sure, however, that our knowledge of Chickasaw burial customs is complete, for Adair, upon whose testimony we must rely, says that the natives were 'unwilling we should join them, upon which account I never saw but one buried'.

The Chickasaw had complete faith in the power of their rain-makers, who in the event of failure were liable to be killed; but the wily magicians usually declared on such occasions that their best endeavours had been unavailing because some one had broken some social regulation or neglected a taboo. 'There are no greater bigots in Europe, nor persons more superstitious than the Indians', Adair says, 'concerning the power of witches, wizards and evil spirits.' He does not give the native word for 'spirits'. The word *holo* meant 'sacred' as well as 'what is sacred', and clearly the names of the so-called 'deities', e.g. *ishto holo*, *hattak ishto holo*, &c., are compounds of this term. It seems possible that *holo*-power was manifest in the thunder, sky, sun, &c., but we cannot interpret the evidence without a knowledge of the language. I cannot find the word for 'magician'. A wizard was *hoollabe*; and, since Adair always spells *holo* as *hoollo*, it seems possible that *holo* was the source of magic power. Mr. Swanton is not helpful; he simply makes extracts from the writings of old travellers and does not attempt to appraise them.555

128. Creek. There was a complete absence of compulsory pre-nuptial continence among the Creeks. C. Swan remarks: 'Simple fornication is no crime or reproach; the sexes indulge their propensities with each other promiscuously, unrestrained by law or custom, and without secrecy or shame. If a young woman becomes pregnant before she is married, which most of them do, the child is maintained in her clan without the least murmuring.' Nor is this an isolated opinion. Mr. Swanton quotes other observers who report that 'female licentiousness before marriage is not attended by loss of character', and that 'the savages [i.e. Creeks] think a young woman nothing the worse for making use of her body, as they term it'.556

The native terms which the Creeks employed in reference to the universe are not given, but 'just as among the beings and objects in nature there were certain which possessed or acquired exceptional supernatural powers, so there were certain men who were possessed of such power or were mediums for its expression'. These magicians were *kila*, *alektca*, or *hilishaya*. A *kila* is called a 'knower'; the word *alektca* was applied to 'priests or doctors proper' (whoever they may be); a *hilishaya* is said to have been a 'medicine-maker'. I do not know what precise meaning Mr. Swanton attaches to these English words; he does not define them. An *alektca* seems to have been an *istiposkalgi*, 'fasting man', because fasting was an
important element in his training. His instructor would tell him what
songs gave healing power to his medicine. He learnt the secrets of
wizardry as well as the curative spells. A wizard who had caused a man's
death, if discovered, is reported to have been killed, but he was killed not
for having practised witchcraft, which was not a punishable offence, but
for having been responsible for another man's death. In addition to these
healers and wizards, there were certain men and women who possessed
the power to control the weather.

The burial customs were diverse, but we cannot tell whether or not
they differed according to the person who was being buried. Swan states
that 'if the deceased has been a man of eminent character, the family
immediately remove from the house in which he is buried and erect a
new one'. Swan seems to imply that this step was not taken when an
ordinary man died. The remains of an abortion, of a still-born child, or
of a very young child were laid away in a hollow tree. The natives thought
that if this were not done there would be a drought, a pestilence would
break out, or deaths from other causes would occur.

We are not told the native words which were used in reference to these
phenomena; it would be interesting to know if the same word was applied
to (1) the places which possessed 'exceptional supernatural powers', (2) the
pestilence, (3) a still-born child. I should expect that, in the opinion of
the Creeks, these things would manifest the same quality.557

129. Natchez. The chroniclers are unanimous in saying that the
Natchez girls were uncommonly licentious, their sexual activity being free-
ly remarked. Indeed a girl seems to have been esteemed in proportion to
the dowry she could amass by hiring out her person. If she gave birth
to a pre-nuptial child, she nourished it if she were so inclined, but, if she
wished to be free from the responsibility of it, the child was strangled
outside the cabin door.558

In their treatment of sickness the people relied on magic. Dumont
remarks: 'Since the savages have no religion, at least apparently, and in
consequence no external worship, it naturally follows that they have among
them no priests and priestesses. There are, however, certain men who
might be thought to take their place, at least they may be regarded as
diviners, sorcerers, or magicians, since they are in fact consulted as such,
and as, through ridiculous ceremonies, they pretend to accomplish things
which if they were true would surpass without difficulty all human power.
These men, who are called alexis or jugglers, also mix themselves up in
medicine.' Charlevoix says: 'The jugglers or doctors of the Natchez pretty
much resemble those of Canada and treat their patients much after the
same manner. There are certain lazy old fellows who undertake to procure
rain or fine weather, according as they are wanted.'559 There is no report
of any post-funeral rites. Indeed the manner in which the common people
were buried has been described but vaguely, all our authorities having
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confined their descriptions to the striking and sanguinary ceremonies which attended the obsequies of a Sun.\textsuperscript{566} The Natchez, in fact, were one of those tribes which were ruled by a despotic chief who is called by the French chroniclers Le Grand Soleil.

We are not told the native word which is translated \textit{soleil}, nor do we know in what other contexts it was employed. As we have seen, there has been a great deal of confusion in many parts of the world between the meaning of a word and the phenomena to which it was applied. Thus the native term which is translated \textit{soleil} may not have meant ‘sun’; it may have been merely applied to it. The so-called classificatory system of relationship is also a frequent source of error, because the words which we translate ‘father’, ‘son’, did not have that limited meaning in the native mind, but were applied to other individuals and things besides the procreator and the procreated. When, therefore, I read that a man was the Sun, or the son of the Sun, or a child of the Sun, I do not accept the words in any literal sense. Having learnt by experience that our translations are not always reliable, I suspend judgement as to the meaning of the phrase. It is plain, however, that the Natchez were ruled by the descendants of a man or men who were almost certainly immigrants, and, though the presence of these strangers did not affect the pattern of Natchez culture, it created a variety within the pattern which is of peculiar interest.

The native story is that a man and his wife came to their country and told them that they did not govern themselves well. When they asked him, he consented, after some hesitation, to perform the duty for them, on condition that his descendants should rule after him, and after that the descendants of his daughter, and of her daughter, and so on. The newcomers married with the natives, the daughters selecting as husbands any men that attracted them. If the husbands were unfaithful, they were killed, but the wives could take as many lovers as they pleased: ‘This is a privilege belonging to the blood of the great chief.’ Some African tribes extended a similar freedom to the daughters of the ruling clan.\textsuperscript{561}

On the death of a chief they strangled his slaves and his wives in a manner which was common in many other parts of the world, but which was unique in North America. They also demolished his cabin, and raised a new mound on which they built the cabin of his successor.\textsuperscript{562} The bones of the chief were afterwards placed in a special building in which a perpetual fire was kept burning. The entrance was low and narrow; there was no window and no chimney. Various descriptions have been given of the contents of this building. Some observers deny that there was a fire, and Charlevoix states that he saw only three or four chests in which there were some dry bones. On a table which has been described as an altar, there was a cane coffer which contained the bones of the last Grand Soleil. Dumont calls the building ‘a good-sized cabin’. Only ‘Suns’ or the descendants of ‘Suns’ were allowed to enter. Ordinary people who passed by laid down their burdens, extended their arms, and emitted the same howl as they
uttered when they passed a living 'Sun'. First-fruits were placed outside the door prior to their presentation to the Grand Soleil. The people made no 'sacrifices, libations, or offerings'. The only rite which was performed was the maintenance of the fire, and apparently this was a matter of importance only to the Grand Soleil himself.\textsuperscript{563}

I have described this building in detail because the word 'temple' has been applied to it; but it was merely the resting-place of the dead chiefs' bones and it does not come within the definition of a temple which I formulated in para. 7 and repeated in para. 122. Dumont, indeed, scoffs at the 'good-sized cabin to which it has pleased our Europeans to give this name' and refers to 'this pretended temple'.\textsuperscript{564} Mr. Swanton considers that while there is no reason to believe that the native statements have been wilfully misrepresented, our authorities were bound to have been the victims of too many preconceptions for us to hope that the accounts are exact. We must remember, too, that the chroniclers did not speak the native language, and that they had not lived among the people for any extended period.\textsuperscript{565}

Thus the Natchez seem to have been ruled by an immigrant clan whose customs were different from their own. Their treatment of sickness and their control of the weather were purely magical. We have no information concerning their methods of burial. The building which is called a 'temple' by the French chroniclers was not a temple in our sense of the word; it seems to have been a repository for the bones of dead chieftains of immigrant descent. We do not know how they were placed there, or what part the building played in the life of the Grand Soleil, to whom alone it appears to have been of any cultural interest.

130. \textit{Pima}. In reading the reports concerning the sexual regulations of the Pima, we must take into account the intrusion of the observer's individual temperament. Mr. Russell secured his information by means of direct questions to old men and women: 'Accurate information concerning the relations between the sexes before marriage can only be obtained from the oldest persons among the Pimas as the moral atmosphere has been heavily clouded since the advent of the Americans.' I do not know if Mr. Russell really believed that he would succeed in eliciting 'accurate information' in this manner. The Pima had already been in contact with white men for a long time, and we are even told that 'when the ceremonies and charms of the native magicians, \textit{makai}, failed to produce a cure', a sick infant was taken to some American or Mexican, or even Papago, 'when he is known to have embraced the Christian faith'. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the people knew what pleased the strangers who had come among them. The outcome of Mr. Russell's inquiries was such as might have been expected: 'Before the Pimas came into contact with civilization,' we are told, 'chastity was the rule among the young women, who were taught by compelling precept, through ever witnessing
the demoralizing example of free and easy divorce.' Mr. Grossman, however, states that 'modesty was unknown to men and women'.

There was a complete absence of any compulsory restraint in sexual matters; the Pima were pre-nuptially free. Pre-nuptial children were aborted at three or four months. A rejected lover might take a piece of the girl's hair and ask a magician to bewitch her by burying it. Adultery was not a crime. Marriage was mere cohabitation.\(^566\)

The Pima were zoistic. Ordinary people were placed in shallow graves, but in many cases medicine-men were buried 'in isolated places which have acquired special sacredness'. Water and pinole were placed on the grave, but the journey to the other world only took a moment. 'Go to your home,' the survivors cried, 'do not come back.' No further attention was paid to the ghost.\(^567\)

There were three types of magicians. The siatcokam treated sickness by magic; the haiitcottam used herbs and roots; the makai had power over the crops and the weather. No Pima fasted or repaired to a solitary place in order to gain power. Dreams and trances were a method of revelation, but usually recipes and remedies were handed on from one generation to another: 'Any one who received instruction and learned to do little tricks could become a medicine-man.' Sickness and death were ascribed to witchcraft, animals, and the neglect of taboo or ceremony. Cures took the form of sucking and song-singing. A makai (make) had no difficulty in creating an abundance of wheat, melons, or rain. 'The Pimas', says Grossman, 'have no form of worship whatever, and have neither idols nor images.'\(^568\)

131. Summary and Chart. The culture and customs of these nine tribes are stated diagrammatically on the next page.

None of these tribes had adopted any regulations which would have compelled any continence. All of them were in the zoistic cultural condition.

Their cultural details have not been elucidated in a manner which will be of much assistance to us. Concerning the Zuni, Sia, Navaho, Apache, Natchez, and Pima, there is a lack of information in regard to native words. The unknown Hopi word which has been translated 'mystery' was associated with phenomena which 'were not understood'; 'mystery' was also the source of magic power. The Chickasaw holo also seems to have been the source of magic power, and has been translated 'gods'. The Creek term for 'supernatural power' is not given, but clearly the native usage corresponded to that of the Chickasaw holo.

The burial customs are imperfectly known, especially those of the Hopi, Sia, and Chickasaw. The Zuni buried a ceremonial leader in a more elaborate manner than they buried an ordinary man. A dead man of 'eminent character' among the Creeks also was treated with more respect than the average citizen. The Navaho and Apache disposed of their dead
AMERICAN INDIANS OF THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST

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<th>Society</th>
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<th>Treatment of affliction</th>
<th>Method of weather control</th>
<th>Treatment of ghosts</th>
<th>Temples and priests</th>
<th>Pre-nuptial chastity</th>
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in various ways, but we are not told the manner in which the matter was decided. The honours which were accorded to the so-called *soleil* among the Natchez cannot be properly understood until the native term which is translated *soleil* is given. It is only among the Pima that the grave of a magician is said definitely to have been specially sacred.

Thus, out of twenty-eight American Indian tribes, there are thirteen instances in which the native terms have not been quoted. We must be content, therefore, to note their cultural pattern. They are: Thompson, Shuswap, Nez Percés, Dene, Hopi, Zuni, Sia, Navaho, Apache, Chickasaw, Creek, Natchez, Pima. In two cases, those of the Blackfeet and Arapaho, the reports are much confused, and though I suspect that the words *natosio* and *baataana* were used respectively by them in the same senses as those other words referring to the power in the universe the native usage of which has been more carefully elucidated, the opinion is the result of inference. Concerning the Iroquoian *orenda* it is difficult to speak. There seems to be no way out of the dilemma which I mentioned in para. 116.

There are ten cases in which the native terms are quoted and the native usage explained. In every case the power in the universe was the quality or power which was manifest in something unusual or beyond comprehension; possession of or by that power afforded magic power. The ten tribes are: Tlingit (*yek*), Haida (*sgana, skil*), Lillooet (*snam*), Coast Salish (*sulia*), Ojibwa (*munedoo*), Dakota (*wakan*), Omaha (*wakonda*), Crow (*maxpe*), Hidatsa (*hopa*), and Mandan (*hopini*). The words which I have
inserted in the brackets represent the native terms which were employed respectively in reference to the power in the universe.

The unknown Hopi word which has been translated 'mystery' was manifest only in things which 'were not understood'. The Winnebago are reported to have used their words in the same manner as the Crows. The Klallam tamanous appears to have been used in the same contexts as yek, siana, munedoo, &c.

There is a lamentable shortage of information concerning the words applied to the dead or to a corpse, so we cannot tell whether these tribes were at a dead level of conception or not. The burial customs also are imperfectly known. In some cases the burial place of a magician was specially sacred and dangerous.

### G. MISCELLANEOUS SOCIETIES

#### 132. Comments on the Remaining Evidence

I am unable to place a high value on our knowledge of six out of the seven societies which remain to be discussed. The nature of the available material varies: in some cases, e.g. that of the Tahitians, the quantity of the evidence is almost overwhelming, but its quality is poor; in other cases, e.g. some of the Assam tribes, there is a considerable lack of detail, but a few facts have been stated in a simple and accurate manner. In one instance, that of the Sea-Dyaks, the methods of our authorities have hidden the native culture, probably for ever; the reports are full of fantastic comparisons between the conceptions of the Sea-Dyaks and those of other races. The native words for the power in the universe are quoted sometimes, but the full contexts in which they were used have not been described; the words are merely translated as 'spirits' and/or as 'gods'. Only concerning the Andaman Islanders is our knowledge adequate. Even in their case the native culture has been fitted to an 'animistic' frame.

We shall discuss the Tahitians; Gilbert Islanders; three Assam tribes, Mikirs, Garos, Khasis; Andaman Islanders; and Sea-Dyaks. I will take them in that order.

#### 133. Tahitians

The material on which we must base our conclusions in regard to the customs and culture of the Tahitians is very different from that on which we relied for our discussion of the other Polynesian societies, Maori, Samoans, and Tongans (paras. 45–52). Tahiti has not produced an Elsdon Best, and though William Ellis, the missionary, has told us a great deal about Tahitian life, he possessed neither the calm detachment of George Turner nor the scholarship of Colenso. No Vason or Mariner lived in Tahiti as a Tahitian; and if James Wilson, the stern captain of the ship Duff, has passed more penetrating remarks about the inhabitants of the Society Islands than about the men and women of Tonga, it is only because he, like the early explorers, was captivated by
their charm and therefore spent more time among them. These arcadian islands, indeed, so attracted the explorers that they returned to them as often as they could and stayed as long as they dared. Their descriptions are one of our chief sources of information; but not the only source: Mr. B. G. Corney has recently edited and published three volumes of Spanish writings which are heavily laden with facts; we possess also The Memoirs of Ari'itaimai, which, if they do not represent anthropological material of the highest quality, at least demonstrate that the Tahitians, before we knew them, had a long history full of social changes. The whole of this literature must be studied, appraised, and compared, before we can be sure that we know anything about pagan Tahiti. 569

When I discussed the Maori, Samoans, and Tongans I called attention to two facts which are sufficiently remarkable to warrant further mention: in the first place, it seems that in a previous epoch their methods of regulating the relations between the sexes had been more stringent than they were at the end of the eighteenth century; secondly, the cultural condition of the Polynesians was in a state of flux when the white man first visited the islands. These same phenomena are revealed in the literature that concerns the Tahitians. Indeed, when we discuss the Tahitians, we must banish from our minds those theoretical and popular ideas which are associated with the word ‘primitive’. Among them the asperities of savage life may not have been softened, and many of their customs are repulsive to a sensitive mind; but the inhabitants of the Society Islands had not always been as they were when first we met them, and the inclusion of the Polynesian race among uncivilized peoples merely illustrates the elastic meaning which we attach to the word ‘uncivilized’.

There is evidence that the Tahitian nobles tried to abolish the human sacrifices which the magicians demanded. They were unable, however, to influence public opinion on the subject. Corney says that they were ‘powerless to oppose so time-honoured, mystic, and, in the people’s view, auspicious an institution’. Yet they do not appear to have been energetic men, so their alleged impotence in the matter may have been due to their lack of enterprise. Be that as it may, the aristocrats seem to have tolerated their native institutions with a smile of amusement. I have referred already (para. 70) to the opinions of the noble lady who was discovered as a stowaway on Captain Cook’s second voyage: ‘She laughed’, Forster tells us, ‘at the prejudices of her countrymen with all the good sense of a citizen of the world.’ Nor is this an isolated instance; the Spaniards often express their astonishment at the attitude of the ruling classes, who did not ‘resent being scoffed at’. 570 Moreover, over a hundred years before the white man arrived, social revolutions had occurred among the Tahitians. Eight generations ago, Ari’itaimai says, ‘about the middle of the seventeenth century, the next great revolution occurred, and tradition says that it was caused by a woman’. 571 The revolution to which Ari’itaimai refers arose out of a quarrel between two members of the aristocracy concerning a
beautiful woman, Taurua. One of them behaved in a manner which was not considered to be in accordance with established tradition; a social upheaval was the result. I do not propose to tell the story (attractive though it is) of how the rebellious noble took advantage of the traditional pride and generosity which was the hallmark of a Tahitian grand seigneur. My point is that Tahitian culture, like Hawaiian culture (para. 48), had been in a transitional and erratic condition for many years before the white man arrived.

During these social upheavals the sexual regulations appear to have been relaxed; but our study of the subject is complicated by the fact that most of our information comes from the explorers, who describe at great length the relations which existed between the native women and the white sailors. The explorers confine their remarks to the sexual behaviour of the natives, and tell us nothing about the regulations which governed that behaviour. Moreover, they describe not the sexual behaviour of the Tahitians among themselves but the attitude of the native women towards the white men. Their evidence, therefore, is strictly inadmissible; but I will summarize their reports.

On two points the travellers are unanimous. First, the Tahitians were guileless and unafraid. Forster emphasizes again and again the frank innocence of the natives: 'Cares, troubles, and disappointments,' he says, 'which untimely furrow our brows, cannot be supposed to exist in this happy nation.' Wilson remarks: 'Their faces are never darkened with a scowl or covered with a cloud of sullenness or suspicion.' Secondly, the women who came on to the decks of the British ships were not averse to the granting of personal favours; they 'yielded without difficulty to the ardent solicitations of our sailors'; and when Captain Cook returned to Tahiti on his second voyage, his crew resumed these relations 'with the greatest eagerness'. The charms of the women, he tells us, were 'more than sufficient to subvert the little reason which a mariner might have left to govern his passions'. When they witnessed this traffic the explorers concluded that the sexual regulations of the natives were very loose. Hawkesworth states that 'chastity does not seem to be considered among them', giving as his reason that the women 'not only readily and openly trafficked with our people but were brought down by their fathers and brothers for that purpose'. Similarly De Bougainville says: 'An unmarried woman suffers no constraints; nor does it appear that how great soever the number of her previous lovers has been, it should prove an obstacle to her meeting with a husband afterwards.'

The women who visited the ships, however, were of the lowest class. Forster says that there were few, if any, instances of 'women among the better people' lowering themselves by such conduct. Moreover we are told that one British officer vainly entreated the sister of a chief called Otae to yield to his embraces. Indeed the difference between the sexual conduct of the lower classes and that of the upper classes was so noticeable that
Forster and Hawkesworth put forward an original hypothesis. The women of the lower classes, they say, were physically smaller than those of the upper classes: 'This defect probably proceeds', they add, 'from their early commerce with men, the only thing in which they differ from their superiors that could possibly affect their growth.'

We must discount, then, the information with which the explorers supply us, first, because their reports refer more especially to the relation between white men and native women and do not necessarily reflect the behaviour of the natives among themselves; secondly, because the reports refer almost exclusively to the lower classes, whose conduct, we must believe, was more lax than that of the upper classes. Similarly, we must discount other reports also, though not for the same reasons. William Ellis condemns the Tahitians in no uncertain terms: 'Their years of childhood', he says, 'were passed in indolence, irregularity, and the unrestrained indulgence in whatever afforded gratification.' In this and other passages, however, Ellis seems to be referring to the activities of the Arreoi Society. The Arreoi seem to have been a band of strolling players who mated as their inclinations directed them and who were forbidden to have children. Should a female member of the Society become a mother, the child was immediately suffocated. These were the customs which called forth the more violent denunciations of the missionary, and we must be careful lest we give a general application to such particular cases. The Arreoi Society may have been formed of prominent citizens, but their habits do not necessarily reflect the general character of Tahitian social life. Indeed there are reasons why the reports of compulsory infanticide cannot be accepted at their face value.

Forster was amazed to find such a custom among the Tahitians: 'When we consider', he says, 'their gentleness, their generosity, their affectionate friendship, their tenderness, their pity, we cannot reconcile these qualities to the murder of their own offspring.' So he made further inquiries, and he found that the women often refused to kill their children. 'Above all,' he adds, 'the act was always performed in secret, and so none of the people were present, because, if it were seen, the murderers must be put to death.' 'We have great room to suppose', he remarks, 'that the original institution required their living in perpetual celibacy', on the ground that sexual activity would enervate them, but this was 'too repugnant to the impulses of nature'. The members of the Society found the restraint 'too difficult to observe'. Ellis also states that the mythical founders of the Society were celibate. He adds that 'though they did not enjoin celibacy on their devotees, they prohibited their having any offspring'.

This puts a different complexion on the matter, and supports the suspicion that the Tahitians were not without experience of compulsory continence. Indeed, when we inquire into the nature of their sexual regulations, we find that a betrothed girl, vahinepahio, was by no means free. 'As she grew up,' Ellis says, 'for the preservation of her chastity, a
small platform of considerable elevation was erected for her abode, within the dwelling of her parents. Here she slept and spent the whole of the time she passed within doors. Some member of the family attended her by night and by day, and accompanied her whenever she left the house. Some of the traditions warrant the inference that this mode of life, in early years, was observed by other females besides those who were betrothed.* In the native legends, we are told, 'in order to preserve her chastity, a girl was made pahio, and kept in a kind of enclosure and constantly attended by her mother'.

The reader will remember that among the Maori the word taumou was applied to a betrothed girl, and that a girl was puhi if she were restrained from sexual intercourse (para. 45). At one time very close relations seem to have existed between the Maori and the Tahitians.

The evidence, then, is that the loose sexual conduct of the Tahitians has been exaggerated; it is an inference from the conduct of the lower classes and that of the Arreoi Society; the upper classes were restrained in their behaviour. Betrothed girls were prevented from indulging their desires; apparently they were not allowed to have intercourse even with their future husbands. Moreover, the legends concerning the foundation of the Arreoi Society state that celibacy was required of its members and that subsequently this ordinance was relaxed. Furthermore, the close confinement of betrothed girls is said to have been in the early days compulsory also for unbetrothed girls; and the native word used to denote a betrothed girl was similar to that used by the Maori in reference to a girl to whom sexual activity was forbidden. There is no report of any demand for the tokens of virginity; we must include the Tahitian regulations, therefore, in the category of 'Irregular or Occasional Continence'.

The Tahitians did not erect special roofed buildings in which the powers in the universe manifested themselves and which were specially erected and maintained in order that a right relation might be preserved with those powers; but they paid some post-funeral attention to their dead. The rites have been reported scantily, but they appear to have been those of tendance. Thus the Tahitians were in the manistic cultural condition.

'There are two places where the dead are deposited,' Hawkesworth says, 'one a kind of shed, where the corpse is suffered to putrefy, the other an enclosure, with erections of stone where the bones are afterwards buried. The shed is called tupahow, the enclosure marae.' The size of the tupahow depended on the rank of the dead man. An average measurement seems to have been fifteen feet long and eleven feet wide, with the height in proportion. One side was left open, the other three sides being partly enclosed with a kind of wicker-work. The bier was about five feet from the ground; food was hung around or placed on a table which was set up before the corpse. Processions were made at various intervals for about five months, but less and less frequently; then the remains were removed
from the bier, and the bones were buried 'within or without the marae'. Some authorities state that the skull of a noble chief was not buried with his bones; it was wrapped in fine cloth and placed in a special box which was deposited in the marae. Hawkesworth calls this box *ewharre no te orometua*, 'the house of the teacher or master'; but possibly the translation is incorrect, for the usual word for house was *fare*, and *orometua*, according to other authorities, was the word which was applied to the family dead. Ordinary people seem to have preserved the jaw-bones of their dead in their houses and to have paraded them on special occasions.

The word *marae*, which among the Maori, Samoans, and Tongans denoted the open space in the middle of a settlement, is said to have been applied by the Tahitians to the stone-stepped pyramidal structure in which the remains of a chief were placed. I have already noted (n. 174) there is reason to believe that our authorities have confused the structure with the open space wherein it stood, and I think that they have assumed prematurely that all the rites which were celebrated in the open space were in honour of the dead man whose bones were in the structure; but the reports of the rites are meagre. Hawkesworth describes the *marae* (i.e. stone structure) of the chiefs Oamo and Oberea; Forster describes that of Parua. The former 'was a pile of stones, raised pyramidically upon an oblong base or square, 267 ft. long and 87 ft. wide'. The side steps were wider than those at the ends, and so it terminated not in a rectangle, but in a ridge, like a roof. There were eleven steps, each of four feet. Parua's structure was sixty yards long, five yards wide. Those which the Spaniards saw were much smaller. One of them mentions 'two or three high steps'; another speaks of 'some graves' on a platform raised step above step; a third says, 'Their cemeteries are constructed after the manner of small rectangular platforms, faced all round with two or three high steps built in with stone.' Thus the structures varied in size and were not made to a pattern.

On or around the stone structures certain wooden figures were placed, called *tii*. A *tii* was supposed to represent the dead ancestor. The word has been variously translated as 'guardian spirit' (Wilson), 'evil spirit' (Cook), 'the dead' (Ellis), 'demons' (Ellis). Forster states that 'they believe every man to have a separate being within him called *tee*, which exists after death in the wooden images which are placed round the burying places and called also *tee*'. Similar figures were used to ornament canoes.

Near the stone structure was a *whatta (ewatta)*, 'altar'. The specimen which Hawkesworth describes was about seven feet high and raised on pillars. Forster saw a piece of thatch on four posts, in front of which a lattice of sticks had been erected. On such an altar offerings of food were placed for *atu*. The word *atu* has been consistently translated as 'god', 'divinity', 'deities', and certain mythological figures, such as Taaroa, Tane, &c., have been called 'gods'; but there is no evidence that the Tahitians called
them atua. If we cease to translate atua, and confine our attention to the phenomena to which the word was applied, we discover that the offerings were always made to the dead, or to a particular dead man. Thus Ellis says that the origin of many of the 'deities' is 'rooted in obscurity, but they are often described as having been renowned men, who after death were deified by their descendants'. The 'gods' of the various professions, he thinks, had once been distinguished men. In a like manner the numerous 'gods of the ocean' were probably men 'who had excelled their contemporaries in nautical adventures and exploit'. Wilson puts the matter in different and probably more accurate terms when he says that 'each family has its tree or guardian spirit: he is supposed to be one of the departed relatives who for his superior excellencies has been exalted into an atua'. We need not wonder, then, that 'each island had its separate theogony', as Forster expresses it, for the alleged theogony consisted merely of the dead men who had been distinguished in various forms of human activity when they were alive.

As I have said, the descriptions of the rites are meagre and vague, and some confusion has been introduced into the reports by the assumption that marae was applied to the stone structure as well as to the open space wherein it stood; but both atua which was manifest in the stone structure and atua of other dead was malevolent if insulted or neglected, and inflicted death or misfortune unless appeased by offerings. The man who revealed the will of atua was called tahua atua. He became 'possessed' by atua, and then was called atua. His symptoms were as usual—bodily contortions, staring eyes, agitation, trembling, stupor, &c. The practical Captain Cook says of such a man that he was 'not in his right senses'. The word tahua (tahowa) signified 'nothing more than a man of knowledge'. It was compounded according to the department of knowledge in which the man excelled; other names also were applied. Thus a tata-o-rero was an expert in cosmogony and geography; tahua pure possessed powerful incantations; a faaterere counteracted the effect of witchcraft; and so on.

The tahua marae, according to some authorities, attended the sick, the treatment of whom consisted either of counter-spells or of sacrifices (often human) to the atua. The man who inflicted disease was also tahua; he also acted by the power of atua. The men who were tahua, indeed, possessed the greatest store of knowledge of every description; they remembered the names and ranks of the various atua, preserved the native traditions, divined and diagnosed, ascertained the fate of expeditions, and presided over the ceremonies (except those connected with marriage). They were also greatly feared.

Natural conditions in the Society Islands were such that the question of weather control did not arise. Rain was frequent and abundant.

Such, in outline, were the customs of the manistic Tahitians. I have discussed them at some length because the evidence is scattered, confused, and conflicting. A detailed anthropological monograph on Tahitian customs
and culture would be a valuable addition to our literature; but the task of the compiler would not be an easy one.

134. Gilbert Islanders. It is impossible to explain the sexual regulations of the Gilbert Islanders unless their system of land tenure is first described. The islands were divided into square blocks of land, like a chessboard. There were four social ranks, including the aomata, 'gentry', and the rau, 'commoners'. There was no intermarriage between these two classes. No land could be owned except by aomata, but it was beneath the dignity of these men to work, so they employed the rau to work for them. A rau could do nothing without the consent of an aomata, but he was not tied to any individual employer; and, since an aomata was compelled to rely on the rau for the tilling of his land, the arrangement worked very well. Both sexes could own land; there was no limit to the number of blocks which any person, family, or couple might possess; but, when a couple married, their lands, formerly held severally, became the joint property of their respective families. Since the sisters of a bride (apparently this was the reason) possessed a share of her family estate, it was customary for a man to marry all the daughters of the family. Once one daughter was married, no one could marry her remaining sisters, and their share of the estate (which, in all probability, could not have been conveniently divided) became part of the new household. If, however, a woman was willing to forego her rights over the estate, she was sexually free, and was called nikiranroro, 'remnant of her generation'. Her relations with her sister's husband seem to have had an exclusively economic basis, if she gave up her title. Even if she refused to do so, her union with him was not always consummated.

A betrothed girl, mata-mata, was compelled to be continent until her marriage. On the day of her wedding, accompanied by her maternal grandmother, she ascended to the top floor of the house, which had been specially built on the land of her husband's father. When her husband joined her, she made a ceremonial resistance; after a time he gave the signal, and his mother ascended. If she found the tokens of virginity, she cried, 'Te tei, te tei'; the mat on which the bridal couple had lain was exhibited to the people and then burnt to prevent witchcraft. If the primitiae were not forthcoming, the girl was dragged down and the assembled people fell upon her and beat her mercilessly, her own family being particularly incensed against her. In some places she might be forgiven if she disclosed the name of her lover; but he would be compelled to forfeit land in expiation of his offence. As a rule, however, she was disowned from the moment when her guilt was proved, and was included henceforward among the nikiranroro, who earned their living by the favour of promiscuous suitors.

Commander Wilkes tells us that in the Gilbert Islands 'chastity is not regarded as a virtue nor considered any recommendation in the selection
of a wife'. The women who trafficked with his sailors, however, were the *nikiranroro*; his remark applies exclusively to them.\(^{597}\)

We have no great knowledge of the culture of these islands, but once more the deistic condition accompanies the demand for the tokens of virginity. Parkinson says that certain houses were sacred to a god whom he calls Tapuariki. Children were not allowed to enter them; adults were full of fear when they went inside. These temples were also sanctuaries, and were known as the 'houses of Tapuariki'. Another temple to this same god (whose name seems to be a compound of *tapu* and *ariki*) existed in Arora (Hurd Island): 'All who brought offerings and came to pray dipped their hands before sitting down, in token of their desire, on account of these offerings, to be considered clean and free from sickness or other expressions of the wrath of Tapuariki.' When heathenism was banished in Peru (Francis Island), 'a number of temples were burned, leaving the stone pillars standing on which the roof rested'. Turner remarks: ‘Beams are laid horizontally along the top of the pillars, and from these beams the rafters ran up towards one, two, or three centre posts, supporting the ridge pole. Whatever may be the solution of the antiquarian problem at Stonehenge, these relics in Peru are simply the lower stone pillars of ancient temples for heathen worship.' Large stone-pillared temples existed also in Onoaotao (Clerk Island).\(^{598}\)

The skulls of ancestors were carefully preserved—at any rate by *aomata*—offerings of food being placed before them. The reports are vaguely expressed, and we cannot tell whether the attention was tendance or cult. Offerings which are said to have been given 'for health, long life, success in war, fishing, and other blessings' may have been *do ut aheas* or *do ut des*. The attention to *aniti*, ghost, seems to have been regular and important.\(^{599}\) There is little information in regard to the treatment of sickness. Sometimes the people went to a temple; sometimes they were treated by a 'priest'. There was no priestly order; any young man of free birth who was apt at reciting prayers could become a priest. The word for these priests was *ibonga* (*iboya*). There was a firm belief in witchcraft.\(^{600}\) The rainfall seems to have been frequent and abundant.\(^{601}\)

135. Mikirs. The first of our Assam societies is that of the Mikirs. They were zoistic. Before the Mikirs came under European influence the girls frequented the *terang*, bachelors' hall, and 'illegitimate' births, to which there seems to have been no objection, were common.

The funeral ceremonies were the most 'elaborate, and costly and important' of all the ceremonies performed by the Mikirs. Before being cremated, the body was kept in the house for at least one day, sometimes for a week or even longer, during which time food was placed by the corpse twice a day: 'After that there was no regular offering, but occasionally a man or woman puts aside from his or her own share of food a portion for the dead, as, for instance, when another funeral reminds them of those
who have died before.' There was no fear of the dead or of their 'coming back to trouble the living'. 'The Mikirs', we are told, 'have no idols, temples, or shrines.' The rites of cremation were performed 'by the neighbours, and cunning men and women of the village and the old people of the family'. Presumably the 'cunning men and women' were uche, the term which was applied to magicians. An uche man or woman diagnosed the cause of sickness and discovered who had bewitched the sufferer, a long and protracted sickness being attributed to witchcraft, maja. Sometimes a recurring illness was thought to be due to hii, a mysterious word which apparently was applied to, inter alios, a person with unusually keen eyes. Charms, pherem, and incantations accompanied the treatment; a bor, a piece of stone or metal which was either found by chance or revealed in a dream, could bring good or bad fortune. There is no report concerning the control of the weather.

The power in the universe was arnam, which is translated as 'god'. 'All natural objects of a striking or imposing character have their divinity', i.e. were arnam. White men also were arnam.602

136. Garos. Among the matrilineal and zoistic Garos a man could possess anything which he had acquired by his own exertions, but under no circumstances could he inherit. Daughters, and according to one account the younger daughter, inherited. A husband's authority, however, was unquestioned during his lifetime. A girl chose her own mate. It was polite for him to refuse her proposal at first, and to run away and hide; he was then recaptured. Usually he escaped a second time, and was again brought back. If he ran away a third time, it was assumed that he really did not wish to marry the girl, and after that he was free. Ample opportunities were afforded for mating; 'No obloquy is incurred by the girl on account of the lapse from the path of virtue, unless she is found to be an expectant mother.' We are not told what pre-nuptial pregnancy entailed.603

Cremation was the usual method of corpse-disposal. A rupee was placed in the hand of the corpse for the expenses of the journey to the next world; food and liquor (of which the Garos were fond) were placed on the bier. The monster nawang lay in wait for the soul, but it was believed that he was covetous of brass ear-rings, and that therefore no one who was well supplied with these needed to fear him. If a body did not burn well, ear-rings were thrown into the fire. A kima, memorial post, decorated (if an artist of sufficient skill was available) with a head in the likeness of a man, was erected in front of the house, but no offerings were placed before it. Mr. Playfair says that 'a great reverence for the dead and for the deceased in general is clearly indicated by the funeral observances'; but there was no tendance and no cult.604 The kamal, magician, directed a trial by ordeal, divined the causes of sickness, cured the sickness, read the omens at a wedding, averted evil at birth, and watched over the dead: 'Any one who has committed to memory the requisite form of prayer may assume
the office.' Death could be caused by placing the body clippings of the intended victim or a piece of his clothing into a section of bamboo, or by placing his faces in a pot which was then buried in a nest of white ants. This was called *daktera* or *susika*. Witchcraft was one of the ordinary risks of life; any person could bewitch another. General affliction was warded off by annual ceremonies, the most important of which was called *asongtata*, performed around certain stones called *asong*, an interesting word which is not explained. If a man had a bad dream, the evil which it portended could be beaten out of him by the *kamal*, who seems to have transferred it to a small boat on which the blood of a cock had dripped; thus the *marang*, ill luck, was averted. As the custom dealt with an affliction which only threatened and did not materialize, we cannot call it 'transference'. When rain was needed the men went to a large rock, each carrying a gourd of water; the *kamal* smeared the rock with the blood of a goat and recited an incantation; after that the men poured the contents of their gourds over the unfortunate *kamal*. If they wanted sunshine, they lit a fire around some special rocks. There were no professional rain-makers.

137. *Khasis*. The Khasis are a well-known tribe and have become a *locus classicus* for the study of matrilineal institutions; but it is probable that if the Garos had been studied with the same care they would have achieved a similar reputation. The two tribes, however, differed in many important details, for whereas the Garos were zoistic, the Khasis were manistic.

I have already remarked (para. 59) that the criteria by which we assess the sexual opportunity which was afforded to the members of any uncivilized society cannot be applied to all matrilineal peoples whose marriages were matrilocal. The Khasis are a case in point. The young men and women were subject to restraints from which the Garos were free, but the regulations cannot be classed under the heading of 'Irregular or Occasional Continence', nor under that of 'Pre-nuptial Chastity', for there was no demand for the tokens of virginity, and the limitations imposed on the young people, obvious though they are, do not come within the definition which I have placed on Irregular or Occasional Continence. I must be content, therefore, to describe the institutions as they existed.

A married man went to live in his mother-in-law’s house; while he was there he was regarded as a complete stranger, and was called *shong kha*, 'begetter'. If the couple found that they could live together amicably, they might set up a house of their own after one or two children had been born; but this was by no means a general practice. Among the Syntengs, and the people of Maoshai, the husband did not live with his wife, but merely visited her. In Jowai such visits were made only after dark, and the man could not be entertained to a meal, for he had not contributed to the support of the household. The youngest daughter received the
largest inheritance, but if there were no daughters the youngest daughter of the mother's sister succeeded. In the Jaintia hills a man could possess self-acquired property, but among the Khasis proper all the possessions which he acquired belonged to his mother until he married, then his wife and youngest daughter inherited them. We are told that young people were 'on more or less easy terms of intimacy' before they married; but no girl could choose her mate as among the Garos. A contemplated union was subject to the veto of the man's parents, uncles, and aunts; the girl's parents had the final word. 'The daughters nearly always agree,' Col. Gurdon says, 'it is very seldom that it is necessary to bring any pressure to bear.' I can find no mention of pre-nuptial children, but the subject in complicated by the fact that, while the women were monandrous, the men contracted extra-matrimonial unions. Col. Gurdon says that polygamy did not exist: 'Such a practice would naturally not be in vogue amongst a people who observe the matriarchate'; but it is merely a question of words, for 'there are instances', he adds, 'of men having wives other than those they have regularly married'. Such a woman, who must not belong to the original wife's village, was ka tynga tuh, 'stolen wife', whereas the regular wife was ka tynga trai. The children which were born of the former union were ki khun kliar, 'children from the top', that is, they were not descended from the root, trai, of the tree. They seem to have had no claim on the property of their mother's family. We are not told what happened in the case of a girl who became pregnant and who afterwards was regularly married. If I read Col. Gurdon's account aright, such an event was rare. The girls, indeed, seem to have been brought up rather strictly.\footnote{607}

It is impossible to say whether or not a girl who became a regular wife was compelled to check any impulse which she may have experienced before her marriage; but we should expect a careful surveillance of girls in whom all property rights were vested and who were responsible for the performance of the ancestral rites.

After the body of a dead Khasi had been cremated, the bones were collected by the female relatives and taken to a cairn, mawshieng. An old man threw some powdered rice on the ground, and adjured the ghost not to trouble the clan, since the funeral rites had been duly performed. From the mawshieng, the bones were removed with great ceremony first to a large repository, mawphee, belonging to the sub-clan, and later to the mawbah, the grand ossuary of the clan. The bestowal of the bones in the mawbah was, we are told, 'without doubt the most important religious ceremony that the Khasis performed': 'If the spirits of the dead are not appeased by the due performance of the ceremonies, it is believed that they roam about and haunt their relations and plague them.' If the mawbah rites had been carried out correctly and successfully, however, the dead continued to live in perpetual bliss, eating betel-nut, which was the Khasi notion of supreme happiness. Large flat memorial stones were erected to
certain ancestors (we are not told how the individuals who were so honoured were selected); offerings of food and drink were placed upon them ‘periodically and in time of trouble’. In later times it was more usual ‘to make the offerings in the house, either annually or at times when it was thought necessary to invoke the aid of the departed’. The largest stones seem to have been erected to ka iawbei, lit. ‘great-grandmother’. Sometimes Col. Gurdon speaks of Ka Iawbei as an individual, but each unit had a separate ka iawbei, who seems to have been the recipient of most of the offerings. The nature of the offerings seems to have been do ut abeas, but the language of the reports is not always precise, such words as ‘invoke’, ‘revere’, ‘worship’ being employed in a manner which begs the most important question.\(^{608}\)

The treatment of sickness has not been described in a manner which can be summarized easily; the respective duties of the various magicians, lyngdoh, sohblei, and nongkhan, are obscure. ‘Propitiation’ and ‘sacrifice’ to ‘spirits’ is said to have been the usual method; the report is not helpful. The lyngdoh seems to have been a member of the Lyngdoh clan; perhaps the sohblei was a person who was or who possessed blei. Usually the word blei is translated as ‘god’ or as ‘spirit’; the power which it denoted was manifest in certain hills, trees, and rivers. I cannot tell if it was used in reference to the dead. It is not always clear what word Col. Gurdon is translating as ‘spirits’ in the appropriate passages.\(^{609}\) Since the average annual rainfall was 448 inches, a ceremony for its production was unnecessary.\(^{610}\)

138. Andaman Islanders. We pass almost due south to the Andaman Islands. The salient facts about the inhabitants can be stated economically, for they have been studied carefully by Professor Radcliffe Brown, who always quotes the words which he is translating. He does not describe, however, the various contexts in which those words were used. ‘Promiscuous intercourse between the sexes’, he says, ‘is the rule before marriage, and no harm is thought of it.’\(^{611}\)

The Andaman Islanders were in the zoistic cultural condition.

A dead person was either buried in a shallow grave or placed in a tree. The latter was the more honourable method of disposal and is said to have been adopted when a person died ‘in the prime of life’. When the flesh had decayed from the bones, the remains were recovered and preserved. The skull and jaw-bone were worn round the neck, the other bones being strung together and worn as a charm to cure or prevent sickness. ‘Like all their other possessions’, Professor Radcliffe Brown says, ‘these relics are lent or exchanged, passing from one person to another, until sometimes a skull may be found in the possession of a man who does not know to whom it belonged.’\(^{612}\) The power in the universe was lau (in North Andaman dialect); the word was qualified according to the place of manifestation; thus, tikuku lau, lau on land. It was applied also to the dead: ‘All Anda-
manese when they die become *lau*. Usually the word is translated ‘spirits’; thus, magicians, *oko-jumu* (in North Andaman dialect), lit. ‘dreamers’, acquired their power ‘through contact in one way or another with the spirits, *lau*’. An *oko-jumu* caused or cured sickness, and could control the weather. Since we are told that the strings of human bones were ‘esteemed as a means of driving away spirits and therefore of curing or preventing disease’, we may conclude perhaps that sickness was due to *lau*. The word *lau* was applied also to Indians, Burmese, Polynesians, and white men, that is, to any man who was not like the Andamanese.

139. *Sea-Dyaks*. Finally, I present a summary of the customs of the Sea-Dyaks with the most tentative submission.

I have already (para. 5) drawn attention to some of the English phrases which have been employed as the equivalents of the Sea-Dyak word *petara*. Perhaps if I mention that *petara* is said to have been the *elohim* of the Old Testament, ‘none other than the Hindoo *avatara*, the incarnations of Vishnu’, and the Allah Taala of Malay, the nature of the reports will be apparent. Interpretations and inferences have been stated as facts; anglicized plurals, e.g. petaras, antus, manangs, abound; and Sea-Dyak ‘beliefs’ are presented in terms of the white man’s thought.

I have endeavoured to extract some facts from the somewhat verbose literature; it is impossible to quote the inferences verbatim, and then examine their meaning; so I will merely state the details of Sea-Dyak culture as it appears after a study of the reports.

It was a common custom for a Sea-Dyak girl to have lovers before she married. They visited her at night, and she was as intimate with them as she pleased. Her parents had full knowledge of her conduct. On these points all the authorities agree. Hugh Low is the only observer who reports the following custom: ‘If the girl should prove pregnant, the father of the child must take the woman to wife; but if the connexion should long continue without the attainment of this desired result, the acquaintance is discontinued and they each seek new sharers of their loves. Should they not be constant to each other, the offence, though public, never becomes an occasion of scandal to either person.’ It seems that the child was desired by both parties; but if that were the aim of the union, why was the man compelled to marry the mother of the child? Surely he would have been quite ready to do so. And would he not have objected to the girl having other lovers? Personally I am inclined to regard the alleged desire for a child either as a false inference or as a piece of false information, gratuitously given by a puzzled native. Yet Hugh Low knew the natives well and probably was not easily deceived. He writes, however, of sexual conduct and regulations in the apologetic tone that was characteristic of his age. Yet in consideration of his report I feel I must enter a minus-star in Col. 11.616

Curiously enough, it is equally doubtful whether the Sea-Dyaks were
zoistic or manistic. I think it is probable that they were manistic; but certainty on this point depends greatly on the meaning of certain native words which are not explained. These words are merely translated as 'spirits'. If antu was applied to the dead exclusively, then the Sea-Dyaks were certainly manistic; if antu was the Sea-Dyak equivalent of petara before the latter Sanskrit term was imported, they may have been zoistic. No certain opinion can be expressed by any one who is not conversant with the people themselves. Both antu and petara have been translated 'spirits'; sometimes indeed it is impossible to tell whether the Sea-Dyaks used antu or petara in those contexts in which our authorities employ the word 'spirits', for the native terms are not always quoted.

Ordinary people were buried, food and drink (baiya) being placed in the grave. The body of a dead magician, manang, was placed in a tree. A fire was kept burning for three or four days, then food was thrown out of the back of the house (the rite was called pana), and then the ghost was in dead-land: 'After life is extinct, the body is no longer spoken of as a body or a corpse; it is an antu, spirit.' This singularly inexact sentence is typical of the literature concerning the Sea-Dyaks. We can do no more than conclude that the word antu was applied to a corpse or to a ghost. After a successful head-hunting expedition the spoils were dedicated in some vague way to the dead (or to antu or to petara); but the attention seems to have been voluntary. At intervals varying from one to three or four years, a Festival of the Dead, gawai antu, was celebrated. A pot of tua k (a native drink made from rice) was placed before the door of the one room which the family occupied in the village house; the dead were invited to revisit their old haunts, and the women wove 'small imitations of various articles of personal and domestic use, which were afterwards hung on the grave'. Sometimes when a man sat down to a meal he threw a pinch of food under the house for the benefit of antu. We are told that there was a belief in metempsychosis; has this idea arisen from the fact that the word antu was applied also to certain animals, such as an alligator and a snake?\footnote{617}

Affliction of every kind was attributed to antu, and when an epidemic occurred, 'little offerings of food and animals killed in sacrifice' were everywhere in evidence: 'This making of sacrifices is a frequently recurring feature in Dyak life.' At first sight this appears to be clear evidence of tendance, but since the Sea-Dyaks confused antu with petara (or to quote Archdeacon Perham's anglicized plurals, 'the line of demarcation between Petaras and antus is altogether indistinct'; Gomes translates the former word 'gods' and the latter word 'spirits'; Perham assigns a capital P to Petaras and withholds the subjective decoration from antus), the offerings which are alleged to have been made to 'the dead' may have been made to petara.\footnote{618}

We are told that 'spirits and magical virtues are largely associated with stones; any remarkable rock, especially if isolated in position, is almost sure to be the object of some kind of cultus'. The 'cultus' is not described;
we have to be content with such statements as 'Petara are not worshipped in temples'. The association of petara (or antu) with the unusual is mentioned also by Gomes: 'Any unusual noise or motion in the jungle, anything which suggests to the mind some invisible operation is attributed to some spirit.' Moreover, people who previously had not seen a coloured glass marble credited it with magic power. White men also were petara, and concerning this use of the word Archdeacon Perham makes an interesting comment: 'When I have remonstrated with them on this application of the term,' he says (and from his writings I gather that he remonstrated very often), 'they have explained that they only mean that we appear to manifest more of the power of Petara.' It is extraordinary that the Archdeacon's preconceived ideas about petara should have so blinded him to the native usage that even then he failed to see that the Sea-Dyaks called him petara because he was something unusual or beyond comprehension. The word was applied also to great chiefs, hills, trees, &c. 619

Just as the American Indian sought sgana, snam, sulia, tamanous, manitou, wakan, &c., so the Sea-Dyak sought petara, and in a similar manner: 'A man who is fired with great ambition to shine in deeds of strength and bravery, and who desires to attain the position of a chief, or to be cured of an obstinate disease, will sometimes spend a night, or nights, by himself on a lonely mountain, hoping to meet some benevolent spirit who will give him what he desires. To be absolutely alone is a primary condition.' The custom was called nampok. 620 By the power of petara the manang interpreted dreams, exorcized 'spirits' (antu? petara?), and bewitched his enemies. His incantations were unintelligible to his fellow citizens. If he were 'possessed', he was called manang ngagi antu. 621

I can find no explicit report in regard to weather control.

140. Summary and Chart. These facts are stated diagrammatically on the opposite page.

The association of the deistic condition with pre-nuptial chastity is illustrated by the culture of the Gilbert Islanders. The Mikirs, Garos, and Andaman Islanders are yet more instances of the coincidence between pre-nuptial sexual freedom and the zoistic condition. The evidence concerning the three manistic societies is less exact. We cannot assess the pre-nuptial sexual opportunity of the Khasis; the Sea-Dyaks have been so described that it is difficult to understand what the native customs were; the Tahitians daunt the bravest interpreter.

The power in the universe was atua (Tahitians), arnam (Mikirs), blei (Khasis), lau (Andaman Islanders), and petara or antu (Sea-Dyaks). The words which were used in this reference by the Gilbert Islanders and the Garos have not been reported. The native usage of atua, arnam, blei, lau, and petara (or antu) has not been fully described, but there is reason to believe that they were orthodox conceptions. We have seen that among those other tribes whose words have been elucidated more fully the same
word was often used to denote 'something unusual', the dead, a magician, and a white stranger. If, then, we find that a native word which has been translated as 'spirit' or as 'god' was used in, say, two of these contexts, it is probable that it was used in reference to the other phenomena also and that the omission is due to the defective nature of the reports. The Tahitians used *atua* in reference to the dead and to a magician; it is not stated definitely that it was applied to anything unusual. The Mikir *arnam* denoted anything striking or imposing; it was applied also to white men; there is no report of its application to a magician or to the dead. Possibly the Khasi *blei* was used in reference to the dead; a *sohblei* was a magician; *blei* was not a power which permeated all natural things: it was manifest only in certain trees, rivers, &c.; the inference is that there was something unusual about these trees and rivers. Among the Andamanese, *lau* was applied to the dead, to a magician, and to a foreigner; we are not informed definitely that it was used in reference to anything unusual. The Sea-Dyak *petara* (or *antu*) was used in all four contexts.

Comparative and inferential evidence of this kind is not wholly satisfactory, but we may conclude, I think, that these five conceptions conformed to the normal pattern.

### MISCELLANEOUS SOCIETIES

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Concerning the source of magic power, in the case of the Gilbert Islanders, Mikirs, and Garos, there is no precise information. In three cases the source of magic power was the possession of or by the power in the universe, *atua* (Tahitians), *lau* (Andaman Islanders), *petara* or *antu* (Sea-Dyaks). The Khasi *sohblei* was probably a man who possessed *blei*. The information in regard to burial rites does not seem to reveal any
discrimination in favour of magicians, but this may be due to the imperfection of our information. The Khasis erected special stones in certain cases, but we are not told how the recipients of such honours were chosen. The Andamanese are said to have discriminated between an ordinary person and a person 'in the prime of life'; but, though I accept the report as it stands, I confess that I doubt if the whole truth on this point is known. The Sea-Dyaks definitely selected a special resting-place for a magician, manang. I suspect that the Tahitians may have paid greater honour to a dead atua-man than they did to an ordinary dead citizen, for the stone structures were built to receive the bones of 'chiefs', i.e. presumably ari'i, and all ari'i were atua-men. The Mikirs and Garos are reported to have conducted the same kind of ceremony for every one.

I have now stated in words the whole of the evidence represented symbolically in the Chart of Evidence (Appendix I), from which we made our original induction (para. 24); but before closing this survey I wish to draw attention to the method I have adopted. In the first place I have taken care to describe in a separate paragraph the salient facts in regard to each society. I have not selected a single cultural detail from one society and then compared it with a similar cultural detail from another society, specially chosen that the parallel might be drawn. I have fitted each of the eighty societies to the same frame of reference and have endeavoured to quote all the available facts in each connexion. Moreover in the notes (which to the general reader are unimportant but to the serious student are vital) I have drawn attention to conflicting statements, if such exist, and have made an attempt to elucidate certain obscure passages in the available literature. In this manner I hope to have avoided the more serious imperfections of the comparative method. Secondly, by classifying the societies not according to their beliefs but according to their rites, thus approaching my problem from a behaviouristic point of view, I have broken with time-honoured tradition. In the first chapter (paras. 4, 5) I stated my reasons for distrusting not only the usual classifications but also the evidence, and especially the translations, on which they are based; and I have been at pains to supplement these theoretical considerations by continually pointing out, usually in the notes but sometimes in the text, some of the difficulties and misunderstandings which have arisen from the current method of studying uncivilized culture and of translating native terms. And I do not believe that any discussion of any uncivilized society can be profitable unless it includes such an appraisement of the evidence. The time is surely past when we can accept at its face value any statement made by any traveller, missionary, or administrator in reference to any uncivilized custom or creed. Thirdly, the evidence which has been considered is only the raw material of our inquiry. Broadly speaking, the evidence is this, namely, that in the past certain types of sexual regulations have invariably
been accompanied by certain types of cultural behaviour. It may be that in the opinion of some students the meaning of the coincident facts can be interpreted without further discussion. If so, I hope that before reading the remaining chapters these enthusiasts will place their own interpretation on the evidence. Those who attempt to do so at this point will suffer from no handicap; indeed I have purposely adjusted my method to this end; and in the following chapters I shall adduce no new material, and shall merely refer to the paragraph or to the note which contains the piece of information to which I allude. For my own part, however, before venturing to suggest the manner in which an extension or reduction of sexual opportunity affects cultural behaviour, I desire a still closer analysis of the available data. To this analysis, therefore, and to a discussion of native ideas, I now proceed.
CHAPTER IV
THE CONNEXION BETWEEN SEXUAL OPPORTUNITY
AND CULTURAL BEHAVIOUR

A. ANALYSIS OF THE CULTURAL EVIDENCE

141. Analysis of the Chart of Evidence (Appendix I). I will begin with the Chart of Evidence. As I have said (para. 11) the evidential value of the entries is unequal; and we must distinguish between the minus signs which may denote a lack of information and those which express definite cultural facts. The minus signs in Cols. 2–7 are in the former category; those in Cols. 8, 10, and 11 represent exact evidence. I will now consider the entries column by column.

So far as cultural behaviour is concerned (Col. 1), the three doubtful entries are those which refer to No. 13, Orakaiva, No. 72, Sema Nagas, and No. 77, Sea-Dyaks. It is certain that none of these three societies was deistic, but the manner in which their cultural details have been described precludes a decision concerning the conduct of post-funeral rites in honour of the dead. We cannot say definitely whether they were manistic or zoistic. The sign M? expresses this uncertainty. The doubtful character of these entries, however, does not detract from the value of our original induction (para. 24), for the pattern of the pre-nuptial regulations which had been adopted by these three societies (Col. 11) is equally uncertain, our authorities having either concentrated their attention on sexual conduct or described the regulations in an incomplete or unsatisfactory manner.

The other entries in Col. 1 are indisputable, with the possible exception of that which refers to No. 69, Ao Nagas. The doubt, however, is too slight to warrant the insertion of a question-mark.

The entries in Col. 2 inform us whether the treatment of sickness by 'magic' has been reported. Only one minus sign appears; it refers to No. 65, Tongans. It has not been reported that in their treatment of sickness the Tongans employed charms, incantations, and other forms of magic, and so it is impossible to insert a plus sign in this column; but I suspect that the reports are incomplete, and no argument can be based on this minus sign which may not represent a definite cultural fact.

In Col. 3 a minus sign appears in reference to No. 3, New Britons; No. 31, Ibibio; No. 64, Maori; No. 70, Angami Nagas; and No. 72, Sema Nagas. A question-mark has been inserted in reference to Nos. 28 and 74, Baronga and Garos. In these cases the minus-plus signs allude to the uncertain character of the evidence; the question-marks denote that our authorities have made a doubtful classification.

The information in regard to the New Britons (para. 32, n. 63) is scanty, and some confusion has been introduced into the reports by Dr. Brown's
unscholarly translation of *tebaran* as both 'spirit' and 'ghost'. It is impossible to tell what was the purpose of the rites he calls 'exorcism'. They may have been designed either to frustrate *tebaran* or to expel a ghost which was thought to be 'possessing' a man.

The 'exorcism' which is alleged to have been practised by an Ibibio 'diviner' or 'clairvoyante' (the native term is not quoted, para. 42) may have consisted of the pronouncement of counter-spells. If that was so, the rite would come within my definition of 'magic' (para. 9).

Concerning the Maori rite *takutaku*, 'exorcism', the facts have been reported only scantily. Moreover, in their treatment of sickness the Maori are often said to have employed no other method than the recital of *karakia*, incantations (para. 49, n. 190). Perhaps the reports refer to different areas, but we are not told that this was the case.

As for the Naga tribes of Assam, interpretations of their rites have been so intertwined with the descriptions that in many cases inferences seem to have been promoted to facts. Before we can arrive at any decision concerning the alleged transference or exorcism of *terhoma* by the Angami and of *teghami* by the Sema Nagas, we should have to be assured that the sickness which necessitated their exorcism was of a different nature from that which a Lhota and an Ao Naga suffered from *tsandramo* and *tsungrem* respectively, and which is stated to have necessitated the recapture of the 'soul'. These four conceptions seem to have been of a similar character, and I am inclined to think that the curious differences and coincidences mentioned in n. 230 are due to different interpretations of rites which in native opinion achieved an identical result.

The Ronga rites which M. Junod has described cannot be called 'exorcism' in any exact sense of that word. M. Junod has applied a high-sounding title to what appears to have been a commonplace form of magic.

In the case of the Garos (para. 136, n. 605) I do not think we are justified in applying the term 'transference' to the rite which was apparently designed merely to ward off sickness.

Transference and/or exorcism is definitely reported as having been a common form of treatment among the SE. Solomon Islanders (Ulawa and Sa'a), Banks Islanders, Fijians, Shilluk, Bakitara, Baganda, Banyankole, Samoans, and Sea-Dyaks. A plus sign in Col. 3 represents the practice of these rites.

In regard to the entries in Col. 4, it will be noticed that the plus signs do not correspond with the plus signs in Col. 10; that is to say, all those societies which erected temples are not reported as having approached a temple in times of affliction. Similarly, the entries in Col. 6 also fail to correspond with those in Col. 10; that is to say, all the deistic societies did not approach a temple when they desired a change in the weather. A minus-plus sign appears in both these columns in reference to No. 14, Shilluk, and No. 17, Bakitara. These minus-plus signs have a different significance. The Shilluk *kengo* was not a temple in the sense in which
I use the term; but it was clearly a border-line case, and I have endeavoured to indicate the difference between the behaviour of the Shilluk and that of their neighbours by employing the minus-plus sign. Among the Bakitara there was a god of healing and a god of rain, each of whom was approached in a temple, but the Bakitara seem to have relied on their medicine-men when they were sick and on their rain-makers when they needed rain. I express their comparative neglect of these gods by inserting a minus-plus sign in Cols. 4 and 6. This is the explanation also of the minus-plus sign which appears in Col. 6 in reference to No. 66, Samoans.

Generally speaking, the information in regard to the control of the weather is scanty and unsatisfactory. I am inclined to think that some harm has been done by the manner in which the subject has been studied and reported. Those students who adopt comparative methods have discovered that in time of drought some uncivilized peoples conduct a rain-making ceremony. They have collected examples of these ceremonies from all over the world. In this manner they have given a bias to the study of uncivilized culture, for the idea has spread that a rain-making ceremony is typical of 'primitive’ man. Thus instead of inquiring what action the members of any society take in time of drought, an untrained observer is apt to inquire whether or not a rain-making ceremony exists. If he finds one, he describes it; but if he finds none, he makes no reference to the matter, and neglects to report any other action which may take place under those circumstances.

In Col. 5 the plus signs have some evidential value, but in most cases the minus signs have none. The value of the entries in Cols. 5 and 6 consists in the contrast between the behaviour represented by a plus in Col. 5 and that represented by a plus in Col. 6.

Some methods of controlling the weather are not shown in the chart. For instance, sometimes among Nos. 25, 26, and 29, Anyanja, Awemba, and Amazulu, dead men were tended in time of drought in the belief that they were withholding the rain because they were angry.

It will be observed that a plus sign does not occur in both Col. 5 and Col. 6 in reference to any society. The rites conducted by the Bakitara and Samoans are expressed by a plus in Col. 5 and a minus-plus in Col. 6. I have explained the meaning of the latter entries.

The plus signs in Col. 7 tell us that the societies to which they refer conducted certain rites designed to effect post-funeral magical control of the dead by living men. They appear in reference to No. 3, New Britons; No. 5, Banks Islanders; No. 8, Kiwai Papuans; No. 16, Lango; Nos. 17–19, Bakitara, Baganda, Banyankole; No. 26, Awemba; No. 29, Amazulu; No. 31, Ibibio; No. 34, Ashanti; No. 42, Nez Percés; No. 64, Maori; and No. 77, Sea-Dyaks. In each case there is evidence that the ghosts which were 'laid' were regarded as a source of trouble, this being the reason for the 'laying'. Thus the appearance of a plus sign in Col. 7 indicates that the members of that society credited ghosts with the power to cause affliction,
and that the living descendants believed that they could control magically the activities of such ghosts, tendance being unnecessary.

In three cases, those of the New Britons, Maori, and Sea-Dyaks, the words which are translated ‘the dead’ or ‘ghost’, tebaran, atua, and antu, respectively, were applied also to other phenomena, and it is possible that the rites which are reported as being connected with the dead may have possessed another significance for the natives, the connexion of those rites with the dead being due solely to our method of translating the native terms. The members of all the other societies in the above list applied a separate word to the ghosts of the dead.

In some cases (e.g. those of the Kiwai Papuans, n. 314; Ojibwa, para. 113; and Navaho, n. 552) we are told that certain rites, such as drawing a line across the path by which they returned from the grave, deleting footprints, or following a zigzag course, were performed by the members of the funeral party, and that these rites were regarded as a means whereby the ghost of the dead man was prevented from following. I have not included such rites as ‘control by magic’ because they were part of the funeral rites. In the study of uncivilized peoples the funeral rites must be carefully distinguished from those conducted after the funeral rites are completed.

The last four columns, Cols. 8–11, contain definite information; we may argue both from the minus and from the plus signs. If a minus sign occurs in Cols. 8 and 9, there is definite evidence that the society did not carry out any post-funeral rites in honour of the dead; a plus sign discloses the character of the rite according to the definitions I have formulated. In these cases the negative entry is not a deduction; it is a definite cultural fact. The question-marks in Col. 8 are the source of those in Col. 1.

In Col. 8 a minus-plus sign appears in reference to No. 3, New Britons; No. 13, Orakaiva; No. 16, Lango; Nos. 20–2, Akikuyu, Akamba, and Nandi; No. 28, Baronga; No. 31, Ibibio; No. 64, Maori; and No. 77, Sea-Dyaks. These minus-plus signs denote either that the evidence is uncertain, or that the rites appear to have been irregular and spasmodic. The latter may or may not be due to the manner in which the rites have been described.

It is not necessary to comment on the entries in Cols. 10 and 11. They represent the data on which our classifications were based, and are indisputable. A minus-plus sign has been inserted in Col. 10 in reference to No. 14, Shilluk, in order to show that the Shilluk kengo was almost, but not quite, a temple.

I have said (para. 24) that after considering the evidence contained in this Chart a social scientist is compelled to induce that among uncivilized peoples there is a close relation between sexual opportunity and cultural behaviour. When we begin to consider the nature of that relation, we must remember the limitations (paras. 1, 24) imposed upon us by the nature of the material. When a chemist has discovered that a relation exists between two chemical elements, he can secure himself against a superficial conclusion by eliminating from his experiments those other factors which might
be responsible for or contribute towards the observed result. In this manner he can ascertain whether or not the result is produced by the admixture of the two elements, and of them alone. When we are dealing with human records, however, it is not enough for us to show that specific variations of A are accompanied by specific variations of B, for it may be that the variations of B are produced by a group of factors of which A is merely a constituent. Before the coincidence between certain variations of A and certain variations of B can be accepted as anything more than a coincidence, some form of reasoning must take the place of the experiments which are possible to the chemist but forbidden to the social scientist. This substitute can be no other than an explanation of the process, that is, an interpretation of the facts. For the chemist this explanation is a secondary consideration, or at least a matter of subsequent inquiry; but for the student of human affairs it is a necessary adjunct which promotes his conclusion from a possibility to that kind of probability which is the limit of human knowledge. From the nature of the case the explanation cannot be supported by anything of an experimental nature; it must rest on its own credibility and likelihood; and it is for this reason that I have distinguished with all rigour between the facts and an interpretation of the facts.

It may be urged, particularly by those whose temperaments are opposed to the meaning of our induction, that there is another reason why it is not enough to demonstrate the accompaniment of specific variations of A by specific variations of B. It may be said that we ought to show also that these variations of B are not produced by other factors. This, however, would be a reversal of the scientific method. We must argue from what we know, not from what we do not know. If other factors are said to be concomitant with the variations of B, the evidence of their existence must be presented before they can be included in the discussion.

142. The Cultural Scale. Diagrammatically the facts presented in the Chart of Evidence may be expressed also in another way. If the reader will turn to Appendix II, he will see a rectangular chart which has been divided into vertical and horizontal columns. The horizontal lines have been marked zoistic, manistic (tendance), and manistic (cult), the top side of the rectangle being marked deistic. These lines create a Cultural Scale upon which the name of any uncivilized society can be entered in one of the vertical columns, its cultural condition being denoted by the blackening of the vertical column as far as the line marked zoistic, manistic (tendance), manistic (cult), or deistic, according to the evidence. In this manner, too, the cultural condition of any given society can be seen in pictorial relationship with that of any other uncivilized society. Appendix II consists of a completed Cultural Scale which has been divided into eighty vertical columns; each of these columns bears the name of one of the eighty societies which we have discussed. The societies are arranged in the same geographical order as in the Chart of Evidence (Appendix I). In the case of
Nos. 13 and 72, Orakaiva (para. 79) and Sema Nagas (paras. 53, 54) the entries are doubtful. The culture of these two tribes, however, seems to have differed in certain details from that of their neighbours, so it is represented by a line which ends half-way between the lines marked zoistic and manistic (tendance). The culture of No. 77, Sea-Dyaks, is represented as manistic (tendance), but, as I have indicated (para. 139), the classification must be accepted with reserve.

Such a Cultural Scale reveals only the general pattern of a culture. Within the pattern there was an intense variety.

143. The Scale of the Limitation of Sexual Opportunity. In a similar manner, and on a chart of the same proportions (Appendix III), I have entered the evidence which is available concerning the sexual opportunity of these eighty societies. In this case the horizontal lines are marked Pre-nuptial Freedom, Irregular or Occasional Continence, and Pre-nuptial Chastity. The intensity of an Irregular or Occasional Continence is uneven, however, and there is evidence on which we can separate from the others some of the societies the regulations of which conformed to this pattern. It is scanty, but concerning two societies, No. 4, South-east Solomon Islanders (Ulawa and Sa'a) and No. 14, Shilluk, comparative data are available: the regulations of the former (para. 28) were more strict than those of the other Melanesian societies which did not insist on pre-nuptial chastity, those of the latter (para. 82) being more strict than those of, e.g., the Dinka and Lango. I have represented this variety by attaching the title Irregular or Occasional Continence to two lines instead of to one line. In order that the chart may reveal the comparative stringency of the regulations which the members of these two societies had adopted, the columns marked with their names have been blackened as far as the upper of these lines, the columns bearing the names of the other societies (the regulations of which conformed to the same pattern) being blackened only as far as the lower of the lines. In this detail, but in this detail only, the Scale of the Limitation of Sexual Opportunity represents the evidence more accurately than the mathematical symbols employed in the Chart of Evidence (Appendix I). I must point out, however, that although definite evidence exists that the regulations of these two societies afforded a more limited sexual opportunity than those of their neighbours, there is no basis on which their regulations can be compared with one another. Their identical position in the Scale must not be interpreted as indicating that their compulsory continence was of the same intensity.

The evidence in regard to the regulations of No. 13, Orakaiva (para. 79), is inexact; that concerning the regulations of No. 77, Sea-Dyaks (para. 139), is doubtful. Thus no reliance can be placed upon these entries. There seems to be some reason to suppose that the members of No. 72, Sema Nagas, had adopted more stringent customs than those of their neighbours, Nos. 69–71, Ao, Angami, and Lhota Nagas, but I am not confident that the Sema
regulations were such as would have imposed an Irregular or Occasional Continence in the sense in which I use the term. Thus the entry in Col. 72 also must be accepted with reserve. One society, that of the Khasis, cannot be placed on this scale; Col. 75 is therefore blank. For the reasons of our inability to assess the sexual opportunity of the Khasis, see para. 59.

These two Scales, Cultural Scale and Scale of Sexual Opportunity, have been printed on the same sheet in order that they may be compared at a glance. It will be noticed that the black lines on the two charts coincide almost exactly, the only exceptions being Nos. 13 (Orakaiva) and 72 (Sema Nagas). In these cases the nature of the evidence is alone responsible for the dissimilarity of the entries. Those two manistic societies, South-east Solomon Islanders and Shilluk, which demanded a more intense pre-nuptial continence than any of the other manistic societies were the only ones the post-funeral rites of which partook of the nature of cult.

By the aid of these charts, Chart of Evidence (Appendix I), Cultural Scale (Appendix II), Scale of Sexual Opportunity (Appendix III), the coincidence between the various patterns of uncivilized behaviour and the various patterns of sexual opportunity has been expressed as clearly as I am able to express it. I do not wish to emphasize unduly the extraordinary character of that coincidence. The facts speak for themselves. Two questions arise: Are the phenomena connected? If so, what is the nature of the connexion?

I shall answer the first question in the affirmative; I shall also state what to the best of my belief is the nature of the connexion; but, before I can do so, it is necessary to appraise, analyse, and summarize the cultural evidence.

A change in human behaviour is due to a change in ideas. It is only when opinions alter that activities are revolutionized. The ideas may be expressed in words; alternatively they may be merely manifest in action. They may be conscious or unconscious, pre-ideological or part of a clearly formulated creed. At the moment I do not discuss these things. My point is that, although we assess the cultural condition of a society by observing its behaviour, we shall understand why its behaviour alters only after we have studied the nature of its ideas. But certain theories in regard to the nature of uncivilized ideas are already current, and on these theories I must pass some comments. Inevitably too these comments must be of a destructive character. I must criticize the theories in order to facilitate the presentation of my own suggestions, for I erect my theoretical edifice on the same ground as that used by my predecessors, and a new building can be erected on the same site only after the old one has been destroyed.

No man can consult the original sources of our knowledge of uncivilized life without realizing that civilized men have drawn a veil of undefined jargon over the opinions of uncivilized men, and that in this manner the inherent simplicity of those opinions has been obscured. Just as when a cloak is thrown over a statue the lively details of the sculptor's creation are obscured, so the description of uncivilized conceptions in terms of civilized
thought obscures the clear outlines which are apparent when we use the native terms. The assumptions contained in the word ‘evolution’ must be challenged, the inferences and misapprehensions due to the use of such words as ‘spirits’, ‘gods’, ‘deities’, ‘supernatural ancestors’, &c., must be discarded, and the cloak of ‘animism’ removed, before we can hope to comprehend the mental processes of those men and women whom our forefathers called ‘savages’. The power in the universe and men who possessed that power, atua and atua-men, jok and jok-men, ngai and ngai-men, mulungu and mulungu-men, wakanda and wakan-men, god and god-like men, God and His Saints—these are the powers which manifest themselves to the members of human societies. The manner in which they are conceived, however, and the steps taken to maintain a right relation with them, differ in different societies; and these differences constitute the various cultural conditions into which human societies arrive. It is the common basis on which these conditions are founded, and the nature of the differences between them, that must be understood before we can understand the influence on human behaviour of different sexual regulations.

Thus our next task has a fourfold character. First, we must discover the common basis on which cultural behaviour rests. Secondly, we must show that current theories in regard to the alleged ‘evolution’ of human culture are mistaken; and, if we can, we must demonstrate how the errors came to be committed. Thirdly, from an analysis of the words used by our eighty societies, and of their ceremonial activities, we must deduce the changes in mental outlook which caused the observed differences in behaviour. Fourthly, we must inquire if these changes in mental outlook were such as to be the outcome of a limitation of sexual opportunity.

I fear that a somewhat technical, but not necessarily complicated, discussion is unavoidable; but it will be facilitated if for the time being the reader will banish from his mind his knowledge of the coincident facts between sexual opportunity and cultural behaviour which have been stated verbally in the text and diagrammatically in the charts. At present I wish to concentrate on the cultural evidence alone.

There is one point, however, which I wish to emphasize again: a change in opinion is never uniform throughout a society. When a society ascends in the cultural scale, some sections of the people retain their old opinions and remain in the lower cultural condition. Then the society is divided into two cultural strata. Indeed, the higher a society ascends the greater is the difference in the culture of the various strata, the number of those strata depending on the nature of the rise of the society. In a deistic society which passed direct from the zoistic into the deistic condition, there would be a zoistic as well as a deistic stratum; in a rationalistic society we may find a deistic stratum, and/or a manistic stratum, and/or a zoistic stratum, according to the manner in which the most developed stratum emerged. In every case each cultural change would leave evidence
of its occurrence in the existence of the stratum for the culture of which it was responsible. It is for this reason that the culture of a rationalistic society is produced by a minority of its members, for only a few keep step with the advance. Moreover, as time goes on, the cultural condition of each individual stratum changes, either upward or downward, these cultural changes being responsible for the revolutions and upheavals which are the chief events in social, political, and religious history. The intense variety which exists both in the occasions and in the descriptions of these events has obscured the fact that the changes conform to certain definite patterns, the change from one pattern to another being of the same nature, and due to the same causes, as that which occurs in the cultural pattern of a less developed society. It is in this manner that the material with which at the moment we are more particularly concerned is related to the historical evidence; and it is for this reason that among civilized societies some sections of the people are in a cultural condition similar to that of uncivilized societies (para. 70).

144. Method of Classifying the Evidence in regard to Uncivilized Ideas.

I have already said (paras. 61, 90) that no account of uncivilized ideas can be accepted at its face value unless we are told both the native terms and the contexts in which those words were used. I have stated my reasons for coming to this conclusion and need not repeat them. I have also pointed out some of the difficulties which have arisen when the native terms have not been quoted and their contexts not explained. In approaching the study of the native ideas, therefore, I classify the available evidence as indisputable, probable, and inferential.

The indisputable evidence consists of explicit statements on the part of reliable observers who have quoted the native words and explained the contexts in which those words were used. Upon the strength of this evidence, and of this evidence alone, a final conclusion may be drawn.

The probable evidence is to be found in the reports of competent observers who have merely translated such native terms as they have seen fit to quote, or who were unfamiliar with the language of the people about whom they have written. These reports have little value unless they are considered in the light of the indisputable evidence. They are not reliable enough to be the foundation of an argument, and can be used only to corroborate a conclusion based on the indisputable evidence.

If the native terms are not quoted at all, a statement has little value. Usually the evidence is merely inferential.

It is rare, of course, for a report to be wholly indisputable, probable, or inferential. Usually it varies, being on one point indisputable, on another point probable, on another point inferential. Sometimes an observer quotes, but does not elucidate, the native term for the power in the universe; at other times he tells us the other contexts in which the word was used, but, when speaking of magic power, omits to mention the native
terms, and states the facts in terms of 'spirits' and 'gods'. Sometimes, too, the report of one observer on any point assumes a different value, even a different meaning, after the report of another observer has been compared with it. Again, there is often no indisputable evidence at all; sometimes there is not even any probable evidence; yet, even in such cases as these, a careful study of the report may reveal a piece of valuable evidence that has almost unwittingly been communicated to us. So no general classification of the available evidence in regard to the native ideas can be scrupulously accurate in all details; the evidence on each point must be separately assessed. In presenting a classification, therefore, I wish to say that the classification is offered, and should be received, merely as a general guide to the kind of evidence that is available in regard to the ideas of any particular society. Speaking generally, it may be said that in any description of native ideas the amount of inference exceeds that of fact, but if a report contains any indisputable evidence at all I place it in a higher class than one that contains no information concerning the native use of native words. As my analysis proceeds, I will state, so far as I can, the kind of evidence that is available on any particular subject.

145. Classification of the Evidence in regard to the Ideas of the Eighty Societies. Of our eighty societies forty-seven were zoistic, twenty-one manistic, and ten deistic, the cultural condition of two (Orakaiva and Sema Nagas) being doubtful. In regard to their ideas, the nature of the evidence is as follows:

ZOISTIC. (a) Native terms quoted and elucidated. Tannese, Banks Islanders; Kiwai Papuans, Purari; Masai; Tlingit, Haida, Lilooet, Coast Salish, Ojibwa, Dakota, Omaha, Hidatsa, Mandan, Crow. (15.)
(b) Native terms quoted but not elucidated. Loyalty Islanders, Trobriand Islanders; Koita, Mailu; Klallam, Blackfeet, Arapaho, Iroquois, Winnebago; Ao, Angami, and Lhota Nagas, Mikirs; Andaman Islanders; Chukchee, Koryak, Yukaghir. (17.)
(c) Native terms not quoted. Mafulu; Thompson, Shuswap, Nez Percés, Dene, Hopi, Zuni, Sia, Navaho, Apache, Chickasaw, Creek, Natchez, Pima; Garos. (15.) Total, 47.

MANISTIC. (a) Native terms quoted and elucidated. Lango, Akikuyu, Akamba, Wayao; Maori; Sea-Dyaks. (6.)
(b) Native terms quoted but not elucidated. New Britons, SE. Solomon Islanders (Ulawa and Sa'a); Shilluk, Dinka, Banyankole, Nandi, Anyanja, Awemba, Baila, Baronga, Amazulu, Basuto, Ibibio; Tahitians; Khasis. (15.)
(c) Native terms not quoted. None. Total, 21.

DEISTIC. (a) Native terms quoted and elucidated. Fijians; Tongans, Samoans. (3.)
(b) Native terms quoted but not elucidated. Bakitara, Baganda, Yoruba, Dahomans, Ashanti; Gilbert Islanders. (6.)
(c) Native terms not quoted. Aztecs. (1.) Total, 10.
Thus in only twenty-four cases out of eighty are the native terms quoted and elucidated; in thirty-eight cases they have been merely translated; in sixteen cases they are not quoted at all. (The two unclassifiable societies are not included in this calculation.)

Sometimes it is difficult to avoid ungenerous comments on the nature of some of the reports, particularly when we remember that the unsatisfactory character of some of the evidence is due not to a lack of knowledge or industry on the part of the observer but to his preoccupation with academic theories, evolutionary and otherwise. If, however, in all cases we distinguish carefully between the incident which was observed and the manner in which that incident has been reported, and if we remember that it is only on the strength of the indisputable evidence that a conclusion can be drawn, we shall avoid most of the errors into which we have been led by those who adopt the comparative method. Most of the societies which were in the manistic condition at the time to which our information refers seem to have developed from the zoistic condition; those which were in the deistic condition seem to have developed from the manistic condition. Thus it is reasonable to expect that these three cultural conditions are founded on a common basis and that this basis will be revealed most clearly in the reports on the zoistic societies, strong indications of it existing among the manistic societies, slight indications among the deistic societies. We shall see that the evidence fulfils these expectations. I must emphasize again, however, that the cultural process is not a one-way street. Cultural changes can occur from a higher to a lower condition, as well as from a lower to a higher; and some of the manistic societies (e.g. Maori, para. 166) appear to have been deistic at some previous period in their history. Moreover it is not necessary for a zoistic society to experience a period of manistic culture before becoming deistic. It is true that at one time our ten deistic societies appear to have been manistic, but there is at least one historical society which seems to have proceeded to the deistic from the zoistic condition. I refer to the Israelites. The Israelites are not included in this treatise, first, because the facts, and especially the chronology, of their history are not well authenticated, and secondly, because we do not know the native meaning of the words which they used to denote the power in the universe, Elohim, Jehovah, El Elohim Jehovah, Adonai, Shaddai, Sabhaoth, El Elyon, &c. These words have been merely translated as God, Lord, Almighty, Most High, &c. Since, however, at some later period of their career the Israelites were deistic, that is, they erected temples wherein they maintained a right relation with the power in the universe, I wish to call attention to those ancient Israelite laws which ordained that a husband should demand the tokens of virginity, that a bride who was not a virgin should be stoned to death, and that the parents of the bride should defend themselves against a false charge by the display of the tokens before the elders, or 'chiefs' (Deuteronomy xxii. 13–29). These customs are exactly parallel to those which were in vogue among our deistic societies; and it is interesting
to observe that among the Israelites, at the period to which these laws refer, a man who had pre-nuptial intercourse with a betrothed girl was killed and that a man who deflowered an unbetrothed girl was merely fined, the girl becoming his wife. This differentiation between intercourse with betrothed girls and intercourse with unbetrothed girls is a common feature of uncivilized life, and there is every reason to believe that if our certain knowledge of Israelite chronology and customs were more extensive, further evidence would be forthcoming in support of the induction I have made (para. 24). Moreover, the facts illustrate forcibly that the culture of no human society is founded on a basis which is peculiar to itself.

The Arabs are another instance of a society which seems to have proceeded direct from the zoistic to the deistic condition.

146. The 'Unusual' as the Power. My suggestion is that the basis of human culture is the conception of, and reaction to, something unusual or beyond comprehension. Fundamentally the power which manifests itself in the universe is the strange quality exhibited by any unusual phenomenon. The agency through which a right relation is maintained with that power is the 'unusual' man, that is to say, the man who is credited with the possession of that quality. The place in which the rites are conducted is the unusual place, that is, the place where the power is manifest. The recipient of the offerings is either the power itself, conceived according to the mental capacity of the people, or the man who is thought to possess or to have possessed it.

First we will discuss the fundamental nature of the power. Some members of a rationalistic society denote the unknown by such terms as 'Nature', 'First Cause', 'Unmoved Mover', 'Fortuitous Concourse of Atoms'. Others hide their ignorance under a cloak of simpler character, using the word 'God'; and to this word the members of each cultural stratum attach their own meaning according to their mental capacity or according to the tradition which they have inherited from their ancestors, the members of the deistic stratum approaching God in temples. The members of zoistic uncivilized societies are more uniform in their opinions; they divide the events of their experience into the usual and the unusual, the normal and the abnormal. The word which they apply to anything unusual cannot be rendered into a civilized language; its meaning is too comprehensive. It is used in reference to every phenomenon which is outside normal experience, being applied to (1) any uncommon or impressive natural feature; (2) any unusual occurrence; (3) any animal of supernormal strength, of peculiar gait, or strange appearance; (4) any event the nature of which is not understood, such as the birth of twins, the female menses, a sudden death, or any unaccountable sickness; (5) any man of outstanding ability or skill, especially white men, and the articles of their equipment, such as watches, compasses, rifles, &c.; (6) anything superlative, such as
riches, poverty, excellent wives, neglectful wives, excessive rain, drought; (7) good luck, fortune, chance.

Here let me protest against the use of the word 'supernatural' in reference to the conceptions of uncivilized men; it implies a conception of the 'natural' which is absent from their minds. It cannot be too greatly emphasized that the conception of the 'natural' is a civilized phenomenon, characteristic only of rationalistic societies. If we wished to be accurate, we should discard the word 'supernatural' even in reference to rationalistic conceptions, for it suggests a transcendence or a contradiction of Nature, whereas, if 'Nature' be accepted as a reasonable hypothesis, it follows that no event can be regarded as contrary to Nature or even as transcending Nature, for if that were true, the conception of the 'natural' would be untenable. Another disadvantage which accrues to the word 'supernatural' is that its meaning is relative to the knowledge of the rationalist who employs it. So long as our knowledge of the 'natural' is limited, however, there will always be a line of demarcation between what is understood and what is not understood, and to those events which are beyond our understanding it is perhaps reasonable, or at any rate convenient, to apply the term 'supernatural'; but manifestly it is unreasonable to employ the word in reference to the conceptions of men who have not arrived at a conception of the 'natural'. The only manner in which we can express their attitude towards the universe is to use the words 'normal' and 'supernormal', for it is into those two categories, I submit, that they divide all the events which come within their experience.

Let us examine the evidence. If the reader will turn to the Table of Native Terms (Appendix IV), he will find a list of the words (so far as they are available) which were used by the members of the eighty uncivilized societies. The name of the society is in the first column. The second column contains the word or words applied to the power or powers in the universe. Usually in our reports these words have been translated as 'spirit' and/or as 'god' and/or by the equivalent and/or by the plural of those terms. In the third column I have inserted the word which the natives applied to anything unusual or beyond their comprehension, the words 'No report' indicating that the native usage of the word in the first column has not been explained. The word or words applied to a ghost or to the dead are in the fourth column. The entries in the fifth column summarize the available reports in reference to the source of magic power; and in the sixth column will be found the number of the paragraph which contains a description of the culture of the society. At present we are concerned only with the entries in the second and third columns, that is, with those that refer to the power or powers in the universe.

In each of the twenty-four cases in which the native terms have been quoted and elucidated the word denoting the power in the universe was applied only to something unusual or beyond comprehension. To this rule there are no exceptions. The twenty-four cases are:
This is the whole of the indisputable evidence concerning the meaning of the words which were used in reference to the power in the universe. Of these twenty-four societies fifteen were zoistic, six manistic, and three deistic.

If, then, we approach the study of our eighty uncivilized societies with no preconceptions, and if we base our conclusions not on translations but on the native usage of native words, we find that the only places wherein the power in the universe was manifest were the 'unusual' places. Any other conclusion is based on inference. Moreover by less developed societies the power was conceived not as an entity but as a quality. 'On the whole', Mr. Williams said in reference to the Purari imunu (para. 76), 'it is safe to regard the word imunu as an adjective rather than a substantive. It stands for a quality or a blend of qualities.' Mr. Hetherwick (para. 98) was equally confident concerning the meaning of the Yao mulungu: 'The untaught Yao', he said, 'refuses to assign to it any idea of being or personality. It is to him a quality or a faculty.' The conceptions of the zoistic American Indians were of a similar character. I select the Dakotan wakanda as my illustration. In reference to wakanda Mr. McGee remarked (para. 117) that it was rather a quality than an entity.

It is wrong to translate such words as if they referred to entities, yet this is our invariable practice. It is only when we have rid our minds of our own preconceptions in favour of entities that we can understand the native meaning of these words. Then we can appreciate, for instance, what the
Akikuyu meant when they said (para. 85) that the sun, Mt. Kenya, and thunder were 'all the same thing', and how greatly we have been misled by Dr. Codrington's rationalization of the Banks Island vui, 'exceeding', into 'spiritual being'. In every case except that of the Lango jok, and that of the Purari imunu, the above listed words have been translated as 'spirit' and/or as 'god' or as the equivalent or as the plural of those terms. If, then, we are told that the members of any uncivilized society believed in 'spirits', we should receive the report with reserve. Moreover, if we are told that the members of any uncivilized society believed in a ubiquity of such 'spirits', we can safely assume the inferential character of the ubiquity, unless the evidence be quoted on which the statements in regard to the alleged ubiquity are based.

Sometimes when the native usage has not been elucidated, we are told that the word which has been translated as 'spirits' was used in some of the above-mentioned contexts. In these cases it is probable that the word denoted the strange quality which was manifest in something-unusual or beyond-comprehension, and that the observer was prevented from informing us of the fact by his preconceptions in favour of 'animism'.

Probable evidence of this kind is available in no less than twenty-one cases out of the remaining fifty-six. Of these twenty-one societies, eleven were zoistic, seven manistic, and three deistic. They are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Word usually translated 'spirit', 'god', &amp;c.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Loyalty Islanders</td>
<td>haze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. New Britons</td>
<td>tebaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SE. Solomon Islanders</td>
<td>akalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unknown word translated 'spirits'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Mafulu</td>
<td>jcoek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Shilluk</td>
<td>mulungu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Anyanja</td>
<td>mitungu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Awemba</td>
<td>tilo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Baronga</td>
<td>orisha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Yoruba</td>
<td>vodu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Dahomans</td>
<td>boksum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Ashanti</td>
<td>tamanous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Klallam</td>
<td>titwat (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Nez Percés</td>
<td>unknown word compared with Dakotan wakan, &amp;c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Dene</td>
<td>natosio (natoye)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Blackfeet</td>
<td>baataana (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Arapaho</td>
<td>hopini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Winnebago</td>
<td>unknown word translated 'mystery'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. Hopi</td>
<td>arnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73. Mikirs</td>
<td>blei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75. Khasis</td>
<td>lau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76. Andaman Islanders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In each case there is an explicit statement that the natives used these words in some of the contexts I have enumerated. In some cases, e.g., those of the Mafulu and Hopi, the native word is not quoted, but we are told that 'spirits' or 'mystery' existed only in 'unusual' places. The evidence will be found either in the paragraph in which the culture of the society is described or in the note attached to the appropriate passage. It is mentioned also in the summary which appears at the end of each section of the foregoing chapters.

Concerning the remaining thirty-five societies the reports in regard to the power in the universe are such as afford only inferential evidence. Twenty-one of these societies were zoistic (Trobrand Islanders, Koita, Mailu; Thompson, Shuswap, Iroquois, Zuni, Sia, Navaho, Apache, Chickasaw, Creek, Natchez, Pima; Ao, Angami, and Lhota Nagas, Garos; Chukchee, Koryak, Yukaghir); eight were manistic (Dinka, Banyankole, Nandi, Ibibio, Baila, Amazulu, Basuto; Tahitians); four were deistic (Bakitara, Baganda; Aztecs; Gilbert Islanders). The cultural condition of the remaining two (Orakaiva and Sema Nagas) is doubtful.

I will briefly consider the nature of the reports on these thirty-five societies.

Among the twenty-one zoistic societies are included three Naga, three Palaeo-Siberian, and eleven American Indian tribes. I have already commented (para. 90) on the reports concerning the three Naga and the three Palaeo-Siberian tribes. These were written from a frank 'animistic' point of view and contain all those inferences which are inseparable from it. Some of those inferences will be discussed later (para. 148). Here we may note that the Ao Nagas used the word tsungrem especially in reference to conspicuous boulders (n. 219), that the Angami terhoma seems to have denoted a quality which has been turned into a conception of entities by our translations (n. 220), and that the Chukchee vairgin was applied especially to large natural features (para. 56). These are slight indications, but the facts suggest that these words were of the usual type and that their native meaning has been obscured, even changed, by our translations. As for the eleven tribes of American Indians it is reasonable to suppose that they used their unknown words in the same contexts as those other American Indians whose ideas have been described with greater care.

Concerning the other four zoistic societies, Trobrand Islanders, Koita, Mailu, and Garos (paras. 73, 77, 78, 136), nothing can usefully be added to what I have already written. We must await further evidence.

Among the manistic societies there are the Banyankole, Nandi, and Ibibio. On the descriptions of their culture I have commented in paras. 61, 90. There is no need to repeat what I have said in their reference.

Our information concerning the Dinka (para. 83) is scanty. In their case the word jok has been merely translated. Indeed it is doubtful if the authorities upon whose testimony we must rely for our knowledge of Dinka culture were sufficiently acquainted with the Dinka language to enable them
to describe the native usage of the word. Since, however, *jok* was a common Nilotic word, and since the translations of the Dinka *jok* are identical with those which have obscured the native meaning of other uncivilized words, it is fair to assume that the Dinka usage was similar to that of the Lango and of the Shilluk.

Concerning the Ila conception of *musamo* (para. 92) Mr. Smith and Mr. Dale have written at length, using it as a basis for a philosophical theory of uncivilized thought. *Musamo* was especially manifest, we are told, in 'strange, unusual things, uncommon sights, newfangled habits, strange foods and ways of doing things', &c. I do not conceal my suspicion that the word 'especially' is an inference and that actually *musamo* was a conception of the ordinary character, its alleged ubiquity being an inference due to circumstances similar to those that caused the Rev. J. H. Holmes to report the ubiquity of the Purari *imunu* (n. 623).

In the reports on the Amazulu and Basuto there seem to be some indications (nn. 415, 422) that the members of these societies used some of their words in the same manner as the words that provide the indisputable and probable evidence were used.

The last of these manistic societies, that of the Tahitians (para. 133), employed *atua* in reference to the power in the universe, to the dead, and to a magician. Perhaps, if we knew the complete native usage, we should find that the Tahitians applied it to anything unusual or beyond their comprehension.

There are no means of knowing the native usage of the terms employed by the members of the three deistic societies, namely, Yoruba, Dahomans, and Ashanti (paras. 42, 99, 100).

In regard to the power in the universe which manifested itself to the members of these thirty-five societies the evidence is unsatisfactory either (1) because the reports have been written from a frank animistic point of view, or (2) because the contexts in which the native words were used have not been explained, or (3) because the native words have not been quoted, or (4) because the white man’s philosophy has intruded upon the black man’s thoughts. But we can infer from the available data that, if the native ideas had been described without bias, they would appear the same as those of the societies which afford the indisputable and probable evidence. On the strength of that evidence we must conclude that uncivilized men react strongly to anything unusual or beyond their comprehension and that by less developed uncivilized societies the power manifest therein is conceived not as an entity but as a quality.

What, then, is the attitude of uncivilized men towards the ‘usual’? The answer seems to be that they accept it without question or inquiry. The hypothesis of ‘spirits’ as ‘personified causes’ is not supported, and is even contradicted, by the evidence.

The Loyalty Islanders (para. 30) did not inquire into the causes of things. In answer to the question ‘Who made the flowers?’ they replied,
§ 147. THE 'UNUSUAL' AS THE AGENCY. I have already discussed at some length (para. 63) the question of the agency through which a right relation was maintained with the power in the universe. I suggested that there was no criterion by which we could distinguish a magician from a priest, and that a priest was a magician who was a member of a deistic society. The sources of magical and priestly power, I submitted, were identical, viz. possession of or by the power in the universe. I will now analyse the collected evidence.

In this connexion the eighty societies divide themselves into four groups, consisting of twenty-four, seven, eight, and forty-one respectively.

1. Concerning twenty-four societies there is a complete lack of reliable information.

The culture of fourteen zoistic American Indian tribes has not been
described in a very definite manner, the appropriate native terms not being quoted; these are Thompson, Shuswap, Nez Percés, Dene, Iroquois, Hopi, Zuni, Sia, Navaho, Apache, Chickasaw, Creek, Natchez, and Pima.

The reports on the deistic Gilbert Islanders are scanty, and no details are available in regard to the deistic Aztecs whose priests were trained in seminaries.

Among the three Palaeo-Siberian tribes, Chukchee, Koryak, and Yukughir, the magicians became ‘possessed’ (n. 238), but no information is forthcoming concerning the nature of the ‘possession’.

Concerning the source of magic power among the five other societies, Koita, Banyankole, Nandi, Awemba, and Ibibio, no evidence of any kind is available.

2. In seven cases, those of the Trobriand Islanders, Kiwi Papuans, Mailu, Orakaiva, Amazulu, Basuto, and Garos, we are told that magic power depended on the possession of spells. We are not told the native term for the power which was inherent in the spells.

3. Probable evidence is forthcoming in eight cases, and to the consideration of these I shall return. They are the Mafulu, Bakitara, Baronga, Baila, Wayao, Anyanja, Khasis, and Mikirs.

4. In the remaining forty-one cases there is indisputable evidence. In each case there is an explicit statement to the effect that the source of magic power was the power in the universe. They are:

## THE SOURCE OF MAGIC POWER
### INDISPUTABLE EVIDENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Power in the universe</th>
<th>Source of magic power</th>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Power in the universe</th>
<th>Source of magic power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty Islanders</td>
<td>haze</td>
<td>haze</td>
<td>Lillooet</td>
<td>sman</td>
<td>sman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tannese</td>
<td>uhngen</td>
<td>uhngen</td>
<td>Coast Salish</td>
<td>sulia</td>
<td>sulia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. New Britons</td>
<td>tebaran</td>
<td>tebaran</td>
<td>Klallam</td>
<td>tamanous</td>
<td>tamanous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SE. Solomon Islanders (Ulua and Sa’a)</td>
<td>akalo</td>
<td>akalo</td>
<td>Ojibwa</td>
<td>munedo</td>
<td>munedo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Banks Islanders</td>
<td>vui</td>
<td>vui</td>
<td>Blackfeet</td>
<td>natosio</td>
<td>natosio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fijians</td>
<td>kalou</td>
<td>kalou</td>
<td>Arapaho</td>
<td>baatana (?)</td>
<td>baatana (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Purari</td>
<td>imunu</td>
<td>jwok</td>
<td>Dakota</td>
<td>wakana</td>
<td>wakana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Shilluk</td>
<td>jwok</td>
<td>jwok</td>
<td>Omaha</td>
<td>wakonda</td>
<td>wakonda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Dinka</td>
<td>jok</td>
<td>jok</td>
<td>Hidatsa</td>
<td>mahopa</td>
<td>mahopa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Naga</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Mandan</td>
<td>mahopini</td>
<td>mahopini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Crow</td>
<td>maxpe</td>
<td>maxpe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Winnebago</td>
<td>atua</td>
<td>atua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>otu</td>
<td>otu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Tongans</td>
<td>aitu</td>
<td>aitu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Samoaans</td>
<td>aitu</td>
<td>aitu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Tahitians</td>
<td>aitu</td>
<td>aitu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Ao Nagas</td>
<td>aitu</td>
<td>aitu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Angami Nagas</td>
<td>aitu</td>
<td>aitu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Lhota Nagas</td>
<td>aitu</td>
<td>aitu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Sema Nagas</td>
<td>aitu</td>
<td>aitu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Andaman</td>
<td>aitu</td>
<td>aitu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Masai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>Islanders</td>
<td>aitu</td>
<td>aitu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Yoruba</td>
<td>orisha</td>
<td>orisha</td>
<td>Sea-Dyaks</td>
<td>petara</td>
<td>petara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Dahomans</td>
<td>vodu</td>
<td>vodu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Ashanti</td>
<td>bohsum</td>
<td>bohsum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Tlingit</td>
<td>yek</td>
<td>yek</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Haida</td>
<td>sgana</td>
<td>sgana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It would be difficult to imagine more convincing evidence.

Most of the above-mentioned words have been translated as ‘spirits’; thus the idea has grown that among uncivilized peoples magic power comes from ‘spirits’. Nothing could be more false. As we have seen (para. 146) in thirty-five cases out of forty-one there is indisputable (twenty-two cases) and probable (thirteen cases) evidence that the word which denoted the source of magic power was applied only to anything unusual or supernormal. In the other six cases, those of the Baganda, Dinka, and the four Naga tribes, the meaning of the native words, lubare, jok, tsungrem, terhoma, tsandramo (or potso), and teghami, has not been explained; they have merely been translated as ‘spirit’, or as ‘god’, or in some such way. The inference is, as I have said (para. 146), that these words were used in the same sense as those of the thirty-five tribes and that their real meaning has been obscured by our translations.

Fundamentally, then, a man is credited with magic power because he is thought to possess the power in the universe. Now this power is manifest only in ‘unusual’ phenomena. It seems to follow that fundamentally a magician is merely an ‘unusual’ man.

Of this conclusion there are three corroborative lines of argument; and these arguments confirm also our conclusions in regard to the fundamental nature of the power in the universe.

In the first place, among some societies the word translated ‘magician’ literally meant ‘skilled’, and was applied to any man who exhibited exceptional skill in any form of human activity, whether it was building, sailing, tattooing, healing, fishing, carpentry, or witchcraft. The Maori tohunga (n. 188), the Zulu nyanga (para. 94), and the Tahitian tahuia (para. 133) are examples. The natives seem to have explained a man’s possession of outstanding skill by crediting him with the possession of the power which was manifest in all supernormal things. Moreover, throughout the Area of Profound Mystery (para. 96), and among other sections of the Southern Bantu, a form of the word nyanga was used to denote a magician, e.g. Wemba nganga, Ronga nanga, Ila nganga, Suto ngaka, Yao nanga. It seems probable that in these cases also the literal meaning of the word was ‘skilled’ and that once more our translations have misled us by emphasizing only one of the contexts in which the word was used (in this case in reference to a magician) and by implying that its use in that context exhausted its meaning.

Secondly, we sometimes find that the association between the ‘unusual’ and magic power is implicit, though not explicit. For instance, the Akamba (para. 86) used to credit a man with the possession of magic power for no other reason than that the manner of his birth had been abnormal, that is to say, mulungu was manifest in that event, and therefore, the natives supposed, it was manifest also in him.

The third argument is even more convincing. A magician can possess the power in the universe in one of two ways. In the first place, he himself
may be its vessel or container. This was the case among the Maori (n. 181), Samoans (para. 50), and Tongans (n. 209). These societies spoke of a magician as the 'canoe' of *atu* (*itu*, and *otua*, respectively. A similar phrase was used by the Purari (n. 323), who called a wonder-working basket a 'canoe' of *imunu*. (This basket was also called *kaeimunu*, lit. 'thunder-*imunu*', and possessed a tremendous mouth, which doubtless represented the native conception of the mouth which emitted a roar of thunder.) Secondly, a magician might possess an instrument which seemed to be charged with the power. Commonly such an instrument was a stone, as among the Loyalty Islanders (para. 30), Tannese (para. 31), Banks Islanders (n. 293), Koita (n. 331), Dakota Indians (n. 522), Crow Indians (n. 530), &c. Now when we are told the method by which these stones were selected (as in the case of the Banks Islanders and Koita) we find that they were credited with magic power only because they were either of an unusual shape or of an uncommon type. And a further illustration of the tremendous power credited to an unusually-shaped stone is afforded by a report concerning the Basuto. We are told that if a Suto (para. 95) found a strange-looking fossil he would refrain from bringing it home lest sickness should break out. A similar attitude towards any unusual phenomenon is evinced by the uncultivated members of our own, and indeed of any civilized, country.

Sometimes we are told that there was a definite word to denote a man who was manifesting great power. Thus among the Maori (n. 191) a *tohunga*, 'skilled man', who was giving evidence of his prowess, and whose power was due to his possession of *atu*, was said to be *mana*. The word was Polynesian, but it was current also in the Melanesian Banks Islands. Dr. Codrington placed an interpretation upon it which is vitiating by the testimony of F. E. Maning. Even in 1876, as Maning said, the word had been 'banded about a good deal', and now is best avoided, for by this time it possesses not its native meaning but one that the white man has attached to it. The Akikuyu, too (para. 85), had a word, *mugu*, which they applied to any man or natural feature which possessed the power in the universe, a medicine-man being *mundu mugu*, a *ngai*-tree *muti mugu*.

Now let us consider the source of magic power among the eight societies concerning which only probable evidence is available. They are the Mafulu, Bakitara, Baronga, Baila, Wayao, Anyanja, Khasis, and Mikirs.

We are told that the Mafulu (para. 75) considered the possession of magic power to be due to 'spirits', but in their case we are definitely told that 'spirits' existed only in 'special peculiar and unusual' places. It seems to follow that among them a magician was merely a 'specially peculiar and unusual' man. Similarly a Ronga rain-maker was said to possess *tilo*; and this word was also applied to the birth of twins, convulsions, and 'certain great cosmic phenomena, more especially those of a sudden and unexpected nature' (para. 93). Thus in these two instances also the word denoting the source of power was applied only to inexplicable, incomprehensible
phenomena. I have conjectured (para. 146) that this was the case also among the Baila, for it was the possession of musamo which differentiated an Ila magician from an ordinary man, and musamo seems to have been manifest only in strange unusual things.

As for the Bakitara we can only say either that a magician was a man who was 'possessed' by muzimu, 'ghost', or by muchwezi, 'god', or that he possessed a mayembe, that is, a 'god', 'fetish', or 'shrine'. We know neither the real meaning of muchwezi nor the native term for the power inherent in mayembe or in the man who manufactured it.

We are not told the source of magic power among the Wayao. Possibly, indeed probably, it was mulungu. The Yao term for a magician was nanga, which may be compared to the Zulu nyanga, 'skilled'.

By the Anyanja 'medicine' was associated with 'anything unaccountable'.

In regard to the Khasi and Mikirs we must infer their opinions from the words which have been translated 'spirits'. Blei is one of the many Khasi words which Col. Gurdon translates 'spirits'; a sohblei was a magician. Undoubtedly, I think, the 'spirits' to which the Mikirs ascribed the power of their magicians owe their existence to our method of translating the word arnam, which was applied also to white men. In many passages, however, the native word is not quoted; in other passages arnam is translated as 'god'.

Such is the evidence in regard to the source of magic power. Fundamentally the magician seems to be a man who is believed to possess the power in the universe, this power being conceived as a quality. He is credited with its possession either because he is an outstanding citizen or because he possesses an instrument of an uncommon shape or type. Alternatively he may be possessed by the power; in this case it is probable that the word which denoted the power was applied to him because in his ecstatic condition he himself was a strange, unusual phenomenon. By virtue of his possession of the power in the universe the man is credited with the ability to cause or to cure sickness, to manufacture charms, to divine the future, to control the weather, to multiply the fruits of the earth, to identify a criminal, to dispel or to bring back love, and to give advice in the perplexities of life. All these things and many others can he do in the opinion of his fellow citizens. Their faith in his power is based on their conviction that in him is manifest the dangerous but powerful quality which is exhibited by all unusual outstanding phenomena.

148. Misconceptions and Misinterpretations. Before proceeding farther in an attempt to understand the various contexts in which uncivilized men used the word applied to anything unusual or beyond comprehension, it is well to discuss some of the reasons why its inherent simplicity has been hitherto concealed. Certain misconceptions in regard to uncivilized ideas have sunk so deep into our consciousness, and have been given such world-
wide consent, that they must be dispelled before the native usage of the word can be understood. It is also well to assess the amount of inference contained in many, if not most, descriptions of uncivilized culture.

We must remember that field-workers publish opinions as well as facts. Indeed sometimes it seems that the amount of opinion exceeds that of fact. Doubtless it is enlightened and well-informed opinion, but therein lies its danger, for inevitably a man’s opinions are influenced by his presentiments; he is apt to find what he expects to find; and the nature of his expectations is affected not only by the character of his own philosophy but also, so far as the study of uncivilized culture is concerned, by those academic theories with which he is acquainted. In my view some of these theories are inherently misleading, and before our discussion of the facts can conveniently be continued I must endeavour to expose the fallacies which appear to have been responsible for them. I shall be better able to do this if I try to explain how these fallacies seem to have arisen.

In the main, I think, they have been due to four causes, viz. to some lack of scholarship, to inferences from inaccurate translations, to a desire to prove evolutionary theories, and to our use of the word ‘primitive’. Those who have been responsible for evolutionary hypotheses have tried to show that the evolution of human culture has proceeded in a straight line from primeval man to twentieth-century white man. These have tended to present uncivilized culture as if it were of a totally different character from our own, whereas the truth seems to be that it is founded on the same basis. And as for the word ‘primitive’, it has been employed to denote uncivilized culture in general, the implication being that the members of all uncivilized societies shared the same opinions, whereas the fact is that their opinions varied between extremely wide limits.

One example of inaccuracy in translation is to be seen in the rendering of a native term by many different English equivalents, and in the rendering of different native terms by the same English equivalent; thus either we distinguish what the natives confused or we confuse what the natives distinguished. In both cases the native conceptions are misunderstood. There are numerous instances of this fault, a few of which may be cited. Canon Roscoe has translated the Bantu words mandwa and mayembe in many different ways (paras. 37–9, nn. 116, 119, 134; cp. para. 61), mandwa being ‘priest’, ‘high priest’, ‘medium’, and ‘medicine-man’, and mayembe being ‘fetish’, ‘god’, and ‘shrine’. The Maori atua (nn. 178–80) has been translated by such a multitude of English equivalents that to the unwary student the Maori appear to have believed in the existence of diverse powers instead of in one power only. Professor Seligman (para. 83) has translated the Dinka jok as ‘High God’, ‘spirit’, ‘totem’, ‘spirits of the dead’, ‘the powerful dead’, and ‘spirit of the clan’. No less than four separate unrelated Manganga words (n. 445) have been rendered as ‘God’, presumably by different workers in the missionary field. I do not deny that these various English equivalents may be convenient. My point is that they conceal rather than
elucidate the nature of the native conception, and that the ideas they represent have been read into and not out of the native culture.

If the native terms are quoted, however, a careful student can overcome the handicaps imposed upon him by this method of translating native terms; but, when he has succeeded in doing so, he will have to be on his guard against certain other confusions which are characteristic of modern social anthropology. Indeed it is doubtful if an eclectic method of translation has been responsible for so much misunderstanding as the confusion between the meaning of the word and the phenomena to which it was applied. Especially is this confusion apparent in the reports on the American Indians. The alleged identification of the sun and Old Man Coyote by the Crows (n. 529) seems to have been assumed from the fact that the same word, *maxpe*, was applied to both, and I cannot doubt that Mrs. Stevenson’s report (para. 125) that the Sia regarded some forms of sickness as being due to certain animals was based on the fact that the Sia applied the same word to an unusual sickness and to certain animals. The same criticism must be made in regard to a similar report in reference to the Pima (n. 565). And the reports on the Haida (para. 104), Blackfeet (n. 510), Arapaho (n. 514), Dakota (n. 522), Mandan (n. 529), and Winnebago (para. 120; n. 531) are remarkable for the manner in which a native word, employed adjectivally or adverbially, has been translated as a substantive. The same indiscrimination seems to have been responsible for the inconsistencies which are apparent in Mr. Williams’s interpretation of the Orakaiva *sovai* (para. 79), for the translation of the Koita *sua* both as ‘soul’ and as ‘spirits of the dead’ (n. 330), and perhaps also for some of the reports concerning the Solomon Islands *akalo* (n. 86) and the Akikuyu *ngoma* (n. 362); while the alleged ‘connexion’ between rainfall and abnormal births among the Baronga (n. 410) seems to be merely an inference from the fact that the Baronga applied the word *tilo* to both of them. We are told that the Andaman Islanders regarded white men as ‘ghosts’, but again the report appears to be an inference from the fact that the word *lau* was applied both to white men and to dead men (n. 614).

This confusion between the adjectival meaning of a word and one of the phenomena to which it was applied has been particularly widespread. It has produced many reports of ‘sun-worship’ and ‘monotheism’ which obviously we must reject as soon as we study the native use of the word. For instance, the Crow Indians (para. 119) applied *maxpe* to the sun and to many other outstanding phenomena, and the *maxpe*-quality of these phenomena was, to use Professor Lovie’s phrase, the ‘badge of their divinity’. The sun was not remarkable *qua* sun, but because it was *maxpe*. The attention to the sun, however, attracted the notice of superficial observers, and the Crows were described as ‘sun-worshippers’. Moreover, the sun was then called ‘Supreme Deity’; and from this misleading conclusion Dr. Radin (n. 468) inferred that the Crows were ‘monotheists’.

Sometimes we find that the power has been confused with the agency
through which a right relation was maintained with it. In these cases the same native term is translated both as 'priest' and as 'god' (or its equivalent). It seems hardly credible; yet the confusion is apparent in the reports on the Banyankole and Bakitara. The word mandwa (n. 116) has been rendered as 'spirit' and as 'priest'; the Kitara bachwezi (n. 122) have been called a 'priestly clan' as well as 'gods'. A Tahitian word also, fanau po, lit. 'born of night', has been described both as a deity and as a priest (n. 585); and another example of the confusion between the power which a man possessed and the man who possessed it is to be found in the reports on the Maori matakite (n. 194).

Some of our authorities are apt to promote descriptive terms to the status of divine beings. I will cite two instances only. In the Tahitian language tabu-tabu-a-tea meant 'it is very sacred'; raa signified 'taboo'. Tabu-tabu-a-tea is said to have been a proper name which was applied to several stone structures; raa is included as a 'god' (n. 582). Again, in the reports on the Gilbert Islanders (n. 599), we are often told that the natives revered a god called Tapuariki. The literal meaning of the word is 'sacred chief'. There is some difference of opinion among our authorities concerning the status of this alleged 'god'. Some of them affirm that he was more revered than Wanigain; others imply that he was the same as Wanigain, and even less revered. The truth seems to have been that Wanigain amongst other 'gods' was tapu-ariki, 'sacred chief', and that the attention paid to him was a form of cult.625

I draw attention to these lapses in order to show that no description of uncivilized beliefs can be accepted at its face value; still less can it be used as the basis of a theory in regard to the development of human culture. Yet the most fashionable theories have been founded on reports which have no greater value. Throughout anthropological literature one is confronted by an inference which is nothing less than a crime against scholarship: the ubiquity of 'spirits' has been inferred from the fact that the word translated 'spirit' was applied only to unusual uncomprehended phenomena. I have already called attention to it (paras. 62, 112; n. 356). The inference is revealed also in Dr. Landtman's monograph on the Kiwai Papuans (para. 74; nn. 309, 310). The word ebihare, Dr. Landtmant tells us, was applied to unusual things, and only to unusual things, but he gave it an 'animistic interpretation'; it was this 'interpretation' that credited ebihare with its alleged ubiquity. Mr. Dundas's report on the Akamba (n. 370) affords another example of the same mistake; and in my view the comparison which Mr. Smith and Mr. Dale made between electricity and the Ila conception of musamo (n. 404) is vitiated by their failure to distinguish between that which is omnipresent and that which is manifest only in supernormal phenomena. Indeed the assumption that the power in the universe must be all-pervasive has become so common that sometimes we read of the existence of a mysterious power which is manifest 'more especially' in strange unusual occurrences. The words 'more especially' betray the pre-
conception, for there is no evidence that the mysterious power was manifest in any other place or at any other time. This inference may have been encouraged by a vague pantheism which still lingers in some of our minds, but in the main it has been due, I think, to a common presentiment that to a 'primitive' man 'spiritual beings' exist in every natural object. Yet clearly the idea is contradicted by the native usage of the word which we translate 'spirit'.

It is upon the inference of the ubiquity of 'spirits' that Sir James Frazer bases his theory concerning the evolution of religion (para. 62). He suggests that the 'despiritualizing' of the universe has been a very slow and gradual process, 'lasting for ages', and due, he thinks, to a desire for simplification and unification. 'After men had peopled with a multitude of indwelling spirits every rock and hill, every tree and flower, every brook and river . . . they began,' he says, 'in virtue of what we may call the economy of thought, to limit the number of the spiritual beings. . . . Instead of a separate spirit for every individual tree, they came to conceive of a god of the woods in general, a Silvanus or what not; instead of personifying all the winds as gods, they imagined a single god of the winds, an Aeolus. . . . The innumerable multitude of spirits or demons was generalized and reduced to a comparatively small number of deities; animism was replaced by polytheism.'

Sir James proceeds to submit that by a further process of simplification and elimination the many gods 'were deposed in favour of one solitary deity'; but with this startling suggestion I am not concerned. I have quoted the first part of his evolutionary theory because it contains all the errors and inferences which I wish to discuss. As I have already pointed out (para. 62), there is no evidence that in the opinion of any of our uncivilized societies there was a separate spirit in every tree; the power was manifest only in particular trees. Thus the very foundations of Sir James Frazer's theory are demolished. Moreover, if that theory were correct, it would appear that the natives would use one word for the spirits in trees, another for the spirits in winds, another for the spirits in rocks, &c.; but the fact is that they used the same word to denote the power, whether it was in a tree, in a rock, or in any other place. How, then, can a Silvanus be a generalization of tree-spirits, for the alleged spirits were never ubiquitous as to trees and the natives did not distinguish between the power in a tree and the power in a rock? Is it not plain that Sir James has based his suggestion first upon a false inference, and then upon a misleading translation?

It is on misleading translations that all theories as to alleged 'nature-spirits' and 'nature-worship' have been founded. These have been responsible for many unacceptable theories in regard to uncivilized ideas. For instance, some scholars have interpreted the presence of sacred groves among some deistic peoples as evidence of nature-worship, basing their interpretations of the facts upon the assumed existence of nature-spirits. A close study of the facts reveals the untenable character of these theories.
Among some of our zoistic and manistic societies the sacred grove was connected with the power in the universe, a grove being sacred because it was unusual either in itself or as the result of a magician's dream. Usually, however, the grove was produced by the growth of sticks which were planted round a dead man's grave. It was the custom among the zoistic Winnebago (para. 120) to plant trees around the grave of a distinguished man. In a similar manner the manistic SE. Solomon Islanders exposed the corpses of their great men in canoes which were placed on sticks. After a time these sticks grew into trees; and such trees could be seen at most of the landing-places, marking the spot where exposures had been carried out (n. 85). Another and more complete example of a sacred grove which had developed from sticks around a dead man's grave is to be found in the reports on the Baila (para. 92).

Around the graves of their distinguished citizens the Baila planted a circle of sticks, mabwabwa; these took root and grew, and in a few years there was a grove of trees to mark the spot, this grove being sacred to the memory of the dead man. A caretaker was appointed to look after it; none but he dared to enter. He was assisted by a medium who was 'possessed' by the dead man's ghost and announced his will or his desires. The Baila did not remember these dead men for long, but if the length of their memory had been extended, we should have been confronted by a cultural phenomenon similar to that which is found among some historical deistic societies. If after the disappearance of the Baila from their present habitat a wandering student should find these sacred groves and be ignorant of their actual history, he might interpret their existence as evidence of nature-worship. Thanks, however, to the industry and care of Mr. Smith and Mr. Dale their true character is known. Thus when I learn that the deistic Yoruba (para. 42), or any other deistic society, conducted certain rites in similar groves, I tend to connect the celebrations with a cult of the dead, remembering at the same time that the comparative argument, unsupported by relevant data, is weak.

The errors to which I have referred are also noticeable in the reports concerning the causes of sickness. We continually read that sickness was thought to be due to malignant demons, evil spirits, maleficent sprites, &c. In my view all such reports are untrustworthy. In many cases these English phrases are translations of the same word as that which in other contexts is rendered 'God', 'deities', 'good spirits', &c. Often it is the same word as that which was applied to anything unusual or beyond comprehension. In the latter case it seems that the natives were confronted by something which they did not understand. They concluded, therefore, that the event was vui (Banks Islanders, n. 295), ebihare (Kiwai Papuans, para. 74), imunu (Purari, para. 76), ngai (Masai, para. 88; n. 385), tamanous (Klallam, para. 109), lau (Andaman Islanders, para. 138); jwok (Shilluk, para. 82), jok (Dinka, para. 83), jok (Lango, para. 84), ngai (Akikuyu, n. 365), tilo (Baronga, para. 93), mulungu (Anyanja, para. 98), atua (Maori, n. 187),
petara or antu (Sea-Dyaks, para. 139); aitu (Samoans, n. 204), őtu (Tongans, n. 212). As soon as we substitute the native word for our English translations, we can understand how greatly those translations have deceived us. Just as under the influence of the animistic theory an inference of ubiquity has been made in regard to a power which was manifest only in strange, unusual things, so also we have assumed that uncivilized men ascribed all forms of sickness to ‘spirits’, whereas the truth is that an ordinary sickness was recognized by them as such, and was treated in an ordinary manner, but an unusual sickness was attributed to the power responsible for all unusual uncomprehended phenomena.

Professor Malinowski has made this point in reference to the Trobriand Islanders (para. 73). If the Trobriand Islanders understood the nature of the complaint from which a man was suffering, they treated it according to their knowledge; but if a man suffered from a sickness which was outside their normal experience they hypothesized a supernormal cause, subjecting him to a course of treatment which would remove that cause. The above-quoted words show that the members of many other uncivilized societies (six zoistic, eight manistic, two deistic) shared these opinions, each of those words being used only in reference to supernormal phenomena. The shortness of the list is due solely to the unsatisfactory nature of the reports in regard to the causes of affliction. Seldom do our authorities quote the native words when they declare sickness to have been due to ‘supernatural agents’; rarely do they realize that we wish to be told not only their inferences from the facts but also the bare facts themselves.

Another observer also has confirmed this interpretation of the available data. Canon Roscoe has told us (paras. 37, 38) that among the inhabitants of Uganda the exorcism or transference of a ghost did not cure the patient who was thought to be suffering from the effects of ghostly anger; the treatment merely placed him in such a condition that the appropriate medicine could be administered with success. The same opinions were current also among the Basuto (para. 95). Among the Dahomans the ghostly theory of causation was adopted only after medicine (in the native sense) had failed to effect a cure (para. 99).

Much credit is due to Professor Malinowski and to Canon Roscoe for these important contributions to the study of uncivilized men. It will be noticed that they studied not the beliefs but the rites.

An unaccountable sickness, then, was ascribed to the power in the universe, and it is in this manner that the cause of sickness and affliction is connected with ‘religion’. Indeed among uncivilized peoples the two questions are so closely related that they cannot be discussed separately. Nor is it only an unaccountable sickness which is ascribed to the power; anything abnormal is attributed to the same cause. For instance, among the Shilluk (para. 82) an ordinary death was regarded as an ordinary event, but if a sudden or a violent death occurred, jwok was manifest. Similarly the Amazulu (para. 94) attributed anything abnormal to tangata, magic,
that is, to the power of a magician who (as we have seen) was a man who wielded the power in the universe. If anything unusual occurred among the Basuto (para. 95), a magician was consulted.

This special regard for anything unusual or beyond comprehension is also revealed in the attitude towards all forms of sky-activity. In the opinion of the Akikuyu, Akamba, and Masai (nn. 362, 366, 377, 383) thunder, lightning, excessive rain, and drought were ngai, the different colours which the sky assumed at different times being called black ngai, red ngai, white ngai, &c. The inference is that there was something incomprehensible about these celestial phenomena, so they were credited with the possession of that quality or power which was inherent in all incomprehensible things.

Under the same circumstances the Baronga (para. 93) employed the word tilo, which they used also in reference to an unaccountable sickness and to the birth of twins. The word tilo has been translated 'Heaven'; that is to say, the meaning of the word has been confused with one of the many phenomena to which it was applied. Tilo has also been called a 'sky-god', so greatly have we read our ideas into the native mind. Parenthetically, I have read in books by reputable authors, and have heard from competent lecturers, that sometimes magicians were possessed by 'sky-spirits'. I do not quote any examples of such fantastic nonsense; obviously it is a rationalization of the fact that the word which denoted the power in the universe was applied both to the sky and to magicians.

Throughout this discussion, indeed throughout this treatise, I am using the word 'spirit' as distinct from 'ghost'. I am trying to remove the cloak of misunderstanding which we have cast over the uncivilized conception of the power in the universe. For this misunderstanding the word 'spirit', as applied to natural phenomena, to the cause of sickness, and to the source of magic power, is largely responsible. Ghosts, or disembodied souls, are in a different category. Some uncivilized men did not credit ghosts with the power to affect the lives of men; others ascribed some misfortunes to ghostly activities. Further, I am trying to understand the basis on which human culture rests, so I am speaking more particularly of zoistic and manistic (tendance) societies, for, as I have said, it is among them that the basis is more apparent. Societies which were in the manistic (cult) or in the deistic condition did not share all these opinions, especially those concerning sky-activity. For instance, the manistic (cult) SE. Solomon Islanders (para. 33) were of the opinion that certain powerful ghosts controlled the rain. The deistic Tongans (n. 211) thought that thunder was caused by the heated arguments of the gods. These differences in opinion are important; they have been obscured only because we have been careless enough to apply the epithet 'primitive' to all uncivilized societies, tacitly assuming that their ideas must have been identical. The difference can also be seen in the opinions held by manistic (cult) and deistic societies concerning the source of magic power.
§ 148 SOME MISINTERPRETATIONS

In the previous paragraph (para. 147) I discussed the evidence which has persuaded me that the source of magic power was the possession of or by the power in the universe; by virtue of this power the magician was credited with the ability to cause or cure sickness and to control the phenomena of nature. Now the rites which were conducted by the members of zoistic and manistic (tendance) societies were of a simple character; the magicians acted directly of their own volition; but when we consider the rites of manistic (cult) and deistic societies we discover some striking variations. The magician was still the man who possessed the power in the universe, but he did not always act single-handed; by making appropriate offerings in the proper place he secured the help of the ghost or of the god he owned or served. Thus among the SE. Solomon Islanders (para. 33) the strength of a man's magic depended on the power of the ghost (li'oa) whose name concluded his incantations. This li'oa was his inisi, 'twin'. Similarly the Fijian (m)hete (para. 34) was not always credited with the power of direct witchcraft; it was by the power of his kalou that his curses were made effective. The deistic Samoans (n. 201) prayed at a graveside when they wished to inflict ills upon their enemies. In Tonga (n. 212) articles which were to be bewitched were placed in a temple. In Dahomey also (para. 99) direct witchcraft was not in vogue; the power of vodu had to be instilled by a voduno, an owner of vodu, or priest. The Dahomans were a highly developed society; among them, as among the Aztecs, Yoruba, and Ashanti, the training of priests was highly organized. Each aspirant learned his trade during a three years' novitiate, and was admitted after the vodu, orisha, or obosum had signified, by 'possessing' him, its willingness to accept him. Doubtless this 'possession' was often a farce, but this only means that the Dahoman intelligentsia did not share all the archaic beliefs of their fellow citizens. A cultural advance is not uniform throughout a society, and in a developed society the members of an organized profession can often throw dust in the eyes of the mob. As a matter of fact in Dahomey any layman could become a priest by payment of heavy fees (n. 453). The calling was a lucrative one, and doubtless the payments were a good investment. And just as among the zoistic Purari (para. 76) any man or instrument possessing imunu was thought to manifest a 'dangerous potency', so the members of the deistic societies were apt to regard the priests as a separate class whom it was dangerous, yet sometimes helpful, to approach.

The use of the word 'spirit' (as distinct from 'ghost') has been responsible for other misinterpretations also. Our use of the word has resulted in all uncivilized men being credited not only with the conception of an entity but also with a notion of causality which is alien to their consciousness, such causality being due to our interpretation of our own word 'spirit'. Thus we are told (n. 220) that among the Angami Nagas 'to terhoma most natural phenomena were ascribed'. The bare fact seems to have been that the word terhoma was applied to some natural phenomena; the conception
of terhoma as a cause is due to its representation as an entity. 'Most' is an eloquent word in that sentence; not all but only a number of natural phenomena were terhoma. Apparently Dr. Hutton did not inquire into the method by which these phenomena were selected; yet the absence of ubiquity might have warned him that he was wrong in giving terhoma an 'animistic' interpretation.

Another convert to the Tylorian hypotheses has made a similar inference in regard to 'possession'. Usually a 'possessed' man talks incoherently; and Mr. Mills tells us that when the Ao Naga magicians were 'possessed', they 'conversed with spirits' (n. 227), and that among the Lhota Nagas 'potso held converse with the village seer' (n. 230). The bare fact seems to have been that the man, being in a strange, unusual condition, was called potso (potso being an anglicized plural). The application of potso to 'highly respected persons' (n. 222) should have caused Mr. Mills to wonder whether he was not transforming a quality into an entity, and inventing a cause of the 'possession' which was alien to the native mind.

In the same manner, and on the strength of the same translations, we have broadcast certain ideas about the causes of sickness which no native seems to have conceived and which seem to have been due solely to our own conceptions concerning cause and effect. Thus we are told that when a Lhota Naga was ill, a medicine-man was called in 'to extract from the body the bit of earth or wood or hair which the evil spirit had put there' (n. 230). Apparently the sentence is innocent; actually it contains three false inferences. First, the 'evil spirit' has been created by our translation; so in the native opinion it cannot have been the maleficent agent. Secondly, there is no reason to think that the bit of wood was 'there' at all, even in the mind of a Lhota Naga; it has been placed there by the white man's logic. Thirdly, the identification between the bit of wood and the sickness is not complete. Yet upon such statements as these we have founded what is known as the intrusive theory of sickness.

Sickness is said to have been regarded as intrusive by the zoistic Tlingit (n. 473), Haida (para. 104), Ojibwa (para. 113), Arapaho (para. 115), Dakota (para. 117), Omaha (para. 118), and Koita (n. 332), by the manistic Dinka (para. 83) and Basuto (n. 423), and by the deistic Ashanti (n. 467). There is no reason to think that this list is exhaustive; probably the rite on which the report is founded was common among many other societies also. It was of a simple character: a medicine-man was observed to go through the motions of sucking out or of withdrawing something from the sufferer; then he produced a piece of stone or wood, asserting that this article was the pain or the cause of the pain. Now it is not permissible to interpret this action as proof that the people regarded sickness as intrusive. When among ourselves a child falls and bruises his leg, his nurse may put her lips to the injured limb and pretend to suck out the pain; she may also draw her other hand away as if she were pulling out something that was inside the leg; she may even produce a block of wood so as to assure the child
that the pain has been extracted; but I am by no means persuaded that either she or the child can be said to have regarded the pain as intrusive. So long as the pain disappears, the child does not question the curative method. On feeling no pain and on seeing the block of wood he may be mystified, but many things are mysterious to him. If the pain has gone and if nurse says that the bit of wood was the pain, who is he to question it? This simple analogy is exact. In both cases the patient is content to be cured; he does not inquire into cause and effect. The actions of the nurse and of the medicine-man are identical, both of them knowing that the piece of wood was not extracted. The difference between their ideas is this: the nurse knows that she has merely succeeded in persuading the child to forget his injury; the medicine-man is convinced that, though he may pretend to have extracted the bit of wood, actually he cured the patient by virtue of his magic power. And in his possession of that power both he and his patient have complete faith.

The intrusive theory of sickness is not held by uncivilized men; it has arisen because we have credited them with our idea of the relation between cause and effect. No ‘spirit’ intrudes pieces of wood into the bodies of uncivilized men; the idea has been created by our translation as ‘spirit’ of a word that meant ‘mysterious’, ‘incomprehensible’.

It will be remembered that according to Sir E. B. Tylor (para. 62) ‘spirits’ were regarded not only as ‘causes’, but also as ‘personified causes’. Psychologically, this alleged personification of the power in the universe is of great interest, but the interest lies in the psychology not of uncivilized but of civilized men. We have always been determined that uncivilized men shall believe in ‘spirits’ and ‘gods’, and have read our thoughts into their minds. Sometimes this may have been unconscious, as when we credit the conception of a ‘Supreme Being’ to the minds of the Banyankole (n. 116), Bakitara (n. 122), Masai (n. 180), Koryak (para. 56), Amazulu (n. 415), and Tahitians (n. 585); at other times it seems to have been almost wilful, as in the reports concerning the Fijian tevoro (n. 97), Banks Island tataro (n. 296), Shilluk jwok (n. 346), Masai ngai (n. 383), Dahoman mawu (n. 451), and Ashanti nyame (n. 462). Now some of us conceive of a personal cause; thus, we consider, uncivilized men must do the same; and the conclusion has been encouraged, if it was not originally suggested, by the native habit of always using the masculine or the feminine but never the neuter gender (nn. 320, 526). Usually natives speak of everything as ‘he’ or ‘she’, but we must not interpret this as signifying a personal conception of everything. The habit is characteristic of undeveloped minds. Any one who is familiar with the speech of our own uncultivated classes will realize how often they substitute ‘he’ or ‘she’ for ‘it’, and address inanimate objects as if they were alive. It is absurd to suggest that they personify these inanimate objects, yet the alleged personification of ‘spirits’ rests on this insecure ground. In the pidgin-English of the Papuans the word ‘it’ does not exist. For instance, in reference to the gope (para. 74)
which the Kiwai Papuans erected as a protection against sickness, a man said: ‘Gope he look; he watch; sick he no can come.’

Gradually, then, the fallacies are being exposed. In uncivilized culture there are no nature-spirits; these owe their existence to our translations. Thus there is no worship of nature. There are no tree-spirits or rock-spirits. No tree or rock is revered qua tree or qua rock. It is regarded with veneration because the power in the universe is manifest there, the power being the same whether it be in a tree or in a rock. This power is often conceived not as an entity but as a quality, the idea that it is a personified cause being due to what Mr. Swanton (n. 471) has called our ‘European lineage’. The alleged causation has been created only by our translations. If life proceeds smoothly, an uncivilized man does not concern himself with the causes of things; he is concerned only when something unusual occurs. Then he tries to place himself in a right relation with the power which is manifest in unusual things. On being examined the theory of animism is found to be guilty of all these fallacies; thus it must be abandoned.

We must abandon also the idea that uncivilized men believe in gods. Perhaps this is a more startling suggestion. Let me amend it, then, by saying that we must abandon the idea until the word ‘god’ has been defined. What is a god? In what manner does a god differ from a spirit? Sometimes it seems that there is no difference between them, for the same native word has often been translated both as ‘spirit’ and as ‘god’. Yet we are faced by the suggestion that ‘spirits’ have become ‘gods’. Let us suppose that we travel to a distant land and live among an uncivilized people, trying to discover the nature of their creed. How shall we decide whether they believe in gods or in spirits?

As soon as the question is put in this way, its absurdity is apparent. The word ‘god’ lacks precise meaning and cannot be used as a basis of classification. It is a neuter Teutonic word which was used by the Teutonic peoples before their conversion to Christianity, Gothic guth, Dutch god, Swedish gud, German gott. We do not know the old Teutonic usage of the word; we only know that it was applied to some natural phenomena and to certain objects of veneration. If a conjecture were permitted, I should suggest that it was employed in the same contexts as the Polynesian atua or the Nilotic jok. On the conversion of the Teutonic peoples the word was adopted as the name of the Christian Supreme Being; it was applied also to the Persons of the Trinity; and this process continues to-day, the meaning of various native words, such as atua and jok, being changed in the same way.628

The word ‘god’ has also been used as our English equivalent of the Greek theos, Latin deus, and other words by means of which the members of other civilized societies denoted the power or powers in the universe. We do not know the oldest meanings of theos and deus; we only know that the Hellenic conception of theos and the Roman conception of deus changed with the passing of time; but since the word ‘god’ has been used in reference to the conceptions of civilized men the idea has grown that a belief in gods
§ 148 SOME MISINTERPRETATIONS

is more civilized than a belief in spirits. On such a flimsy foundation do our evolutionary theories rest. Sometimes we read that a dead man was deified; but in what detail does the deification consist? My own view is that we can define the difference between a ghost and a god only by the manner in which a right relation was maintained with them. A god, I suggest, is a power which is manifest in a temple, and, according to the definitions which I should like to adopt, it is manifest only to deistic peoples; but I am aware that if this definition were adopted, most commentaries on historical religions would have to be rewritten. Moreover, the definition is based not on beliefs but on rites. Yet the theory that animism was replaced by polytheism is founded on a study of beliefs alone. The difficulty is real: when it is said that a native conception is that of a god, we do not know by what criterion it has been judged whether it is a god or not. Is it not plain that Mr. Fewkes was right when he said (para. 123) that ‘in the use of the words gods, deities, and worship we undoubtedly endow the subject with conceptions which do not exist in the native mind’?

I have spoken of the ascription of incomprehensible events to the agency of the power in the universe. This is a fundamental feature of human life. It exists in some of the cultural strata of our own society; not long ago it was common to all members of our society. There seems to be no difference between the cultural condition of our own uncultured classes and that of simpler peoples (para. 70), and since at one time the opinions of our uncultured classes were shared by the great majority of our forefathers, we cannot be surprised that any unusual incomprehensible event is known to them as an ‘act of God’. The phrase is still extant in our legal documents, in our forms of contract, and in our bills of lading. Moreover, it is the equivalent of the Tannese uhngen, Nilotic jok, Bantu mulungu, Polynesian atua, American Indian wakanda, and of all the other words which were used in the same contexts (para. 146). When we say that an event was due to an ‘act of God’, we mean that there is no reasonable explanation of its occurrence; it is strange, unusual, outside normal experience, incomprehensible. The similarity between the ideas of our forefathers and those of uncivilized men has been obscured because, with a natural and comprehensible egocentricity, we have tried to interpret the culture of simpler societies in such a manner that the result would reflect to our own glory and bear witness to the great difference between us and them. We have tried to prove the existence of an evolution from primeval man to twentieth-century white man. We shall never succeed in understanding either ourselves or any other men if we study human affairs in so unscholarly a manner.

At the same time, of course, I do not wish to suggest the phrase ‘act of God’ as a fair translation of uhngen, jok, mulungu, atua, and wakanda. The phrase has only a relative meaning; its meaning is relative to the conception of God in the mind of the man who speaks. My point is that the culture of uncivilized societies is founded on the same basis as our own culture.
Now we can proceed with our analysis of the evidence unhampered by conceptions of spirits, gods, personified causes, or any other beings which by our translations have been credited to uncivilized minds.

149. The 'Unusual' as 'the Dead'. The word applied to the power in the universe and to the source of magic power was used also in another important context; and often, when used in this manner, it has been translated as 'the dead'.

Here we arrive at the most intricate part of our problem. I will state as clearly as I can both the nature of the difficulties and my solution of them.

The word or words (so far as they are available) which the eighty societies used in reference to the dead will be found in the fourth column of the Table of Native Terms (Appendix IV). First I will discuss the zoistic societies, then the manistic ones. The words used by the deistic societies will be considered in the next paragraph (para. 150).

There are forty-seven zoistic societies; but in no less than thirty-seven cases there is a lack of reliable evidence. In each case one or another of the native words is missing. In discussing the subject of 'the dead', therefore, we must concentrate, so far as zoistic societies are concerned, on ten societies only.

The thirty-seven zoistic societies which must be omitted are:

(a) Trobriand Islanders, Mafulu, Koita, Mailu.

We do not know the native term for the power in the universe which was manifest to the Trobriand Islanders or to the Mailu. Concerning the Koita also we must await further information. Moreover, I suspect that the word *sua*, which has been translated both as 'soul' and as 'spirits of the dead', may have been used in other contexts of which we are ignorant.

The native terms have not been quoted in the report on the Mafulu. 

(b) Twenty-five out of twenty-eight American Indian tribes, the necessary information being available only concerning the Tlingit, Haida, and Lillooet.

The word *wagi* appears in the Table in reference to No. 40, Dakota; but I suspect that *wagi* was applied not to the new identity assumed after death but to a spook.

(c) Ao, Angami, and Lhota Nagas, Mikirs, Garos; Chukchee, Koryak, and Yukaghir.

Our knowledge is incomplete in regard to the words used by these eight societies.

The ten zoistic societies concerning which the required evidence is available are the Loyalty Islanders, Tannese, Banks Islanders; Kiwai Papuans, Purari; Masai; Tlingit, Haida, and Lillooet Indians; Andaman Islanders. The native terms are tabulated on the opposite page.

Of these ten societies seven, namely, Loyalty Islanders, Tannese, Masai, Tlingit, Haida, Lillooet, and Andaman Islanders, used the same word in reference to the dead as they applied to the power in the universe. The remaining three, Banks Islanders, Kiwai Papuans, and Purari, used a dif-
different word. I will discuss them later (para. 166). For the moment I wish to confine my attention to the first seven, for the problem is to re-discover the native meaning of the word applied to the power in the universe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>The power in the universe</th>
<th>Word denoting something unusual or beyond comprehension</th>
<th>Word translated as or applied to 'ghost' or 'the dead'</th>
<th>The source of magic power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty Islanders</td>
<td>haze</td>
<td>? haze</td>
<td>haze</td>
<td>haze</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tannese</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banks Islanders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiwai PAPuans</td>
<td>ebihare</td>
<td>ebihare</td>
<td>ebihare</td>
<td>Native term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purari</td>
<td>imunu</td>
<td>imunu</td>
<td>a'avaia</td>
<td>imunu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Masai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>menengai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlingit</td>
<td>yek</td>
<td>yek</td>
<td>kinayek</td>
<td>yek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haida</td>
<td>sgana</td>
<td>sgana</td>
<td>'dead braves'</td>
<td>sgana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lillooet</td>
<td>snam</td>
<td>snam</td>
<td>snam</td>
<td>snam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andaman Islanders</td>
<td>lau</td>
<td>? lau</td>
<td>lau</td>
<td>lau</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

How is it that by these seven zoistic societies the same word was used to denote both the power in the universe (something-unusual or beyond-comprehension) and 'the dead'?

First it is necessary to assess the amount of inference which the reports contain. When a word is said to have meant 'the dead', we do not know if it was applied to all ghosts or only to some ghosts. Throughout anthropological literature some authorities say one thing, some another; in both cases difficulties arise. When the word is said to have been applied to all ghosts, there is a danger that the statement is an assumption, and possibly a false one, from its application to some ghosts. When it was definitely applied only to some ghosts, we are seldom told on what principle these ghosts were selected. There is also another point. Zoistic societies appear to have regarded a man's death as his final extinction. At any rate they carried out no such rites as would persuade us that they cherished a belief in his continued existence after death. Thus, when in a report on a zoistic society a word is translated as 'the dead', the truth may sometimes have been that it was applied merely to corpses, or to some corpses, and that our authorities have assumed the word to have meant 'the dead' because a conception of the dead is a common 'primitive' phenomenon. Hitherto we have been so accustomed to regard 'primitive' men as uniform in their opinions that we must always be on our guard against the inferences due to this assumption.

Two examples will illustrate what I mean.

In the Masai language menengai, a compound of ngai, is said to have meant 'corpses' or 'ghosts' (n. 384). Now the Masai were one of those tribes which appear to have regarded a man's death as his final extinction. As a son and heir went out of the kraal on the morning after he had cast
the corpse of his father into the bush, he kicked from his path the dead man's skull, this having been denuded of flesh by the beasts that prowled in the night. I doubt, therefore, if we can credit the Masai with the conception of 'ghosts'. I am inclined to regard the second translation of menengai as being due to the author's preconceptions, for, a number of African tribes having been reported as believing in ghosts, he may have assumed that all African tribes did so. Moreover there is explicit evidence that the Masai did not trouble their heads about a man after he was dead. So I accept 'corpses' but not 'ghosts' as a fair rendering of menengai, adding a rider to the effect that the word may have referred not to all corpses but only to some corpses.

The second example is of a different character. We are told (para. 63) that among the Loyalty Islanders 'a ghost or departed spirit was also sometimes called a haze'. Let us first subtract the animistic inference which has transformed the quality haze into an entity, and then appraise the word 'also'. The sentence does not mean, I think, that usually another word than haze was applied to ghosts and that sometimes haze was used in their reference; it means that sometimes a ghost also, as well as e.g. a stone, was called haze.

We are not told how the natives distinguished between a ghost which was haze and one which was not haze. If the word was really applied to ghosts, and not merely to corpses, my suggestion is that a man's ghost was haze if he had possessed haze when he was alive; that is to say, by their use of haze in that context the Loyalty Islanders distinguished between the ghosts of supernormal men and those of ordinary men. And this suggestion seems to be supported by the fact that the manistic Dinka (para. 83) used jok only in reference to the powerful dead, and that the Tlingit Indians (para. 103) employed a compound of yek, kinayek, when they spoke of dead braves. Yet it is at least possible that in this case also the natives were referring not to the ghost but to the corpse, for there is no reason to suppose that they had arrived at a conception of ghosts. When a Loyalty Islands haze-man died, would-be magicians contended for the possession of some part of his body (para. 30), hoping thereby to secure for themselves some of the magic power which was inherent in every part of it. Such a custom does not seem compatible with the conviction that the man had assumed a new identity; but it does suggest a special regard for a haze corpse. Now if I am right in thinking that by the Loyalty Islanders the word haze was applied not to some ghosts, as has been said, but merely to certain corpses, it would appear to follow that it was used only in reference to the corpses of those men who had possessed haze when they were alive. In a similar manner I conjecture that by the Masai menengai was used only in reference to the corpses of those who had possessed ngai when they were alive.

Thus, when a zoistic society is said to have applied to 'the dead' the same word as they applied to anything unusual or beyond their comprehension,
the first possibility is that the word was applied merely to corpses, or, more probably, only to some corpses. In the latter case we can understand the native terminology if we assume that the corpses were those of men whose manner of birth, life, or death had been supernormal. But there is another possibility too, and of a different nature. It refers to all reports concerning the word meaning ‘the dead’, whatever the cultural condition of the society under discussion.

Dr. Stannus has explained (para. 98) that in reply to many questions to which they had no ready answer, the Wayao used to ejaculate, *Mulungu*, using the word in the same careless manner as that in which we say ‘God knows’. By ‘God knows’ we mean either that the matter is beyond our understanding or that we are not interested in the subject; and it is possible, I think, that in answer to insistent questions concerning the fate of the dead many natives have used the words *jok, mulungu, atua* (or their analogues) in this manner, and that our authorities have reported this declaration of uninterested ignorance as if it were a straight answer to a direct question, telling us either that *mulungu, jok, atua*, &c., meant ‘the dead’, or that the souls of dead men became merged in *mulungu, jok, atua*, &c., whereas the truth was that the natives, being a little tired of the white man’s questionings, were merely saying ‘God knows’.

I do not know how far this conjecture is correct. It is at least sufficiently plausible to warrant the assumption that the reports in connexion with ‘the dead’ cannot be accepted at their face value. I am inclined to think that when a word meaning ‘unusual’ is said to have meant ‘the dead’, either it was used impulsively, in the sense of our ‘God knows’, or that it was connected in the minds of the natives with the corpses or with the ghosts of ‘unusual’ men, the alleged application of the word to the dead in general being a false inference from this fact.

There are three corroborative lines of argument.

In the first place, so far as the natives were concerned, the word denoted the quality in anything supernormal; thus it could be applied only to supernormal events or persons.

Secondly, much confusion has arisen out of the vague use of the word ‘ancestor-worship’; and if we accept the suggestion, this confusion disappears.

It is an extraordinary fact that hitherto, as soon as an uncivilized people have been observed to conduct a post-funeral rite, we have concluded that they worshipped their ancestors. We have not inquired whether or not all ancestors were treated in the same manner, or how the selection, if any, was made. Nor have we troubled to make sure that the recipients were ‘ancestors’ in any exact sense of the word. Yet clearly these points are of paramount importance.

The reasons for the inadmissible character of many reports of alleged ‘ancestor-worship’ are these. First, the term implies that the recipient of an offering was related by blood to the person who made it, whereas among
uncivilized peoples, as we have seen in the foregoing chapters, this was not always the case. Secondly, the word ‘worship’ is devoid of precise meaning. Almost certainly, as I have pointed out (para. 148), the rites we call ‘spirit-worship’ have never existed as such. Undoubtedly the rites called ‘ancestor-worship’ have existed; but I am by no means persuaded that their object was the worship of an ancestor. Indeed, when the facts have been carefully studied, it is plain that no manistic society conducted post-funeral rites in honour of every dead person; attention was paid only to the ghosts of those whose manner of birth, life, or death had been supernormal.

In the manistic SE. Solomon Islands (para. 33), when a man died, the natives consulted with one another as to whether any relic of him should be preserved or not; the inference is that they debated whether or not the dead man was powerful enough to harm or assist them in their daily lives. The manistic Akamba (para. 86), Wayao, and Anyanja (para. 98) honoured only the ghosts of distinguished citizens. The manistic Amazulu (para. 94) are said to have paid post-funeral attention only to the heads of families and to ‘chiefs’. In reference to the manistic stratum of the deistic Bakitara (n. 128) Canon Roscoe has said that the ghosts of people who had no property or power in this world were not feared and that no steps were taken to keep them in a good temper. Our knowledge of Tahitian rites is imperfect (para. 133; n. 586), but we know that post-funeral attention was paid only to those who had been distinguished in some form of human activity when they were alive, only those being remembered who had excelled their contemporaries in adventure and exploit. And that it was the supernormal character of these men’s lives which was responsible for offerings being made to them is clear from the fact that the natives regarded in the same manner any one whose manner of death had been supernormal. Thus normally the Bakitara (n. 128) did not trouble their heads about the ghosts of any female, but the ghost of a woman who had committed suicide was feared greatly. The special attention which the zoistic Kiwai Papuans (para. 74) paid to the corpse of a man who had been killed by a crocodile (sibara-adiri) is another instance of the same mental attitude.

A manistic society, therefore, cannot be accurately described as worshipping its ancestors; its members paid post-funeral attention only to the ghosts of supernormal persons, that is to say, to the ghosts of persons in whose manner of birth, life, or death jok, mulungu, atua (or analogous power) was manifest. Is it not natural, then, that these words should be applied to the ghosts? Do not these facts confirm my suggestion (supported by evidence, already cited, from the reports on the Dinka and Tlingit Indians) that when a word meaning ‘unusual’ is said to have meant ‘the dead’, actually the powerful dead only were referred to? Admittedly we are sometimes told, as for example in the report on the manistic Baronga (para. 93) that any man can become a ‘god’; but in my view such statements are misleading and betray the romantic nature of the report. It seems to me that the observer has noticed that post-funeral attention has been paid
to some dead men, and, neglecting to make exhaustive inquiries, has con-
cluded that the same attention was, or might be, paid to all dead men.

The differentiation between normal and supernormal men, which is so
marked in the rites of manistic peoples, is also a fundamental feature of
zoistic life. And this is the third corroborative argument which I wish to
advance.

Among zoistic societies it is common for different methods of burial to be
adopted for different men; and when we are told the reason for the differentia-
tion it is plain that the corpses of some men are treated in a special manner
because the manner of their birth, life, or death has been supernormal.

I will recount such evidence as I have been able to collect. Its quality
is not high; and as I am speaking only of those zoistic societies which
definitely applied to the dead the same word as that by which they denoted
the power in the universe, I exclude the five Assam societies, Ao, Angami,
and Lhota Nagas, Mikirs, and Garos; the three Palaeo-Siberian, Chukchee,
Koryak, and Yukaghir; the five Papuan, Kiwai Papuans, Mafulu, Purari,
Koita, and Mailu; and two of the Melanesian, Banks Islanders and Tro-
 briand Islanders. Out of the forty-seven zoistic societies thirty-two remain,
Loyalty Islanders, Tannese, Masai, Andaman Islanders, and twenty-eight
American Indian.

Among the Loyalty Islanders and Tannese various methods of disposal
were adopted; but we are not told on what basis the matter was decided.630

Among the Masai only some people were buried; the corpses of other
people were merely thrown away. Unfortunately the reports concerning
their identity conflict (para. 88; n. 384). Perhaps Christian influence had
affected the native customs before the later reports were written, this being
the explanation of the difference between the statements of the earlier and
later authorities. Among the Akikuyu (para. 85) and Akamba (para. 86),
who were only just manistic, only 'leading citizens' were buried, the corpses
of ordinary citizens being thrown to the hyenas.

I doubt if our knowledge of Andamanese burial customs is exhaustive;
but we are told (para. 138) that while the corpses of ordinary people were
merely buried, that of a person who died 'in the prime of life' was placed
in a tree. It seems possible that to the natives there was something incom-
prehensible in the death of a person who was in full possession of his or
her powers.

The evidence in connexion with the American Indians is disheartening
to a student who wishes to possess reliable evidence. In seven cases, those
of the Thompson, Shuswap, Coast Salish, Hidatsa, Mandan, Crow, and
Hopí, Christian influence had become paramount before the native cus-
toms were studied. In nine cases, those of the Nez Percés, Dene, Arapahe,
Iroquois, Omaha, Winnebago, Sia, Chickasaw, and Natchez, the pagan
rites are little known. Only concerning the remaining twelve tribes is any
information available; the members of all these tribes adopted different
methods of disposal for the corpses of different people. It seems hardly
credible, yet in no less than six of these twelve cases, those of the Klallam, Lillooet, Dakota, Navaho, Apache, and Creek, our authorities did not inquire, at any rate they have not reported, how the matter was decided. In the other six cases, those of the Tlingit, Haida, Ojibwa, Blackfeet, Zuni, and Pima, we are told that the body of a magician was treated in a special manner, being carefully placed in a high, isolated or other special place. Moreover, we are told also that among the Tlingit, Haida, and Pima the burial-place of a man who had possessed the power in the universe was especially revered and feared.

Thus there is reason to believe that in zoistic societies the special regard for a living magician was paid also to his corpse. It was treated in a special manner; its burial-place was feared. His sole claim to preferential treatment lay in the fact that in him the power in the universe was manifest. His burial-place was feared not because it was a burial-place but because the power in the universe was manifest there, this being confirmed by the fact that the same attention was paid to the corpse of a twin or of a suicide, or indeed of any person whose manner of birth, life, or death had been supernormal.

Granted, therefore, the division of phenomena into usual and unusual, normal and supernormal (I am concerned not with the psychological origin of this mental attitude but with the bare fact of its existence), it is rational for a zoistic society to apply the same word first, to the power in the universe, manifest in strange uncomprehended things (para. 146); secondly, to a magician who fundamentally is merely a supernormal man (para. 147); thirdly, to the corpses of those whose manner of birth, life, or death had been supernormal.

To this simple philosophy I have applied the term Dead Level of Conception (para. 66); and having analysed and appraised the evidence in its connexion, we have completed our most difficult task. A dead level of conception is the rational outcome of a reaction against anything unusual or beyond comprehension; and upon this basis, I submit, uncivilized culture (in my sense of the word 'culture') rests.

An important item in manistic life has also emerged from our analysis of the words applied to the dead, namely, that post-funeral attention was paid only to the ghosts of supernormal persons.

Now let us examine the words which our manistic societies used in reference to these ghosts.

There are twenty-one manistic societies. Concerning three, Ibibio, Khasis, and Nandi, the relevant evidence is either lacking or inadequate. The remaining eighteen divide themselves into three groups, containing four, six, and eight societies respectively. Those of the first group applied to the dead the same word as they used in reference to the power in the universe; but the evidence in their connexion is of a poor quality. Those
of the second group used a different word; this evidence is not relevant to
the subject of this paragraph. Those of the third group used the same word
as well as a different word; in these cases the evidence is good.

I will analyse the available material in each case.

1. The first group consists of the New Britons, Maori, Tahitians, and
Sea-Dyaks. The native words are tabulated in Table 1 (p. 274).

I have already made a preliminary evaluation of some of this evidence
(para. 90). In the case of the New Britons (para. 32), Maori (para. 49), and
Sea-Dyaks (para. 139) anglicized plurals, tebarans, atusas, and petaras,
have been formed out of the native words, and the hybrid given an ang-
licized meaning. The words have been translated as 'spirits', 'gods', and
'ghosts', a polymorphic culture thus being fabricated out of a simple con-
ception. Moreover in each case the post-funeral rites, such as they were,
have been only vaguely described. I can do no more, therefore, than record
that their conceptions were founded upon a dead level of conception, this
being obvious from the fact that the same word was used in reference to the
power in the universe, 'the dead', and the source of magic power.

The conceptions of the Tahitians also (para. 133) were founded on a dead
level of conception; but no more can safely be said. Our knowledge of their
post-funeral rites is imperfect; in the appropriate passages the native words
are not always quoted. Sometimes the word tiit has been translated (by Ellis) as 'the dead'; but as it was applied also to the figures placed on the
top of the stone structures and on canoes, I doubt if we can accept the
translation as a fair rendering of the word.

2. The manistic societies which used a different word for the dead from
that which denoted the power in the universe are shown in Table 2 (p. 274).

The imperfect character of the evidence is apparent. Indeed, five of the
societies inhabited a part of the Area of Profound Mystery (para. 66). The
reports on the Banyankole are not good, and have already been discussed
(paras. 61, 90).

3. The remaining eight societies applied to 'the dead' two different
words, one of these words being that which denoted the power in the
universe. The native terms are tabulated in Table 3 (p. 274).

From my analysis of this evidence I shall exclude the Akikuyu and
Anyanja. The ideas of the former seem to have been the same as those of
the Akamba; but in their case we are faced by some conflicting reports
(para. 85). As for the Anyanja (para. 98), their ideas and habits were almost
identical with those of the Wayao, but our knowledge of the latter is more
extensive. The Akamba, Wayao, Lango, Dinka, Shilluk, and SE. Solomon
Islanders remain.

It is clear that the ideas of these societies were founded on a dead level
of conception, for they used the same word to denote the power in the
universe, 'the dead', and the source of magic power; but when we analyse
their practices we see that the development from that mental condition
had been uneven.
ANALYSIS OF THE CULTURAL EVIDENCE

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>The power in the universe</th>
<th>Word denoting something unusual or beyond comprehension</th>
<th>Word translated as or applied to 'ghost' or 'the dead'</th>
<th>The source of magic power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Britons</td>
<td>tebaran</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>tebaran</td>
<td>tebaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>atua</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>atua</td>
<td>atua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahitians</td>
<td>petara</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>petara</td>
<td>petara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea-Dyaks</td>
<td>antu</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>antu</td>
<td>antu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>The power in the universe</th>
<th>Word denoting something unusual or beyond comprehension</th>
<th>Word translated as or applied to 'ghost' or 'the dead'</th>
<th>The source of magic power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banyankole</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>mizimu (pl.)</td>
<td>No definite report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awemba</td>
<td>milungu</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>mipashi (pl.)</td>
<td>No report; Sometimes 'possession' musamo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baila</td>
<td>leza</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>mizhimo (pl.)</td>
<td>Inherited; Tilo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baronga</td>
<td>musano</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>shikwembu (sing.)</td>
<td>Inherited, &amp;c. Learnt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazulu</td>
<td>shikwembu tilo</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>itongo (sing.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basuto</td>
<td>molimo</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>idhlozi (sing.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>balimo (pl.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>The power in the universe</th>
<th>Word denoting something unusual or beyond comprehension</th>
<th>Word translated as or applied to 'ghost' or 'the dead'</th>
<th>The source of magic power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>? ngai</td>
<td>ngoma-ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akamba</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>? ngai</td>
<td>aina-ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayao</td>
<td>mulungu</td>
<td>mulungu</td>
<td>mulungu</td>
<td>mulungu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyanja</td>
<td>mulungu</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>loko (sing.)</td>
<td>No report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lango</td>
<td>jok</td>
<td>jok</td>
<td>jok</td>
<td>jok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinka</td>
<td>jok</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>jok</td>
<td>jok (of tiet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE. Solomon Islanders (Ulawa and Sa’a)</td>
<td>akalo</td>
<td>? akalo</td>
<td>akalo</td>
<td>akalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shilluk</td>
<td>jwok</td>
<td>jwok</td>
<td>jwok</td>
<td>jwok</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Akamba (para. 86) conceived of *aimu*, 'spirits of the dead', but they so confused *aimu* with *ngai (mulungu)*, the power in the universe, that to our authorities it was always uncertain for which an offering was intended. Moreover their conception of 'the dead' was not formulated clearly, for they seem to have thought of the dead in a mass, this mass being confused with *ngai (mulungu)*. The Akamba, too, had a short memory, for they believed that after a time 'the dead' disappeared, being replaced by other 'dead' which vanished in their turn. Yet, as I remarked when I summarized their culture (para. 89), the Akamba must have made some distinction, albeit a vague one, between *aimu* and *ngai (mulungu)*, for otherwise they would not have used two words to denote them.

In a similar manner when the Wayao (para. 98) used *mulungu* in reference to 'the dead', they conceived of 'the aggregate of the spirits of the dead', 'a village of departed spirits'. In reference to an individual ghost, however, they used the word *lisoka, pl. masoka*. When they passed the grave of a *mulungu*-man, the people said, *Masoka*; but the offering at the grave-hut was made not to *masoka* but to *mulungu*, the confusion between the various meanings of the word being so great that no one could tell whether the offering was made to *mulungu* as a group of ghosts, to *mulungu* as an individual ghost, or, presumably, to *mulungu* as the power in the universe. Moreover, Yao memory was short, for when a *mulungu*-man died, the tendance of his predecessor ceased, the newly deceased man being the *lisoka (or mulungu)* which was placated.

The same ideas were current among the Lango (para. 84), who used the word *jok* in reference to the power in the universe, to the source of magic power, and to 'the dead'; but just as the ideas of the Wayao (by virtue of their conception of an individual ghost) were more developed than those of the Akamba, so the ideas of the Lango were more developed than those of the Wayao. By the Lango an individual ghost was called *tipo*; but among them there was no such confusion between *jok* and *tipo* as existed among the Wayao between *mulungu* and *lisoka*. In this detail the Lango made a distinction which the Wayao disregarded; the Wayao were guilty of a confusion which was foreign to the clearer thought of the Lango. The length of Lango memory, however, was not greater than that of the Wayao, for no man handed over to a successor the shrine of his *tipo*. Eventually every *tipo* lost its individual identity and became merged (we are told) in *jok*.

When we turn to the *Dinka* (para. 83) we find that these differences are accentuated. By the word *jok* the Dinka denoted the power in the universe, the source of magic power, and the powerful dead, the ghost of an individual ghost being *atiep*; but among them some dead men were tended for more than one generation, the care of their shrines being handed over to a successor. A magician, Deng-dit, who may have been a noted rain-maker, for his name meant 'Great Rain', was both remembered and tended for several generations. So also were his sons. Yet even among the Dinka there was some confusion between the power in the universe (or the powerful dead
in a mass) and Deng-dit, for sometimes Deng-dit and jok were spoken of as if they were identical.

(I am inclined to place the Tahitians on the same level as the Dinka. If our information were sufficiently good, we should find, I think, that such beings as Matatine and Matabu-fenua (n. 586) were tended in the same manner as Deng-dit.)

The SE. Solomon Islanders (para. 33) differed from the Dinka in so far as their post-funeral rites partook of the nature of cult as well as of the nature of tendance; but in regard to the length of their memory we must bracket them with the Dinka. They placed the relics of successful fishermen (n. 79) and of renowned warriors (n. 86) in special sacred places, the cult of these powerful ghosts being handed over to a successor; but the cult of any individual ghosts soon sank into oblivion before the rising importance of a newly dead man, the neglected relics of his predecessor being the only memorial of him that remained.

It is clear, therefore, that in the manner of their remembrance of individual dead men the mental powers of the SE. Solomon Islanders and the Dinka had developed to a greater extent than those of the Lango, and that the Lango in their turn were more developed than the Wayao, the Wayao than the Akamba, and the Akamba than the zoistic Masai, who celebrated their dead warriors in a dance and then forgot them (n. 384). The one common trait in the ideas of all these societies is that their ideas were founded on a dead level of conception. Manifestly too the ideas of the Shilluk also were founded on the same basis, for they used jwok in those contexts in which the Lango used jok. The memory of the Shilluk, however, was considerable. They not only conducted a cult as well as a tendance of the powerful dead; they still honoured a number of powerful men some of whom, according to the natives, had been dead for eleven generations.

Thus according to the manner in which they remembered and placated their powerful dead, these six societies may be placed in this order:

Tendance only

1. Akamba.

2. Wayao.

3. Lango.

4. Dinka.

Tendance and Cult

5. SE. Solomon Islanders.


I must beg that their relative positions be noted, for I intend to place them on another scale according to the manner in which they elaborated their sacred places. We shall see that they occupy the same relative positions. In this manner I shall be able to corroborate my conclusions and to justify my criteria, for if according to different standards of judgement the same societies arrange themselves in the same order, the inference is not
only that they have been placed correctly but also that the standards of
judgement were well conceived.

Let me summarize the first truth that has emerged from the analysis of
the manistic evidence in regard to the word translated ‘the dead’.

The conceptions of manistic societies appear to have developed from a
dead level of conception; but the first great difference between their ideas
and those of a zoistic (dead level of conception) society was a consciousness
of the past. These manistic people remembered and conciliated their
powerful dead, while the zoistic people forgot and neglected them. Thus
when a society ceased to be zoistic and became manistic one of the details
of the cultural change seems to have consisted in the growth and extension
of their memory. Now it seems to me that this extension of memory cannot
have been due to anything but a mental effort. Thus, so far as the memory
of ‘the dead’ was concerned, the factor responsible for the change from the
zoistic to the manistic condition must have been one that induced thought
and reflection. It must have been absent in zoistic societies and present in
manistic societies. Moreover it must have been present in uneven force
among the manistic societies, being operative to a greater degree, for
instance, among the Wayao than among the Akamba, and among the
Shilluk than among any other manistic society.

Now we will consider, first, the recipient of the offerings made by our
eighty societies, and, secondly, the place in which these offerings were made.
In zoistic (dead level of conception) societies the recipient was the strange
quality in anything unusual; the place in which the offerings were made was
the ‘unusual’ place, all human ideas of taboo, sin, and sacredness being
derivative from these sources; but among manistic and deistic societies
a change of opinion is apparent, offerings being made by manistic societies
first to the powerful dead, then to a single powerful ghost for a short
period, then to a single powerful ghost for a longer period. Coincident with
these changes of opinion there occurred an elaboration and decoration of
the places in which the offerings were made.

When we have considered this evidence, we shall have seen that
1. each type of behaviour, zoistic, manistic, and deistic, is founded upon
   a conception of the ‘unusual’;
2. a change from one type of behaviour to another occurred as a result
   of a change in ideas, any cultural advance being produced by mental
   energy.

§ 150. The ‘Unusual’ as the Recipient. It is self-evident that the offerings
of a zoistic (dead level of conception) society were made to the power in
the universe, for this is the only power of which it conceived. I shall
not describe the nature of these offerings or the method of their presenta-
tion; for these details I refer the reader to the appropriate paragraphs in
the preceding chapters. Here I shall do no more than select a few illustra-
tions from the available evidence. And, even if this method were not
desirable for the sake of brevity and lucidity, inevitably it would be forced upon me, for, as I have often said, most of our observers have neglected to describe the native rites, having concentrated their attention on the native beliefs alone. Moreover, of our forty-seven zoistic societies, twenty-eight were American Indian; and of American Indian pagan rites we are sadly ignorant.

Generally speaking the offerings made by zoistic societies were designed either as a defence against danger or as a means of securing help.

When a Tlingit Indian (para. 103), on passing the burial place of a magician, threw some food into the sea, he was warding off the danger of contact with yek. He made no such sacrifice when he passed the grave of an ordinary man. Similarly, when the Masai (n. 384) threw stones on the graves of those people whom they buried, they were shielding themselves from the perils of ngai. The Masai conducted no post-funeral rites in honour of their dead for the simple reason that they did not trouble their heads about the ghosts of men, who were forgotten as soon as they died.

These two examples are of offerings which were made to the power in the universe at the graves of powerful men. The offerings which were made at any unusual place were of an identical character. The Mafulu (para. 75) guarded themselves against the 'spirits' (the native term is missing) which were manifest in 'specially peculiar and unusual' places by throwing aside a handful of grass as they passed. The food which was offered to kaei'imunu, imunu of the thunder, by the Purari (para. 76) was regarded as a defence against imunu. If a Dakotan Indian (n. 522) dreamt that he was in danger, he went a few yards away from his tent, cleared away the grass, put his wakan-stone in the middle of the patch, and placed before the stone some feathers or tobacco. In this manner, he considered, he protected himself from the calamity which threatened him.

The other idea, that of securing the help of the power in the universe, is apparent in the behaviour of the Loyalty Islanders (para. 30), to which I have already drawn attention. In the Loyalty Islands, when a magician or a hase-man died, his bones were literally bones of contention; the survivors contended for the possession of parts of his body, their object being to secure for themselves the hase which was inherent in every part of it. To the Loyalty Islanders, as also to the Tannese (para. 31), Banks Islanders (para. 72), Koita (n. 331), Dakotan (n. 522), and Crow Indians (n. 530), the power in the universe was also manifest in stones of an unusual shape or of an uncommon type; and a man 'sacrificed' at such a stone in order to secure the assistance of the power which it contained. A Banks Islander (para. 72) also placed offerings before an unusual animal, or in the place where he had seen it. Indeed, whenever he was impressed by the sight of an unusual phenomenon, he apprehended the presence of vui; and he scattered offerings there. The recipient of these zoistic gifts was not a spirit or a god in our sense of those vague words, but vui, hase, ngai, imunu, wakan, or yek, according to the language of the people. The mem-
bers of our other zoistic societies called the power unhgen, sgana, snam, sulia, tamanous, munedoo, natosio, maxpe, or lau, according as they were members of the society of the Tannese, Haida, Lillooet, Coast Salish, Klallam, Ojibwa, Blackfeet, Crow, or Andaman Islanders. There was no difference in the pattern either of the conception or of the rite, for each of those words denoted the strange quality in anything unusual, wherever it was manifest.

Now this power, the recipient of zoistic offerings, was manifest not only in any unusual place, in any place where anything unusual had occurred, and in the burial place of a dead magician, but also in a living magician; and fundamentally the objects of the payments made to him by zoistic societies were identical with those of the 'sacrifices' I have already mentioned. For a magician, as we have seen (para. 147), was simply a man who possessed the power in the universe; and just as his contemporaries made offerings to the power in the universe either to ward off the danger inherent in any of its manifestations or to secure it for themselves, so they made payments to him either to prevent him from doing them harm or as a reward for exercising his power on their behalf. The American Indian who made a payment to a living man for the help of a magic 'bundle' was acting from the same motives as his brother who placed an offering before a wakan-stone or before wakan in the sun. In each case the help of the power in the universe was being acknowledged or requested. Moreover, the character of the offerings made directly to the power in the universe was identical with that of the payments made to living men. Usually the offerings made to the power consisted of food, drink, tobacco, cloth, or of anything else that appealed to human frailty or satisfied a human desire.

I do not wish any doubt to arise on this important point, for unless it is understood it is almost impossible to comprehend the nature of the change from the zoistic to the manistic condition. The identification by zoistic societies of the payment to a living magician and an offering to the power in the universe has been obscured only because we have called the former a payment and the latter a 'sacrifice'. Moreover, after we have used the word 'sacrifice', we have been inclined to assume that there existed in the native mind some of the ideas which we associate with it. In this manner we have not only concealed the native ideas but also transferred to them some of our own. The faults are apparent as soon as we speak in native terms; and the meaning of the Banks Island oloolo shows clearly what I mean. It was applied both to the payments made to living magicians and to offerings made to the power in the universe, both to the money set aside for the recital of an incantation and to that placed in a marana, sanctuary. Indeed it denoted the money paid for any exertion of supernormal power, whether the power was exerted by a stone, rock, animal, or living man. Oloolo has been translated as 'sacrifice', but the translation is both inexact and misleading. A man was said to oloolo his money when he consulted a magician. If he had a vui-stone, he was said to oloolo on or at the stone.
He was never thought to *oololo* to the stone or to *vui* which was manifest in the stone. Yet that is what our word 'sacrifice' implies. It was the same if a man scattered money in front of an animal that possessed some unusual or uncommon characteristic; he was said to *oololo* not to the animal but in the place where he had seen it. Incalculable harm has been done to our study of uncivilized ideas by the translation of such words as *oololo* as 'sacrifice' and of such words as *vui* as 'spirit', for by virtue of such inaccurate translations, and by no other means at all, we have concluded that uncivilized men propitiate 'spirits', whereas the truth is that according to the native terminology zoistic men simply place offerings in 'unusual' places, their object in doing so being identical with that of the payments made to living magicians (n. 294).

The ideas of manistic societies are similar. They also regard the power in the universe as dangerous to touch, yet precious to possess; they also consult their magicians when they need help or protection; they also make offerings to the power and payments to magicians, and for identical purposes; but whereas zoistic societies only make payments to a magician when he is alive, manistic societies continue to make payments to him after he is dead. And it is in this important detail that manistic behaviour differs from zoistic behaviour. We have already seen (para. 149) that the first fundamental difference between zoistic and manistic societies lay in their memory of the powerful dead: whereas the former forgot them, the latter remembered them for varying lengths of time. Now we come to the second fundamental difference: manistic societies not only remembered the powerful dead but also propitiated them, their behaviour being ten- dance or cult according as their desire was to escape danger or to secure assistance. I have suggested that the first difference was due to thought and reflection. This seems to be the explanation of the second difference also.

Let us try to imagine what happened when a zoistic society became manistic. First we must grant the premises on which zoistic societies base their conduct. Let us suppose, then, that a zoistic magician had been called in to heal a sick man, that he had pronounced without effect the counter-spells which were the usual corrective in a case of witchcraft, and that the sick man had not been guilty of trespass on sacred ground or of any other sin. Normally in a zoistic society the magician could think of no other method of treatment; he excused his failure by saying that the sickness was due either to the machinations of a more powerful magician or to the power in the universe. Now let us suppose that for some reason or other the power of his thought had been stimulated or intensified. My suggestion is that his mind would turn from the living to the dead. Perhaps the patient was an enemy of a recently deceased magician, and their differences had not been adjusted before the latter died. Perhaps a notorious wizard was newly dead. Since no living man had caused the trouble could it be that the responsibility lay with the dead man? Would it not be worth while to placate him in case the idea was correct? I do not
know how many visits our friend would make to his patient before he resolved to put his theory into practice, or how many vigils he would keep on the hillside while he wrestled with his problem; but my suggestion is that after due consideration he decided to make an attempt to placate the dead man by making to him such a payment as would have been made to him had he been alive. So the sick man would be told to place some food aside for the ghost of the dead man and to announce in a loud voice that he had done so.

In some such manner as this, I submit, the rites of tendance were inaugurated in a zoistic society. The rites having been generally adopted, the cultural condition of the society changed from zoistic to manistic.

There is another possibility. In zoistic societies, indeed throughout uncivilized life, the youths were under the close surveillance of their elders, who chid them if they infringed the social customs, insisted on a rigid observance of the established order, and punished any disregard of convention. Moreover, especially in a patrilineal society, a father was angry if he was neglected or disobeyed. Let us suppose that in a zoistic society a rich young man was being afflicted by a series of misfortunes. There was no apparent reason for his ill luck; he had tried the usual counter-magic without success; the magicians could not help him. Normally in a zoistic society nothing more was done; the affictions were ascribed to more powerful magic or to unwitting sin. Now let us suppose that for some reason or other the power of the youth’s thought was stimulated or intensified. I suggest that his mind would revert to his late father who had been a powerful and influential man when he was alive. Perhaps the youth would remember that recently he had done certain things of which his father would have disapproved. Is it fanciful to suggest that after due consideration the youth would attribute his misfortunes to his father’s anger? Would he not hasten, after a period of reflection, to placate the dead man’s anger by an offering of food or drink? In a zoistic society no such rites were conducted; but every manistic society adopted the ghostly theory of causation after unassisted magic had failed.

In order to account, therefore, for the inauguration of the rites which we call tendance, and thus for the change from the zoistic to the manistic condition, we must find a factor, present in manistic and absent in zoistic societies, which intensified thought and reflection.

It is only possible to make these suggestions in a very general manner. Manistic rites were so various that even if it were desirable to trace the growth of them all, the argument would be swamped by a flood of detail. Thus I shall do no more than illustrate by these examples what I consider was the probable line of thought which zoistic societies followed when they began to become manistic, the change being complete when the new rites had become part of the inherited tradition of a proportion of the society. Before this could happen, however, a number of people must have been persuaded of both the necessity for and the efficacy of the rites, for unless
they had been convinced of both these things, the rite would not have been generally adopted. It is unlikely that all the people adopted them, for, as I have said (para. 145), a cultural advance is seldom uniform throughout a society; usually in a manistic society there remains a zoistic stratum; but some section of the society must have seen fit to conduct the new rites or they would have fallen into desuetude. It is possible, perhaps, for an outstanding man to devise a rite of a higher cultural pattern, and for other people to adopt his ritual without thought or reflection; indeed there is no doubt in my mind that in many zoistic societies some experiments of this character are often made; but unless the converts to the new methods had indulged in the same thought and reflection as was necessary for the original revolution, those methods would be discontinued on the death of their originator. If, on the other hand, the converts also had applied the power of their reason to the innovation, and found it desirable, they would not only continue to conduct the rites; they would also hand them on to their children. Thus the actual change in the cultural condition of the society would depend not only on the genius of the individual revolutionary but also upon the psychological condition of his contemporaries.532

The rites which we call tendance, then, seem to have developed from the payments which zoistic societies made to a living magician, these being identical with those which they made before the power in the universe. Let me put forward a corroborative argument.

The zoistic rites, I submit, changed into manistic rites as the result of thought and reflection. Naturally the mental effort first changed the conceptions; the new rites were merely the outward manifestation of the new ideas. If, then, I am correct in tracing the development of the rites of tendance from an offering before the unusual, wherever manifest, we should expect some manistic societies to conceive of ghosts as existing in places where zoistic societies see only the strange quality manifest in anything unusual. The facts fulfil this expectation. In Africa large trees (especially fig-trees), rather than stones, were regarded as the residence of the power in the universe, impressing the people by their unusual, incomprehensible character. This is especially reported in reference to the Akamba (para. 86), Lango (n. 356), Wayao (para. 98), and Baila (n. 403); but between the ideas of these societies there was an interesting difference which supports my suggestion. In these trees the Lango and Wayao beheld the power in the universe, jok and mulungu, respectively; the Akamba saw both mulungu and aimu, the power in the universe and ghosts; the Baila regarded the trees as the residence only of ghosts, mishimo.

According to the evidence, the majority of our twenty-one manistic societies only tended the powerful dead; they did this, as we have seen, for varying lengths of time; but they did not carry out any post-funeral rites which were exclusively an appeal for help (do ut des). Only two of them, indeed, Shilluk and SE. Solomon Islanders, can definitely be said to have conducted a cult of the great dead. And it is noteworthy that the
memory of these two societies was longer than that of most other manistic tribes. The fact suggests that our standards of judgement are not mistaken, for the same societies occupy the same relative position to each other according to two different criteria.

If the above suggestions be acceptable, the development of a *do ut des* rite is not difficult to understand. The idea of a powerful dead man as the cause of affliction having sunk into the native consciousness, it is only a small step to the conviction that a powerful ghost can assist in an undertaking. Once again all that seems to have been needed is an intensification of thought and reflection. Instead of relying on their own unaided magic the natives requested the help of a man who recently had lived among them. It may be that the first man to inaugurate a cult of the great dead had lost confidence in his own magic powers. Possibly he may have gone farther and perceived the futility of all magical incantations, refusing to accept any longer the excuses made by living magicians to account for their failures. Again, he may have contemplated an unusually dangerous or difficult operation, and doubted his ability to perform the task single-handed. Provided that the man's thought was intensified, I can conceive of all these and many other reasons for his introduction of a new rite. By some students, however, humility and disillusion may be regarded as part of the white man's psychology and as alien to an uncivilized mentality. In that case I should attribute the inauguration of cult to mere self-interest. With a natural regard for his own interests the man wished to bring all possible power to bear, and to secure all possible help; so after due consideration he approached the sacred precincts not in order to placate the dead man's anger but in order to secure his help.\(^{633}\)

Thus all that would be needed to change manistic (tendance) into manistic (cult) behaviour would be a further intensification of the same thought and reflection which was responsible for the change from the zoistic to the manistic (tendance) condition. The factor responsible for the latter seems to have been responsible for the former also, but evidently it was present in manistic (cult) societies to a greater degree than in manistic (tendance) societies.

It is interesting to observe the new meanings which creep into the native words when a cult of the dead is established. In reference to *jwok* the Shilluk (para. 82) used the word *lama*, 'conjure', but to a dead hero they were said to *kewacho*, 'ask for, beg'. In the SE. Solomon Islands (para. 33) an ordinary *akalo* was thought to *ta'ei*, to possess or inspire a man, but a powerful *li'oa* was his *iusi*, twin. No man exorcized a *li'oa*, as he exorcized an *akalo, tola akalo*; such treatment was beneath the dignity of a *li'oa*, which was approached by prayer and sacrifice.

We have now followed the change from the zoistic to the manistic pattern according to

(a) the growth of memory, which makes the survivors think of a powerful man who otherwise would have been forgotten;
(b) the introduction by an individual, and the adoption by the society, of post-funeral rites in honour of that powerful man;
(c) the extension of memory as the society proceeded up the manistic cultural scale, the dead man being remembered for an increasing period of time;
(d) the change from tendance to cult.
In each case, I suggest, the change was due to mental effort.
Now we must discuss the change from the manistic to the deistic pattern.
Hitherto most students of human affairs have been accustomed to speak of the more advanced uncivilized societies as believing in gods, but, as I have said (para. 148), before we can say that any particular society believed in gods as distinct from any other power or powers, we must define the criteria by which we judge whether a power be a god or not. Moreover, those criteria must be such as to be applied with ease and certainty to the culture of any uncivilized people. For my own part I do not understand how the power or powers in the universe, as conceived by uncivilized men, can be classified except according to the manner in which a right relation was maintained with them, and for this reason I should like to define the word 'god' as a power manifesting itself in the universe with which a right relation is maintained in a temple; but this is not the meaning attached to it by the writers on whose testimony we must rely for our knowledge of uncivilized culture. These use the word 'god' in an extremely loose manner. For instance, according to Sir A. B. Ellis (paras. 42, 62), the greater power and sway of the Yoruba gods had caused ancestor-worship to be relegated to an inferior position, but Sir Arthur does not say how he decided which powers were ancestors and which gods. Certainly he cannot have relied on his knowledge of the native terminology, for the word which he translates 'god' is orisha, and, according to Mr. Dennett, orisha also meant 'deified departed one' (n. 145). Similarly, Dr. Brown considers (para. 50) that among the Samoans 'ancestor-worship had gradually given place to the worship of a superior order of supernatural beings'. Dr. Brown does not tell us by what criteria he judged whether a power was an ancestor or a superior kind of 'supernatural being'; nor can his report have been founded on native terminology, for the same native word, aitu, was applied both to a dead man and to those superior beings. Among the Tongans, too, we are told (n. 208), 'the number of gods was liable to constant augmentation by the deification of the illustrious and well-beloved dead'. The author does not say how he decided that a ghost had been deified, or in what the deification consisted. When, indeed, does a ghost cease to be a ghost and become a god?

It is obvious that no conclusion can be satisfactory if it is founded on such loose phraseology. Let us examine, then, the meaning of the terms by which the natives denoted the powers which were manifest in their temples. They are to be found in the Table of Native Terms (Appendix IV) and are available in nine out of ten cases, the Aztecs being the only instance
in which the information is lacking. The nine other deistic societies are the Fijians, Bakitara, Baganda, Yoruba, Dahomans, Ashanti, Samoans, Tongans, and Gilbert Islanders. Four were Oceanic, five were African. The evidence in regard to the former is indisputable, in regard to the latter probable and inferential.

In a Fijian temple (para. 34) the kalou-vu was manifest; he was an illustrious dead man. It was only in degree that the kalou-vu differed from the kalou-yalo, a less powerful but still eminent dead man who was conciliated in another place. Similarly, the Samoan aitu (para. 50) was 'he that is dead'. The Tongan word otua (para. 51) was applied to anything unusual or beyond Tongan comprehension and to the souls of the dead; this exhausts the native use of the word. We do not know the precise manner in which the Gilbert Islanders used atua; but among them tapu-ariki is said to have been a famous god (paras. 134, 145). Literally the word meant 'sacred chief'; but in the available literature this purely descriptive term has been spelt with a capital T, our authorities debating at great length the relative importance of Tapuariki, Wanigain, and other 'gods'. Some of them say that Tapuariki and Wanigain were identical; others affirm that Tapuariki was identical also with other gods. The truth seems to have been that the power manifest in every Gilbert Island temple was tapu-ariki, a sacred chief or dead chieftain.

To the members of these Oceanic societies, therefore, the powers which were manifest in their temples were ghosts. We may call them 'gods', but if we do so we must remember that for the purpose of classification we are merely applying a technical term to the native conceptions. From the native point of view there was no difference, except in degree, between the kalou, aitu, or otua placated at the graveside and the kalou, aitu, or otua approached in a temple.

Now let us consider the five African societies.

We do not know the native meaning of the Kitara word muchwezi or of the Uganda word lubare, but that 'bewildering collection of beings', the Kitara bachwezi, who were manifest in the Kitara temples, are said to have been dead kings (para. 38). Similarly, the Uganda balubare were dead rulers of Uganda, whose mutual relationship was remembered by the people (para. 39). Until they were converted to Christianity, the Baganda built a new temple wherein was placed the jawbone of a newly dead king. To the jawbone, they considered, the ghost attached itself especially. A similar opinion was held by the Tahitians (para. 133). Moreover, dead kings were not the only mortals that were deified by the Baganda. A distinguished female medium of the rain-god Musoke became the goddess Nagawonyi, and in time of drought female supplicants were dispatched to her temple (n. 137).

In regard to the three West African societies, Yoruba, Dahomans, and Ashanti, there is little direct evidence. Admittedly the Yoruba word orisha has not only been translated 'deified departed one' but also been
equated with the Dahoman *vodu* and Ashanti *bohsum* (n. 145); but it would be rash, I think, to conclude on such slender evidence that the latter words, like *orisha*, were used in reference to the dead. In two of these cases, however, the native traditions support the conclusion based on the Oceanic evidence. Just as among the Fijians the *kalou-vu* Ndengei and Tanovu are said to have been immigrant rulers, the former being recognized throughout the Fijian Islands except the Lau group, the latter being *kalou-vu* of Ono, so also among the Yoruba and Dahomans temples are said to have been erected to distinguished foreigners. Thus among the Dahoman 'gods' there were two kings and two sailors. Both the kings are reputed to have wielded great power when they were alive. One was king of Porto Novo, the other of Dahomey proper. Of the two sailors one was captain of the first ship which anchored in the harbour; the other was his assistant. Both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Talbot assert that the Yoruba 'god' Shango was the fourth king of that land, and that the 'goddess' Odudua, his reputed grandmother, was an immigrant.

Thus there is much probable and inferential evidence which supports my first conclusion; but since I am appraising as well as analysing the evidence I should add that without the indisputable evidence such illustrations as these would have no evidential value. To base an argument on them alone would be as foolish as to maintain that Jupiter had once been a man because temples were built to Caesar.

The recipients of the offerings made by our deistic societies, then, seem to have been the same as the recipients of the manistic offerings, namely, the ghosts of powerful dead men; and the great difference in this connexion between the deistic and the manistic societies is that by the former the dead men were remembered and placated for a longer time.

There are two corroborative arguments.

In the first place, we have seen that it was the custom for manistic societies to placate the ghosts of powerful men who when they were alive excelled in some human activity. Thus the manistic SE. Solomon Islanders (para. 33) used to preserve the relics of their famous men in special relic-houses. When they went to sea or to war they placed offerings before the relics of successful fishermen or of noted warriors, and begged for their assistance. These men, however, were remembered only for a short time; soon their place in the popular estimation was taken by the ghosts of newly dead men whose earthly exploits were fresher in the memory of the people. Now among the deistic Fijians many professions had their special *kalou*, 'god', who was approached under appropriate circumstances. Thus Aokova and Rokola were invoked by carpenters, Vava by fishermen, and so on. The rites conducted in their honour have not been described; yet it is not plain that these 'gods' were dead men who had been skilled in carpentry and fishing when they were alive? From the native point of view they cannot well have been anything else, for the natives called them *kalou*.
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I place a similar interpretation on the Samoan 'gods' Ponge and Toafa, the parents of Saato, the 'god' of rain (n. 203). To a Samoan Saato was aitu, 'he that is dead'; and the inference is that he was a noted rain-maker and that the stone which is said to have 'represented' him was the magical instrument by means of which he had wrought his miracles.

Similarly, the Tongan 'gods' of artificers and arts appear to have been dead craftsmen, Toobo having been an eminent sailor, Alai-valoo a successful healer, and Alo-alo a rain-maker (n. 208). Probably, too, the Dahoman Atinbodum, patron saint of medicine-men, had been a successful medical practitioner (para. 99). The Aztec 'god' Quetzalcoatl, according to native tradition, was once a mortal man (n. 157).

The great difference between these ghosts and those to which the manistic societies made offerings was, first, that these had been remembered for a longer time, their cult being handed on from generation to generation, and, secondly, that temples were erected in their honour.

The second corroborative argument refers to the Ashanti. Three of the most important ceremonies which the Ashanti conducted were the adae, affrahabi (afahye), and odwira (ojirrah). Concerning the recipients of the offerings which were made during the celebrations, the reports conflict (n. 466): the offerings which according to Capt. Rattray were made to the gods are said by Sir A. B. Ellis to have been made to ghosts; those which Sir A. B. Ellis connects with the gods are said by Capt. Rattray to have been a propitiation of the ancestral spirits. Neither of these observers quotes the native terms; neither of them states the facts on which their opinions were based. My suggestion is that the reports do not contradict one another; their contrariness seems too complete. From the native point of view the recipients may have been the same in each case, the distinction between ghosts and gods being due to the translation of one native word by two different English words.

So far as the recipients of the offerings were concerned, therefore, the change from the manistic to the deistic condition was of the same nature as that from the zoistic to the manistic condition. From a dead level of conception there emerged a conception of an individual ghost. By manistic societies a dead man was remembered and conciliated for varying lengths of time; but in the deistic societies his cult was handed on from generation to generation, and to a new generation he appeared not merely as a ghost but as a definite and formidable power which could be approached only in a temple and which was in charge of some natural or human activity.

The conclusion which I draw is that the change from the manistic to the deistic condition was produced by the same factor as that which produced the change from the zoistic to the manistic condition; but evidently the factor was operative in the deistic societies to a greater degree than in the manistic societies, for just as the memory of the manistic societies was greater than the memory of the zoistic societies, so the memory of the deistic societies was greater than that of the manistic societies.
The last evidence which I wish to analyse and appraise is that which is available concerning the place in which the offerings were made.

151. The 'Unusual' as the Place. We have already seen (para. 150) that the place in which the members of zoistic societies conducted some of their rites was the 'unusual' place, that is, either a place which for some reason was of an impressive character or a place where a dead magician was buried. There is no need to refer again to the evidence. Zoistic people, however, seem to have conducted some rites in other places also, the selection of these places depending either upon the whim of a magician or upon the nature of the matter in hand. Hitherto I have spoken of the place in which a rite was conducted as if it were identical with the place in which an offering was made, but many zoistic rites did not involve the presentation of an offering, and we must distinguish these from the others, for it is only in those entailing an offering that we are interested.

There are difficulties, however, for the rites have been reported but scantily, and it is not always clear whether an offering was made or not. For instance, sometimes incantations had to be sung when a canoe was being made, when the completed canoe was launched, or when a special canoe went forth to face the unknown perils of the open sea (as distinct from the more familiar dangers of the local waters). Usually these incantations were sung by magicians, but occasionally the ordinary citizens uttered them. In the latter case no offering may have been made, so no problem arises. In the former case we are not always told whether the magician was or was not paid for his services. If he was paid, the payment would be the equivalent of an offering to the power in the universe, for his selection as precentor was solely on account of his possession of that power. If, on the other hand, he was not paid, the rite involved no offering; the man acted as an honorary benefactor to the community. Similarly among some zoistic agricultural peoples certain magical rites had to be conducted when the crops were planted and reaped, when rain came in too great or in too small quantities, or when the even tenor of life was interrupted by an untimely event. Maybe on these occasions too the magicians who recited the appropriate chants were not paid for their services; they merely placed their outstanding genius at the service of their fellow men; but if they were paid, the payments they received were identical with the offerings made to any other manifestation of the power in the universe. Naturally the variety of these rites depended greatly on the geographical environment in which the people lived: an inland people would not trouble themselves about the dangers of a sea which they had never seen; a pastoral tribe would conduct no rites at planting and harvest; an agricultural society would possess no magic formulae for the counteraction of cattle-disease; and in all cases the choice of the place in which the offering (if any) was made would depend upon circumstances. Such variety is to be expected, but the cultural pattern was the same: the magician, or the utterance of
the incantation, placed the people in a right relation with the power in the universe.

Again, the place in which a zoistic offering was made might depend not only on the whim of the individual magician but also on the whereabouts of his victim or of his patient. Thus, as we have seen (paras. 147, 150), the Loyalty Islanders, as well as the Tannese, Banks Islanders, Koita, Dakota and Crow Indians, searched for stones of an unusual shape or of an uncommon type; they considered that such stones possessed the powerful quality which was manifest in all unusual things. The man who was fortunate enough to possess such a stone was consulted in cases of sickness and distress, and became rich and influential according to the power that he exhibited. Such a man exercised his power in whatever place he happened to be. Indeed he might carry the stone with him on his daily rounds. It was the same with the magic 'bundles' of the American Indians. The men who possessed them manipulated their power wherever they lived, and earned distinction according to the cures they effected or the miracles they wrought. In all these cases, though usually a payment was made to the owner of the stone or bundle, there was no special place in which the rites were conducted; its choice depended upon circumstances or upon the whim of the magician. The same is true of such an offering as a Crow Indian made before maxpe in the sun (para. 119). There was no rigid rule in regard to the place in which it had to be made; the place where the man stood was selected in accordance with his own peculiar fancy. When, however, an offering was regularly made to the power in the universe manifest elsewhere than in the sky or in a living man, it was always made in an unusual place, that is, in a place of outstanding character, in a place where something unusual had occurred, or at the burial-place either of a dead magician or of a man whose manner of birth, life, or death had been unusual. And this was natural, for only in these places was the power manifest.

Inevitably a complete report of a society which made its offerings in all those places is hard to find. We may be told that offerings were made at an unusual place, but our authorities may not have noticed, or at any rate described, the other places in which similar rites were carried out. Sometimes we learn that the grave of a notable citizen was specially sacred and that passers-by threw some offering in its vicinity. In these cases there may have been other places also in which the people did the same thing, and the scantiness of our knowledge alone prevents us from saying that all unusual places were regarded in the same way. In one case, however, that of the manistic Akamba (para. 86), the facts have been reported in full. A Kamba place of sacrifice was called ithembo. There were many ithembo, including almost every large tree and grove, especially fig-trees, graves of distinguished citizens, and every place in which anything unusual had occurred or been encountered. Among zoistic societies the idea is seen most clearly in the actions of the Banks Islanders (para. 72), who appre-
hended the presence of *vui* whenever and wherever they were impressed by any new, unusual, uncomprehended work or event. If a man found a stone which struck his fancy, or if he saw an animal which seemed to him unusual, he scattered money in the place where he had seen it. The place was then *rongo*, sacred, because *vui* was there; it was also called *tano ooolo*, which referred to the deposit of the money paid for an exertion of magic power. The man spoke of it as his *marana*, sanctuary, and forbade any one else to trespass on his sacred ground. If a stranger did so, he was guilty of sin, for he had disobeyed the master of the sanctuary, the possessor of *vui*. In a similar manner, if a man was impressed by the appearance of a boulder or of a rock, he concluded that *vui* was there; then the rock was *rongo*, the place in which it was situated was *rongo*, and the space around it was the *marana* of its discoverer. No one but himself and those brought by him could enter. Any one who trespassed fell ill, for he had broken the taboo and sinned.

The same conception of sin as a cause of sickness existed also in many manistic and deistic societies, and it is in this manner that human ideas of sin and sacredness are founded upon the division of men and phenomena into the usual and the unusual. Thus among the manistic Baila (para. 92) all strange, unusual things were *tonda*, taboo, for *musamo* was manifest; any one who came into contact with that mysterious power fell ill. The manistic Maori too (n. 187) ascribed some afflictions to *hara*, sin, the breaking of a taboo, such *tapu* being connected with *atua*, or the word of an *atua*-man. Similar opinions were held by the manistic Wayao (n. 440).

Not long ago, when a sickness was incurable or seemed incomprehensible, our own forefathers used to attribute it to the sin of the sufferer or to the power in the universe; and even now the same idea lingers amongst us, both among the members of the deistic stratum in our society and among those members of the rationalistic stratum whose faith in their rationalism is not great enough to withstand the effect of an untoward calamity.

Another type of taboo was the one attached to the utterance of a spell which a man inherited or purchased. An example of this is to be found in the reports on the zoistic Mailu (para. 78), among whom the efficacy of an incantation depended upon the due observance of the *sora* which belonged to it. The man who uttered it was compelled to refrain from certain kinds of behaviour. If he broke these rules, he was discredited. Presumably these captious regulations had been formulated by the original inventor of the spell or had been adopted by him after some experience of its working. Possibly on one memorable occasion when by means of the spell he had succeeded in performing a task beyond his wildest dreams he had done certain things in a certain way; and ever after he behaved in the same manner in the hope that he would secure an equal success, the taboo arising from a false correlation between cause and effect.

I am only touching lightly on the questions of sin and sacredness in order to make good my claim that the whole of human culture (in my sense
of the word 'culture') is founded on the reaction against the 'unusual'. Having indicated in a general manner the nature of the connexion, I will consider the places in which the manistic societies made their offerings either to the power in the universe or to the dead. Like those of zoistic societies these places were the 'unusual' places, but manistic societies decorated and elaborated them, these elaborations being due, I submit, to thought, reflection, and social energy. I will discuss these elaborations in order, taking the least important first. In this connexion, however, it must be remembered that our judgements concerning the comparative importance of any cultural item have no permanent value, for sometimes if one item has been described in great detail we assume that it is important for that reason alone, a rite which is casually mentioned being dismissed as insignificant. Yet often the paucity or abundance of our information is due solely to the manner in which an observer has made his report; and we shall come to a sorry pass if we minimize the importance of a rite simply because an observer, possibly owing to his lack of knowledge, to a personal disinterest, or to lack of time, has devoted only a few lines to its description.

The elaborations to which I refer consisted of the erection of platforms, frameworks of sticks, and small huts.

Concerning four of our twenty-one manistic societies, New Britons, Nandi, Amazulu, and Basuto, there is an almost complete lack of information; a few facts can be gleaned concerning the places in which the Ibibio, Sea-Dyaks, Akikuyu, Baronga, Tahitians, and Khasis performed their rites; but in the main the evidence in this connexion is derived from the reports on the remaining eleven manistic societies, SE. Solomon Islanders, Banyankole, Shilluk, Dinka, Lango, Akamba, Wayao, Anyanja, Awemba, Baila, and Maori.

The Banks Island marana, to which I have already referred, was not decorated in any way. It is an example of the 'cut-off' place (Lat. templum; Gk. temenos) in its simplest form. The Sea-Dyaks too (para. 139) placed offerings before any remarkable rock, especially if it was in an isolated position, but they are not said to have decorated the rock; and this is an interesting phenomenon, for, as I noted when I described their culture, it is doubtful whether the Sea-Dyaks were manistic or zoistic. By the manistic Maori, however (para. 49; nn. 184, 186-7), the 'cut-off' place, *tuahu*, was slightly elaborated, and I think this is true also of the Kikuyu village shrines (para. 85) of which we know little but which are said to have been marked by specially gathered stones. Usually a Maori *tuahu*, situated in the open air, was marked by a few rough stones; but sometimes the people erected a stone column. Such *tuahu* as these were small open spaces in the bush or in a grove, chosen by a *tohunga*, or *atua*-man. Others were indoors. Unfortunately these have not been described in detail; but they seem to have possessed a *tiepa*, a framework of sticks or a platform on which offerings were placed. These frameworks or platforms seem to have existed also in other places out-of-doors, perhaps near the *wai tapu*,
sacred stream, where rites were regularly conducted. Frameworks of sticks were erected also by the Dinka (para. 83). In the SE. Solomon Islands (para. 33; n. 85) offerings were made in still more elaborate places. The 'cut-off' places contained built-up altars, and were surrounded by special stone walls, *liliehu*, like those which were erected to keep the pigs out of the gardens. Inside the enclosure was the *ora*, sacrificial fire-place. Trees were planted both inside and outside the wall. Another Oceanic society also, that of the Tahitians (para. 133), erected platforms in the *marae*, open space; on these platforms were placed the offerings made to *atua*. The Tahitian platform, *ewatta*, was raised on pillars, and seems to have consisted of a thatch on four posts in front of which was placed the lattice of sticks. The Banyankole (para. 37) erected shrines (concerning which no details are available) at their bedsides or at the kraal gate, the latter being a sacred place also among the Baila (n. 402). In the kraal of the Ankole Mugabe ('king') there was a special place, *kagondo*, which was 'devoted to the shrines of past rulers'. No details are available concerning either the *kagondo* or the shrines; but we may conclude, I think, that the latter were noticeable features, or they would not have been mentioned even in that vague manner. The Baila (n. 402) and Baronga (para. 93) erected pronged poles (Ila *hwanga*, Ronga *nhonola*) as places of offering.

From these vague indications of manistic enterprise, we turn to more definite evidence. It concerns the relics of the dead. Some zoistic societies preserved relics of their dead, but they neither made offerings to them nor took any trouble to house them in any special manner. Thus the Purari (para. 76) placed exhumed skulls in the corners of their houses, but no regular attention was paid to these skulls, which were preserved but neither propitiated nor honoured by the erection of special huts or shrines. Similarly the zoistic Mailu (para. 78) placed some relics in the corners of their houses. These were affectionately regarded, but no attempt was made either to conciliate them or to build huts for them. The zoistic Andaman Islanders too (para. 138) were accustomed to attach certain relics to their persons, and carried them about 'for luck', as we should say, but no offerings were made to these relics, which were worn in quite a careless manner. Indeed the people used to exchange skulls, so that after a time no one knew the identity of their original owners. Now manistic societies also preserved relics, but in their case offerings were placed before them. Moreover, special shrines and huts were built in which the relics were preserved. Our authorities have told us few details, having concentrated on a description of the native beliefs, and neglected to describe the shrines which they were seeing every day; but from the available evidence it is immediately apparent that among the manistic societies there was an energy and an enterprise which was lacking among the zoistic societies. Thus the manistic Ibibio (para. 42), having exhumed the skull of a 'chief', placed it on a post on the verandah or in a little shrine. The manistic Tahitians (para. 133) kept the relics of ordinary persons in the house, displaying and
propitiating them on certain occasions such as weddings. Those of famous men were placed in the pyramidal stone structures which were erected in the marae, open space. It was in front of these stone structures that the altars and thatched huts were erected. The manistic SE. Solomon Islanders (n. 79) preserved some relics in special relic-cases, these being placed and conciliated in the house. They also built special relic-houses, tawau, in which they preserved the relics of great men. These relic-houses were equipped with an altar and sacrificial fire-place.

Similar houses were erected by deistic societies also. By some deistic societies special temples were built for the relics of great men. Thus in the Uganda malalo (n. 131) were placed the jaw-bone and umbilical cord of a dead king, the malalo being specially erected for this purpose.

Among the deistic Yoruba (n. 153) a skull was sometimes exhumed and placed in a small hut where offerings were made to it. Unfortunately we know neither where the hut was erected nor what it looked like. In the reports on the deistic Samoans (n. 197) we are told that there were some small wooden houses from which a priest announced the will of his aitu. It seems possible that this building contained some relics of the dead man. The deistic Tongans too (n. 208) appear to have erected similar houses, but we do not know what they contained. The reports are vaguely expressed and the native terms are not quoted. The information in regard to the 'shrines' and temples of the deistic Bakitara (paras. 38, 40) is inexact; but some of them seem to have contained relics.

If we collect all this scanty information we may say that manistic societies preserved a different attitude towards the relics of their dead from that which was characteristic of zoistic peoples. This difference is revealed not only in offerings of conciliation but also in the erection of relic-houses in which offerings were placed. I have already suggested that the acts of memory (para. 149) and of conciliation (para. 150) were due to thought and reflection; my further submission is that the erection of altars and houses was an exhibition of social energy.

Another elaboration introduced by manistic societies into the 'unusual' place consisted of the erection of a small hut.

An 'unusual' place might be 'unusual' not only because of its peculiar character or because a great man was buried there, but also because a magician had dreamt that the power in the universe was there. A simple instance is to be seen in the culture of the zoistic Ojibwa Indians (para. 113). Old Jack dreamt that munedoo was manifest in a certain tree which was taller than any other tree in the neighbourhood. He desired to share the tree's virtue, so on returning from a successful hunt he placed some of his best game at the foot of the tree. He did not decorate the tree, or place a wall around it; it did not occur to him to erect a platform or a hut beneath it. In his view these things were not worth while. Munedoo being in the tree, he endeavoured to secure the help of munedoo by making a simple offering. The same idea was current among some manistic peoples,
but in their case we find that the place was decorated and elaborated. Thus, if among the manistic Akamba a 'prophetess' dreamt that ngai was in a certain tree (para. 86), the tree became sacred, and a small hut, in which offerings were placed, was erected on the spot. The native terms are not quoted, nor is the hut described, but these details are available concerning the small huts which were built under similar conditions by the manistic Lango (para. 84), Mr. Driberg again being responsible for the more accurate report. If a headman dreamt that jok was in a certain tree, he went out at dawn, and standing at a safe distance (jok being dangerous) asked the tree's advice and counsel (jok being precious to possess). If the tree demanded a shrine, a diminutive hut was built consisting of a grass roof supported on four posts one foot high, the hut being about eighteen inches in diameter. This hut was called an abila; it was known also as ot jok, house of jok. Food and drink were placed inside.

I call attention to the name 'house of jok'. If the Lango had exhibited a greater energy than actually was the case, it is reasonable to suppose that the house of jok would have been a larger and more elaborate structure. Perhaps a caretaker would have been appointed, assisted by a medium who would have revealed the will of jok. If their energy had been greater still, they would have chosen other materials such as stone or brick; greater thought would have been expended on the edifice, the interior of which might have been decorated by mural paintings, and by the addition of an altar. This building would have been called by the same name, house of jok, and to the uprising generations jok would have appeared as a different power than actually was the case. As things were, the manistic Lango displayed only a small amount of energy, so the house of jok was small and humble.

As we have seen, the manistic Akamba made offerings at many other places than those of which a ngai-woman dreamt; indeed ithembo were numerous; but the Akamba are not reported as having erected huts either at a dead magician's grave or at the places where anything unusual had occurred. The manistic Lango, however, though less enterprising than the deistic societies, exhibited a greater energy than the Akamba, for sometimes they erected an abila to the ghost, tipo, of an individual dead man. This abila was identical with an ot jok, house of jok, the difference being that the offerings were made to the dead man instead of to the power in the universe. We do not know where these huts were erected. This detail, however, is available in other cases, for example, that of the Baila. Inside the circle of sticks, mabwabwa, which the manistic Baila (para. 92) planted round the grave of a distinguished man a small hut was erected, consisting of a few short uprights and a roof of grass; offerings were placed inside it. We are told that sometimes these huts were erected by the Baila in other places also, but unfortunately we are not told how these places were selected. The Baila manifested their energy also in another way. Sometimes an eminent citizen was buried in the hut in which he had lived. At first this hut was
kept in repair, but afterwards a new one, smaller and flimsier, was erected (n. 402). Offerings were placed inside it.

This habit of erecting huts over the graves of the powerful dead was not uncommon in the Area of Profound Mystery. For instance, the manistic Awamba (para. 91) built large huts (mafuba? n. 393) over the graves of their leading citizens. These were furnished; two wives of the deceased remained to tend the ghost. We can deduce the size of these huts from the fact that if the headman dreamt of the dead man, he went inside, made obeisance and presented gifts of beer and tobacco. No such shrine was erected over the grave of an ordinary man, who was tended in the house. Probably among the manistic Baronga too (n. 408) similar huts were built over the graves of some magicians, for although M. Junod has neither described them, nor mentioned them in his narrative, he has published a photograph of such an addition to the grave of a medicine-man. Obviously the Wemba huts were of a more elaborate character than those of the Baila, and, if our knowledge of Wemba culture were more extensive, I should be inclined to argue that in this detail the Awemba exhibited a greater social energy than the Baila. As it is, I draw attention to this cultural item among the manistic societies which lived in the Area of Profound Mystery, and leave the matter there. None of them affords such certain evidence as is needed for an understanding of a cultural change.

By the manistic Wayao and Anyanja also (para. 98) grave-huts were built. Among the former the hut consisted of a framework of bamboo and a grass roof, the wall being left open on one side; from the bamboo rafters offerings were suspended. This hut was the village shrine. Similarly the Anyanja built a kachisi over the grave of leading citizens, as well as at the foot of any large tree (n. 446). Offerings were made there to mulungu and/or mzimu. The Yao hut does not appear to have been a larger edition of the Lango abila; it seems to have been an elaboration of the framework of sticks to which I have already referred.

Grave-huts were erected also by the manistic Dinka (para. 83), the graves being those of their most distinguished men. Information is scarce in their reference; the native words are not quoted, and no description of any particular hut is available. We know, however, that Deng-dit and his sons were honoured in this manner, their shrines being tended by a special caretaker.

It is unfortunate that our knowledge of Dinka practices is so limited, for it seems possible that these Deng-dit huts were erected in places other than his burial-place. If that was so, such cenotaphic huts would be an important cultural item; but, although their existence seems to be implied in the scanty reports, a definite conclusion is impossible. Moreover, there was great confusion in the native mind between Deng-dit and jok; so even if a hut had been erected in another place than over the grave, it might have been built in honour of jok and not of Deng-dit.

Among our manistic societies an instance of a cenotaphic grave-hut is
found only among the Shilluk (para. 82). The Shilluk distinguished between the grave of a commoner and that of a ret (‘king’) by calling the former roro and the latter kengo. The word kengo was applied also to the hut which was erected over the great man’s grave. The Shilluk were not content to build this single hut; they erected kengo also in other places in addition to that in which the man was buried. Most of these cenotaphic buildings were smaller and more slender than ordinary living-huts, but larger and more elaborate examples were not unknown, some being decorated by mural designs. Certain old women and some of the wives of the dead man lived near the kengo and kept it clean. The oting ret, magicians who were inspired by the ghost, were attached to its service.

Thus among manistic societies the place of offering was the ‘unusual’ place, but certain elaborations had been introduced. In the place which was unusual owing to its peculiar character a platform was erected; sometimes a fire-place also was provided; in other cases a small hut was built. Similar platforms and huts were erected also in other places which possessed a peculiar sanctity. A framework of sticks might be erected, which in some cases developed into a three-sided hut. Sticks might be planted around the graves of distinguished men; these took root and grew, and in a few years a sacred grove was formed. In the place which was unusual as the result of a magician’s dream a small hut was erected (‘house of god’), these huts being larger in some cases than others. Similar huts were built over the graves of some distinguished men. In the available reports we can trace the development of this hut from a diminutive erection into a large decorated building; in one case, perhaps in another case also, such a building was erected elsewhere than in the place where the man was buried.

My suggestion is that the erection of these huts was an exhibition of energy, and apparently the amount of this energy was greater among some manistic societies than others. Thus in this detail the change from the zoistic to the manistic condition seems to have been due to a factor which produced or intensified human energy. This factor must have been absent in zoistic societies but present in manistic societies. Moreover, it must have been present to a greater degree in some manistic societies than in others.

In a previous paragraph (para. 149) I placed six manistic societies on a scale according to the length of time during which they remembered and placated a powerful ghost. They arranged themselves in this order, those with the shortest memory being placed first:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tendance</th>
<th>1. Akamba.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>only</td>
<td>2. Wayao.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendance and Cult</td>
<td>3. Lango.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Dinka.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. SE. Solomon Islanders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The amount of energy displayed by these societies was also uneven. It can be roughly assessed by considering the manner in which they elaborated their sacred places. According to this criterion they arrange themselves thus:

1, 2, 3. Akamba, Wayao, Lango—small huts;
4. Dinka—huts (not described); possibly cenotaphic huts;
5. SE. Solomon Islanders—relic-houses with altars and fire-places; sanctuaries equipped with fire-places and surrounded by a wall;

It will be noticed that those societies which remembered and placated a powerful ghost for the longest period were also those which manifested the greatest energy. Moreover, those two societies, SE. Solomon Islanders and Shilluk, which introduced the greatest elaborations into their sacred places, and among which a sense of the past was most highly developed, were also those the post-funeral rites of which partook of the nature of cult as well as of tendance. Thus according to three different standards of judgement these were the most developed manistic societies.

Now we will consider the places in which the deistic societies conducted their rites.

We call them deistic because they erected temples (para. 7); and a study of the native terminology (so far as it is available) reveals that these temples were simply either elaborate cenotaphic grave-huts or larger editions of such buildings as the Lango ot jok, house of jok; and the difference in this connexion between a manistic and a deistic society lay in the extent of the elaborations introduced into the 'unusual' or sacred places, that is to say, in the extent of its energy. Thus the factor responsible for the change from the manistic to the deistic condition seems to have been one which intensified social energy, and to have been the same as that which produced the change from the zoistic to the manistic condition. It must have been present in deistic societies, however, to a greater degree than in any manistic society, for the energy of the deistic societies was greater than that of any manistic society.

In the reports on the deistic societies the native terms have not always been quoted; nor have many of the temples been described. The following is a summary of the evidence which is available.

The Fijians (para. 34) built small huts, mbure kalou, over the graves of some distinguished men; this name was applied also to the larger structures which they used as temples. In the erection of the temples no pains were spared, each one being built on a separate mound of earth and approached by a winding path or steep slope. The word mbure meant 'house', a house of kalou being the exact equivalent of the 'house of jok' which was erected by the manistic Lango. The difference between the Fijian mbure kalou and the Lango ot jok lay in the character of the building, the former being a large and complicated structure, the latter a small hut a foot high.
A Samoan temple (para. 50) was called *fale-aitu*, ‘house of aitu’. Some Samoan temples had a stone floor and roof, this being an indication of a greater social energy than that exhibited by the Fijians. The Samoans are not reported as having erected huts over graves.

The Tongan temples (para. 51) were like ordinary houses, but more care was taken both in building them and in keeping them clean. The native word was *fale-tapu*, sacred house, or *fale-lotu*, house of supplication. The same words seem to have been applied to the huts which were erected over some graves.

There is no information in regard to the words used by the Yoruba (para. 42), Dahomans (para. 99), and Ashanti (para. 100) to denote a temple; nor do we possess any detailed descriptions of their temples. Plainly, however, their culture was of a similar pattern to that of the other societies, for over the grave of a Dahoman and of an Ashanti king a hut was erected wherein the dead man was tended, special women (Dahoman *tonsino*, Ashanti *barinfo*) being detailed for this task.

I have already noted that some of the temples erected by the deistic Samoans, Tongans, Bikitara, and Baganda appear to have been relic-houses of a specially elaborate nature. In some cases the Kitara and Uganda temples may have been additional houses in which the priests kept their paraphernalia. The evidence, however, has not been stated clearly.

There is no information in regard to the words which the Gilbert Islanders and Aztecs used for their temples. We only know that the buildings were of a complicated character.

This concludes our analysis and appraisement of the cultural evidence. I will summarize the results we have obtained.

152. *Summary of the Foregoing.* 1. In the opinion of zoistic uncivilized men there was a strange, mysterious, dangerous quality in anything unusual or beyond their comprehension. This quality was manifest in outstanding natural features, in stones of unusual shape or uncommon type, in a violent death, in the birth of twins, in the female menses, in the white man and the articles of his equipment, in an unaccountable sickness, and in any other event, incident, article, or machine the nature of which was not understood. If a man exhibited exceptional skill in any department of human activity or fell into an ecstatic condition, he was credited with the possession of this quality or power, and became what we call a magician.

2. The word which denoted this quality is untranslatable. The translations which have been made are unacceptable and misleading because they

(a) represent it as an entity;
(b) suggest that different powers were in different places;
(c) destroy its comprehensive meaning.

On these translations Sir E. B. Tylor founded his theory of animism. A knowledge of this theory on the part of observers and travellers has been
SUMMARY

负责许多不满意的描述是未开化文化，

这种描述基于虚假的推论。

在神秘主义理论中，也有一些其他不切实际的理论，

在人类文化方面，这些被基于未开化的人被代表为

（a）探究事情的原因，他们接受

“普通的”没有问题或怀疑；

（b）进行对自然的崇拜，

而他们只敬拜那些自然的特征

具有不寻常的特性；

（c）认为“精神”是普遍的，

而上帝在宇宙中的存在

只在“不寻常”的地方。

3. 它已经被建议，作为人从一个原始的条件

神秘主义被代替为多神论和多神论给了

相当于一神论。这类进化的理论是不可行的原因

（a）没有理由假定，

那种假设的物种，始祖人，就像未开化的人

（b）的替换为多神论

是基于一个错误的假设

“精神”的存在是普遍的；

（c）他们建立在对“信念”的研究

是无法准确的

不关心的；

（d）即使信念没有被报告

或先入为主的假设

在观察者，没有确定的

我们可能会判断一个想法

或那种的神；

（e）他们假定（i）所有未开化的想法

是原始的，因此

相同的，（ii）我们的文化

是建立在不同的

未开化文化；而事实是未开化文化

想法在广泛的范围内变化

并且我们的文化是建立

相同的未开化文化。

4. 一个异教社会，应用了相同的词

（i）不寻常的

（ii）的神秘力量的来源

（iii）的尸体或鬼魂的强大的人，

在原始的水平上。其接受的供品

是宇宙的力量。其中的供品被做

是不寻常的。供品的对象

已经与那些的

支付给生活的魔术师，供品被设计为

为了防止危险的力量

或确保其帮助。

从原始的水平上

我们的神秘和神学社会

似乎已经发展。

5. 在一个神秘主义的宇宙

在宇宙的力量仍然

在任何不寻常或超出理解；但

有差异在人们对强大的人

支付。支付被做给强大的人不只

他们在活着但之后他们

死，这些人在不同的时间被记得

为不同的长度的时间。
Among the majority of our manistic societies these offerings were designed to ward off danger (tendance), but in two cases, those of the SE. Solomon Islanders and Shilluk, they were also made to secure the help of a powerful dead man (cult). These two societies also remembered and conciliated their powerful dead for a longer period than the other manistic societies.

Manistic offerings, like zoistic offerings, were made in 'unusual' places, but by manistic societies these places were decorated and elaborated by the erection of huts, the provision of fire-places, and the building of platforms. In this connexion the SE. Solomon Islanders and the Shilluk displayed the greatest energy.

My suggestion is that the introduction of post-funeral attention and the act of memory were due to thought and reflection, and that the elaboration of the places in which the offerings were made was due to an energy lacking among zoistic societies. Thus the factor responsible for the change from the zoistic to the manistic condition must be one that produces thought, reflection, and energy. It must have been absent from the zoistic societies, but present in all the manistic societies. Moreover, it must have been present to a greater degree among the SE. Solomon Islanders and Shilluk than among the other manistic societies.

6. Our deistic societies also reacted strongly to anything unusual or beyond their comprehension, but their offerings were usually made to the powers that were manifest in their temples. A study of the native terminology shows that these powers were the ghosts of powerful dead men, the difference in this connexion between a manistic and a deistic society being that by the latter these men were remembered for a longer period than they were by the former.

Deistic offerings were made in specially erected houses which were elaborations of the huts built by manistic societies.

Thus a change from the manistic to the deistic condition was of the same nature as a change from the zoistic to the manistic condition, the difference being that both the memory and the energy were intensified. The factor responsible for the change, therefore, must have been one which intensified thought, reflection, and social energy. Moreover, it must have been the same factor as was responsible for the change from the zoistic to the manistic condition, but operating to a greater degree in deistic societies than in any manistic society.

Now the evidence is:

1. All the zoistic societies permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom; conversely, all the societies which permitted that freedom were in the zoistic condition.

2. All the manistic societies had adopted such regulations as compelled an irregular or occasional continence; conversely, all the societies which had adopted such regulations were in the manistic condition.

The two societies, SE. Solomon Islanders and Shilluk, which remembered
and conciliated their illustrious dead for a longer period than the other manistic societies, which introduced more elaborations into the 'unusual' place, and which conducted a cult as well as a tendance of the dead, insisted on a greater degree of continence than their manistic neighbours.

3. All the deistic societies insisted on pre-nuptial chastity; conversely, all the societies which insisted on pre-nuptial chastity were in the deistic condition.

Is there any causal relationship between the compulsory continence and the thought, reflection, and energy which produced the change from one cultural condition to another? Psychology, not social anthropology, must answer the question.

One thing is certain: if a causal relation exist, the continence must have caused the thought, not the thought the continence. There is no possibility, for instance, that the thought which produced the cultural advance was responsible for the reduction of sexual opportunity. This is important. Crediting zoistic men with mental processes which are peculiar to rationalists, an unwise student might think that continued failure to account for and to cure their misfortunes would awaken the power of reason in zoistic men, and that they would then change not only their cultural habits but also their sexual regulations. A little reflection on the actual facts reveals the unacceptable character of the suggestion.

In the first place, if failure to produce the desired results by magic awakens the power of reason, how is it that some societies remain zoistic? We should have expected them to change their habits as soon as they fail to fulfil their desires by zoistic methods.

Secondly, there is no reason to think that uncivilized men apply their reason to their sexual regulations; rather do they incline to defend their established customs. In this year of grace nineteen hundred and thirty-two we are applying our reason to our sexual regulations; but that is only because our ideas have changed from deistic to rationalistic. We used to accept our sexual regulations as part of the revealed will of a creative deity; the members of the deistic stratum in our society still hold that opinion; but we who are now rationalists must not credit uncivilized men with our method of thinking. The demand among uncivilized peoples for an irregular or an occasional continence or for pre-nuptial chastity was not made either on cultural or on rational grounds. Among many societies there seems to have been a close relation between the bride-price and the reservation to her betrothed of a girl's sexual qualities. The Awemba (para. 91) and Wayao (para. 97) are cases in point.

Thirdly, we are too ready to believe that the methods of uncivilized men end in failure. As a matter of fact the alleged failure exists only in our minds. To the native there is no failure; a perfectly rational and satisfactory explanation is forthcoming. The alleged failure, therefore, of a zoistic native to account for his misfortunes cannot produce thought and reflection for the simple reason that in his opinion the failure does not
exist. Thus the members of a zoistic society are convinced that a magician can make rain; upon this assumption they base their behaviour. If the magician fails, they conclude either that he is lazy or that another and more powerful magician is making doses of sunshine. Granted the premise, the conclusion follows. Granted the premise, the conclusion is also rational. The magician’s failure never causes the people to doubt the accuracy of their premise. This is changed only when the power of reason has been awakened or intensified. And the evidence is that this happens only when the sexual opportunity of the society has been limited. Then the behaviour of the society changes in accordance with the new ideas.

Similarly when manistic (tendance) societies are being afflicted by some misfortunes not due to witchcraft, they conclude that some powerful dead man is angry with them and that their sufferings have been inflicted by him. So they try to conciliate him by making offerings to him. If their sufferings are not relieved, they do not doubt the accuracy of their diagnosis; they conclude either that the offering has been rejected or that they have conciliated the wrong man. In either case are thought and reflection induced by the failure to achieve the desired end; nor is the sleeping power of reason awakened by the continuance of the sufferings after the offerings have been made. Indeed the contrary is the case. The society retains a firm faith in its old ideas and continues to base its behaviour upon them. The ideas are changed only when the sexual opportunity of the society has been limited, new ideas being adopted according to the intensity of the compulsory continence which the new regulations impose.

If, therefore, there is any causal relationship between a reduction of sexual opportunity and cultural condition, the continence must have caused the thought which produced the change in ideas, and so the cultural change. The contrary cannot have been the case.

We will ask the psychologists if in their opinion the limitation of sexual opportunity can have acted in this manner.

B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS

153. Origin of Psycho-Analysis. Among the conclusions drawn from the results of recent psychological research, two are important for our purpose: the first is that a considerable part of any man’s temperament and disposition is the product of his experiences during childhood and puberty; the second is that, if a man’s sexual impulses cannot be satisfied in a direct animal manner, they will inevitably be expressed in another form. These are not mere philosophical speculations; they were formulated after due consideration had been given to the results of original research into the nature of neurosis. Some people will accept them at once; others may desire a summary of competent opinion. So I will state as shortly and as simply as I can the evidence on which the conclusions are based. I can make, of course, no personal contribution on the subject; I can merely
repeat the pronouncements of those who are worthy to be heard. It will be convenient if I make my quotations from simple text-books which are readily accessible.

During the last twenty years of the nineteenth century great interest was taken in the symptoms and treatment of hysteria. Some medical practitioners, experimenting with treatment under hypnosis, found that a disease like paralysis could be brought about arbitrarily during hypnotic sleep merely by suggesting to the hypnotized patient that a limb was paralysed. They discovered also that the symptoms of hysteria could be induced in a similar manner. Naturally the obvious conclusion was drawn: if it was possible to induce the symptoms during hypnotic sleep, it might be equally possible to remove them under the same conditions. Experiments showed that indeed this was the case. Thus it seemed probable that the causes of many mental disturbances were not physiological, as had been supposed, but psychological. As a consequence, a new theory was formulated which has become generally accepted, viz. that the symptoms of hysteria are not always evidence of degeneration or of physical derangement but are sometimes the result of some suggestion or impression which unwittingly the patient has received.

With these discoveries the names of J. Breuer and Sigmund Freud will always be associated.

The manner in which the symptoms were removed is important. It was discovered that under hypnosis patients were able to describe events which normally they were unable to recall to conscious memory, and that they were able to answer questions in regard to those events which normally they were unable or unwilling to answer. For instance, a woman who suffered from unaccountable fits of dread whenever she saw a fire was able, in a hypnotic condition, to relate a terrifying incident which had occurred during a conflagration in the time of her childhood. When she had described the original incident, and expressed some of the emotions which had accompanied it, the hysterical symptoms disappeared.

It was not only under hypnosis that such patients were cured of their disturbances. If the forgotten incident could be brought back to conscious memory under ordinary conditions, the effect was the same: the patient was relieved of his symptoms by the promotion into consciousness of emotions which up to then had been unconsciously retained. Thus Dr. W. H. R. Rivers found that a complicated case of claustrophobia was cured after the patient had succeeded in recalling and describing the incident which had given rise to the claustrophobic reaction; in this case it was the confinement of the patient, at the age of three or four, in a dark passage with a strange, growling dog. The recovery by the conscious mind of this forgotten incident had an immediate effect, and the old fear was dispelled.

Men discovered too that psychologically mental disturbances and morbid symptoms could be caused in another way also. Instead of being the mani-
festation of the emotions connected with a terrifying event, they might be produced by a repression of feeling. Thus a girl who had nursed her father in a serious illness became afflicted after his death by a strange disorder. She contracted paralysis of the right arm, and was unable to speak her native language. Other morbid symptoms also were present in her case, for she had been unable to give rein to her feelings in the presence of her sick father and had been compelled to repress certain emotions that arose in her heart. It was discovered that her symptoms were closely related to the repressed emotions, for, as she related the unfortunate incidents which had given rise to those emotions, her condition improved. When she had expressed all the emotions which were associated with the memories, the symptoms disappeared. 639

From such successes as these two conclusions were drawn: (1) that in the minds of these patients there existed an unconscious element of which they were unaware, (2) that the mental disturbances were the product of that unconscious element. Thus in their treatment of hysteria the pioneer doctors tried to delve deeply into the past experiences of their patients and to persuade them to recall events and emotions which previously had been banished, wittingly or unwittingly, into their unconscious minds; and it was the promotion into consciousness of the forgotten incident which dispelled the mental disturbances. Dr. Freud says: 'Always and everywhere the meaning of the symptoms is unknown to the sufferer; analysis invariably shows that these symptoms are derived from unconscious mental processes which under various favourable conditions can become conscious. . . . Not merely is the meaning of the symptom invariably unconscious; there exists also a connexion of a substitutive nature between the two; the existence of the symptom is only possible by reason of this unconscious activity. Every time we meet with a symptom we may conclude that definite unconscious activities which contain the meaning of the symptom are present in the patient's mind. Conversely, this meaning must be unconscious before a symptom can arise from it. Symptoms are not produced by conscious processes; as soon as the unconscious processes involved are made conscious, the symptom must vanish.' 640

Now all the patients whom the doctors examined were members of the white man's society, and in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century every individual born into that society was compelled, and usually is still compelled, to repress not only his emotional reaction to some particular event or person but also some of his innate desires; for the social system was, and in most cases is still, such as to inflict certain limitations upon them. Foremost among these innate desires are those connected with sex; and, as the analysts penetrated more and more into the life-history of their patients, they found that a large number of hysterical symptoms were due to the repression of desires and emotions which belonged to that extensive category. So great, indeed, was the proportion of such cases that Dr. Freud was compelled to conclude that the repression of sexual impulses ‘played a
particularly large part, never before sufficiently appreciated, in the causation of nervous and mental disturbances'.

Dr. Freud has been much criticized for the emphasis which he placed on the effect of sexual repressions, but it is not surprising that a large number of his patients had failed to adapt themselves to their cultural environment, for, when his researches were being conducted, the white man's inherited tradition contained (and still does contain) many factors which placed a more effective check upon normal sexual intercourse than had been known in any previous civilization. It is true that recently in many sections of the white man's society there has been a considerable extension of both pre-nuptial and post-nuptial sexual opportunity; but this is not the tradition in which Dr. Freud's patients were reared. They had been subjected not only to stern post-nuptial regulations but also to the operation of certain ideas which were equally, if not more, effective in preventing normal intercourse, especially at puberty. I refer to the teaching that pre-nuptial intercourse is a sin and that post-nuptial intercourse is a concession to the flesh. If we accept the usual interpretation of the appropriate passages in the New Testament (Matt. v. 32, xix, 9; Mark x, 2-12; Luke xvi. 18), we must conclude that the Founder of Christianity forbade divorce, at any rate except for adultery. The white man's post-nuptial regulations used to be based on that teaching, but it is doubtful if they affected pre-nuptial sexual opportunity as much as the (at one time literal) interpretation of the teaching of Paul of Tarsus: 'It is better to marry than to burn' (1 Cor. vii. 9). Among all nineteenth-century white men there was a sense of shame and sin in regard to sexual intercourse which still exists among many twentieth-century white men; and this sense of shame was, and is, responsible for as many, if not more, sexual repressions than the social regulations which merely punish sexual lapses. This, I think, accounts at least in part for the preponderance of morbid symptoms which seemed to arise from sexual repressions; and it was unfortunate that the prominence given to the discussion of sexual repressions should have caused so much misunderstanding of, and hostility towards, Dr. Freud's suggestions. The peculiar atmosphere which used to surround, and in some places still surrounds, any discussion of sex, and which was produced by those ideas of shame and sin to which I have referred, prevented an objective discussion of a purely pathological subject. Consequently Dr. Freud's aims were distorted and his theories misconstrued. Indeed such a storm of vituperation fell upon him that there seemed to be a chance of his ideas being prematurely consigned to the limbo of unacceptable hypotheses. Moreover his popularity, albeit unsought, with those who wished to abolish all sexual taboos did not assist his cause. Eventually, however, like all valuable contributions to knowledge, his basic hypotheses proved their worth, and after a time he regained the ears of the elect. The evidence being overwhelming, his suggestions were quietly adopted. Yet it is well to remember that, in addressing a cultivated audience only a few years ago (1917), Dr. Rivers
felt constrained to ask if we are ‘to reject with contumely a helping hand because it sometimes leads us to discover unpleasant aspects of human nature’.641

The sense of shame and sin which accompanied any sexual urge, and even any discussion of sexual urges, was responsible also for another and equally important phenomenon. We have seen that, when a mental disturbance has been caused by a repression of feeling, it can be dispelled only by the promotion into consciousness of the repressed emotions. Now when Dr. Freud tried to relieve the symptoms caused by a repression of sexual impulses, he found that his patients put up a stout resistance to the progress of the analytic treatment. He concluded, therefore, that powerful forces were at work opposing the continuance of the confession, and suspected that these were the forces which originally induced the mental derangement. He says: ‘It follows from the existence of a symptom that some mental process has not been carried through to an end in a normal manner, so that it could become conscious; the symptom is a substitute for that which has not come through. A vehement effort must have been exercised to prevent the mental process from penetrating into consciousness and as a result it has remained unconscious; being unconscious it had the power to construct a symptom. The same vehement effort is again at work during the analytic treatment, opposing the attempt to bring the unconscious into consciousness’.642

The powerful forces which caused this vehement effort in the case of sexual impulses were, of course, none other than the ideas and regulations which controlled the sexual opportunity of the individual. Each child born into the white man’s society had to be moulded to the social order. Consequently he had to contain himself on those occasions on which either the white man’s law or his accepted conventions forbade direct sexual intercourse.

The evidence is, then, that mental disturbances may be produced either by an unusually terrifying incident in childhood or by the repression of emotions. Wittingly or unwittingly the emotions are banished from the conscious mind and form themselves into an unconscious element which is manifest in the morbid symptoms, their connexion with those symptoms being proved by the fact that as soon as the emotions are made conscious the symptoms disappear. If the social system demands an intense sexual continence, a large part of the unconscious mind will consist of the emotions and conflicts caused by the compulsory repressions.

As I have said, these are no academic theories, farrowed in the cloister; they were formulated as the result of long patient research into the fundamental character of neurosis.

Now if, in cases which we call abnormal, the experiences in childhood and the repressions, if any, of innate desires form a dominating unconscious element in the human mind, do they also exercise a predominating influence in cases which we call normal? Inevitably the psychologists have answered
this question in the affirmative. Each one of us possesses some curious characteristics of which we are unaware; we react to particular incidents quickly and without deliberation. Sometimes these dispositional traits are of great, sometimes of little, importance, but they are always better known to our intimates than to ourselves. Just as in hysterical people unconscious feelings and thoughts are manifest in their mental disturbances, so also in people whom we call normal ‘expressions occur which have no apparent relation to the conscious mind’. Van der Hoop says: ‘Usually we learn more about any one’s unconscious life by these small weaknesses than by his dreams or conscious disturbances. His whole emotional life is revealed rather by small occurrences and delicate shades of expression than by violent outbursts. Though sometimes it may be difficult to prove the existence of such unconscious qualities of the mind, we shall find that quite ordinary people usually know very well how to interpret these small weaknesses which they observe in some one with whom they have daily intercourse. The psycho-analytical method by which we search into the depths of the unconscious is by no means the only way to attain self-knowledge. Great men, through all the ages, have succeeded in gaining this self-knowledge, and developing themselves, by methods which every one is free to use, and of which psycho-analysis is a somewhat more technical and systematic expansion. We can bring our hidden unconscious processes to the light of consciousness simply by observing our expressions and our relations to other people, and by studying the way other people react to these expressions. We shall then begin to understand how our character is gradually modified by experience and circumstances, and we shall see the interrelation between our past and present emotions, which are the outcome and expression of a similar impulse, however much they may have changed in the course of time. The actions and relationships of normal people depend upon the conditions and emotions of their childhood, and are chiefly explained by them, just as the morbid symptoms of a patient are caused by the emotions and circumstances of childhood which prepared the way for the later neurotic reaction.’

Dr. Rivers has published a similar opinion. Commenting on the case of claustrophobia to which I have referred, he remarks: ‘Psychological literature contains many similar histories. I take this case of claustrophobia as an example partly because, having come under my own notice, I am able to estimate its worth. It was possible to obtain conclusive evidence that the infantile experience had really occurred and was neither the fancy of the patient nor the result of suggestion on the part of the physician... This patient not only affords conclusive evidence for the existence of experience shut off from consciousness under ordinary conditions; his case shows that this experience, though inaccessible to consciousness directly, may yet be capable of affecting it indirectly. His dread of confined spaces had so definite a relation to the early experience that the two were undoubtedly connected, while the complete disappearance of his claustrophobia, after
bringing the long dormant experience to the surface, affords further evidence in the same direction.' Dr. Rivers then pursues his conclusions further, taking it for granted that an unconscious element exists not only in cases which we call abnormal but also in those which we call normal. He admits that the average student of human affairs can rarely experience an instance of such a 'dramatic and conclusive character' as this case of claustrophobia, and that 'the records of others can never carry the conviction which comes from one's own experience'; so he suggests that 'one who wishes to satisfy himself whether or not unconscious experience exists should subject his own life-history to the severest scrutiny, either aided by another in a course of psycho-analysis, or, though less satisfactory and less likely to convince, by a process of self-analysis'.

For my own part I cannot doubt that any one who adopts this suggestion will be persuaded that the psycho-analysts were right when they asserted the existence of an unconscious element in the mind of every human organism. Dr. Freud endeavoured to demonstrate its existence by the same methods as those by which he had proved the psychological origin of many mental disturbances; he studied the psychology of errors and the nature of dreams, and suggested that the former were caused by the operation of unconscious tendencies and that the latter were symbolic representations of an unfulfilled desire. Doubtless in many cases both these things are true, but in this matter it is better, I think, to rely upon the unaided human reason than upon further experiment. As Dr. Rivers implies, the existence of an Unconscious in every human being follows from a correct understanding of the medical evidence. It is further attested by the knowledge which is gained by every individual who has the capacity, inclination, and courage to subject himself to a stern self-analysis. We may state the matter in general terms by saying that a child's early environment has a preponderating influence on the development of its emotional life and that the disposition of an adult is the product of interplay between past and present emotions. Just as the morbid symptoms of an abnormal patient are produced by the emotional conflicts and the experiences of childhood, so the actions and attitudes of those individuals whom we call normal depend upon the conditions and emotions of their childhood. Gradually their characters are modified by circumstances, being greatly affected by an unconscious life which is closely related to infantile emotions. It is impossible to gauge the effect which any particular infantile experience will produce, but manifestly every experience leaves its mark. Every hasty word and angry retort, every sympathetic smile and loving caress, every joy, every disappointment, every detail of adult behaviour in the child's presence and every incident of which the child is the witting or unwitting spectator—all these things accumulate in the child's receptive mind. The memory of them having passed away, they form themselves into an Unconscious which has a dominating influence upon subsequent conduct and behaviour. A child that is surrounded by an atmosphere of harmony and
peace will grow into a different man from that which he would have been had he been subjected to the conflicting emotions produced by a rough and hostile environment; the plastic mind of an infant that spends his early years under the affectionate care of tender-minded adults will develop in a different manner from his contemporary whose mind is subjected to the experience of discordant wrangles and jangles. The various characteristics of normal people are produced by former circumstances and conflicts, the emotional experiences of childhood exercising a predominating influence on adult disposition and development.

To some students this will seem trite and commonplace, whilst for others it will be necessary to emphasize the fact. I submit the conclusion not as a personal opinion but as a logical development from the indubitable results of medical research. In this year of grace nineteen hundred and thirty-two, there is a widespread opinion that each child born into the world is a fresh individuation; our lyrical poets seek to free themselves from society in order to be 'themselves'; and upon an attempt to isolate an individual from the society of which he is a member most modern educational philosophies are founded. Yet the plain fact remains that as soon as we leave our mothers' wombs we are subjected to a multitude of influences which willy-nilly affect, and even create, our subsequent dispositions. It is impossible to obtain any inductive evidence in regard to the inheritance of these dispositional traits, for we cannot study the disposition of any human being before he is born, and as soon as he is born he is subject to a cultural environment; but upon the evidence which the psychologists have accumulated we must conclude that many of these traits are due to the early environment. Since the emotions which are aroused by infantile experiences form themselves into an unconscious element, and since in most cases that unconscious element exercises a dominating influence over subsequent reactions, how is it possible to regard a new generation as anything but a product of social forces? The whole trend of psychological research contradicts the opinion to which I have referred, but lest the powerful egoism which prevails in our present culture vitiate our understanding of the psychological evidence, I will consider the matter at greater length. I wish to make another point also. I not only submit that in the mind of nearly every human being there is a dominating unconscious element which has been created by the experiences and emotional conflicts of early childhood; I also suggest that this dominating unconscious element is a social product. I will relate the experiences and conclusions of an American practitioner, Dr. Trigant Burrow.

154. Social Nature of the Unconscious. Dr. Burrow says: 'What we call the individual is by no means the fresh and native expression of individuality pure and simple that we are accustomed to assume; rather he is an individuation resulting from the repressive forces acting upon him from the environmental social aggregate in which he himself is but an intrinsic
and contributory element. Every individual arising amid the influences of
the social system is but a special application of the social system about him.
Whatever the code of the consensus, the individual is necessarily an off-
print of it.'

The incident which brought this truth home to Dr. Burrow's mind was
of a peculiar character. It shows how greatly every man is affected by his
unconscious mind. It shows also that scientifically it is impossible to speak
either of a normal or of an abnormal person.

Dr. Burrow was engaged in analysing one of his students when the
latter challenged his master's honesty. He insisted that Dr. Burrow was
being influenced by other motives than an objective analysis of his mind.
He would only be convinced of Dr. Burrow's sincerity, he said, if Dr.
Burrow submitted himself to be analysed by him. Dr. Burrow was pleased
to indulge what appeared to him as a wayward impulse of an inexperienced
young man, so they exchanged places, Dr. Burrow becoming the patient,
the pupil taking his master's chair. After a time this situation, accepted
with levity, became profoundly serious. At the outset Dr. Burrow's resis-
tances became noticeable, then insuperable; and the longer the examination
proceeded, the tighter his resistances took hold of him. Deeply mortified,
Dr. Burrow faced the indubitable fact, and reflected upon the position.
At length it became clear that the student was preserving towards his
master a no less proprietary and personal attitude than his master had
preserved towards him, the adoption of that attitude having been the
cause of the original dispute. This was significant, and both men had to
admit that this attitude was what Dr. Burrow calls authoritarian, depending
upon the occupancy of the master's chair. When they exchanged places,
he who began as a patient had stepped into a position of authority; as soon
as he was protected by the appropriate background the authoritarian atti-
dude was expressed. Moreover, the use which was made of the authori-
tarian position was dictated by the unconscious mind of its holder, the
conclusion being that while conducting his analysis any practising psycho-
analyst is as much controlled by his unconscious mind as the patient whose
mind he is analysing.

Some time elapsed before Dr. Burrow was driven to this conclusion by
a calm examination of his own resistances, but finally he was convinced of
it. He states the matter thus: 'It has not yet been recognized that we who
are psycho-analysts are ourselves theorists, that we also are very largely
misled by an unconscious that is social, that we too are neurotic in so far as
every expression but that of life in its native simplicity is neurotic. Our
disharmony is a phase of that widely diffused neurosis that exists under the
prevailing social consensus represented in its normal adaptation. As with
others, who have been inured to the curriculum of daily adaptation from the
impressionable years of earliest childhood, so with ourselves; it is well nigh
impossible to study the virgin soil of consciousness from our present adap-
tive premise without vitiating our conclusions with the bias of our own
adaptation." In a word, every practising psycho-analyst is affected by his unconscious mind, this in its turn being dependent upon the nature of his social and cultural heritage.

I am not concerned with the application of these conclusions to the practice of psycho-analysis. I have related Dr. Burrow's experiences in order to show not only that a normal man is greatly affected by his unconscious mind but also that the influence which the unconscious mind exerts is itself unconscious. Moreover, the nature of that unconscious mind depends on the cultural environment into which a man is born.

Dr. Burrow's contention that every man who calls himself 'normal' suffers from a 'neurosis' which is the result of the 'prevailing social consensus' raises another important issue. The interest lies in the tacit assumption that a normal man exists, yet plainly this is an illusion, for the man whom we call normal is merely a human being who has adapted himself successfully to the prevailing tradition, while the man whom we call abnormal is either one who has failed to adapt himself or one who by rigid self-analysis has attained to self-knowledge and so gained conscious control of himself. Those in the former category become neurotic or perverted, whilst from the scanty numbers of the latter prophets arise, concerning whom popular writers express the psychological truth and say that such men are born out of their time. In our unthinking moments some of us are apt to assume that it is natural to be normal and unnatural to be abnormal. A little reflection would enable us to perceive the foolish and irrational character of the assumption. Natural man, or man in his native simplicity, is an unverified and unverifiable hypothesis, for every human being of whom we have any knowledge has been affected, during childhood, by some kind of inherited tradition. From the day of his birth the mind of every human being is subject to cultural influences of some kind or another, the nature of those influences depending on the culture of the society into which he is born. Thus there is no evidence by means of which we can separate what is natural, or what is inherited, from what is imposed by experience. For my own part I doubt if we can even speak of the existence of an individual apart from that of the society, if by the word 'individual' we indicate the details of a man's temperament and disposition. Still more do I doubt the existence of that individual (or social product) for more than a short space of time, for the process of adaptation is continuous. Scientifically, at any rate, the individual cannot be considered apart from his society, for he is controlled by a dominating unconscious which is social. The conclusions of social science may apply to many individuals; the conduct of those individuals may be prophesied from accepted premises; but the interplay of cultural influences, especially in a society which contains a number of cultural strata, is so great and so uninterrupted that no general law can be formulated in regard to the behaviour of every individual member. Moreover, every individual seems to possess free will, even if that free will exist only in the sense that he can control, if he wishes, and even banish, the influence
which his unconscious mind exerts over his consciousness. I am not fully persuaded that this possession of free will is more than an illusion, for it seems that the wish to control the unconscious may itself be determined; but even if one accepts (as I do) both its existence and its power, it must be remembered that its possession does not set an individual free from the operation of the forces which determine the behaviour of the society. Ultimately his own behaviour also will be determined by them. Indeed, the relation between an individual and a society may be likened to the relation between a single electron and a mass of electrons. In regard to the behaviour of a single electron there is said to be an Uncertainty Principle which makes it impossible for a physicist to prophesy its next movement, but the behaviour of a mass of electrons can be prophesied with assurance. By some eager philosophers the Uncertainty Principle has been interpreted as a sign that the behaviour of Nature cannot be formulated in scientific laws; in the same way it has been held that the possession of free will places the human organism outside the realm of science; but, as Professor Darwin has well said, the apparent caprice of the electron provides no loop-hole by which the doctrine of indeterminism may enter, and the same is true in regard to the behaviour of individual men. 'We cannot say exactly what will happen to a single electron,' Professor Darwin says, 'but we can confidently estimate the probabilities. If an experiment is carried out with a thousand electrons, what was a probability for one becomes nearly a certainty. Physical theory confidently predicts that the million of millions of electrons . . . will behave even more regularly, and that to find a case of noticeable departure from the average we should have to wait for a time fantastically longer than the estimated age of the universe.' Similarly we cannot prophesy the behaviour of any individual human organism, but we can estimate the probabilities. If we consider a human society as a whole, we can predict with confidence its future behaviour if we are provided with the necessary data. And since every individual is the product of a society, it follows that ultimately his behaviour also is determined, for he is controlled by an unconscious that is social.

To this general statement, however, one addition must be made. Dr. Burrow speaks of the 'prevailing social consensus' as if it were uniform throughout society. Except in a zoistic society this is seldom the case. As I have said (paras. 39, 70, 143, 148), a developed society consists of a number of cultural strata, the number of these strata depending on the nature of its cultural history. Thus in a rationalistic society there may be also a deistic stratum, and a zoistic stratum too. An individual, therefore, who is born into that society may spend his early years in any one of these cultural environments. Sometimes, especially when democratic principles of government (or those loosely called democratic) are applied to every detail of life and thought, we are apt to assume that the personal reaction of every individual to any incident, idea, or method of training will be the same; but since the psychological attitude of men is governed largely by
their unconscious minds, and since those unconscious minds are moulded in their early years, it follows that their dispositional traits will be dissimilar, and that they will respond in a different manner to the same experiences and events, their individual attitudes depending largely upon the cultural stratum into which they were introduced as babes.

Now we will consider the opinions of competent psychologists in regard to the effect produced when men are prevented by their inherited cultural tradition from satisfying their innate desires in a direct manner.

155. Effect of Sexual Limitations. Dr. W. H. R. Rivers has defined an instinct summarily as 'a set of dispositions to behaviour determined by innate conditions'. 'It is now becoming widely recognized', he remarks, 'that nearly all, if not all, the behaviour of mankind is partly determined by inborn factors, by tendencies which the individual brings into the world with him when he is born. At the same time it is, I think, equally widely accepted that it is only very rarely that human behaviour is purely instinctive, that every instinct suffers modification through experience.' By 'experience' Dr. Rivers means what Dr. Burrow called 'adaptation'. This is clear from his definition of the Unconscious: 'The Unconscious is a storehouse of experience associated with instinctive reactions.'

In Dr. Rivers's terminology, then, an innate desire or instinctive tendency is modified by the experience gained as the human organism is moulded into the cultural tradition of a society, this modification forming an unconscious element in the man's mind. The sexual desire is one of the chief instinctive tendencies. Thus if the sexual regulations forbid direct intercourse, the sexual instinct is modified in some way or other. We have already seen (para. 153) that in some cases the repression of sexual desires has been responsible for the production of mental disturbances and morbid symptoms. In his list of these disturbances Dr. Rivers includes phobia, hypochondriasis, alcoholism, paranoia, and dementia praecox. Any of these things may result, he thinks, from a conflict between an instinctive tendency and the forces by which it is controlled. Yet every member of the white man's society is subjected to the same rigid compulsions as those who suffer those symptoms. What happens in these 'normal' cases? It is possible that there may be a regression on the part of the individual to infantile behaviour; but this seems to be rare. Usually the energy finds a totally different form of expression. When a desire is compelled to remain unsatisfied, strong mental tension occurs; the emotional energy is compressed. According to Dr. Rivers, 'the energy arising out of the conflict is diverted from some channel which leads in an asocial direction and turned into one leading to an end connected with the higher ideals of society. . . . Many lines of evidence are converging to show that all great accomplishments in human endeavour depend on processes which go on outside those regions of the mind of the activity of which we are clearly conscious.'

To this diversion Dr. Freud applied a word which has been translated
'sublimation'. It is not a satisfactory word; indeed it has almost disappeared from technical literature; but I shall retain it, for it occurs in the simple text-books from which I am quoting. Dr. Rivers defines it thus: 'By sublimation is meant a process in which an instinctive tendency, more or less fostered by experience, which would normally find expression in some kind of undesirable conduct, has its energy diverted into a channel in which it comes to have a positive social value.' Dr. Freud says: 'We believe that civilization has been built up by sacrifices in gratification of the primitive impulses, and that it is to a great extent for ever being recreated as each individual repeats the sacrifice of his instinctive pleasures for the common good. The sexual are amongst the most important of the instinctive forces thus utilized: they are in this way sublimated, that is to say, their energy is turned aside from its sexual goal and diverted towards other ends, no longer sexual and socially more valuable.'

It is difficult to understand why those who were reared in a nineteenth-century tradition branded such a pronouncement as aesthetically offensive, morally reprehensible, and inherently dangerous. Perhaps their condemnation of it was due to some feeling akin to that which among uncivilized peoples constitutes the reaction to anything unusual or beyond comprehension.

The language in which both Dr. Rivers and Dr. Freud speak of the relation between sexual repression and the product of the tense emotions needs some amendment, for their phraseology lacks precise meaning. Dr. Rivers speaks of 'undesirable conduct' and 'the higher ideals of society'; Dr. Freud employs the expression 'socially more valuable'. Their meaning is clear, but there is no consensus of opinion among men in regard to what constitutes 'undesirable conduct'; some think one thing, some another; and we shall never advance our knowledge of human affairs if we rely upon expressions of mere opinion which, as we have seen, are affected by, if they are not the product of, early training and experience. Nor can we speak of the 'higher ideals of society', for there is a complete lack of agreement as to what kind of conduct is 'higher'.

An example of this diversity is to be found in the opinions which are extant to-day in regard to post-nuptial sexual regulations. Some assert that divorce should be forbidden; others maintain that if a man and woman cannot live together in complete harmony, their union should be severed, each being free to form a new alliance. The members of each party claim that their ideals are higher than those of their opponents; all of them stoutly defend their proposals on the ground that the contrary ideas are immoral and base. The real difference between the parties lies in the meaning which they attach to the words 'higher', 'ideal', and 'moral'.

I am aware that in this special case one party goes farther, and maintains that the indissolubility of the marriage tie is not an opinion concerning the 'best' method of regulating the relations between the sexes but a law of a creative deity, the knowledge of which was revealed to men under special
and peculiar circumstances. Yet still it remains an opinion, for before a man can admit the existence of the divine law he must be satisfied that the alleged revelation took place. This, however, is not admitted by all men, and, since it is a matter of opinion whether or not the revelation was made, it follows that the laws based upon it are also opinions. Moreover, other alleged revelations have taken place which conflict in important details. Thus the followers of Mohammed assert that according to divine law a man may have four wives, this being contrary to the usual interpretations of the Christian revelation to which I have referred. There is one important difference, however, between the opinions of men who believe in divine revelation and the opinions of others. The former originate in an outside source; the latter are merely the product of an interplay between past and present emotions. The former are outside time, the latter inside it. This distinction, however, does not promote the former to the status of a rational conclusion which may be reached by all men, irrespective of racial and cultural differences, if they consent to rely upon their unaided reason and to free themselves from the effect of their cultural environment.

Dr. Rivers speaks also of the ‘great accomplishments in human endevour’. Dr. Freud refers to the same phenomena when he submits that ‘civilization’ has been achieved by sacrifices in the gratification of innate desires. These phrases also are not exact enough for our purpose. Moreover, they refer only to the achievements of those societies which have manifested great social energy. Just as the psychologists have conducted their researches only among those men and women who have been reared in the white man’s tradition, so they have formulated their theoretical conclusions in such a way that they apply more especially to extremely energetic societies, of which the white man’s society is one. Social energy, however, is displayed, though in a humble manner, by other societies also; and though the accomplishments of these societies may not be great as compared with the greatest, they are great as compared with those of less energetic societies. Moreover, great social energy is of two kinds, which may be called expansive and productive; these differ both in nature and intent. If we speak merely of ‘great accomplishments’ or ‘civilization’, we shall confuse them. It is necessary, therefore, to restate the psychological conclusion so as to give it a more precise and comprehensive application.

Among the accomplishments of extremely energetic societies are territorial expansion, conquest, colonization and the foundation of a widely flung commerce. All these things, and their like, are manifestations of what I call expansive social energy. A society which displays productive social energy develops the resources of its habitat and by increasing its knowledge of the material universe bends nature to its will. All such accomplishments as these imply the previous exertion of thought and reflection, these being necessary precursors to all human achievements.

This is the sense, then, in which I employ the term social energy. I do not refer to that futile energy which in popular writings is alleged to be
exhibited in the contemporary lust for scurry and haste. I refer to the manifestation by human societies of powers that are essentially and exclusively human (para. 175).

When the Teutonic tribes overran the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century, they manifested an expansive social energy. A similar energy was exhibited by the Babylonians four thousand years ago, by the Romans when they conquered Carthage, by the Arabs when they burst over Egypt in the seventh century, and by the English when they colonized in all parts of the world. Similarly the Hellenes displayed an expansive energy when they colonized in Sicily. The Athenians, however, manifested a productive energy when they decorated the Acropolis and developed their dramatic art. Productive energy was displayed also by the Moors when they invented algebra and the compass, and by the Western Europeans who discovered the use first of steam, then of electricity, then of wireless communication. Likewise the adaptation to their own use of these discoveries, the ability to ride beneath the sea and above the clouds: all these and similar achievements are the result of productive social energy.

Now in human records there is no trace of any display of productive energy which has not been preceded by a display of expansive energy. Although the two kinds of energy must be carefully distinguished, in the past they have been, as it were, united in the sense that one has developed out of the other. As Sir James Frazer has said, ‘Intellectual progress, which reveals itself in the growth of art and science, cannot be dissociated from industrial and economic progress, and that in its turn receives an immense impetus from conquest and empire. It is no mere accident that the most vehement outbursts of activity of the human mind have followed close upon the heels of victory.’

Conquests and empires are created by expansive energy; the vehement outbursts of mental activity which follow close upon the heels of victory reveal the existence of productive energy and of rationalistic culture. Certainly it is no mere accident that sometimes the one has succeeded the other, but many victories have been won which have not been followed by a burst of productive energy. The intellectual progress which sometimes has taken place after a victory has been caused by a depth of thought and reflection which has been lacking in those societies whose energy has been displayed only expansively.

In this manner I bring the term social energy into line with the definitions of the various cultural conditions in which human societies can be observed (para. 7). A society which displays productive energy possesses a rationalistic culture. Expansive energy is more typical of deistic societies, or of the deistic stratum in rationalistic society; usually a war is waged, or a colony founded, in the name of a god. I am far from identifying expansive energy with deistic culture, however, for although the two are often coincident, there have been many deistic societies whose energy was not great enough to be exhibited in an expansive manner. It has received a more humble manifestation. It was always greater, however, than that of manistic
societies, which in their turn always display a greater energy than zoistic societies, though the products of that energy are not great. And just as it is impossible for any society to display productive energy without a greater amount of thought and reflection than that which is exerted by an expansive society, so a period of thought and reflection must precede any other exhibition of social energy, whatever its character. Every human society possesses potential social energy (para. 70); the ability to apply thought and reason to the details of the inherited tradition is inherent in the human organism; but a display of that energy, the psychologists assert, depends upon sacrifices in the gratification of innate desires, the energy arising from the emotional conflict producing a depth of thought and enterprise which is not manifest except under those conditions. In other words, psychological researches reveal that the placing of a compulsory check upon the sexual impulses, that is, a limitation of sexual opportunity, produces thought, reflection, and energy.

Now the evidence is that a cultural advance has been caused by a factor which produces thought, reflection, and social energy (paras. 149–51) and that it occurs only when the sexual opportunity has been limited. I submit, therefore, that the limitation of the sexual opportunity must be regarded as the cause of the cultural advance.

We can state the matter in general terms by saying that after a consideration of the appropriate psychological and pathological data psychologists were compelled to regard social energy as a manifestation of sublimated sexual impulses. As a child is moulded into a social tradition, his character is modified by experience and circumstance. In some cases the social conventions compel some repression of innate desires. If men and women are sexually free, their sexual desires will receive direct satisfaction; but if the sexual opportunity is limited, the impulses must be checked. Then the repressed desires will be expressed in another form. In some cases, especially when the compulsory continence is intense, they may manifest themselves in morbid symptoms; in other cases they may produce a condition of regression; but usually the tension produced by the emotional conflicts is exhibited in some form of mental and social energy, the intensity of that energy depending upon the intensity of the compulsory continence. When the sexual opportunity of a society is reduced almost to a minimum, the resulting social energy produces 'great accomplishments in human endeavour' and 'civilization'. When the compulsory continence is of a less rigorous character, lesser energy is displayed, and manistic or deistic behaviour produced.

Such is the general conclusion which must be drawn from the psychological evidence. Now we will inquire more closely into the precise relation between sexual energy and social energy, and define the word 'cause'.

156. The Cause of Social Energy. Both Dr. Rivers and Dr. Freud seem to regard sexual energy as identical with social energy, for they speak of a
‘diversion’ of sexual energy into other channels; but it is not clear whether it is the sexual energy or the energy arising out of the emotional conflict which in their opinion is diverted. Dr. Rivers expresses himself thus: ‘It is an interesting question to ask whence comes the energy of which this work’ (i.e. art, literature, science) ‘is the expression. There are two chief possibilities; one, that it is derived from the instinctive tendencies which, through the action of controlling forces, fail to find their normal outlet; the other, that the energy so arising is increased in amount through the conflict between controlled and controlling forces.’ Dr. Rivers himself inclines to the second opinion. ‘Many pathological facts’, he says, ‘and especially the general diminution of bodily energy accompanying so many forms of psycho-neurosis, point to the truth of the second alternative.’ It will be noticed, however, that these two possibilities are not mutually exclusive but complementary. In each case the energy is derived from the instinctive tendency, its intensity being increased by the emotional conflict.

It is tempting to accept this suggestion and to apply it to the cultural data; but it would be an act of rather outrageous eclecticism, for all psychologists would not agree with it. Indeed there is a school of thought, represented in psychology by Dr. C. G. Jung and in philosophy by Professor H. Bergson, which insists that the desire as well as the ability to exhibit social energy is inherent in the human soul, which they regard as a synthesis of opposing forces. They consider, however, that social energy cannot be displayed except under conditions of sexual continence. They maintain that the exertion of social energy depends on the circumstances of the cultural environment, but that the energy is not produced by the emotional conflict. Rather is it the manifestation of a powerful vital impulse, or élan vital, which is always seeking fresh opportunities of manifestation and creation. ‘In nature’, Dr. Jung says, ‘we see only a will to live which will attain the creation of the whole species through the preservation of the individual.’ This compelling force, he considers, is manifested also in the products of human social energy. It follows its own principle of development and makes use of circumstances only in so far as they can be made to agree with that principle. In human society it works best when sexuality becomes deflected from its original destination, and is diverted ‘from sexual territory into associated functions’. ‘When this operation succeeds without injury to the adaptation of the individual,’ he says, ‘it is called sublimation.’

Plainly the production of social energy is regarded by these vitalists in a different light from that in which it appears to the followers of Dr. Freud and Dr. Rivers, but we must remember that in making these suggestions the psychologists were applying their psychological conclusions to cultural data. They produced no cultural facts to support them, and from our point of view this omission is valuable, for it shows that on the psychological evidence alone they considered that there was a connexion between the reduction of sexual opportunity and a display of social energy. When
scientific discoveries are being used, however, as a foundation for a general theory, there comes a point when the student must step outside his own province, and as soon as he does so he evinces the influence of his temperament. So long as his reason is harnessed to facts of which he has an intimate knowledge, the temperament is subdued; but it manifests itself as soon as it is free from the burden of objective evidence. A creating urge, a life-force, may exist in the living organism, but no one can point to any indisputable evidence of its existence. Its existence is purely subjective, due to the temperament of the thinker. It is a philosophical, not a scientific, assumption. As William James once said, "The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of temperaments. The temperament of the professional philosopher really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe to suit it, he believes in any representation of the universe which does suit it. He feels men of an opposite temper to be out of key with the world's character and in his heart considers them incompetent. Yet in the forum he can make no claim on the ground of his temperament to superior discernment or authority."  

We have arrived, therefore, at a point when the psychologists can help us no longer. They tell us that according to psychological evidence there is a causal relation between a limitation of sexual opportunity and an outburst of social energy, but it is from the cultural facts that we must decide the precise nature of that relation.

Whenever we use the word 'cause' we must distinguish carefully between immediate, final, and ultimate cause. If, in our interpretation of the available evidence, we may lay it down that a limitation of sexual opportunity, whenever and wherever it occurs, will produce an outburst of social energy, we may fairly regard the limitation as the immediate cause of the outburst. It is not the final cause; that depends on the volition of the society which consents to suffer the limitations and to make the necessary sacrifices of its instinctive desires. Nor is it the ultimate cause; that depends on the inherent nature of the human organism, which is such that under certain circumstances social energy can be displayed. If, however, our induction (para. 24) be accepted literally, the actual limitation must be regarded as the immediate cause of the observed result.

For my own part I am ready to suggest that this is the meaning of the evidence; but at the same time I am ready to admit the comparative paucity of the records. It may need a considerable mental effort to obtain an intimate knowledge of eighty uncivilized societies, and to remember the appropriate facts in regard to a number of civilized societies whose historical careers are spread over five thousand years of history; but the extent of this knowledge is not great compared with the number of societies which exist and have existed in the world. Moreover, I have based my suggestions on the assumption (para. 70) that every human society is biologically fit to
manifest social energy. The evidence in favour of this assumption seems to be overwhelming, but it would be rash to assume that no human society has existed, or could exist, which would be incapable of displaying that energy. In spite of the fact, therefore, that among extremely energetic societies are included such varied types as the Egyptian, Moor, Roman, Mongolian, Hindu, Hittite, Sumerian, and Western European, I am inclined to think that we should be stretching the evidence unduly if we were to conclude that any collection of human organisms would manifest social energy if they were to limit their sexual opportunity. It is possible that some variety of the species *homo sapiens* does not possess the inherent power which was possessed by the civilized societies I have mentioned and by the eighty uncivilized societies we have discussed. Although, therefore, I tend to regard a limitation of sexual opportunity as the immediate cause of social energy, I am content to conclude that it is the cause of social energy only in the sense of being an indispensable contributory factor; that is to say, even if other factors also are indispensable and operating, no social energy can be displayed unless the sexual opportunity is limited. Other things being equal, however, social energy will be exhibited by any society which places a compulsory limitation upon the sexual opportunity of its members. Conversely, in all cases any extension of sexual opportunity must result in a reduction of social energy.653

Such is the evidence from psychological research.

First, the mind of any individual human organism, especially in a society which places severe limitations upon the direct satisfaction of innate desires, is controlled by a dominating unconscious element which is of a social character. This Unconscious is formed by the modifications imposed by the circumstances of the cultural environment and by the experiences involved in the adaptation to the social tradition. Thus it is determined by the forces which control the tradition. From the control of this dominating Unconscious only a few individuals shake themselves free, their freedom being secured by a rigorous self-analysis, by the conscious expression of the emotions which originally created it, and by the resolute extinguishment of those dispositional traits which are its conscious manifestation. The vast majority of human beings are children of their age; they spend their lives in the perpetual grip of the unconscious element in their minds which is created by their early experiences and training.

Secondly, if the social conventions forbid direct sexual intercourse before marriage and limit the sexual opportunity after marriage, the tension which arises from the emotional conflicts may produce morbid symptoms or a state of regression, but usually the energy arising out of the conflicts is transformed into mental and social energy. If sexual freedom is the rule, there can be no such energy; but, others things being equal, if some limitations are imposed, an amount of social energy will be produced, the intensity of which will correspond to the severity of the compulsory limitations.
157. Application of these conclusions to the Cultural Data. When we apply these principles to the cultural data, two conclusions follow at once. The first is that the full effect of an extension or limitation of sexual opportunity, whether in the whole society or in one of the social strata of a society, is not revealed for at least three generations (roughly a century) after its adoption. The second is that in the production of social energy the sexual opportunity of the females is a more important factor than that of the males.

The best manner in which I can make the first point is to tell the story of a certain Lotingiro, a member of the Didinga tribe which occupied an area in southern Sudan and northern Uganda.

Lotingiro was a popular young man who from his earliest youth questioned the accepted beliefs of his fellow citizens, and openly expressed his doubts concerning the validity of Didinga institutions. His elders disapproved of his ideas, but did not interfere with him. When he was nineteen, Lotingiro offended against the tribal law. On this occasion only a lenient punishment was inflicted, for he was popular and his offence was judged to have been involuntary. When, however, he proceeded to offend again, and of deliberate purpose, he was executed.654

I do not know if Lotingiro’s scepticism was the result of white influence; I am ready to believe that it was the product of his own unaided reason. The point I wish to make is that if the Didinga elders had applied the power of their reason to their existing institutions they would not have executed Lotingiro; they would have hailed him as a prophet. They acted as they did because like all human beings they regarded their own peculiar beliefs as right, proper, and true, and they feared that, if their institutions were abolished, they would no longer be in a right relation with the power or powers in the universe. Now let us suppose that all the members of the Didinga tribe had been subjected to a limitation of sexual opportunity. Other things being equal, this, as we have seen, would have stimulated or intensified the power of their thought. We may suppose, then, that Lotingiro’s opinions would have been accorded a different reception. The tribal elders might have consented to hear them discussed; but they would scarcely have adopted them, for their minds would be dominated by unconscious elements which had been formed during the days of their childhood. The younger generations, however, would not have been subjected to precisely the same influence; so in all probability they would have been prepared to adopt some of the young rebel’s suggestions. At the same time their acceptance would not have been complete, for they would have been unable to free themselves from the influence of their childish experiences, the nature of which had been determined by the culture of the preceding generation. It would not have been until their grandchildren had been born that the influence of the pre-Lotingiro tradition would have been dispelled.

I have already suggested (para. 150) that a cultural change can never occur unless a number of citizens have given to the innovation the same
thought and consideration as produced it; now we can see the psychological reason. The attitude of society in general or of an individual in particular is governed by the nature of the inherited tradition, that is to say, by the nature of the influences which surround a child from the day of its birth. The emotional experiences of childhood leave an unavoidable mark on subsequent disposition, and the reception which a society or an individual accords to any action or idea is affected by them. But the nature of the inherited tradition depends upon that of the previous generation, which in its turn is influenced by that of the previous generation, and so on. On the strength of the psychological evidence we must assert the indubitable power of this inherited tradition; thus logical reasoning compels us to conclude that in the chance conditions of the past it has taken at least three generations (roughly a century) before a complete change could be effected. Needless to say, in the course of these hundred years much seed falls by the wayside; not all but only a few citizens accept and pass on the new tradition. Thus when a cultural change occurs haphazardly, either upward or downward, there remain some representatives of the higher or lower culture, these increasing or decreasing in number according to the behaviour of subsequent generations. The factors responsible for the present condition of any society or of any group within the society came into operation a hundred years ago. Conversely, any limitation or extension of sexual opportunity will not produce its full effect until a hundred years have passed.

I do not understand how the human reason can escape these conclusions. I am aware that just as there exists a fond hope that an individual may be a fresh edition of the creative forces competent to develop on his own lines, freed from the influence of the tradition in which he spent his earliest childhood, so there is a temperamental rebellion against the idea that the sins of parents are visited on their children. I will even confess that in the riotous optimism of extreme youth I shared these convictions. Now, however, I am persuaded that no rebellion could be more foolish or irrational. It is a cold fact that the mind of any adult human being is the product of many mysterious forces, not the least powerful of these forces being the behaviour of his parents in the days of his childhood.

Since this is so, it follows that generally speaking the character of the female has a greater influence than that of the male, for normally an infant spends his earliest and most impressionable years in the company and under the influence of his women-folk. In the preceding chapters we have seen that the coincident cultural facts support this conclusion.

Both these facts must be carefully borne in mind when the conclusions of this treatise are applied to any civilized society. In the records of history the full effect of any extension or limitation of sexual opportunity is visible in the succeeding century, while the varying sexual opportunity of the women explains the variety which has existed in the intensity of
the social energy displayed by different civilized societies. Only after the sexual opportunity of the women, pre-nuptial and post-nuptial, has been reduced to a minimum does the sexual opportunity of the men affect the amount of that energy.

158. Digest of the Foregoing Chapters. By this consideration of psychological speculations and conclusions the scope of our inquiry has been widened. Instead of confining our attention to uncivilized peoples we have been compelled to make certain suggestions which apply to all human societies, or at any rate to those human societies which have the power to display social energy. Thus there is a risk that instead of proceeding to our proper destination we shall be side-tracked. The best manner in which I can restore a sense of direction is to summarize, at the risk of overstatement, the evidence which has been submitted.

When we began (para. 1) I suggested that the first task was the collection, classification, and presentation of the facts. I divided human societies (para. 12) into civilized and uncivilized. According to the quality and quantity of the evidence which was available in regard to their culture (para. 24), I selected eighty uncivilized societies as the subject of an inductive inquiry (para. 11), classifying them according to the manner in which they maintained a right relation with the power or powers manifest in the universe. Each of these societies was fitted to the same frame of reference, the appropriate facts being presented symbolically in a Chart of Evidence (Appendix I), which afterwards (para. 141) was analysed and appraised. From a study of the entries we decided (para. 24) that in all probability there was some relation among uncivilized peoples between sexual opportunity and cultural condition, for

(a) pre-nuptial sexual freedom was accompanied by the zoistic cultural condition; conversely, all the zoistic societies permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom;

(b) a compulsory irregular or occasional continence was accompanied by the manistic cultural condition; conversely, all the manistic societies insisted on an irregular or occasional continence;

(c) pre-nuptial chastity was accompanied by the deistic cultural condition; conversely, all the deistic societies insisted on pre-nuptial chastity.

The technical terms on which the classifications were based, zoistic, manistic, and deistic (para. 7), sexual freedom (para. 18), irregular or occasional continence (para. 19), and pre-nuptial chastity (para. 18), were defined in the rigid manner which the inquiry demanded.

In the second and third chapters I stated verbally, with references to and comments on the appropriate literature, the facts which were represented symbolically in the Chart of Evidence (Appendix I). At the same time I endeavoured to correct some of the misconceptions which had arisen from (a) the classification of societies according to their beliefs, (b) the
translation of native words into civilized languages. I also tried to show
how some theories, evolutionary and otherwise, were unacceptable, being
founded on misconceptions arising out of (a) and (b).

The second task, it was agreed (para. 1), was to sift the evidence as finely
as possible in order that some intelligible suggestion might be made con-
cerning the manner in which the coincident phenomena were connected.
Thus in the first section of the fourth chapter I concentrated my attention
on the cultural data. From an analysis and appraisement of these data, the
following facts emerged:

(a) The culture of our eighty societies (forty-seven zoistic, twenty-one
manistic, ten deistic, two uncertain) was founded on a common basis, the
conception of the strange quality or power manifest in anything unusual or
beyond comprehension.

In a zoistic society this quality was the power in the universe. An un-
usual or highly gifted man was credited with its possession. The place in
which the people made their offerings was the place in which the quality
was manifest, such a place being considered ‘unusual’ either (1) because it
possessed some outstanding characteristic, or (2) because something un-
usual had happened there, or (3) because a magician was buried there. By
many societies the word which denoted the power in the universe was also
applied either to corpses or to the ghosts of distinguished dead men.

I described such a society as being at a dead level of conception.

(b) Among the manistic societies there was some variety, this being
revealed in the identity of the recipients of the offerings, in the purpose of
the offerings, and in the elaboration of the places in which the offerings
were made. The power in the universe was still the strange power manifest
in anything unusual or beyond comprehension; the source of magic power
was still the possession of unusual qualities; but the offerings which had
been made to an outstanding citizen when he was alive, whether as a reward
for help or as a means of avoiding danger, were continued after his death.
The making of this offering seemed to involve an extension of memory,
and an exertion of thought and reflection. The elaboration of the sacred
places suggested the display of an energy lacking in zoistic societies.

Thus the change from the zoistic to the manistic condition seemed to
be due to the operation of a factor which produced or intensified thought,
reflection, and energy, this factor being present in manistic societies and
absent in zoistic societies. The evidence was that the pre-nuptial sexual
opportunity of the manistic societies was less than that of the zoistic
societies.

In two cases, those of the Shilluk and SE. Solomon Islanders, the
illustrious dead were remembered for a longer period than they were
by any other manistic society; the post-funeral rites of these two societies
partook also of the nature of cult as well as of tendance; they introduced
more extensive elaborations into the places where offerings were made.
Thus it seemed that in these two societies the factor responsible for the
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Cultural change was operative to a greater degree than in the other manistic societies. The evidence was that their compulsory pre-nuptial continence was of a greater intensity than that of their manistic neighbours.

(c) By the ten deistic societies the illustrious dead were remembered and conciliated for an even longer period than among the two manistic (cult) societies. The place in which a right relation was maintained with them was elaborated still more extensively, the temples of these deistic peoples being elaborations of the grave-houses or relic-houses erected by the manistic societies.

Thus the change from the manistic to the deistic condition seemed to be of the same character as the change from the zoistic to the manistic pattern, the conclusion being that the factor producing thought, reflection, and energy was present among them to a greater degree than among any of the manistic societies. The evidence was that among all the deistic societies the women were compelled to be pre-nuptially chaste, that is, the pre-nuptial sexual opportunity of a deistic society was less than that of any manistic society.

Undoubtedly the culture of these ten deistic societies was a development from the manistic condition; but such a course of development, we perceived, was not inevitable. It is possible for a zoistic society to become deistic without being manistic provided that the factor which produces the deistic condition is in operation. Furthermore, it is just as possible for a deistic society to become zoistic as it is for a zoistic society to become deistic, the descent from the deistic condition being caused by the absence of the factor which previously had produced it. The cultural process is not a one-way street. The evidence in regard to degeneracy among our eighty uncivilized societies, however, remains to be considered.

Having completed the analysis and appraisement of the cultural evidence, we proceeded to our third task. We consulted the appropriate psychological authorities in order to discover if according to the results of their researches there was any relation between a reduction of sexual opportunity and the production or intensification of thought, reflection, and social energy. This was necessary because we were unable to conduct experiments in order to test the validity of the induction made from the entries in the Chart of Evidence (Appendix I). We found that there was explicit, reliable evidence to this effect. Thus I suggested that the reduction of sexual opportunity was the cause of a cultural change.

In that context the word 'cause' must be interpreted as immediate cause. An assumption is involved, however, which, although supported by evidence, may not be readily granted, viz. that every human society is capable of displaying social energy. It is possible, though improbable, that some human varieties of the species homo sapiens, do not possess, or have not possessed, this inherent power. If that view be adopted, compulsory continence cannot be regarded even as the immediate cause of a cultural change; it would be merely an indispensable contributory factor. At the
same time, if these conclusions be applied to any particular society which, according to other evidence, is undoubtedly capable of displaying social energy, compulsory continence must be regarded as the immediate cause of a cultural advance. Any extension of sexual opportunity must always be the immediate cause of a cultural decline.

In no sense can the compulsory continence be regarded either as the final or as the ultimate cause of either advance or decline.

From a study of competent psychological authorities we discovered also that in a developed society the conscious mind of any individual is dominated by an unconscious element, the latter being formed in early childhood. This led to three conclusions:

(a) that under the chance circumstances which hitherto have prevailed in human affairs a cultural change cannot have been completed in less than a century, or, to put the matter in another way, the extension or limitation of sexual opportunity, either in society as a whole or in a class within the society, cannot have its full cultural effect for a hundred years;

(b) that culturally the sexual opportunity of the females is a more important factor than that of the males;

(c) that scientifically an individual cannot be considered apart from the society of which he is a member, the dominating Unconscious being of a social character.

Further we perceived that the possession by an individual of free will, whether it be an illusion or not, does not vitiate a deterministic conclusion in regard to the cultural process.

Now we can state the matter in general terms and in such a way that the conclusions can be applied to any human society at any time. It is at this point that I bring the sixteen civilized societies (para. 12) within the scope of my suggestions. In discussing them I shall extend the meaning of the term 'cultural condition' so as to include their methods of political organization. It will be remembered (para. 3) that this was my original intention, and that the definition had to be narrowed on account of the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence in regard to the political institutions of uncivilized societies.
CHAPTER V
NECESSITY IN HUMAN AFFAIRS

159. The Relativity of Human Affairs. At the outset I distinguish with
great rigour between the biological and cultural processes. They are not
only distinct; they are also dissimilar. The biological process is that in
which the human organism received its physical attributes and its inherent
nature; in the cultural process can be seen the results of an uneven develop-
ment of that inherent nature.

In the past there has been some confusion between these processes, for
the same word, evolution, has been applied to both of them. This con-
fusion has been responsible for several preconceptions in regard to the
cultural process.

We are careless in the use of the word 'evolution'. Literally it means an
unfolding, or an appearance in due succession; but after it had been applied
to the successive appearance on the earth's surface of different organic
species, it acquired a technical meaning which previously it did not possess.
In its literal meaning it is still applied to any series of successive appearances,
such as the cultural process; but we have become so accustomed to its
technical meaning that by a queer mental twist we ascribe those successive
appearances to the operation of the same forces as those which we hypo-
thesise as responsible for the successive appearance of different organic
species. In this manner the development by the human organism of its
inherent nature has been ascribed to the same forces as produced its
physical attributes. Yet plainly the idea has been read into the facts and
not out of them. If we had not applied the same word, evolution, to both
processes, they could never have been confused.

Actually when we confuse them we try to apply to the cultural process
a scientific method which is not applicable to it. It may be said that there
are two kinds of science, historical and inductive. A historical scientist
is one who studies the past history of a phenomenon and formulates a
working hypothesis by means of which he tries to connect, even to explain,
his data. Thus a geologist is acting as a historical scientist when he attempts
to estimate the age of the earth and the method of its formation; an
astronomer is a historical scientist when he submits a hypothesis in regard
to the birth of the solar system; and to this class of science the study of the
biological process has often been considered to belong. There are signs
(para. 175) that biological methods may be changing and that soon biology
may become a strictly inductive science; but in the past biologists have
concentrated most of their attention on the submission of likely conjectures
in regard to the arrival of different organic species on the earth's surface.
Now in any historical science the sequence of the related facts is interrupted.
There are many gaps in the record; these must be filled in by the hypothesis; and inevitably they are filled according to the temperament of the student. In this manner historical science tends to become philosophical, even teleological; and the biological process, considered historically, has been variously regarded as selective, creative, or emergent, according to the point of view from which the available evidence has been approached or selected. Then, by the mental twist to which I have referred, the cultural process (being regarded as identical with, or as an extension of, the biological process) has been included within the scope of the teleological speculations which accompany the historical hypothesis. In this manner it has become the custom to regard the cultural problem as a philosophical, even as a biological, one; but the truth is that it is of an entirely different character, and must be studied not by historical but by inductive methods.

The use of the word evolution in reference to the cultural process is also responsible for another devastating preconception. The human species is the most developed form of life which has yet appeared on the earth's surface; and, so far as we can tell, the human organism made a later appearance than other mammals. Thus the biological process has been regarded as a progressive development in the course of which higher and higher forms of life are successively produced. It is true that this opinion is vitiated by the short space of time during which we have studied the biological process. It seems possible that other species of a lower order are being continually produced and that, when biologists have recorded the working of nature for a longer period of time, they may be able to point to such an event, which hitherto has not been noted because it is still in the process of 'becoming'. As things are, however, there is some evidence which inclines some students to regard the biological process as a continual development towards 'higher' things. The result is that the cultural process has been regarded in the same way; but, if we base our conclusions on the cultural evidence alone, we see that in the past the cultural process has consisted of a long series of alternations, uprisings, and declines. By no means can it be represented as an ascending straight line. There has been no long, slow, gradual process towards higher things. All that has happened is that at different times different human societies have occupied different positions in the cultural scale.

The notion of an ever-increasing cultural process has been encouraged by our own attitude to our own peculiar culture. There is reason to believe that in some ways our own culture is incomparably richer than that of any previous known culture. This well-recognized but usually exaggerated fact, combined with a pardonable egocentricity, has produced an irrational attitude towards the changes in our own cultural condition. As rationalists we are conscious of changes in the cultural condition of our own society and in that of the various cultural strata into which our society is divided. Then, convinced that the cultural process is a progressive development and that our own culture is the most developed of all cultures, we assume that
every change in our cultural condition is evidence of higher cultural development. Anything which is subsequent in time is regarded as more enlightened and more developed. Culturally, twentieth-century white man is assumed to be more 'evolved' than nineteenth-century white man; twenty-first-century white man will be more evolved than twentieth-century white man; and so on.

It is a quaint and comfortable doctrine; yet until it is dispelled we shall understand neither our own culture nor that of any other society. It vitiates many of our historical judgements and plays havoc with our efforts to understand the culture of societies which have passed away. If, in the study of a society which no longer inhabits any part of the earth as an organized unit, we discover an institution which we ourselves have adopted, we call it a civilized society. If the society allowed the institution to fall into desuetude, we say that then its members were degenerate. Sometimes we applaud as more enlightened the introduction into our own society of a custom which in the culture of another society we have condemned as decadent; but this does not embarrass us; we simply rewrite the history of that society. Sometimes we find that an ancient society introduced a reform which recently we ourselves have adopted. We call attention to this strange phenomenon, and condescendingly observe how civilized those ancient men were. We forget that there is another point of view; a more disinterested spectator might remark that only recently have we become as civilized as they were. Admittedly the vague use of the word 'civilized' is responsible for some of this woolly thought; the word is essentially meaningless, yet masquerades as a technical term; but this is not a sufficient explanation for our culpable inexactitude. Always we assess the development of another society by comparing it with our own; always we assume that each successive change in our own culture is an improvement on that which preceded it. A similar egocentric outlook used to vitiate our understanding of the physical universe. Now it has been abandoned. We must abandon the egocentric outlook also in the study of human affairs. Perhaps this will be the more easily performed if we consider briefly one of the causes of the recent change in the outlook of the physicists.

With the earth as our vehicle, we are told, we are travelling at twenty miles a second round the sun; the sun carries us at twelve miles a second through the galactic system; the galactic system bears us at two hundred and fifty miles a second amid the spiral nebulae. From this gyrating platform we observe the universe around us. We see another star which, we calculate, hurries through space at a thousand miles a second. How odd, we think, to travel so fast. Yet from the point of view of any conscious organism on that star it is we, not they, who scurry along at that tremendous speed; for, if they appear to travel at a thousand miles a second in relation to us, we must appear to them to travel at the same relative velocity. The apparent oddity in their behaviour is due solely to our position on the slow-moving earth.
It is the same in human affairs. We are members of the society in which we happened to be born; we have become accustomed to certain ideas and institutions. Like the members of all other societies we regard these ideas and institutions as normal and natural; and we consider it odd that human beings should think and behave in a different manner. Yet the oddity in their behaviour exists only in our minds; we are allowing our thought to be dominated by the accident of our inherited tradition. To them we appear as odd as they appear to us.

In the nineteenth century the calculated velocity of another star was regarded as absolute; now physicists have perceived that all such estimates are relative to the speed of our own planet. Moreover they have discovered that the standards by which they calculate the distance and mass of any object in space are relative to the motion of the earth. The length of our inches and the contents of our pints depend on the speed at which the earth travels. An observer on another star would look out upon the same universe and make his calculations according to his standards, these depending on the velocity of his habitation. Thus an object which appears rectangular to us might seem square to him, and there is no method by means of which the two judgements can be compared. Relatively both are equally valid; absolutely neither possesses any value at all; for the frame of space to which each observer has fitted the point-events depends on the velocity of the star on which he happens to be situated. As Professor Sir Arthur Eddington has said: 'Owing to the accident of having been born on a particular planet, our observer had hitherto unthinkingly adopted one of the frames, but he realizes that this is no ground for obstinately asserting that it must be the right frame.'

It is the same in human affairs. Owing to the accident of having been born into a particular society, we have adopted one method of assessing human culture, but there is no reason to think that this is the right method. Just as the length of our inches and the contents of our pints depend upon our habitation of the earth, so the standards of our cultural judgements, and especially the standards of our moral judgements, depend on our membership of a particular society. Moreover they depend also on the cultural age in which we as individuals happened to be born. A member of another society, or a member of our own society at a different period of our history, would apply the terms civilized and enlightened to ideas and institutions which now we despise; they would condemn as degenerate those innovations which to us represent the apogee of human achievement; and future generations, if they adopt our present method, will call us decadent or enlightened according to the nature of their own ideas.

If we are to arrive at an intelligent understanding of the cultural process, we must adopt a frame upon which the culture of any society at any time can be fitted, and we must place our own culture upon it by the side of other cultures, recording the observed changes in our cultural condition according to the definitions we adopt. For this reason I entitled my first
chapter ‘The Frame of Reference’. In that chapter I defined the standards by which I should assess the culture of the societies which I proposed to discuss. Admittedly the frame I adopted is inadequate in so far as the culture of all societies at all times cannot be fitted upon it, but its limitations do not invalidate the argument, for it was designed only for uncivilized peoples. In this chapter I propose to make certain suggestions based on the preceding evidence and considerations. It is vital that I gauge our cultural development by the same standards as I apply to any other earthly culture. Thus henceforward I shall speak not of ‘us’ but of ‘them’. I shall refer to the changes in our cultural condition as the cultural history of the English. By this means I hope to avoid the subjective intrusion which is apt to occur when we speak in the first person. Furthermore, in order to dispel completely the influence which our training and environment exert upon our judgement, I propose to discuss the cultural process from the point of view of an observer outside the galactic system. Sir Arthur Eddington has remarked that recently the physicist has found it necessary to adopt impressionist methods, for he desires to convey significances which cannot be told in microscopic detail. We also shall profit by taking an impressionist view of the cultural process, filling in the details on another occasion.

From our detached position outside the galactic system, unaffected by the dominating unconscious mind which controls the operation of earth-bound brains, we can watch the earth pursuing its cosmic journey round the sun. It seems small, and does not take long to complete its orbit. Thus we can watch for what to a man on earth would seem an extended period of time, say five thousand orbits, or, as he would say, five thousand years. We perceive that as it revolves the earth carries on its surface a multitude of human societies. We cannot help being struck by the differences between them. The members of one society appear to be lethargic: they smile when they are well-fed, snarl when they are hungry, and satisfy their animal desires as they feel inclined. It is different in the case of the people inhabiting the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris. They are engaged in sundry activities, such as erecting temples, organizing armies, building ships and cities, creating engines for their own convenience, writing books and letters, and searching the whole area for some new field of enterprise. Plainly this second society is displaying an energy which in the other case is absent. There is some activity too in the valley of the Nile, a few faint stirrings in Crete, and a glimpse of something happening in China, but most of the other human societies, in whatever part of the earth they happen to be, are as sluggish and as indifferent as the first society at which we glanced.

As the earth turns round and round, these conditions alter. Generally speaking the otiose groups live their languid lives unmolested, but sometimes a hitherto insignificant group bursts its boundaries and occupies new lands. Moreover, many sluggish societies are conquered by their more energetic neighbours. The societies which at one time were so busy seem
to suffer from a failure of nerve. In some cases they relax, their energy vanishing as mysteriously as it began. In other cases the energy of their neighbours increases; these men rise up, and overrun the country of those whose activities we have been admiring. Then in quick succession, first in south-eastern Europe, then in Asia Minor, then in southern Europe and the lands that abut on the Mediterranean Sea, then in north Africa, south-western Europe, and then throughout western Europe, human societies awake from lethargy and engage in the same kinds of activities as those we have already noted. They erect temples, then pull them down and build bigger and more complicated ones; they organize armies and navies, build cities, organize means of rapid communication, cast their eyes up to the sky in an endeavour to understand the phenomena of the universe around them, and search for every possible outlet for their abundant energy. Then one by one each of these vigorous societies experiences the same failure of nerve as its predecessors. They relax; their energy fades away. The products of that energy crumble to pieces; a mound of dust remains.

Though from a general point of view the activities of these vigorous societies always conform to certain definite patterns, there is considerable variety within these patterns. Maybe the temples are built of different materials; on the other hand they may differ merely in shape. Letters are written in one place on clay tablets, in another place on sheepskins, in a third on paper. Some men wear hats, others do not. Those who wear them differ in their opinions concerning the occasions on which hats should be doffed or donned. In some areas the houses are completely roofed; in others they are open to the sky; and so on. Yet always the pattern is the same throughout the whole earth; the various societies manifest their energies in a similar manner. In one detail, however, there is a great difference among them. Without exception, in the days of its early stirrings, each society is under the leadership of one man. In some cases the society as a whole has spent its energy before any change takes place in the political organization, but in other cases a small group of energetic men deprives the one man of his privileges and subjects the remainder of the society to its rule. And it is noticeable that the difference between this energetic group and the men whom it dominates is precisely the same as the difference between a vigorous and a sluggish society. Simply, the more energetic group rules the less energetic one. This, however, is not always the end of the story. Sometimes other changes occur, the changes being of a different character according to the relative energy of the internal groups. In some cases the small group hesitates, then relaxes; those who previously have been dominated assume control of affairs. Moreover, they appear to display an energy which hitherto we have not associated with them. In other cases the small group does not immediately lose its energy; the lower orders begin to manifest an equal energy, the whole society becoming homogeneous and extremely energetic. And in all cases, if the society preserves its independence, any other change in its political organization
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reflected the differences in the relative energy of the various social groups of which it is composed.

According to the amount of their energy, too, these vigorous societies change their opinions on every conceivable subject. At one time they have faith in one opinion, at another time in another; at one time they adopt one method of behaviour, at another time they adopt another. The new opinion is always hailed as the most enlightened; the people are always convinced that their new way is better than their old way; but actually they have merely exchanged one convention for another convention, the nature of the new convention depending upon the amount of their mental and social energy. Indeed sometimes we can watch the changes in their opinion and behaviour, and observe the manner in which first they have faith in one method, then in another, and then again in the one which they had discarded as superficial and uncultivated.

Thus, when first they attract our attention by the abundance of their energy, the Hellenes are of the opinion that diseases are due to the action of certain malignant powers which can be coerced by incantations or swayed by prayers. Only certain men, the priests of Asclepius, know the proper words, so they must be consulted. After the earth has completed a few more revolutions, the Hellenes defeat the Persians at Marathon. After a few more revolutions each city appoints a state-physician, who is paid out of public funds; private practitioners also set up; surgery becomes a favourite method of treatment. Men begin to specialize in diseases of the eyes, ears, or teeth. Moreover, one of the leading physicians, Hippocrates, has nothing but contempt for charms and incantations. In his opinion they are both vulgar and superstitious; he lays stress on a quiet reserved manner at the bedside. The earth continues to revolve, then we notice that once more the Hellenes are changing their opinions. Clinical histories are replaced by cures which can be classed only as magical; amulets return to favour. Physicians no longer regard incantations and purifications as vulgar; they even adopt them in the course of their own treatment. In a word Hellenic therapeutics return to what they had been a few orbits ago.\textsuperscript{657}

We find the same changes of opinion among the men of western Europe as soon as the earth has travelled round the sun a few hundred times. Before they begin to display great social energy, they use charms, amulets, and incantations; they also consult the priests attached to their temples. Then like the Hellenes they start to rely on surgery and physic. The last glimpse we have of them reveals a growing distrust of these methods, some members of society choosing to wear charms and to utter prayers rather than to go into hospital.

This would be the impression we should gain if we were to watch some particular part of the earth; we should be able to compare the condition of a particular society with its condition in a previous or a subsequent epoch. If we were to include the whole earth in one comprehensive glance, we should receive a different impression; in this case we should compare
the behaviour of one society with that of another society in the same epoch. We should notice, for instance, that the earth carries not only a few extremely vigorous societies but also a multitude of less energetic ones. The members of these societies seem content to preserve the tradition which they inherited from their fathers. Indeed they seem nervous of any change, and they, in their turn, train their children to think and to behave as they themselves have thought and behaved. At the same time their behaviour differs, for both the nature of their inherited tradition and the amount of their energy vary. In some of these societies men erect temples. These temples differ, some being sturdy stone structures, others like ordinary houses. In most cases the temples are clean and well kept; but in a few cases they are neglected, being put in order only when the people are in trouble. There is no relation between the geographical situation of a society and the erection of temples; those which are building temples are scattered all over the earth. The existence of the temples seems to be due to the display of an energy akin to that displayed in a greater degree by the extremely vigorous societies.

Most of the less energetic societies, however, do not exhibit enough energy to build even a temple. Some of them merely erect small huts either over certain graves or under certain trees. Others select certain areas in which they place a small platform or a framework of sticks; and this is as far as their energy extends. A large number have not enough energy to do even this. Only one thing is common to all of them: when they encounter or experience anything unusual or beyond their comprehension, they suffer from an intense anxiety, their behaviour under these conditions varying according to the amount of their energy. Some go to a temple, seeking either to allay the anger of the power which is manifest therein or to secure its help. Others present an offering on a raised platform. Still others place food and drink inside a small hut erected over a grave or under a tree. Those which erect neither temples, platforms, nor huts visit, or are visited by, certain seemingly abnormal men who sing songs, perform antics, or murmur over a curiously shaped stone or bundle.

The behaviour of these less energetic societies varies also in times of drought. When rain is late, and even when it comes too much, some approach a temple; others place an offering on a platform or in a hut; still others consult the men who possess the special stones or bundles. And, whatever a society does, it imagines that it is doing the thing which is right, proper, and appropriate to the occasion.

The explanation of these diverse phenomena is, I think, as follows. The inherent nature of the human organism is such that when collected into groups it possesses the power to manifest mental and social energy. This energy, however, can be manifested only under certain conditions. If these conditions are satisfied, energy will be displayed. If on the other hand they are not satisfied, necessarily no energy can be exhibited. As the earth pursues its cosmic journey round the sun, human societies arise in different
places, manifest their inherent power, then fall into decline. During the period of their great activity, they happen to have satisfied the conditions under which alone their energy can be displayed. Before their decline they have chanced to depart from their old habits; their subsequent decrepitude is the inevitable result. Within each of these vigorous societies, as it displays its energy, various groups are more energetic than other groups. The more energetic men dominate the less energetic men, according to their relative energy, the methods of government which the historian calls monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy being adopted as circumstances dictate. Moreover, according to their mental energy these vigorous societies change their cultural habits, their ideas concerning such things as the treatment of sickness and the method of obtaining rain depending upon the amount of mental energy they have devoted to these problems.

It is the same with the less energetic societies. The amount of energy which they could display is the same as that of any other society; the amount of energy which they do display depends upon the degree in which they have satisfied the necessary conditions. In every case the amount of energy seems to be determined. Moreover, the opinions of the members of any society on any subject seem to be determined in a like manner, for their nature depends upon the amount of energy displayed by the society. These opinions have a relative, not an absolute, value. They cannot be used as a basis of judgement, nor can they afford the solution of any human problem. The man who relies upon them, indeed, is like one that expects a vehicle in which he is seated to save him from a fall over a cliff: the vehicle itself is controlled by the same forces as those which act upon its occupant.

160. The Science of Human Affairs. There is no pessimism in this outlook. The contrary is the case. In human affairs the doctrine of determinism is sometimes derided, being alleged to conflict with the noblest aspirations of the human mind; but I do not comprehend why this should be so. Indeed, if we examine the misgivings with which the doctrine is sometimes received, I think we must conclude that it is merely the name which arouses mistrust and despondency, for, if the doctrine itself be considered dispassionately, it assumes a different nature from that which is commonly attached to the name.

We must distinguish, of course, between what has happened in the past and what can happen in the future. In the past human energy has been displayed only fortuitously, for it is only by chance that the necessary conditions have been satisfied; but, like all natural forces, those which control the manifestations of human energy can be controlled by men. Thus in the future high culture, or any other form of culture, can be consciously created. Just as when petrol is compressed in a cylinder, and then fired, its potential energy is transformed into kinetic energy, so the potential power of a human society can be made to manifest itself, either in large or in small quantities, either for a short or for a long time, or even for
ever. Thus the cultural development of any society can be controlled; the human organism can take charge of its own cultural destiny.

So long as we regard our destiny as outside our control, we must sit quietly while more powerful forces operate. Under such circumstances hope is regarded as the greatest of virtues; human beings are mere tools of a power or powers which may be well or ill disposed towards them. If, however, we adopt the deterministic attitude which the facts demand, a human society can assume the mastery of its own development; its future is in its own hands. In that case hope descends to a low place in the scale of virtues, for it implies inaction. A humble acceptance of inherent nature (and therefore humility before the power responsible for it), combined with a firm creative resolution, takes its place. Such an attitude seems optimistic, not pessimistic.

The truth is, I think, that this optimistic creative outlook on human affairs has never been adopted because we have failed to apply inductive methods to our study; in the past human affairs have been studied only historically. As soon as we adopt inductive methods, the alleged pessimism disappears. Alone of all sciences inductive science is creative; it is only by the use of inductive science that man controls his environment. Historical science, on the other hand, is purely academic; it merely satisfies our curiosity and enables us to understand, or to think we understand, how things came to be in the condition in which they are observed at any time. Inductive scientists are not interested in the past history of phenomena; they concentrate their attention on the natural behaviour of things, and endeavour to formulate that behaviour into scientific laws, which are statements in general terms of the necessity (ananke) which controls the behaviour, the behaviour itself depending on the inherent nature (physis) of the material. It is as the result of these researches that men can assume the mastery of the universe around them. When we create a self-propelling vehicle, build a ship which rides beneath the waves, erect a microphone which carries our voices without the aid of wires to the uttermost ends of the earth, and make any other machine which yields comfort and convenience, we are simply placing parts of the material universe in such a relation to one another that their behaviour affords the results which we desire. That behaviour is dictated to them by their inherent nature; it is necessary. This necessity has been translated into scientific laws; the machine has been built in accordance with the laws. Until men had studied the behaviour and reduced the necessity to laws, however, the machine could not be created.

This may be commonplace; but there are two reasons why it is vital to restate it. In the first place there has recently been a tendency to confuse the inherent nature of a phenomenon and the behaviour which is dependent upon that nature, this confusion being apparent in the most exact of all inductive sciences, physics. When they act exclusively as inductive scientists, physicists confine their attention to the study of natural behaviour;
but, after they had pierced the atom, some of them began to trespass in other gardens and to speculate on matters which strictly speaking were outside their scientific province. Thus there arose the idea that scientists, when working as scientists, were concerned as much with the inherent nature of things as with their behaviour. Emphatically this is not the case. Secondly, we have become so accustomed to the scientific conception of things that sometimes the precise meaning of the terms we employ is obscured by their familiarity. Thus we are apt to say that the law of gravitation makes bodies attract one another and makes the apple fall to the ground. The abstract name by which we denote the necessary behaviour is conceived as an operative force. A law of gravitation, however, is merely a human conception; by its means we formulate in words the influence which owing to their inherent nature bodies exert on one another. The apple falls to the ground not because the law of gravitation demands such behaviour but because such behaviour is a constituent part of nature. Physicists have studied the behaviour, observing it to be inevitable; the law is a verbal statement of this inevitability or necessity. And that, so far as inductive science is concerned, is the end of the matter.

Professor Lloyd Morgan has made this point. 'We have such a way', he says, 'of making our general and abstract terms pose as so-called forces. Thus by many people gravitation is supposed to make bodies attract one another, and crystallization to make sugar run into crystalline form. I am one of those who regard gravitation as a concept under which attractions of a certain order are formulated, crystallization as that which denotes certain modes of crystalline synthesis. . . . If we are asked why crystallization occurs under such and such conditions, all that we can reply is that the constitution of nature is such that under these conditions it does occur. . . . Crystallization does not make the facts to be what they are; the related facts being what they are makes our concept of crystallization what it is.'

In inductive science, then, there are three separate items: first, the inherent nature of things; secondly, the behaviour dependent on that inherent nature; thirdly, the law which formulates the necessity. The first must be accepted with humility; the second is the material on which the scientist works; the third is a human method of translating and formulating the force which controls the behaviour of the material, enabling us at the same time to prophesy its future conduct. When, therefore, we apply inductive methods to the study of human affairs, we must accept the inherent nature of the human organism as it is revealed in the cultural data; then we must examine the manner in which the behaviour of a human society changes under changing conditions; finally we must formulate the law or laws which express in general terms the controlling necessity. In this manner we shall not only explain the events of the past but also lay the foundations for the control of the future.

In what follows I am concerned solely with the past.
To every human society known to us a certain power (or powers) has manifested itself (or themselves) in the universe; the people have endeavoured to maintain a right relation with it (or them). Since there is no known exception to this rule, we must conclude in all humility that such behaviour is part of the inherent nature of the human organism. For the same reason it appears to be also part of its inherent nature both to react strongly to anything unusual or beyond its comprehension and to see in any unusual natural feature, animal or man, a dangerous but powerful, and therefore desirable, quality. Before such natural features, animals or men, a human being, manifesting his inherent nature, places offerings in an attempt either to avoid the danger immanent in any place where the quality is manifest or to secure the quality for himself.

The reaction to anything unusual is not peculiar to the human organism; the peculiarity lies in the nature of the reaction. On coming into contact with something outside its previous experience, a kitten will retreat, a bird will fly away. The reaction of the kitten or of the bird, however, is modified by direct experience in the sense that after a while both these animals may take for granted the existence of the uncomprehended phenomenon which previously had caused their immediate retreat. The human organism also stands in awe before anything unusual; sometimes it also tends to retreat; but its subsequent behaviour differs from that of the kitten or of the bird in at least two ways: first, it forms a mental conception of the strange quality which is manifest in the unusual phenomenon; secondly, it makes an offering. Like the reaction of the kitten, that of the human organism is modified by experience, but both the modification and the experience are of a different nature. The human organism continues to make offerings in the same place, before the same power, and for the same purpose until its conception of the nature of the power changes. Then it proceeds to make its offerings to the newly-conceived power, its purpose varying according to the nature of the new conception. In rationalistic cultures further modification occurs.

Although this aspiration to secure the help of the power in the universe, variously conceived, is inherent in the human organism, and although the aspiration is manifested in the offerings placed before the power, we must beware of concluding that the desire to make offerings is peculiar to human beings. Neither can we say that offerings are made by human beings for no other purpose than the two which I have mentioned. When Herr Wolfgang Kohler was conducting his researches into the mentality and behaviour of chimpanzees, he found that in the desire for reunion with its group an isolated chimpanzee would throw towards the other members any article which was near to it, even those which it valued for its own warmth and comfort. Such an action as this corresponds almost exactly to some human offerings, a discussion of which is not included in my present submissions.

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universe, and in the methods of maintaining a right relation with it, seem to depend upon the amount of mental energy which a society displays. Its social energy is the outward manifestation, and sole objective evidence, of this mental energy. The power of thought is inherent; similarly the power to display social energy is inherent; but neither mental nor social energy can be manifested except under certain conditions. Both the power of reason and potential energy are separate items of the natural constitution of the organism, yet they are indissoluble in operation. Before any social energy can be expended, thought must be brought to bear upon the avenue of expenditure; before any thought can bear fruit, energy must be expended on the selected object; and the change in the outward appearance of that object is the sole objective evidence of the existence of the thought. Both the thought and the social energy are stimulated and intensified by the operation of a single factor, the cultural condition (in my sense of the word "culture") of any society at any time depending on the amount of social energy which it displays. This factor is compulsory continence, or the reduction of sexual opportunity. The inherent power of thought and the potential energy of the human organism can be exhibited only when the sexual impulses are controlled by the operation of social ordinances; and the amount of energy and the profundity of the thought depend upon the extent of the limitation which these ordinances impose. If the compulsory continence be great, the society will display great energy; if it be small, there will be a little energy. If there be no compulsory continence, there can be no energy; it remains potential.

This, however, does not state enough of the truth, for it omits a vital consideration. As the inherent tendencies of the organism are modified by experience, there arises within it a dominating Unconscious (paras. 153, 154). Speaking generally, three factors contribute to its formation: first, the experiences of early childhood, and the emotions arising therefrom; secondly, the inhibition of psychological reactions to any event or person; thirdly, the repression of an innate desire. In human societies the second and third factors operate in varying degrees, for it is not always necessary, in every human society, for a psychological reaction to be inhibited, and different societies demand different degrees of sexual continence. Thus the content of the unconscious element varies. In the societies in which the first factor alone operates to an effective degree, the people will be uniform both in appearance and in behaviour. If, on the other hand, sexual opportunity is reduced to a minimum, and the society is hedged around by a multitude of conventions which compel the inhibition of psychological reactions, the men and women will be diverse, the diversity arising from the varied character of the Unconscious which dominates each individual.

(This, I think, explains, at least in part, why in undeveloped societies uniformity is the rule, while diversity is characteristic of highly developed societies, for the development of any society depends on the amount of its energy, this in its turn being produced by rigid sexual regulations.)
Since the Unconscious is the product of early training and experience, and since it exercises a dominating influence upon conscious behaviour, the cultural condition of any society at any time depends to some extent upon the tradition in which its members are reared, that depending upon the tradition in which the previous generation was reared, and so on back to the earliest origins of the societies. The nature of the inherited tradition, in its turn, depends upon the amount of energy which the previous generation displayed, that generation inheriting a tradition dependent on the amount of energy the preceding generation displayed, and so on. Now in each case the amount of this energy depended on the intensity of the compulsory continence which the sexual regulations imposed. Thus the cultural condition of any society in any geographical environment is conditioned by its past and present methods of regulating the relations between the sexes.

This is the first primary law which operates in all human societies.

Two comments are appropriate.

In the first place, the law applies only to those human societies which are capable of displaying energy. I have spoken of this energy as being potential in the inherent character of the human organism. The evidence in favour of this assumption (paras. 70, 156) seems to be overwhelming, yet it may be true that some varieties of the human species may not have been so equipped. All the societies of which we have any reliable knowledge, however, possessed the potential energy.

Secondly, I have spoken of energy being produced by compulsory continence. It is possible (para. 156) that there is a relation of a substitutive nature between sexual energy (or the conflict arising from any interference with its direct expression) and mental and social energy, but that is a matter on which we can come to no definite conclusion. If the mental and social energy is regarded as the product of the conflicting emotions, the limitation of sexual opportunity is its immediate cause; but, if the energies are not identified, we can regard the limitation of sexual opportunity only as an indispensable contributory factor in its production, the energy itself being due to the presence of another inherent factor which operates only under conditions of sexual continence. For this reason, in my statement of the law, I have used the words 'conditioned by', not the word 'caused'. In the remainder of this chapter, however, I shall assume biological fitness and identify the energies, for all the evidence seems to be in favour of these points of view. The remainder of this chapter must be read in the light of this assumption.

We will apply this law to certain selected societies, the sexual regulations and cultural details of which are well known to us. We will classify them according to their sexual regulations, then prophesy the pattern of their culture. We shall see that the results agree with the recorded facts. In this manner the working of the law will be illustrated, and we shall explain the coincidences which appear in the Chart of Evidence (Appendix I). I shall not discuss all the eighty societies; that is quite unnecessary. I shall
confine myself to the consideration of certain selected societies, especially those mentioned in the preliminary assessment of the evidence (para. 90). Then I shall discuss the question of degeneracy among uncivilized peoples, and apply the law summarily to the historical careers of some of the civilized societies (para. 12), namely, Sumerians, Babylonians, Athenians, Romans, Anglo-Saxons, and English.

161. Seven Classes of Sexual Regulations. According to the continence they compelled, the sexual regulations adopted by human societies in the past may be divided into seven classes. Three refer to pre-nuptial, four to post-nuptial, conduct. We are already familiar with the former (paras. 18, 19); I merely repeat them so that the whole problem may be seen in its proper perspective. Pre-nuptially (1) men and women may be sexually free, (2) they may be subject to regulations which compel only an irregular or occasional continence, (3) under pain of punishment and even death the women may have to remain virgins until they are married.

When I speak of pre-nuptial sexual freedom, I refer to complete freedom outside the exogamic regulations and prohibited degrees (para. 17). In every human society known to us there were always some men with whom a woman might not have sexual intercourse, and some women who were forbidden to a man. In some cases intercourse was permitted with any man or woman outside the social group, whether the members of the group were related by blood or not; in other cases intercourse was forbidden only with a number of individuals related by blood or by affinity, the identity of these individuals varying from society to society. Sometimes there was a combination of exogamic regulations and prohibited degrees. In all cases intercourse within the forbidden group was regarded with peculiar horror, being incestuous.

There is no reason to think that this horror is inherent in the organism. If it were, there would have been no need either for the adoption of the rigid regulations or for the drastic punishment which usually, but not always, was meted out to those who infringed them. Moreover, under a system of pure exogamy many unions were forbidden which under a system of prohibited degrees were permitted, and vice versa. If the horror of incest were inherent, some societies would not have abhorred unions which other societies regarded as normal. Admittedly, since every human society of which we have any knowledge has seen fit to place some such restrictions on the sexual opportunity of its members, it seems to follow that the sentiments represented by the various regulations are inherent either in the male or in the female organism; but that is another point. Since the horror is not inherent, we cannot say that it is part of the inherent nature of the human being to avoid certain sexual unions.

Students who make a habit of confusing the biological and cultural processes might regard this reduction of sexual opportunity as the first step from savagery to civilization, using these words in the inexact manner
common to evolutionary thinkers. They might suggest that *homo sapiens* placed certain limitations upon the direct expression of sexual energy and that the resulting conflict of emotions produced a small spark of energy which was manifest in the first cultural advance. All such theories are dangerous, because the reasoning is unreliable. In the first place, there is the risk of identifying the biological and cultural processes. Secondly, the source of the evidence in regard to the social regulations of primeval man is unknown; most decidedly we cannot employ the social regulations of uncivilized societies as comparative data. Thirdly, I see no reason to believe that the sentiments represented in human society by the exogamic regulations are peculiar to the human organism; other organisms, in addition to man, may prevent intercourse within the group, and expel those who infringe the rule. The only safe method, therefore, is to assume the presence of exogamic regulations and/or prohibited degrees and to classify human sexual regulations in accordance with the remaining data. It is worth while, however, to point out that just as no case of complete sexual freedom is known to us, so no human society is known to us which is entirely without energy. Other organisms may punish by expulsion a member of the group that indulges in intercourse within the group, thereby reducing its sexual opportunity; but since its inherent nature is different from that of the human organism, such action does not have the same psychological result.\(^{660}\)

In reference to the four types of post-nuptial regulations I employ the terms modified monogamy, modified polygamy, absolute monogamy, absolute polygamy, which I define as follows:

Modified monogamy—the practice or circumstance of having one spouse at one time, the association being terminable by either party in accordance with the prevailing law or custom;

Modified polygamy—the practice or circumstance of having more than one wife at one time, the wives being free to leave their husbands on terms laid down by law and custom;

Absolute monogamy—the practice or circumstance of having one spouse at one time, but presupposing conditions whereby legally the wife is under the dominion of her husband and must confine her sexual qualities to him, under pain of punishment, for the whole of his or her life;

Absolute polygamy—the practice or circumstance of having more than one wife at one time, these wives being compelled to confine their sexual qualities to their husband for the whole of their lives.

I must beg that the significance of these terms be remembered. The post-nuptial regulations adopted in the past by any human society, civilized or uncivilized, fall into one of these categories.

We have already seen (para. 157) the reasons why, so far as the production of social energy is concerned, the sexual opportunity of the female is a more important factor than that of the male. Thus an absolute monogamy
or an absolute polygamy produces greater energy than either a modified monogamy or a modified polygamy, for in each case a woman knows no man but her husband. Since in an absolutely monogamous society a man’s post-nuptial opportunity is less than that of an absolutely polygamous man, absolute monogamy produces greater energy than absolute polygamy. Thus on a scale of post-nuptial sexual opportunity the regulations arrange themselves in this order, those affording the most extended opportunity being placed first:

1. Modified monogamy or polygamy—neither party is compelled to confine his or her sexual qualities to the other for his or her whole life;
2. Absolute polygamy—the female knows only her husband, but the male is free to have other sexual partners;
3. Absolute monogamy—the female knows no man but her husband, the male is confined to one woman for so long as she obeys the social ordinances.

The evidence is that post-nuptial regulations are not a productive factor unless the society insists on pre-nuptial chastity. Thus in the past the compulsory continence suffered by human societies has been of six different intensities, according as they

1. permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom (outside the exogamic regulations and prohibited degrees),
2. insisted on an irregular or occasional pre-nuptial continence,
3. compelled a woman to be *virgo intacta* when she joined her husband,
4. permitted a modified monogamy or polygamy,
5. insisted on absolute polygamy,
6. instituted an absolute monogamy.

The sexual regulations of the eighty uncivilized societies fall into one of the first three classes. Those of the ten societies which insisted on pre-nuptial chastity also fall into (4). None of them insisted on absolute polygamy or on absolute monogamy, but there is some evidence that in the past some of them may have adopted the former. I shall refer to this matter when I discuss the question of degeneracy (para. 166). The extension of post-nuptial opportunity which is afforded by such customs as those of e.g. the Bakitara (para. 36) is included under (4), the regulations under this heading affording a varying post-nuptial opportunity.

Generally speaking, in the past when they began to display great energy (as opposed to the lesser energy of uncivilized peoples), human societies were absolutely monogamous. There is only one example of a polygamous society displaying productive social energy, that of the Moors; but in their case the women whom the men took to wife had been reared in an absolutely monogamous tradition. The energy of the Moors faded away when the mothers spent their early childhood in a less rigorous tradition. With this exception, the energy of the most developed civilized societies, or that of any group within them, was exhibited for so long as they preserved their austere regulations. Their energy faded away as soon as a modified
monogamy became part of the inherited tradition of the whole society. No group of human beings, however, has ever been able, or at any rate has ever consented, to tolerate a state of absolute monogamy for very long. This is not surprising, for it is an unequal bargain for the women; and in the end they have always been freed from their legal disadvantages. To express the matter in popular language, they have been ‘emancipated’. This has happened regularly and unfailingly in every recorded example of absolute monogamy, except one; in that case special circumstances prevailed. The Sumerians, Babylonians, Athenians, Romans, and Teutons began their historical careers in a condition of absolute monogamy; in each case the women were legal nonentities. After a time the laws were altered; a woman became a legal entity, the equal of a man. This happened among the Sumerians before they were dominated by the absolutely monogamous Babylonians; then among the latter just before Babylonia fell under the sway of the uncultivated Kassites. Under the ius gentium the Roman matrons were freed from most of the disadvantages from which they suffered under the old ius civile. Among the Anglo-Saxons the same changes were taking place when after the reign of Cnut the ecclesiastical authorities succeeded in obtaining control of sexual regulations. After the introduction of a pseudo-indissoluble monogamy (which, so far as the position of women and sexual opportunity were concerned, was the same as absolute monogamy) the English instituted the same reforms, which were still incomplete in the twentieth century. Only among the Athenians was the emancipation of native-born women never completed. Yet there seems to have been an emancipating movement in Athens too, but apparently the Periclean decree of 451 B.C. and the laws in regard to the epicleros, never repealed, prevented the native-born women from being freed from their legal disadvantages. In Athenian society the part which was played in later Sumerian, Babylonian, Roman, Anglo-Saxon, and English society by emancipated women was played by the Outlander women (as Professor Zimmerm has called them). Thus the impulses which helped to inaugurate the changes were operative, and to some extent satisfied, in this case also.

I mention the matter now because, owing to the egocentricity in our historical outlook, to which I have already referred (para. 159), it is often supposed that female emancipation is an invention of the modern white man. Sometimes we imagine that we have arrived at a conception of the status of women in society which is far superior to that of any other age; we feel an inordinate pride because we regard ourselves as the only civilized society which has understood that the sexes must have social, legal, and political equality. Nothing could be farther from the truth. A female emancipating movement is a cultural phenomenon of unfailing regularity; it appears to be the necessary outcome of absolute monogamy. The subsequent loss of social energy after the emancipation of women, which is sometimes emphasized, has been due not to the emancipation but to the extension of sexual opportunity which has always accompanied it. In
human records there is no instance of female emancipation which has not been accompanied by an extension of sexual opportunity.

So much for the various types of sexual regulations and for the intensity of the compulsory continence which is inflicted by them. Now we will apply the first primary law to the selected societies, remembering that it is part of the inherent nature of the human organism (1) to react strongly to anything unusual or beyond comprehension, (2) to imagine that an unusual or uncomprehended phenomenon contains a peculiar quality or power, (3) to attempt both to secure this power for itself and to ward off the danger manifest therein.

162. Cultural Effect of Pre-nuptial Sexual Freedom. If the social regulations compel no sexual continence (outside the exogamic regulations and prohibited degrees), this inherent nature expresses itself without modification; a zoistic (dead level of conception) culture is the result. The people possess the power of reason, but they do not apply it to the world of their experience. Thus they do not inquire into the causes of things; they accept without question (para. 140) that assembly of activities which we call Nature. On all matters of human interest their opinions are uniform; the society contains no cultural strata. In any unusual or uncomprehended event or phenomenon the people see a strange quality or power which they regard as both dangerous and desirable. This quality or power is called by the same name wherever and whenever it is manifest. It is exhibited by any stone, tree, or animal of uncommon type or unusual appearance, and by any article the nature of which is not understood; any man whose manner of birth or life is in any way extraordinary is credited with its possession; it is manifest also in his corpse, and in the corpse of any man whose manner of death is abnormal. Strangers are not thought of as men, but as beings who possess the power manifest in all strange, uncomprehended things. A sickness which comes within the normal experience of the people is treated in what the people consider a normal manner, but an unaccountable sickness (para. 148) is ascribed either to the power responsible for all unaccountable things or to a man who, possessing that power, has employed it for his own purposes. We call him a magician. If rain is late or comes too much, a magician is asked to create the needed shower or to make the sun shine. He is paid for his services. If a magician is not consulted, a similar payment is placed at the foot of an unusual tree, before an unusually shaped stone, or in any other place where the power is thought to be manifest. Similar payments are made to avoid either the evil effect of a magician’s curse or the danger immanent in every place where the power is manifest, that is, any place possessing some unusual characteristic, where something unusual has occurred, or where a dead magician has been buried. When they pass such places, the people make an offering. With these exceptions, so long as things go smoothly, they eat, drink, dance, copulate, and sleep, working only that their bellies may be filled and that
their organic desires may be satisfied. They suffer from ordinary human failings, and regard themselves as the most important men on the earth; they take it for granted that the world (as they know it) was especially made for them. And they are not puzzled by what we call their failure to control their environment, for in their view there is no failure. If a magician fail to create sunshine or to heal a sick man, they conclude either that he is lazy or that a more powerful magician is working against him. It never occurs to them to doubt either the efficacy of his methods or the accuracy of the premises on which their own behaviour is based. If things go awry, either they place an offering in some sacred place or they seek out the anti-social wizard who is thought to be responsible. In the latter case, they either persuade him to withdraw his powerful charms or request another magician to counteract the effect of those charms by the utterance of counter-spells.

Generation after generation the same tradition is handed on; the same ideas prevail. Time does not alter them. In such a society human beings are born; they satisfy their desires; they die. And, when their corpses have been disposed of, they are forgotten.

The social vision of such a human society is not very different from that of any other group of gregarious mammals, and may be represented by a plane. A fish which struggles up-stream in order to deposit its spawn is aware only of itself; its sexual complement and its offspring are never known to it. Its social vision may be represented by a dot. Similarly that of a non-gregarious mammal may be represented by a line, for it is aware both of its mate and of its offspring, but it is unaware of any dependence upon, or link with, its fellows. In a group of gregarious mammals, however, there is a sense of group-relationship; every single organism experiences both interdependence and mutual help. Apparently this relationship to its fellows is important to its feeling of security, for, if it becomes detached from the group, it is miserable and will risk everything, even life itself, in order to regain the main body. Thus its social vision may be represented by a series of united straight lines, that is, a plane. The different social visions of these various forms of life are the result of diverse behaviour, the behaviour in its turn depending on the inherent nature of the organism. Some human societies have a social vision which has another dimension, and which may be represented by a solid. A sense of the past arises, and, in developed societies, a responsibility for the future; thus the social vision may be represented as a series of planes, one upon the other, in uninterupted sequence. The introduction of this third dimension is due not to the inherent nature of the human organism but to the modification of that inherent nature by a display of mental energy. In the social vision of zoistic societies the third dimension does not exist; it emerges only as the society rises in the cultural scale. Fully developed it is found only among rationalistic societies, but in its initial stages it can be seen in manistic societies.661

Of the selected societies the opinions I have just described were held by the Loyalty Islanders (para. 30), Tannese (para. 31), Masai (para. 88),
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Tlingit (para. 103), Haida (para. 104), Lilooet (para. 107), and Andaman Islanders (para. 138). None of these societies placed any restrictions upon any sexual play or upon the early satisfaction of the sexual impulses. Without exception they were in the zoistic cultural condition and at a dead level of conception. The word which they used to denote (1) the power in the universe, (2) the source of magic power, (3) ‘the dead’, was haze, uhngen, ngai, yek, sgana, snam, and lau, respectively. The Loyalty Islanders and Tannese are said to have placed their faith more especially in magic stones, that is, in stones which possessed a haze- or uhngen-quality. They credited their magicians with the power to control nature. When the Masai saw anything abnormal, they said, Ngai. On passing the grave of a magician a Tlingit Indian threw aside a morsel of food, the Haida and Lilooet using sgana and snam respectively in those contexts in which the Tlingit used yek (or its compound). The other twenty-four American Indian tribes also were zoistic, but the evidence is not sufficiently exact to warrant a decision in regard to their word for ‘the dead’. I shall refer to them again when I discuss the question of degeneracy among uncivilized peoples (para. 166). I mention them at this point in order to elucidate the rider which I attach to the first secondary law.

A secondary law is a particular formulation of a primary law which is couched in general terms only. The first secondary law is this:

*Any society in which complete pre-nuptial sexual freedom (outside the exogamic regulations and prohibited degrees) has been permitted for at least three generations will be in the zoistic cultural condition. It will also be at a dead level of conception if previously it has not been in a higher cultural condition.*

The words ‘has been permitted for at least three generations’ are important. If pre-nuptial freedom has been permitted only for one generation, some members of the society may have inherited a different tradition. We have seen (para. 157) the reason why a cultural change cannot be complete in less than three generations.

Now we will consider the cultural pattern which is produced by the second type of sexual regulations, that is, by the infliction of an irregular or an occasional continence before marriage. Before doing so, however, I must refer again to a subject I have already discussed (paras. 66, 149).

Some confusion has been introduced into the study of uncivilized culture by the inferential, and therefore unsatisfactory, character of the evidence in reference to the native word which we translate ‘the dead’. It may have been applied only to corpses; in that case we do not know whether it was applied to all corpses or only to some corpses. I have conjectured (para. 149) that, since it denoted the strange quality exhibited by unusual things, it was used only in reference to the corpses of those men whose manner of birth, life, or death had been abnormal. Sometimes we are told that the word was applied to ghosts, but again we do not know whether to all ghosts or only to some ghosts. I have suggested (para. 149) that the latter was the
case, the ghosts of powerful men being those to which the natives referred. This suggestion is supported by collateral evidence.

I refer, of course, only to those societies which were at a dead level of conception. If a society used a different word for the dead from that which they applied to the power in the universe, no problem arises. At a dead level of conception a zoistic society applies the same word to (1) the power in the universe, (2) the source of magic power, (3) the powerful dead or the corpses of men whose manner of birth, life, or death is abnormal. We have seen (paras. 146, 147, 149) that the use of the same word in these three contexts is both comprehensible and rational.

163. Cultural Effect of a Compulsory Irregular or Occasional Continence.

If the social regulations compel an irregular or occasional continence, a small amount of mental and social energy is produced by the emotional conflict (para. 155), and there is a slight modification of these zoistic ideas. The society becomes manistic.

We have already seen (paras. 146, 162) that, so long as things run smoothly, zoistic people do not spend any time in an unprofitable exploration of the mysteries surrounding them; they are concerned only when something unusual occurs or when they are afflicted by unaccountable misfortunes. Thus the first display of mental energy is directed towards a consideration of the causes of affliction. The new culture possesses many features in common with the old culture, and is founded upon the same basis, that is, upon the conception of the strange quality or power in anything unusual or beyond comprehension; but the application of thought and reflection to the cause of affliction changes the old ideas concerning them. Then the behaviour of the society is altered in such a way as to give expression to the new opinions.

One of the social regulations which in the past has induced an irregular or occasional continence (para. 19) is the reservation of a girl’s sexual qualities to her betrothed. Let us try to imagine what happens when first this custom is introduced into a sexually free society.

In a society which has permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom for at least three generations, any young female can indulge in any sexual play of any kind whatever; she can also have intercourse with any young male. Mutual consent is the sole consideration. Both the female and the male are free from any restraint; they are not troubled by any of those strong emotions which arise in the hearts of those whose adolescent impulses have been checked. From earliest childhood they indulge in any sexual play that attracts them; they notice the contempt which their elders express for the boy or girl who fails to attract the opposite sex; they hear the joking remarks which are passed by adult members of the community when a young female feels and obeys an urge towards any young male or has any sexual play with him. They live in an atmosphere of care-free indulgence; and if they feel a desire they satisfy it at once.
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Into such a society, we must imagine, a new arrangement is introduced whereby the sexual qualities of a young female are reserved exclusively to a young male, who in all probability has transferred some property to her parents. The result is that all the other males, old and young, have to repress a desire to possess or inspect her; she in her turn is compelled to check any impulse towards them. So far as we can judge, the human organism does not tend to be promiscuous; usually a pair continue to consort for so long as they are attracted to one another. Except in such rare cases as the organized fornication of the Masai (para. 88), lovers are taken one at a time; a girl who changes her lover too often is condemned by public opinion. Thus it seems unlikely that in the society of which we are speaking a young betrothed male will have any other mistresses; plainly, at any rate he cannot interfere with any of the betrothed girls; thus his occasional continence is probably greater than that of an unbetrothed male, for, whereas he is bound to one mistress by social regulations, the unbetrothed are bound to theirs only by mutual consent. Whereas in all probability he confines himself to one girl, they are free to have intercourse, if they wish, with any girl who is not betrothed. What is merely probable in the case of the male, however, is certain in the case of the female. The sexual opportunity of the betrothed girl is definitely less than that of the unbetrothed girls, for, whereas they are free to change their lovers as they please, she is compelled to confine herself always to the same lover, whether she wishes to do so or not.

As I have said, we must suppose that the mental and social energy induced by the emotional conflicts arising out of the compulsory continence will be directed towards the one great problem of zoistic life, the cause of affliction. We must imagine, therefore, the case of a young man, suffering from misfortune, whose mental power has been stimulated in a manner hitherto unknown, that he has consulted the magicians without success, and that his offerings at the sacred place or before a sacred stone have not produced any cessation of his ill luck. My suggestion is that, as he broods over his problems, he will reconsider the question of the cause of misfortune. I do not think that he will question the accuracy of the premises on which the behaviour of his society is based; he will merely try to seek for a hitherto unrecognized cause; thus his mind turns from the living to the powerful dead. Since no living magician has caused the trouble, can it be that the responsibility lay with one who was newly dead? Perhaps he remembers that recently one of his enemies has died, or that his differences with some powerful man had not been composed before the latter's death. Again, he may remember an occasion on which he has been guilty of some breach of established convention which would have angered his recently deceased father. Can it be that his sufferings have been caused by these dead, or by any one of them? Would it not be worth while making an attempt to placate them? This is the manner, I submit, in which a newly awakened mind would work on the premises which formed the basis of the
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Inherited tradition. Thus the result of an irregular or occasional continence is the presentation to a powerful dead man of such an offering as would have been made to him had he been alive. (Compare para. 150.)

After the reservation of a girl’s sexual qualities to her betrothed has become part of the tradition which a new generation inherited, the old idea of complete sexual freedom passes away; and uprising generations regard the new regulations as the normal method of regulating the relations between the sexes; but since every girl is not betrothed, and since the sexual opportunity of betrothed couples is less than that of unbetrothed couples, the society is divided into two strata, the members of one stratum being brought up in an atmosphere of occasional continence, those of the other stratum experiencing no sexual repressions. Those who betroth their girls look down upon those who permit them to run wild; the betrothed girls affect a contempt for their sisters who are not subject to the irksome restrictions imposed by betrothal.

In a similar manner there are two cultural strata. When misfortune befalls them, some members of the society carry out their zoistic rites; others tend the powerful dead, regarding some form of tendance as the normal and proper manner of expiating neglect or of removing the cause of ill luck.

I do not suggest, of course, that there is a clear line of demarcation between these strata. I am putting the matter in this way in order that the full effect of an irregular or occasional continence may be made clear.

Thenceforward one section of the people remembers some of its powerful dead, ascribing its misfortunes to the anti-social machinations of those who were recently in the flesh and who, when they were alive, possessed the power to inflict illness by witchcraft and to wreak magical vengeance on their enemies. A tittle of compulsory continence, however, produces only a jot of mental energy. The people still fear the strange quality in anything unusual; they still desire to possess it for themselves; they still credit any outstanding man with its possession. It is still their opinion that these magicians are able to control the weather and to counteract the effects of witchcraft. The powerful dead are placated only when an unaccountable misfortune befalls. Moreover, there is some confusion in the manner in which the dead are remembered. Just as zoistic (dead level of conception) societies apply the same word to the power in the universe and to the powerful dead, so some of the societies confuse the ghost of an individual dead man with the powerful dead in general. The distinction between them emerges only after a further period of reflection and thought. Gradually, however, this new idea of an individual ghost becomes part of the inherited tradition, and is expressed by a new word. Thus instead of one word for the powerful dead, there are two words, one denoting the individual, the other being applied to the powerful dead in general. And according to the mental energy of the people the individual ghost is remembered for a long or for a short time.
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Parenthetically, I draw attention to the evidence that (1) by manistic societies the powerful dead only were placated, other dead men being neglected (para. 149); (2) the ghostly theory of causation was adopted only after other methods of treatment had failed (para. 149); (3) post-funeral offerings were regarded as the equivalent of payments to living magicians (para. 150); (4) originally all cultural revolutions appear to have been introduced by individual men (n. 632).

The emotional conflicts also produce a small amount of social energy, and this energy is displayed in the methods by which the new ideas are carried out. The offerings made by zoistic societies consist of those things which appeal to some human desire; thus in other ways also the ghost is treated in the same way as a living man likes to be treated. Men live in huts; thus a small hut is erected over the dead man’s grave so that his ghost may be properly housed. Alternatively a similar hut is built in any other ‘unusual’ place, for zoistic people consider that the power in the universe must be placated in the same way as a living man. Other elaborations also are introduced as befit the occasion or appeal to human delight. And so long as there is a small amount of compulsory continence the resulting energy is expended in this manner.

Thus the introduction of a small amount of compulsory continence into a sexually free society produces

1. the remembrance of powerful ghosts in general, and of individual ghosts in particular;
2. the tendance of these ghosts;
3. the decoration and elaboration of sacred places by such additions as would please a living man.

Let us look at the evidence provided by the selected societies (paras. 90, 161). Three of them, New Britons, Maori, and Wayao, insisted that betrothed girls should confine their sexual qualities to their betrothed. The New Britons (paras. 27, 32) conducted an irregular tendance of the dead, their offerings being called wairok tebaran, ‘to cause the ghost to go or leap away’. In other details this society was zoistic, relying on its magicians to control the weather and employing the same word, tebaran, in reference to those natural phenomena which impressed it.

Among the Maori (paras. 45, 49) a betrothed girl was taumou, this word corresponding to the New Briton webat. The old Maori saying was, ‘Those on whom a taumou has been placed, do not interfere with them’. The culture of the Maori was based on their conception of atua, the quality in anything unusual or beyond their comprehension. They marked a sacred place, tuahu, with stones (n. 184), and erected a platform, tiepa, on which offerings were placed (n. 185). They also tended their powerful dead. Unfortunately the placatory rites have not been described.

Among the Wayao (paras. 97, 98) mulungu was applied to anything unusual, to the powerful dead, and to an individual ghost. In reference to an individual ghost they used also the word lisoka. Over the graves of their
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'chiefs' they erected small huts inside which offerings were placed. There was the greatest confusion in the Yao mind between mulungu, the power in the universe, mulungu, a 'village of departed spirits', and mulungu, an individual ghost. An individual ghost was not remembered for long; the offerings to a dead 'chief' were only made during the lifetime of his successor. Upon the latter's death he became the recipient of the offerings.

In the past an irregular or occasional continence has been induced also by the infliction of a fine on the father of a pre-nuptial child (para. 19). Many patrilineal zoistic societies objected to the birth of pre-nuptial children; usually unmarried pregnant girls procured an abortion; but some of these societies did not punish the father of a bastard. If such a custom is introduced, a similar irregular continence is induced as that which results from the reservation to her betrothed of a girl's sexual qualities. Thus the outcome of this regulation is a similar cultural change.

Of our selected societies the Akamba, Lango, and Dinka had adopted it; the fine which they inflicted was of a varying intensity. The Akamba (para. 86) confused ngai-mulungu, the power in the universe, and aimu, 'the dead'. Offerings were made at ithembo, sacred places, a small hut being erected under a ngai-mulungu tree at the bidding of a 'prophetess'. Aimu were placated, but were not remembered for long. After a time ghosts disappeared, being replaced by new ones which vanished in their turn.

Among the Lango (para. 84) an ot jok, 'house of jok', was erected in honour of jok, the power in the universe, a similar abila being erected to a tipo, an individual ghost. A tipo was tended during the lifetime of the man who built the little hut, and then forgotten.

The Dinka (para. 83) remembered some of their powerful dead for a longer time than the Lango. They erected huts to them, but confused them with jok, the power in the universe. They placated an atiep, or individual ghost, and they erected paraphernalia on which offerings were placed.

For the cultural details of these manistic (tendance) societies I refer to the appropriate paragraphs in the foregoing chapters. I offer this sketch of some of their customs in order to show that the salient points of their culture can be prophesied by the application of the first primary law (para. 160). The regulations which are included as Irregular or Occasional Continence, however, induced a varying degree of pre-nuptial sexual repression, and therefore a varying degree of mental energy. Except in rare cases it is impossible to assess the comparative amount of compulsory continence, but the variety which existed will explain why some societies remembered and tended an individual ghost while others conceived of the powerful dead as a village of departed spirits, and why some societies remembered a powerful ghost for a longer time than other societies did. Basing my conclusions on evidence which is by no means indisputable, I have placed (para. 89) some of these societies on a scale both according to the manner in which they remembered an individual ghost and according
to the degree of their occasional continence. The societies occupy the same relative positions in each case.

It seems, however, that in some societies, after it had become the fashion to reserve a girl's sexual qualities for a man who had transferred some property to her parents, the parents began to arrange marriages between couples who had never met. Under these conditions the girl had to remain chaste, while the boy, probably living at a distance, had no chance of having intercourse with her. The SE. Solomon Islanders (para. 28) are a case in point.

We will consider the effect of these further limitations.

We have seen (para. 150) that an offering might be made not only to avoid misfortune but also to secure help. The jot of mental energy which produces a manistic (tendance) culture is directed only towards the former problem, complete faith being maintained in the power of the magicians to perform their miracles by their own unaided power. Now we must suppose that a further regulation is introduced whereby a betrothed girl is forbidden access even to her betrothed. We must assume that a manistic (tendance) culture has been inherited, and that the greater rigidity of the new regulations produces a greater mental and social energy than that displayed by those societies which permit direct intercourse between betrothed couples. To what problem will the mental energy be directed? Surely towards the question of securing help. My suggestion is that under these conditions the youths become dissatisfied with the explanations which the magicians give of their inability to produce the desired results (para. 150). The acts of post-funeral conciliation have preserved the memory of the great dead, and the sceptical youths, I submit, begin to compare the failures of the living with the great exploits of the dead (for usually the deeds of a man are magnified by time). Thus I conceive that after a period of thought and reflection due to greater enforced continence a man will turn to a powerful dead man for help on those occasions on which previously he has consulted the living.

There is no need to enlarge upon the subject, which I have already discussed (para. 150). There are a multitude of circumstances under which a thoughtful revolutionary might have inaugurated a cult of the great dead; all of them are conjectural. Granted the necessary mental energy a change from unassisted magic to a cult of the dead is inevitable. Contemporary with the change from tendance to cult there is an increase in (a) the length of time during which a powerful ghost is remembered and conciliated, (b) the energy responsible for the elaboration and decoration of the sacred places.

Of the Melanesian societies which did not insist on pre-nuptial chastity, the SE. Solomon Islanders (paras. 28, 33) afforded the most limited pre-nuptial sexual opportunity. A lad did not meet his betrothed before all the betrothal arrangements had been made. His parents decided whether the girl was satisfactory or not. Before the actual marriage she was compelled...
to be chaste; he had no chance of sexual intercourse with her. The SE. Solomon Islanders conducted a cult as well as a tendance of the great dead. By the erection of special altars, enclosed within walls and encircled by trees, and by the erection of special relic-houses, they elaborated their sacred places to a greater extent than any other manistic Melanesian society. They remembered and conciliated their powerful dead for more than one generation, the cult of a li'oa being handed on from father to son. Moreover, it was among them, and only among them, that, as Dr. Codrington says (para. 33), a sense of the past was found.

In north-east Africa the Shilluk (para. 82) placed upon sexual intercourse between betrothed couples some restrictions which did not exist among their neighbours; there is definite evidence that the Shilluk insisted on a greater degree of pre-nuptial continence. They conducted a cult of their great dead, a dead ret ('king') being remembered and conciliated for many generations. They erected cenotaphic grave-huts in other places than that in which the ret had been buried. Such kengo were elaborated and decorated in a manner which was quite foreign to the practices of the other manistic tribes which lived in the same geographical area and which enjoyed a greater pre-nuptial sexual-opportunity.

Once again I submit these slight indications in order to show that in human records a greater degree of compulsory continence has definitely produced the greater mental and social energy that we should expect. For the cultural details of the Shilluk and SE. Solomon Islanders I refer to the appropriate paragraphs in the foregoing chapters.

The second secondary law is this:

*If in any human society such regulations are adopted as compel an irregular or occasional continence, the cultural condition of that society will become manistic. If the compulsory continence be slight, the post-funeral rites will partake of the nature of tendance. If it be great, they will partake also of the nature of cult.*

The reader will have noticed that under the influence of mental energy the third dimension is being introduced into the social vision of these societies; a sense of the past is transforming the plane into a solid. A three-dimensional philosophy, indeed, including a regard for the past and a care for the future, is characteristic of developed virile minds; a two-dimensional outlook, implying an exclusive regard for the present, suggests either a lack of development or a state of degeneracy.

The introduction of an irregular continence into a society accustomed to sexual freedom is the most important and the most painful of all social revolutions. We are so inured to our own social system, and so trained to place a check upon our sexual impulses, that we can scarcely imagine the significance of the event. Compared with an increase in its intensity, the first insistence on compulsory continence is as wine to water. Under the influence of that continence two great revolutions occur, the elaboration and decoration of the sacred place and the loss of faith in unassisted magic.
NECESSITY IN HUMAN AFFAIRS

§ 164

It is well, then, to be quite clear in our minds concerning the relation between the energies, mental and social, which are produced for the first time in the history of the society.

Two considerations are of primary importance.

In the first place, the existence of mental energy is only a deduction from the observed results of the social energy. We only know that a manistic society ascribed its unaccountable misfortunes to the anger of powerful ghosts because those ghosts were the recipients of post-funeral offerings, the words in which the natives described these offerings revealing the nature of their intentions. Before the members of any society build huts over the graves of notable men, and before they place offerings of food and drink inside those huts, they must have applied the power of their thought to the problem of evil. Moreover, their solution of that problem, inadequate to us, is perfectly satisfactory to them, for, if the presentation of the offering does not produce a cessation of their misfortunes, they will say either that they have placated the wrong man or that the offering has been rejected.

Secondly, when the new regulations have become part of the inherited tradition of an uprising generation, the people will become accustomed to the idea of occasional continence from their earliest childhood. Their emotional conflicts will not be the same as those which their fathers had suffered. Such energy as they exhibit will be expended merely in the elaboration and decoration of the sacred places. Before another change in accepted premises (or 'beliefs') can occur, a further limitation of the pre-nuptial sexual opportunity must take place. This is the reason why in a society which insists only on an irregular or occasional continence there is no increase, generation after generation, of the inherited tradition; the mental energy responsible for the change in ideas is produced only when first the sexual limitations are imposed. When the new notions have been inherited, the society settles down to a period of comparative quietude, expressing its repressed emotions by a display of social energy, the products of which are the sole objective evidence that the mental revolution ever took place.

164. Cultural Effect of Compulsory Pre-nuptial Chastity. If the sexual regulations are of the third type (para. 161), the pattern of the culture changes again, and becomes deistic, whether previously the society has been zoistic or manistic. First I will discuss the cultural effects of the introduction of a demand for the tokens of virginity into a society which previously has experienced only an irregular or occasional continence, that is to say, which is in the manistic cultural condition.

Since the demand for pre-nuptial chastity does not produce a much greater continence than the customs, say, of the SE. Solomon Islanders, the emergent culture does not differ greatly from that of a manistic (cult) society. The difference is one not of kind but of degree. The change from the zoistic to the manistic (tendance) condition consisted in the remembrance
and placation of the individual man and in the elaboration and decoration of the sacred place. That from the manistic (tendance) to the manistic (cult) condition involved not only an extension of memory and further elaboration of the sacred place but also a change of attitude towards the dead. Instead of being placated in order that they might be persuaded to cease their ravages, powerful ghosts were approached with a request for help in mortal undertakings. In a society like that of the SE. Solomon Islanders (para. 33) the efficacy of an incantation, sarue, did not depend on the power of the man who uttered it, as was the case in zoistic and manistic (tendance) societies, but in the name of the ghost by which it concluded. Faith in unassisted magic was lost; in times of difficulty and distress the help of higher powers was solicited. These changes were due to a display of mental energy arising out of the emotional conflicts due to compulsory continence. If, then, the intensity of that continence is increased, there is a further extension of memory, a greater elaboration of the sacred places, and a complete loss of faith in unassisted magic.

Of our selected societies the Fijians (para. 29), Baganda (para. 36), Yoruba (para. 41), Dahomans (para. 99), Ashanti (para. 100), Samoans (para. 46), and Tongans (para. 47) compelled some of their girls to be pre-nuptially chaste. When one of these girls joined her husband, she was expected to be a virgin. If the signs of her virginity were not visible on the nuptial mat, there was a great outcry. Each of these societies erected special buildings, other than grave-houses, in which the powers in the universe manifested themselves and which were erected and maintained in order that a right relation might be preserved with those powers. These temples were more elaborate than the simple grave-huts of manistic peoples, and the explanation of the coincidence of pre-nuptial chastity and the erection of temples lies in the fact that societies which are pre-nuptially chaste display greater social energy than those of which the sexual regulations compel a lesser continence. In the native terminology, and to the natives themselves, the powers manifest in the temples were dead men (para. 150). We may call them 'gods', but, if we do so, we must remember that we are merely applying to the native conceptions a technical term (albeit undefined) by which they may conveniently be described. In the SE. Solomon Islands the cult of a powerful ghost, li'oa, was handed over from father to son, but eventually the ghost gave way before the rising importance of one newly dead. Powerful ghosts were often canonized among deistic societies too, the Tongans affording a good example of this (n. 208); but among them the cult of the dead man was handed on from generation to generation, and in this fact lies the evidence that they remembered their great dead for a longer time than manistic (cult) societies. When deistic people were afflicted by misfortune, they approached a temple, either asking the 'god' for help or making an offering in expiation of their offences, the nature of which was revealed to them by the magician (i.e. priest, para. 65) attached to the service of the temple. In a few cases, e.g. that of the Fijians, the
people went to the same temple whatever the nature of their request, but usually they approached one temple when they needed rain, another temple when they were sick, another when they went to war, and so on. The Baganda are a case in point. And just as the efficacy of the SE. Solomon Islands incantation, sarwe, depended not on the magic power of the man who uttered it but on that of the ghost in whose name it was uttered, so the charms of e.g. the Fijians (para. 34), Tongans (n. 212), and Dahomans (para. 99) were ineffective unless they had been placed in a temple or blessed by a priest. The culture of these deistic societies was founded on the same basis as a zoistic culture, for in every case in which the meaning of the native words is explained the word translated 'god' was applied only to certain ghosts and to abnormal events or persons. Plainly too their culture developed from a manistic culture, for, in the first place, the temples were either elaborated relic-houses or, more usually, elaborated grave-huts (para. 151); and, secondly, the conciliated powers were dead men.

Since pre-nuptial chastity seems to have been demanded only of betrothed girls, and since every girl was not betrothed, the societies probably contained at least two cultural strata. Maybe there was a zoistic stratum too. Unfortunately our study of uncivilized peoples has not yet reached such a standard of accuracy as would enable our authorities to make this important distinction. Indeed they appear to have assumed, without inquiry, that all the members of every 'primitive' society thought and behaved in exactly the same way.

It is possible for a demand for pre-nuptial chastity to be introduced into a society which hitherto has been sexually free. No case of this change came within our survey; but it is not unknown in human records (para. 145), so it is well to consider its effects.

Since the compulsory continence is of the same intensity whatever the previous customs may have been, the same amount of mental and social energy is produced. The difference is that a different cultural tradition is inherited. Thus the emergent culture, while conforming to the same pattern, differs in some respects from the other.

In order to make my submissions clear, I will denote the power in the universe by the Nilotic word jok.

In a zoistic society only two causes of an unaccountable affliction are recognized, namely, the power in the universe, jok, and magicians, jok-men. We have seen that one of the effects of an intense irregular or occasional continence is to make men lose faith in unassisted magic. Thus when pre-nuptial chastity is introduced into a sexually free (or zoistic) society, compelling an even greater continence, some members of the society begin to understand that of their own volition jok-men cannot inflict illness upon their fellow citizens. Jok, therefore, becomes the only hypothesized cause of an unaccountable misfortune. Likewise, when they need help, the people do not consult jok-men; they ask jok for assistance.
Moreover, they arrive at a new conception of jok, promoting it from a quality to an entity. Furthermore, they build a house for him, an ot jok, house of Jok. This house is not a diminutive hut such as is built by a society which suffers only an irregular or occasional continence, but an imposing structure, in the erection of which no pains are spared. In this temple the superman Jok is thought to be manifest; to him all unaccountable incomprehensible things are ascribed. Offerings are made to him in order to expiate a fault or to secure a favour; prayers are said to him in times of difficulty and distress. His will is revealed by jok-men, who under the influence of mental and social energy form themselves into powerful and exclusive sects. Their power is said to come from Jok; without his help they are unable to do anything. Finally the great dead, or the ghosts of jok-men, who by a zoistic society are known as jok, are regarded as being Jok or with Jok.

I must leave it to the reader to decide whether or not such a result is a probable one. Perhaps my suggestion will be understood even more clearly if for the Nilotic word jok we substitute the Teutonic word god. Both these words seem to have possessed the same fundamental import (para. 148).

It does not matter, therefore, whether the society into which pre-nuptial chastity is introduced enjoys sexual freedom or suffers an irregular or occasional continence; the emergent culture is of the same pattern. The deistic cultural condition, indeed, subdivides, the presence of any society in either subdivision depending upon the nature of its inherited tradition. If the tradition be zoistic, the same power is manifest in all temples; this power is held responsible for all incalculable misfortunes; it is the recipient of all offerings, whether they are made to avoid punishment or to secure blessings; it is regarded as the cause of all incomprehensible things. If the tradition be manistic, different powers are manifest in different temples, and offerings are made to a number of different powers either to avoid the particular misfortunes which in the opinion of the society each power is able to inflict or to secure the particular blessing which each power is able to grant.

Hitherto in the study of human affairs these two subdivisions have been regarded as different patterns, the former being called monotheism, the latter polytheism; and many crimes against scholarship have been committed in order to show the development of one from the other. The error has lain in the assumption that human societies can be scientifically classified according to their ‘beliefs’. It has been encouraged by our desire to prove that the beliefs of white men are more ‘evolved’ than those of any other society.

The third secondary law is this:

*If in any human society the girls of an uprising generation are compelled to be pre-nuptially chaste, that society will be in the deistic cultural condition. If a zoistic culture be inherited, the same power will be manifest in all*
If a manistic culture be inherited, different powers will be manifest in different temples.

This concludes our discussion of the cultural effects which are produced by the third type of sexual regulations. When we turn to the consideration of the remaining types, we shall have to discuss not pre-nuptial but post-nuptial regulations. Then the civilized societies will come into the picture. Before considering them I wish, first, to suggest a line of reasoning and research by means of which the truth of these suggestions may be corroborated, and, secondly, to discuss the question of degeneracy among uncivilized peoples.

165. A Method of Confirming these Suggestions. I have represented a cultural development as due to mental and social energy, the products of the latter being the sole objective evidence of the existence of the former. I have suggested that the cultural condition of any society depends upon the amount of energy which it displays, the amount of that energy being dependent on the intensity of the continence imposed by the sexual regulations. The cultural evidence which I have employed as the foundation of these conclusions may be as considerable as one man’s mind can retain conveniently or communicate readily, but compared with the multitudinous items to which human beings apply their mental energy, should they display it, it is insignificant. If, therefore, the suggestions I have made are correct, it should be possible to check the entries on my cultural scale by arranging the same societies on another scale according to other criteria.

I will give an example of what I mean.

One of the most essential details of human life is the possession of a numeric system or a method of counting. It is plain that a society which possesses and employs a complicated system displays greater mental energy than one which is satisfied with a simple one. Now every one knows that some uncivilized societies have no numeral beyond two; others can count up to four; others still can conceive of sixty, using this to indicate any large number. If, then, I am correct in representing the difference between a zoistic and a deistic society as due to mental energy, we ought to find that deistic societies conceived of numbers beyond the mental range of zoistic societies, and that manistic societies occupied a mid-way position between the two.

The evidence fulfils these expectations. Among the manistic Lango, Mr. Driberg tells us, the highest numeral was fifty, this being used to designate any large number. The numerical terminology of the deistic Dahomans began at one and ended at tens of thousands; that of the deistic Baganda ran into a million.663

I hope that some inquiring student will check the entries in my cultural scale either in this or in some other way. He will have the satisfaction of knowing that I have not prejudged the result, for I merely came across the above-mentioned facts in the course of my reading, and have made no
detailed research into the numeric systems of uncivilized peoples. Should he adopt, however, any other criterion of judgement than that of numeric systems, his conclusions must be subject to the qualifications implied in the next paragraph.

166. Degeneracy among Uncivilized Peoples. Indications are not lacking that, when first the white man came into contact with them, some of our ten deistic societies were relaxing, and that some had relaxed, the severity of their sexual regulations. The best manner in which we can appraise the evidence is to consider it in the light of contemporary events.

Recently in most sections of the white man's society there has been an extension both of pre-nuptial and of post-nuptial sexual opportunity. Formerly absolute monogamy was the rule, and when first this absolute monogamy was being modified there was a private departure from ancient practices which publicly were still preserved. Thus at one time if a woman lapsed before marriage a stern father turned her out of his house. Later, excuses were made for her in private, her lapse being publicly denied. Later still, even if her behaviour was publicly acknowledged, it did not cause much adverse comment.

The same phenomenon can be observed among some uncivilized peoples. In Samoa (para. 46) the virginity of a bride used to be tested either publicly or privately. If at a public test the girl failed to satisfy the conditions her father and her brothers rushed upon her, and even killed her: 'Every memorial of her life was destroyed and abhorred, her very name forgotten.' At the end of the eighteenth century, however, the cultivation of chastity was becoming more of a name than a reality, and I have no doubt that sometimes the virginity test was a farce. A similar situation seems to have existed among the Tongans also (para. 47). At one time virginity was of paramount importance, but later if it was known that the girl would fail to pass the test, a friend would preserve her reputation 'by a little pious fraud'.

These are examples of deistic societies in which the regulations were being relaxed. In two other cases from the same geographical area, those of the Maori and the Tahitians, there is reason to believe that the regulations had already been relaxed before the white man arrived, and that a less rigorous tradition had been inherited by new generations. At the time to which our information refers, the Maori permitted pre-nuptial freedom to all girls except those who had been betrothed (taumou); but one of their customs suggests that at one time pre-nuptial chastity may have been the rule. Among the Samoans (n. 163) a high-born girl was selected as taupou. A taupou seems to have been mistress of some village ceremonies; but our information concerning her duties is vague and unsatisfactory. One thing is certain: she was required to abstain from sexual intercourse. If she was frail, she was severely punished, and probably killed. Other girls also were supposed to be pre-nuptially chaste, but for some reason which we do not
understand the virginity of the taupou was regarded as a social factor of vital importance. A similar custom existed among the Maori (n. 162). A high-born girl (puhi) was selected to fulfil an important social function; she was forbidden to do certain menial work and was supposed to be sexually continent; but, whereas the Samoan taupou was severely punished if she lost her virginity, a Maori puhi was merely degraded. Nothing else seems to have happened to her. Moreover, it was not uncommon for a puhi to be detected in sexual activity. Thus the Maori puhi seems to be the equivalent of the Samoan taupou, but in the former case the institution existed in a decadent form. It seems possible that in olden days virginity had been prized by the Maori and that in course of time the old customs fell into desuetude, leaving a suggestion of their former existence in the empty shell of a lifeless and archaic institution.

The character of the Tahitian sexual regulations (para. 133) has been obscured by the great interest which historians and travellers have displayed not only in the relations between the white sailors and the native women but also in the activities of the Arreoi Society, as described by a Nonconformist missionary. From a superficial study of these two items the impression has been created that the Tahitian regulations were extremely loose. A careful perusal of all the evidence, however, reveals the fact that when first the white man met them the Tahitians compelled an irregular or occasional continence and that in former times they may have been even more strict. Moreover, the founders of the Arreoi Society seem to have been slandered. Originally the members of this Society were supposed to be celibate, but after a time this rule became repugnant to them, so in later days sexual experiences were allowed on the condition that no member of the Society bore a child. This Society seems to have been a band of strolling players who gave histrionic performances not unlike a modern masque. At the end of the eighteenth century its members mated as they liked, but evidently between some couples there was a strong feeling of mutual attachment, for we are told that if one member conducted himself improperly towards a fellow member's mate there was considerable trouble. The prohibition of children seems to have caused a certain amount of infanticide, and William Ellis, the missionary, lays great emphasis upon it; but, since we are told that the murderers of any infant, if caught, were liable to be killed, it seems possible that Ellis has exaggerated the real facts, or, rather, that he was so repelled by the custom that he failed to make exhaustive inquiries. We are also told that any female member of the Society was allowed to rear her child, provided that she could persuade a male member to 'patronize' it (n. 574). In that case the mother was called whannowenoe, 'bearer of children'. This was a term of reproach.

As for the sexual conduct of Tahitian society in general, the evidence is that the high-born women resisted the advances of the white men and that the women in whom the white sailors delighted were those of the lower orders. Furthermore, a betrothed girl, vahinepahio, was carefully watched,
her virginity being preserved by keeping her apart from the rest of the household and by forbidding her to consort with strangers. The word *pahio* seems to have been the equivalent of the Maori *puhi*, and the nature of the reports suggests that in former times the meaning of the word was interpreted literally, a betrothed girl being compelled to be pre-nuptially chaste.

In a similar manner, there is reason to believe that the sexual regulations of some African societies were relaxed in the years which immediately preceded the arrival of the white man. Among the pastoral clans of the Bakitara a man used to take a second wife only when he found that his first wife was sterile. Later wealthy citizens followed 'the example of the king', and increased the number of their wives until they possessed a veritable seraglio.\(^665\)

Concerning the Baganda there is still more detailed evidence. The Baganda were so squeamish about sexual matters that 'they preferred to substitute for any plain noun dealing with sex or sexual intercourse the politest and vaguest of paraphrases'.\(^666\) Their prudishness was due not to their contact with Christian white men but to the stern nature of their erstwhile social ordinances. It is also revealed in the manner of their dress. Unlike that of sexually free societies, the dress of the Baganda fully enveloped their bodies. Wives, who had been married as virgins, were confined to their apartments, which were guarded by trusty servants. Even a suspicion of lax behaviour was punished by death; a wife was tortured by her husband if he merely suspected her of frailty.\(^667\) No one seems to have possessed more than one or two wives; even the Kabaka ('king') only possessed three, two of them being charged with the performance of certain ritualistic ceremonies.\(^668\) Now after the reign of Mutesa, who flourished about 1850, these regulations appear to have been relaxed. Mutesa himself is said to have had seven thousand wives (probably this merely designates vaguely a large number), and, as among the Bakitara, wealthy men followed the king's example. When the households grew larger, the closely guarded wives rebelled against the irksome restrictions imposed upon them. Unable to gratify their desires, they resorted both to obscene practices and to theft; and eventually they became very poor breeders. In spite of the horrible punishments which were meted out to delinquents, adultery became common, the women adopting various devices in order to admit their lovers into their houses.\(^669\)

There are other indications also that at one time the Baganda were more strict than they were when first we met them. When a demand for the tokens of virginity is introduced into a society, the bridegroom's people are apt to be both literal in their interpretation of the custom and angered if positive proof is not forthcoming. These opinions are retained so long as the society lays the same emphasis on the importance of pre-nuptial chastity. If, however, these ideas are modified by time, it seems reasonable to suppose that the same ceremony will be conducted as before, but the punishment for indulgence will be lessened or cancelled.
Among the Yoruba (para. 41) a girl who failed to pass the test was tied up, beaten, and forced to name her lover, he being liable to the parents for the loss of property which they had sustained. The bridegroom was at liberty to repudiate the girl and to demand the return of the property which he had transferred to her parents. These customs were still extant when first we met the Yoruba, who are described as the most developed of all the West African nations. ‘Without saying that the Yoruba are more intelligent,’ Sir A. B. Ellis remarks (para. 42), ‘we can safely say that their intellect is more cultivated.’ Now the Baganda (para. 36) demanded virginity of their brides; but if the primitiae were not forthcoming no punishment was inflicted; the girl and her guardians were merely shamed. Indeed, a girl who became pregnant before marriage was hardly condemned; she was merely sent to the house of her lover’s father, a fine equal to the bride-price being inflicted on her lover. Thus it seems that if the white man had not succeeded to the domination of Uganda society the Baganda sexual regulations would have been gradually relaxed, and that in a few years, say a generation, they would have suffered only an irregular or occasional continence.

Now if I am right in my interpretation of the whole evidence, I should expect these societies to have fallen or to be falling in the cultural scale. By the application of the secondary laws to the available data I should predict that the Maori, who at one time may have demanded pre-nuptial chastity, were once deistic, and that the Baganda, who, instead of demanding pre-nuptial chastity were tending to substitute an irregular or occasional continence, would be falling from the deistic to the manistic condition. The evidence fulfils these expectations.

According to what appears to be a trustworthy report (n. 174) the first Maori immigrants into New Zealand erected a temple at Taporapora, in which they placed the sacred paraphernalia they had brought with them. Apparently they regarded the erection of this temple as a matter of prime importance, for they did not wait until they had penetrated into the country; they erected it as soon as they had landed. Indeed they appear to have been in such a hurry to build it that they put it up too close to the beach; soon the waves came and washed it away. No more temples seem to have been erected; Maori energy relaxed; and when first the white man met them the people merely placed a few stones around their sacred places. So little energy did they display that some students have described them as ‘objecting’ to any further elaborations (n. 184).

I am inclined to think that the Tahitians also (n. 582) may have erected temples (in my sense of the word) to their atua; but the evidence is confusing. By the one word ‘temple’ William Ellis has translated many different Tahitian words, and it is impossible to tell which word the Tahitians used in any context.

The evidence concerning the culture of the Baganda is noteworthy (para. 39; n. 135). Let us formulate our prediction precisely. First we are
told that before the reign of Mutesa the Baganda were absolutely polygamous, that is to say, a wife knew no man but her husband; even the king possessed only three wives. Moreover, two of these women were cultural necessities rather than sexual partners. Secondly, there are signs that after Mutesa’s death virginity was not prized as highly as in former times, the people tending to substitute such regulations as imposed only an irregular or occasional continence. Under the influence of their former absolute and limited polygamy we should expect the ideas of the deistic stratum to be more and more intelligently formulated; the decrease in the intensity of the pre-nuptial continence among the common people would cause a descent to manistic practices. Now the evidence is that at the court of the king great mental energy was displayed. Mutesa extended a hearty welcome to his first white visitors because they would join him in those theological and philosophical discussions in which he delighted. Apparently he had lost his faith both in the Uganda theogony and in the pretensions of the native priests, so he ‘changed the status of the gods and reduced the power of the priests from its unique position’. Doubtless he imagined that in this manner he was liberating his people from the shackles of an imperfect creed, and that in the future his nation would be troubled no longer by the superstitious claims of a dominating priesthood; but the actual outcome was very different from what Mutesa supposed it would be. When Canon Roscoe was in the country, the priests were comparatively powerless, but this was not because Mutesa had disbelieved in them. The medicine-men, basawo, had usurped the priestly functions, and, though the deistic stratum still erected temples, the ghosts, misimu, were more venerated than the gods, balubare, the people conducting those rites which would qualify them for inclusion as manistic only. Yet, if any particularly frightful event occurred, they remembered their ancient faith. In times of plague and unaccountable distress, they approached a temple.

We find the same phenomenon in the reports on the Fijians. Compared with the medicine-men the Fijian priests possessed little power (n. 99). The temples were neglected, being garnished only when the people wished to make some particular request of the ‘god’, kalou-vu. It might be thought that the greater influence of the medicine-men and the neglect of the temples were signs of manistic culture and that the Fijians were beginning to be deistic when first we met them; but neglect of a temple is a sign of degeneracy. When a society becomes deistic it is careful to treat the powers in the universe with respect. When it is rising in the cultural scale, the faith of the people in those powers is too implicit to permit any carelessness in the behaviour towards them. Thus the lack of interest which the Fijians displayed in caring for their temples indicates that they were losing their energy; the relative importance of the Fijian medicine-men, as compared with that of the priests, was due to a coming descent from the deistic to the manistic condition. We do not possess any reliable detailed information in regard to Fijian sexual regulations, but in all the literature on the
Fijians we are told that the relations between the sexes were more loose than they had been in a previous epoch. Some of the later laxity, however, appears to have been due to Christian influences (for the Christians merely forbade what the natives had prevented); so the available evidence is not valuable.

Thus it seems to be true that, just as a decrease of sexual opportunity produces a cultural advance, so an increase results in a cultural decline. And, basing my conclusions on the same kind of evidence, I consider that the finest period of Mayan history was already past when the white man arrived in Central America, for it seems that among the Mayans also the demand for pre-nuptial chastity had been relaxed (n. 156).

So far I have discussed only a descent from the deistic to the manistic condition. There are some indications that at one time some zoistic societies had been manistic.

Let us suppose that the hypothesis is true. In what cultural details would degeneracy be apparent? If a society no longer insisted that a betrothed girl should confine herself to her betrothed, in what manner would the fact of its former insistence be revealed? My suggestion is that the insistence would remain as an opinion that such continence was right and proper. The compulsion to refrain from intercourse with other men would have been cancelled; a mere injunction to that effect would remain; but no punishment would be meted out to a delinquent. Again, if a society ceased to pay post-funeral attention to its great dead, how can we tell whether or not it did so in the past? We have seen that one of the results of manistic culture is the adoption of a separate word in reference to the dead; I submit, therefore, that if a manistic society descended to the zoistic condition we should find not only a pious opinion that betrothed couples should not seek elsewhere for sexual satisfaction, but also a different word for ‘ghost’ from that which was applied to the power in the universe.

Of our forty-seven societies, seven, it appears, were at a dead level of conception (para. 149). Of the remaining forty, twenty-five were American Indian; for the moment we will leave them on one side. Our information is inadequate concerning twelve of the remaining fifteen; in each case the native terms have been merely translated, and not elucidated. They are Ao, Angami, and Lhota Nagas; Mikirs, Garos; Chukchee, Koryak, Yukaghir; Trobriand Islanders, Mafulu, Koita, and Mailu. Only three remain, Banks Islanders, Kiwai Papuans, and Purari. These societies applied a different word to the dead from that by which they denoted the power in the universe (Appendix IV). Concerning their sexual regulations the evidence is uneven. In the case of the Banks Islanders (para. 72) we are merely told that considerable laxity existed and that there was no compulsory continence. Among the Kiwai Papuans (para. 74) it was considered desirable that a betrothed girl should confine herself to her betrothed. The Purari (para. 76) are said to have ‘severely deprecated’ loose conduct, but such a report is valueless, for it is possible that the native assumed the
opinion in order to please his white questioner. The sense of some passages in Mr. Williams's book, however, implies that usually betrothed girls refrained from intercourse with other men than their betrothed.

The evidence is slight; again its inadequacy is due to the fact that the native words have not been elucidated; but I do not understand how the idea of a girl confining herself to her betrothed could have prevailed unless at one time she had been compelled to behave in that manner. In zoistic (dead level of conception) societies lovers mate as they please; mutual consent is the sole criterion; there is a complete absence of any general opinion about 'right and proper' conduct for betrothed couples. Among the three above-mentioned societies, I submit, the compulsion once placed on betrothed couples had been relaxed; the idea of what was 'right and proper' had remained. Is this not a common feature in human life? When a dogma is abolished, is not the standard of conduct which the dogma had imposed retained as the model to which men should mould their conduct if they can? May not the ceremony with the skulls which Kairi instituted among the Purari represent post-funeral rites in degeneracy? A society which is losing its energy is apt to adopt the easy course in everything; may not the attraction of the Kairi ceremony have lain in the fact that it was easier to conciliate all the dead at one time than to placate each ghost at the grave-side? It seems strange for the Kiwai Papuans to erect a small hut for a sibara-adiri, and not for any one else; is it not possible that they regarded a man killed by a crocodile as exceptionally fearsome and that in this single instance they thought it well to be on the safe side by reverting to their ancient practices?

There are other cultural details also which can be explained, it seems, only by the supposition that the people were degenerate. After the Kairi ceremony the Purari exclaimed: 'Depart now for good and all; never return.' It would be impossible, I think, for a zoistic (dead level of conception) society to address ghosts in this manner, for they did not conceive of ghosts being able to return and to cause trouble; but if we assume that at one time the Purari had been manistic the words are comprehensible. Similarly the Kiwai Papuans said: 'You go back; you no come; you belong dead.' Again the expression could not have been used by a zoistic (dead level of conception) society, for at a dead level of conception the people use the same word for the dead as they apply to the power in the universe; the separate existence of the dead is unconceived by them. If, however, the Kiwai Papuans had been manistic in a previous epoch, the words would be singularly appropriate.

Now if a society were degenerate I should expect it to preserve some items of inherited culture which would not have been present if it had never displayed a greater social energy. Especially, I think, would some details of domestic culture, such as clothes and methods of house-building, be retained. This brings me back to the American Indians. Our knowledge of their languages is exceedingly imperfect; only in three cases, those of the
Tlingit, Haida, and Lilooet, have I been able to find the word which was applied to the new identity assumed by a man after death. Even in these three cases I doubt if I have been successful in removing the last vestige of the animistic cloak which has been thrown over the native culture. I am far from satisfied with some of the evidence concerning the meaning of the words they used. Sometimes, however, when we do not know the native words, we learn that an American Indian society possessed some items of domestic culture which appear to indicate that its forefathers had been members of a more energetic society. The Navaho method of weaving, the Chilcat blanket, and the general decoration of the native clothing, are examples of what I mean. Much research would be necessary before a definite opinion could be expressed, but on the whole I tend to regard the American Indians as the descendants of more cultured men and women.

The suggestions I am making in regard to degeneracy seem to explain the character of Maori domestic culture. I have already described the manner in which the Maori seem to have fallen from the deistic to the manistic condition; thus I should expect some sign of their former energy to be revealed in their clothing, domestic architecture, and cognate cultural items. Their development in these directions is too well known to be repeated. Some students, indeed, basing their suggestions on material culture alone, have given the Maori credit for an extremely high 'culture'; and it may be that these scholars are surprised at the humble position which the Maori occupy in my cultural scale. According to the definitions I adopt, however, the Maori have been correctly placed. I do not know the single precise meaning which is attached to the word 'culture' by those who assert the high character of Maori 'culture'. Certainly, until the word is defined, the expression 'high culture' is meaningless. Sometimes the alleged development of Maori art has arrested attention; but 'art' is a difficult word to define, and I doubt if the word 'developed' can be applied to it in any exact sense. Usually it is a matter of opinion, not of fact, whether an art be developed or not. At other times there has been a tendency to form a high opinion of Maori culture because various members of the society have risen to comparatively prominent positions in modern life; but members of the other uncivilized societies have been equally successful in adjusting themselves to the new conditions created by the advent of the white man, and all of them are capable of doing so. Whether, in the event of the white man's departure from New Zealand and the subsequent exclusive habitation of that country by the Maori, the latter would preserve, after, say, two generations, the veneer of white culture which they have assumed is a different question.

My suggestion is, then, that if a zoistic society applies a different word to the dead from that by which it denotes the power in the universe that society is degenerate. Probably at one time it was manistic. The suggestion is based on data which are easily discoverable; it can be checked by a reference to the domestic culture of the society. If the society were
degenerate, either from the manistic or from the deistic condition, I should expect it to retain some items of domestic culture which it had inherited from the days of its greater energy.

Now we will consider the cultural effects of the remaining types of sexual regulations (para. 161). They concern post-nuptial sexual opportunity, pre-nuptial chastity being assumed. If a society permit pre-nuptial freedom, or insist only on an irregular or occasional continence, the nature of its post-nuptial regulations does not affect its culture; its ideas have already been shaped into a zoistic or a manistic mould.670

At this point I extend my definition of cultural condition so as to include political institutions. I have stated (paras. 3, 158) the reasons both for its present extension and for its previous limitation.

167. Cultural Effect of different Post-nuptial Regulations; Christian Marriage. If pre-nuptial chastity be the rule, the amount of social energy displayed by any society depends on the rigour of its post-nuptial regulations. We have seen (para. 161) that of the four types of post-nuptial regulations which have been adopted in the past, a modified monogamy and a modified polygamy compelled the least post-nuptial continence. Thus the energy of the ancient societies which adopted them was less than that of absolutely polygamous or absolutely monogamous societies. Indeed it is rare that a society remained deistic after modifying its monogamy, for usually it ceased to demand pre-nuptial chastity.

An absolutely polygamous society preserves but does not increase its tradition. It does not possess the energy to adopt new ideas; it remains content with its old institutions. Yet in such a case there may be complications. So far as the production of social energy is concerned, the sexual opportunity of the female is of more importance than that of the male. Thus, if the male members of an absolutely polygamous society mate with the females of an absolutely monogamous society, the new generation display a greater energy than that displayed by the sons of women born into a polygamous tradition. That is why, I submit, the Moors in Spain achieved such a high culture. Their fathers were born into a polygamous tradition; but their mothers were the daughters of Christians and Jews, and had spent their early years in an absolutely monogamous environment. The sons of these women laid the foundations of rationalistic culture; but soon the supply of Christian and Jewish women was insufficient, so the incipient rationalism failed to mature greatly. The Moors in Spain, however, could never have advanced up the cultural scale if they had not mated with women who had been reared in a more rigorous tradition than their own. They would simply have remained deistic, as other Mohammedans have done. As it was, the quality of their wives was such that a rationalistic culture was almost created. This tradition, however, was not preserved after all the mothers of a new generation had spent their early years in an absolutely polygamous environment.
In an absolutely polygamous society the sexual opportunity of the female is at a minimum; she is married as a virgin and must confine her sexual qualities to her husband. The sexual opportunity of the male, on the other hand, although restricted, is not at a minimum, for he need not confine himself to one woman. In the past a male has suffered this limitation only when a form of absolute monogamy has been adopted. In the records of history, indeed, there is no example of a society displaying great energy for any appreciable period unless it has been absolutely monogamous. Moreover, I do not know of a case in which an absolutely monogamous society has failed to display great energy. In the past different societies have risen up in different parts of the earth, flourished greatly, and then declined. In every case the society started its historical career in a state of absolute monogamy, manifested great energy while it preserved its austere regulations, and relaxed after a less rigorous tradition had been inherited by a complete new generation. Moreover, the political organization which it adopted from time to time reflected the relative energy displayed by the various social strata of which it was composed. Each society began as a monarchy; and any subsequent change in the identity of those which possessed the sovereign power was due to the changes in the sexual opportunity of the ruling clan or of its subjects.

The existence of a monarchy depends upon two factors: first, the energy of the ruling clan; secondly, the lethargy of the subjects. If the ruling clan loses its energy, or if the energy of its subjects increases, the sovereign power is transferred to those who hitherto have tolerated its rule. In the former case the monarchy disappears; in the latter case it may be preserved in name; but in no case does it enjoy its ancient privileges and power. When the sovereign power is transferred, it may fall into the hands of a small group; alternatively it may be possessed by the whole people. It depends on the relative energy of the new dominants. If a small group displays a greater energy than the remainder, the political organization is aristocratic; and the aristocrats retain both their power and their privileges so long as their energy is greater than that of their subjects. If they relax their sexual regulations, their energy decreases; those who hitherto have been dominated succeed to the domination. This is what happened among the Athenians and English. If, on the other hand, the small group does not relax, and if its subjects, by adopting stricter sexual regulations, increase their energy, the society becomes homogeneous and extremely energetic. This is what happened among the Romans in the time of the Republic.

As I have said (para. 3), there is no reliable evidence in regard to the political institutions of uncivilized men, for the word 'chief' has been used in an extremely loose manner. Only concerning the ten deistic societies have we any reliable information. Even in these cases the word 'king' has been used in a vague manner, and is often employed in those contexts in which another writer would say 'Paramount Chief'. Yet the available data
are noteworthy. The Aztecs, Ashanti, Dahomans, Yoruba, Baganda, and Bakitara were organized as monarchies. The four Oceanic deistic societies, Samoans, Tongans, Gilbert Islanders, and Fijians, are said to have been aristocratic; yet each noble family seems to have been supreme in its own area. Among them there was no such division of authority as existed, for instance, among the Roman patricians after the abolition of the regal office. Much depends on the meaning attached to the word 'king'; but if it be applied to the member of the ruling clan who exercised the supreme political power, the Polynesian Islands seem to have been governed by petty 'kings'. In this sense of the word the coincidence between 'kingship' and the deistic cultural condition holds good for every part of the world.

It must be noted, however, that in this sense 'kingship' has been coincident also with other cultural conditions (for instance, among the man- istic Banyankole); and although I doubt the complete reliability of the reports, the evidence, such as it is, must be accepted as it stands. At the same time it is at least possible, I think, that in these cases the facts have not been studied exhaustively, and that if our information were complete we should find certain differences between the culture and behaviour of the ruling clan and that of its subjects. Hitherto we have been accustomed to assume that in every uncivilized society opinions are uniform throughout the society, but except in the case of a zoistic one this is never the case; and the assumption has vitiated the reports of many observers and prevented them from pursuing their inquiries into the habits and behaviour of each cultural stratum.

The only inference which we can safely draw from the evidence in regard to the political organization of uncivilized men (and it is not a very valuable one) is that invariably deistic societies have been organized as monarchies. It is this coincidence which we find also in history. Every energetic society has begun its historical career in the deistic condition and as a monarchy. Sometimes, as in Babylon, the kingship was retained; at other times it was abolished, either in fact or in name. When it was abolished, the society became aristocratic or democratic according to the relative energy of the various social strata into which it was divided.

The only type of post-nuptial ordinance which I shall discuss in detail is that of absolute monogamy. It is not only the most interesting but also the most important. Before considering it, however, I will complete my discussion of the ten uncivilized deistic societies. I must also pass some remarks in reference to the sexual regulations of the Christians. These, however, will be of a very general character, indicative rather than definitive.

At the time to which our information refers the ten deistic uncivilized societies had adopted a modified polygamy. Their regulations afforded a varying post-nuptial sexual opportunity; but except in one case, that of the Bakitara, the evidence is not sufficiently exact to enable us to assess the extent of this opportunity.

We must always remember that the social energy which is displayed at
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any time by any society depends not only upon the sexual opportunity it enjoys but also upon that enjoyed by the two preceding generations. It takes at least three generations for an extension or a limitation of sexual opportunity to have its full cultural effect; and if we happen to observe a society which is beginning, or has just begun, to extend its sexual opportunity, the full effects of the change have not yet been felt. The society still displays an energy which corresponds in some part to its old regulations. This seems to have been the state of affairs in Samoa and Tonga at the time to which our information refers (para. 166); and by deduction I conclude that the inequality of the energy displayed by the ten deistic societies was due to differences in the sexual opportunity enjoyed by previous generations. There is a complete lack of evidence, however, from which the conclusion might be induced. If we may judge from their architectural achievements, the Aztecs displayed a greater energy than any of the uncivilized deistic societies; but we have no knowledge of the customs which prevailed among them before we first met them. All we know is that they demanded pre-nuptial chastity and that they were deistic. Similarly there is a lack of relevant data in regard to the Gilbert Islanders. Again, all we can say is that their ruling caste demanded virginity of their brides and that they were deistic.

We have seen (para. 166) that the regulations of the Baganda, and probably those of the Fijians also, were being relaxed at the time of the white man’s arrival. In these cases less than a hundred years had elapsed since the initiation of the reforms; thus the changes had not produced their full effect. Both these societies seem to have been in a state of incipient degeneracy; but the degeneracy, being incomplete, had not resulted in a definite cultural decline.

In regard to the deistic Bakitara (para. 36), however, there is evidence that their post-nuptial opportunity was greater than that of their deistic neighbours, the Baganda. Among the Bakitara a wife’s sexual qualities were shared by her husband’s clan-brothers; among the Baganda a wife was compelled to confine herself to her husband. Consequently the Bakitara, though deistic, displayed less energy than the Baganda. Indeed they were comparatively lethargic (para. 40). Their temples were less elaborate, their ritual less developed. Some items of Kitara culture suggest that the people were degenerating from the deistic condition; but no definite conclusion can be drawn. All we can say is that at the end of the nineteenth century both the Bakitara and the Baganda demanded pre-nuptial chastity; likewise both were deistic. The post-nuptial regulations of the Bakitara afforded a greater sexual opportunity than those of the Baganda; in a coincident manner the Bakitara were less energetic than the Baganda.

It is impossible to assess the post-nuptial opportunity of the remaining deistic societies, Yoruba, Dahomans, and Ashanti. The evidence is neither adequate nor reliable. Indeed, as I remarked at the outset (para. 20), the whole of our information in regard to the post-nuptial regulations of
uncivilized peoples is unsatisfactory. Usually, it seems, the punishment for adultery was in the hands of the husband, or at any rate those of his social group; and it is impossible to say that any particular regulations were in force. Moreover, I doubt if in all cases we have persuaded the natives to tell the whole truth. The white man is seldom slow to make a moral judgement; and sensitive natives, feeling that they are treading on dangerous ground, make tactful but not truthful replies to the insistent questionings of their distinguished visitor (or overlord).

So much for the uncivilized deistic societies. Their post-nuptial regulations were a form of modified polygamy, and afforded a varying post-nuptial sexual opportunity; but except in the case of the Bakitara we are unable to assess the extent of the variation. Likewise these societies displayed an unequal amount of social energy; but there are no criteria by which the products of that energy may be compared. It is possible, however, to compare the energy of these ten societies with that displayed by absolutely polygamous and absolutely monogamous societies; and as soon as we do so we find that we have passed in our studies from uncivilized to civilized life. The simplicity and ease of the passage reveals the artificial nature of the barrier which is popularly supposed to exist between social anthropology and social history (para. 2).

In historical records a polygamous society sometimes displays an amount of energy which at first sight seems out of tune with its sexual regulations. The explanation is that a greater post-nuptial continence was imposed on the fathers and mothers of the two previous generations. Sometimes a polygamous society springs suddenly into the pages of history (the Persians, Macedonians, and Huns are examples), displaying great energy; this energy was created by the sexual regulations of a previous epoch. Usually we are ignorant of the ancient customs of the society; but the effect of their extended post-nuptial opportunity is apparent in the third generation after polygamy is known to have been generally adopted. This later extension of post-nuptial sexual opportunity is the explanation also of the fact that the social energy of civilized polygamous societies has been unequal; their old sexual regulations imposed an unequal continence on the fathers and grandfathers of the historical generation.

Unless its males marry females who have been reared in an absolutely monogamous tradition, an absolutely polygamous society remains deistic. It can never advance to the rationalistic condition. This advance takes place only after sexual opportunity has been reduced to a minimum.

We must remember that a cultural change is hard to bear. When a society advances in the cultural scale, many illusions are lost; old conventions give way to new conventions; and while the change is taking place the society is divided against itself. Moreover, the creed of every deistic society is founded on the fear of abnormal, unusual things; its members are inherently conservative. They dislike the feeling of insecurity and abnormality which precedes the formulation of the new principles by which
their children resolve to direct their lives. So long as they can, therefore, they cling to their archaic faith, rejecting it only when it becomes too uncomfortable to be preserved. When the new principles have been accepted by a new generation, a period of comparative quietude ensues, and no society permits another upheaval unless it suffers a compelling urge. This urge is supplied only by a further increase in the intensity of the compulsory continence. Then the painful process is repeated. Once more the mental sea is troubled; once more it reassumes its calm serenity after the cultural revolution has taken place. And so the cultural process continues, until sexual opportunity is reduced to a minimum. Then, but only then, mental energy is displayed unceasingly.

This is the reason why, in all the cases we have discussed, there is no increase in the inherited tradition as generation succeeds generation. Unless there is a further limitation of sexual opportunity, and so a further outburst of unwonted mental energy, no cultural change takes place. The advance from the deistic to the rationalistic condition, however, does not occur as soon as sexual opportunity has been reduced to a minimum. The initial results of such enforced continence are of another character.

The first thing that happens is that the society becomes dissatisfied with the limitations imposed by its geographical environment. The repressed desires of its leading members are manifested in a lust for power; ardent men explore new countries which hitherto have remained unvisited because the necessary urge was absent; vigorous individuals dominate their fellow citizens and lead them forward on a career of conquest and triumph; the eyes of thoughtful men are lifted beyond the horizon which their fathers regarded as the limits of the earth. The energy of such a society is displayed also in the production of material comforts; they demand tribute from their conquered enemies, whom they despise as barbarians. Commerce is developed; wealth increases. This is expansive social energy (para. 155).

If the sexual opportunity of the society is then extended, and a new generation inherits a less rigorous tradition, the society will begin to display less energy. It will enjoy the usufruct of its conquests for so long as it has the energy to retain them; but if it meets a more energetic society it will be conquered in its turn. This is what seems to have happened among the Babylonians; and by deduction I conclude that it happened also among the Persians, Macedonians, Huns, Mongols, and any other society which manifested expansive energy and then collapsed. If, however, the sexual opportunity of new generations is maintained at a minimum, a further cultural change occurs. The mental energy of the society is exerted on the age-old problems which have always engaged human interest, the inherent nature of the human organism always expressing itself. By applying their minds to the phenomena by which they are surrounded and by directing their attention to the causes of misfortune, the members of such a society begin to inquire into and to perceive the immediate causes of those things which hitherto have been unaccountable, and therefore ascribed to the power
(or powers) in the universe. Instead of accepting normal events as normal and abnormal events as the work of the power (or powers) in the universe, the people advance to the conception of the 'natural', the conception of the power in the universe being adjusted to meet the new conditions. The power is then identified with those phenomena which cannot yet be explained, the desire to maintain a right relation with it being expressed by a further elaboration of temples and ritual. At the same time the reaction to anything beyond comprehension still asserts itself so strongly that even cultivated men, while accounting many things 'natural', will regard those things which they do not yet understand as 'supernatural', referring thereby to a contradiction or a transcendence of nature as they understand it. They will overlook the patent fact that if 'nature' be accepted as a reasonable conception nothing can transcend or contradict it, for, if that were true, the conception of the 'natural' would be untenable.

Under the influence of further mental energy, many things, hitherto unaccountable, and included within the realm of the power in the universe, become explicable, and the area of the 'natural' continually expands, a new conception of the power in the universe, based on the yet unknown, being the inevitable result. And, when first the conception of the 'natural' appears, the society is divided against itself; and it is divided against itself once more whenever the area of the 'natural' expands. The new ideas conflict with the old notions; and those who would prefer to preserve their archaic faith struggle against the iconoclasts who desire to destroy it. Such a society is in the rationalistic condition. The advance to that condition depends not only on the reduction of sexual opportunity but also upon its preservation at a minimum. The great mental energy of such a society is directed to every detail of its environment, to every item of human activity, and to every problem of human life. It changes its ideas on every conceivable subject, increases its mental range, and expands in all its multifarious activities. Its method of treating sickness is altered in accordance with its new knowledge; by using the inherent power of reason it formulates and applies its knowledge of the physical universe; it produces more than it consumes, thus creating capital; it unearths new sources of wealth which less energetic societies neglect; it discovers new ways of treating old materials, bends nature to its purpose, and assumes a mastery of the earth. This is productive social energy (para. 155).

Now in the past, as I have said, sexual opportunity has been reduced to a minimum only by the adoption of absolute monogamy; a complete reduction of sexual opportunity has never taken place unless the females have been subjected to the domination of their husbands. All our selected societies, Sumerians, Babylonians, Athenians, Romans, Anglo-Saxons, and English, started their historical careers in a state of absolute monogamy, in the deistic cultural condition, and as monarchies. The ba' al marriage of the early Arabians conformed to the same pattern as the sexual regulations of the selected societies. Certain forms of Christian marriage also have
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reduced sexual opportunity to a minimum. Other forms of Christian marriage, however, afford a greater and a varying pre-nuptial sexual opportunity, even compelling only an irregular or occasional continence. Before I discuss absolute monogamy, therefore, I will pass some remarks on the sexual regulations of the Christians.

The first thing to be noticed is that historically speaking there is no such thing as Christian marriage. The term is a comprehensive one; within its scope many different types of sexual regulations have been included. Indeed if the ideas of Jerome, Archbishop Theodore, Howel the Good, John Milton, and Pope Pius XI are to be regarded as equally Christian, all we can say is that the epithet lacks any single precise meaning. No one will dispute that in the Western Roman Empire the Christians raised the institution of marriage to a dignity which it had not known since con-farreatio disappeared; but the precise regulations adopted by the converts are not known to us. Moreover, when one by one the Teutonic nations were converted to the new religion, the sexual regulations they adopted were by no means identical. The Franks upheld the Catholic banner while their Teutonic brethren preferred the Arian type of Christianity. We know that many members of the Frankish ruling clan married more than one wife at one time; but we do not know the manner in which the acceptance of Arian Christianity affected the sexual habits of such men as the Visigoths, Vandals, and Lombards. In later days the teaching and practice of the Catholics in the West do not appear to have been the same as those of the Orthodox Christians in the East, who, indeed, have always enjoyed a greater post-nuptial sexual opportunity than the Catholic Christians.

Now in the past, as I have said, sexual opportunity has never been reduced to a minimum except by depriving the female of the species of certain legal rights which she seems entitled to enjoy; so when the matter is being considered it is impossible to avoid some discussion of family relationships in general, and particularly those between man and wife, father and children. In every Christian society these relations have been governed not so much by the teaching of the Galilean as by that of Paul of Tarsus. Paul spent his early years in a Romano-Jewish environment; the ideas he absorbed from contact with the dominating Roman element in his native town were confirmed by what he learnt from Gamaliel. In each case the ideas were those of absolute monogamy; and in this manner some implications of absolute monogamy have been petrified in a Christian ideal. Admittedly by some Christian sects the Pauline recommendations, although applauded in theory, have been disregarded in practice; but by other sects they have been firmly applied to every detail of family life. The sexual regulations of the latter, therefore, differ in some respects from those of other Christians, and are almost identical with those of their pagan forefathers. Most Protestant and all Nonconformist Christians have placed a literal interpretation on Paul’s writings; and the result has been
that their ideas in regard to the relations between husband and wife, father and children, were those which the Sumerians, Babylonians, Athenians, Romans, and Anglo-Saxons once possessed and later discarded. As I have to discuss the sexual regulations of the English, the ideas of Protestant and Nonconformist Christians are important; and, in order to preserve their unique (as Christian) yet common character, I denote their customs by the term Pauline absolute monogamy.

Like those of all societies which have adopted any form of absolute monogamy, the ideas of Protestant and Nonconformist Christians have changed with the passing of time; but those of Catholic Christians (who must not be confused with one of their chief divisions, the Roman Catholic Christians) have been permanent. These permanent ideas having been put into practice, a permanent and unchanging culture has been created, deistic in character, with a manistic flavour. And the pattern of this culture has been controlled by the attitude of Catholic Christians towards pre-nuptial sexual intercourse.

Generally speaking Christians have invented no ritual; they have taken over pagan ceremonies and adapted them to a new purpose. When the Catholic priests began to convert the pagan Teutons, their aim (as it still is) was to increase the number of their flock, for it was only to the members of the Catholic Church that they could extend the benefit of atonement and the blessings of salvation. To this end they were ready to sympathize with any ritualistic behaviour which did not conflict with their fundamental doctrine, that of the Trinity, and with their fundamental rite, that of the Eucharist. For the rest, new converts, and indeed all adherents to the new faith, were permitted, and even encouraged, to worship their god in the manner most suited to their particular mentality. And this is occurring again in England during the present Catholic revival. In course of time, therefore, certain elements were added to Catholic ritual which, so far as we can tell, had not found a place there from the beginning. As early as the fourth century it had become the custom for some Christians to conduct post-funeral rites in honour of their great dead, these dead being invoked to secure favours for the living; and the Fathers had been forced to make public explanations of their conduct, and to defend their converts against the charges made by enlightened pagans. The Emperor Julian seems to have been particularly emphatic in his attacks on the worship of the dead; but doubtless then, as now, the Christian priests smiled tolerantly upon their enthusiastic but uninstructed followers and allowed them to continue to praise their god in the manner best suited to their mental condition.

In modern times a form of Catholic Christianity is being widely disseminated throughout the uncivilized world; and, though Christians may dislike it, the effect of their teaching upon uncivilized societies is not to tighten but to loosen the sexual regulations. The reason is that the Christians merely forgive and forbid those sexual lapses which under native rule were effectually prevented. Mr. Gouldsbury and Mr. Sheane
(para. 91) have described the influence of Christian teaching on the inhabitants of the Tanganyika plateau, and have emphasized the fact that when the old penalties for sexual irregularities are no longer exacted the natives soon take advantage of their extended opportunities. The same report has been made by other observers; and the effect of Christian teaching on Fijian society has been noted and described by Sir Basil Thomson (para. 29). The same is true, I think, of the sexual conduct of the Teutonic converts in England in the seventh century. At that time (para. 172) it was still the custom to transfer a bride-price, weotuma, to the parents of a bride, the girl's virginity being one of the considerations for which the weotuma was offered and paid. If and when these men adopted Catholic ideas, the effect upon them, I submit, was the same as the effect on modern uncivilized converts. Mutual consent became a necessary condition of a marriage; an irregular or occasional continence was substituted for pre-nuptial chastity; sexual lapses were no longer prevented but merely forbidden and forgiven. Thus in accordance with the second secondary law (para. 163) the worship of the great dead, and the reverence of the relics of these dead men, soon formed part of the inherited tradition, remaining so until the English adopted a kind of Pauline absolute monogamy when pre-nuptial chastity was not only encouraged but also compelled. And my suggestion is that in the so-called Middle Ages, among ordinary men and women, who spent the whole of their lives without travelling more than a few miles from their native village, pre-nuptial intercourse (especially between betrothed couples) and not pre-nuptial chastity was the rule. The latter was confined to the ruling classes, who alone were genuinely deistic.

The second point to be noticed in reference to the ideas of Catholic Christians is that in the course of its long career the Catholic Church has laid emphasis first on one aspect of sexual life, then on another. This changing emphasis has resulted in a changing attitude towards marriage itself; and the result in England has been that the energy of the inhabitants has sometimes been reduced by two factors which were cancelled in the sixteenth century.

In the fourth century the Christian Fathers began to compel the acceptance of the doctrine that marriage was a compromise with sin and that those who married fell from an immaculate ideal. As Jerome put it, 'Nuptiae terram replent, virginitas Paradisum.' It then became the fashion for new converts to found religious houses which were quickly filled by male and female votaries of celibacy. By their voluntary acceptance of compulsory continence the women who first entered these houses prove themselves to have been the very ones who, being fruitful, would have bred a generation of energetic sons; and if we examine the records of the events which took place in western Europe between the seventh and thirteenth centuries we find that after accepting and practising this type of Christianity a society soon ceased to manifest the same energy as before. It
does not matter whether the people were Anglo-Saxons, Danes, Normans, Franks, or Venetians; their social energy varied according as they permitted or did not permit the custom of voluntary sterility.

A developed society may be likened to a cone, which at its base is broad and which at its top narrows to a point. As a society proceeds up the cultural scale the highest cultural strata bear a smaller and a smaller proportion to the rest of the society. If natural development is prevented, the society becomes like a cone from which the top has been removed; the most developed stratum is prevented from reaching its due point. Such was the condition of Christian society in England before the sixteenth century.

We do not know the numbers of women who at any time devoted themselves to a life of perpetual virginity. Even if we did the information would be valueless, for we should not know what proportion of the female population they represented. All we know is that among the Anglo-Saxons in the seventh and tenth centuries, and among the Normans in the twelfth century, every effort was made to encourage the finest women to be barren. In each case the result can be seen three generations later, when the society, or the particular social stratum, failed to produce the leaders and thinkers who normally would have arisen from the ranks of the dominant classes. By the Normans the despised English were excluded from these religious houses. In the thirteenth century the quality of the Norman stock began to decline, that of the English to improve.

The social energy of the Normans was affected also by another factor; this was one which extended their sexual opportunity. I quote from a fourteenth-century document: 'In those days arose a great clamour among the people, that whenever there was a tournament there came a great concourse of ladies of the most costly and of the most beautiful but not of the best in the kingdom, sometimes forty or fifty in number, as if they were a part of the tournament, in diverse and wonderful male apparel, in parti-coloured tunics, . . . and then they proceeded on chosen coursers to the place of tourney, and so expended and wasted their goods and vexed their bodies with scurrilous wantonness that the rumour of the people sounded everywhere; and thus they neither feared God nor blushed at the chaste voice of the people.' This passage is quoted by Green, who adds pertinently that the ladies were not called upon to blush at the chaste voice of the Church.

There are two other complications in the study of the social customs of the so-called Middle Ages.

In the first place, it was always uncertain, at any rate in England, whether mutual consent or the sexual act (or both) was the essence of the marriage contract. Under these circumstances doubt could be cast upon the efficacy of the rite which sanctified a union. Moreover, it might be argued that by an open expression of consent a man who had consummated his marriage with one woman had already bound himself in marriage to another; thus his contract was invalid because a pre-contract existed.
Secondly, in the history of the Catholic Church, there has been some change of opinion in regard to the degrees of relationship which must be avoided in a valid marriage. Sometimes there has been a tendency to regard relatives by affinity in the same way as relatives by blood. Thus it has been possible to declare a marriage null and void because either the wife or the husband was a relative of the husband or wife of another member of his or her family, or because a pre-contract may have existed between a relative of one partner to a valid marriage and a relative by marriage of the other partner. 671

In consideration of these difficulties a full discussion of the sexual regulations of Catholic Christians, even if it were desirable, would be impossible. The records are singularly incomplete; very rarely is the evidence wholly reliable. Moreover, some eclecticism is apparent in most text-books and in all social histories. It was in the first century A.D. that the Christians first appeared in Rome; so I shall discuss the details of Roman marriage law only down to that era. Of the events after that date I shall do no more than present a bare outline. Then I shall pass to the consideration of the Anglo-Saxons. The Christian priests did not dominate the law and practice of Anglo-Saxon marriage until the reign of Cnut, when they succeeded to the office of the Anglo-Saxon ‘orator’. The priestly benediction, of course, did not add to, nor did its absence detract from, the validity of any marriage until after the Council of Trent (1563); but between the tenth and the sixteenth centuries the priests appear to have exercised a close surveillance over sexual matters. I have already pointed out some of the points which arise in the study of that epoch. I have also indicated its general cultural character. I shall not refer to it again. After describing the changes which the Anglo-Saxons introduced into their method of regulating the relations between the sexes, I shall proceed from the reign of Cnut to that of Henry VIII, thenceforward paying some attention to detail and bringing the record down to the twentieth century.

Now let us examine the nature of the institution under which alone in the past sexual opportunity has been reduced to a minimum, and which alone, therefore, has produced the greatest social energy and the highest human culture.

168. The Institution of Absolute Monogamy. When absolute monogamy is the rule, marriage is a means whereby a man secures domestic labour and heirs of his blood. A wife and her children are under the domination of her husband; in the eyes of the law he alone is an entity. The wife is taught to submit to her husband in all things; it is her duty to serve him and to obey him. No woman may have sexual relations with any other man than with him whom she marries as a virgin. When she is married, she is not permitted to withhold conjugal rights. In an absolutely monogamous society female chastity becomes desirable for its own sake, for after
a while the women accept as a point of honour the restraint imposed upon them by their lords. Over his children also a man has complete power.

In its full rigour this institution has never been tolerated for very long. Indeed all those human societies which have adopted it were constantly revising their methods of regulating the relation between the sexes. Moreover, the reforms which they introduced always conformed to the same pattern, being apparently designed to correct a state of affairs in which women and children were legal nonentities. Sometimes (as in Babylon) the changes were made by a series of separate enactments; sometimes (as in Rome) by a somewhat violent change in legal premises; but in every case they took the same course. In every case, too, the qualification of the marital and parental authorities was accompanied by the reduction of marriage to a temporary union made and broken by mutual consent. Furthermore, in most cases the demand for pre-nuptial chastity was relaxed. In this manner the sexual opportunity of each society was extended; and as soon as a lack of compulsory continence became part of the inherited tradition of a complete new generation the energy of the society faded away. Sexual impulses could be satisfied in a direct manner; there was no compulsory continence, and consequently no energy.

I will briefly summarize the manner in which the legal changes took place. Their general course is important, especially to those who wish to understand the cultural history of the English. Among the inhabitants of England absolute monogamy was enacted twice, married women being freed from their legal disadvantages on two separate occasions and being deprived of their equality after their first emancipation.

In all cases except that of the Protestant English and possibly also that of those Romans who were married by *confarreatio*, the female occupied a humble position in society because she had been married to a man who transferred some property to her parents. This payment secured for him the exclusive possession not only of her sexual qualities but also of the products of her labour. The result was that a wife’s goods, and even her life, were at her husband’s disposal. In course of time the custom of transferring property in return for a bride fell into disuse; a new custom, that of presenting a dowry to a daughter, took its place, a transitional stage being represented by the custom whereby a father presented his daughter with the bride-price he had received from her suitor. Sometimes this substitution of the dowry for the bride-price is apparent in the language of the people, for in later days the word which at one time meant bride-price was used also to denote the dowry. The Hellenic *hedna* is an example. Another innovation was the custom whereby a bridegroom presented his bride with a marriage-gift or settlement. The Babylonian *nudunnu* and the Saxon *morgen-gifu* are instances of this. Usually, as time went by, all these financial arrangements were discontinued, and, from being a matter of bargaining between a bride’s parents and a suitor (or his parents), a marriage became a matter of mutual consent on the part of the contracting parties.
In a coincident manner reforms were introduced into the legal position of married women. From a position of complete subjection and legal nonentity they succeeded to the status of free and equal citizens, being able to hold property, to trade, and to contract. They were granted the power of testamentary disposition, and finally took their place in society on a complete equality with men. The parental authority also was qualified, some of the privileges possessed by the father being transferred to public courts.

Invariably these have been the results of a modification of absolute monogamy. The only varieties within the pattern occurred among the Athenians and English. In both cases the varieties owed their existence to unique circumstances.

So long as Athens remained an independent city, the native-born women were never legally emancipated. The immigration of the Outlander women (as Professor Zimmern calls them) seems to have alarmed the Athenian leaders; and by the Periclean decree of 451 B.C. a strict line of demarcation between native and alien women was created. The latter were already emancipated; and, although there seems to have been a movement to free the native-born married women, nothing definite was done. The laws of the epiceros also may have contributed to the success of the conservative policy.

Among the English, in spite of a consistent outcry by an excited minority, divorce by mutual consent was not in operation; a semblance of the Catholic tradition which the Protestant and Nonconformist English had inherited prevented its legal enactment. If, however, the contracting parties to an English marriage were rich, they could secure, in the twentieth century, a divorce as and when they wished, by arranging to break the letter of the existing law.

With these two exceptions the same changes were made successively by the Sumerians, Babylonians, Athenians, Romans, Anglo-Saxons, and Protestant English. These societies lived in different geographical environments; they belonged to different racial stocks; but the history of their marriage customs is the same. In the beginning each society had the same ideas in regard to sexual regulations. Then the same struggles took place; the same sentiments were expressed; the same changes were made; the same results ensued. Each society reduced its sexual opportunity to a minimum and, displaying great social energy, flourished greatly. Then it extended its sexual opportunity; its energy decreased, and faded away. The one outstanding feature of the whole story is its unrelieved monotony.

I have summarized these changes in matrimonial law so that the whole matter may be discussed from an impressionistic point of view. From a superficial study of the available data it might be thought that the questions of female subjection and parental power are indissolubly allied to that of female continence; but actually their alliance in the past has been due to the chance factor that sexual opportunity has never been reduced to a
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minimum except by depriving women and children of their legal status. It is historically true to say that in the past social energy has been purchased at the price of individual freedom, for it has never been displayed unless the female of the species has sacrificed her rights as an individual and unless children have been treated as mere appendages to the estate of the male parent; but it would be rash to conclude that sexual opportunity cannot be reduced to a minimum under any other conditions. The evidence is that the subjection of women and children is intolerable and therefore temporary; but we should go beyond the evidence if we were to conclude from this fact that compulsory continence also is intolerable and therefore temporary. Such a statement, indeed, is contradicted by the tenor of the whole story.

Now I will describe the historical careers of the selected societies. In doing so I shall rely to a great extent on the reader's knowledge of the historical facts, and shall merely summarize the changes which were introduced into the methods of regulating the relations between the sexes. I shall neglect, or merely imply, the cultural events which followed those changes.

In my survey of the facts the points I wish to make are:
1. that when they began to display great social energy the societies had reduced their sexual opportunity by the adoption of absolute monogamy;
2. that in each case the society was dominated by the group which displayed the greatest relative energy;
3. that as soon as the sexual opportunity of the society, or of a group within the society, was extended, the energy of the society, or of the group within it, decreased and finally disappeared;
4. that whatever the racial extraction of the people, and whatever the geographical environment in which they lived, the manner in which they modified their absolute monogamy was the same in every case.

169. Post-nuptial Regulations of the Babylonians and Sumerians. The twelve hundred years of Babylonian history which preceded the death of King Hammurabi in the twentieth century B.C. divide themselves conveniently into four epochs. First we find traces of the Sumerians, the beginning of whose cultural career is far back in the dim recesses of time. Gradually they were being thrust south by the Semites from the Arabian desert. After two centuries of Sumerian prosperity in Lagash, these Semites extended their sway over the whole country. Two centuries of Semitic dominion were followed by a Sumerian revival, apparently inaugurated in Lagash. This lasted for about three centuries, during which the country, after a period of anarchy, was united under Sumerian leadership. Then Babylon, hitherto an insignificant village, developed into a great and powerful city. Commerce was developed; temples were built, restored, and enriched; the villagers extended their sway from Elam to the Syrian coast, from the Persian Gulf to Anatolia. They were deistic,
monarchical, and absolutely monogamous. Three centuries after their first display of expansive energy, they weakened. Local kingdoms arose, and eventually the land was dominated by the uncultivated Kassites, whose crude rule was suffered without demur.

The evidence concerning the changes in the post-nuptial regulations of the Babylonians is to be found in the Code of Hammurabi, published about the thirty-fifth year of his reign. The Code does not represent a series of new regulations which were imposed upon society by the will of a powerful ruler; it is a collection of enactments which had been made from time to time to meet social needs. It consists of three elements: first, the ancient law; secondly, a series of newer laws based on the old principles; thirdly, a collection of judicial decisions made to meet special problems. By separating the older from the later elements we can trace in detail the changes which the Babylonians introduced into their method of regulating the relations between the sexes.⁶⁷²

At first a wife was secured by a payment, tirhatu, to her parents; she was subject to her husband in all things, and possessed no legal rights. If she denied him, she was drowned; such conduct was regarded as an offence not only against her husband but also against society in general. A husband could repudiate his wife if he wished to do so; he could also sell her outright, or give her as security for a debt. Similarly children were the property of their parents; they also could be mortgaged or sold as slaves. Parents arranged the marriages of all their children. They gave their daughters to those suitors who transferred property to them. Any child could be expelled from the house at any time and for any reason, but a son who repudiated his parents was branded and sold.⁶⁷³

This is absolute monogamy in its most stringent form. Gradually the conditions were modified, these modifications extending sexual opportunity.

First a man’s power to sell his wife or child was limited to the power to lease them for three years; any wife or child given as security was free in the fourth year. Later this power could be completely cancelled by the insertion of an appropriate clause in the marriage contract. (No marriage was valid without a written contract.) The payment of the bride-price, tirhatu, fell out of fashion; and eventually the tirhatu became a mere formality, a small token, presented on a plate. Fathers began to present their daughters with a dowry, seriktu; later a husband made a marriage settlement, nudunnu. The seriktu and the nudunnu were always regarded as a wife’s personal property, which she forfeited only if she misbehaved herself. In the old days, as I have said, a refusal of conjugal rights was looked upon as an offence against society (‘One shall throw her into the river’); later a wife was given an opportunity of justifying her aversion in court. If she were judged to be blameless, the court allowed her to take her dowry and to return to her own people. And it seems that when a man wished to put away his wife he had to submit his case to the court. If the woman had acted foolishly and had neglected her duties, he could
either divorce her without compensating her or reduce her to the status of a slave.\textsuperscript{674}

These regulations qualified the marital authority. The parental authority was limited in a similar manner, a father being compelled to apply to the court before he could disinherit his son. The court decided whether an adequate cause existed or not; but whatever the nature of the son's offence, if it were the first, it had to be condoned. Moreover, from being chattels, daughters became legal entities. No father was ever obliged to give his daughter a dowry, and difficulties appear to have arisen in connexion with daughters who were not dowered and with daughters who never married. So in order to abolish all distinctions every daughter was given a definite claim on the estate, a daughter who subsequently became dowered forfeiting her right.\textsuperscript{675}

Under the old law a man could repudiate his wife whether she was innocent or guilty, childless or the mother of children. This power was never abrogated, but in later days certain formalities had to be complied with; financial adjustments had to be made; the wife's point of view was considered. For instance, the Code says that if a man divorced a wife who had borne him children he must return her dowry and give her sufficient alimony to keep both herself and her children. When the children grew up, their mother received a son's share of the estate, and was free to marry a man of her own choice. If a man divorced a barren wife, he had to return her dowry and compensate her by presenting her with another sum of money equal to the bride-price he had paid to her parents; if there had been no bride-price, he had to make her a cash payment, the amount of which varied according to his social status. An invalid wife was protected by law from her husband's whim. If she wished, she could take her dowry and depart. If she preferred to stay, she could do so, and her husband was compelled to support her, but she was no longer regarded as his wife, he being free to remarry. Likewise the rights of a widow were recognized and codified. Even if her children were young, a widow could remarry if she wished, after obtaining permission of the court, which filed an inventory of the children's property and handed it over in trust to the woman and her second husband. If she did not remarry, she could continue to live in her deceased husband's house, from which, should her own conduct be blameless, her sons could not dislodge her. Her dowry and her marriage-settlement always remained in her hands. If there had been no marriage-settlement, the widow was given a son's share of the estate.\textsuperscript{676}

Plainly this legally protected individual was a very different person from the chattel which in former times had been secured in order to provide heirs for the man who purchased his rights over her; and in course of time the status of all women, married or unmarried, underwent a complete transformation. When Hammurabi published his Code, women enjoyed the same social and legal position as men. They could trade, contract, hold property, and dispose of their goods as they wished; from the date of her
marriage a wife became equally liable with her husband for all post-nuptial debts. So greatly, indeed, had the relations between the sexes changed that, comically enough, Hammurabi had to protect a husband from his wife; he ordained that if a woman had incurred a debt before her marriage her husband's person could not be seized either in payment or as security. The equality of the sexes and the total disappearance of the old absolute monogamy are well illustrated by this marriage contract: 'Enlil-idzu, priest of Enlil, son of Lugal-azida, has taken Ama-sukkal, daughter of Nunurta-Mansi, to wife. Nineteen shekels of silver Ama-sukkal has brought to Enlil-idzu. If Enlil-idzu divorces Ama-sukkal, he shall return the nineteen shekels of silver, and, in addition, pay half a mina. If Ama-sukkal divorces Enlil-idzu, she shall forfeit the nineteen shekels of silver, and pay half a mina. In mutual agreement they have both sworn by the name of the King." 677

Such a marriage is a union of two individuals broken and made by mutual consent; such were the customs of the Babylonians towards the end of Hammurabi's reign. Female emancipation, freedom of divorce, legal equality of the sexes, and freedom to choose or to repudiate a sexual partner, had succeeded the stern rigour of absolute monogamy. After Hammurabi's death the Babylonians weakened. Samsu-iluna, his son and successor, lost control of the southern provinces. The Hittites raided the country, robbed the rich temples, and returned to their own country with their booty. Soon afterwards the Kassites dominated the once vigorous city. The inhabitants of the village of Babylon came from Amurru. They reduced their sexual opportunity to a minimum and, displaying tremendous energy, flourished greatly; they then extended their sexual opportunity, and declined.

Similar changes to those I have described had occurred in Sumerian law. We possess some fragments of a Sumerian Code which, when considered in the light of the old Sumerian family laws, shows that in the case of the Sumerians the adoption of less rigorous sexual regulations immediately preceded their subjection to the men of Babylon.

At first absolute monogamy was the rule. A wife was secured by means of payment to her parents; a marriage was arranged by the parents of the contracting parties; a man enjoyed full marital and parental authority. Gradually these conditions were modified. For example, if a man eloped with a girl without consulting her parents, he violated the old ordinance; later it was enacted that the marriage between the runaways was to be recognized, provided that the man agreed to pay what the parents demanded. The spirit of the old rule was preserved, but the new regulation was a step towards the changing of marriage from a bargain between parents into a union based on mutual consent. The parental authority was qualified also in another way. In the old days a parent could repudiate a son at any time, without giving any reason, and without making any provision for the lad; later the lad could demand his share of the family
estate. Later still a son could leave his home whenever he wished, and could take with him his share of the family possessions.

We do not possess the complete Code, so all the details of subsequent legislation are not known to us; but in the days of the last independent kings of Ur the same conditions prevailed as among the Babylonians in the time of Hammurabi. Women, from being legal nonentities, had become free and equal citizens; they could possess real estate; they could contract, administer, buy, and sell. They were granted a definite legal status, and could appeal to the court in their own names. A wife could even prosecute her husband. Sons and daughters married without their parents' consent. Adultery, punished in the old days by drowning, was regarded with more lenience.\(^{678}\)

The introduction of these customs was followed by the fall of the great Sumerian race. Even at the end of Shulgi’s reign the Semites were becoming restless. Later Gimmil-sin built a great wall in a futile attempt to keep them back; but the Sumerians were in rapid decline. Their energetic days were done. They had reduced their sexual opportunity to a minimum and, displaying tremendous energy, flourished greatly; they then extended their sexual opportunity, and declined.

There is one more piece of evidence from this area. In the days before the Akkadian domination which preceded this Sumerian revival, Lagash was a rich and powerful city; and it thrived. After a few generations the usual symptoms of degeneracy began to appear. A huge bureaucracy sprang up; officials and priests plundered the poor; public funds were misappropriated; and there was great oppression. Urukagina usurped the throne, and tried to stem the flowing tide. He found that the marriage tie had fallen into disrepute. Open adultery was rampant; the cupidity of priests and officials prevented the just administration of the law. Urukagina reintroduced the old severe punishments for incontinence. In addressing himself to the abolition of practices which he regarded as a danger, ‘he probably revived’, says King, ‘the law of a still earlier age which had been allowed to fall into disuse’.\(^{679}\)

The damage, however, was done; Lagash fell. Within a quarter of a century Sargon of Akkad had inaugurated two centuries of Semitic dominion, after which hordes of barbarians from Gutium overran the country, plundering and ravaging. Then came the Sumerian revival to which I have already referred. And it was in Lagash, the city in which the old laws of continence had been re-enacted, that the new age seems to have received its inspiration.

170. Post-nuptial Regulations of the Athenians. In speaking of the people who occupied Hellas towards the end of the second millennium we must distinguish carefully between the various groups into which they were divided, Achaeans, DORians, Ionians, Aeolians. The conception of a straight-line cultural process to which I have alluded (para. 159) has given
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a bias to Hellenic history. Thus the comparatively high position of women in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* has been compared with their lowly position in fifth-century Athens, and historians have interpreted the facts as a sign that among 'the Greeks' the position of women deteriorated. Such confusion between the separate ethnic units is dangerous and misleading. It is not permissible to mass 'the Greeks' together in that vague manner; each of the four groups must be considered separately. If the social conditions described or implied by Homer be accepted as historical, the evidence applies either to the Achaeans or to the time when Homer lived, which is unknown; it has nothing to do with the Dorian Spartans or with the Ionian Athenians. The Achaeans flourished, and then declined, as the Cretans had flourished, and then declined. Later the Athenians displayed an even greater energy; in their turn they flourished, and then declined. In each case, as time went on, the method of regulating the relations between the sexes was altered; the position of women in any group at any time was a reflection of the method which prevailed at that time. We must not be surprised, therefore, to find Nausicaa enjoying comparative freedom and Agarista being treated as a piece of property, for Nausicaa belonged to one group, Agarista to another and entirely separate group. Moreover, since in every monogamous society of which we have detailed knowledge marriage customs were constantly changing, we must not assume that in any particular Hellenic group the post-nuptial regulations which prevailed in one century were in operation also in the preceding or in the succeeding century. It would be as sensible to think that the ideas of twentieth-century white men were shared by nineteenth-century white men. Furthermore, we must not assume that any particular custom prevailed in all the strata of any particular group, for each social stratum may have preserved its own particular habits. Just as the position of women in the comedies of Congreve and Webster cannot be used as evidence of English middle-class life in the nineteenth century, so the evidence on which we rely for our knowledge of Periclean Athens cannot be employed in a discussion of the social conditions of the Athenian aristocracy in the Solonian era. It would be as reasonable to suppose that the facts deduced from the Middle Comedy were true of the mothers of the men who built the Parthenon.

Professor Westermarck has observed that 'among the Greeks of early days marriage was evidently a union of great stability, although in later times it became extremely easy and frequent'. That, indeed, is the gist of the matter, but the significant fact is that each separate group of Hellenes was energetic while it preserved its rigorous customs and that, after its sexual opportunity had been extended, each group rapidly declined.

When first they appeared in the historical arena, the Hellenes were absolutely monogamous. Marriage was a lifelong union, contracted for the supply of legitimate offspring of the male blood. It was only by the procreation of legitimate children that the tradition and ritual of the domestic hearth could be perpetuated. Dionysius of Halicarnassus states
that at one time throughout Hellas capture was a favourite method of obtaining a wife. According to Aristotle the early Hellenes bought their wives. M. Beaufret considers that purchase succeeded capture as the prevailing custom. The bride was sold to her husband’s family by her guardian (kurios), who might be her father, brother, or nearest male relative; she was regarded as a child-producer and as a housekeeper. If she were guilty, or even suspected, of adultery, her husband had no option: society compelled him to put her away. An adulteress was a social outcast, and liable to suffer any insult, however violent, which stopped short of murder. A man’s children were looked upon as his personal property, and were not legal entities.\footnote{681}

These absolutely monogamous men displayed great expansive energy. They penetrated to the utmost confines of the Mediterranean coast, and established colonies on the eastern shore of Spain, in the south of Gaul, in Italy and Sicily. They placed outposts in the north of Africa and founded settlements on the western coast of Asia Minor. They were deistic, monarchical, and extremely energetic, especially in Hellas, Asia Minor, and Sicily. We know very little of their early history, less of their social life. Of the conditions which prevailed in Sicily and Asia Minor we have no continuous record. We know that in Sicily Charondas made it possible for a woman to secure a divorce; his date is about 500 B.C. We are left to infer that corresponding changes may have taken place in the relations between the sexes. The customs of those who settled in Asia Minor must have altered very considerably between the date of colonization and the sixth century B.C., for in the sixth century we find traces of rationalism there, accompanied (as usual) by the emancipation of women. Only concerning the Hellenes who settled in Attica is the evidence reliable and adequate. Even in their case it is lamentably incomplete.

We know little of Athenian history before the sixth century, but by that time many changes had taken place. The office of basileus had been abolished; the control of affairs was in the hands of a few noble families, who became rich from piracy and trade. Of these, the Alcmeonids were outstanding. They had been driven out of Pylus by the Dorians (who avoided Attica) and had settled in Athens, whence they were banished, for sacrilege, about 595 B.C. Later they returned, and played a leading part in Athenian history.

By the beginning of the sixth century the custom of buying a wife had fallen into disuse among the noble families; it had become the practice to provide a daughter with a dowry. This did not affect the parental or the marital authority, but it acted as a defence against a husband’s caprice; for the dowry seems to have remained the property of the wife’s people, so if the husband exercised his power of repudiation he had to restore the dowry. Moreover, he was sometimes required to give collateral security that the property would pass to the wife’s children. A good idea of the relations between the sexes can be gathered from the manner in which
Megacles, son of Alcmeon, received his wife, Agarista. She was the daughter of Cleisthenes of Sicyon; at his invitation suitors arrived from all corners of the Hellenic world. Cleisthenes was inclined to bestow Agarista upon Hippoclides, son of Tisander, but at the feast Hippoclides was ribald, so Cleisthenes changed his mind, told Hippoclides that he had danced away his wife, and gave Agarista to Megacles. In such a way did a Eupatrid receive his wife; in such a manner were a woman’s sexual inclinations disregarded. Agarista’s son was Cleisthenes, the lawgiver; her granddaughter was the mother of Pericles.682

It appears, however, that in the first half of the sixth century some of the aristocratic families departed from their ancient customs. The status of women improved, and they were granted social privileges which hitherto they had not enjoyed. We have no knowledge of Athenian law before the end of the fifth century, but it seems that as the noble families became richer their women became creatures of pomp and vanity, indulging in spendthrift entertainments and nocturnal escapades. In the middle of the sixth century, Solon was appointed dictator to cope with the economic crisis which had arisen. Our knowledge of his reforms is inconsiderable, but according to Plutarch Solon placed a statutory limit on the amount of money a woman might spend on dress, entertainment, and household furniture. He also enacted that no woman was to carry more than three dresses on her travels and that in future she was not to go abroad at night unless she was accompanied by her attendants. Moreover, she must travel in a lighted carriage. Plainly these queer regulations would apply only to the women of the noble families, and we are left to imagine the circumstances which rendered them necessary. Indeed a few examples of sexual laxity (compared with the customs of former days) may be noticed. Pisistratus possessed an Argive mistress, Timonessa, as well as a legitimate wife; by both of them he had sons. We do not know what happened to these women, but later Pisistratus married the daughter of his former enemy, Megacles. Two generations later another aristocrat, Cimon, is reported to have indulged an amorous disposition. He is said to have had at least two mistresses, in addition to his lawful wife, the granddaughter of Megacles. Gossip was also rife concerning his sister, Elpinice, who was said to have been intimate not only with her brother but also with Polygnotus, the painter. She married Callias, a rich man who paid the fine of fifty talents, for the non-payment of which Cimon had been imprisoned.683

These are slight indications, but, as I have said, we are ignorant of the real state of affairs. The evidence, such as it is, suggests that among the Athenian aristocracy of the sixth century a less intense sexual continence was suffered than formerly. Towards the end of that century the aristocrats began to lose their supremacy; by the middle of the fifth century the sovereign power had been transferred to those whom the once energetic aristocrats had dominated for at least two, possibly for three, centuries.
Meanwhile the monogamy of the lower classes remained absolute. Apparently some of them had retained the habit of selling their womenfolk, for Solon forbade the practice. Anyway the old rigours were preserved. At the time when the aristocratic ladies were enjoying considerable freedom, the ordinary Athenian girl was still brought up in the strictest seclusion. Her very existence pointed towards her ultimate fate, for the Athenians did not hesitate to expose an unwanted female child. A girl’s marriage was arranged by her legal guardian (kurios), and when she was about fifteen or sixteen she was handed to her husband. A special part of the house was set aside for her; to those rooms she was confined. She was not present when her husband entertained his guests, and her activities outside the house were limited to participation in religious festivals. She was not allowed to walk the streets unaccompanied; even if she was seen looking out of a window, she was shamed. It was to the sons of these women that the sovereign power was transferred; it was their sons who defeated the Persians at Marathon and at Salamis; they were the mothers of the men who displayed such tremendous mental and productive energy that their influence on human thought, religion, architecture, and aspirations is still felt by the Western European, two thousand four hundred years later. For a time the Athenians remained deistic; then their most developed cultural stratum became rationalistic.684

By the end of the fifth century, however, the old customs had disappeared, the sexual opportunity of both sexes being extended. There was no compulsory continence; sexual desires could be satisfied in a direct manner. Divorce became easy and common; paederasty appeared; the men possessed mistresses as well as wives; the women broke bounds, consoling themselves with both wine and clandestine love-affairs. The energy of the Athenians declined. Three generations later the once vigorous city, torn by dissension, was subject to a foreign master.685

The changes in the relations between the sexes conform to the usual pattern except in regard to the position of married women and unmarried girls. As I have said (para. 168), there were special reasons for this exception to the rule.

From the beginning of the sixth century onwards many strangers had found their way to the growing city; and among the visitors were a number of women, by this time emancipated, from the settlements in Asia Minor. Keen-witted, charming, and intelligent, these women were attracted to a city which after the time of Pisistratus offered them a more abundant life than did their native towns, which, in truth, were in decline and subject to Persia. We have seen that in the sixth century the noble Athenian ladies had been freed from many of their social, if not also from their legal, disadvantages, but in the first half of the fifth century they lost their predominant position in Athenian society, being supplanted by the newcomers, who assumed an intellectual and social equality with the men. Some of these cultivated women married Athenians, but their presence
alarmed the more conservative natives; so at the instigation of Pericles, who was anxious to curry favour with the voters, it was decreed that no one could enjoy full civic rights unless both his parents were Athenians. Thus from the middle of the fifth century onwards there lived side by side two distinct types of women, the aliens, who were free but unable to bear legitimate sons, and the native-born wives, who could bear legitimate sons but were far from free. Between them a great gulf was fixed; this gulf was never bridged. Greater stress than ever was laid upon the ideal of a wife whose duty (Thucydides makes Pericles express the sentiment publicly) was to provide the city with sons. The alien women, unable to be wives, became 'companions'. Later they descended to being mere sexual partners or professional whores. Euripides lashed out in fury against the unequal lot of the native women; Aristophanes wrote comedies in which he depicted the city under the control of wives; but the old tradition was preserved. Even in the fourth century, when the institution of regulated marriage was held in public contempt, we find cases of a literal interpretation of the law. Thus on his death-bed the father of Demosthenes bequeathed his wife to Aphobus and his daughter to Demophon. Likewise Pasion, the banker, gave both his wife and a large fortune to Phormion, his freedman. 686

At the same time it is doubtful, I think, if these cases could have occurred, or if female emancipation could have been postponed, if the epicleros law had been modified or repealed. When an Athenian died without male heirs, his daughter was in a peculiar position. She alone could inherit the estate, yet she was not qualified to hold property. She was an heiress (epicleros) who could not possess her heritage. So her nearest male relative was compelled to marry her, he being the agent through whom she took possession of her own. Increased wealth had created many desirable estates, and in the late fifth and early fourth centuries there seems to have been considerable litigation and dispute. In every case the successful claimant had to marry the epicleros. If she was married, he took her away from her husband; if he was married, he put away his wife. Apparently the law was never altered while Athens remained an independent city, and the helplessness of the unfortunate heiresses bore public witness to the lowly position of a native-born girl who had no brothers. Doubtless too it contributed towards the intensity of the rebellion against marriage which was common in the fourth century. 687

I have said that when a society changes its sexual regulations the same sentiments are always expressed. The point is well illustrated by the literature of the fourth century B.C. Thus, when first the girls insisted on choosing their own husbands, the parents first used the familiar arguments concerning modesty and maidenly shame; in the fifth century these had been extolled as the greatest of feminine virtues. In a significant dialogue a middle-class mother is depicted as remonstrating with her daughter who announces her inability to control her desire for a certain man. The mother suggests a dose of hellebore (an alleged cure for insanity). It
became the custom, too, for middle-class women to embellish their features by means of artificial devices. This is a constant theme in contemporary literature. Of a lady who delighted in these factitious aids to beauty, it is said: 'And with frequent glances she surveyed her person and looked to see if others noticed her.' This kind of literature would have been quite impossible in the fifth century. Alexis remarked that no sensible man ever married; his nephew, Menander, seems to have shared his views. Doubtless, too, when they coined the following epigrams the later dramatists were giving their public what it wanted: 'marriage is worse than disenfranchise-
ment'; 'why do girls prefer old wine but young men'; 'love is a severe god, especially to the old'; 'the sudden effects of a kiss'; 'a respectable woman does not dye her hair'; 'a wife is an expensive luxury'. Such bright little sayings could be quoted almost indefinitely from the Middle Comedy. They illustrate the shallow superficiality of the Athenians who were conquered by Philip.

171. Post-nuptial Regulations of the Romans (down to the first century A.D.). When the Athenians were discussing the exclusion of the sons of Outlander women from the enjoyment of civic rights, a special council of ten (Decemvirate) was appointed by the populus Romanus to reduce the laws of the village to writing. According to native tradition Rome was founded in the middle of the eighth century B.C., but for the first three centuries of Roman history there are no indisputable records. At first the people were absolutely monogamous, deistic, and monarchical. Usually the rex is regarded as having been the head of the hierarchy, but by the fifth century the office had been abolished. The institution which at one time had been looked upon as the origin of blessings was then held in contempt. The sovereign power was transferred to the patricians. Up to the fifth century the patricians alone were the populus Romanus; they alone possessed civic rights. They ordered their lives according to the ius civile, the benefits of which were conferred upon those who were cives, that is, upon those who were the offspring of a iustum matrimonium. A citizen contracted a iustum matrimonium when he took to wife a citizen of Rome, or a Latin or alien to whom the Romans had extended the right of intermarriage, ius conubii. His children were cives, and subject to his potestas, or that of his paterfamilias; his wife was in manu.

In the early days, before any proposal could be enacted, first, it had to be approved by the senatus, then sanctioned by the populus: potestas in populo, auctoritas in senatu. For this purpose the populus assembled as a comitia curiata, which was an exclusively patrician organization. Before the fifth century, however, this had been changed, and according to a reform credited to the sixth rex, Servius Tullius, a comitia centuriata was formed, of which every landowner (patrician, plebeian, or clients), and all the adult males in potestate, were members. Originally, the comitia centuriata was nothing but the standing army. Frequent wars had necessitated
the formation of a stronger military organization, so from being a personal obligation military service was changed to an incident of land tenure. Not unnaturally, as soon as this assembly began to function, it assumed the right of deciding the question of peace or war, hitherto exercised by the comitia curiata. This transfer of power was the first of many. Indeed in the first hundred and fifty years which followed the publication of the Twelve Tables the comitia curiata lost its dominating position, which thereafter was assumed by the comitia centuriata, the final victory of the plebs being formulated in the Lex Hortensia, 287 B.C. Gradually the plebeians broke down the barriers which separated them from the enjoyment of political rights and privileges, and were finally in a position of complete equality with the patricians.

Thus by the beginning of the third century the population of Rome, instead of being divided into two distinct endogamous elements, the populus Romanus and the plebs, had become homogeneous; the plebeians had climbed until they reached the topmost social and political heights. The parallel evidence is that at first the compulsory continence inflicted by the sexual regulations of the patricians was greater than that suffered by the plebeians, whose institutions were based on less rigorous principles, and that from the fifth century onwards the plebeians followed patrician practices.

After the population had become homogeneous, the expansive social energy of the Romans was tremendous. When they had subdued what is now called Italy, they extended their sway over the whole of the Mediterranean area, rising from an insignificant township to a position of domination in less than three centuries. Moreover, the members of the most developed cultural stratum began to show a rationalistic inclination, and listened with sympathy to the members of the Hellenistic intelligentsia who visited the growing city. Then the archaic ius civile was supplanted by the ius gentium, a form of law which came into operation in response to the demands of advancing society. Absolute monogamy was modified; sexual opportunity was extended; sexual desires were expressed in a direct manner; the marriage institution fell out of fashion; women were emancipated; the marital and parental authorities were qualified; Roman gravitas disappeared.

There is some evidence that sexual laxity first appeared among the patricians, and then later among the plebeians also.

Such, in outline, are the facts; the details are these.

At first the patricians were married by confarreatio, an almost indis- soluble bond, solemnized by a religious ceremony performed by the pontifex maximus. Marriage was an institution designed for the provision of children of the male blood. The marital and parental authorities were complete. A wife was in manu, either of her husband or of his paterfamilias, the man being sole judge in all matters which concerned his wife and children. Their lives were in his hands; he could sell them into bondage.
By the fifth century, however, it had become the custom to assemble the family council before any drastic action was taken. The system of relationship was agnatic; blood-relationship, as understood in later days, was unknown. Any person or persons transferred from one family to another ceased to be related to their former family, and owed allegiance only to their new family. Thus when a woman was married she was no longer legally related to her parents; she exchanged the sacra of her family for those of her husband. Her relationship to her children was that of a sister; both she and they were subject to the same patria potestas. A father decided whether a child should be exposed or permitted to live; no person could marry without the consent of the head of the family. Adultery was an offence which was possible only for a woman. Every male was either filiusfamilias or paterfamilias. A filiusfamilias could be a debtor, but not a creditor; he could be a witness, but could not make a will. If he benefited under a succession, his rights were vested in his father. He might be permitted to administer some of the family property, but he held it on the same terms as a slave. Privately he could only contract obligations; he possessed no rights. Publicly it was different. As a civis a filiusfamilias was equal to his paterfamilias; he could even act as index in a case to which his father was a party. Women, however, possessed no legal rights whatever; they could neither hold property nor administer it. A widow was under the complete control of her guardian, and possessed no power over her children, who were her legal equals.

Such was the compulsory continence, such the severe discipline, suffered by the men who expelled the reges and assumed control of Rome. It is difficult to imagine a more complete reduction of sexual opportunity or a more rigid cancellation of personal impulses. To the period of patrician domination belong the stories of Cincinnatus, Coriolanus, Camillus, and Cloelia. It was the patricians who defended Rome against the Tuscans and who gained the victory of Lake Regillus. They gave Rome her gravitas. Their honourable dealings became proverbial as the πίστις τῶν Ῥωμαίων (as the Hellenistic people called it), which towards the end of the Republic disappeared.

Before the fifth century there had been no written law. The fas was an oral heritage, handed on from one generation to another. Soon the plebeians, having gained some standing by virtue of their membership of the comitia centuriata, seem to have complained both of their ignorance of the law and of the uneven justice with which they were treated. The patricians replied by a contemptuous reference to the loose sexual behaviour of the plebs. They decided, however, to reduce the ius civile to writing, this entailing the definition of plebeian customs according to patrician principles. A plebeian secured his wife either by coemptio or by usus. Coemptio was a civil act, consisting of the conveyance of a woman to a man in the presence of witnesses. In earlier times coemptio seems to have been a literal sale, but by the fifth century the bride-price had become a formality (like the
Babylonian tirhatu (para. 169)). Under the conditions of a sale, albeit a symbolic one, the marital and parental authorities were, of course, complete; so there was no difficulty in identifying the marital authority incurred by the plebeian coemptio with the patrician manus, and the parental authority with the patrician potestas. The case of usus was not so simple. In early times some of the plebeians seem to have married by cohabitation, simply. Some authorities maintain that such cohabitation was a survival of forcible abduction and that in course of time capture gave way to mutual consent. However that may be, there was no compulsory continence about the sexual union, a separated couple being regarded as no longer married. Naturally such a custom was severely condemned by the patricians, who made no secret of their disgust; but since among them any property which had been held for a year became legally acquired (in manus), they appear to have held that a woman who had lived with a man for a year automatically incurred manus. Thus in the Twelve Tables it was enacted that cohabitation for a year produced manus. Yet plainly from the plebeian point of view this decision contravened the fundamental character of the union, so (apparently this was the reason) the trinoctium was introduced, by means of which it was ordained that if a woman wished to escape manus she must absent herself for three successive nights in each year. In this manner the conflicting points of view were adjusted, for the patricians were unable to conceive of marriage without manus, and the device of the trinoctium was their method of giving legal recognition to the customs of the despised plebs.

Thus before the fifth century the compulsory continence suffered by the plebeians was less than that of the patricians. Immediately after the publication of the Twelve Tables the former began to discard their old customs (if indeed they had not done so already) and to adopt those of the patricians, including confarreatio. First they gained the right of inter-marriage. This was the most significant revolution of all, but the privilege was not obtained without difficulty, the loose character of plebeian sexual regulations being the point at issue. It was only after 'much strong language,' Muirhead says, 'much contemptuous denunciation of the looseness of the matrimonial relations of the lower order, sanctioned by no auspices, and hallowed by no sacrifice, and much declamation, more or less sincere, about the divinity of the commonwealth, that the patricians accepted the motion'.690

There is no evidence that the patricians ever compromised in any way. Indeed it is certain that they adhered to their principles. The evidence is that they permitted the plebeians to take public office only after the latter had discarded marriage by usus and adopted confarreatio. This is proved by the passing of the Lex Ogulnia (300 B.C.). This law enabled a plebeian to be pontifex maximus. Now no man was allowed to hold that high office unless he was the son of a woman married by confarreatio and unless his own marriage had been sanctified by the same holy rite. Thus for two
generations at least before 300 B.C. (say sixty years) some plebeians must have been married in that manner, and, moreover, the number of plebeian confrarreatio marriages cannot have been small, for, if only a small minority of the plebeians had adopted confrarreatio, the patricians would hardly have passed the Lex Ogulnia. The dates on which the various public offices were thrown open reveal the fact that the patricians never accepted plebeian officials until, from the patrician point of view, the plebeians had mended their ways. After the patricians were convinced of plebeian orthodoxy, however, plebeian successes were continuous, they being admitted to the consulate in 367, to the dictatorship in 356, and to the censorship in 350; but even though the praetorship was opened in 360 no plebeian succeeded to that important office until 337, so reluctant were the patricians to permit any break with the old traditions.

By the end of the fourth century the extended populus Romanus was absolutely monogamous, homogeneous, deistic, and extremely energetic. Furthermore, signs of rationalism started to appear. It was at this time that the patricians began to depart from their old customs. There is some evidence that the men had taken advantage of their privileged position at an earlier date; but it is not indisputable. In 295, during the third Samnite War, matrons are said to have been publicly tried for adultery. Ihne remarks: 'We cannot imagine that immorality on such a scale was confined to one year, or to one period. It must have been an evil of long growth before it could reach such dimensions. For moral disease, unlike a physical epidemic, is not capricious and unaccountable in its devastations. It can neither come nor go quickly.' The plebeians, on the other hand, continued to preserve the ideas which in former times had been exclusively held by the patricians. Although intermarriage between the orders had been legal for one hundred and fifty years, it was still unpopular with the patrician ladies, some of whom once appear to have excluded one of their number, Virginia by name, from participation in their rites, because she had married a plebeian. Virginia is said to have returned to her own house, and erected a new altar there. She dedicated it, she said, to Plebeian Pudicitia, and she exhorted the Plebeian matrons to emulate in regard to chastity the courage of their men-folk. Moreover, she is said to have expressed the hope that her altar would be honoured 'by more holy observances and by purer worshippers' than that of the Patrician Pudicitia. Thenceforward the plebeians played not merely an equal but even a leading part in Roman life. The Decii, who offered their lives as an expiatory sacrifice, were plebeians; by plebeians Pyrrhus was checked, then conquered. A plebeian subdued the Gauls in Italy; another plebeian annihilated the Cimbri and Teutones. A plebeian consul foiled Catiline. The Catos, Gracchi, and Brutus were plebeians. Some of the patrician families retained their old customs, however; indeed this was true of the majority; and the energy of the patrician order was by no means exhausted. Families who preserved the ancient tradition in their homes included the Sulpicii,
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Valerii, Fabii, and Cornelli: 'Their images stand peaceably beside those of the great plebeians. . . . All gradually deteriorated. . . . But new families from the municipia preserved the city in its youthful vigour.'⁶⁹²

It was during the Punic Wars, and in the years after Zama, that the *ius gentium* took shape. Its introduction seems to have been due to Roman exclusiveness. A legal transaction could take place only between *cives*; thus the business done by *peregrini* was not valid. In early days, by an act of special friendship, the *ius conubii* and the *ius commercii* had been extended to favoured aliens, but the practice ceased after the break-up of the Latin League in 338 B.C. After that date the Romans reduced their conquered enemies to a condition which approached servility; only in exceptional cases (e.g. that of Carthage, after the Pyrrhic Wars) were *peregrini* treated as equals. As time went by, however, the numbers of *peregrini* in Rome increased rapidly; and, since they were outside the law, chaos ensued, for none of their transactions was valid. So a special praetor was appointed, *praetor peregrinus*, who was charged with the jurisdiction over all the *peregrini* in Rome. Unlike the *praetor urbanus*, the *praetor peregrinus* was bound neither by tradition nor by statute, so his decisions effected the introduction of a new form of law, the *ius gentium*. At first the *ius civile* and the *ius gentium* were administered side by side; but eventually the latter superseded the former, being applied not only to *peregrini* but also to *cives*.⁶⁹³

Under the *ius gentium* marriage was a union based on the mutual consent of the contracting parties. There was no *manus*; the wife did not pass into her husband's family; she and her children remained under her father's *potestas*. At first this 'free' marriage was illegal, but the numbers of free marriages increased so rapidly that they compelled recognition, the system of relationship changing from agnatic to cognatic. Soon it became the custom for a man to recognize his children publicly; then they came under his *potestas*; but the wife ceased to have the status of a *filiafamilias*, and became an individual on an equality with her spouse. Moreover, by the Maenian law of 168 B.C., the family council was deposed from the position of judge of family conduct, its functions being transferred to a *iusdictium de moribus*.⁶⁹⁴

In the second century *confarreatio* disappeared, and for no less than seventy-five years it was impossible to find a man qualified to occupy the priesthood of Jupiter, for the occupier of that office had to be the product of a *confarreatio* marriage. Free marriages became usual, made and broken by mutual consent. Indeed the will of one party only was sufficient for a divorce, the intention to dissolve being communicated either by word of mouth or by messenger. There was no ceremony, no registration, no formality. Women were free from any trace of marital authority; they could hold property and could contract in their own name. The *tutela* remained, but a woman could appoint her own guardian, and the ingenuity of fashionable lawyers assisted them to escape the limitations which a
nominal tutelage imposed. Even on these terms marriage became un-
fashionable, especially among the men—but perhaps it would be more just
to say that marriage on these terms was despised, for there seemed to be
few advantages to be gained, many to be lost. A large number of leading
citizens preferred a mistress (concubina) to a wife. A Roman concubina was
not an additional sexual partner; she was a man’s sole female companion,
sometimes his life-long associate. The one great difference was that a
freeman could take a freedwoman as a concubina but not as a wife.\footnote{695}

Augustus endeavoured to effect a change by the Lex Julia et Papia
Poppaea, but it is doubtful if his efforts to prop up a rotting edifice were
successful. It took three years to persuade the people to accept the law,
which Muirhead describes as ‘a voluminous matrimonial code, which for
two or three centuries exercised such an influence as to be regarded as one
of the sources of Roman law almost quite as much as the Twelve Tables’. Certainly the tone
of many of its provisions was contrary to the practices of
the first century B.C., but the basis of sexual relationships remained
the same—mutual consent. The object of the law was not to reintroduce com-
pulsory continence, but to encourage fertility and to restore some order
into the existing chaos. Marriage with men and women of low character
was forbidden; unmarried persons were not allowed to benefit under a
will; married childless people were permitted to inherit only half their
legal share; mothers of children were relieved of tutela; concubinage
received official sanction; no divorce was valid unless a formal declaration
was made before witnesses. Such was the tenor of the proposals of the
Princeps. Soon the emancipation of women received official sanction.
The parental authority also was abolished almost completely.\footnote{696}

Gradually the old forms of government, outwardly preserved, ceased to
function. The comitia lost even the shadow of authority; it was simply
incapable of possessing it. It was the same with the senate. ‘There can
be little doubt’, Sir Samuel Dill observes, ‘that there were men who
dreamed of a restored senatorial power. It is equally certain that the
senate was incapable of asserting it.’ The extension of sexual oppor-
tunity had done its work. The Romans satisfied their sexual desires in
a direct manner. Consequently they had no energy for anything else.\footnote{697}

In some parts of the Empire, however, the old Roman traditions were
preserved. In Italy, Gaul, Illyria, and Spain, the old idea of the family was
still put into practice. The ladies even did their hair in the old-fashioned
way, long discarded by those who lived in the city. The sons of these
women went to Rome, succeeded to high office, and controlled the Empire.
They entered the senate and restored some of its old authority. From this
provincial stock came Trajan, Hadrian, and the Antonines.

It is often supposed that in the second century the Roman Empire was
at its strongest. These provincials were the men who gave it strength,
conditions in the provinces being such as to produce social energy.

Then in their turn the provincials reversed the habits of their fathers
by extending their sexual opportunity. Paederasty also was not unknown. The lack of energy displayed by their sons and grandsons is apparent in the records of the third century.

Yet once more there emerged a group of men who had spent their early years in an atmosphere of compulsory continence. I mean the Christians. They had survived many violent persecutions; eventually they dominated the Empire, which in the fourth century recovered the strength it had shown in the second century. The Edict of Milan may have been a political move, but Constantine was right in thinking that the Christians were the men on whom he should rely. Then the Christians in their turn changed their habits. In the matter of post-nuptial regulations they compromised with the civil authorities; they also encouraged, even commanded, their finest women to be sterile. Then the Teutons overran the Western Empire. These Teutons possessed, in regard to sexual regulations, the same absolutely monogamous ideas that the Sumerians, Babylonians, Athenians, and Romans had once possessed, and later discarded.

172. Post-nuptial Regulations of the Anglo-Saxons. When first the Teutonic tribes appeared in history, manifesting great expansive social energy, they were absolutely monogamous, deistic, and monarchical. Parents, sons, sons’ wives, and children formed a hearth-circle similar to that of the early Romans. The father was the head of the hearth-unit; over his wife and children his power was absolute.

A man obtained his wife by making a bargain with her parents. He transferred property to them, and so obtained for himself the authority, mund, over her which hitherto they had possessed. Fearful punishments were inflicted upon an unfaithful wife, for adultery was a violation of the mund. Similar conduct on the part of the man was not punished in the same way; but since by such action a man violated the mund of another man he was liable to certain penalties. Usually a widow was put to death on her deceased husband’s pyre, or at his graveside. If she did not offer herself for death, she was scorned and hated.

A father decided whether a new-born child should live or be killed. At one time a son seems to have been subject to his father in all things, but by the fifth century, when the great revolutions took place, a son was free to arrange his own marriage. It was the custom, however, for a son to consult his parents before taking any definite steps in the matter. Probably at one time the system of relationship was agnatic, but we possess no certain information in regard to the system which prevailed before the seventh century. Indeed no one system may have been in vogue. ‘There would be two neighbouring villages in Germany,’ Messrs. Pollock and Maitland declare, ‘they would be inhabited by men of the same race, religion, and language, and yet have different rules concerning the commonest of human relationships.’ With these exceptions the same customs were common to the Goths, Franks, Allemanni, Burgundians, Angles, Saxons, Lombards,
and Jutes. The Roman historian, Tacitus, writing about the end of the first century, has described the social condition of some of the tribes, but we do not know from which area his information was collected. As if contrasting by implication the habits of the Teutons with those of his own contemporaries, Tacitus says that the Teutons did not laugh at vice, nor regard it as the fashion to corrupt and be corrupted. For a woman to limit the number of her offspring, he adds, was accounted ‘infamous’, ‘good habits here being more effectual than good laws elsewhere’.698

These absolutely monogamous Teutons overran the Western Roman Empire, and founded new kingdoms throughout western Europe; but so deep an impression had the gravitas of Rome made upon them that, even after capturing the city and conquering the Western Empire, some of them acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome. The Franks and Burgundians moved westward, settling in northern and south-eastern Gaul respectively. The Vandals left the banks of the Vistula and made their way to Spain, whence they proceeded to North Africa, making raids from there upon southern Europe and upon the Mediterranean islands. They were succeeded in Spain by the Visigoths, who arrived from the lands of the lower Danube via Italy, Rome, and southern Gaul. The Ostrogoths, after supplying the Eastern Roman Empire with soldiers and generals, set up a separate kingdom which included Italy and the Alpine country. To the north of this kingdom, astride the River Oder, lay the Lombards; in the sixth century the Lombards crossed the Alps and conquered northern Italy. The Angles and the Saxons, who had occupied a district to the north and west of the Lombards, crossed the seas to Britain and conquered all the lowlands, pushing the Britons westwards and south-westwards. The Saxons occupied the district now known as Essex (East Saxons), Sussex (South Saxons), and Wessex (West Saxons). From the Angles were descended the East Angles, Middle Angles (Mercians), and Northumbrians, who peopled the area north of the Humber. The Jutes embarked from Denmark and made their way to Kent, southern Hampshire, and the Isle of Wight.

At first the Jutes seem to have been the most energetic tribe, for in the sixth century the whole of England south of the Humber appears to have been subject to Ethelberht, king of Kent. The facts, however, are obscure. Even if it existed, the Jutish domination did not last long. We possess some information concerning Jutish laws of the sixth century; they suggest (nn. 701, 705) that the Jutes modified their absolute monogamy at an earlier date than did either the Angles or the Saxons. We possess also some knowledge of Anglo-Saxon laws between the seventh and tenth centuries; it is from them that we learn the changes which the Anglo-Saxons introduced into their method of regulating the relations between the sexes. In describing these changes, I shall leave it to be understood that the course of social change may have been more rapid in some parts of the Heptarchy than in others. So far as the qualification of the marital and parental authority was concerned, the change was of the same pattern as that with
which we are now familiar. In the matter of post-nuptial regulations some variety within the pattern was introduced by the conversion of the people to Christianity, monasticism being encouraged and divorce condemned. It must be remembered, however, that during the whole of this period marriage remained a civil contract. The benediction of the Christian priest did not add to, and its omission did not detract from, the validity of any marriage.

For some time after the pagan tribes had arrived in Britain the 'usual and lawful' method of obtaining a wife was still purchase, the mund of a woman being secured by the transfer of property to the head of her family. On the death of her father the mund of an unmarried girl passed to her guardian, who enjoyed the use and product of any estate. The guardian could sell the mund to whomsoever he wished. The earliest laws which we possess are those of Ethelberht, Jutish king of Kent. One of them was as follows:

‘If a man buy a maiden with cattle, let the bargain stand if it be without guile; but if there be guile, let him bring her home again, and let his property be restored to him.’

The exact nature of the 'guile' to which Ethelberht refers is obscure; but since a law of Alfred (ninth century) refers to the bride-price, weotuma, as ‘the price of maidenhood’, the guilt may have consisted in selling the mund of a girl who was no longer virgo intacta.

Another law of Ethelberht was:

‘If a man carry off a maiden by force, let him pay 50 shillings to the owner, and afterwards buy the consent of the owner. If the woman has already been betrothed, the man is to make restitution to the value of 20 shillings.’

Presumably the 20 shillings was additional to the 50 shillings. Thus the fine for carrying off a betrothed girl was 70 shillings, 50 being paid to the owner of the mund, 20, perhaps, to the man who had arranged to buy it.

A definite scale of mund-values was published, the cost of the mund of a first-class widow being 50 shillings, of a widow of the second class 20 shillings, of the third class 12 shillings, of the fourth class 6 shillings. Women had no legal rights. Adultery on the part of a woman was punished by death; her lover was merely fined. Thus, ‘if a freeman lie with a freeman’s wife, let him pay for it with his wergeld and provide another wife with his own money’.

The wergeld was the monetary compensation paid by a man who violated the rights either of another man or of another family. Murder, adultery, and some lesser crimes were punished in this way.

Similar customs still prevailed also among the Anglo-Saxons in the seventh century. Thus a law of Ine (Wessex, late seventh century) begins: ‘If a man buy a wife and the marriage does not take place ...’ In the seventh century, however, the marital authority began to be qualified.

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Possibly also cognition began to supplant agnation as the system of relationship, for one of the first qualifications of the marital authority arose out of a recognition of the rights of the woman's kindred.

According to ancient custom, when a man was murdered, his kindred had to avenge the act by slaying an enemy of equal rank. In some tribes, even in the time of Tacitus, a system of property compensation had developed, but in Britain the acceptance of monetary compensation was not compulsory before the seventh century. Until then one of the sureties against the recurrence of a blood-feud was intermarriage. Naturally, under such conditions, the woman's kindred watched over her interests, and gradually the mutual rights and obligations of the two kindreds were defined. The mund was still the exclusive possession of the husband, but weotuma was paid as to two parts by the paternal kindred and as to one part by the maternal kindred. If a husband died leaving a wife and child, the child followed the mother, but the paternal kinsmen appointed a guardian who acted until the child was ten years old; and so on.

Another seventh-century innovation was the postponement of the payment of the weotuma. Instead of being compelled to pay the whole sum at the betrothal, beweddung, the groom handed over a nominal amount as earnest money. The legality of the marriage was still dependent on the payment of the weotuma in full; the beweddung was still a contract of mund-sale; but, instead of completing his marriage by one cash transaction, a man contracted to pay in the future. Thus the beweddung ceased to be the legal bond; a second ceremony assumed that character. Moreover, either party could refuse to proceed after the beweddung had taken place. If the refusal came from the man, he lost his deposit; but if it was the woman who changed her mind, the man received back his deposit plus one-third.700

Other alterations were made in the financial transactions which attended a legal marriage. It became the custom for a man, on the morning after his marriage, to present his wife with a morning-gift, morgen-gifu, as a token of his satisfaction. Later the morgen-gifu consisted of real property, which was transferred in a written document signed at the beweddung ceremony, this property being the special perquisite of the bride. Later still the bride-price, weotuma, was paid not to the bride's parents but to the bride herself. Alfred (late ninth century) commanded that a bride should receive not only raiment but also 'that which is the price of her maidenhood, namely, the weotuma'.

It was in this manner that married women became the legal possessors of real property. In later times the weotuma and the morgen-gifu were merged, and developed into the dowry; but this transition was not complete in Anglo-Saxon times. The change in the legal position of women was begun when a married woman received real property as a morgen-gifu and when Alfred commanded that her weotuma was to be paid not to her parents but to herself. Marital authority was further qualified by the
custom that a widow who had not received a *morgen-gifu* was entitled to a part of her deceased husband's estate, usually one-half.701

By the tenth century the consent of the bride was an essential part of a valid marriage. Edmund laid it down that, 'if a man desire to betroth a maiden or a woman, and it so be agreeable to her and her friends . . .', he must state what he would give her 'if she chose his will' (i.e. *as morgen-gifu*) and what he would settle on her in the event of her living longer than he did. His friends had to act as guarantors that his promises would be fulfilled. By the eleventh century a woman was in a very different position from the purchased creature of the sixth century. Indeed she was completely emancipated. A girl could arrange her own marriage; she and her chosen husband could conduct their own ceremony. Cnut said: 'Let no one compel either woman or maiden to him whom she dislikes, nor for money sell her.' When she was married to a man of her own choice, a woman could hold property, dispose of her goods either by sale, or by transfer or by testament. She could bear witness in the courts, and plead in her own right. She possessed her own private keys. From being subject to the tutelage of her husband's kindred, a widow became an unfettered individual, a transitional stage in her emancipation being represented by her power to appoint her own guardian. One of the legal historians emphasizes 'the enormous change that had taken place in the position of women since the settlement of the Saxons in England'. Thrupp says: 'There was as much difference between the morals and manners of the time of Hengest and Horsa and those of the reign of Edward the Confessor as between the customs of England under Henry VII and those of the nineteenth century.'702

I wish to emphasize the legal equality of the sexes among the Anglo-Saxons in the eleventh century, for no one will understand the social history of the English unless the fact is carefully remembered. In the sixteenth century the married women of Protestant England occupied a legal position inferior to that of their Anglo-Saxon forbears; and even by the twentieth century English married women had not regained all the rights which an Anglo-Saxon wife enjoyed. Under the influence of canon law, and a literal interpretation of the teaching of Paul of Tarsus (e.g. Eph. v. 22; Col. iii. 18; cf. 1 Pet. iii. 1), married women lost what they had possessed in the reign of Cnut, the reason being that husband and wife were not regarded as two individuals but as one flesh. In all his writings on the family, of course, Paul was not publishing any new opinion which Jesus may have taught; he was repeating the old ideas which as a strict Jew he had learnt from Gamaliel and in Tarsus. Thus by the sixteenth century, so far as the relations of husband and wife were concerned, absolute monogamy had been re-enacted in England. Then the usual struggle for legal recognition began to take place, its severity being intensified by the fact that organized religion was in favour of absolute monogamy. In spite of this, however, the English married women were
again emancipated; and between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries, so far as the legal position of married women was concerned, the same social changes took place as those which had occurred among the Anglo-Saxons between the seventh and tenth centuries A.D., among the Romans between the fifth and second centuries B.C., among the Babylonians between the twenty-third and twentieth centuries B.C., and among the Sumerians at a still earlier date.

The nature of the influence which the Christian priests exerted between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries can be illustrated by a reference to the English marriage ritual.

In the marriage rite of the Protestant English there were both Roman and Anglo-Saxon elements. The long white robe in which the English Christian bride was dressed, her girdle, veil, and floral wreath, her loosed hair and her gold ring—these were of Roman origin; but the words of her covenant were Anglo-Saxon. When, however, the Christian priests took over the pagan sentences, they adapted them in accordance with their own ideas. In the pagan ceremony the bride promised that she would take her husband ‘to have and to hold, from this day forward, for better or worse, for richer or poorer, in sickness or in health . . . and thereto I plight thee my troth’. These words were adopted without change. The Anglo-Saxon bride also promised to be ‘buxom and bonny in bed and at board’; but these companionable words conflicted with the Pauline notion that marriage was a concession to the flesh, so they were omitted. Moreover, other words were inserted which stated more succinctly the Pauline view. So, instead of making the friendly promise of her Anglo-Saxon ancestress, the English Christian bride promised to ‘honour’ and to ‘obey’ her newly acquired master. In that form the English Protestant marriage ritual was preserved until the twentieth century, when in the rejected liturgy of 1928 an unsuccessful attempt was made to delete the implication of female subjection.\(^{703}\)

Between the seventh and tenth centuries the Anglo-Saxons modified also the parental authority. At first the life and person of every child was at the disposal of its father; but by the seventh century no father was permitted to sell any child above the age of seven years. At that time too a widow’s child was accounted her own, the paternal kinsmen being responsible for its upkeep until it was ten years old, when their authority ceased. Infanticide, which had been customary, gave place to exposure, and Ine (Wessex, end of seventh century) laid down a scale of monetary rewards which were to be paid to the foster-parents of foundlings, which became a favourite subject of fireside stories (and later of legends and fairy-tales). Soon the sale of children was absolutely forbidden. We have already seen the manner in which a daughter was free to choose her own mate. In the time of Cnut a son was free at the age of 12 and ‘for the female’, we are told, ‘as for the male, there came a period of majority’. The regulations which controlled the lives of unmarried girls, however, are obscure. As
It is almost impossible to say what post-nuptial regulations prevailed among the Anglo-Saxons between the sixth and tenth centuries. At first the right of repudiation was enjoyed exclusively by the husband, this being the logical accompaniment of the mund. A husband seldom used his power, however, and one commentator considers that the severance of the marriage tie was ‘alien to the German legal consciousness’. Indeed we can readily understand that a man did not repudiate a purchased article so long as it suited the purposes for which he had acquired it. Yet the point is unimportant, for in the seventh century the man lost his arbitrary right; from that time onwards he had to plead a cause. Moreover, the influence of the Christian priests began to be felt. The nature of their teaching is obscure, but on the whole the Christian principle seems to have been that a marriage was indissoluble, except for adultery. There was no agreement concerning the situation which arose when a couple were separated or divorced for adultery. It is doubtful if, guilty or not guilty, they could remarry. Even on the question of indissolubility there was no unanimity. The Penitential of Theodore, an archbishop of the seventh century, reveals a laxity of principle and practice which can be explained only by assuming that Theodore was applying to the Anglo-Saxon Christians the teaching of the Eastern Church into which he had been born. On the other hand, in 673 the Council of Hertford, which met under the presidency of Theodore, proclaimed indissolubility. In the eighth century remarriage after divorce was permitted; in the tenth century the Laws of the Northumbrian Priests forbade it. Contemporaneous with the latter were the ordinances, applying to parts of Wales, of Howel the Good, which appear to have been regarded as equally Christian. Howel allowed a couple to live together on mutual probation for seven years; after seven years they could separate if they wished and take other sexual partners, the duration of the second and subsequent unions depending upon mutual consent. The conclusion must be that opinions differed and that no practice was common to the whole island. A law of Cnut (eleventh century) reveals a peculiar mixture of pagan and Christian ideas: ‘If during her husband’s lifetime a woman lie with another man, and it become public, let her afterwards be for a worldly shame, and let her lawful husband have all that she possess, and let her forfeit both nose and ears.’ We are not told what happened if the sexual lapse did not become public. It will be noticed that in the eyes of the law the adultery itself was not the crime; the woman’s fault lay in her violation of her husband’s rights. This suggests that the pagan ideas still prevailed in regard to adultery, the Christian contribution consisting of the ‘worldly shame’.

Doubtless much of this confusion is due to the paucity of our knowledge, but we should be wrong if we exaggerated the influence of Christianity on Anglo-Saxon post-nuptial regulations. Until the eleventh century it
was not the custom for a couple to receive the priestly benediction; not until the Council of Trent (1545-63) was the benediction a necessary part of a valid marriage. Many petty kings may have been persuaded of the sinful nature of divorce; but the Christian priests preached many things which those chieftains disregarded, and I do not think that the pagan idea of marriage passed away either so easily or so rapidly as is popularly supposed. Moreover, the evidence is that at first the Christian priests did not emphasize the sinful nature of divorce so much as the sinful nature of sexual intercourse. Ecclesiastical influence was directed not so much against divorce as against marriage. Marriage was a concession to the flesh; if possible, it had to be avoided. Towards the end of the seventh century mixed religious houses were founded throughout the countryside, especially in the north and midlands. I have already discussed (para. 167) the effect of these houses on social energy. The records are extremely imperfect.\(^{705}\)

I pass on, as stated (para. 167), to the consideration of English customs from the sixteenth century onwards.

173. Post-nuptial Regulations of the English (sixteenth to twentieth centuries). Towards the middle of the sixteenth century some order was introduced into the chaos which had been created by the uncertainties of canon law (para. 167). No longer was a marriage declared null and void because another marriage (or a pre-contract, or sexual intercourse) had taken place between some relatives of the contracting parties within the seventh degree. For a time there was considerable uncertainty concerning not only the nature of the law but also its future character; but the English did not go to the extremes which some of the Reformers recommended. King Henry VIII appointed a commission to consider the whole question of post-nuptial regulations; but the recommendations of this commission were never adopted. Eventually such regulations were enacted as reintroduced absolute monogamy; but divorce, instead of being impossible for the woman and disadvantageous for the man (as was always the case with pagan absolute monogamy), became wellnigh impossible for them both. The control of post-nuptial regulations remained in the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities, and officially marriage was still a concession to the flesh; but women were no longer encouraged to be barren.\(^{706}\)

We have already seen (para. 172) that married women had ceased to be recognized as legal entities; likewise the parental authority had been reinforced. Thus the sexual opportunity of the English was reduced to a minimum, the stringent law being accompanied by the same marital and parental authorities as among the early Babylonians, Athenians, Romans, and Anglo-Saxons. The English were deistic and monarchical. Soon they began to display tremendous social energy. They founded the greatest empire which the world had ever seen, established a large foreign commerce, sent out colonists to every part of the world, and
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conquered less energetic nations. Later they displayed productive as well as expansive energy; the most developed cultural stratum became rationalistic. Thenceforward the changes in their method of regulating the relations between the sexes, and consequently the changes in their cultural condition, were the same as those with which we are now familiar. After the ruling clan had lost its energy, a powerful minority dominated the society. When the aristocrats had modified their absolute monogamy, they lost their supremacy to the rising middle classes, who preserved (or adopted) Pauline absolute monogamy. Nominally until the nineteenth century marriage was indissoluble; but throughout their history the English were casuists in any matter which concerned the relation between husband and wife, and, by passing a special bill through a parliament which they dominated, the nobles proclaimed the dissolution of the indissoluble bond. In the middle of the nineteenth century the control of post-nuptial regulations was transferred from the ecclesiastical to the civil authorities, a special court being created for the hearing of matrimonial causes. Once again absolute monogamy had proved itself an intolerable institution. Then the middle classes in their turn discarded their rigorous habits. Less stringent sexual customs began to prevail. By the twentieth century marriage and divorce by mutual consent was the theory, and, among the rich and the brave, the practice. Meanwhile married women were freed from their legal disadvantages; but, having obtained some legal recognition, the English married women do not appear to have demanded, even if they desired, the cancellation of the marital authority which a husband still enjoyed, and the testamentary power of the male was not qualified. The parental authority was limited, special courts being empowered to override a father’s decision; but no widow and no child had any legal claim on the estate. This was one of the details in which the English were less advanced than, for example, the Babylonians and the Anglo-Saxons. Towards the middle of the twentieth century some failure of nerve was apparent throughout the society; there were signs, too, that the middle classes were losing their supremacy. No further records are available, and the productive energy of the English remained tremendous, for marriage, sexual intercourse, and divorce by mutual consent had not become part of the inherited tradition of a complete new generation. Indeed the majority of the population still insisted on some degree of compulsory continence. Evidence is not lacking, however, that such customs were falling into desuetude. Those noble families who preserved the old tradition maintained their position as national leaders.

Summarily these are the salient facts. I will discuss separately the modification of the marital and parental authority, and the question of post-nuptial regulations.

When it is applied to the details of daily life, the smallest change in the fundamental principle of a social law will revolutionize the social tradition; and, although I acquit the clergy of a conscious intention to deprive married
women of their freedom, it is impossible not to be staggered by the result of the literal interpretation of the doctrine that husband and wife are one flesh. In the sixteenth century a wife could not possess separate property; all her rights were vested in her husband, who was entitled to the profits accruing therefrom. No wife could withhold conjugal rights. Debts due to a wife were payable to the husband. Only her personal ornaments, and apparently her blankets, were her own possessions; all her other goods, including her furniture, belonged to her husband. With her husband's consent a wife could dispose of her own possessions by will; but this privilege was granted to her only if she survived him. Indeed, with one or two technical exceptions, this was the only condition under which a married woman could make a will. So long as her husband lived, she was a legal nonentity. Yet some vestige of the older customs remained, for nominally a married woman could be invested with legal authority on behalf of a third party. We are left to conclude that the responsibility was rarely placed upon her. Unmarried women could trade, contract, sue, and be sued; but many difficulties, inherent in the feudal system, survived which embarrassed them when they became the possessors of real estate. It may be that the confusion between a woman who was one flesh with her husband and a woman who was a legal entity was responsible for the exclusion of women from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of Henry VIII; but unmarried women were especially mentioned in the Bankruptcy Act of Elizabeth, and in each subsequent act, so doubtless by that time the ecclesiastical authorities had educated the minds of plainer men in the subtle difference between the legal position of married and unmarried women.

In the so-called Middle Ages the personal apparel of the women had been the subject of legislation. In the fourteenth century Edward III saw fit to make certain regulations which are reminiscent of the Solonian legislation in Athens (para. 170). Edward limited the amount of money which a female commoner might spend on dress, and ordained that only the women of the royal and noble families should be permitted to wear fur.707

Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries there was no alteration in the legal position of married women. 'That women should possess any rights beyond that of marriage, ruling the household, or superintending the education of infant children, was a thought rarely, if ever, entertained.' 'Throughout the whole three hundred years the position to her' (i.e. a married woman) 'was very little better than that which she held under the House of Tudor.' In the nineteenth century, however, the marital authority was fully qualified, the last vestige (with the exceptions already mentioned) disappearing in 1891; and, though minor difficulties remained, the theory that man and wife were one in the eyes of the law was exploded. A wife was no longer compelled to cohabit; her husband's control of her property was cancelled; she could trade, contract, plead, execute, sue, and be sued.708

In the eleventh century, a girl could betroth herself and conduct her
own marriage ceremony. Even in the early Middle Ages she could consent or dissent from a marriage when she was 12 years old. It is possible that at the same age she could bequeath her personal estate; but the law is obscure. At 14 she was free to choose her own guardian; at 17 she could act as executrix. Later the whole tendency of the law, we are told, was 'to strengthen the parental authority'; and it was only in the nineteenth century that the English began to qualify it. The power of choosing their own guardians was not taken away from unmarried women until the seventeenth century; but for some time previously children were being deprived of the rights they had enjoyed in Anglo-Saxon times. A widow and her children used to be entitled to some share of the estate (usually one-half or two-thirds); but this was no longer the case in the sixteenth century, except in the province of York, city of London, and principality of Wales. Later the rights of widows and children were abolished in these areas also. The sale of children was still forbidden; but a parent was given control of his child's person, a father being allowed to claim damages if his daughter was seduced. Moreover, during the lifetime of the father, a mother had no legal authority over her children. Finally the parental authority was maintained until a child was 21 years of age. And thus the law remained, until the twentieth century, when the courts of justice were empowered to override a father's refusal to consent to the marriage of one of his children.\textsuperscript{709}

The significant fact about the post-nuptial regulations is that while the Reformers were arguing in favour of easy divorce, and while the ecclesiastical authorities were disputing concerning the precise meaning of such passages as Matt. v. 32; xix. 9, no one seems to have considered the possibility of male and female equality. The advanced opinions of such men as Martin Bucer were never in danger of being adopted; but even when in the seventeenth century John Milton, angered at Mary Powell's desertion, turned his private complaint into a public protest, he concerned himself solely with the grievances of husbands. Even by implication he never seems to have suggested that a wife should be allowed to institute proceedings against a detested husband; yet he quoted Martin Bucer's teaching with facility and consistency in order to plead for the freedom of dissatisfied husbands. This distinction in favour of husbands, typical of all forms of absolute monogamy, pagan or Christian, was always preserved throughout English legislation until the twentieth century. As I have said, the precise nature of the law which prevailed in the second half of the sixteenth century is uncertain. Undoubtedly irregularities existed; but in the main they consisted not in easy and frequent divorce but in remarriage after a judicial separation. Towards the end of the seventeenth century the practice of parliamentary divorces originated; but even then, while an injured husband was permitted to remarry, the same indulgence was not extended to an injured wife.

Doubtless the idea of parliamentary divorces was suggested by prior
legislative interference with matrimonial questions, which for a long time were still regarded as the exclusive concern of the ecclesiastical courts; but in all probability the deciding argument in their favour was that the law should take some notice of, and attempt to regularize, the private departure from established custom which had become common after the Restoration. Anyway the nobility and landed gentry were not slow to take advantage of the facilities. In the eighteenth century divorces were granted in increasing numbers. Yet, even though the ratio of increase was continually accelerated, I doubt if a mere quotation of the figures would give an accurate idea of the real state of affairs, for often both a man and his wife possessed extra-matrimonial sexual partners and took no steps to regularize their position in the eyes of the law. It is an important fact that in every succeeding decade a greater average number of divorces was granted, and that the facilities were extended only to the nobility, who dominated the nation; but the habits of the time are best judged by a reference to Restoration literature, the point being that from the end of the seventeenth century the sexual opportunity of the English nobility was increased. Moreover, another phenomenon of equal importance appeared, viz. the opinion that a wife should be a man’s equal, not his slave. Just as the Athenian dramatists lashed out in fury against the unequal lot of the native-born women, so in a gentler manner Congreve preached a new social doctrine. To a society in which women preened themselves on being prominent as wits, he presented The Way of the World, where Millament is given an opportunity to proclaim the rights of married women. Angelica, in Love for Love, speaks to the same effect.710

Meanwhile the English puritans had adopted different views in regard to post-nuptial regulations from those which had been published by Bucer and Milton. Indeed, from being comparative libertines in their opinions they became the sternest of disciplinarians. And it is for their later practices, not for their earlier opinions, that they are remembered in popular literature. In the seventeenth century, when the members of the nobility, with cultivated grace, sped lightly from one sexual partner to another, the middle classes practised and preached the most rigorous absolute monogamy. By the middle of the nineteenth century the days of the aristocracy were done; the middle classes began to dominate the nation.

During the nineteenth century legislation was fast and furious. Two generations were born and died; and the whole social system, so far as the relations between the sexes was concerned, was altered. In 1823 banns were ordered to be published; but (those of Jews and Quakers excepted) no marriage was valid unless it was solemnized by the rite of the established Church. Thirteen years later the numerous sects of Dissenters were given the power to celebrate their own nuptials. In 1857 a civil court was established which dealt with matrimonial causes; divorce became legal, and possible for the richer members of the middle classes. Public courts also took over some of the parental authority, the common rights of parents
over children being considerably curtailed. In 1841, 1843, and 1869 the husbands and wives of parties to civil (but not criminal) proceedings were adjudged to be competent, and so were compelled, to give evidence, the doctrine of one flesh being retained in the provision that no husband or wife need disclose any communication made during marriage. Married women were granted rights over their estates in 1870; in 1882 they were empowered to contract, acquire, and to do all other things relating to their separate property. And just as private practice preceded the public renunciation of ancient custom by Riho-riho, king of Hawaii (para. 48), and just as in their private lives the English nobility anticipated the legal extension of their sexual opportunity, so also the English middle classes took matters into their private hands. By their behaviour they assumed the legal equality of the sexes before it had been legally enacted; and they accepted without comment the greater laxity in sexual conduct which in public was not acknowledged until a generation later.

Before the middle of the twentieth century a modified monogamy had become general throughout the society; and, just as under the same conditions marriage became unpopular among the Athenians and Romans, so among the English middle classes there were many men who preferred a mistress to a wife. Middle-class dramatists presented to middle-class audiences the same sentiments and the same situations as those which Congreve and Webster had treated according to the manner of their time; the captions of the daily press repeated the same shallow sentiments as had amused the fourth-century Athenians. Except among those who preserved a dying tradition, pre-nuptial chastity was neither demanded by the males nor practised by the females; homosexuality was not unknown. Furthermore sexual freedom was accompanied by one of its usual manifestations, namely, the artificial prevention of conception. Casuists to the last, however, in anything that concerned sexual matters, the English did not openly express their desire to indulge in sexual intercourse without the risk of the organic results that so often attend it; they preferred to justify their use of contraceptives by professing a concern for the abundance of the population.

174. Human Entropy. Such, in brief but sufficient outline, were the post-nuptial regulations of these vigorous societies; such were their methods of regulating the relations between the sexes. In each case they reduced their sexual opportunity to a minimum by the adoption of absolute monogamy; in each case the ensuing compulsory continence produced great social energy. The group within the society which suffered the greatest continence displayed the greatest energy, and dominated the society. When absolute monogamy was preserved only for a short time, the energy was only expansive, but when the rigorous tradition was inherited by a number of generations the energy became productive. As soon as the institution of modified monogamy, that is, marriage and divorce by mutual consent, became part
of the inherited tradition of a complete new generation, the energy, either of the whole society or of a group within the society, decreased, and then disappeared.

It is in this manner that the behaviour of these societies was controlled by their methods of regulating the relation between the sexes. In no case was sexual opportunity reduced to a minimum unless married women, and usually unmarried women also, were compelled to suffer legal and social disadvantages. The manner in which the marital and parental authorities were modified was the same in each society. In every case the same situations arose; the same sentiments were expressed; the same changes were made; the same results ensued. The history of these societies consists of a series of monotonous repetitions; and it is difficult to decide which aspect of the story is the more significant: the lamentable lack of original thought which in each case the reformers displayed, or the amazing alacrity with which, after a period of intense compulsory continence, the human organism seizes the earliest opportunity to satisfy its innate desires in a direct or perverted manner. Sometimes a man has been heard to declare that he wishes both to enjoy the advantages of high culture and to abolish compulsory continence. The inherent nature of the human organism, however, seems to be such that these desires are incompatible, even contradictory. The reformer may be likened to the foolish boy who desires both to keep his cake and to consume it. Any human society is free to choose either to display great energy or to enjoy sexual freedom; the evidence is that it cannot do both for more than one generation.

After great social energy has been displayed, a new element, inherent in the nature of the organism, makes its appearance. The society begins to discriminate between the slovenly and the elegant, between the vague and the exact. When a society first displays expansive energy, its members appreciate little but fighting, eating, and drinking; their standards of judgement are comparatively uncouth. Such a society will erect a bridge, and, so long as the bridge bears the weight imposed upon it, the men who made it are content. After a time, however, they begin to have different ideas. They not only pay particular attention to the material used for making the bridge but also concern themselves with considerations of line, colour, form, and proportion. In different cultural eras different proportions are preferred, for the standards of aesthetic judgement change with the passing of time; but it is the appearance and existence of the new element that matters. Just as a man of cruder taste cannot appreciate the delicacies which delight a more cultivated palate, so at first expansive societies fail to understand the subtleties which their descendants regard as of paramount importance. The former can appreciate a story, but not the manner in which a story is told. They can understand a rhyme, but cannot distinguish it from poetry.

As soon as this new element appears in the culture of any society, the cultural tradition is refined and enriched. The ability to refine and enrich
is inherent in the nature of the organism; but in the past the potential power has never manifested itself until after great energy has been displayed. Only after a new generation has inherited a tradition which has been heightened by a display of great energy has the inherent nature of a human society been manifest in the loftiest form yet known. I call this new element \textit{human entropy}, for it is innate, and transforms the cultural tradition. Moreover, it reveals the apparent Direction of the Cultural Process.\textsuperscript{712}

It is impossible to mistake the appearances of human entropy. It can be seen by contrasting the achievements of deistic societies. Both the Uganda and the Athenian temples were erected by human energy. The former were mud huts, roofed in grass. In their early days the Athenians were satisfied with buildings of a similar character; later they were productively energetic, human entropy being manifest in the Parthenon frieze and in the Caryatides. There was no need to add these decorations to the temples; moreover, other societies were equally capable of executing the work (though, of course, they would have executed it in a different manner); but the Athenians had satisfied the conditions under which alone human entropy can appear. The Teutons vaulted the Roman basilica and produced Gothic architecture; eventually they created such things as Amiens Cathedral. The difference between their early buildings and the porches of Amiens Cathedral was due to human entropy. Sometimes after being present in the achievements of a society human entropy disappears, recurring at a later period. Thus in the eighteenth century the English aristocracy was productively energetic; human entropy refined its tradition. In the nineteenth century it was degenerate; the middle classes dominated the society. At first among the middle classes human entropy was absent, and the world was strewn with their crude creations. Later human entropy began to appear among the middle classes also, and then they regarded the tradition of their fathers as graceless and grotesque.

Of course it is not only in architecture that human entropy can be seen; it manifests itself in every department of human life. Thus both Pythagoras and Copernicus supposed that the earth went round the sun; their instruments were in proportion to the energy of their society. The twentieth-century spectroscope represents the degree of energy that the white man has exerted in the production of the instruments which he uses for the purpose of studying the stars and nebulae; the desire for greater exactitude in this direction was due to human entropy. If I were asked to define a 

sophist, I should describe him as a man whose conclusion does not follow from his premise. Sophistry is appreciated only by those among whom human entropy is disappearing; they mistake it for sound reasoning. It flourishes among those people who have extended their sexual opportunity after a period of intense compulsory continence. The ideas of a society are translated from abstract conceptions into concrete forms by social energy; human entropy transforms the ideas by introducing a new element which in less developed societies remains potential. Conversation, literature,
drama, art, science, cookery, furniture, architecture, engineering, gardening, agriculture—these and all other human activities are winnowed by its gentle breeze. All societies may travel the cultural road so far as to meet its influence; in the past few have been so energetic as to arrive.

Now I can formulate the second primary law which operates on all human societies. By means of the first primary law (para. 160) we can determine the cultural condition of any society at any time. The secondary laws (paras. 162–4) are particular statements of the first primary law, and apply more especially to less developed societies. The second primary law applies only to those societies which manifest productive energy. It is this:

No society can display productive social energy unless a new generation inherits a social system under which sexual opportunity is reduced to a minimum. If such a system be preserved, a richer and yet richer tradition will be created, refined by human entropy.

There is no need for the whole society to suffer the same continence. So long as the sexual opportunity of one social stratum is maintained at a minimum, the society will display productive energy.

I have been obliged to discuss human entropy in a summary (and therefore unsatisfactory) manner, because in this treatise I am not erecting an edifice but digging some of the foundations on which an edifice may afterwards be erected. The ideas of our fathers in regard to human affairs were not dictated by an inquiry into the nature of human behaviour but by the application to human behaviour of certain hypotheses concerning the method by which the human organism arrived on the earth’s surface. Thus their conclusions were based on what appear to have been mere intuitive preconceptions, the nature of which was due, in no small degree, to their confusion of the biological and cultural processes. As a result of the researches presented in this treatise I have been compelled to abandon the old opinions (which once I held), but I do not think it is advisable to introduce too many complications into my presentation of the apparent facts, and to lay too much stress on the philosophic significance of those facts. And this is what I should do if I were to discuss the Direction of the Cultural Process at greater length. Having given, therefore, this slight indication of what I conceive to be that Direction, I propose to conclude my present submissions by making a summary of the changes in human behaviour which appear to occur necessarily according to the degree of compulsory continence imposed by the sexual regulations that a society sees fit to adopt. First I shall pass some general remarks on the cultural process as a whole; and then place the various cultural states where in the process they appear to belong. In order that the salient features of the process may receive the emphasis they deserve, my picture will have to be of such a nature as to appear over-simplified. I regard this as unavoidable. Actually the cultural behaviour of a society is often distorted and pulled out of shape by the different forces that act upon it; and this is particularly the case
when a vigorous society is displaying expansive energy. It then comes into contact with many other societies which it would never have met if it had displayed a lesser energy. Less energetic societies come within its sphere of influence; and, just as a star seems to be twisted and warped when it comes within the field of force of another and greater star, so the cultural behaviour of these societies is affected by their contact with the more developed society. If some members of that society settle among the less developed societies, and intermarry, a fresh cultural stratum is added to the strata already existing; but if the members of the more energetic society pay a passing visit or visits the result of the contact is merely a new variety within the cultural pattern. In no case is the cultural pattern, either of the visitors or of the natives, affected unless there is an increase or decrease in their energy. From the historical point of view such cultural clashes are important; but, since they do not affect the cultural pattern, there is no need for me to enlarge my canvas by considering them; for my attention is confined to the cultural pattern. I am not concerned with the intense variety which always exists within it (paras. 11, 90, 122, 142).

175. Conclusion. In this mysterious cosmos three processes seem to occur continually. Actually these processes appear to be part of a single Cosmic Process, but for the purpose of study it is convenient to divide the Cosmic Process into the universal, biological, and cultural processes. If we were content to speak in the language of our forefathers, we might say that these three processes concerned matter, life, and mind, respectively; but the use of these popular terms is unsatisfactory. In the first place, there still attaches to the word 'matter' some of the old pre-electronic ideas. So far as our present knowledge goes, matter seems to be a congealed form of energy or radiation, and to consist of whirling units of electrical forces. It is not 'material' in the sense in which our fathers used the word. But their ideas are still preserved among us by those who regard the piercing of the atom as a death-blow to 'materialism', and as an argument in favour of the 'spiritual' nature of things. The idea seems to be that matter is something we can see, spirit is something we cannot see; thus, if matter consists of waves of energy, it cannot be material. Let it be said, then, that, though analysis seems to reveal matter as consisting finally of energy or radiation, nevertheless it still remains matter. The only thing is that we have found our fathers' idea of matter to have been mistaken. The apparent dissolution of matter in radiation has not given it a spiritual nature; and, unless the idea is dispelled, it will not only create needless misunderstanding with those who emphasize the importance of spiritual values but also introduce an erroneous impression of the universal process itself. Matter is not something we can see, feel, or hear; it includes many forms of radiation which our senses are incapable of appreciating. Our scientific instruments are sensitive to some forms of radiation which escape our senses, but at present only a few of the events in the universal
process are within our comprehension; and the more we study the process, the more exciting and astonishing it becomes, the more mistaken our fathers seem to have been. Moreover, since a scientist, or student of process, can speak with knowledge of only a fraction of the process, he can make no claim, on the strength of his scientific learning, to any special authority or hearing when such questions as Purpose or Reality are being debated.

The second difficulty in regarding matter, life, and mind as technical (though convenient) terms lies in the fact that no man has yet succeeded in defining what he means by 'life'. The division between the living and the non-living is obvious enough when we compare a mammal and a mat, but it is not at all obvious when we consider certain forms of colloidal matter. Recently, indeed, some biologists have perceived the advisability, even the necessity, of a complete revolution in their methods. Until then we were so affected by the evolutionary hypotheses of our forefathers that biological conclusions rested, as Dr. Gray has pointed out, not on the result of observation but on 'a rather indefinite foundation of intuitive belief'. Dr. Gray himself seems to regard it as possible but improbable 'for a living organism to have been evolved spontaneously from inanimate matter'; and, in his study of the biological process, seems disinclined to accept, as a dogma, the spontaneous origin of living from non-living matter. He further suggests that, just as the physicist is not concerned with the origin of inanimate matter, so 'the biologist must likewise accept the living state as he finds it, and not allow his science to rest on theories, however spectacular or attractive'. Doubtless less distinguished students of the biological process will take this advice, and, having shaken themselves free from the more arbitrary assumptions of the Victorian era, will pay greater attention to the observed behaviour of each living entity, to its structure, and to the manner in which its behaviour and structure changes according to the conditions of its experience. But even then the problem of what is living or non-living will remain, for plainly when we speak of the 'living cell' we are using the word 'living' in a different sense from that implied in the words 'living organism'.713

Most of our fathers thought not only that life evolved or emerged out of matter but also that mind evolved or emerged out of life. Perhaps both these things are true; no man yet knows. Such hypotheses belong to what I have called historical science (para. 159); and it cannot be too greatly emphasized in making his plea for a revision of the methods of experimental zoology Dr. Gray was actually asking his fellow workers to forget historical assumptions and to adopt purely inductive methods. But whether or not mind was evolved or emerged out of matter, the difficulty of defining 'mind' remains. Just as it is difficult to say whether or not some colloidal cells are living or not, so it is difficult to say whether in some organic activities mind is present or not. Thus a bird builds a nest, a man builds a hut. Is the act of building a manifestation of mind? If it is, then
a bird possesses mind, and we must find some other term to denote those human powers which are not displayed by other vertebrates and which are usually classed as the manifestation of mind. If the act of building a nest is not an act of mind, when does mind begin to enter into human architecture? Plainly it was present in the human organism that designed, for instance, Salisbury Cathedral or Broadcasting House.

To say, then, that the three great divisions of the Cosmic Process, the universal, biological, and cultural processes, concern matter, life, and mind respectively is to repeat without reflection the phraseological inexactitudes of our fathers. All of us have a vague idea of what we mean when we use the words, but, since we cannot explain our meaning exactly, it follows that in using such words as matter, life, and mind we are speaking not scientifically but journalistically. As a social scientist I am not concerned with placing an exact definition on the universal and biological processes; it is not my affair; but in studying the cultural process I have tried to adopt the methods recommended to biologists by Dr. Gray. Just as he wishes his fellow workers to take the living state as they find it, and not to allow their study of the biological process to be affected by theories, 'however spectacular or attractive', so in my study of the cultural process I have tried to take human societies as I found them, and have not allowed my inquiries to be affected by the theories that were current in the last century. Just as the biologist, according to Dr. Gray, is not to concern himself with the origin of living matter, so I have not concerned myself with the method by which the human organism may have arrived on the earth's surface. That problem belongs to historical science, which of its very nature, as I have already suggested (para. 159), seems to become unavoidably philosophical, even teleological. And with these things a student of process, as such, has nothing whatever to do.

In the cultural process (para. 159) can be seen the results of uneven developments. We must now understand what is developed.

If we observe the human organism, we notice that it possesses at least three attributes that appear to be lacking in all other mammals. It may be that other attributes also are peculiar to the human organism, but I myself can find no certain evidence that this is so, although I confess to being puzzled sometimes concerning its evident aspirational behaviour. Its exclusive possession of three attributes, however, is attested and undeniable. These are the power of reason, the power of creation, and the power of reflecting upon itself. I define the cultural process as the series of events for which these powers are responsible. Human energy, as I use the term, consists of the use of these powers, which are potential in all human organisms. And in my view it is remarkable that, although we can conjecture, and even indicate, the physiological coefficient of many human moods and actions, we have not yet discovered the physiological coefficient of the powers to which I have referred. If the body is in certain chemical conditions, the use of the powers appears to be difficult, even impossible; but
as yet we do not know where in the organic structure the seat of self-consciousness and reason lies.

The powers themselves appear to co-exist and blend. Thus the power of reason cannot well exist except in a self-conscious organism; the power of creation cannot be used unless the power of reason has first been active; and so on. But in human records there is no trace of any use of the powers except by a human society: in the past human energy has always been social energy.

The powers of reason and of reflecting upon the self need no elucidation, but the power of creation is not of such an obvious nature. 'Creation' is a word that has a dual meaning. It includes not only an appearance out of nothing from nowhere but also any rearrangement of existing events. In the study of the cultural process the word can only be used in the second sense. I do not deny that the human organism may be able to produce something (e.g. ideas) out of nothing, but I do not see that such a creation can be finally proved. Moreover, there is always the difficulty about the meaning of 'something' and 'nothing'. At first sight they seem to be simple words, but a little reflection persuades us that they are not so simple as they appear. In the sense in which I use the term, then, human creation is merely a rearrangement, in accordance with some preconceived plan, of existing material; and it is the existence of the preconceived plan that shows whether the event is a creation or a fortuitous happening. In a previous paragraph (para. 160) I said, perhaps prematurely, that there seems to be no reason why in the future the events in the cultural process should continue to be as fortuitous as they appear to have been in the past. By using its inherent powers the human organism can rearrange the events in the universal process, and theoretically there seems to be no reason why it cannot rearrange the events in the cultural process also. I believe that the idea only seems strange because in the past we have studied human affairs historically instead of inductively, and have confused the biological and cultural processes.

I do no more than record this possibility of a created (or rearranged) event in the cultural process. Likewise I have been content merely to note the apparent existence, and do not discuss the final meaning, of a Direction in the Cultural Process. In its connexion, however, there is one general truth which may be stated here. In the past, as we have seen, the amount of energy displayed by any human society has varied from century to century. Moreover, some of its social strata have displayed a greater energy than other strata; and the amount of this energy also has varied from time to time. Thus the cultural state of the society, and that of its component parts, has changed, and changed again. To these changes our forefathers were accustomed to apply such words as progress and decay, development and degeneracy; and there is no serious objection to them if there is no subjective intrusion; but it cannot be denied that such words embarrass the mental detachment that is vital in the study of the cultural process. To our fathers (as Mr. Max Beerbohm has well said) progress and develop-
ment merely implied a larger edition of themselves; anything of which they disapproved, or which they did not practise, was decadent or degenerate; and they did not always succeed in excluding moral judgements from their minds. This will not do; and my suggestion is that all we can really say of any cultural change is that it is in or away from the Direction of the Cultural Process. The evidence is a little scanty, but, if I have read it correctly, the creations of the most energetic stratum of a vigorous society have always changed in a direction which the creators regarded as refinement, elegance, and exactitude. In them there was an urge towards these things; and as we look back we see that this urge was sometimes satisfied. Then, according to my terminology, human entropy appeared. There is no question, of course, of our intruding our opinions on them. We must not compare the Parthenon with Salisbury Cathedral or Broadcasting House, and judge which is the more elegant. The point is that in the Parthenon there was present an element that was absent from the Athenian buildings of a previous epoch. In human records this element seems to appear if the energy of the most energetic stratum is great enough, and lasts long enough; and it disappears when the energy decreases. If another stratum then begins to dominate the society, and if its energy is less than that of its predecessor, the element is absent; but it reappears if the energy of the new stratum increases. I conclude, therefore, that this is the Direction of the Cultural Process, and that if a society were to display great energy for an extended period its cultural tradition would be continually refined and augmented.

In a previous paragraph (para. 154) I compared the relation of an individual human being to the society of which he is a member with the relation of an electron to the chemical element which it helps to form. The analogy is a useful one, and will bear expansion.

There is a sense in which every event in the cultural process is created by an individual man, but in order that he may display his potential powers he must be a member of a society. Moreover, in the past no single event in the cultural process has occurred in isolation; it has always been accompanied by a number of other events, created by other individual men. They themselves were separate entities, distinct, unique; yet they were the products of a society. If we say, as our fathers said, that the human organism is a gregarious mammal, we miss the main point: just as the electron sometimes appears as a wave, sometimes as a particle, so each individual man is sometimes an entity, sometimes an influence. And these two aspects of his nature cannot be separated. Actually he is neither the one nor the other, but both at the same time. As an entity he is affected by his behaviour of other men; as an influence he affects the behaviour of those who come within his field of force; and there is no possible method of studying the one aspect apart from the other; for we cannot analyse a man unless he is aware of it, and, as soon as he is aware of it, his behaviour alters. In so far as the behaviour of a man is mere reflection of his previous
experience and that of his ancestors, he is a determined product; and some students have been so impressed by the evidence that they boldly deny our possession of free will. But so far they have failed to produce incontestable proof of their conclusion. Meanwhile we ourselves still cherish a belief that we at any rate are in some measure free. None of us can point to any irrefragable evidence that he possesses free will; and this, of course, is what would be expected if, as some claim, our possession of free will is an illusion; but we refuse to admit that we do not possess it, so we must make the same concession to all other men. This possession of free will, however, though unequivocally granted and even emphasized, is not a matter of great importance in the study of the cultural process, for the evidence is that the behaviour of a human society is determined. By some students of the universal process the electron has been credited with some spontaneity, and, although I myself am not persuaded of the fact (n. 646), I am not competent to deny it; but, whether the behaviour of a single electron is determined or spontaneous, that of a mass of electrons is demonstrably determined. In a similar manner the spontaneity of the individual man does not in any way affect a deterministic conclusion in regard to the behaviour of a human society. I do not know what in future the physicists will say about electronic spontaneity, but in the case of the human organism the explanation of the apparent contradiction seems to lie in the dual existence of the individual man as determined entity (dominated by an unconscious or congealed experience) and as creating influence. As a creating influence he is free, but he himself is incapable of placing himself in the environment necessary for the display of his potential powers. The conditions must be imposed by his society. If by chance or design they are imposed, the society produces many free creative citizens; but, if the conditions are not imposed, the determined aspect of each individual man seems to be uppermost. In the latter case a man’s behaviour is a mere reflection of or a reaction against his previous experience and that of his ancestors; in the former case the conditions are ripe for the display of the powers that suggest the existence of free will. Human energy is the result; and the higher a society advances in the cultural scale, the more free will is displayed by its most developed stratum.

In the universal process the chemical properties of an atom are determined by its outer belt or belts of electrons. A spectrum, too, is an extra-nuclear, not a nuclear, affair. In a similar manner the cultural state of any human society depends not on the behaviour of the majority (who often are almost completely controlled by their unconscious minds) but on that of a small minority who display their inherent powers. In the study of human history this is not always remembered; yet a few examples make it clear. When we speak, for instance, of Hellenic culture, we refer either to a few rich rationalists who left Asia Minor and settled in Hellas and Italy or to a few notable Athenians; we overlook the thousands of less cultivated Ionians who preserved their old superstitions and submitted to the Persians;
we also forget the number of less developed Athenians who did not under-
stand the anger of Euripides or the taunts of Aristophanes. Again, when
we speak of modern architecture, we refer to a few isolated buildings, or to
the plans of buildings that are contemplated or hoped for; we forget the
vast acreage that groans under bungalow and other growths that no
cultivated architect could ever have conceived or proud craftsman ever
have built. It is the same with any society. The number of those by whose
behaviour we assess its cultural state bears a small proportion to the whole
society; and in the past the higher the society has risen in the cultural
scale the smaller has been the proportion of those who have reached the
highest cultural heights.

Another property of the electron is to control the valency of its atom,
that is, the measure of the atom's capacity to unite with other atoms within
a molecule. In a similar manner the ideas and behaviour of a dominant
minority in a human society seem to control the extent to which it can
sympathize or coalesce with other societies. The particularist spirit which
exists among uncivilized societies, which prevented an understanding
between the Hellenic city-states, and which is noticeable among modern
nations, would appear to be due to the fact that their valencies are dis-
similar. What may be called human valency is, indeed, an item of immense
significance in the study of the cultural process.

In one way the behaviour of an event in the universal process is opposite
to that of an event in the cultural process. An atom consists of a nucleus
and a number of electrons which, though free in the sense of being attached
to the atom by no visible bonds, are held in position by forces we do not
understand. Nor do we understand how the electrons and protons in the
nucleus are held together. When an atom emits energy, the outer electrons
seem to jump down a quantum or a number of quanta; finally they are
locked against the nucleus; and what was once a massive event of low
density becomes a small event of high density. When a human society
radiates energy, precisely the opposite occurs. We begin with a society in
which all the individuals are locked together by forces we do not under-
stand; such a society displays no energy; but, as soon as we energize it,
individuals begin to leave the nucleus, and form, as it were, an energetic
belt around it, the behaviour of this belt determining the cultural condition
of the society. If the society is energized again, more individuals leave the
nucleus and join the outer belt; others leave the belt itself, assume still
newer modes of behaviour, and form, as it were, a second belt, this belt in
its turn determining the cultural condition of the society. And the more
energy a society displays, the greater is the cultural distance between the
outer belts and the original nucleus, which, indeed, may even be disinte-
grated. And just as the outer electrons of an atom are held to the nucleus
by invisible, uncomprehended forces, so all the individuals of a human
society, however highly cultured or undeveloped, are united by influences
that have not yet been completely analysed or understood.
Diagrammatically this process can be represented not only as I have described it, that is, by a nucleus with outer rings, but also by a cone, the top of which bears a smaller and smaller proportion to its base. In this case the society in its inert state would be represented by a level line, out of which the various cultural states emerge. I have already used this symbol (para. 167), but it is not so eloquent as the nuclear one, for by means of the latter we can show not only the four great cultural conditions but also the six different states of energy into which, in the past, human societies have arrived.

The idea I am trying to put forward can also be illustrated by a reference to ice. In a piece of ice the molecules consist of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, each with its free electron or electrons. As I have said, some students ask us to believe that the behaviour of these electrons is spontaneous, but, if that be so, the spontaneity disappears when the electron forms a part of ice. In a piece of ice the molecules cohere rigidly, but, when energy in the form of heat is applied to it, these molecules move freely, and the ice changes its state, and becomes water. The ice has no choice in the matter; when treated in this manner it cannot help changing its state; nor has it any choice concerning the state into which it must arrive; and it becomes water, I submit, because it is part of its inherent nature, when energized, to behave in that manner. If we apply still more energy to the event that at one time was ice, the molecules are dissociated from one another to a still greater extent, and fly apart, and appear to us as steam. Again, the water has no choice in the matter; nor can the compulsory change in its state be any other than that which is observed. In a similar manner, in a zoistic (dead level of conception) society the individuals are locked together by invisible forces, united in such human atoms as secret societies, gangs, clans, families, brotherhoods, sisterhoods, and other similar formations. If the society is energized, some of these individuals move apart, and between them and their fellow citizens there is a cultural distance due to the energy they have displayed. And, if the society is energized again and again, new cultural strata are continually formed; the cultural distance between the groups grows larger; the behaviour of each stratum changes and changes again; the behaviour of the society alters; its cultural condition changes; new events in the cultural process continually occur.

The process of turning ice into steam is reversible; similarly any cultural change is reversible. In such a case the energy of the society decreases; the outer belts of individuals fall back into other positions; and the cultural condition of the society passes through the various states represented by the various positions of the outermost belt. To any individual human being, whether he is transferring himself from an inner belt to an outer one, or from an outer belt to an inner one, the change will appear obvious and desirable, for his natural egocentricity seems to be such that he imagines his own behaviour, whether it be that of his society in general or of himself only, to be right and proper. Only a detached observer of the
cultural process can tell whether or not the change is in the Direction of the Process, or away from it. Even he cannot express, on the cultural evidence alone, any opinion in regard to the desirability of the change.

Any form of energy is a mysterious thing. We speak of energy as being the secret of the universal process, but no man knows what it is. According to Professor Einstein, energy possesses mass, and has inertia; and, when a physicist analyses matter, he seems to find energy only. Indeed, matter seems to be a congealed form of energy. Yet the two cannot be identified, for matter may have qualities which energy may not possess, and energy may have qualities which matter has not. We cannot tell, for we have no direct acquaintance with energy except in its material form. In the process of congealment energy (if it constitute the whole of matter) begins to change its form, and to assume attributes which, so far as we can tell, had no existence in the energy from which they were apparently derived. Thus in the universal process something new seems to emerge continually. Moreover, what is old changes continually, the change being the result of a display of energy. Stars and other forms of matter radiate energy; and, as their energy is emitted, new elements are produced, their chemical qualities depending, first, on the electrons in orbit around the atomic nucleus, and, secondly, on the manner in which the atoms are placed in relation to one another.

With the difference already stated, the cultural process seems to be similar. We do not know what human energy is; we only see its fruits; but if we reduce any event in the cultural process to its final terms we find nothing but human energy. In the process of manifesting itself human energy seems to assume qualities and attributes which must have been potential in the human organism but which in the beginning were neither visible nor calculable. As a human society displays its potential energy it arrives into different states, and with each change of state a new event in the cultural process is created. The character of the state depends on the behaviour of the individuals that are farthest removed from the nucleus; and the structure of the society alters according to the relative energy of the strata of which it is composed.

Again, in the universal process certain radio-active elements emit energy, and transform themselves. Thus uranium becomes thorium, then radium; from radium comes an emanation. From this fact physicists have concluded that it may be theoretically possible to transmute elements artificially, and from radium emanation to produce lead, from lead mercury, and from mercury gold. Similarly, in the past, human societies have continually transmuted their cultural condition, fortuitously; but theoretically it seems possible to transmute, consciously and artificially, the culture of any society, simply by decreasing or increasing the amount of its energy. It might even be possible to change the structure of a society in such a way that it would display energy unceasingly. In that case it would appear that every subsequent change in its cultural condition would be in the Direction of the Cultural Process.
Although the external properties of any chemical element are simply the outward expression of its structure, it may be either stable or unstable. If in each atom the number of sentinel electrons (as they are sometimes called) produces equilibrium, the atom will be stable, and the element inert, inactive. Helium seems to be an example of an inert, inactive element. But if the atom has one sentinel electron too many, or one too few, it is unstable. Under such conditions the inherent nature of the atom seems to be such that its unsatisfied requirements, positive or negative, must be satisfied; so the atom or the element combines with another atom or element which has an opposite charge unsatisfied. As a result of this combination, a new event in the universal process comes into existence.

An event in the cultural process is created in a similar manner. By virtue of its inherent nature each human organism possesses certain requirements which must be satisfied. If the members of any society have no unsatisfied requirements, the society is stable, inert, inactive; but, if some of the requirements are unsatisfied, it is restless and unstable. If the unsatisfied requirements are those of hunger and thirst, the society is likely to stamped, but it settles down again as soon as its hunger is appeased, its thirst quenched. If, however, the unsatisfied requirements are those of sex, and if these cannot be directly satisfied, some satisfaction must be sought elsewhere. And the evidence is that the effect of this dissatisfaction is to awaken the potential powers to which I have referred, and to create what I have called human energy. As a result of a display of this energy, uniquely human, the society rises in the cultural scale. No such rise occurs, or apparently can occur, unless a sexual requirement is unsatisfied; but as soon as there is any sexual dissatisfaction (biological fitness being assumed, para. 160), a rise in the cultural scale must occur. Conversely, if, after a period of dissatisfaction, complete direct satisfaction becomes the rule, the energy of the society begins to decrease, and the society falls in the cultural scale.

We do not know why this should be so. I submit the conclusion as the result of a detailed examination of human behaviour, from which alone we can judge. No student of process can ever say why anything in the universal, biological, or cultural processes should be as it is observed to be; he must always be content to record the fact as part of the natural constitution of things. We do not know why, when heated, ice becomes water, not coal, or why carbon atoms, when differently placed, should produce coal and diamonds. We merely know that the observed facts are such as I have said. For his authority no scientist can point to anything except the results of his observations. Thus my authority for saying that a display of human energy is dependent on the limitation of sexual opportunity (which results in sexual dissatisfaction, or, as some psychologists prefer to say, in the diversion of sexual energy into other channels of expression) is the observation of human records and the results of psychological researches.
I will now take an inert, inactive human society, and then energize it in such a way as to create the six states of energy which in the past have been produced by the seven classes of sexual regulations with which we are familiar (para. 161). This inert society is the nucleus with which we begin when we wish to draw an impressionistic picture of the cultural process. The society is in the zoistic cultural condition and at a dead level of conception. Diagrammatically it can be represented either by a black circle or by a thick black line (Fig. A).

To every human society known to us a certain power (or powers) has manifested itself in the universe; the people have endeavoured to maintain a right relation with it (or them). Since there is no known exception to this rule, we must conclude, in all humility, that such behaviour is part of the inherent nature of the human organism. For the same reason it appears to be part of its inherent nature both to react strongly to anything unusual or beyond its comprehension, and to see in any unusual natural feature, animal, or man, a dangerous, powerful, and therefore desirable, quality. Before such natural features a human being, manifesting his inherent nature, places offerings which consist either of those things which he himself values or of those which he thinks the recipient will prefer. In this manner he tries to avoid the danger immanent in any place where the power is manifest or to secure the power for himself. Moreover, he makes similar payments for the same purpose to the men whose manner of life is unusual or supernormal, and whom he credits with the possession of the power; for by virtue of the power, he thinks, these men can inflict ill fortune upon him, or relieve him of his afflictions. He also considers that the power is manifest in the corpses of such men, and he may even try to secure a piece of such a corpse, that he himself may possess the power on his own account (paras. 146–7, 149, 162).714

If a human society is in an inert, inactive condition, its behaviour is such that this inherent nature expresses itself without any appreciable modification. A zoistic (dead level of conception) culture is the result. Now let us energize the society by checking the satisfaction of its prenuptial impulses to an increasing extent. Soon a number of energetic individuals begin to change their ideas concerning the cause of an unaccountable affliction and to credit a newly dead magician with still possessing the same magic power as he had possessed when he was alive. The living magicians are still regarded as capable of controlling or creating any form of sky-activity, but their failure to cure a stubborn sickness is apparent to the awakening minds of their energetic brethren, who consider it more appropriate to placate the dead. These newly dead men, however, are not remembered for very long, and are continually replaced in popular estimation by more recently deceased men, whose exploits are more fresh in the people’s minds; and these in their turn give place to those who die after them. The people also begin to decorate the places where they make their offerings to the ghosts of these powerful dead men. Small huts are
**N.B.** These diagrams are intentionally over-simplified. Actually the divisions between the strata (or belts) are never rigid and defined, as they appear, but loose and undefined. A human society is a dynamic unit, but it may be an inert, inactive one. If it is active, as generation succeeds generation individual persons continually leave the stratum (or belt) into which they were introduced as babes, and join another. After two generations a stratum (or belt) may disappear. Alternatively, a new one may be created.

If a society comes within the field of force of another and more energetic society, its cultural state may be warped and distorted. See para. 174.

The diagrams only reveal the cultural patterns. Within the patterns there is an intense variety. Culture-contact increases this variety.
erected over their graves. Similar huts are erected in a place where the power in the universe is manifest. It is not the custom for zoistic societies to do these things, and by behaving in this manner the individuals responsible for the innovations separate themselves from their zoistic brethren, and form a manistic belt around the zoistic nucleus (Fig. B).

The cultural state of the society can also be represented by a manistic cone, with a level zoistic base (Fig. B). The Akamba, Lango, and Wayao (paras. 149–51, 163) were in this condition.

Under the influence of further energy the manistic individuals begin to lose their faith in unassisted magic, and to request the aid of a powerful ghost whenever they embark on some dangerous, unaccustomed, or important enterprise. They also decorate their sacred places more elaborately; and soon a cult of the powerful dead is established. The SE. Solomon Islanders were in this condition (paras. 151, 152, 163). Moreover, an increased number of individuals leave the zoistic nucleus and join the manistic belt; and the dead are no longer replaced in popular favour by those whose mortal exploits are greener in living memory. The cult of some powerful ghosts is handed on from generation to generation. The Shilluk were in this condition (paras. 151, 152, 163).

If the pre-nuptial sexual impulses of the females are not satisfied at all, still greater energy is produced. Then the huts over the graves, and in other sacred places, assume the dignity of temples; and to uprising generations the powers manifest therein appear as gods who have charge of all human and natural activities, and rule them in an arbitrary and personal manner. A sense of the past arrives in the consciousness of the most developed stratum; and, separating themselves from their manistic and zoistic brethren, the individuals of that stratum form a deistic belt outside the manistic belt, so that the society now consists of three cultural strata (Fig. C).

The cultural state of such a society can also be represented by a cone which at its top is deistic, and in the centre manistic, with a zoistic base (Fig. C).

The Fijians, Bakitara, Baganda, Yoruba, Dahomans, Ashanti, Tongans, and Samoans were in this cultural state (paras. 149–51, 164).

This is what would happen if we energized the society gradually. If we excite it quickly by introducing pre-nuptial chastity suddenly, without any such preparatory steps as compel only an irregular or occasional continence, the behaviour of the society conforms to the same pattern but it has no manistic stratum. The energetic individuals lose their faith in unassisted magic before they begin to tend the powerful dead; thus the power in the universe becomes the only hypothesized cause of any unaccountable suffering. No cult of the great dead is inaugurated; the power in the universe is regarded as the only source of supernormal help, and is thought of as an entity that rules the whole world in a personal and arbitrary manner. So, instead of a number of different powers, the most energetic individuals
think of one power only; their temples are erected to that power alone
(para. 164). These individuals separate themselves from their zoistic
brethren, and form a deistic belt around the zoistic nucleus (Fig. D).

The cultural state of such a society can also be represented by a deistic
cone, with a zoistic base (Fig. D).

The Arabs appear to have been in this cultural state in the seventh century.

All these processes are reversible. If a deistic society, with a manistic
stratum, ceases to insist on pre-nuptial chastity but retains such regula-
tions as compel an irregular or occasional continence, its deistic stratum
disappears; but in the cultural tradition there probably remain some
cultural items which were produced during the period of greater energy.
This is what appears to have been happening among the Baganda, Fijians,
Tongans, and Samoans at the time to which our information refers (para.
166). It appears to have happened among the Maori and Tahitians before
we met them (para. 166).

Similarly, if a manistic society ceases to demand even the irregular or
occasional continence which at one time it compelled, its manistic stratum
disappears, and the society becomes zoistic again; but in the cultural
tradition there probably remain some cultural items which were produced
during the manistic period. This is what seems to have happened among
the Kiwai Papuans and Purari (para. 166). Many of the American Indians
also appear to have been the comparatively inert descendants of more
energetic ancestors (para. 166).

Now let us return to the experimental society with which we began. We
left it energized to such an extent as to bring it into the deistic cultural
condition.

If we wish to energize it to a greater extent, we must reduce its
post-nuptial sexual opportunity, thereby introducing some post-nuptial
dissatisfaction. If we merely give it a modified form of polygamy, it
simply exists as a deistic unit while it retains its demand for pre-nuptial
chastity; but if the male as well as the female is compelled to confine him-
self to one sexual partner the society begins to display some expansive
energy. It bursts over the boundaries of its habitat, explores new countries,
and conquers less energetic peoples. Such energy does not create a cultural
change; expansive energy is the form of behaviour adopted by societies
which have reduced their sexual opportunity to a minimum. A number of
lusty individuals form an expansive belt outside the deistic and manistic
belts, but the cultural condition remains the same (Fig. E).

The early Babylonians, Hellenes, Romans, and Teutons are classic
examples of deistic societies which displayed great expansive energy (paras.
167, 169–72).

If, after suffering such limitations of their post-nuptial opportunity, the
males are permitted to have more than one sexual partner, the society
ceases to display expansive energy, but so long as it continues to demand
pre-nuptial chastity it remains deistic. It also enjoys the usufruct of its
conquests for so long as it possesses a greater energy than the societies which desire to rob it of its possessions. If a man's wives are compelled to confine their sexual qualities to their husband for the whole of their lives, or for so long as he wishes, the energy of the society is greater than it would be if the wives could leave their husband of their own free will. In the former case the society is in the absolutely polygamous condition. The energy of an absolutely polygamous society is greater than that of any other society except an absolutely monogamous one; so if, after displaying expansive energy, the society becomes absolutely polygamous, it is likely to preserve its conquests as well as its culture. If, however, it relaxes its sexual regulations to a further extent, it collapses. By deduction I consider that this is what happened among the Persians, Macedonians, Huns, and Mongols (para. 167). At one time the Yoruba also seem to have displayed a slight expansive energy, and, when we first met them, they were still the most energetic people in West Africa (paras. 42, 44; n. 154).

We must remember that no change in the sexual opportunity of a society produces its full effect until the third generation (paras. 157, 162, 167). Thus when a society appears in the pages of history it is displaying an energy produced in the two previous generations. In order to see the effect of the sexual opportunity it enjoys when we first hear of it, we must search the records of the next century.

It may be that the members of an absolutely polygamous society, which in an expansive period has conquered new lands, marry native women. If these women have spent their early years in an atmosphere of intense continence, the energy of the new generation will exceed that of its absolutely polygamous fathers. This greater energy will be maintained for so long as the mothers of new generations are reared in a sterner environment than that of absolute polygamy.

The history of the Arabs affords the best illustration of these complications. The Arabs are an authenticated instance of a society which, after permitting pre-nuptial intercourse, instituted pre-nuptial chastity, reduced its sexual opportunity to a minimum, displayed some expansive energy, faltered under the influence of absolute polygamy, and then, by marrying women of other societies, increased its energy again and again.

Among the early Arabs women were not compelled to be pre-nuptially chaste; but, in the generations that immediately preceded the birth of Mohammed, they began to replace mot'a marriage by ba'al marriage. Pre-nuptial chastity being introduced, the Arabs necessarily became deistic. Moreover, the effect of ba'al marriage was to create some expansive energy, for at first ba'al marriage reduced the post-nuptial opportunity of the males to a minimum; but, when this marital authority became part of the inherited tradition of a new generation, the question arose, Of how many women could a man be ba'al? It is clear that the problem was being discussed when the Prophet was alive, for he published an explicit answer to the question. After charging his followers to 'reverence the wombs' that
bore them, he said, 'And if ye are apprehensive that ye shall not deal fairly... marry but two, or three, or four; and if ye still fear that ye shall not deal fairly, then but one only.' The energy created by ba'al marriage carried the Arabs to Egypt, but they were unable to proceed farther. They stayed in Egypt for more than a generation, and there married Christian women, who had not only been reared in an atmosphere of intense continence but also encouraged, perhaps commanded, to adopt a life-long virginity. The sons of these women conquered North Africa. Then Berber men under Berber leaders led the way to Spain; and there once more the Arabs married Christian women, and Jewish women too. Soon an incipient rationalism began to appear, and flourished spasmodically for two, perhaps for three, centuries. It failed to mature greatly, however, for soon there were no more women who had been reared in an atmosphere of intense sexual continence.\textsuperscript{715}

There is one more complication which we must notice before we energize our experimental society again.

If into a society which insists on pre-nuptial chastity, and has a limited post-nuptial opportunity, such habits are introduced as compel only an irregular or occasional continence among its less cultivated members, a manistic stratum appears beneath the deistic stratum. This is what appears to have happened among the Christians in the fourth century (para. 167). This manistic stratum may be squeezed out again by the adoption of more rigorous pre-nuptial ordinances. This is what appears to have happened among the English in the sixteenth century (paras. 167, 172, 173). Many energetic Englishmen wished to squeeze out the manistic stratum before that time, but their own energy was insufficient to accomplish a task which was not completed before the sixteenth century, perhaps not even then.

We return to the experimental society.

So far we have energized it by a complete reduction of its pre-nuptial opportunity, first in two stages, then in one stage, and by placing varying limitations on its post-nuptial opportunity. In order to make it display expansive energy, we reduced its sexual opportunity to a minimum. Now let us retain that opportunity at a minimum for at least three generations. The society now begins to display such energy as the world has seldom seen. Indeed, among the societies we have discussed, there are only three indisputable instances of such behaviour. I refer to the Athenians, Romans, and English.

When I compared certain aspects of the universal process with certain aspects of the cultural process, I noticed one detail in which the events in these processes differed. A star, for instance, seems to begin by having a large mass and a low density; the effect of its radiation is to reduce its mass and to increase its density. After inconceivable aeons have passed, its component atoms are locked together against one another. At first, we are told, it squanders its energy profusely, like any youth; then the pace slackens; and in the end the star emits energy in the mature, measured manner
that we associate with old age. The opposite is the case with a human society. We begin with a number of individuals locked together by their uniform ideas and behaviour. The first energizing, painful though it is (para. 163), produces few cultural results; with subsequent energizings cultural effects become more noticeable; under the influence of still greater sexual checks, the society bursts its boundaries, conquers, slays, subdues, and explores; but, if this intense continence remains part of the inherited tradition for two generations, the energy increases abundantly, changes its form, and displays attributes which up to now remained hidden. The energy increases, indeed, in what seems to be geometrical progression. The society expands in all its multifarious activities, exhibits a terrific mental energy that is manifest in the arts and sciences, refines its craftsmanship, changes its opinions on every conceivable subject, exerts considerable control over its environment, and manifests its potential powers in the loftiest forms yet known. Its inherited tradition is augmented by the products of its abundant energy, and refined by human entropy. A rationalistic stratum separates itself from the main body and forms another belt outside the deistic one (Figs. F, G).

The cultural state of such a society can also be represented by a cone, with a rationalistic top, a deistic centre, perhaps a manistic stratum too, and a zoistic base (Figs. F, G).

Such is the manner in which human energy seems to be produced and exerted. In the past no human society has displayed great energy for an extended period. Moreover, societies which have displayed it have always been dominated by the stratum which manifested the greatest relative energy. No society has ever aimed at displaying energy for its own sake; every burst of energy seems to have been fortuitous. Furthermore, no man has yet proved that human energy is a desirable thing. All we know is that in the past it has been displayed in uneven quantities, and that the amount displayed by any society has varied from time to time. In the past, too, the greatest energy has been displayed only by those societies which have reduced their sexual opportunity to a minimum by the adoption of absolute monogamy (para. 168). In every case the women and children were reduced to the level of legal nonentities, sometimes also to the level of chattels, always to the level of mere appendages of the male estate. Eventually they were freed from their disadvantages, but at the same time the sexual opportunity of the society was extended. Sexual desires could then be satisfied in a direct or perverted manner; no dissatisfaction demanded an outlet; no emotional stress arose. So the energy of the society decreased, and then disappeared.

It is difficult to express any opinion with complete confidence, but as, at the end of my task, I look back along the stream of time, it seems to me that it was the unequal fate of the women, not the compulsory continence, that caused the downfall of absolute monogamy. No society has yet succeeded in regulating the relations between the sexes in such a way as
to enable sexual opportunity to remain at a minimum for an extended period. The inference I draw from the historical evidence is that, if ever such a result should be desired, the sexes must first be placed on a footing of complete legal equality.

In the future, it seems, a human society may continue its fortuitous career, and reflect, both in its cultural behaviour and in its structure, the amount of energy it chances to possess; but, if any society should desire to control its cultural destiny, it may do so by decreasing or increasing the amount of its energy. Such decrease or increase will appear in the third generation after the sexual opportunity has been extended or reduced. A lesser energy is easily secured, for the force of life seems to flow backwards, and the members of the society will not be slow to take advantage of any relaxation in the regulations. If, on the other hand, a vigorous society wishes to display its productive energy for a long time, and even for ever, it must re-create itself, I think, first, by placing the sexes on a level of complete legal equality, and then by altering its economic and social organization in such a way as to render it both possible and tolerable for sexual opportunity to remain at a minimum for an extended period, and even for ever. In such a case the face of the society would be set in the Direction of the Cultural Process; its inherited tradition would be continually enriched; it would achieve a higher culture than has yet been attained; by the action of human entropy its tradition would be augmented and refined in a manner which surpasses our present understanding.
## NOTES AND REFERENCES

### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>A.J.S.L.</td>
<td>American Journal of Semitic Languages.</td>
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<td>J.P.S.</td>
<td>Journal of the Polynesian Society.</td>
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<td>Pte. Com.</td>
<td>Private Communication to Author.</td>
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<td>S.N.R.</td>
<td>Sudan Notes and Records.</td>
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1. Our comparative ignorance of human history is indeed lamentable. We possess reliable information concerning only a few societies which have inhabited a small part of the earth's surface for a short space of time. Even in this imperfect record there are many gaps.

The social and cultural condition of the Babylonians before 1800 B.C. is revealed in the Hammurabi Code and in the extant inscriptions, contracts, and letters; that of the Sumerians is also known, though to a less degree; but no Egyptian law-code has yet been recovered, and, though our knowledge of Egyptian history extends over three thousand years, there is a complete lack of detailed information in regard to the conditions prevailing in any particular century. Our knowledge of Assyria is confined almost to the post-Sennacherib epoch; early Persian life is revealed only in glimpses. It is uncertain whether or not the customs of the Achaean Greeks are reflected in the Iliad and the Odyssey. Athenian law is a dark corner in an otherwise well-lit room; we should know very little about Dorian Sparta if we did not possess the Athenian writings. The laws of Manu tell us something about the conditions under which the ancient Hindus lived; but few facts can be gleaned about the early Chinese and Japanese. For our study of the Sassanids Rawlinson is almost our only English authority; we must rely almost exclusively on Robertson Smith when we discuss early Arabia. Our knowledge of the Hittites, Neo-Babylonians, and Moors is not good enough to be used as the foundation of an inquiry; it can be used merely as corroborative evidence for a conclusion which has been based on more detailed material. The Romans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons are the only societies of which the social and cultural history is really well known.

Researches which are confined to this historical material cannot claim to be exhaustive.

For the post-nuptial regulations of the Sumerians, Babylonians, Athenians, Romans, Anglo-Saxons, and English, and for some comments on the nature of these regulations, see paras. 167-73.

2. O. Lodge, Science and Human Progress, p. 16.


4. Definitions of 'religion' are numerous; their quality is uneven.

As an example of some of the meaningless phrases which have been submitted, I quote the following: 'Religion is a substitute in the rational world for instinct in the sub-rational world' (L. F. Ward, 'The Essential Nature of Religion', International Journal of Ethics, viii (1898), p. 169).

J. H. Leuba (A Psychological Study of Religion, pp. 24 ff., 339 ff.) has arranged forty-eight different definitions in two different series or groups, but his discussion of them is vitiated by the fact that he confuses religion with religions. This necessary discrimination has been recognized by Wilson D. Wallis (An Introduction to Anthropology, p. 284): 'If we are to approach the matter of religion anthropologically, we must not confuse religion in the large with any special brand of it. The pretensions of the devotees are one thing, their validity is another. As anthropologists we are not concerned with validity but with verbal and ritualistic expressions of the religious consciousness.' Professor Wallis does not commit himself to any definition of the word 'religion'.

A. Lang was guilty of the confusion between religion and religions when he said (The Making of Religion, pp. 35-6): 'By religion we mean the belief in the existence of an Intelligence, or Intelligences, not human, which could not be dependent on
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a material mechanism of brain or nerves... We also mean the additional belief that there is, in men, an element so far kindred to those Intelligences that it can transcend the knowledge obtained through the bodily senses. The subjective intrusion in such a passage is intense. Lang had a genius for controversy, and the character of his other writings has given his anthropological conjectures a wider currency than their scientific importance warrants. His thought is seldom exact. 'It is a positive fact', he says, 'that among some of the lowest savages, there exists, not a doctrinal and abstract monotheism, but a belief in a moral, powerful, kindly, creative Being, while this faith is found in juxtaposition with belief in ghosts, totems, fetishes, &c.' (op. cit., p. 254). But can we accept the evidence on which such statements are based?

Lang did not divulge the criteria by which he judged whether or not an alleged belief could be included as a belief in a 'High God'; nor did he define the term 'High God'. Yet this vague conception has been allowed to masquerade as a scientific classification. Moreover, when Lang maintained (Magic and Religion, preface) that the 'earliest form of religion was comparatively high' and that it was 'inevitably lowered during the process of social evolution', he did not define such important words as 'earliest', 'high', and 'lowered'. Yet the value of his submissions depends on the meaning which he attached to them.

Sir James Frazer (G.B., The Magic Art, i. 222–3, 235, 426) defined religion as the 'propitiation and conciliation of powers superior to man, who are believed to control the course of nature and of human life'. He maintained that a Magical Age preceded the Religious Age.

If religion is defined in this manner, it follows that the phenomenon is confined to those people who believe in a power superior to man. Those who do not recognize any such power are 'magical'. But Sir James's antithesis is not complete. He recognized that religion consisted of 'two elements', beliefs and rites, but in his use of the word 'magical' he confused them. The propitiatory rites which were conducted by 'religious' people may be legitimately contrasted with 'magic', as he defined the term, but Sir James omitted to point out that some power in the universe manifests itself to those who are in the 'Magical Age'. In his definition of 'magical' there is no mention of a power corresponding to the 'power superior to man' which manifests itself to 'religious' people. Dr. R. R. Marett (The Threshold of Religion, passim) has made a tentative attempt to fill the gap; indeed his suggestions concerning the nature of the power which is manifest to people who are not 'religious' in the Frazerian sense of the word are extremely valuable; but he does not seem to have pursued his researches to their final or logical conclusion. He remained a disciple of Sir E. B. Tylor, and did not appreciate that the power in the universe (which is, as he rightly said, the same as the source of magic power) was associated exclusively in the native mind with something unusual or beyond comprehension. Thus his suggestions were deprived of their full value. I must add, however, that I have learnt more from Dr. Marett's early writings than from the more extensive publications of other scholars. I should like to acknowledge my great debt to him.

For some comments on the Tylorian 'animism', see paras. 4, 62, and 148. For another comment on Sir James Frazer's terminology, see n. 633.

The pronouncements made by the following writers are vitiated by an apparent confusion between the belief and the rite: A. Lang, Magic and Religion, pp. 69–70; E. S. Hartland, Ritual and Belief, p. 96; F. B. Jevons, Comparative Religion, p. 51 f.; idem, Introduction to the Study of Religion, p. 39; idem, Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion, p. 147. These writers freely criticize Sir James Frazer, but appear to have overlooked his declaration that religion consisted of 'two elements'.

The dual character of religion has been recognized by W. James, The Varieties
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§ 5

of Religious Experience, p. 53: 'The Life of Religion consists of the belief that there is an unseen order and a supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto.' In that passage James is discussing certain civilized religions, but obviously he is stating in philosophical terms the same idea as A. C. Haddon, Magic and Fetishism, p. 93, has expressed: 'There are thus produced the two fundamental factors in religion, the belief in some mysterious power, and the desire to enter into communication with the power by means of worship.' The substitution of the word 'it' for the last six words of that sentence would make this definition almost identical with the meaning which I have attached to 'cultural condition'.

For the phraseology of my definition I am indebted in no small measure to Ira D. Howarth, who says ('What is religion?' International Journal of Ethics, xiii (1903), p. 203): 'Religion is the effective desire to be in right relations with the power manifesting itself in the universe.' I have restated Mr. Howarth's suggestion, however, so as to emphasize the dual character of the phenomenon. W. Warde Fowler, The Religious Experience of the Roman People, p. 9, has relied on the same passage, but he has altered the last part of the sentence to '... the Power manifesting itself ...' The transition from the lower-case to the capital letter changes the sense.

According to E. Durkeim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. J. W. Swain, p. 36, we cannot define a rite until we have defined the belief; but I do not understand how we are to discover the nature of a belief apart from the rite. See para. 4. The 'bipartite division of the universe' which M. Durkeim (op. cit., p. 40) calls the 'real characteristic' of religious phenomena is indeed important, but among most uncivilized peoples it is not fixed and conscious, as he suggests, but variable and unconscious. R. H. Lowie, Primitive Religion, pp. 322-3, also derives the 'least common denominator' of religions from a 'dichotomy of the universe'. Professor Lowie adds that the difference between the two parts is 'the differential response to normal and abnormal stimuli'. That is a penetrating judgement. See para. 146.


For the Tlingit, see para. 103.


For the Dinka and Lango, see paras. 83, 84.


For the Angami Nagas, see paras. 53, 54.

Sir James Frazer, The Worship of Nature, p. 9, has maintained that a god is a generalization from a multitude of indwelling spirits, but I am unable to accept the evidence on which his premises are based. I discuss the suggestion in paras. 62, 148.


For the Banks Islanders, see para. 72.

Notes and references

Archdeacon Perham's interpretations have been reprinted in H. Ling Roth, The Natives of Sarawak and British North Borneo, pp. 168–9.

For the Sea-Dyaks, see para. 159.


For the Maori, see paras. 45, 49.

12. Zoism is the word which has been suggested by A. B. Cook, Zeus: a Study in Ancient Religion, i. 27, n. 4, as an alternative to the animatism of R. R. MARETT, The Threshold of Religion, p. 117. As I do not use it in its substantival form, I may be excused for changing the meaning of the word. There are some similarities between my term zoistic (based on rites) and Dr. Maret's term animastic (based on beliefs). The beliefs of some zoistic peoples, indeed, would be accurately described as 'animatism', but the beliefs of other zoistic peoples cannot be included in that category. My 'Dead Level of Conception' (para. 66) almost corresponds to 'animatism', but the scope of the latter term is not wide enough to include the application to the dead' of the word which denoted (a) the power in the universe, (b) the source of magic power. This use of the word, however, is as important as any other. See para. 149.

The term zoistic, as I use it, has no reference to 'life', though this is implied by its Greek derivation.

I derive manistic from Latin manes.


Dr. Farnell's use of 'tendance' and 'cult' has been adopted also by H. J. Rose, Primitive Culture in Greece, p. 2. Under the former heading Professor Rose included the ritual of burial. Among uncivilized societies, however, burial rites often differ in meaning and intent from post-funeral rites. If the word 'tendance' were to be used to denote the former, another word would have to be employed to denote the latter. I have limited the meaning of 'tendance', therefore, to post-funeral rites.


15. I have borrowed the term 'Frame of Reference' from the physicists. See, e.g., A. S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, pp. 12 ff. For the importance of the term, see para. 159.

16. The question of 'group-marriage' and/or 'sexual promiscuity' has been discussed by E. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, i. 103–25; iii. 223–66; R. Briffault, The Mothers, i. 614–781; J. G. Frazer, Totemism and Exogamy, iv. 139 ff., 151; idem, Folk-Lore in the Old Testament, ii. 203 ff., 229 ff., 317. The voluminous literature on the subject is cited by these authorities. B. Malinowski, in Science, Religion and Reality, ed. J. Needham, p. 41, has applied the epithet 'fantastic' to the hypotheses. The whole question seems to depend on the meaning which is attached to the word 'marriage'.

For further notes on the 'group-marriage' hypothesis, see nn. 24, 25.

17. None of the following definitions of the word 'marriage' seems satisfactory. According to Lord Avebury, Marriage, Totemism and Religion, p. 2: 'Marriage is an exclusive relation of one or more men to one or more women, based on custom,
recognized and supported by public opinion and where law exists by law.' It is a fact, however, that the sexual relationship is not always exclusive.

C. N. Starcke, *The Primitive Family*, p. 13, considers that 'in its widest sense, marriage is only a connexion between man and woman, which is of more than momentary duration, and as long as it endures they seek for subsistence in common'. This begs the question, What is the nature of the connexion? Furthermore, what is the meaning of 'momentary duration'?

W. H. R. Rivers, *Social Organization*, p. 37, makes an academic distinction which the facts do not warrant. He emphasizes 'the important function of marriage as the means by which every individual born into a society is assigned a definite place in that society'; but there are many societies (e.g. Sia and Navaho, paras. 125, 126) which treat pre-nuptial children in the same manner as children born in wedlock. In such societies the place which pre-nuptial children occupy in the social structure does not depend on marriage.

R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, i. 523; ii. 75, considers that 'it is practically impossible to frame any definition of marriage'. His own attempt is not successful. 'The whole distinction', he says, 'between sex relations which are and those which are not marriage turns upon their degree of permanency.' What, in Briffault's opinion, is the degree of permanency which is required for a sexual union to become marriage? Briffault uses the word in other senses also: e.g. when he speaks of marriage being instituted by a mythical legislator, he seems to use 'marriage' as a synonym for exogamic regulations.

E. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, i. 26, 71, employs two separate definitions, the original and more famous one being: 'A more or less durable connexion between male and female lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of offspring.' According to this account, a couple who separate before the birth of a child are never married; a barren woman can never be married. Moreover, what is the exact meaning of 'more or less'?

C. Letourneau, *Sociology*, p. 330, and *The Evolution of Marriage*, p. 3, declares that marriage is merely 'a sexual union governed by social conventions'. He suggests also that 'the institution of marriage had no other object than the regulation of marriage'. His meaning is obscure.


18. The word 'exogamy' was coined by J. F. McLennan. See his *Studies in Ancient History*, p. 25.

An extensive study of exogamic regulations has been published by J. G. Frazer, who criticizes the theories of McLennan, Westermarck, Durkeim, and Morgan in *Totemism and Exogamy*, iv. 75 ff., 92 ff., 100 ff., 103 ff. See also E. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, i. 121 ff.; ii. 82–161; R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, i. 201–3, 241–9.

For an example of a man being reported as a member of two exogamous groups, see R. S. Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, pp. 51, 79. But the Ashanti *ntoro* is not an easy subject. Cp. e.g. R. S. Rattray, op. cit., pp. 155, 318, n. 1, with J. G. Cristaller, *Dictionary of the Asante and Fante Languages*, pp. 254 f., 407, 428.

19. The questions of chastity and modesty have been discussed at length by E. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, i. 139–60, 418–54, and by R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, ii. 8–64; iii. 259 f. The discussion is vitiated by the fact that the words have not been defined. Moreover, most of the alleged instances to which these writers refer are mere expressions of opinion by travellers and observers whose judgements reveal only their own individual temperaments.

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For the Omaha, see para. 118.


The word nikiranroro has been rendered ‘harlots’ by Tutuila, ‘The Line Islanders’, J.P.S. i (1892), pp. 265–70.

For the Gilbert Islanders, see para. 134.


23. For a discussion on alleged indifference to adultery, see R. Briffault, The Mothers, ii. 100–17.

It is from Pentecost in the New Hebrides that an example comes of a lack of jealousy on the part of an elderly husband as long as his young wives continued to work for him. See F. Speiser, Two Years with the Natives of the Western Pacific, p. 235.

Tanna is the only New Hebrides society which I include in my list. Concerning Lepers Island (Omba), Aurora (Maewo), and Pentecost (Raga, Araga), our information is inexact and contradictory. Ambryn has been the subject of what Professor Malinowski (Man, 1930, no. 17) has called ‘Mock-kinship-algebra’. Concerning Santo, Malekula, Epi, and Vao, nothing much is known. The reports on Anetiyum, Aniwa, Erromanga, and Efate are scanty.

24. Some of the evidence has been collected by E. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, iii. 223–66, but I do not understand why the illustrations should be included in a chapter entitled ‘Group-Marriage’. The differences between the customs of those various tribes were as remarkable as their similarities.

See also R. Briffault, The Mothers, i. 716–66.


Sir James Frazer uses the term ‘group-marriage’ in the same sense as Mr. Briffault employs ‘sororal polygamy’. The latter seems to be the preferable term, for it states the fact without the theory. ‘Sororal’ must be understood, of course, as referring to classificatory sisters.

Sir James Frazer considers that the custom of the sororate is a relic of ‘group-marriage’, and endeavours to prove his point by the citation of a number of instances in which a man has married two or more sisters. I should place a higher value on his discussion if he had been careful to distinguish between own and classificatory sisters. Moreover, in the passages to which I have referred his critical sense is not apparent. For instance, he says (Folk-Lore in the Old Testament, ii. 264): ‘The surmise that marriage with two sisters in their lifetime was an ancient Semitic custom is confirmed by Babylonian practice, which is known to have sanctioned such unions.’ He then refers to a solitary example of such a marriage which has been discussed by C. H. W. Johns, Babylonian Laws, Contracts and Letters, pp. 138 ff. But the marriage of the sisters Iltani and Taram-sagil (they were sisters only by adoption?) to Ardishamash was contrary to the normal Babylonian custom. The whole point of Johns’s discussion is that it was an exceptional case. It was so exceptional that when Ardishamash married Iltani two marriage contracts had to be drawn up instead of one. It was, indeed, so extraordinary for a man to marry two sisters that a legal contract had to be made also between the two sisters, for this was the only method by which the situation could
be regularized. How, then, can we say that marriage with two sisters was an ancient Babylonian custom?

26. Both E. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, iii. 208, and R. Briffault, The Mothers, i. 761, maintain that the levirate was a very widespread custom among uncivilized peoples. They add an imposing array of references in support of their submission. But I am not confident that every one of these 'authorities' made exhaustive inquiries into the widow's rights; nor am I satisfied that every reported example of the levirate among uncivilized peoples was identical with the Israelite institution. Moreover, we are not always told whether the brother who took the widow was performing a duty or exercising a right.

J. G. Frazer, Folk-Lore in the Old Testament, ii. 265–341, considers that the levirate, like the sororate (n. 25), originated in 'group-marriage'. I do not know how Sir James interprets the custom whereby a widow was free if she repaid the bride-price which had been paid for her when she married. In many cases she was taken by a classificatory brother of her husband only if she chose to remain where she was.

For 'group-marriage', see para. 14.

27. A. Cheyne, A Description of the Islands in the Western Pacific, p. 15; E. Hadfield, Among the Natives of the Loyalty Group, p. 180.

Cheyne was the captain of a ship engaged in the sandal-wood trade. For that reason I do not place a high value on his testimony. Indeed, if he were our sole authority, I should be inclined to omit the Loyalty Islanders from this treatise on the grounds that our knowledge of their customs is inadequate.

Cheyne remarks (op. cit., p. 25) that in one island which he visited strict chastity was observed among both sexes before marriage. He may have formed this opinion about the females from their reception of his sailors' advances or from the slaughter of pre-nuptial children. I am unable to conjecture the source of his information in regard to the males.

28. A. Cheyne, A Description of the Islands in the Western Pacific, p. 36.


When Powell uses the word 'prostitution' he probably refers to sexual intercourse. The professional element implied by the former term was nowhere present.

According to G. Brown, Melanesians and Polynesians, p. 38, the women prevented conception by eating a certain leaf.

31. G. Brown, Melanesians and Polynesians, pp. 253–4, who remarks that children commenced to have intercourse with one another at a very early age.

In some districts young girls, when about six years old, were placed in bamboo cages, and were kept there for four or five years until their breasts developed. If such a custom were carried out regularly, a check would be placed on premature intercourse; but in New Britain it does not seem to have been universal in any area. See G. Brown, 'Notes on the Duke of York Group, New Britain and New Ireland', J.R.G.S. xlvii (1877), p. 142 f.; B. Danks, 'Marriage Customs of the New Britain Group', J.A.I. xviii (1889), p. 284 f.


34. G. Brown, Melanesians and Polynesians, p. 23.

This custom has been interpreted as 'marriage by service' by E. Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage, ii. 362, but surely the presentation to a future father-in-law of the product of voluntary labour must be distinguished from the performance of duties under his personal supervision and command.

For other reports concerning New Britain, see E. Westermarck, op. cit., i. 436, 490; ii. 299, and refs.


J. G. Frazer, Totemism and Exogamy, ii. 124, states upon authority that the maternal uncle was responsible for buying a wife for his nephew, but according to the authorities on whom I rely both the privilege and the duty belonged to the kinsmen generally.


40. W. G. Ivens, Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands, pp. 72, 87, 90.

The child of an unmarried girl, or a bastard child of a married woman, was 'a child of auwo', a term which referred to the haphazard, irregular character of the birth (ibid., p. 91). Abortion and contraceptives are said to have been unknown until introduced from Fiji. The practices are still condemned. See A. I. Hopkins, In the Isles of King Solomon, p. 70; W. G. Ivens, op. cit., p. 92.

We are told that if a girl of good family was found to be pregnant before marriage, she would be killed, 'unless the paramour could pay enough to save her and make her his wife': 'A girl of no family might be allowed to become a harlot.' See R. H. Codrington, op. cit., p. 235. A harlot, repl, was a social outcast. Apparently a girl could be prostituted by her father with profit to himself or be sold by him to a chief who would share her earnings (W. G. Ivens, op. cit., p. 90).

41. W. G. Ivens, Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands, pp. 71–3; R. H. Codrington, The Melanesians, p. 238 f.; A. I. Hopkins, In the Isles of King Solomon, pp. 97–8; F. Coombe, Islands of Enchantment, p. 257. Dr. Ivens says that the bride was present at the final ceremony.


According to W. Deane, Fijian Society, p. 195, both sexes wore the plaits, but Sir Basil Thomson says that men wore them only in some villages in Vanua Levu.

The information in the text applies almost exclusively to Viti Levu, which is the only island to which our detailed information extends. Cp. n. 91.

The demand for chastity is attributed by Sir Basil Thomson to (i) parents' cupidity, since a virgin had a higher market value than a girl who had had adventures, (ii) fear of the girl's future husband.


This, however, may apply only to the girls whose frailty had been discovered prior to the wedding celebrations. The context is not clear.
Abortion was practised by married women of high rank, but seems to have been limited to them. Ordinary people, we are told, had neither the occasion nor the inclination to use the drugs; nor did they possess the money with which to pay the practitioner. The original cause of the custom is thought to have been the *tamu*-right.


An old authority, cited by S. H. Ray, 'The People and Language of Lifu, Loyalty Islands', *J.R.A.I.* xlvii (1917), p. 289, states that the inhabitants of these islands 'invoke the spirits of their departed chiefs: they preserve relics of their dead, such as a finger-nail, a tooth, or a tuft of hair, and pay divine homage to it'. The passage probably refers to the custom, noted in the text, whereby certain parts of the body of a dead magician were seized in order that their new owner might receive some of the dead man's magic power. See further n. 51.

Such statements as 'they invoke the spirits of their departed chiefs' lack precise meaning and are valueless as anthropological material. The above quotation illustrates the extreme need (i) of distinguishing fact from inference, especially when dealing with the early writings, (ii) of caution in accepting such phrases as 'divine homage'.


Diseases were few; 'doctors' were many. In addition to the *tene haze*, who used magic stones, there was also the *tene dosino*, who gave herbal treatment. Apparently *dosino* treatment was ineffectual without *haze*, for Mrs. Hadfield says that 'the two arts seem to merge into one another'. Perhaps *dosino* refers to the herbs rather than to the herbalist.

It was probably the prevalence of this custom which caused the early missionaries to think that the natives worshipped finger-nails. See n. 48.

The rain-maker was a popular man, but the magician who controlled the sun was often suspected of causing a drought so that people would die of hunger and thus furnish food for a cannibal feast. It seems to have been his privilege to proclaim a cannibal feast whenever he wished, and, in order to prevent him from creating too much sunshine, it was ordained that whenever he exercised the prerogative he must kill and eat his eldest son. It seems rational; for, granted such unquestioning faith in the power of the magician, this was an excellent way of preventing a drought. Would Professor Lévy-Bruhl call it 'prelogical'?

For Professor Lévy-Bruhl's suggestions, see para. 70.

53. S. H. Ray, 'The People and Language of Lifu, Loyalty Islands', *J.R.A.I.* xlvii (1917), p. 252. On p. 296 Mr. Ray remarks that almost every individual had his sacred object and that each object had its special area of operation. Thus some caused yams to grow, others fertilized the *taro* fields, and so on.

54. W. Gray and S. H. Ray, 'Some Notes on the Tannese', *Intern. Archiv für Eth. vii* (1894), pp. 232–3, who include also the *nethuning* of Aneityum, the *supse* (*supu*) of Efate and other islands of the Central New Hebrides, and the *nobu* of Erromanga. For our information concerning these islands, see n. 23.

For *uhngen*, see para. 63.
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56. The missionary, being a 'sacred (uhgen) man', was suspected on more than one occasion of causing and spreading disease. See, e.g., A. C. P. Watt, Twenty-five Years on Tanna, pp. 153, 155.


The general term for the stones which were used in altering the course of nature was *nauveti nadi*, as distinct from *nauveti nuruk*, which contained the power of life and death. The meaning of *nauveti* is not given. If 'stone' be correct, then *nadi* and *nuruk* seem to be qualifying adjectives or adverbs, and *nuruk* is not the equivalent of the Loyalty Island *haze*. The latter conclusion might appear to follow from the fact that a wizard was *tene haze* (Loyalty Is.) and *yolinuruk* (Tanna).

See also the passages cited in n. 55.

59. A. C. P. Watt, Twenty-five Years on Tanna, pp. 178-84, describes the methods of the rain-maker in some detail, and says that 'he calls on his departed father and friends and asks them to join him and his party in making rain'. But it is clear from the passage which I have quoted in the text that the man's success did not depend upon any assistance which he might receive from them, and that his failure was not due to their reluctance. Perhaps we should understand that he mentioned the names of successful rain-makers who were then dead. The word 'father', at any rate, must not be interpreted literally. We are certainly told that 'the power of rain-making was hereditary', but, as Mrs. Watt remarks (op. cit., p. 180), 'All a man's brother's children are his children, and there is seldom any difficulty in finding a successor.' She might have added that since a man's orthodox cousins were his 'brothers', his 'son' might have been almost any male of the same social group and of the next generation. Under such circumstances the use of the word 'hereditary' is grotesque.

When a form of the classificatory system of relationship prevails, all reports of the alleged hereditary nature of any institution must be received with caution. The term which has been translated (wrongly, in my view) as 'son' is applied to many individuals who are not 'sons' in our sense of the word. Thus the alleged heredity may be a false inference from an inaccurate rendering of a native term.

These criticisms apply also to the alleged hereditary nature of the magical profession in other societies, e.g. Loyalty Islands (n. 52), Fiji (n. 94), Bikitara (n. 123), Yoruba (n. 148).


61. Ibid., pp. 141-3.

62. Ibid., p. 201.

Dr. Brown states that the recipients were 'ancestors', but on p. 196 he qualifies the report by saying that the ghosts who were invoked were always those of their own kindred. 'Kindred', however, is a vague word. The New Britons had a dual organization and a classificatory system of relationship. The terms which we translate 'father', 'mother', &c., were applied by an individual to any one of the previous generation who was a member of the same moiety. The recipients of the offerings need not have been 'kindred' in our sense of the word.

Elsewhere (p. 193) we are told that 'in the case of relatives food is given for a
long time until all funeral feasts are over. The report is not helpful. No more
details are available.

63. Ibid., pp. 176, 202, 233.
In addition to the tena agagara there were the tena papet and the tena pinapet.
I have been unable to discover whether the same individual could be described
by all these titles or whether they were respectively exclusive. Dr. Brown is the
only authority who mentions them. His language is not exact. On p. 197 the tena
papet is called a sorcerer who practised exorcism; on p. 200 he is a 'priest'. Papet
is translated 'prayer' on p. 177, but since the utterance of a papet over a banana-skin
is called 'praying', and we read of 'chirping' and 'hissing', papet seems to have
denoted an incantation. In that case a tena papet may have been merely the owner
of an incantation.

I can find no description of the tena pinapet. The name is mentioned only once.
Tena agagara seems to have been an inclusive term which was applied to magical
practitioners in general. The other two words may have had a more particular
application. We cannot tell until the native terms have been elucidated.

64. Ibid., p. 199, where it seems to be suggested that the magician worked by the
aid of 'spirits'. The word which is so translated is tebaran, and we must beware of
assuming that his power was dependent on other powerful beings. See further
para. 65.

The description of a wind-making process by W. Powell, Wanderings in a Wild
Country, pp. 166, 169, suggests pure sympathetic magic.

65. J. G. Frazer, G.B., The Scapegoat, p. 82, translates tebaran as 'poor wretch'
or 'sufferer', but I can find no support for his view in the books which I have
consulted. Sir James also mentions (op. cit., p. 199 f.) that the people used to
beat the bushes in order to frighten away 'evil spirits'. According to G. Brown,
Melanesians and Polynesians, pp. 141-3, the practice was connected with ghosts.

But it is simply a question of translation. G. Brown, op. cit., p. 196, n. 1,
remarks that 'the ideas of the people were very indistinct as to the precise difference
between the spirits of the dead and tebarans'. Why, then, should we distinguish
them? The distinction has been created by our translations; it did not exist in
the native mind, for the natives used the same word in each case. If we refrain
from translating tebaran, and discontinue the anglicized plural, we may say that
the natives applied the word tebaran to some natural phenomena and to some ghosts.
The confusion is reasonable. In fact, it is common. See paras 62, 63, 149.


The statements in the text refer only to the island of Ulawa and to the district
of Sa'a, Little Mala, and must not be assumed (unless the fact is explicitly stated)
to apply to any other area.

The name Mala (Malanta) was given to two separate islands which are distin-
guished by the adjectives Big and Little. There were three distinct peoples on
Little Mala, each speaking a different language: (i) the inhabitants of Sa'a and its
environs, (ii) the Tolo people of the hill-country, (iii) those who dwelt in Port

There was a very close connexion between the island of Ulawa and the district
of Sa'a, and, although occasionally I have specified to which place a particular
statement refers, at other times I have assumed that a report may apply to both.

There are some discrepancies between the statements of Dr. Ivens and those
of C. E. Fox in his The Threshold of the Pacific (London, 1924).

Mr. Fox (op. cit., p. 345) says that there was a tradition that the chiefs were
immigrants; Dr. Ivens (op. cit., p. 129) states that he could find no confirmation
of the report. According to Dr. Ivens (op. cit., p. 64) there was at Sa’a a sharp distinction between chiefs and commoners, alaha and apoloa, which existed in a less pronounced form in Ulawa, where they were called alaha and ruruha; Mr. Fox (op. cit., p. 344) states that in Ulawa the apoloa were an intermediate class which had been formed by intermarriage between alaha, immigrant chiefs, and commoners, mwai komu. In the opinion of Dr. Ivens (op. cit., p. 65) Mr. Fox was misinformed.

Mr. Fox (op. cit., p. 344) states that commoners were matrilineal and chiefs patrilineal; Dr. Ivens (op. cit., pp. 65, 79) is confident that the whole society was patrilineal. Both writers are referring to a social group called komu. According to Dr. Ivens (op. cit., pp. 60 f., 65, 69) there were no clans; members of a komu were a kindred in the sense in which Dr. Rivers used the term, i.e. ‘a group consisting of persons related to one another, other than by marriage, through both mother and father’ (W. H. R. Rivers, Social Organization, p. 16). Mr. Fox (op. cit., pp. 344, 351, n. 2) maintains that the komu was a matrilineal exogamous clan, and that a man belonged to his mother’s komu, ‘and must marry a woman of another komu’. In his opinion, therefore, komu was a unilateral group. Dr. Ivens (II. cc.) expressly denies this, and considers that Mr. Fox has misinterpreted the association of groups of individuals with certain animals.

In my use of komu, I follow Dr. Ivens.

The report of C. E. Fox may not be uninfluenced by a desire to prove or to illustrate a theory concerning the origins of Melanesian culture.

Throughout the discussion the word ‘chief’ is used without precise meaning. In the majority of passages it seems to denote ‘high-born’, or ‘noble’, without any suggestion of social or political power. Indeed, Dr. Ivens (op. cit., p. 128) explicitly states that at Sa’a the ‘chiefs’ exercised no authority. In other passages the word is used to denote a social leader.

Dr. Codrington’s information in regard to this area seems to have been obtained at Sa’a. According to W. G. Ivens, op. cit., p. xv f., Dr. Codrington did not speak the local language, but relied on Mota, the language of the Banks Islands.


68. Ibid., pp. 124, 254, 257. Dr. Codrington equates the tidadho of Ysabel and the tindalo of Guadalcanar with the tindalo of Florida.

69. Ibid., p. 125. That tindalo was ‘a ghost of power’ seems to be clear from p. 175. Cp. paras. 66, 149.

70. Ibid., p. 124. Dr. Codrington wrote li’o’a, which W. G. Ivens, Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands, p. 485, n. 2, has corrected to li’oa. I follow Dr. Ivens.

71. R. H. Codrington, The Melanesians, p. 260. From p. 136 (‘The ghost of some departed warrior, or otherwise powerful man, becomes a li’oa’) and other passages, it is clear that li’oa is used by Dr. Codrington in the same sense as he used tindalo on p. 175.

72. Li’oa was the Sa’a term. Elsewhere on Little Mala the corresponding term was hi’ona. This word is said to have been introduced from Wango, San Cristoval. The former word also is alleged to have been an importation. In Ulawa the word akalo was applied to all the ghosts to whom attention was paid, the very powerful ones being called Big Akalo. See W. G. Ivens, Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands, pp. 119, 180–1, 487.

There is some discrepancy between the reports; e.g., according to Dr. Ivens (op. cit., pp. 15–16), numu meant the living soul, but Dr. Codrington (The Melanesians, p. 260) states that at Sa’a akalo was used for the soul of the living man as well as for that of a dead man.
For *akalo* as ghosts of the *komu* kindred and *li'oa* as ghosts of 'chiefs', 'fighting men', 'important priests', &c., see W. G. Ivens, op. cit., pp. 34, 119, 178, 274.

The following sentence may appear to conflict with the text: "They postulate the existence of two kinds of ghosts both of which are called ghosts, *akalo*, but only one of these is an object of worship. The first kind is the ordinary *akalo*, the ghost of the dead, and the second is the ghost whose abode is in the forest" (W. G. Ivens, op. cit., p. 178). But was not the ghost 'whose abode is in the forest' also a ghost of the dead? If so, what is the distinction between the two? If not, is the word 'ghost' justified? Only the 'ghosts of the dead' were worshipped, we are told; but there were big *akalo* and ordinary *akalo* in Ulawa, *akalo* and *li'oa* at Sa'a, and *akalo* and *hi'ona* elsewhere on Little Malaita. How, then, can it be said that 'only one of these' is an object of worship?

The answer, I think, is simple. The men of Ulawa and Sa'a applied *akalo* not only to souls of the dead but also to some natural phenomena. The word is then translated (wrongly, in my view) 'spirits'. Thus there were 'sea-spirits', *akalo ni matawa*, and 'forest-spirits', whose native name I have been unable to find; but as *akalo* was applied also to the dead, and therefore is translated 'ghosts', these 'beings' are referred to (by Dr. Ivens) as 'sea-ghosts' and 'forest-ghosts'. They were not 'ghosts' in the sense that they were the disembodied souls of dead men, and only a complete disregard for the meaning of the English words can justify the translation.

For the meaning of *akalo*, see para. 63.

When Dr. Codrington's report on this area is studied, his confusion between *akalo* and *li'oa* (i.e. little *akalo* and big *akalo*) must be remembered.

73. At Sa'a a village was inhabited by a *komu* kindred, for which see n. 66. This does not mean, of course, that all the members lived there. We must understand, I think, that people who were related to one another built their huts in the same place, and such a collection of dwelling-places is called by us a 'village'. In Florida, indeed, the word *komu* is said to have meant village. See W. G. Ivens, *The Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands*, pp. 28, 61.

We should be justiﬁed, perhaps, in assuming that a rite performed in a village by a member of that village might be *tendance*, and that a rite performed there by a man who came from another village would be *cult*.

74. W. G. Ivens, *Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands*, p. 209. This passage seems to mean that only some ghosts were *akalo*, but on p. 178 Dr. Ivens remarks that 'every person at death becomes an *akalo*'. The native usage of a word translated 'ghost' is often difficult to understand. See paras. 66, 149, and 162. Yet sometimes Dr. Ivens increases our difficulties by contradicting himself. Cp. e.g. n. 87.


An offering such as a porpoise tooth was considered to be sufficient for an ordinary *akalo*, whereas a pig was reserved invariably for a *li'oa* (W. G. Ivens, op. cit., p. 241). In a later passage (op. cit., p. 321) Dr. Ivens says that occasionally an *akalo* also might demand the more valuable gift. Perhaps he is here referring to big *akalo*. From the context, however, I judge that only at Sa'a was a pig offered to *akalo*. 

77. At Sa'a the first-fruits are said to have been offered on the inland altars, while sacrifices for success at sea were made at the beach altars. In Ulawa first-fruits also were offered on the shore. In both cases the recipients seem to have been li'oa, not akalo. Cp. W. G. Ivens, Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands, pp. 179, 246 f.

78. W. G. Ivens, Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands, pp. 184, 247-8, 321, 497.

79. For disposal of the relics of 'important people' (saka men, i.e. li'oa), see W. G. Ivens, Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands, pp. 178, 210, 214; R. H. Codrington, The Melanesians, p. 177.

Dr. Ivens says that the men of Ulawa placed in the canoe-house the relics of those ghosts whose magic might be expected to assist with bonito fishing and that at Sa'a these relics were placed in a special relic-house, tawau, alongside the canoe-house. According to Dr. Codrington, shrines were erected in Little Mala only when the canoe-house, oha, was full.

We are told that in a village the relic-house was near the house of the priest. Only the priest had the right of entry.

Concerning the word 'priest', see n. 82.

80. 'Ownership' of a li'oa might be inherited, or a new claim might be made and substantiated. See W. G. Ivens, Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands, pp. 242-3, 250, 252; R. H. Codrington, The Melanesians, pp. 128, 132, 192.

Dr. Ivens remarks: 'The right to sacrifice to a ghost was confined to those who belonged to the ghost as members of his family, or to those to whom he had appeared as a sign that he wished to be friendly with them. No stranger might sacrifice, and if he presumed to do so the ghost would punish him for his intrusion.'

The passage raises more questions than it answers. Does the first part refer to akalo, and the second to li'oa? Probably, I think, for only powerful ghosts became 'twins' and helped a man. See n. 81. Yet the writer appears to refer to the same ghost in both parts of the sentence. It seems that the latter part of the quotation must refer to li'oa, for ordinary household akalo were manifest only in relic-cases and therefore had no ground upon which a stranger could 'intrude'.

A similar confusion is apparent in other passages also; e.g., when Dr. Ivens states (op. cit., p. 244 f.) that 'ownership' depended on membership of the family either by birth, adoption, or dependency, he appears to refer to akalo; he then cites a passage from Dr. Codrington, who plainly is referring to li'oa.

Such ambiguities as these are not uncommon in anthropological literature, and would be avoided if native terms were always employed. As it is, the word 'ghost' is used alone, and confusion arises because more than one native word has been translated as 'ghost'. For further examples of this confusion, see nn. 81, 87.


Another word for demoniacal possession was iperi. Apparently iperi was equivalent to awasi, for which see also R. H. Codrington, The Melanesians, p. 210; A. I. Hopkins, In the Isles of King Solomon, p. 206.

Dr. Ivens says that it was beneath the dignity of a li'oa to behave in this manner. Only an akalo gave the power to pronounce an oracle or caused illness by occupying the body of a delinquent. To induce 'possession' was ta'e akalo, which refers to the 'lifting up' or the 'raising' of a ghost. The word rau, 'abide', was also used, but apparently only in connexion with li'oa, e.g. 'li'oa abode with me and I was not drowned'.

In his long and detailed description of the native rites, Dr. Ivens does not always quote the native word which he translates as 'ghost'. He is careful to point out (e.g. op. cit., p. 191) the difference between the treatment of an akalo and that of
82. When Dr. Ivens speaks of a 'priest', he refers, he explains, to the man 'who has to do with the worship of the ghosts'. See his _Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands_, p. 283. 'The title of 'priest' is not given to such a man by R. H. Codrington, _The Melanesians_, p. 192, who says: 'Almost every man of consideration knows how to approach some ghost or spirit.' Probably this is why he was a man of consideration'.

W. G. Ivens, op. cit., p. 242, says that at Sa'a the following words were used to denote the man whom he calls 'priest': _poroma'i_ , 'holy man'; _peeau ni mae_ , 'head of the fight'; _peeau si hemne_ , 'head of the village'. But surely it is wrong to translate these terms as 'priest'. The fact seems to have been that a man who knew how to approach a ghost was sometimes a distinguished warrior also or the head of the _komu_ kindred whose habitation we call a 'village'. For _komu_ as kindred and village, see nn. 66, 73.

The English words 'holy man' are submitted by Dr. Ivens as the equivalent of the Ulawa _poro ni muaane_. The phrase _ni muaane_ meant 'of males'; 'i.e.', Dr. Ivens says, 'having to do with sacred things'. The connexion is not obvious.

For other notes on 'priests', see n. 87.

83. R. H. Codrington, _The Melanesians_, p. 125. The ousting of one _li'oa_ by the ghost of a man more recently deceased is mentioned also by A. I. Hopkins, _In the Isles of King Solomon_, p. 119.

We are told by W. G. Ivens, _Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands_, p. 210, that the relics which were no longer tended might be placed either on an inland altar, _te'ete'e_ , or on a beach-altar, _pirupiru_. These were the Sa'a terms. In Ulawa _pirupiru_ was applied to an inland as well as to a beach-altar. The reports concerning the disposal of relics, however, are not always clear, for sometimes it appears that relics which were still tended were placed on an altar, which indeed is said to have been the usual place of 'sacrifice'. See W. G. Ivens, op. cit., pp. 214, 246.


W. G. Ivens, _Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands_, p. 243, considers it to be 'beyond belief' that a man should inaugurate a new style in sacrificing to his father. I do not see why; nor does Dr. Ivens state his reasons for doubting the fact. Certainly the _taro-cult_ and _baigona-cult_ in Papua (para. 79) were introduced by individual men. On this question, see further n. 632.

85. W. G. Ivens, _Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands_, p. 246. The altar consisted of an outer wall of stones piled up in the same manner as those (_lilihen_) which were erected to keep pigs out of the gardens. Trees were planted both inside and outside the wall.

Trees were planted also at the place where the body of an important citizen was exposed, being used to support the canoe in which the body was placed. See W. G. Ivens, op. cit., p. 209.

86. At some of these 'altars' certain _li'oa_ were approached on behalf of the whole community that they might lend their aid in that department of life in which they had been famous. Thus _li'oa ni mae_ were the ghosts of great warriors; others were those of successful fishermen; and so on. See W. G. Ivens, _Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands_, p. 180 f.; R. H. Codrington, _The Melanesians_, p. 136.

W. G. Ivens, op. cit., p. 486, n. 9, maintains that _li'oa_ were land ghosts and that _paewa_ were the only ghosts who had power at sea. He corrects Dr. Codrington's
use of the former word. I notice, however, that in op. cit., p. 185, he himself speaks of a li'oa operating at sea.

Renowned fishermen sometimes announced that they would appear after death as sharks, and a shark of any special size or colour was considered to be some one's akalo. Food was reserved for such an animal and only those who were going to be sharks after death were allowed to partake of it. Every landing-place had a tutelary shark. There were also other 'sacred' sharks, 'owned' by mortal men, who punished any sacrilege. Ordinary unowned sharks could be kept off by incantations. Moreover, just as a man could become a shark, so could a shark become a man. The same word, lapi, was used of both processes.

For the shark-cult, see W. G. Ivens, op. cit., pp. 229-40; R. H. Codrington, op. cit., p. 179; F. Coombe, Islands of Enchantment, pp. 248 ff. It is impossible to tell from the appropriate passages whether akalo of the shark-cult were big akalo (= Sa'a li'oa) or little akalo. The evidence seems inferential, not irrefragable.

We are told that ghosts were manifest also in bananas; but this may be a mere inference, due to the fact that the word akalo was applied to bananas. Cp. W. G. Ivens, op. cit., pp. 179, 268 ff.; R. H. Codrington, op. cit., p. 32 f.

Different meanings are attached by these authors to such words as 'worship', 'invoke', and 'sacrifice'.

W. G. Ivens, op. cit., p. 246, insists that the word 'sacrifice' should contain some idea of substitution, but R. H. Codrington, op. cit., pp. 128, 144, remarks: 'To burn a pig entirely without any accompanying rite, with a view to obtaining mana, is a sacrificial act'; and again, 'The simplest and most common sacrificial act is that of throwing a small portion of food to the dead.' Dr. Codrington's use of the word, however, is not uniform. On the same page he says (i) 'The sacrifices on the Solomon Islands may well be traced to the desire to make the deceased sharers of the common meal'; (ii) 'If there is a Melanesian sacrifice to a god, it is to a vui.' Cp. these quotations with those which are quoted above. The ideas of substitution, do ut des, do ut abeas, and self-deprivation have been confused under one heading.

For the Banks Islands vui, see para. 72. It is difficult to understand how any one can apply the words 'god' and 'sacrifice' to such conceptions and practices.

For ooolo, the word translated as 'sacrifice', see n. 294.

87. For the treatment of affliction, see W. G. Ivens, Melanesians of the S.E. Solomon Islands, pp. 192 f., 247 f., 345-52, 467.

In studying these passages I experience the same difficulties as those mentioned in nn. 80, 81. The English word 'ghost' is used as the equivalent of two native words, between which in the native mind there was a vital distinction. I have tried to cope with the difficulties by referring to Dr. Ivens's A Dictionary of the Language of Sa'a and Ulawa, S.E. Solomon Islands; but I have not found it helpful; e.g. too akalo is rendered as 'exorcise', 'propitiate', 'cure', and it seems doubtful if it was used in reference to li'oa; but this is not certain. Nor can I discover the real difference between toto and tola.

Dr. Ivens defines a 'diviner' as 'one who knows the proper incantation and is regarded as a master, as one to whom the ghosts vouchsafe the power required'. Cp. the definition of 'priest' quoted in n. 82: 'One who has to do with the worship of the ghosts.' Apparently the same man is meant. Why, then, does Dr. Ivens write as if they were two separate men? The diviner announced (i) the identity of a wizard who had performed sionga, witchcraft, (ii) the reasons for ghostly displeasure. His native title is not given.

In regard to the exorcist, Dr. Ivens contradicts himself. Cp. op. cit., p. 192, 'The exorcist need not be a priest proper'; and op. cit., p. 462 f., 'The power of exorcism was definitely confined to the priests.'
Dr. Ivens also says, 'The offices of leech and priest are often confined (sic) in one person, but incantations to ghosts might be used by those who had no claim to priestly office.' I do not know what he means, for he has already defined a priest as a man 'who has to do with the worship of the ghosts'.

A. I. Hopkins, In the Isles of King Solomon, p. 206, mentions that the village medicine-man trained young aspirants and had charge of the village relic-house; but since a village consisted of a komu kindred (nn. 66, 73), the man was in charge of the relics of his dead kinsmen. Thus he may have acted in another capacity besides that of medicine-man.


I am not persuaded that the charms reported by W. G. Ivens, op. cit., pp. 97-8, were anything more than children's games. Before we can admit that a child's dance or song is correctly termed 'magic', we must have evidence that the organizers arranged the performance with the intention of exerting magic power, and, moreover, that they were conscious of their purpose.


91. T. Williams, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 187, 189, 196; D. Hazlewood, A Fee- jean and English Dictionary, s.v. bure.

Williams says that the bure was used also as a council chamber and as a village hall. Local dignitaries slept there. 'Though built expressly for the purposes of religion,' he says, 'the bure was less devoted to them than to anything else.'

A. M. Hocart, 'On the meaning of kalou and the Origin of Fijian Temples', J.R.A.I. xlii (1912), pp. 441, 442 f., objects to this sentence, but his reasons for doing so are not clear. So much depends on the meaning attached to the word 'religion'.

Mr. Hocart writes bure as m bure. He tells us that the word was applied also to the small huts which were erected over the graves of the dead.

There were two main islands in Fiji, Vanua Levu and Viti Levu. Except where stated, the information in the text applies exclusively to the latter. Cp. n. 44.

92. For the kalou-vu, 'ancestor-gods', see the passages cited in n. 102.

93. T. Williams, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 189-90, 192. For M. Rougier's statement that priests and chiefs had 'familiar spirits', see n. 97.

94. T. Williams, Fiji and the Fijians, p. 192; B. Thomson, The Fijians, pp. 157-8. When a classificatory system of relationship prevailed, a statement that an office was hereditary must be received with reserve. See n. 59. Even if we accepted the report in this particular case, we could not tell whether the succession was in the family (as we know it) or in some group like the matanggali. Nor are we sufficiently well informed concerning the organization of Fijian society to justify an opinion.

Various suggestions have been made in regard to the matanggali. According to L. Fison, 'Land Tenure in Fiji', J.A.I. x (1881), pp. 335, 345, the matanggali was a non-exogamous unit which consisted of the descendants of a band of brothers; all the members of a matanggali were 'brothers' to one another. W. Deane, Fijian Society, p. 100, says that the matanggali was an enlarged family, united by the cult of the kalou-vu. W. H. R. Rivers, History of Melanesian Society, i. 264 f., maintains that it was part of a primary body whose members were united by the common
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possession of a more or less sacred object. If Dr. Rivers is thinking of the 'totem', then his readers must be referred to the passages quoted in n. 97.

A. M. Hocart, 'The Dual Organization in Fiji', Man, 1915, no. 3, apologizes for translating *matanggali* 'clan', since that word, *ex definitione* (but only according to W. H. R. Rivers?), implies exogamy. He therefore agrees with Fison. He was unable to trace any relationship between the *matanggali* and the *vosa*.

Mr. Hocart, I think, is our best authority.

95. T. Williams, Fiji and the Fijians, p. 188.

96. B. Thomson, The Fijians, p. 168; P. Rougier, 'Maladies et médecins à Fiji autrefois et aujourd'hui', Anthropos, ii (1907), p. 70. Apparently Sir Basil Thomson's statement is confirmed by T. Williams, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 191, 193, but Williams also mentions the dautradra. M. Rougier's remarks are extremely vague.

The Fijian had implicit faith in dreams. If a Fijian dreamt of the death of a man, this man, should he wish to survive, had to make a present to the dreamer in order to induce him to withdraw the dream; otherwise death would occur according to the dream. No dautradra was foolish enough to dream anything about a poor man.


When M. Rougier uses the word 'esprit', he seems to refer to the Fijian *tevoro*, which he renders also as 'génie' and as 'familiar spirit'. He attempts to derive the word *voro*, 'fear'. I think that *tevoro* is also the word which Sir Basil Thomson translates as 'spirit' when he says (The Fijians, p. xiii) that an 'evil spirit' could be sent into a man.

W. H. R. Rivers, 'Totemism in Fiji', Man, 1908, 75, is of the opinion that *tevoro* meant a 'sacred object' or 'totem', and on the strength of his assertion Sir J. G. Frazer, Totemism and Exogamy, ii. 140, remarks that 'Dr. Rivers is unquestionably right in holding that the sacred animals associated with tribes, or subdivisions of tribes, are totems in the process of evolving into gods, and that a more advanced stage in this evolution is represented by the village deities called *tevoro*'. (I presume that when Sir James speaks of 'subdivision of tribes' he refers to the *matanggali*, for which see n. 94.) Father W. Schmidt, 'Totemism in Fiji', Man, 1908, 84, considers that there is little evidence of the existence of totemism in Fiji, and he refers to P. J. de Marzan, 'Le Totémisme aux Îles Fiji', Anthropos, ii (1907), p. 402, upon whose testimony Dr. Rivers himself relies elsewhere (Hist. Mel. Soc. ii. 369).

But these vaguely expressed doubts are of no importance compared with the researches of Mr. Hocart, who shows quite conclusively that *tevoro* was not a Fijian word at all. It was *Tahitian*. The Tahitian Christian missionaries brought the word to Fiji, when they brought their new religion. To such Christians as the Tahitians became, all objects which were venerated by the Fijians were 'devils', *tevoro*. Thus the *kalou-vu* and the *kalou-yalo* were both *tevoro*, and every ghost, *kalou*, was called *tevoro*. 'Tevoro proper', Mr. Hocart declares, 'are souls of the dead.' See A. M. Hocart, 'On the meaning of *kalou* and the Origin of Fijian Temples', J.R.A.I. xlii (1912), pp. 437–8, 445. Mr. Hocart repeats the equation *kalou* = *tevoro* in 'Note on the Dual Organization in Fiji', Man, 1914, 2.

Thus Fijian 'totemism' is extremely suspect, and we must conclude that Dr. Rivers misunderstood the meaning of the word *tevoro*. This implies that his interpretation of the meaning of *matanggali* (n. 94) is unacceptable. Moreover, when M. Rougier remarks that sickness was due to 'esprit' (i.e. *tevoro*), he must be understood, I suppose, as referring to ghostly anger. Further, the 'familiar spirit', with the possession of which he credits both priests and chiefs, must be *kalou*.
Such intricate puzzles as these would have been avoided if the native terms had been employed. The absence of native terms has sometimes cast a mist of vague uncertainty over the meaning of the reports.

A. B. Brewster, *The Hill Tribes of Fiji*, facing p. 224, translates *tevoro* as ‘cannibal’. It is not difficult to understand that a Christian convert would call a cannibal *tevoro*, but when a native term is thus translated, without comment, I feel that the author is out of touch with the culture of pagan Fiji.


For wizardry in general, see B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, pp. 164–5; but if the passage is to be understood it must be read only after the results of Mr. Hocart's researches have been digested.

99. T. Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*, p. 209. The word *vaka-mdraunikan*, which, according to Williams, i.e., meant 'witchcraft', is translated 'wizard' by P. Rougier, *Anthropos*, ii (1907), p. 78. *Ndraunikan* seems to have meant 'leaves'.

Williams observes that there were many who 'laughed at the priest but trembled at the wizard'. Compare the comparative impotence of the priests among the Baganda (n. 135). For a discussion on its significance, see para. 166.

100. T. Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*, pp. 194, 196.


Offerings were of two kinds, *soro* and *madrali*. There is no precise information concerning the nature or intent of these so-called 'sacrifices'. Cp. T. Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*, pp. 195–6 (*soro* and *madrali*) with A. M. Hocart, op. cit., p. 441 (*soro*). According to Williams, *du ut des* predominated. *Madrali* is called a 'thanksgiving', but surely 'thanksgiving' is as question-begging as 'sacrifice'.


110. Canon J. Roscoe considers that there may have been 'at least three distinct races in the Lake Region, each of which has left traces of its residence'.

In the first place, the existence of a number of megaliths suggests that the country was once inhabited by a people who also left other traces of their presence. For instance, there still exist the remains of buildings with stone enclosures; and holes of considerable depth are found 'which some think to be shafts from which ironstone was dug'. (It is not suggested that the present inhabitants of the country are descended from these men, whose existence is deduced from these remains.)
The other two 'races' still occupy the area: (i) The negroes, such as the Bagesu and others, including those who live on the mountain ridges of Ruwenzori and Elgon; (ii) the Bahima, a pastoral people who came into and conquered the country of these agriculturists. See J. Roscoe, 'Immigrants and their influence in the Lake Region of Central Africa', Frasier Lecture (1923), pp. 6 ff.

If this hypothesis be accepted, we must conclude that the racial mixture has produced a different physical type in different districts of the same geographical area. Among the Baganda, 'there are to be found clans with Roman features and others varying from this type to the broad nose and thick lips of the negro'; 'every clan appears to differ from every other either in build or in face, so that after a time, when these peculiarities have been mentally noted, it becomes possible to distinguish at sight the members of certain clans'. Since the line of descent has been paternal for many generations, and since women from other clans have constantly been introduced in accordance with the exogamic regulations, the particular features of these clans must have been 'transmitted solely through the males and retained in the clan': 'In like manner', Canon Roscoe adds, 'Royalty retain the Muhima features, though the males have married women from clans differing from the Muhima type.' See J. Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 7, 186, 493.

Among the Bakitara, however, the outcome has been different: the admixture has resulted in the production of 'a shorter and coarser type', and 'the effect of the mixed marriages was apparent in the physical appearance of the race, though owing to the fact that some pastoral clans have kept themselves apart, there are still to be found people who show little trace of negro blood' (J. Roscoe, The Bakitara, pp. 7, 13).

The same racial mixture, therefore, under precisely similar conditions, has resulted in the one case in the transmission and preservation of the male type, in the other case in the disappearance of that type.

Major J. A. Meldon, 'Notes on the Bahima of Ankole', Journal Afr. Soc. vi (1907), p. 140, refers to the original negro inhabitants as the Banyankole and distinguishes them from the pastoral and immigrant Bahima. Canon Roscoe seems to use the names as alternatives in 'The Bahima', J.R.A.I. xxxvii (1907), p. 94, but in his latest publication he uses the title Banyankole to denote the whole of the society which has resulted from the interbreeding.

Among the Bakitara there were three social grades, the Bahima, Banyoro and Bahera. The first name denoted the Nilo-Hamitic pastoral nomads; the third was given to the agricultural aborigines; the Banyoro were a middle class which came into existence as a result of intermarriage between the Bahima and Bahera. Cp. the apoloa of Ulawa, SE. Solomon Islands (n. 66).


The cow-people must have introduced the superstition that pre-nuptial pregnancy affected the health of the cattle, but apparently the agricultural people shared the belief.

Neither the Banyankole nor the Bakitara seem to have connected the prohibition of pre-nuptial pregnancy with ghostly anger, as might be suspected from R. Briffault, The Mothers, ii. 26.

Canon Roscoe reports that among the agricultural clans a bridegroom whose bride was not a virgin sent to her parents a hoe-handle 'with a hole in it for the insertion of the iron blade'. The man seems to have taken no other action; evidently he did not expect, certainly he did not demand, that the girl should be a virgin. The custom does not seem to have prevailed among the pastoral clans.

Since the conception of exclusive sexual rights seems to have been quite alien to the consciousness of the agricultural people, who allowed 'the greatest possible freedom'
after marriage, I am inclined to think that the incident of the hoe-handle was nothing more than an isolated case. Perhaps the man in question had visited the Baganda or the Bakitara and observed their customs. The sentence in which his action is described occupies an insignificant position in Canon Roscoe’s narrative, and, indeed, might easily be missed. I have thought it well, however, to drag it out of its obscurity lest I should be suspected of selecting the evidence instead of stating it.

Among both the pastoral and the agricultural clans the father of the groom consummated the marriage if his son was too young. Occasionally the girl seems to have lived for some time as the father’s wife. See J. Roscoe, *The Banyankole*, pp. 127–9, 132.


The Banyankole and the Bakitara are two of the examples which have been chosen by R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, ii. 25, to show that Dr. Westermarck was mistaken when he adduced the objection to pre-nuptial pregnancy as evidence of pre-nuptial chastity. In making this point Mr. Briffault made a valuable contribution to social anthropology. The reported facts, however, do not warrant the insertion in the index of his book, ‘Pre-nuptial Sexual Freedom’, in reference to the Bakitara. Mr. Briffault omits to point out that the *primitiae* were demanded. Indeed, neither the Baganda nor the Bakitara are mentioned in his long note (op. cit., ii. 2–13) which purports to illustrate the prevalence of pre-nuptial freedom among ‘primitive’ peoples, and which, in the opinion of its author, proves that ‘primitive’ man was pre-nuptially sexually free.

For further comments on the work of R. Briffault, see nn. 155, 163, 172, 382, 421, 470.


Some Kitara men are said to have used their influence with their wives in order to persuade them to refrain from such activities. A man ‘might be annoyed’, we are told, with his wife if she admitted to her bed ‘a member of the clan with whom he was not on good terms’: ‘But he could not accuse her of unfaithfulness for so doing.’

It seems a pity to use the word ‘polyandry’ to denote these sexual rights. It might imply an economic relationship which did not exist.

114. J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, p. 91. Canon Roscoe says (op. cit., p. 263) that a girl who became pregnant before marriage was sent to the house of her lover’s father. Her lover was compelled to pay the full bride-price and marry her. If he refused, he was fined.

115. Ibid., pp. 94, 263. Some clans had special tests whereby they sought to prove the legitimacy of a child (ibid., pp. 59, 56–8).

Doubtless the stern character of the Baganda sexual regulations was responsible for their prudish attitude towards nakedness. ‘They preferred to substitute’, we are told, ‘for any plain noun dealing with sex and sexual intercourse the politest and vaguest of paraphrases.’ See H. H. Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, p. 685; J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, p. 443. But surely Sir Harry Johnston was wrong when he attributed the ‘appreciation of female chastity’ to the influence of Christianity, if by ‘chastity’ he means their insistence that a bride should be a virgin. We can hardly credit the missionaries with the diffusion of the demand for the tokens of virginity.

For further remarks on Baganda sexual regulations, see para. 166.

The descriptions of Banyankole 'beliefs' are remarkable examples of loose phraseology, indefinite translations, and contradictory statements. They illustrate forcibly the untrustworthiness of any classifications which are based on 'beliefs'. The value of Canon Roscoe's testimony is vitiated by his neglect of native terminology and his arbitrary use of common English words.

Compare the following statements:

(i) 'Their religion consists of invocations to a spirit known as Mbandua; he has seven different personalities, Wemerra, Kagoro, Diangombe, Nyakururu, Mugasha, Simba, Ndahora' (J. A. Meldon, 'Notes on the Bahima of Ankole', Journ. Afr. Soc. vi (1907), p. 142).


If we exclude (or identify) Simba and Kyomya, the names of Roscoe's 'fetishes' are clearly the same as Meldon's 'personalities'. In The Banyankole, p. 30, Canon Roscoe describes the 'fetishes' as 'horns filled by certain medicine-men with herbs and other ingredients'. I am unable to conjecture how Major Meldon arrived at the conclusion that such magical instruments were 'personalities'. Mandwa is the word which was used by the Bakitara and the Baganda to denote the male or female 'medium' who spoke with the voice of the god when 'possessed' by him. Major Meldon seems to have thought that this man was a 'Spirit' with seven different personalities. Thus he confused the power and the human agency through which a right relation was maintained with that power. Cp. Canon Roscoe's various translations of the Kitara muchwezi (n. 122).

Canon Roscoe does not quote the native words in his monograph on the Banyankole; but mandwa and mayembe seem to be the words which he usually translates as 'medium' (or 'guardian') and as 'fetish' respectively.

In The Banyankole, p. 23, he speaks of an 'ancient dynasty of kings' who became 'gods of the people'. He adds that 'these deified kings had no temples'. The native word which he translates 'gods' is not given; it seems to have been mayembe, which in other passages is rendered as 'fetish'. Moreover, among these alleged deified kings were Wamala, Ndahura, Kagoro, Kyomya, Mugasa, Nyakiri. All these names appear in the above-quoted list of 'fetishes'. But the members of the 'ancient dynasty of kings' were not kings of Ankole: e.g. Wamala was an ancient Kitara king; Mugasa was a king of Uganda. Furthermore, Wamala and Kagoro were Kitara bachwezi; Mugasa was a Uganda lubare. See The Bakitara, pp. 22–5; The Baganda, pp. 290–300.

We must conclude, then, that the phenomena (one cannot say 'beings') which Canon Roscoe first calls 'fetishes' and later 'gods' were named after noted African rulers; and it seems likely that certain bandwa merely manufactured certain magical instruments, bawembe, which they called by the seven above-mentioned names and pretended to consult on behalf of applicants. But this is not what we are told. In his report Canon Roscoe has merely translated the native terms, which he seldom quotes, and fitted the facts to an animistic or polytheistic framework. Having translated mayembe as 'god', he proceeds to credit the Banyankole with some of the ideas which we associate with the word.

Inference is piled upon inference. Thus, we are told that each god 'had his own special fetish'. Such a sentence cannot be intelligently understood. The same native word has been translated both as 'god' and as 'fetish'.

Canon Roscoe contradicts himself in reference to the so-called 'war-god'. Cp. the Northern Bantu, p. 131 ('The war-god is named Zoba. He has both a temple and a priest who is also the medium of the god'), with The Banyankole, pp. 23–4 ('There were no priests, the duties usually performed by such men being left to mediums and medicine-men, and there were no temples. . . . Kazoba had a special
shrine in the country of the clan Baisanza whose members went there to ask favours, taking to him cattle and beer'). I rely on the latter (and later) opinion.

We are not always told the native words which are translated as 'temple', 'shrine', 'priest', 'medium', 'medicine-man', &c. The 'priest' and the 'medium' seem to have been the same man, mandsee; is 'shrine' yet another rendering of mayembe?

For mayembe of the Bakitara and Baganda, see nn. 123, 134.

Cp. also the following statements:

(i) 'Besides the Wemerra and other gods mentioned above, there is the Lugaba, or spirit, who created mankind. The Lugaba has huts built for his worship. The priest is called Omusaza. They pray to Lugaba for rain, and the huts dedicated to him are divided into two parts, one for himself and the other for his father Ruhanga' (J. A. Meldon, 'Notes on the Bahima of Ankole', Journ. Afr. Soc. vi (1907), p. 144).

(ii) 'Lugaba is the supreme deity. He is not worshipped, nor are offerings made to him. He has no sacred place' (J. Roscoe, 'The Bahima', J.R.A.1. xxxvii (1907), p. 108).

(iii) 'The chief deity is named Lugaba. He dwells in the sky and is really the Creator. The Creator has no temples, no priests, and no worship' (J. Roscoe, The Northern Bantu, p. 131).

(iv) 'The creator was Ruhanga. He was known as the Creator and Powerful One, but no prayers were offered to him, though his name was used in ejaculations' (J. Roscoe, The Banyankole, p. 23).

Let us pass over the contradictions in regard to temples and sacred places. Let us even accept the statement that the Banyankole were conscious of a 'creation'. What, in their opinion, was 'created'? We cannot accept 'mankind' as a Bantu conception without direct evidence. And did a Muhima really use the word 'supreme'? What was the Bantu word which he employed? 'Dwells in the sky'—was this an answer to Canon Roscoe's direct question? Let us spell the words lugaba and ruhanga without capitals: does not the conception alter? The one fact seems to have been that on certain unspecified occasions the men of Ankole ejaculated 'ruhanga'.

Cp. n. 122, where the Bakitara ruhanga is discussed. Cp. also my note on the alleged Maori 'Supreme Being', lo (n. 180). For comments on the reports of other Supreme Beings, see nn. 237, 246, 451, 462, 471, 501, 585.

Possibly Major Meldon's omusaza is connected with omusuzi, female diviner, for whom see n. 119.

Such imperfections as these are due to an attempt to describe native 'beliefs', apart from the rites that are based upon them, and in other words than the native words.

117. J. Roscoe, The Banyankole, p. 27.

Mugabe was the title which the British substituted for the original mukama in order to distinguish the ruler of Ankole from the ruler of Kitara, who also was called mukama. The Ankole mukama had to drink poison as soon as there were signs of any deterioration in his mental or physical powers. One of his half-sisters by the same father (the woman who had purified him after the death of his predecessor) was appointed manyanya mukama, the most important position in the land. She did not marry the mukama, but on his death she either strangled herself or retired into private life. It is misleading to call this woman 'queen'. The word 'queen' implies a physical relationship with the mukama which did not exist. See The Banyankole, pp. 35, 50–1, 59–61.

I think, too, that we should refrain from translating mukama or mugabe as 'king', for the word has no single precise meaning, and popular meanings which exist only in the translation may be unwittingly attached to it. It would be better if we spoke
of the Ankole mugabe (or mukama), Kitara mukama, and Uganda kabaka, just as we speak of the Roman rex and the Hellenic basileus.

For the Kitara mukama and Uganda kabaka, see nn. 126, 131.

118. J. Roscoe, *The Banyankole*, p. 31. By 'fetish' Roscoe probably means mayembe. I do not know the word which he renders 'shrine'. I suspect that it is mayembe also. Cp. n. 116.

J. A. Meldon, 'Notes on the Bahima of Ankole', *Journ. Afr. Soc.* vi (1907), p. 145, states that there were no rain-makers in Ankole when he was there. The influence of the missionaries had caused their total disappearance. His description of their erstwhile methods agrees with that of Roscoe. For his statement that 'they pray to Lugaba for rain', see n. 116.


There were women doctors also, omusuzi. We are not told whether their activities were confined to divination or whether they were general practitioners who also divined. The native term for the more expensive consultant was mfumu, pl. abamfungu (Meldon), bafumu (Roscoe).

Ghosts (mizimu) and witchcraft (kuloga) were the commonest causes of sickness. In his earlier writings Canon Roscoe states that a dead king was held responsible also for some forms of illness, but this is not so much emphasized in his later reports. Cp. *J.R.A.I.* xxxvii (1907), p. 28, and *The Northern Bantu*, pp. 127, 134, with *The Banyankole*, p. 28. Perhaps a dead king troubled only the mugabe (mukama).

I am not clear whether or not a medicine-man condescended to act as a wizard. In *J.R.A.I.* xxxvii (1907), p. 103, Canon Roscoe says that the two practitioners were distinguished from one another, but in *The Banyankole*, p. 135, he reports that a man who wished to cause discomfort to his enemy would take a severed portion of the latter's body and a medicine-man (mfumu? mandwa?) 'would work magic with it and cause the owner to fall ill'.

With other passages which concern illness I have the same difficulties as I have mentioned in n. 116. For instance, consider this passage. 'If the cause of the illness, we are told (*The Banyankole*, p. 137), 'was found to be the action of some god, the priests of that god were called in.' The native terms are not quoted, and I suspect that this 'god' is none other than a mayembe, a horn filled with magic herbs. Moreover, this god does not appear to have been one of the members of that ancient dynasty of kings who are said to have become 'gods of the people'. The only one of these 'gods' who is reported to have caused illness is Kagoro; he does not find a place in any list of 'kings'. Kagoro, however, was a Kitara muchwezi, so perhaps some Muhima may have claimed that this mayembe was a manifestation of Kagoro.

It is possible, of course, that in the above-mentioned passage Canon Roscoe is referring to an illness which was caused by the ghost of a dead king. In such a case 'the mandwa or chief priest of the king is the only person who can assist'. This makes sense of the phrase, 'the priest was called in', but surely the word 'god' is inapplicable, for a Muhima would have said muzimu, 'ghost'. On the other hand, if we accept the word 'god' (mayembe, see n. 116), how does the 'priest' come in, for we are told that 'there were no priests' (*The Banyankole*, p. 23)?

All these confusions would have been avoided if the native terms had been quoted. Moreover, when he calls the mandwa a 'chief priest', Canon Roscoe implies that he was the head of the profession, but this is plainly contrary to fact, for the word is a common Bantu term.

Canon Roscoe also uses the word 'priest' to denote the caretakers of Esanza
(Ensangi, Isangi), the forest where the bodies of dead kings were deposited. This increases the confusion of his narrative.


120. J. Roscoe, ‘The Bahima’, *J.R.A.I.* xxxvii (1907), p. 103; idem, *The Banyankole*, p. 139. According to the former passage, a ghost which caused trouble was always that of some relation or of some person of another clan, never that of a father. ‘A father’s ghost was always good and might never be driven away.’ This statement seems to be contradicted by the erection of shrines to a dead father by his heir. See *The Banyankole*, pp. 25-6, 149.


Apparently the statement that the muchwezi was approached by every one in time of difficulty must be qualified, for the bandwea, ‘priests’, had nothing to do with the agricultural clans. Canon Roscoe does not explain this discrepancy in his report. The latter statement is on p. 25.

The muchwezi are commonly called ‘gods’, but in *The Northern Bantu*, pp. 8, 16, Canon Roscoe calls them ‘priests of the country’, and speaks of a ‘priestly clan’. Thus he confused the power with the agency through which a right relation was maintained with that power. Cp. a similar confusion by Major J. A. Meldon in reference to the mandwea of the Banyankole (n. 116).

H. H. Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, pp. 587-9, states that the word muchwezi meant the ghost of an ancestor or chief, and was translated ‘High Priest’ by the early missionaries. The latter would not be interested in the accurate interpretation of native conceptions and their error may have been the cause of the latter confusion.

Canon Roscoe reports a belief in ‘Ruhanga, the Creator’, but it is difficult to understand what ruhanga created. The capital R does not appear to be justified. Ruhanga is said to have ‘created mankind’. Did a Kitara man state, without being prompted, that this was his opinion? What word did he use to denote ‘create’ and ‘mankind’? Cp. my comments on the alleged Banyankole ‘Creator’ (n. 116) and on the alleged Maori ‘Supreme Being’, Io (n. 180).

Cp. the following statements:

(i) ‘He (i.e. ruhanga) had neither temple nor priest. People did not call upon him for assistance’ (*The Northern Bantu*, p. 91).

(ii) ‘There was but one god, Ruhanga, the creator and father of mankind. With him were associated the names Enkya and Enkaya Enkya . . . Ruhanga, or more frequently Enkya, was called upon by the people in distress’ (*The Bakitara*, p. 21).

The evidence is not quoted which would justify this ejaculation being called a ‘god’. Moreover, if there was ‘but one god’, why are the nineteen bachwezi called ‘gods’? To call this ejaculation of ruhanga and/or enkya a ‘monotheistic belief’, as Canon Roscoe does, and then to report the attention which was paid to nineteen other alleged ‘gods’, is to make nonsense of English words. The lack of exactitude, both in thought and in expression, which is apparent in these pages is characteristic of most attempts to describe native beliefs apart from the rites, and in any words but the native words.

In the following passages (*The Bakitara*, pp. 41, 44, 219) the word or words translated ‘spirit’ are not quoted: ‘Though there were certain spirits which were feared, there was no knowledge of a spirit-world or of any spirits created apart from this world. The people stood in constant awe only of disembodied spirits of
men, ghosts.' A hill is said to have been sacred 'because it was the home of a special earth-spirit'. A 'hill-spirit' was propitiated by offerings before quarrying operations were commenced.

Until the native words have been divulged, such reports are valueless. Cp. a similar use of the word 'spirit' in the report on the Baganda (n. 133).


The *mandwa* of Kagoro, a *muchwezi* who was connected with the lightning, is said to have controlled a number of medicine-men. There is no information concerning the extent of his jurisdiction or concerning the number of his followers. The native word which is translated 'medicine-men' is not given. Was it *bandwa*? Perhaps not, for only the pastoral clans consulted *bandwa*. The names of the inferior practitioners who were consulted by the agricultural clans are not given.

The Kitara word for 'shrime' is also missing. Perhaps it was *mayenibe*, for which see n. 116.

When we are told that the priesthood, i.e. the office of *mandwa*, was hereditary in the clan, we may understand (merely) that the clan appointed the successor. For a comment on the untrustworthiness of the reports of heredity when the classificatory system of relationship prevails, see n. 59.

124. Ibid., pp. 22–5.

125. Ibid., pp. 28–33. These men are alternately called 'rain-makers' and 'priests'. The native term is not given. Were they the *bandwa* of Munume? Possibly they were connected with Munume; but Munume's power cannot have been great, or his representatives would not have been treated in this cavalier manner.

126. Ibid., pp. 27 f., 38–41, 118–19, 285.

A cure might be effected also by drawing the sufferer through a hole made in an ant-hill—a procedure (perhaps uncommon) which may be compared with the Lango method of drawing a child under a granary (n. 358).

The native terms for wizard and witchcraft are not given.

The *Mukama*, 'King', was not allowed to live to a ripe old age. As soon as he showed any sign of mental or physical deterioration, one of his wives prepared poison for him. When the new king succeeded, a mock or substitute king was first put upon the throne and afterwards was killed—in order to deceive death, we are told. See J. Roscoe, *The Northern Bantu*, pp. 14, 27, 50 f.; idem, *The Bakitara*, pp. 6–11, 89, 123, 129–30.

For a comment on the translation of the word *mukama*, see n. 117.

The native word which is translated 'queen' is not given. A comparison with the Ankole terms suggests a compound of *mukama*. A half-sister of a recently enthroned *Mukama* was chosen when he succeeded to power, and the ceremony of her appointment was regarded also, we are told, as a form of marriage. The *Mukama* often took her to his bed, but she was not allowed to bear a child. A union with a full sister was incestuous. See J. Roscoe, *The Bakitara*, pp. 136, 140.

It is noteworthy that the sexual relations which existed between the Kitara *Mukama* and his half-sister were not permitted between the Ankole *Mukama* (*Mugabe*) and the *Munyanya Mukama*, for whom see n. 117.


128. Ibid., pp. 41–2, 296. 'People who had no property and no power in this world were not generally feared and no steps were taken to keep their ghosts in good temper'; but the ghost of any one who had been wrongfully accused, or who had committed suicide, was dangerous. Even ghosts of women were feared under those circumstances.


When we study this monograph, Canon Roscoe's application of 'priest' to the caretaker of the temple, and of 'medium' to the mandwa who uttered the god's word, must be remembered. He translates mandwa as 'priest' in his other publications. In this monograph his use of 'priest' is not always clear. Moreover, he does not quote the native word which he is translating. Cp. e.g. pp. 134 and 273 f. In the latter passage the 'chief priest' (who does not seem to be mentioned elsewhere) is kabona.

There was no priestly order. The so-called priest interpreted the utterance of the mandwa and looked after the temple estates. Some temples had more than one (so-called) priest, but no temple had more than one mandwa.

Many clans possessed their own special lubare, 'god', and the care of the so-called national gods was handed over to certain clans. According to Canon Roscoe's use of the word 'priest', the heads of those clans were ex officio 'priests'. Thus the qualification of 'priests' seems to have been social or political, not ecclesiastical or magical.

The dual priesthood of the Baganda may be compared with the dual priesthood of the Tongans, but in our reports on the latter society the taula-outua, who corresponds to the mandwa, is called the 'priest', and the feao, who corresponds to the Uganda 'priest', is referred to as 'friend of the god'. These various English equivalents are at first extremely puzzling. They illustrate the vague manner in which common English words have been used in anthropological literature.

For the Tongan priesthood, see n. 209. Cp. also the dual character of the staff attached to an Ila ghost-grove (n. 403).

For the Ankole and Kitara mandwa, see paras. 37-8, nn. 116, 119.

131. J. Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 275-6, 283. The native term for temple is not given.

The Baganda considered that the ghost of a dead man attached itself to his jaw-bone, and a special building was erected to receive the jaw-bone of a dead king. A temple of this kind was called malalo. It must be distinguished from the mastiro, mausoleum, where the royal corpses lay. But there were other temples, too, e.g. that of Kaumpuli on the Kitara border, which were different from the malalo. The native term for them is missing. Within the malalo enclosure some of the dead king's widows (those who had not been slaughtered at his funeral) lived, together with his mandwa. A visit by a ruling king to the malalo of his predecessor was a very great occasion indeed.

The word which Canon Roscoe translates 'king' is kabaka. The title was held also by the 'queen' and the 'queen-mother'. It seems a pity that a word of such wide application should be limited in this manner by a rendering which is only roughly accurate. The word which Canon Roscoe translates 'queen' is lubuga: 'Any man becoming heir to another', we are told, 'took to wife lubuga, a near female relative of the deceased. This woman was treated by all the members of the clan as the man's wife, though he was not allowed to have marital relations with her, because she was his sister.' I am not clear whether we are to understand 'sister' as own or as classificatory. If the lubuga was own sister of the heir, she would be the daughter of the deceased, for usually a man's heir was his son, but 'near female relative' is a queer manner of referring to a daughter. If, on the other hand, the classificatory sister is meant, why refer to a classificatory sister as 'sister' and a classificatory daughter as 'near female relative'? The lubuga was just as much a 'near female relative' to the heir as to the deceased. The sense of most of the passages seems to demand the former interpretation; e.g. if a man had no sister,
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a daughter of the deceased’s brother was appointed. The evidence, however, is not conclusive.

On the death of a kabaka, a lubuga was chosen for his heir, and she remained with the heir during the period in which he mourned the dead man. When he went to live in his new palace, she lived near him, but her court was separated from his court by a stream of running water. She was the half-sister of the new kabaka, and his ‘queen’, but she was neither his wife nor his sexual partner. She had officials in her court who bore the same titles as the great chiefs of the realm, and enjoyed absolute power over her subjects and her estates. She was forbidden, however, to bear children.

See J. Roscoe, The Baganda, pp. 83 f., 122, 125, 191, 236.

I should conjecture that the practice of lubuga among the commoners was an imitation of the institution which the immigrant Bahima brought with them into the country. For the two elements in Baganda society, see n. 110.

The Uganda kabaka corresponds to the mukama of Kitara and the mukama (mugabe) of Ankole, for whom see nn. 117, 126.

132. J. Roscoe, ‘Immigrants and their Influence in the Lake Region of Central Africa’, Frazer Lecture (1923), p. 25; idem, The Baganda, p. 271. The former of these passages represents Canon Roscoe’s more mature opinion. The importance of these four balubare was not emphasized so greatly in the latter, and earlier, book.


Usually when an observer reports a ‘belief in’ ghosts, he does not mean ‘confidence in the existence of’ but ‘confidence in the power of’ ghosts.

Canon Roscoe says that large trees and rivers were thought to be the abode of ‘spirits’. He does not give the native term for ‘spirits’. My suspicion of this anamistic belief is increased when I read that some hills were sacred as the residence of animal ghosts (op. cit., pp. 317–19). Cp. the report of some alleged ‘spirit’ beliefs among the Bakitara (n. 122).


‘The temple of every king from Kintu to Mutesa (i.e. thirty) is known.’

We are told that a mayembe, ‘fetish’, was an ‘object of veneration’; but the phrase is not helpful.

Fetishes, we read, were ‘varied and numberless’. Some of them had temples and priests. I do not know what native terms are translated as ‘temple’ and ‘priest’. The word for temple cannot be malalo, for which see n. 131. The priest cannot well have been the mandwa or the kabona, for which see n. 131. The problem, therefore, cannot be solved.

This consistent absence of native terms is distressing. Sometimes the same English word is employed as the equivalent of several native words; sometimes a native word is translated by different English words; sometimes the native words are not quoted at all. We cannot understand native conceptions under such conditions. See further para. 148.

Only the most powerful medicine-men (basawo, n. 135) could manufacture a mayembe, which seems to have consisted of a buffalo horn, stuffed with powerful herbs; but there were many varieties of bayembe. For the mayembe of the Bakitara and Banyankole, see nn. 116, 119, 123.


C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan, i. 198, describe Mutesa as taking ‘an intelligent interest in a wide range of subjects’, and state that he would ‘discuss for hours abstruse points in theology, political economy, and philosophy’. It is not uncommon for leading citizens in a deistic society to be sceptical about the gods of their country. See para. 70.
It seems possible, however, that Mutesa delivered his subjects from the clutches of a hierarchy and then saw them fall into the embraces of the more direct magicians, for, when Canon Roscoe was in the country, 'The priests and the mediums had little power in comparison with the medicine-men' (The Baganda, p. 277). Yet apparently customs were diverse. Cp. the following statements: 'It was to those men (basawo) that the nation turned in time of trouble' (The Baganda, p. 338); 'Especially in cases of sickness did the mandwa, medium, give advice' (Frazer Lecture (1923), p. 25).

Cp. the comparative impotence of the priests among the deistic Fijians (n. 99). For a discussion of its significance, see para. 166.

A special clan, or society, of basawo, bakuba engato, 'leather-throwers', used pieces of leather like dice in their divinations. They are said to have 'belonged to the god Mwanga', who is to be identified, I presume, with the lubare Wanga, the reputed grandfather of Mukasa. See The Baganda, pp. 338–9.

A medicine-man could transfer sickness to an animal, which then was driven out to some waste land and killed. If a patient could not afford an animal, the practitioner took a bunch of grass, passed it over the sufferer and threw it away; the sickness went with it. Occasionally a sickness could be transferred to another human being; a moulded figure of the sick man was placed in the path and the individual who was unfortunate enough to step over it took the illness away with him. See The Baganda, pp. 343–4.

I should prefer to have the native terms for these processes. It seems that it would be easy to confuse the transference of a sickness with the transference of a ghost, and vice versa, for we often find that the natives applied the same word to both a sickness and a ghost. It is only by noting and emphasizing the native terminology that we can be sure of avoiding errors.

We are told that when the gods announced that the Bakitara were working magic in order to inflict disease upon the Baganda, a man and a boy were placed on the border, with broken limbs, and left there. The idea seems to have been that the affliction would be passed to them. See The Baganda, p. 342. I do not know whether this course of action was adopted on every occasion, or whether an odd custom has been reported owing to its anthropological interest. It is, at any rate, a noteworthy fact that Kaumpuli, god of plague, had a temple on the Kitara border. See The Baganda, p. 309; Frazer Lecture (1923), p. 25.

Kaumpuli is said to have resided in a deep hole inside the temple; the hole was kept securely covered lest the god should escape. This is an interesting example of magical control of a recognized deity. We must rid ourselves of any ideas of quiet respect in regard to these deities. For instance, although a Kabaka consulted the representatives of the gods, propitiated them with presents, and followed their instructions, 'he would,' we are told (The Baganda, p. 273), 'if one of them annoyed him, send and loot his temple and estate'.


In the latter and earlier work Canon Roscoe does not mention a specific rain-god. Perhaps he was looking for a rain-making ceremony such as was regarded at one time as a typical item of 'primitive' culture. He submits a short description of 'ceremonies to stop rain', which are reported to have been connected with the god Kiwanuka (whom I do not find mentioned elsewhere), but these ceremonies seem to have been impulsive actions which have been noted as the result of a diligent search.
Rain-making seems to have been a recognised female occupation. A deceased female *mandwa*, medium, of Musoke became the goddess Nagawonyi. Women were specifically connected with rain-making. When there was a long period of drought, female messengers were sent to the temple of Nagawonyi in order to persuade her to use her influence with Musoke on their behalf. Thus Nagawonyi appears to have occupied a celestial position analogous to that of a Christian saint.

With Nagawonyi, op. the Lango *Atida* (n. 359).


Sir A. B. Ellis also remarks: 'Unbetrothed girls are allowed considerable freedom, and virginity is hardly expected of them'; but, according to Mr. Ajisafe, a man 'who has carnal knowledge of an unbetrothed girl must pay for her and take her to wife'. I do not know whether this apparently definite statement from a Christian Yoruba can be accepted without question. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Talbot seem to think that betrothals were usual in all sections of the people.

Sir A. B. Ellis says that extreme steps were not always taken in the case of an unmarried girl who was not a virgin: 'Usually some compromise is reached.' I do not know how far this remark would apply to conditions which prevailed before the arrival of the white man. 'It would appear', Mr. Talbot remarks (op. cit. iii. 430), 'that the standard of morality has been lowered since the arrival of Europeans.' I presume that by 'standard of morality' we are to understand sexual conduct, and, although the observation seems to apply more to post-nuptial than to pre-nuptial conduct, I am inclined to think that the alien influence would have been responsible for a 'compromise' in the matter of virginity which would not have been acceptable before the advent of the white man. If they had been always ready to compromise, the Yoruba scarcely would have continued to demand the tokens. They are more likely to have indulged in the same kind of deception as that practised by the Tongans (para. 47).

The exclusive sexual rights of a husband were secured to him as soon as he paid the *ijohun*, 'consent-fee'. See A. K. Ajisafe, op. cit., p. 55.

Unlike other Nigerian people, the Yoruba did not place their young girls in a fatting-house before marriage (P. A. Talbot, op. cit. ii. 394, 398).

140. P. A. Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, pp. 203-4, 217; idem, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, ii. 408-9; P. A. Talbot, Woman's Mysteries of a Primitive People, pp. 76, 82, 86. The last two references apply only to the 'fatting-house' custom.

The first, and apparently the third also, of these publications refers exclusively to the Eket (Ekkett) district, which was inhabited by less than one-sixth of the people. In the second-named book Mr. Talbot deals with all the nine sub-tribes, but he handles his subject in a very general manner, and in his description of Ibibio 'beliefs' he makes constant reference to and comparison with Babylonian, Egyptian, and Greek culture. The comparisons which he makes may have increased the significance of some native customs, which thus may have received a greater emphasis than their cultural importance warranted. Cp. para. 61.


142. P. A. Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, ii. 324. Is this the *abia idiong*?


In the fourth of these passages Mr. Talbot reports that a ghost might haunt a place and kill people as they passed. In that case a noted witch-doctor would entice the ghost into a pot which he afterwards buried. Mr. Talbot does not give the native word which he translates 'wicked ghost or devil'.

It is said that the diviners used to have a secret society of their own. Latterly membership did not confer the power to divine; that was the result of special training; we are not told what the training was. In later days any one was admitted as a member, whether he was a diviner or not.


Sir A. B. Ellis equates the Yoruba orisha with the Tshi bohsum (para. 100), Ga wong, Ewe todu (para. 99), and derives it from ori, 'summit', and sha, 'select', 'choose'. Mr. Talbot suggests ri, 'see', instead of ori. For Sir J. G. Frazer's opinion of these derivations, see para. 99.

Orisha was applied also to white men, and to any sacred object. It was used also as an adjective, 'sacred', 'holy'.

R. E. Dennett, *Nigerian Studies*, p. 12, n. 1, translates orisha 'deified departed one'.


A priest was orilisha, 'owner of orisha'; a priest of Shango was onishango, 'owner of shango'; and the man who practised medicine was olosanyin, 'owner of sanyin'. May not ologun, then, have been 'owner of ogun, god of iron and war'? In the reports ologun is described as an 'owner of medicine'.

For a comment on the alleged hereditary nature of a profession when a classificatory system of relationship prevails, see n. 59.


150. Some general remarks concerning the Southern Nigerian societies in general, but no individual society in particular, have been passed by P. A. Talbot, *The Peoples of Southern Nigeria*, iii. 949 ff., 954. Mr. Talbot says that 'many doctors and priests are credited with the power to send rain 'or to stop it'. The Yoruba method is not described. Mr. Talbot purports to describe the beliefs of the Yoruba about rain and pays no attention to the method by which they tried to secure it. Unfortunately, therefore, his Table No. 30 is useless from the anthropological point of view: it raises many questions and answers few.


'Sanyin has been compared to Asclepius, but these comparisons with the 'gods' of other societies are inadmissible unless the method of maintaining a right relation
with those gods was identical. Cp. my comments on the Aztec god of healing, para. 43.

Aroni is reported to have been a 'god' or 'spirit' who lived in a forest and revealed medical secrets to those who displayed no fear of him.


All the remarks in this volume are vague, such words as 'doctor', 'juju', 'medicine', &c., being used freely but in no exact sense. Pp. 153-62 seem to apply to no society in particular; pp. 179-84 may or may not apply to the Yoruba; apparently not. Mr. Talbot's inexact phrases afford yet another example of the perplexities which result when 'beliefs' are separated from the rites and described in any terms but the native terms.


We are not told what worship was paid nor to whom it was paid.

Mr. Talbot's remarks are very general, e.g. op. cit. ii. 307: 'The Yoruba generally made sacrifices once a year of a he-goat, or of a cock at any time, when the help of the ancestors was needed.' Sir A. B. Ellis (op. cit., p. 137) is a little more explicit: 'It is usual for offerings and prayers to be made to the dead from time to time, and sometimes the skull of the deceased is exhumed and placed in a small temple where offerings are made to it.' Sir Arthur does not say on what principle they decided whether the skull should be exhumed or not. 'Before taking the field for war, offerings are made at the graves of warriors of renown and their assistance supplicated.' Is this ancestor-cult? The information is extremely scanty. Cp. the attention which the Dahomans paid to noli (para. 99).


In the eighteenth century Yoruba was a powerful kingdom, and received tribute from Dahomey until 1818 (R. E. Dennett, *Nigerian Studies*, p. 6; A. B. Ellis, op. cit., p. 7). Thus at one time they may have displayed expansive energy.


It seems that boys fed with their parents but slept in the seminary (Bancroft, l.c.), and that girls slept in large halls under the supervision of matrons (Clavigero, l.c.). Clavigero lays great emphasis upon the rigidity of the regulations which kept the sexes apart, and Bancroft often mentions the extensive character of parental power and surveillance; but I doubt if in these matters the habits of all classes of people were the same.

Joseph de Acosta, *The Natural and Moral History of the Indies*, trans. E. Grimston, ed. C. R. Markham, ii. 370, makes several observations in regard to the sexual life of the Aztecs, but he discusses sexual behaviour rather than sexual regulations. He seems to mean that a husband liked his bride to be a virgin, and that, if she was not, her family was shamed, 'for that they had not kept good guard over her'. I do not cite him with confidence. His phrases are often so circumlocutory as to be almost meaningless.

The passage (H. H. Bancroft, op. cit. i. 514) which R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, ii. 4 n., cites, and which is included in his index under the heading 'Mexico, pre-nuptial licence', refers exclusively to *New Mexican Indians*, i.e. Navaho, Comanches, Yuman, and Apaches. It is a pity to make such a misleading entry in an index to a collection of data the value of which depends upon the accuracy of its information.

For further comments on Mr. Briffault's methods, see nn. 112, 163, 172, 382, 121, 470.
Concerning the Mayan natives Bancroft remarks (op. cit. ii. 661-2, 666, 673, 675) that they entrusted the more advanced education to the priests, but they were not so strict with their children as the Nahuans. They are said to have dealt more leniently with adulteresses, but death seems to have been the fate of a seducer. Both sexes submitted to their parents in the choice of a spouse.

It is impossible, of course, to accept as definite evidence any statement about 'lenience' unless the sexual regulations, both post-nuptial and pre-nuptial, are described. Otherwise the word merely denotes an opinion on the part of the writer. Moreover, we require to be assured that (i) the judgement is made after the general conduct of the whole society has been reviewed, (ii) the lenience was definitely the result of unaffected native habits and not due to extenuating circumstances.

In a complicated society like the Mayan we must be especially careful that the first requirement is satisfied. For instance, a superficial observer might be content to state that the Romans treated an adulteress more leniently than the Teutons; but, in the first place, the remark would lack any scientific value unless it applied to each of the social strata into which the Romans and Teutons were organized; secondly, it would be misleading, for the Romans treated their adulteresses in a different manner at different periods of their history.

We know very little of Mayan social customs. A further passage of H. H. Bancroft (op. cit. ii. 670), however, is worth quoting: 'Among the civilized nations of Nicaragua, the father, mother, or whoever gave away the bride, was asked in presence of the assembled guests whether or not she came as a virgin. If the answer was in the affirmative and the husband afterwards found that she had been already seduced, he had the right to return her to her parents, and she was looked upon as a bad woman; but if the parents answered that she was not a virgin, and the man agreed to take her, the marriage was valid.' It might be possible to infer from this passage that at one time virginity was required of a bride, and that in later days society relaxed its demands.

Cp. the Tongans (para. 47).

Quetzalcoatl was also an honorary title of the high priest of Uitzilopochtli (op. cit., p. 81). It seems possible that he was once a mortal man. See the passage cited in n. 159.

In the conquest period Mexican religion was, Mr. Spence considers, 'a vastly elaborated rain-cult, similar in its tendency to that still prevalent among the Pueblo tribes of New Mexico and Arizona, yet broader in outlook, of a higher complexity, and productive of a theology and an ethical system of greater sophistication and scope' (op. cit., p. 11). Again, 'The rain-cult of Tlaloc resembled perhaps that of Pueblo at the present time' (op. cit., p. 23). The comparison with the Pueblo ceremonies is easily made, but the resemblances must not be allowed to hide the very great differences. The Aztec gods were approached in temples through the agency of priests; the Pueblo rites were carried out in a different manner. The two cults may have had a common origin, but at the time when we knew them they were of a totally different nature. For a comment on and summary of Pueblo culture, see paras. 122-5.

When Mr. Spence remarks (op. cit., p. 20), 'All later additions of theology and priestly invention can be viewed as mere excrescences and ornaments upon the simple architecture of the temple of the rain-cult', he seems to suggest that a later belief coalesced with an alleged primary rite. It is more likely, I think, that when a temple was erected to one power or god, then similar buildings were put up in honour of the other gods. The 'additions of theology and priestly invention' would
appear to be later and more considered opinions concerning the nature and character of the powers with which a right relation was maintained in those temples.

Mr. Spence also says (op. cit., p. 9): ‘At the time of the Conquest we observe Mexican religion as a highly complex faith, with a ceremonial of a most elaborate nature, a priesthood with nicely defined gradations in office, and a pantheon which had obviously been formed by the collocation of the deities of provincial and dependent tribes and peoples around a nucleus composed of the national and departmental gods of the Aztecs.’ Mr. Spence does not quote the evidence which would justify the use of the word ‘obviously’. I doubt if ‘beliefs’ have ever been formed by a process of ‘collocation’.

Tlaloc is mentioned also as ‘the Mexican rain and water-god’ by H. H. Bancroft, The Native Races of the Pacific States of North America, ii. 305; iii. 120, 134, &c. Bancroft describes the ritual in op. cit. iii. 324-48.

Apparently it is uncertain whether Tlaloc was one god or many. Bancroft speaks of ‘Tlalocs, gods of rains and waters’ (op. cit. ii. 305), but ‘they drowned children in honour of Tlaloc’ (op. cit. ii. 308). He uses the plural in op. cit. ii. 334, 337, and the singular in op. cit. ii. 584. In op. cit. iii. 118, we read of ‘the Mexican god Tlaloc’ while in op. cit. iii. 343, 345, Bancroft speaks of Tlaloc as ‘they’.

For a report concerning rain-makers, see n. 160.

160. H. H. Bancroft, The Native Races of the Pacific States of North America, ii. 597. The references to the treatment of sickness are scanty.

Mrs. Zelia Nuttall, ‘Sorcery, Medicine and Surgery in Ancient Mexico’, The Johns Hopkins Hospital Bulletin, xiii, no. 133 (April 1902) (separate reprint), mentions certain healers ‘who sucked out illness’ and certain sorcerers whose office she compares to that of the ‘rain-maker’ of the Pueblo tribes. I should follow her exposition with a greater ease if I were confident that she were not selecting those aspects of Aztec life which could be paralleled by Pueblo data, and disregarding the practices which differed from Pueblo customs. Just as rationalistic society consists of a number of social strata each occupying a different position in the cultural scale, so in a deistic society all the people do not rely on the same medium. The neighbour of a god-worshipper is often a wizard. But Mrs. Nuttall mentions a ‘priest who lived in strict seclusion in the temple, and fasted’; and states that he alone could protect the people ‘from the evil sorcerers who could bewitch a man’. The emphasis which she has placed upon the existence of Aztec sorcerers, therefore, has not blinded her to the fact that there were also Aztec priests and temples. Yet the fact of their existence vitiates her comparison between the Aztec and the Pueblo magicians, for after reading her paper it might be assumed that the Aztecs relied exclusively on ‘rain-makers’ when they needed rain. The assumption would be false.


Taylor remarks that ‘every woman was noa, or common’; but the term noa seems to have been applied to all women who were outside the prohibited degrees. ‘Not forbidden’ would be a more accurate rendering, if an attempt must be made to translate a word which has no English equivalent.

All the above passages refer explicitly to the sexual conduct of unmarried girls.

The restrictions which were placed on a betrothed girl are mentioned also by W. Brown, *New Zealand and its Aborigines*, p. 34; G. F. Angas, *Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand*, ii. 314; E. Best, *The Maori*, i. 257 (*Memoirs of the Polynesian Society*, vol. v). E. Tregear, *The Maori*, p. 285, states that ‘even when there was no betrothal the daughters of a great chief had to exhibit much discretion’. This probably means that a man of influence and rank objected to his daughter having relations with a man of a lower class.

According to E. Best, ‘Maori Marriage Customs’, *T.N.Z.I.* xxxvi (1903), p. 33 f., it was the custom among the Tuhoe tribe to make the eldest daughter of a chief puhi. Her title as an eldest daughter was *tapairu*; puhi was a social rank which was specially conferred upon her. A puhi was not allowed to have sexual intercourse. She was forbidden also to do certain work: ‘The idea was to make her an important person, to be treated with respect and looked up to.’ We are not told whether this was a regular or an occasional custom, nor have we any information in regard to the girl’s duties. A puhi who was detected in sexual activity was degraded and released from the tapu. Nothing else seems to have happened and no one seems to have taken a serious view of the matter. Apparently such falls from grace were not uncommon.

The puhi is not mentioned by any authority except Best, who repeats his evidence at greater length in *The Maori*, i. 450–1. Both H. W. Williams, *A Dictionary of the Maori Language*, s.v., and E. Tregear, *Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, s.v., translate puhi ‘betrothed woman’, or ‘a much-courted, unbetrothed young woman’. These renderings contradict one another. According to E. S. Shortland, *Maori Religion and Mythology*, p. 107, the puhi was a betrothed female, or a female of rank restricted from marriage. It is unlikely, however, that the word can have possessed such contrary meanings, and it is clear that every betrothed female was not a puhi.

I am inclined to think that the custom which Best reports as prevailing among the Tuhoe tribe prevailed also in other districts, and that neither Williams nor Tregear was introduced to those details which reveal its true character. Perhaps the institution was already in desuetude. Shortland seems to refer to the same custom as Best when he mentions ‘a female of rank restricted from marriage’. His statement that the word was applied to a ‘betrothed female’ may be an inference he had drawn and not a fact he had observed. At the same time, it is remarkable that the dictionaries make no reference to the restrictions which were placed on the girl’s sexual activities, for therein seems to have lain the difference between *taumon* and *puhi*.

The institution of the puhi as described by Best is reminiscent of the Samoan *taupo(u)*, but the differences between the two institutions are as significant as their similarities. Virginity was demanded of *taupo(u)*; a public test was made of her obedience to the ordinance; her frailty was punished. A puhi also was supposed to refrain from sexual intercourse, but her continence was a fiction rather than a fact. Moreover, she was not punished if she broke the tapu. The Maori institution seems to represent the Samoan custom in a decadent form.

For the Samoan *taupo(u)*, see n. 163.

163. The quotations are from W. T. Pritchard, ‘Notes on certain matters connected with the South Sea Islanders’, *Memoirs of the London Anthropological Society*, i (1863–4), pp. 324–5, who repeats the account in his *Polynesian Reminiscences*, pp. 138–9. In the latter volume, however, he omits the details of the ceremony of which, he says, ‘the amenities of decorum forbid the description’.
S. Ella, ‘Samoa’, Fourth Rep. Aust. Ass. Adv. Sc. (1892), p. 626, states that at the marriage of a chief’s children there was ‘a truly heathenish custom which will not bear description’. J. B. Stair, Old Samoa, p. 174, who is the only writer to quote the native name for the rite, remarks that ‘the degrading details are utterly unfit for publication’. There can be no doubt, I think, that both these writers refer to the virginity test; thus they may be cited as authorities for the statement which is made more explicitly by Pritchard.

H. S. Cooper, Coral Islands, p. 213, remarks that the leading feature of the betrothal ceremony of a lady of rank was that ‘the virtue of the bride-elect was publicly placed beyond doubt’. G. Turner, Samoa, A Hundred Years Ago and Long Before, pp. 94–5, mentions the applause which greeted the girl who passed the test successfully. ‘The obscenity to prove her virginity which preceded this burst of feeling’, he says, ‘will not bear the light of description.’ He adds that the punishment was ‘a severe beating’ and that the ‘fear of disgrace’ was a powerful deterrent.

All the above authorities speak as if the public test of virginity was an integral part of the ceremony whenever a chief’s daughter was married. It is true that they do not define the word ‘chief’, and we cannot tell whether an alii is meant, or a tulafale, or a matai who was neither alii nor tulafale; but it is plain that Pritchard, Ella, Stair, Turner, and Cooper thought that every chief’s daughter was compelled to undergo the ordeal. One authority, however, states that the girl who was exposed to the public gaze was the taupou of the village, usually the daughter of the ruling chief. See G. Brown, Melanesians and Polynesians, pp. 119–22. Dr. Brown’s testimony has been interpreted by R. Briffault, The Mothers, ii. 57, to mean that there was only one virgin per village, ‘that village virgin being specially chosen and guarded for the purpose of a ceremonial marriage with a chief’.

It is difficult to understand how Dr. Brown’s statements can be thus understood. He says that there were two kinds of marriages, ‘those in which the whole village is concerned, and those in which the matter is only one between the parties themselves and their respective families’. He describes in full detail the first kind of marriage, and then adds a few lines about elopements, which afterwards had to be regularized. He omits to refer again to the unions which were conducted privately. He certainly seems to think that the taupou was required to be a virgin, but I do not understand him to mean that every girl who was required to be a virgin was a taupou. Even if he had made this explicit statement, I should hesitate to allow his testimony to outweigh that of the other authorities whose reports are quoted above.

I have already mentioned the inexactitude of Dr. Brown’s writings on the inhabitants of New Britain (para. 32, nn. 52–5), and I think that Mr. Briffault has stretched the evidence unjustifiably in order to make his point.

The taupou (taupo) was a daughter of a chief who was appointed to an office of social and diplomatic importance. She was a kind of village hostess and spokeswoman. Margaret Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa, p. 98, states that even in modern times the taupo is compelled to undergo the virginity test, with the same results as in former days. She adds, ‘Although this virginity-testing ceremony was theoretically observed at weddings of people of all ranks, it was simply ignored if the boy knew that it was an idle form.’ I do not know the source of Miss Mead’s information on this important point, but I should hesitate to believe that in the old days the boy’s opinion mattered one way or the other. The ceremony was carried out by the elders before the assembled people; probably what the groom said or felt was of little importance.

Christianity has put an end to the test, and instead of preventing pre-nuptial indulgence is content to forbid it, with the inevitable result that in Samoa, as in Fiji and elsewhere, the sexual conduct of the natives has become much more loose. I do not think that the reports which reach us now from living Samoans concerning the pagan customs of their forefathers have any anthropological value.
It is noteworthy, however, that Miss Mead regards the virginity tests as having been at one time regular and universal.

Our information concerning the taupou is not very satisfactory. According to E. Schultz, 'The most important principles of Samoan Family Law', J.P.S. xx (1911), p. 48, only some chiefs could appoint them. I do not know if we must conclude that every village did not possess a taupou. The use of the word 'chief' is too vague to warrant a definite opinion. A great deal of uncertainty would have been avoided if our authorities had employed, or even mentioned, the native title, or titles, of the man whom they describe as a 'chief'.

R. Briffault, The Mothers, ii. 11 n., 57 f., cites, inter alios, G. Turner, op. cit., p. 95, G. Brown, op. cit., p. 285, and S. Ella, op. cit., p. 626, in support of a claim that pre-nuptial sexual intercourse was the rule among the Samoans. The only passage in Turner's book which possibly could be interpreted as referring to pre-nuptial sexual conduct is quoted in the text. Briffault omits to mention the virginity tests which Turner described on a preceding page, though he makes an effort to belittle them in the second of the above-cited passages. I can find no sentence in Ella's essay or in Brown's book which could bear the meaning which Briffault places on it. On the pages to which we are referred Brown describes part of the Samoan system of government and Ella mentions the temporary unions of certain well-born handsome youths, or beaux, manaia, who contracted alliances with young women for the sake of the property which was always exchanged on the occasion of a marriage; but the manaia was no more representative of Samoan society than the so-called 'lounge lizard' typifies modern society.

Briffault also refers us to F. Walpole, Four Years in the Pacific, ii. 353. I hesitate to recognize a naval officer as an anthropological authority unless he has resided for an extended period among the people of whom he writes. His evidence in regard to the sexual conduct of native women is, I think, particularly suspect. However, I have checked this reference. Walpole states that when a marriage was arranged the contracting parties were not consulted. He adds that the young men 'soved their wild oats' before marriage. I have read the passage carefully and am unable to find a single word which even implies that pre-nuptial sexual freedom was generally permitted.

Another passage to which Briffault refers is J. L. Brenchley, Jottings during the Cruise of H.M.S. Curacao, p. 58. Brenchley says: 'Sexual intercourse between the unmarried and adultery are common, if the white residents are to be believed.' The 'white residents', I presume, were the missionaries, whose testimony I have already recounted. Their written statements seem to contradict these alleged verbal declarations. Moreover, Brenchley states that he does not believe what he was told. The 'state of marital vigilance' which existed, he says, makes it difficult to understand how adultery could be so common a practice as the 'white residents' maintained. As for pre-nuptial conduct: 'Marriage according to tribal custom is distinguished by a singular and, as measured by our ideas, grossly indelicate ceremony which requires a woman to establish the fact of her virginity in public; when the proof is not satisfactory they are brutal enough to kill the woman.'

Thus Briffault's statement that the Samoans allowed pre-nuptial sexual freedom is made on the strength of a passage which categorically states that brides were killed if they were not virgins.

Briffault (op. cit. ii. 31) indulges in a long and possibly justifiable criticism of Professor Westermarck, and remarks: 'In the majority of those passages', i.e. to which the Professor had referred, 'we read nothing of the sort, and in some we read the exact opposite.' This devastating comment seems to apply in at least an equal measure to his own writings.

Briffault's last reference is to C. Phillips, Samoa, Past and Present, p. 20. This little book is not readily accessible, but I have been at some pains to consult it in
order to become acquainted with the available literature and to test as far as possible the merit of the anthropological method which submits an argument and then illustrates it by examples culled from any book which has been written about any people. The volume contains ninety-six small pages, twenty of which are devoted to a description of 'The Islands and the People' and 'Heathen Life'. The remaining seventy-six pages contain an account of 'The Dawn of Day' and of the evangelizing enterprise. It does not seem possible that a sober investigator could for a single moment regard such a publication as a reliable source of information. A man who can describe in twenty small pages both the physical features of the Samoan islands and the social life of the inhabitants cannot be allowed to rank as an anthropological authority. Clearly the little volume was designed for popular and provincial consumption at home; and its contents must be received with diffidence, especially in regard to the sexual conduct of the natives. The only passage which can possibly refer to pre-nuptial sexual freedom is: '... immorality and vice of every description: an extremely loose relationship between the sexes: the marriage tie formed and broken at convenience.' Possibly such a remark in such a book might be understood as indicating that all Samoan marriages were not lifelong unions, but it cannot be accepted as an authoritative declaration that the Samoans permitted free pre-nuptial intercourse. I prefer to describe it as an irresponsible statement on the part of a superficial observer who employed his imperfect knowledge of native customs to impress upon his readers the heinous character of Samoan sin.

It is difficult to understand what Briffault gains by thus misrepresenting the facts. He seems anxious to point out that in 'primitive society' marriage is 'neither the entrance into sexual life nor even the condition of access'. Thus it is necessary that he should prove that 'primitive' societies permitted pre-nuptial freedom. He disregards, as I have said (n. 112), many of those so-called 'primitive' societies (e.g. Baganda) whose sexual regulations were extremely strict; and in reference to other societies he finds it necessary to treat the available evidence as he has treated the evidence concerning the Samoans.

'Primitive' societies occupy many different positions in the cultural scale and any endeavour to 'prove' by the citation of illustrations that such-and-such a phenomenon is typical of 'primitive' society is doomed to failure, because both the idea and the method are unsound.

For further comments on the work of R. Briffault, see nn. 112, 155, 172, 382, 421, 470.

164. G. Turner, Samoa, A Hundred Years Ago and Long Before, p. 95.

Turner adds that 'there were many marriages without any such ceremonies at all', but in that passage he is clearly referring to elopements. An elopement was contrary to established custom and had to be regularized. Cp. Dr. Brown's statement which was quoted in n. 163. Turner does not mean, as R. Briffault, The Mothers, ii. 57 f., endeavours to persuade us, that the demand for the tokens was relaxed at many regular marriages.

Margaret Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa, p. 98, seems to regard the virginity tests as having been universal throughout society. The authorities to whom I referred in n. 163 confine their definite remarks to the public ceremonies. Perhaps none of them was fortunate enough to witness a privately conducted wedding.

165. G. Turner, Samoa, A Hundred Years Ago and Long Before, p. 91. This is evidently the passage which, according to R. Briffault, The Mothers, ii. 11 n., proves that the Samoans permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom. See n. 163. Turner was a missionary, and he lived in the early nineteenth century. His remark on Samoan sexual life must be understood in the light of these two facts; and it is extremely likely that, as would be conjectured from the phraseology of his
statement, he judged the moral character of Samoans by the tone of their conversations. Such a report has only an autobiographical value. Another opinion which can be placed in the same category is that of Erskine who remarks that in eighteen days no example of 'an indelicate word or action' came under his notice. See J. L. Blenchley, Jottings during the Cruise of H.M.S. Curacoa, p. 86.

Abortion was prevalent 'to a melancholy extent' (G. Turner, op. cit., p. 29). I do not know if the statement applies to unmarried girls. Turner mentions 'shame, fear of punishment, lazy unwillingness to nurse, and a dread of soon being old-looking' as some of the reasons for the practice. The two latter clearly refer to married women. If the former apply to unmarried girls (but I am not sure, for 'shame' is an ambiguous word, and 'fear of punishment' may refer to the discovery of an adultery), the statement is still obscure, for we are still ignorant of the reason for the condemnation. It may have been either the pregnancy or the sexual intercourse. If the latter, then the remark may suggest that an erstwhile rigid social regulation had fallen into desuetude.

According to S. Ella, 'Samoan', Fourth Rep. Aust. Ass. Adv. Sc. (1892), p. 621, the women who performed abortion were mostly unmarried. In recent times, if we may follow Margaret Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa, pp. 88 ff., sexual experience depended on individual choice. Mead (op. cit., p. 260) worked in a locality which was inhabited by only six hundred people, and her statements cannot be accepted as applying to the whole group of islands; but it is clear that in the small area to which she refers the sexual conduct of the natives is now much more lax than it was a hundred years ago. I doubt if Ella's statements (written in 1892) are true of pagan Samoa.

The careful guarding of young women, especially of those of high rank, by attendant females, is stated in so many words by W. T. Pritchard, 'Notes on certain matters respecting the South Sea Islanders', Memoirs of the London Anthropological Society i (1863-4), p. 324; idem, Polynesian Reminiscences, p. 138; J. B. Stair, Old Samoa, p. 110. Great precautions were taken against pre-nuptial sexual intercourse, not merely against pre-nuptial pregnancy.

166. M. Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa, p. 98.

167. The passages occur in the same chapter. Cp. E. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, i. 133 and 148. Professor Westermarck repeats the first statement in his The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, ii. 423. His authority is Mariner, for whose remark see n. 172. The second statement is made on the strength of Sir Basil Thomson's evidence, cited in n. 168.


169. G. Vason, An Authentic Narrative of Four Years' Residence at Tongatabu, pp. 142, 182-3. Vason was very intimate with Tongan customs, for he lived in the Friendly Islands as a native, and married a Tongan lady. The long uncut hair of the maidens is mentioned also by E. E. V. Collacott, 'Marriage in Tonga', J.P.S. xxxii (1923), p. 225, who says that 'the two long locks at the back of the head' were cut off at marriage. Cp. the Fijian tombe, for which see para. 29 and n. 44.

According to W. Mariner, An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands, vocab., tahine meant 'virgin; young girl; also a term of respect to female nobles, even if they are old and have a family'. Was virginity, then, such a regular phenomenon that the word became a synonym for a well-born female? Or was the word tahine originally applied to a well-born female and then by implication to a virgin? Was a virgin of the lower classes called tahine?

NOTES AND REFERENCES

171. Ibid., p. 224. According to William Wilson, *A Missionary Voyage in the Southern Pacific Ocean in the Years 1796–7–8 in the Ship 'Duff*, p. 275 f., the 'lower orders' were not at all restrained in their conduct. It was a common practice, he says, with the chiefs 'in our visits to them, to offer some of their females to sleep with us: the practice of our abandoned countrymen making them believe that this was a favour which we could not well do without'. I readily accept his opinion concerning the conduct of the 'lower orders', but I do not place a high value on Wilson's testimony. The behaviour of a native man or woman towards a white man, especially when they meet for the first time, cannot be accepted as evidence of the behaviour of that same man or woman towards one of his or her fellows. The presence of an elderly relative at the consummation is mentioned also by B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, p. 203.


172. Sexual conduct is discussed by W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, ii. 147–81, under the heading 'State of Morals'. Mariner does not state the nature of the sexual regulations. His information was compiled and arranged by John Martin, who evidently wrote the book from Mariner's notes or while Mariner stood by. See, e.g., op. cit., Introd., p. viii.

I feel confident that John Martin decided to broach a difficult subject in the general and gentlemanly manner which was in accordance with the accepted conventions of his time and type; but the phraseology of the appropriate pages is rarely exact. The ceremony of the nuptial mat is not mentioned; and the sexual conduct of the Tongans is described in the terms of early nineteenth-century middle-class Christian theory. And by 'chastity' Martin clearly means the post-nuptial constancy of married women. It was, he says, 'universally considered a positive duty in any married woman to remain true to her husband' (ii. 162). A married woman is defined as 'one who cohabits with a man and lives under his roof and protection, holding an establishment with him'. Tongan practice, however, seems to have differed from Tongan theory, for divorce was, we are told, easy and common. A divorced woman was free to marry again or to take a lover (ii. 173).

In support of his statement that wives were greatly attached to their husbands, Mariner mentions (ii. 171–2) the conduct of some widows who refused to remarry in spite of splendid opportunities. Martin then writes (ii. 174): 'As to those women who are not actually married, they may bestow their favours upon whomsoever they please without any opprobrium. It must not be supposed, however, that these women are easily won.'

This is the passage to which Professor Westermarck (see n. 167) refers when he states that 'unmarried' women were sexually free. At first sight this does not seem out of harmony with what Martin wrote, but, whereas we should conclude from Westermarck's citation that young girls who had not yet been married were sexually free, it is clear from the context that Martin was thinking of widows and divorcées who were no longer living with any man under one roof, that is, were not 'actually married' in the sense in which Mariner uses the term. By changing the words 'not actually married' into 'unmarried' Westermarck has introduced a meaning into the passage which the original words and context cannot bear.

A specific and definite statement in regard to pre-nuptial conduct is not to be found in Mariner's account as John Martin has written it. In a long note (ii. 177–8) he mentions the 'becoming modesty' of the young girls and the athletic occupations of the young men.
W. Waldegrave, 'Extracts from a Private Journal kept on board H.M.S. Seringapatam in the Pacific, 1830', _J.R.G.S._ iii (1833), p. 194, states that 'single women and sometimes the married women sleep in parties, in a large hut. At night the young men visit them.' This seems to be a definite statement, and pre-nuptial sexual freedom might be implied; but it is curious that none of our other authorities mentions this female dormitory. If the custom had been universal, I should have expected both Vason and Mariner to have mentioned it, but their descriptions of Tongan life seem to indicate that all the girls slept at home. I do not place a high value on Waldegrave's testimony. He does not say how long he stayed in the Friendly Islands, nor from what area his facts were drawn. He says that no Tongan woman would have anything to do with a white man unless she received permission from the chief, but he does not disclose the sources of his information in regard to the native habits.

James Cook, _A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean in the Years 1776–1780_, i. 401, remarks that he was compelled to revise his first impression concerning the conduct of the Tongan women. At first he had considered that ' chastity ' was held in no great estimation (Cook usually employs the word ' chastity ' in reference to post-nuptial conduct), and declares that ' unmarried girls of the better sort ' were by no means free with their favours. Perhaps Waldegrave also would have revised his original opinion if he had paid another visit to the Friendly Islands.

R. Briffault, _The Mothers_, ii. 11 n., cites three authorities for stating that the Tongans permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom. He first refers to the passage in W. Mariner, _An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 174, which I have already appraised. Briffault has imitated Professor Westermarck in misreading the words ' not actually married '. He then cites T. West, _Ten Years in South-central Polynesia_, p. 270. I have studied this volume with great care. Neither on that nor on any other page have I found any passage which can be interpreted as even implying that pre-nuptial sexual intercourse was permitted in Tonga. In the passage to which Briffault seems to refer, West remarks: 'The morals of the Tongans were never so thoroughly debased as those of the Sandwich and Society Islanders, but there was enough to show how low humanity could fall without the restraints and sanctions of a Divine faith. Polygamy was common. ' I can only repeat what I have said in reference to Briffault's statement in regard to the Samoans (n. 163). In an attempt to ' prove ' that ' primitive ' societies permit, or ' primitive ' man permitted, free pre-nuptial sexual intercourse, Briffault has been guilty of great eclecticism in his choice of illustrations; he has also misinterpreted his authorities. We cannot accept the above-quoted passage as evidence of pre-nuptial licence among the Tongans. If the whole of West's remarks are taken into account it is clear that he agrees with Mariner and Vason in thinking that so far as post-nuptial conduct was concerned Tongan theory differed from Tongan practice: ' Some sentiments ', he says, ' relating to connubial fidelity prevailed which may be said to have bordered on morality, for after the parties had lived together for a while it was considered disgraceful to separate. ' If, therefore, West is used as an authority on the sexual conduct of the Tongans, his testimony must be accepted as corroborating the other reports. He makes no direct reference to pre-nuptial conduct.

Briffault also refers to the passage from Waldegrave's paper which I have already discussed.

For further comments on Briffault's methods, see nn. 112, 155, 163, 382, 421, 470.

The reports which we possess concerning Hawaiian religion either come from travellers who visited the islands before 1820, or are based on information which was gathered from those natives who held to some vestige of the old practices after these had been abolished by the ruling classes. Their credibility is doubtful.

174. See especially E. Best, The Maori, i. 288: 'Let it be clearly understood that the Maori never erected anything in the form of a temple'; idem, 'Maori Religion and Mythology', N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull. 10, p. 88 f.: 'No form of temple or sacred edifice of any kind was erected by the Maori in connexion with their gods.' I do not think that the words 'never erected' are to be literally understood. We must interpret them merely as an emphatic negative, not as a denial that the Maori erected temples in a previous epoch. There are some indications indeed that at one time the people whom we call the Maori did erect temples. The indications are slight, and we must be careful of our translations in considering them.

There was at one time a very close connexion between the Maori and the Tahitians, and it has often been suggested that the Maori migrated from Tahiti. According to E. Best, The Maori, i. 291, the Maori knew of the stone structures in the Society and Sandwich Islands, and realized that they were connected with religion. If we accept the report that the Tahitians built 'temples', then it might seem to follow that the ancestors of the people whom we call the Maori may have done the same thing. The so-called 'temple', marae, of the Tahitians, however, was not a temple in the sense in which the word is used in this treatise (para. 7), that is, it was not a roofed building, other than a grave-house, in which the powers in the universe manifested themselves and which was specially erected and maintained in order that a right relation might be preserved with those powers. The Tahitian building to which some writers attach the word marae was a pyramidal stone structure which contained the dry bones of a dead chief. See para. 133. In the Maori language marae denoted the open space in a village or in front of a house, and Best considers that a mistake may have been made by the residents of Tahiti when they thought that the natives applied the word to the stone structure. He suggests that the Tahitians meant to indicate not the pyramid but 'the place where it was situated, or the open space in front of it'. See E. Best, 'Maori Religion and Mythology', N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull. 10, p. 174; idem, The Maori, i. 291, 373.

In the latter passage we are told that by an extension of meaning the word from denoting 'open space' or 'village square' came to mean 'generous', because visitors were entertained there; thus, wahine marae, 'generous woman'. See also H. W. Williams, A Dictionary of the Maori Language, s.v. marae, and E. Tregear, Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary, s.v. marae.

For further notes on marae, see nn. 196 (Samoa), 205 (Tonga), and 582 (Tahiti).

We must beware, therefore, of suggesting that at one time the Maori may have erected temples because their ancestors may have built some of the stone pyramids in Tahiti. We must also take care not to translate such a word as whare-kura, 'temple', as does R. Taylor, Te Ika a Maui, pp. 174 ff. In Hawaiki, the legendary home of the Maori, there was a building of this name. Taylor remarks in its connexion that 'although the natives had no places particularly devoted to religious purposes, there are still traditions of a temple having once existed among them'. The whare-kura, however, seems to have been no more than a council-house where tribal leaders met together and in which the heroic deeds of their ancestors were recounted.

For a slight, though apparently definite, indication that the early migrants erected temples in the sense in which the word is used in this treatise, see E. Tregear, The Maori Race, p. 203: 'A very sacred spot for centuries was the temple and courtyard, marae, at Taporapora in the Kaipura harbour. The place on which it stood has no residential existence now, for it became covered by the sea and
appears as a sand bank, but it exists in Maori legend. The temple and all the sacred property therein which had been brought to New Zealand by the immigrants in the Mahuhu canoe were swallowed up beneath the waves.'

In this passage marae clearly refers not to the building but to the courtyard. This is its usual meaning.

I have already had reason to suggest (n. 162) that at one time the Maori may have demanded virginity of their brides; thus the possible existence of temples at a previous period in their history is interesting. For the apparently inevitable association between the erection of temples and compulsory pre-nuptial continence, see paras. 24, 58, 152, 158, 164, 175.

175. The quotation in reference to kehua is from E. Tregear, The Maori Race, p. 426.

According to E. Best, 'Maori Religion', Twelfth Report, Aust. Ass. Adv. Sc.: (1909), p. 459, 'ancestor-worship, or rather the deification of ancestors, is essentially a Maori cult'. In a later publication, N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull. 10, pp. 132–5, Best says that 'so-called' Maori ancestor-worship was 'a very inferior exhibition of the religious sentiment', and that 'ancestor-worship as practised by the Maori did not include what we call worship'. He does not define the word 'worship'; so the statement is not helpful. In the former of the above-quoted passages Best says that a man 'placated' 'the spirit of his father', but he does not describe the placatory rites. Moreover, the Maori word which he translates 'spirits of the dead' is atua, and atua was used in a variety of contexts (nn. 178–80), so we should require a full description of the rites before we could be sure that our conclusions had not been vitiated by a mistranslation. Such details are not available.

Various English equivalents have been employed in an attempt to translate the untranslatable word atua. Much confusion has been caused thereby. Moreover, in the course of his description of Maori beliefs and practices, Best indulges in a long criticism of certain anthropological theories, and especially of the theories formulated by Lord Avebury and Herbert Spencer. I have noticed (n. 180) the influence which the theories of Andrew Lang appear to have exercised over Best's presentation of the alleged 'Cult of Io', and I suspect that his parentheses in reference to Lord Avebury and Herbert Spencer have affected his description of the attitude of the Maori towards the dead. I have been unable to extract from his reports any definite facts concerning the Maori ancestral rites. If he had quoted the native word (or words) which he was representing by 'ghost', 'spirit', 'god', &c., his descriptions would have been more readily understood. Perhaps, too, his theoretical discussion would have had less influence on the manner of his report.

E. Tregear, 'The Maori of New Zealand', J.A.I. xix (1890), p. 120 f., states that Maori ancestor-worship was 'a sop to Cerberus'. He seems to have interpreted the slight tendance which was conducted as a propitiation of the God of the Underworld. The idea is proved false by the fact that the rites referred to were post-funeral.

Kehua was not the only term which was used in reference to an actively malevolent ghost. The words koromatua, kikokiko, and kahuwhahu also were used. There is a lack of definite information concerning their meaning. According to H. W. Williams, A Dictionary of the Maori Language, s.v., and E. Tregear, Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary, s.v., koromatua meant 'thumb or great toe of a chief'; but is it not possible that it was derived from koro, 'person', matua, 'parent' or 'adult'? May not the term have been used adjectivally? There has been so much confusion between the substantival and adjectival use of atua (n. 180) that we may have confused the possible meanings of koromatua also, that is, we may have confused the meaning of the word with the phenomena to which it was applied adjectivally.
Apparently the words *kikokiko* and *kahukahu* were the same. (For these, see also n. 187.) The *swairua*, soul of the living man, became, according to one account, *kehua* at death. If the funeral rites were not properly carried out, the *kehua* seems to have become malevolent as *kahukahu*. See E. Tregear, 'The Maori of New Zealand', *J.A.I.* xix (1890), p. 105. This opinion conflicts with the statement that a ghost was *atua* and that a malevolent ghost was *kehua*. I incline to the opinion that *kehua, kahukahu, and kikokiko* were used in similar contexts by different groups of people, and that they were all applied to malevolent ghosts. I also believe that the application of *atua* to 'the dead' puzzled our observers because their pre-conceived ideas in regard to 'primitive' religion had suggested to them that *atua* must mean 'spirit' or 'god'. The statement which I have just quoted was, I think, an endeavour to rationalize Maori conceptions in such a manner as to smooth away the difficulties which had been introduced by these translations.

For another translation (or interpretation) of *kahukahu*, see n. 187 (3).

According to R. Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*, p. 216 ff., 'the customs relating to the dead' (but Taylor may refer only to burial practices) 'varied in almost every part of the island, as did also the ideas entertained of their estate after death'. Thus no custom can be regarded as universal. But it would have been more helpful if we had possessed a simple description of some of the rites, together with details of the place in which and the occasion on which they were carried out. The available evidence is scanty, for, though some of our authorities describe in vague phrases the alleged beliefs in regard to the dead, they seldom describe the post-funeral rites which were conducted in honour of the dead.

I have been unable to find a description of the rites which were conducted when an affliction was thought to be due to 'the dead' (*atua*). We are continually informed that affliction was often so caused, but the available reports are of a poor quality, and the absence of native terms is bewildering.

In order to send the ghost away, a *tuku wairu*, 'soul-dispatch', was sung over the dead man. This, we are told, prevented the soul from remaining in this world and from annoying the relatives. See E. Best, *The Maori*, i. 393. Cp. the 'Go, go to thy people', which is mentioned by W. Colenso, 'On the Maori Races of New Zealand', *T.N.Z.I.* i (1869), p. 44. The song was sung by a *tohunga* (nn. 188, 192) in order to prevent the spirits from returning to afflict the people or crops. The *tohunga* repeated these *karahia*, incantations, 'to render innocuous the evil designs of the *wairua*, soul' (E. Best, 'Maori Eschatology', *T.N.Z.I.* xxxviii (1905), p. 187).


Yet I am so sceptical about the translation of *atua* that I confess to some doubt about the alleged reincarnation. Is it not possible that this statement is an inference? May not the Maori have applied the word *atua* to both a dead man and a butterfly? Have our authorities concluded that a dead man and a butterfly were identical simply and solely because the same word was applied to them?

Cp. my comments in paras. 120, 148.


The usual type was 'a wooden figure, carved in grotesque imitation of the human
form in its upper part, with the lower ends brought to a point'. These were used by a tohunga (nn. 188, 192), who carried them on warlike expeditions and on visits to the sick. The tillers of the soil, however, seem to have employed a figure of a different pattern. There were several names for these figures, and the fact suggests that the Maori distinguished one type from another. Best says that they were called tiki or tiki wananga, 'temporary shrines or abiding places of the gods'. The word which he translates 'gods' is, of course, atua (n. 180). Shortland does not give the native term. He says that some tribes preserved in their houses small carved images of wood, each of which was dedicated to the 'spirit of the ancestor of the family'. Here again the Maori word would be atua. 'These images', Shortland adds, 'are not objects of worship, nor are they held sacred as possessing in themselves any virtue, but merely because they have been in contact with an atua.' (The word 'an' in 'an atua' seems to be an inference. 'In contact with atua' would possibly be more correct.)

According to H. W. Williams, A Dictionary of the Maori Language, s.v., and E. Tregear, Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary, s.v., tiki denoted a cenotaph, and though Best says that the figures in the house or on a canoe were tekoteko, both Williams and Tregear state that the word tiki also was applied to them.

In the Hawaiian language, wananga meant 'prophecy', and in Maori also, according to Williams; but Tregear translates it as 'a holy altar, a sacred medium, the spirit of any one who when living had learnt the incantations and spells of his ancestors'. It seems possible, then, that the difference between a tiki and a tiki wananga lay in the fact that offerings were laid before the latter but not before the former. The precise significance of tiki is obscure. Clearly it was associated by the Maori with atua. Perhaps it may be compared with the Tahitian tīi, for which see para. 133, n. 583.

According to J. S. Polack, Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders, i. 116, 118 ff., 227, the figures which were erected in honour of the dead were raouī(s).

The name is not mentioned elsewhere.

178. W. Colenso, A Maori-English Lexicon, pt. i, s.v. atua. Colenso also includes among his translations: 'god, the one true God, the God of Christians'. As 'malevolent demons' he includes Tu, Tane, Tangaroa, Rongo, Tawhirimatea, and Whiro, and seems to consider that the 'genii' or 'wood-spirits', patupaiarehe and hakitaka were atua. For a comment on this opinion, see n. 180.

In order that we may exhaust as far as possible the meanings which are attached to atua by our various authorities, I give the opinions of two other lexicographers. Surely the bewildering variety of the translations must convince the most conservative scholar that there is no safe English equivalent.

H. W. Williams, A Dictionary of the Maori Language, s.v. atua, submits the following: god, demon, supernatural being, ghost; object of superstitious regard; anything malign, strange, extraordinary; stingy, unfriendly.

E. Tregear, Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary, s.v. atua, includes 'God', 'a god', 'demon', 'supernatural being'; 'a malicious person'; 'to be wicked, surly'.

It will be noticed that the above lists contain substantives, adjectives, adverbs, and verbs.

See further nn. 179, 180.

179. See W. Brown, New Zealand and its Aborigines, p. 79: 'White men were addressed as divinities. Many of the natives said that they felt unwell if even looked upon by these attuas.' This anglicized plural of a native word is most undesirable. Dr. G. Brown has been guilty of a similar fault in reference to the New Briton tebaran and has introduced thereby a great deal of confusion into the study of New Briton culture. See para. 32.

According to J. S. Polack, Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders, i. 234,
a scarecrow erected by a European was termed an *atua*. The ‘an’ is an inference, quite possibly a mistaken one. A similar inference has been made by Shortland (n. 177). Many other examples could be quoted.

The application of *atua* to a white man’s watch is reported by E. Best, ‘Maori Religion and Mythology’, *N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull.* 10, p. 84, who remarks (op. cit., p. 156): ‘The Maori word *atua* is one of peculiar significance, and in many cases to translate the word “god” is to convey a totally wrong impression. It is, however, often difficult to find a suitable word to employ. *Atua* is applied to the Supreme Being of Christianity and to a virulent or loathsome disease. Europeans, fire-arms, watches, and compasses have all been alluded to as *atua*. Anything supernatural, or strange, or objectionable, anything not understood or mysterious may be so termed.’ Again, still more explicitly (*The Maori*, i. 234): ‘The term *atua* is employed to denote ... anything believed to possess supernatural powers. It is often applied to anything mysterious or that is believed to possess a malign influence.’

See further nn. 178, 180.

### 180.

The Maori *atua* is one of the words which I have selected as an illustration of the unacceptable character of many anthropological translations. See para. 5. In order that there may be no doubt about the matter, I will state some of the English equivalents which have been submitted. I have already quoted the opinions of the lexicographers (n. 178) and of Mr. Best (n. 179). I have also noted that *atua* was applied to the white man and his equipment (n. 179).

Among other renderings of the word are the following:

‘gods’ (W. Brown, *New Zealand and its Aborigines*, p. 79; Hare Hongi, ‘The Gods of Maori Worship’, *J.P.S.* xxix (1920), p. 25. The latter translates *atua* also as ‘the beyond’;

‘invisible spirits’ (G. F. Angas, *Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand*, ii. 331–2; E. Tregear, ‘The Maori of New Zealand’, *J.A.I.* xix (1890), p. 121);


‘spirits of the dead’, ‘spirits of their chiefs’, ‘deified ancestors’, &c., or the singular of these terms (E. Shortland, *Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders*, p. 81; E. Best, ‘Spiritual Concepts of the Maori’, *J.P.S.* ix (1900), p. 175; J. S. Polack, *Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders*, i. 249);

‘familiar spirit’ (F. E. Maning, *Old New Zealand*, p. 119);

‘idols’ (T. G. Hammond, ‘Atua Maori’, *J.P.S.* viii (1899), p. 92);

‘guardian spirit of the tribe’ (W. E. Gudgeon, ‘Maori Religion’, *J.P.S.* xiv (1905), p. 130);


Is it not plain that no single one of these English equivalents is satisfactory and that our authorities have often confused the meaning of the word with the phenomena to which it was adverbially or adjectivally applied? The above list is by no means exhaustive, and though some writers seem to have entertained some doubts concerning the validity of their submissions, they continued to flounder in a quagmire of verbiage. Elsdon Best employs the word ‘god’ fairly confidently in ‘Omens and Superstitions of the Maori’, *J.P.S.* vii (1898), p. 119, but in his later writings he again criticizes the translation and condemns it as unsuitable. See, e.g., ‘Maori Religion’, *Twelfth Rep. Aust. Ass. Adv. Sc.* (1909), p. 458; ‘Some Aspects of Maori Myth and Religion’, *N.Z. Dom. Mus. Mon.* i, p. 18; and the passage cited in n. 179. In one of his earliest papers (‘Spiritual Concepts of the Maori’, *J.P.S.* ix (1900), p. 176) Best remarks: ‘The term *atua*, commonly translated
“god”, was most comprehensive. It included malevolent demons, fairies, deified ancestors, natural phenomena, personifications of pain and disease, &c.” It does not seem to have occurred to him that the word ‘included’ might be a source of the confusion. Let us substitute ‘was applied to’. Are not the inferences then separated from the facts?

There is reason to believe that the word ‘fairies’ may have slipped unawares into the above list. The Maori called these tiny creatures patupaiarehe (dangerous and fearful), ponatiri (mythological only), and pake-pakeha (elves in flowers and shrubs). See E. Tregear, ‘The Maori of New Zealand’, J.A.I. xix (1890), p. 121; idem, *The Maori Race*, pp. 523, 527. Apparently they were not atua. According to E. Shortland, *Maori Religion and Mythology*, p. 50, a tohunga could control them. Colenso (n. 178) seems to have been mistaken in regard to the Little People.

Another Maori word which has been translated ‘demon’, ‘goblin’, is *tipua* (*tipua*). See E. Tregear, *The Maori Race*, p. 537. For other translations of *tipua*, see n. 292.

The early missionaries selected *atu$a* as the word by which they could denote the Christian God. As Best has often remarked, it was hardly a happy choice. See, e.g., his *Maori Religion*, Twelfth Rep. Aust. Ass. Adv. Sc. (1909), p. 458; ‘Maori Religion and Mythology’, *N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull*. 10, p. 84. Best is still more emphatic in ‘Maori Medical Lore’, *J.P.S.* xxxii (1909), p. 216: ‘To say that the Maori word *atu$a* = God is simply ridiculous.’ Twenty years later he compared another Maori ‘being’ with the Christian Supreme Being. See (1) below.

In his later publications Elsdon Best has made an attempt to rationalize Maori ‘beliefs’, and has submitted an organized scheme which seems to be at variance with the native conceptions as they have been described in his earlier essays and by other observers. See his *Maori Religion and Mythology*, *N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull*. 10, pp. 89 ff., and *The Maori*, i. 234 ff. As these later publications may be regarded as standard and authoritative pronouncements by those who have not made themselves acquainted with all the available literature, an examination of the appropriate passages is advisable. There is another advantage, too, in making this examination. Two of my reasons for discarding those classifications of uncivilized culture which are based on ‘beliefs’ were (i) English equivalents lack precise meaning and do not accurately represent native conceptions, (ii) an alleged belief cannot be described without a certain amount of subjective intrusion on the part of the author. Best’s organized scheme is an example of what I mean. He makes a valiant attempt to present Maori beliefs as a form of organized polytheism, and his submissions afford a good illustration of the indeterminate obscurities which in my view are inseparable from any attempt to divorce the belief from the rite.

Having translated *atu$a*, ‘god’, Best divides the Maori ‘gods’ into four classes:

1. Io, Supreme Being, who is placed in a class by himself. Now no rites were conducted in honour of Io, and it is difficult to comprehend in what his claim to deification consists. The absence of rites is reported in two interesting passages:
   i. ‘No invocations to Io are known by the Maori at the present time’ (Maori Religion’), Twelfth Rep. Aust. Ass. Adv. Sc. (1909), p. 451; ii. ‘No offerings were ever made to the Supreme Being Io’ (‘Maori Religion and Mythology’, *N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull*. 10, p. 140). In the first of these passages the words ‘at the present time’ might imply that ‘invocations’ were made to Io at some remote period; but it is not clear whether this is an inference or a fact. Moreover, ‘invocation’ is a question-begging word, and Best’s use of it is obscure. See n. 189. As it stands, the statement has no reliable meaning, and the possibility that ‘invocations’ were made to Io in the past is considerably reduced when we learn from the second passage that offerings had never been made to him at any time. We are not told, however, the evidence on which this definite statement is based. The
name Io is merely said to have occurred in songs and incantations. This, indeed, appears to be his only claim to divine rank.

In reference to the phrase ‘Supreme Being’ which is applied to him, compare my observations (nn. 116, 122) in reference to ruhanga, the alleged ‘Supreme Being’ of the Banyankole and the Bakitara. How did the Maori express their conception of Io? Would a Buddhist inquirer have concluded that Io was a ‘Supreme Being’? On what evidence is Io thus separated from, e.g., Tane? I am not denying the truth of what Best has written. My point is that he has not quoted the evidence on which he relied. Moreover, there is reason to believe that he has not made the report with the open-mindedness which (para. 61) is one of the essential qualities of a field-worker.

If we may judge from a short paper entitled ‘The Cult of Io, the Concept of a Supreme Being evolved by the Ancestors of the Polynesians’ (Man, 1913, no. 52), and from scattered, though numerous, references which he makes to those collections of anthropological data which have served as a foundation of many theories concerning primitive religion, it was Andrew Lang’s suggestions concerning ‘High Gods’ which first encouraged, or emboldened, Best to write about Io. But Andrew Lang did not define what he meant by ‘High God’, nor did he state by what criteria he adjudged the ‘beings’ which he included in that category (n. 4). I do not understand, therefore, how Best decided whether Io was qualified for inclusion in that category. Indeed, I have excluded the above-mentioned article from the list of publications (Bibliography, No. 64) on which I have relied for my study of Maori culture, for it seems to contain more inferences than facts. Indeed I do not think it would have been written unless Lang had formulated the conception of ‘High Gods’. Best’s predilections in favour of that conception are also revealed in many other passages.

When he promoted Io to the status of ‘Supreme Being’, he seems to have had a twofold purpose:

(i) He wished to illustrate what he calls ‘the mentality and psychology of the race’, i.e. that the Maori were capable of abstract thought; e.g. ‘Io looks like an abstract conception’ (‘Maori Religion and Mythology’, N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull. 10, p. 89). A similar observation has been made also by W. E. Gudgeon, ‘Maori Religion’, J.P.S. xiv (1905), pp. 108–9.

(ii) He wished to make a favourable comparison between Maori ‘beliefs’ and behaviour and those of the Christian priesthood. See, e.g., ‘The Maori believed in a Supreme Being called Io. We believe in one whom we call God. We say that Io is a false God. Why?’ (‘Maori Religion and Mythology’, N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull. 10, p. 100; and ‘Some Aspects of Maori Mythology and Religion’, N.Z. Dom. Mus. Mon. 7, p. 21).

Probably a Christian theologian would experience little difficulty in answering the question to the satisfaction of Christians, and there is no doubt that when Best assumed the role of Maori apologist, and stated that apology at considerable length in a serious anthropological monograph, he allowed his very great knowledge of Maori culture to be influenced by Christian conceptions. In his discussion of Io, he seems to be merely autobiographical, and to be making a personal declaration of his attitude towards Christianity. He returns to the subject again and again: e.g. ‘Christian priesthoods have murdered with fiendish tortures many thousands of persons for worshipping our God in a slightly different manner. Has the Maori savage ever descended to such a level?’ A more intense subjective intrusion is inconceivable.

Io is not the only Maori ‘being’ who has been identified with the Christian God. R. Taylor, Te Ika a Maui, preface, calls Maui ‘the Creator’, and J. S. Polack, Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders, i. 233, says that Maui was ‘the only national deity’. Such pronouncements, I submit, are merely evidence that the
writer spent his early childhood in a Christian environment. Do they not demonstrate that we cannot use such words as 'god', 'supreme being', and 'deity' as technical terms until they have been defined?

For comments on the reports of other Supreme Beings, see nn. 116, 122, 237, 246, 415, 451, 462, 471, 501, 585.

(2) Best's second class of Maori 'gods', i.e. atua, are the 'departmental gods', also called 'primal gods'; but, as Best himself has often said, these 'beings' were not called atua by the Maori. See, e.g., the following passages: 'What may be termed the primal or principal gods, such as Tane, Tu, Rongo, and Tangaroa, are not usually termed atua by the Maori' ('Maori Religion', Twelfth Rep. Aust. Ass. Adv. Sc. (1909), p. 460); 'They were not ordinary atua' ('Maori Religion and Mythology', N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull. 10, p. 101). How, then, is it possible to include them in a list of atua?

The explanation seems to be this. The position of Tane, Tu, Rongo, &c., in Maori stories, legends, songs, and charms, has suggested to Best that these 'beings' were 'gods' in the sense in which a number of Hellenic and Latin heroes (with no greater accuracy of thought) have been termed 'gods'. Having decided that they were 'gods', Best proceeded to classify them as atua since 'god' is one of the English equivalents of atua. Yet the Maori did not think of them in that manner; and the result of Best's translation of atua as 'god' has produced a complete misrepresentation of the native ideas.

Although he does not confess to these mental gymnastics, Best seems to have entertained some honest doubts in regard to his scheme. In The Maori, i. 238, he remarks: 'There is one explanation to make in regard to our "departmental gods". They were viewed as supernatural beings, and so may be termed atua, but the Maori seemed to view them more as originating beings than as ordinary gods.' But what is a 'supernatural being'? How does a supernatural being differ from an 'originating being'? What is an 'ordinary god'? These terms are valid if they are defined, but they have no value if they are not defined. Moreover, by what right does Best declare that 'they may be termed atua'? By what authority does he apply to them a title which the Maori withheld? Only he himself could have explained. Yet he himself tells us that a wise old native corrected him when he applied the word atua to Tu. 'Do you mean Tu, the atua?' Best inquired. 'No,' replied the old man, 'I mean Tu, the tupuna.' See E. Best, 'Maori Religion and Mythology', N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull. 10, p. 85.

After a long discussion of these 'beings', Best remarks ('Maori Religion and Mythology', N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull. 10, p. 168): 'Although Tane and his brethren are tutelary beings, yet the application of the term 'god' to them may be objected to. Some authorities assert that such beings belong more to mythology than to religion.' The confession is welcome, but what do these terms mean, e.g. 'tutelary being', which Best uses so freely? Having stated that the Maori did not apply the word atua to Tane, Tu, Ronga, Whiro, &c., how can he declare in his latest publication (The Maori, i. 237, 314) that Whiro was 'the most active and pernicious of all atua'?

(3) Best's third class of 'gods' are 'tribal gods', so called 'for want of a better term': 'These beings are in many cases personifications of natural phenomena' (The Maori, i. 238). Some of them had proper names; but the connexion of those names with any form of sky-activity is not explained. Best further remarks ('Maori Religion and Mythology', N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull. 10, p. 119) that he is unable to agree with those who maintain that this class of atua consisted of deified ancestors.

The disagreement seems to have arisen out of a confusion between the meaning of atua and the phenomena to which it was adverbially or adjectively applied: the Maori seem to have applied the word atua to certain dead men and to any unusual form of sky-activity, such as comets, rainbows, thunder, and a supernormal glow.
in the heavens. As for the connexion between proper names and these or other forms of sky-activity, it seems possible that the occurrence of such celestial pheno-
mena was associated in the minds of the Maori, or of that group of Maori whom
Best knew so well, with the name of some dead tohunga (nn. 188, 192) who during
his life-time had exercised power over the elements.
These alleged ‘tribal gods’, we are told, possessed aria, visible forms of incarnations: ‘Such a form might be a bird, insect, lizard, dog, or some natural pheno-
Adv. Sc. (1909), p. 460). In some passages Best seems to think that the lizard was
a ‘god’ because it represented Whiro (who, it will be remembered, was not called
atau by the Maori). In other passages we are told that the ‘primal gods’, of whose
number Whiro is alleged to have been one, ‘had no such forms of incarnation’.
I cannot explain the contradiction. It may be that the Maori applied the word
atau to certain animals, especially the lizard, as well as to certain natural phenom-
ena and dead men, and that the application of the same word to these phenomena
has caused Best to identify the phenomena themselves.
‘Gods’ in lizards are mentioned also by G. F. Angas, Savage Life and Scenes in
Australia and New Zealand, ii. 331 f.; J. S. Polack, Manners and Customs of the
New Zealanders, i. 241; and W. Colenso, ‘On the Maori Races of New Zealand’,
(4) The ‘gods’ of Best’s fourth and last class are termed ‘familiars’, for ‘god
seems to be too dignified a term for them’. For these ‘familiar spirits’, ‘family gods’,
souls of defunct forbears’, ‘deified spirits of ancestors’, ‘malignant demons who
possessed people’, ‘lowest class of native gods utilized by the lowest class of
tohunga’, as they are variously termed, see ‘Spiritual Concepts of the Maori’,
pp. 131–2; and The Maori, i. 234, 239–40: they were as ‘the sands of the sea-shore’,
and they were ‘offended by any infringement of tapu’. We may merely conclude
from these translations that the Maori applied the word atua to various phenomena
under various circumstances.
In The Maori, i. 238, Best says that it was the atua of the third and fourth classes
‘who were most frequently appealed to’. This is not surprising, since the first
and second classes were not atua at all. And I do not know what meaning we can
attach to the word ‘appealed to’, for the rites are not described.
former passage Best happily compares the huaca of Spanish America.
Waka literally meant canoe, or the crew of a canoe; hence a tribe, and even a flock of birds. Kaupapa meant floor, wise man or oracle, altar, or sacred platform.
See E. Tregear, Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary, ss.vv.; H. W. Williams,
A Dictionary of the Maori Language, ss.vv.
Cp. the Samoan taula-aitu (n. 198), Tongan taula-otua (n. 209), and Purari
imumi-vii (n. 323).
182. E. Tregear, The Maori Race, p. 218, who says also that their character
differed ‘according to the nature of the person to be propitiated’. In such a passage
we must remember that the native word which is being translated ‘person’ is
atau, for which see nn. 178–80. It seems possible that a ‘person’ may not always
have been meant.
pp. 140–2. Apparently a tohunga always conducted the ceremony, which took place
on the occasion of a lad’s first kill. Human sacrifices were made when a new house or a new canoe was built, when a young woman (virgin?) was tattooed, and at other times. We are ignorant of their real purpose.


The word tuahu was applied also to the place where men’s hair was cut and to the village latrine. This use of the word is at first unintelligible, but the fact that there was a risk of witchcraft if the severed portions of the body were not protected (n. 187) suggests two possible explanations: (i) Body clippings and droppings may have been placed in a tapu-place that they might be safe from witchcraft; (ii) the places where body clippings and droppings were deposited were made tapu by a tohunga. The latter seems the more likely alternative, for a tapu-place was (a) any place which was chosen and announced by a tohunga (E. Best, The Maori, i. 288–93); (b) any place where atua was manifest (E. Best, The Maori, i. 251; E. Tregear, The Maori Race, p. 192; E. Shortland, Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders, p. 102; idem, Maori Religion and Mythology, p. 25, &c.).

In ‘The Spiritual Concepts of the Maori’, J.P.S. ix (1900), p. 163, and other passages in his earlier writings, Elsdon Best seems to think that a village had only one recognized tuahu, for he speaks of ‘the sacred place, tuahu, of the tribe’; but it is clear from the above-quoted references that any place chosen by a tohunga was a tuahu. Naturally some places would be used more than others; thus they would become more prominent in the life of the tribe.

A native description of a tuahu, as the word is sometimes spelt, has been published by Tarakawa, and translated by S. Percy Smith. See J.P.S. iii (1894), pp. 202–207. Tarakawa says: ‘There are many kinds of tuahu; the tapatāi is one, the ahupuke another, the torino another, the ahurewa another.’ The precise character of these four varieties is obscure. According to H. W. Williams, A Dictionary of the Maori Language, s.v. tuahu, and E. Tregear, A Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary, s.v. tuahu, tapatāi meant sea-shore; ahurewa denoted an indoor tuahu, sometimes called ‘altar’. These two words, therefore, seem to refer to the position of the tuahu rather than to its character. Torino and ahupuke were applied to that part of the tuahu which was used in connexion with witchcraft.

These four ‘classes’ of tuahu are mentioned also by E. Best, Maori Religion and Mythology, N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull. 10, pp. 172–3, who gives examples.

Tregear (i.e.) says that tuahu meant ‘to throw the soil into hillocks’, and compares the Marquesan ahu, mound. Thus Tregear seems to regard tuahu as a verb. Williams (i.e.), on the other hand, describes a tuahu as ‘a sacred place consisting of an enclosure containing a mound, and marked by the erection of rods or poles, which was used for the purposes of divination and other mystic rites. It differed from the ahurewa in being out of doors.’ Thus Williams distinguishes between tuahu and ahurewa, whereas the other authorities state that the latter was a special kind of tuahu. It is difficult, however, to see how ‘an enclosure containing a mound’ could be indoors, and it seems possible that the ‘erection of rods and poles’ has been confused with the place, tuahu, in which it stood. The native term for the erection of rods or poles was perhaps tiepa, as may be inferred from other sources; but this is not stated in the above-quoted passages. For tiepa, see n. 185.

T. W. Downes, ‘Tuahu on the Wanganui River’, J.P.S. xxxvii (1928), pp. 165–8, has given the only detailed description of a tuahu which I can find. The facts of its history are meagre, but we are told that it was connected with atua, which Downes translates ‘guardian-spirits’. The tuahu was ‘a raised mound, with sloping sides, about eight feet square at the top, and twelve feet at the bottom, rising about ten feet from the bottom of the trench, and four or five feet above the level of the ground. On the top of this mound, and in the centre was a hole about two feet
square. This hole was possibly used as a receptacle for such sacred things as a chief’s hair. Surrounding the mound was a trench about six feet deep and three feet wide at the bottom.’ The editors of the *Journal of the Polynesian Society* make the following comment: ‘The form of *tuahu* or *tapu*-place described by Mr. Downes is a highly unusual one. When we remember that such places were as a rule not marked by anything more than one or more unworked stones, and in some cases by nothing, and that the Maori seems to have objected to built-up altars, and to any fashioned objects thereat, then it seems probable that the Arimatia *tuahu* was made in post-European times and that the idea of such a place was the result of reading the Scriptures.’

The probability is indeed great, but I should accept the editorial comment with a greater readiness if there were any reason to believe that the habits of the Maori were uniform throughout the whole of New Zealand.

Is it possible that the hole at the top of this structure was called *torino* or *ahupuke*?


According to H. W. Williams, *A Dictionary of the Maori Language*, s.v., and E. Tregear, *Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, s.v., the word *tiepa* meant ‘to hang loosely’, and so a framework of sticks on which were placed the offerings dedicated to a god’. The word translated ‘god’ is *atua*, for which see nn. 178–80.

When W. E. Gudgeon, ‘Maori Religion’, *J.P.S.* xiv (1905), p. 125, translates *tuahu*, ‘altar’, and calls it ‘a very rude affair’, he may be confusing *tiepa* and *tuahu*. See further n. 184.


We are not told how and why any particular stream or pool was selected, but ‘a considerable number of religious rites were performed at such streams’. Since the rites were performed at places where *atua* was manifest (n. 184), and since *atua* was manifest in places where anything unusual was seen or heard, it seems possible that ceremonies were conducted by the side of any stream which possessed any remarkable characteristic.

R. Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*, p. 174, mentions a ‘sacred grove’, *wahi tapu*. It was, he says, ‘a sacred store of odds and ends’. Perhaps he means a store of sacred odds and ends, for the *wahi tapu* to which he refers contained ‘the bones of chiefs, offerings to the gods and sacrifices’. But Taylor’s description might well apply also to a *tuahu* (n. 184).

187. Such a sickness was thought to be due to

(i) *Makutu*, witchcraft, which was of two kinds:

(a) *Direct*. Hair, saliva, nail-clippings, &c., were carefully buried; crumbs and table-clearings were always collected; see W. Colenso, ‘On the Maori Races in New Zealand’, *T.N.Z.I.* i (1889), p. 43; E. Shortland, *Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders*, p. 117.

Charmed material also might be buried for the victim to walk over (E. Best, *The Maori*, i. 335).


The great fear of witchcraft is mentioned by E. Best, ‘Omens and Superstitions and Beliefs of the Maori’, *J.P.S.* vii (1898), p. 119, and throughout his writings; G. F. Angas, *Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand*, ii. 331;

According to Polack, any one could bewitch. W. H. Goldie, 'Maori Medical Lore', *T.N.Z.I.* xxxvii (1904), pp. 36 ff., describes the various methods, between which there were many interesting differences.

(b) *Indirect*; by the employment of a *kehua*, ghost, and other means. The reports are vague. For *kehua*, see n. 175. W. H. Goldie, op. cit., p. 31, states that a wizard did not always act directly by the employment of charms; sometimes he would send the *kehua* of a dead man into his enemy. F. E. Maning, *Old New Zealand*, p. 122, tells how a *tohunga* could call up the 'soul of a dead man' to inflict injury.

According to E. Tregear, 'The Maori of New Zealand', *J.A.I.* xix (1890), p. 117, the object of witchcraft was to persuade a man to break a *tapu*. This opinion has been expressed also by E. Shortland, *Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders*, p. 177, who adds that *atau* was thus offended.

E. Best, 'Spiritual Concepts of the Maori', *J.P.S.* ix (1900), p. 187, considers that when a man killed another man by witchcraft he captured and destroyed the man's *wairma*, soul.

Do these opinions reflect a white man's attempt to rationalize a puzzling phenomenon by asking direct questions and reporting the answers? I receive them with great reserve.


Taylor says that the 'spirits of the departed' afflicted those who approached a burial place. Since the word which is translated 'spirits of the departed' would be *ataua* (nn. 178–80), Taylor may have misinterpreted the conception by a mistranslation of *ataua*. E. Best, *The Maori*, i. 290, says that a *tohunga* could approach a *tapua*-place (i.e. *ataua*-place) with impunity. Any one else fell ill.

(3) *Atua*; but the translations of the word are so varied that the whole subject is extremely confused. Cp. E. Tregear, *The Maori Race*, p. 104; W. Colenso, 'On the Maori Races of New Zealand', *T.N.Z.I.* i (1869), p. 42; W. H. Goldie, op. cit., pp. 12 ff.; J. S. Polack, op. cit. i. 263; E. Best, 'Maori Medical Lore', *J.P.S.* xiii (1904), pp. 216, 224. In these passages *ataua* is variously rendered 'evil spirit', 'spirits of the dead', 'disease gods', &c. (Goldie's comparison with Asclepius is unscholarly), and, if we are not careful, we shall conclude that the Maori conceived of an abundance of causes when they actually conceived of one cause, that is, *ataua*.

For the various English equivalents of *ataua* see nn. 178–80.

Indefinite and sometimes contradictory translations have also confused the reports in regard to the causes of death. Cp. E. Best, 'Omens and Superstitions and Beliefs of the Maori', *J.P.S.* vii (1898), p. 119; idem, 'Maori Magic', *T.N.Z.I.* xxxiv (1901), p. 169; idem, *The Maori*, ii. 32; W. H. Goldie, op. cit., p. 2. It will be noticed that the lists do not agree.

Sometimes the meaning of *mate*, 'death', is extended to denote 'complaints'. Thus E. Best, 'Maori Medical Lore', *J.P.S.* xiii (1904), p. 224, speaks of *mate kikokiko* as a term applied to 'complaints supposed to have been caused by the *kikokiko*, or "evil spirits"', which were spirits, he says, either of the dead or of the unborn children; but according to E. Tregear, *Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, s.v., *kikokiko* should be *ataua kikokiko*, which was represented in current language by *kohukohu*, 'ghost, the germ of a human being grown into a malignant spirit'. Since neither H. W. Williams, *A Dictionary of the Maori Language*, s.v., nor W. H. Goldie, op. cit., p. 26, alludes to 'ghost', *kohukohu* may have meant only the spirit of an unborn child. In view of the statements concerning 'ancestor-worship' (n. 175), this is important.
§ 188. Usually the word *tohunga* is translated priest, shaman, wizard, doctor, wise man, magician, &c., but just as ‘god’ is not a fair rendering of *ataua* (nn. 178–80), so none of these words reveals the native significance of *tohunga*. A clever builder, a successful gardener, or any man or woman skilled in any form of human activity was *tohunga*. The word was used both as a substantive and as an adjective. Thus, *tohunga tarai waka* was a canoe-making expert; *tohunga whakairo*, a tattoo or carving artist; and so on. See E. Tregear, *Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, s.v.; H. W. Williams, *A Dictionary of the Maori Language*, s.v.; E. Best, ‘Maori Religion and Mythology’, *N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull.* 10, p. 163; idem, *The Maori*, i. 243–4; T. G. Hammond, ‘The Tohunga Maori’, *J.P.S.* xvii (1908), p. 165, &c.

See further n. 192.

189. The word *karakia* has been translated prayer, ritual formula, charm, invocation, spell, incantation, &c. H. W. Williams, *A Dictionary of the Maori Language*, s.v., utters a warning against the modern use of the term which E. Tregear, *Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, s.v., probably reflects when he says that it meant ‘conduct a religious service’.

That a *karakia* was a mere incantation is clear from the following quotations, which might be augmented:

(i) ‘The Maori did not pray to his *atua*, as we understand the word “pray”. His *karakia*, usually described as “prayers”, were but incantations’ (E. Best, ‘Spiritual Concepts of the Maori’, *J.P.S.* ix (1900), p. 176);

(ii) ‘In most cases there is no sign of entreaty, or of any request, and the words employed contain no reference whatever to the subject under consideration’ (E. Best, *The Maori*, i. 262–3);

(iii) ‘The Maori did not worship his gods’ (the word translated ‘god’ is *atua*, for which see nn. 178–80), ‘he possessed a budget of charms, spells, incantations, invocations. None of these would be termed prayers; a small number may be classed as invocations, but the majority do not appear to rise above the level of incantations’ (E. Best, ‘Maori Religion’, *Twelfth Rep. Aust. Ass. Adv. Sc.* (1909), p. 457 f.).

In the last passage Best seems to place a prayer, invocation, and incantation in a descending scale. He does not define the words, however, and I do not know the respective meanings which he attached to them.

Perhaps *karakia* has been translated ‘prayer’ because the word was adopted by the missionaries: ‘The word *karakia*,’ remarks R. Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*, p. 181, ‘which we use for prayer, formerly meant a charm, spell, or incantation.’

The complete absence of ritual is emphasized by W. Colenso, ‘On the Maori Races of New Zealand’, *T.N.Z.I.* i (1869), p. 43: ‘They had neither doctrine nor dogma, neither cultus nor system of worship.’


Magical extraction from the body is mentioned by W. Brown, *New Zealand and its Aborigines*, p. 81, but this may have been an isolated case, for I can find no other mention of such treatment. Witchcraft, according to E. Best, ‘Maori Medical Lore’, *J.P.S.* xiv (1905), p. 3, was cured by a spell, *kai ure*, during the recital of which the *tohunga* clasped his genital organ in his left hand. The rite is described more fully in ‘Maori Magic’, *T.N.Z.I.* xxxiv (1901), pp. 74–9. There were many other methods of treating a case of witchcraft, some of which Best describes in his *The Maori*, ii. 42 ff. In that passage Best describes also the purificatory ceremonies which were necessary after an infringement of *tapu*.

Other rites and incantations are described by W. H. Goldie, ‘Maori Medical Lore’, *T.N.Z.I.* xxxvii (1904), pp. 82 ff.

The only case of transference which has come to my notice is mentioned by
E. Best, 'Maori Religion and Mythology', *N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull.* 10, p. 199, where we are told that if a stalk was sent adrift, accompanied by spells, it would bear away the evil influences of an epidemic. I think that with so copious a supply of literature we should require more than one mention of this method of treatment before we concluded that it was a general custom.

The same remark applies to takutaku, which is reported by W. H. Goldie, 'Maori Medical Lore', *T.N.Z.I.* xxxvi (1904), p. 48, and E. Best, 'Maori Medical Lore', *J.P.S.* xiii (1904), p. 230. Both these papers were published in the same year. Goldie's paper was edited by Best.

Usually a sick man was taken down to the wai tapu, sacred stream. See E. Best, 'Maori Magic', *T.N.Z.I.* xxxiv (1900), pp. 78, 91; idem, 'Maori Medical Lore', *J.P.S.* xiii (1904), p. 225; W. H. Goldie, op. cit., p. 39. In the second of these passages Best reports that a ripa or parepore was sung, and seems to consider that this charm performed the cure; but the words meant 'ward off', and, as W. H. Goldie, op. cit., p. 44, points out, the charm was purely defensive.

For wai tapu, see n. 186.

There is an amazing passage in E. Best, *The Maori*, i. 303: 'A tohunga took a bewitched person down to the local wai tapu and by means of incantations caused the wairua of the magician to appear, when he would give the name of the warlock'. I do not know who 'the magician' can have been. Surely he was not the same man as 'the warlock'. Does 'he' refer to the tohunga or to 'the magician'? If, as seems probable, tohunga, 'magician', 'he' and 'warlock' refer to two or perhaps three different persons, what was their mutual relationship?


Quaintly enough, Best continues: 'Ordinary folk employed the more common charms only'; but since he has already declared that the efficacy lay not in the charm but in the charmer, there can have been no 'common' charms, or 'high-class' charms, for charms possessed no unequal power. It is Best's rationalism of Maori 'belief' which leads him into these contradictions. See nn. 186, 192.

The word mana has received a wide currency as a typical native term for 'magic power'. It is worth while, therefore, to quote the opinion of F. E. Maning, op. cit., p. 174 f., who complains that the word has been 'bandied about a good deal in late years'. 'The mana of a tohunga', he says, 'is proved by the truth of his assertions and the success of his incantations, which same incantations, performed by another person of inferior mana, would have no effect.' Mana, he adds, is 'the accompaniment of power, not the power itself': 'Mind you do not translate mana as a power: that won't do: they are two different things entirely.'

E. Tregear, *The Maori Race*, p. 322, happily describes a man of mana as 'the darling of the gods'.

E. Shortland, *Maori Religion and Mythology*, p. 35, points out that superiority of mana depended on the command of a more powerful atua.

Similarly E. Best, 'Maori Medical Lore', *J.P.S.* xiii (1904), pp. 217, 224, states (i) 'what gives power to the charm or spell is the atua of the wizard'; (ii) 'the atua'—the 'the', of course, is an inference—'are always behind the manifestations of supernatural and diabolic power'.

The intimate relationship between mana and atua, thus clarified, is important. The power came from atua; when it was manifested its possessor was credited with mana. As soon as the manifestations ceased, the man was no longer mana.

With mana, cp. the Kikuyu mugu (n. 365).

192. There were many other occasions on which the presence of a tohunga was necessary: birth, death, the felling of a tree, the building of a house, the launching of a canoe, the planting of seeds, &c. See E. Best, *The Maori*, i. 250. Apparently
any tohunga could perform any of the ceremonies. It must be noted, however, that according to E. Tregear, 'The Maori of New Zealand', J.A.I. xix (1899), p. 121, there was no ceremony at seed-time or at harvest.

Most of our authorities confine their descriptions to a few of the tohunga activities. Thus E. Shortland, Maori Religion and Mythology, p. 47, is content to say that a tohunga was 'one skilled in makutu [witchcraft] and in bringing back love'. Love-charms are also mentioned by E. Best, 'Maori Marriage Customs', T.N.Z.I. xxxvi (1903), pp. 35-40, who adds that a tohunga was equally able and willing to recite toko which would destroy marital affection.

A general word like 'magician' seems to be the only suitable English equivalent of tohunga, but it is best to use the native term, for 'magician' implies that a tohunga's activities were always magical. This was clearly not the case among the Maori: any skilled craftsman was tohunga. In translating the word, our authorities adopt various English equivalents, none of which is satisfactory. W. Brown, New Zealand and its Aborigines, p. 80, says that the tohunga united in his person 'the offices of priest, shaman, sorcerer, juggler and physician'. J. S. Polack, Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders, i. 263, gives him the titles of 'physician, apothecary, soothsayer, magician, conjurer, priest, legislator'. No one expects a scientific accuracy from Brown and Polack, but the reports of modern ethnologists are not more precise. I have noted some of their renderings in n. 188. I do not think that the study of social anthropology will continue to make progress unless these various English words are defined and the definitions rigidly adhered to. See para. 9.


Best tells us neither what he means by 'high-class' and 'low-class', nor by what criteria he appraised the practitioners. The following comments are appropriate.

In (ii) and (iii) tohunga ahurewa and tohunga tua hu are called 'high-class priests' and 'first-grade priests'. Yet the terms themselves reveal to the most inexpert eye that they were merely descriptive of tohunga activities at a tua hu (tapu-place), and at the ahurewa (indoor tua hu). These classes are not mentioned in (i). For tua hu and ahurewa, see n. 184.

In (i) and (ii) tohunga taua is called a 'high-class priest'. But since taua literally meant 'old man', tohunga taua literally meant 'skilled old man'. This 'class' is omitted from (iii).

In (i) tohunga kehua is called a 'wizard', 'tohunga of the lowest class'; in (ii) he is a 'shaman'. But since kehua was applied to a malevolent ghost (n. 175), I conjecture that a man to whom the title tohunga kehua (lit. 'skilled' and 'ghost') was given enjoyed a local reputation as a ghost-layer. I cannot understand that 'wizard' or 'shaman' is a fair rendering of such a word. Moreover in (ii) and (iii) the word 'wizard' is applied to the tohunga mukutu, and since mukutu meant 'witchcraft', the rendering is acceptable; but in that case we must assume that in Best's opinion there was no difference between a tohunga kehua and a tohunga mukutu, for he employs the same English equivalent for them. Yet the Maori were careful to distinguish the two men.

In (i) both tohunga ruanuku and tohunga puri are called 'wizards'. Best confesses, however, that the meaning of the words is 'not quite clear'. These are omitted from (ii) and (iii).

I do not know why Best has chosen to complicate the subject by these contrary reports. If we cease to translate the native terms, their meaning seems clear.

When a tohunga was possessed by atua he became urua, demented. His
symptoms were the usual ones, viz. foaming at the mouth, twitching of the limbs, &c. See E. Tregear, *The Maori Race*, p. 514; E. Best, *The Maori*, i. 250.

Every *tohunga* seems to have been taught his trade or his arts, and Best often mentions a 'school of learning'. See, e.g., 'Maori Religion and Mythology', *N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull.* 10, pp. 166-70. In *The Maori*, i. 243, we are simply told that the old men taught the young men.


Colenso well describes 'the old grey-haired man in his puny little vessel' who 'in a few simple words commanded the heavy breakers to listen to his powerful charms'. Two pages later he makes a comparison between Tawhiramatai and Neptune. Such comparisons are more easily made than justified.

In 'Notes on Maori Mythology', *J.P.S.* viii (1899), p. 97, Best recounts the story how Maui snared the sun and by an incantation caused it to move more slowly through its course. An interference with the cosmic motion of the sun is apparently a feat commonly credited to human heroes in oral or written legend.

194. At first sight the evidence in regard to diviners seems to be contradictory, but a close study of the appropriate literature shows that the confusion is due to the different meanings which our authorities have attached to the word *matakite*.

According to E. Best, *The Maori*, i. 239, 'A man might become the medium of a defunct parent or grandparent; the most marked advantage gained by such a medium was the power of second sight, *matakite or matatuthi*'. The Maori word which is rendered 'defunct parent' is *atua* (nn. 178-80); thus this report means that a man divined by the power of *atua*, that is to say, he was *tohunga* (nn. 188, 192). In 'Maori Religion and Mythology', *N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull.* 10, p. 137, however, Best says that 'the only people who can see the spirits', i.e. *atua*, are *matakite*, seers'. Here *matakite* denotes not the power but the person in whom that power was manifest. Moreover, it is rendered as plural. E. Shortland, *Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders*, pp. 125-6, also uses *matakite* in reference to the person: 'The *matakite* and the *tohunga* must both be members of the same *hapu*, or tribal sub-division, to which the sick man belongs; every *hapu* contains at least one *matakite* and several *tohunga*. Apparently Shortland regarded the two professions as distinct. Yet it seems clear from E. Best, 'Maori Medical Lore', *J.P.S.* xiii (1904), p. 226, that a seer was a *tohunga*. W. H. Goldie, 'Maori Medical Lore', *T.N.Z.I.* xxxvii (1934), p. 119, agrees, and speaks of *tohunga* 'with powers of *matakite*, clairvoyancy'. On the whole the balance of evidence is in favour of the view that *matakite* denoted the power and not the person.

It is unfortunate that in his latest monograph Best did not make an authoritative pronouncement on such an important point. Surely he was conscious that he had employed the word in two different senses. Unfortunately again we cannot assume that his most recent opinion is the most reliable, for in his mature years Best rationalized Maori conceptions in a manner which is incompatible with exact scholarship and clear thinking. See my comments on his 'classes' of *atua* (n. 186) and on his 'classes' of *tohunga* (n. 192).

195. The translations and interpretations of *atua* are many and bewildering. The following may be noticed:

1. G. Pratt, *Samoan Grammar and Dictionary*, s.v. *atua*, 'spirit' and 'god'. But in answer to his question, 'What is an *atua*?' Pratt was told, 'The man that is dead'.


NOTES AND REFERENCES


(5) According to G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, p. 226: ‘The world was full of spiritual beings. They saw or heard an *aitu* or spirit everywhere.’ In this passage ‘everywhere’ seems to mean ‘in many places’; apparently ubiquity is not to be understood: ‘There were many places which were dreaded as the abode of some *aitu* and at which offerings were made.’

Similarly, the number of *aitu* places is limited by J. B. Stair, op. cit., pp. 228–9: ‘Various localities were haunts of *aitu* or spirits and thus acquired sacredness from being a gathering place of spirits.’ Cp. (2).

If, therefore, uncivilized societies are classified according to their ‘beliefs’, the Samoans may be termed ‘animistic’ or ‘polytheistic’ as we prefer. For further renderings of *aitu*, see n. 198.

The native use of *aitu* becomes plain only after the various reports have been compared. According to G. Turner, op. cit., p. ix, the white man’s ships were *aitu*; and just as the Maori (para. 49) applied *atua* to everything which was beyond their comprehension, so everything outside Samoan comprehension seems to have been *aitu*.

The word *atua* was current in most Polynesian societies, and was even used by the Samoans, sometimes in the same contexts as *aitu* (G. Pratt, op. cit., *s.v. aitutu*). When the native usage is elucidated, we find that the word was always associated with anything unusual or beyond comprehension. This was the case among the Maori (para. 49), Tongans (n. 207), and also the Hawaiians, who are not included in this treatise (para. 48), but Larin Andrews, *A Vocabulary of Words in the Hawaiian Language*, *s.v. atua*, translates, ‘The Deity, God, any supernatural being, an object of religious homage, any artificial object the nature and properties of which the Hawaiians do not understand, such as a watch, compass, etc.’ Since, then, in the Samoan language, *aitu* and *atua* were synonymous, and since among the Maori, Tongans and Hawaiians *atua* was associated with the unusual and the supernatural, it is reasonable to suppose that *aitu* had the same connexion.

*Atua*, however, had not such a wide currency in Samoa as *aitu*. According to J. B. Stair, ‘Mythology and Spirit-Lore of Old Samoa’, *J.P.S.* v (1896), p. 34; idem, *Old Samoa*, pp. 211, 214, *atua* was applied to ‘the original gods who dwelt in Puloke and in Le Langi, the heavens’: ‘The chief *atua* is Tangaloa.’ There is no evidence that any rites were conducted in honour of these mythological heroes and it is difficult to understand how the word ‘god’ can be used in reference to them. Cp. my comments on the Maori heroes (n. 180) whom Elsdon Best has called ‘gods’. At the same time it is remarkable that the name of Tangaloa, who figures in the mythology of so many Polynesian societies, should be associated in the minds of the Samoans with the word which was common to those societies but which had fallen into disuse among the men of Samoa. Since *aitu* was current also among (e.g.) the Maori, the facts suggest that before the Polynesians reached the habitations in which we found them at the end of the eighteenth century there were two words in their language, *atua* and *aitu*, which possessed a somewhat similar meaning. After the dispersion of the Polynesians some units may have preferred *atua* and some may have preferred *aitu*, the alternate word in each case remaining in the vocabulary as an archaic survival. This conjecture is suggested by the Samoan application of *atua* to Tangaloa and to his mythological associates; it receives strong support from the Maori use of *aitu*. W. Colenso, *A Maori-English Lexicon*, pt. i, *s.v.*, says that *aitu* was ‘a very ancient and peculiar word’, much used in ancient *karakia* (incantations), rarely in colloquial language. We are not told whether *aitu* was applied by the Maori to Tane, Tu, Rongo, &c., but, if this was the
case, the suggestion which I have made would be confirmed. At any rate the Maori did not use the word *atua* in reference to them.

A. M. Hocart, in two scholarly papers, 'On the Meaning of the Rotuman word *atua*', *Man*, 1915, no. 75, and 'Spirit Animals', *Man*, 1915, no. 86, suggests that the Rotuman usage of *atua* corresponded to the Fijian use of *kalou*. He thinks that the words *atua* and *aitu* were imported into Rotuma from Samoa. If the Rotumans used the word *atua* in the same sense as the Maori did (para. 49), then the word certainly corresponded to the Fijian *kalou* (pars. 34, 63) in so far as both words were applied to anything unusual or beyond comprehension; but this is not the point which Hocart makes. His argument is fascinating, although there is danger, perhaps, in concentrating upon a single translation (in this case 'ghosts') of a comprehensive term like *atua*. I should have greater faith in his conclusions if he did not insist that the words were diffused 'together with the beliefs which they imply'. No special 'belief' is implied by the presence of any word in any language or on any island, for different people place different interpretations upon the same word. The Rotuman idea of *atua* may have been different from that of any other Polynesian society.

I have, however, great sympathy with Hocart when he protests that 'writer after writer on savage customs will accept the hasty assumptions of his predecessors and never think of inquiring for himself'.

Every Samoan *aitu* is said to have manifested itself in the form of an animal or animals. For this reason some students have thought that Samoan religion was a form of zoolatry. See, e.g., J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, ii. 166. But *aitu* was the power to which the attention was paid. The animal was merely its manifestation. If we label Samoan rites as zoolatry, we run the risk of confusing the meaning of *aitu* with the phenomena to which it was adjectivally or adverbially applied.

Some Samoan *aitu* are said to have been recognized by the whole people; others are called 'tutelary deities' of districts, villages or crafts; others still are termed 'household gods'. There are two reasons why such reports cannot be literally accepted. In the first place we must beware of such words as 'household' and 'family' when we discuss the Samoans, for the Samoan 'family' was such an extended unit that a whole settlement might consist of one family. Thus a village *aitu* and a family *aitu* might be identical. Secondly, when we possess two reports on the same society, our authorities do not always agree concerning the extent of the area over which an alleged deity enjoyed divine influence. See my remarks in reference to the 'general' and 'local' deities of the Dahomans (para. 99), and to the lists of Tongan *atua* (n. 208). In regard to the status of Samoan *aitu* there is only one detailed report, that of G. Turner. It seems possible that if we possessed another equally detailed report it would differ from Turner's.

Some of Turner's classifications are as follows:

(1) These *aitu* are said to have enjoyed a wide reputation and to have been recognized over a considerable area (G. Turner, *Samoan*, pp. 28-40, 54-5):

(a) Nafanua, a goddess of war. Her priests were the most important in the land. See n. 198.

(b) O le Fe'e, 'cuttle-fish'. In one village a new temple was erected every year to this *aitu*. All quarrels were left over for settlement on that day. See further n. 197.

(c) Moso. He was represented in one village by a stone, in another by a bowl. To some people he was manifest in a pet pigeon, to others in a domestic fowl, to others still in a cuttle-fish, creeper bird, &c. Apparently he had no temple. Plainly, I think, our information concerning this alleged 'god' is not exhaustive.

(d) Talma, lit. 'glittering black'. In one village Talma had a temple with only one opening; there he was a war-god. Elsewhere the name Talma was given to a goddess who had been discovered by two fishermen as she swam between
Tutuila and Upolu. ‘They covered her with fine native cloth and conveyed her to the bush, where they built a temple for her.’ These men became her priests; they also grew rich. In other places Talma was a war-goddess and was credited with the introduction of tattooing.

(e) Taigmalie, lit. ‘tide gently rising’, was incarnate in a bat in Upolu, in a man and in a sea-eel in Savaii. He is said to have been a ‘household god’ in various other districts.

(2) These aitu are classed as ‘district war-gods’ (G. Turner, op. cit., pp. 26 f., 33 f., 42-4, 46-9):

(a) Faamalu, whose temple contained a sacred shell.
(b) La’ata’a, a village war-god in Savaii and a champion of wrestlers in Upolu. His priest possessed great powers of divination.
(c) Pava, who once lived as a man in the eastern islands. After his death he became a war-god in southern Upolu.
(d) Lesa, who, when incarnate in a lizard, was a war-god, and, when incarnate in a centipede, was a household god.
(e) Salevo, whose priest dwelt permanently in one of the temples in Savaii.


The report of C. Wilkes also (*Narrative of U.S. Exploring Expedition, 1838-1842*, ii. 131 f.) differs in some details from that of Turner; but I doubt if Commander Wilkes can be permitted to rank as an anthropological authority. For comments on his work, see nn. 268, 595, 597.

Some aitu were equipped with temples, some were not. See n. 196.


Stair seems to be confident that a temple ‘of more or less dignity’ was to be found in every settlement. Invariably the war-gods, he says, were equipped in that manner. The reports of G. Turner, *Samoa*, p. 19, and of W. T. Pritchard, *Polynesian Reminiscences*, p. 110, are less definite. They say that a temple was to be found in nearly every village and that some villages possessed a sacred grove. If there was no formal temple, the great house of the village, faelele, where the elders were in the habit of assembling, was used.

It would be wrong, I think, to conclude that such villages had never possessed a temple. The influence of the missionaries may have caused the inhabitants to gather in a house which, so far as the white strangers were aware, was devoted solely to civil purposes. Thus the natives would have been able to conduct their ceremonies without interruption or protest.

The faelele was situated in the marae (malae), the open space or green in the middle of the village where the public assemblies were held. See J. B. Stair, *Old Samoa*, p. 84; G. Pratt, op. cit., s.v. malae; E. Tregear, *Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, s.v. marae. The faeleitu also was in the marae.

For other notes on marae, see nn. 174 (Maori), 205 (Tonga), 582 (Tahiti).


The temple was dedicated to Fe’e, lit. ‘cuttle-fish’, war-god of A’ana, Upolu. (The Samoans are said to have cut the stone in a manner similar to that which, according to Mr. Frank Worthington, was employed by the Barotse. Mr.
Worthington published the information in a private lecture which I was privileged to attend.) J. B. Stair, *Old Samoa*, p. 228, regards this temple as unique.

G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, p. 226, says that he saw 'what was probably the last heathen temple in Samoa'. Dr. Brown also mentions a small wooden thatched house with two stones in it, which was used as a building from which a priest announced the will of his *aitu*.

198. See J. B. Stair, *Old Samoa*, pp. 220 ff. The word is spelt *taulaitu* by G. Pratt, *Samoan Grammar and Dictionary*, s.v., who gives these alternative renderings: 'priest of an *aitu*', 'doctor who worked by charms'.

Stair divides the Samoan priests into four classes:

1. *taula-aitu-o-aitu-tau* (the repetition of *aitu* is puzzling), 'anchors of the war-gods'. This title was given to the priests of Nafanua, for whom see n. 195.

2. *tausi-aitu-tau*, 'keepers of the war-gods', who were in charge of the sacred objects which represented the *aitu* or were used in the ceremonies. They seem to have served the district war-gods, for whom see n. 195.

3. *taula-aitu-o-ainga*, 'anchors of the family *aitu*'. As a rule the office was held by the head of the family or by his sister.

4. *taula-aitu-vavalo-ma-fei*, 'anchors of the spirits who helped to predict and to curse'. Clearly these priests were diviners, but they also appear to have assisted a man who suffered from an anti-social impulse. Cp. my comments on wizards, para. 65.

It will be noticed that *aitu* is translated 'god' in (1) and (2) and 'spirits' in (4). The whim of the author seems to be wholly responsible for these alternatives in translation. See further n. 195.

According to J. B. Stair, 'O Le Fale-o-le-Fe'e', *J.P.S.* iii (1894), p. 240, the priests of the war-gods were *vaa taua*, 'warships'. Cp. the Maori *waka*, 'canoe', 'vessel' (n. 181), and the *Purari imunu-vii*, 'canoe of imunu' (n. 323).

With *taulaitu*, cp. the Tongan *taulautua* (n. 209).


In every village there was a specially appointed *taula-aitu* whose duties consisted in making offerings to the *aitu*, appointing feast-days, and announcing whether the *aitu* permitted or forbade a war.

We are not told how a man became a priest in a recognized temple; perhaps by being 'possessed', for insanity and epilepsy were ascribed to possession by *aitu*. See G. Turner, *Samoan*, p. 137; G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, p. 223.


Dr. Brown also remarks (op. cit., p. 221) that ghosts were feared. The Samoans thought that they haunted the houses and burial places, and sometimes tried to drive them away by shouts and noises. It seems possible that these were the ghosts not of ordinary men but of the unburied, the fear of whom is reported by G. Turner, *Samoan*, p. 150; W. T. Pritchard, *Polynesian Reminiscences*, p. 151; S. Ella, 'Samo', *Fourth Rep. Aust. Ass. Adv. Sc.* (1892), p. 626; J. B. Stair, *Old Samoa*, p. 184; G. Brown, op. cit., pp. 218–19.

201. When we are discussing Samoan 'ancestor-worship', we must always remember that *aitu* has been translated both as 'ghost' and as 'god'. Thus we can distinguish Samoan 'ancestor-worship' from Samoan 'religion' only by the place in which the rites were conducted, for it is only in this manner that the uncertainties arising from the translations can be dispelled.

There are two definite statements:

(i) J. B. Stair, *Old Samoa*, p. 235, says that a small portion of food was offered to the family *aitu* at the beginning of every meal.

(ii) G. Turner, *Samoan*, p. 151, reports that prayers were said at the grave of a
parent, brother or chief. Some people would pray for health, others for the death of some one whom they disliked, and 'so the custom went on, but with fluctuating belief in its efficacy'. It is impossible to tell from this description whether the rites were do ut abeas or do ut des. The latter seems probable.

202. The word *tupua* was common to many Polynesian societies. The Maori applied the term to Tane, Tu, Rongo, and other mythical heroes (n. 180). In Samoa, according to J. B. Stair, *Old Samoa*, pp. 211, 215, *tupua* denoted 'deified spirits of the chiefs'. G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, p. 223, corrects this statement and maintains that the word was applied to a stone which was reputed to be a petrified man. G. Pratt, *Samoan Grammar and Dictionary*, s.v., agrees with Brown. So does E. Tregear, *Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, s.v., who includes 'riddle', 'a fine mat when torn', 'certain privileges', among his renderings. In Hawaiian, Tregear says, the word was *kupua*, and denoted a person of extraordinary powers, a magician. This is confirmed by Larin Andrews, *A Vocabulary of Words in the Hawaiian Language*, s.v. In Paumotan *tupua* is said to have been applied to a corpse or ghost.

A. M. Hocart, 'Chieftainship and Sister's Son in the Pacific', *American Anthropologist*, N.S. xvii (1915), p. 633, endeavours to derive *tupua* from *tupu*, 'to grow, originate', and thinks that it was equivalent to the Fijian *vu*; but, as he himself remarks, 'the beings who in Polynesia correspond to the Fijian *vu* are more commonly described as *atua* or *aitu*'. Does he suggest, then, that *tupua* was the equivalent of *atua*? In that case see n. 180, where I have quoted the words of an old Maori who corrected Elsdon Best when the latter endeavoured to apply *atua* to Tu.

*Tupua* and *tupuna* are alternative forms of *tupua*.


I can find no detailed description of the methods which were adopted. The ceremonies are mentioned only casually by Turner; the other authorities make no reference to the subject.

In one village there were two oblong stones, Ponge and Toafa, which were supposed to be the parents of Saato, 'a god who controlled the rain'. The word translated 'god' is *aitu* (n. 195), and, since *aitu* was applied to a 'ghost', it seems possible that Saato was once a noted Samoan magician. He was (the) *aitu* of fertility; food was placed on the stones 'accompanied by prayers for fine weather'.

If a dog or a rat ate the food, it was assumed that the *aitu* was incarnate in them.

Stones seem to have been closely associated with rain-making in Samoa. 'Smooth stones of the stream' were kept in a temple. 'Another stone was carefully housed in another village as the representative of a rain-making god; when there was overmuch rain, the stone was laid by the fire and kept heated until fine weather set in; in time of drought the priest and his followers dressed up in fine mats, and went in procession to the stream, dipped the stone and prayed for rain.' Probably the details of these 'prayers' would reveal that they were mere incantations.

Turia was another *aitu* who could command rain and sunshine. He had a sacred grove on one island, with a smooth stone in it. Perhaps Turia, like Saato, was a Samoan magician who had possessed the stone when he was alive and by its aid had successfully controlled the elements.

204. The priest of La'a-La'a (n. 195) was reputed to possess exceptional powers of diagnosis. Sometimes the sick were carried to the temple of Salevao, whose priest was able to restore a diseased limb by stroking it. The priests of Nanaua also would consent to perform a miraculous cure if they were given an adequate fee. See G. Turner, *Samoa*, pp. 33-4, 49, 49.

For the Samoan priests, see n. 198.

Every disease, according to G. Turner, *Samoa*, pp. 140, 143, had its particular
physician, and a man who by some lucky chance had effected a cure was regarded as both diviner and medicine-man. The fact that the same word, *taula-aitu*, was applied both to the priest erected to a temple and to the medicine-man supports the suggestion (n. 199) that a man became *taula-aitu* by virtue of his achievements, and not by special training. Thus the professional standing of a *taula-aitu* would depend on the character of his *aitu*, i.e. on whether it was one which (i) had a special temple erected in its honour, or (ii) was manifest only in the achievements of its *taula*.


In general, affliction was thought to be caused by *aitu*. See the above-quoted passages. Ella adds that sickness could be ‘produced by an evil spirit or by the spirit of a dead relative’. But in each case the Samoa term would be *aitu*. It is strange how often our authorities create a multiplicity of causes by translating a simple native term in many different ways.

All the above-cited authorities state that a troublesome *aitu* could be attacked with a spear and expelled. Brown and Ella say that a ‘relative’ could effect his deliverance. Probably the ‘relative’ was the so-called household *taula-aitu*, for whom see n. 198.

205. Le Père A. C., *Dictionnaire toga-français*, s.v., who is the only authority to mention the native term.

S. Rabone, *A Dictionary of the Tongan Language*, s.v. *falefeao*, states that this was the name of ‘the house built near the god’s house for the reception of the sick’. Since the *feao* was the assistant who presented the suppliants to the priest (n. 209), Rabone may have confused the *falefeao* with the *faletapu*.

The native term for temple is not mentioned by W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, either in his text or in his vocabulary, though the word *lotoo*, ‘prayer’, is included in the latter.


The Tongan word *malie* is translated ‘temple’ by W. Lawry, *A Second Visit to the Friendly and the Feejee Islands*, pp. 85–6. Lawry seems to have transliterated the native word phonetically, and almost certainly refers to the *malai* (*malae*). *Malie*, as all the dictionaries agree, meant ‘Well done! Bravo!’ *Malae*, on the other hand, is the same as *marae*, a common Polynesian word which has been (wrongly) rendered ‘temple’ in our reports concerning the Society Islands (n. 582).

In Tonga, according to Mariner (op. cit. ii. vocab.) the word denoted ‘a piece of ground, generally before a large house, a chief’s grave, where public ceremonies are principally held’. So also Le Père A. C. (op. cit., s.v.), and S. Rabone (op. cit., s.v.), both of whom call it ‘a grass plot, a green’. Thus the meaning of *malae* in Tonga was the same as in Samoa (n. 196) and among the Maori (n. 174).

The following comment on *marae* has been made by R. W. Williamson, *Social and Political Systems of Central Polynesia*, ii. 60, 63: ‘Broadly speaking the *marae* were sacred structures, specially associated with the gods and the spirits of the dead.’ Apparently the sentence is innocent; actually it is most misleading. In the first place, the native word for both ‘gods’ and ‘spirits of the dead’ would be *atuia* (*otua*), and we must be careful not to distinguish what the Polynesians confused. Secondly, the words ‘broadly speaking’, undesirable in a work which makes any claim to exactitude, in this case are positively unjustified. Mr. Williamson adds that ‘in some islands the *marae* was merely an open space’, but he fails to cite an authoritative example of *marae* meaning anything else. Moreover, it is not true that ‘the bulk of the evidence on the whole subject comes from the Society Islands’.
It may be that the Tahitian marae has been described at greater length than the marae of any other island has been, but we shall come to a sorry pass if we rely on quantity and not quality in appraising our evidence. As Elsdon Best has pointed out (n. 174), it is probable that the white residents in Tahiti were mistaken when they applied the term marae to the stone structures which the Tahitians erected in the marae (open space). Furthermore, it is plain that Mr. Williamson has not consulted the available literature in regard to the Samoan temples. C. p. his references in op. cit. ii. 82, and his casual remark in op. cit. iii. 49, with my nn. 196 and 197. He makes a single perfunctory reference to the Tongan ‘god-houses’ (op. cit. ii. 412) and does not quote the native word for them. In his notes on the Society Islands he seems to have been somewhat hasty in accepting at its face value every statement made by any writer on Tahitian culture, for which see para. 133.

W. Lawry, A Second Visit to the Friendly and the Feejee Islands, p. 86, speaks of hufanga, ‘city of refuge’. No other writer appears to have mentioned the place.

206. See W. Mariner, An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands, ii. 111 f., who states that some otua had five or six temples, others a lesser number.

Sir Basil Thomson, Diversions of a Prime Minister, p. 379, says that the houses were made of grass; and in this respect the Tongan buildings contrasted in an interesting manner with those of the Samoans, for which see para. 51, nn. 196, 197.

According to E. E. V. Collacott, ‘Notes on Tongan Religion’, J.P.S. xxx (1921), p. 155, ‘sacred objects, such as war weapons, stones, pieces of wood more or less roughly carved and often painted’ were kept in the temples; several fine mats also were indispensable: ‘At times of worship these mats were spread and the priest sat either on or beside them, while the sacred objects of the temple were displayed on the mats.’

207. The comprehensive meaning of the Tongan otua, like that of the Maori attua (nn. 178–80) and the Samoan aitu (n. 195), has been concealed by our methods of translation. The word has been variously spelt otua (West), hotooa (Mariner), odooa (Vason and Wilson), otooa (Cook and others). For the sake of uniformity I adopt otua. Various English equivalents have been employed: god, spirit, supernatural being, divinity, invisible being, &c. The missionaries used the term to denote the Christian God.

(1) Otua was applied to the soul of a dead man, i.e. ghost: ‘A human soul,’ says W. Mariner, An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands, ii. 38, ‘after its separation from the body, was said to be hotooa’. So also W. Lawry, Missionary Visit to the Friendly and the Feejee Islands, p. 251. We are not told, nor can I discover, whether all ghosts were otua, or whether the term was applied only to the ghosts of great men. The latter seems the more likely alternative, for, according to J. Wilson, A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific in the Ship ‘Duff’, p. 282, a chief when alive was esteemed odooa, “god” or “spirit”’. Unfortunately Wilson’s use of the word ‘chief’ is not sufficiently exact to warrant any conclusion being drawn from his statement.

(2) Anything unusual, or beyond Tongan comprehension, was otua. Thus, G. West, Ten Years in South-central Polynesia, p. 256, speaking of the native gods, remarks that any unusual natural phenomenon, such as a shark or a volcano, ‘had its devotees’, that is, was otua.

G. Vason, An Authentic Narrative of Four Years’ Residence at Tongatapu, p. 153, says: ‘When anything wonderful excited their attention respecting us or our goods or our arts, as was the case with the cuckoo-clock’, they said, odooa, ‘he has a spirit’. But did the Tongans exclaim ‘he has an odooa’, or did they say ‘odooa’, simply? They meant, I think, that the strange quality odooa (otua) was manifest. See further para. 63.

The application of otua to anything unusual or incomprehensible was probably
208. When we are dealing with the various 'beings' to whom the Tongans applied the word *otua* (n. 207), we must be careful to distinguish between *otua* in whose honour temples were erected and the 'heroes' of Tongan mythology. Just as in our reports concerning the Maori (n. 180) the translation of *otua*, 'god', and the application of 'god' to mythological heroes, have resulted in the application of *otua* to heroes who were not so regarded by the Maori, so also the word 'deities' has been employed freely in connexion with Tongan 'heroes' who may not have been known as *otua*. At any rate, they did not possess temples.

S. Farmer, *Tonga and the Friendly Islands*, p. 125, was conscious of a difference between these heroes and *otua* to whom supplication was made. 'There were many gods', she says, but they were 'not all objects of worship'. Similarly, E. E. V. Collacott, 'Notes on Tongan Religion', *J.P.S. xxx* (1921), p. 154 f., speaks of Tangaloa, Maui and Hikuleo as 'gods of the Sky, Underworld and Bulutu', and calls them 'major deities'. 'In spite of the widespread recognition of these major deities', they were not, he says, 'resorted to'. Attention was paid rather 'to a number of gods whose cults were in some cases nation-wide and in others confined to different localities, or more strictly to various groups of people'.


(1) West and Lawry are the only writers who mention Heu-moana-ului. He is said to have governed the sea.

(2) Tangaloa is called 'god of the sky' (Wilson), 'god of carpenters' who lived in the sky and sent the thunder (Lawry), and 'god of artificers and arts who had several priests, most of them carpenters' (Mariner). Farmer states that no offerings were made to him. Mariner says that he had no temple.

I should require to be told the native term for the alleged 'carpenter priests' before concluding that they were *taula-otua*. For *taula-otua*, see n. 209.

According to Farmer, Tangaloa had a threefold nature. This is not mentioned by the earlier writers, so either the threefold character of the Christian God has encouraged a rationalization of Tongan conceptions, or Tangaloa was associated with different things in different districts. Lawry mentions that in the opinion of the Tongans, Tangaloa had taught the white man how to construct his fine ships. In the area with which Mariner was most familiar, it was Tangaloa and not Maui (see below) who brought the Friendly Islands up out of the sea. The contrary nature of the stories suggests that they were obtained in different areas.

(3) Maui bore the earth on his shoulders, and sometimes, in some places,
people (presumably during an earthquake or during a volcanic eruption) used to beat the earth with sticks in order to induce him to lie still. He had neither temple nor priest; no one was ever 'possessed' by him. According to Lawry, he drew the Friendly Islands up out of the sea and had two sons, Maui Atalonga and Kijikiji. Farmer, however, regards them as father, son and nephew. They are also said to have been father, son and grandson.

C. Wilkes, Narrative of U.S. Exploring Expedition, 1838-1842, iii. 23, relates these stories and states that Maui was the 'oldest god'. He adds concerning Maui, 'He is not now worshipped by any tribe.' The words 'not now' seem to imply that Maui was 'worshipped' in olden times, but there is no evidence that this was so. I do not know what exact meaning can be attached to the phrase 'oldest god'. For a comment on Commander Wilkes's value as an anthropological authority, see nn. 195, 595, 597.

(4) Hikuleo presided over the underworld. Mariner calls him 'a very high god', and adds that 'he has no house, no priest, and the natives are uncertain about his attributes'. On the other hand, Lawry says that he had 'his spirit-temple'. According to Farmer, the Tongans rarely made offerings to him. I doubt if Lawry's report can be allowed to override the rest of our authorities. Farmer's 'rarely' is vague.

According to S. Farmer, Tonga and the Friendly Islands, p. 129, and T. West, Ten Years in South-central Polynesia, p. 254, the famous ina ʻi (ina che, ina chi) ceremony was held in honour of Hikuleo. Perhaps this is why Farmer calls the Tuitonga his 'high priest', for the ina ʻi was the occasion when the first-fruits were offered to the Tuitonga. The festival lasted a fortnight and was celebrated by a display of wrestling, boxing, club fighting, &c. J. Cook, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean in the Years 1776-1780, i. 337 fl., describes this 'grand solemnity'. He seems to have thought that the celebration was in honour of Tuitonga's son. The festival was abolished by Finau (Finow) 'as a great and useless expense to the people'.

Finau's abolition of the ina ʻi ceremony is a good example of the changes which were occurring in Polynesia about the end of the eighteenth century (para. 48), and was the more remarkable because, in the popular opinion, 'if this ceremony was omitted, the vengeance of the gods would fall in a signal manner upon the people'. See W. Mariner, An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands, ii. 2, 84.

Since these heroes had no temples, they do not come within the definition which I should like to place on the word 'god' (para. 148). I doubt if they were ʻotua.

The ʻotua to whom supplication was made are divided by Mariner (op. cit. ii. 110-16) into six classes:

(1) 'Original gods', which must be distinguished from Collacott's 'major deities' and Wilkes's 'oldest' gods. Nor can we justifiably call them 'district gods', for the lists disagree, and none can be regarded as exhaustive, even for the area from which the information was gathered. Lists are given by the following writers: J. Wilson, A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific in the Ship 'Duff', pp. 276-9; J. Cook, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean in the Years 1776-1780, i. 404; E. E. V. Collacott, 'Notes on Tongan Religion', J.P.S. xxx (1921), p. 154 f.; W. Mariner, l.c. Collacott's information seems to apply to Tongatabu; Mariner was more intimate with Vavau.

The following are included by Mariner:

(a) Tali-y-toobo—'Wait there, toobo'. Four temples were dedicated to him, but only the how (hau) could be his medium.

(b) Tøoifoua Bolotoo—'chief of all Bulutu'. Cp. (f). But I should have expected Hikuleo (Higooleo) to be given that title. Tøoifoua Bolotoo had several temples and three or four priests.

(c) Tøobotatai—'Tooob the mariner'. Cp. (a). Several houses were dedicated to him. This ʻotua was concerned in the incident of Finau's (Finow's) daughter (n. 212).
(d) Alai-valoo—the meaning of the name is unknown; this *otua* seems to have specialized in healing.

(e) Alo-alo—'to fan', god of the wind, weather, rain, harvest and vegetation. He is reported to have had two temples; and a priest lived in each of them. See also n. 211.

(f) Tooi bolotoo—'chief of Bulutu'. Cp. (b).

(2) 'Souls of nobles' (*egi(e)*) that is, those who were kin to the Tuitonga: 'They have the power of inspiring priests and of appearing in dreams and visions; they have no houses dedicated to them; the proper places to approach them are their graves, which are considered sacred and are therefore as much respected as consecrated houses.' Probably the native term for 'grave' was *faitoka*. See Le Pére A. C., *Dictionnaire toga-français*, s.v., S. Rabone, *A Dictionary of the Tongan Language*, s.v. The 'consecrated houses' were called *fale-lotu* or *fale-tapu* (n. 205).

Mariner does not describe the rites which were conducted in honour of these *otua*. Thus it is impossible to say whether the rites should be classed as *do ut abea* or as *do ut des*.

S. Farmer, *Tonga and the Friendly Islands*, p. 127, says: 'There were certain priests and priestesses into whom the spirit' (i.e. *otua*) entered, and houses were built from which these sacred persons might utter their oracles. When a great blessing was desired, or a serious evil deprecated, if they wished to have children or success, they would go to the burying ground of their great chiefs, clean them up thoroughly, sprinkle the floor with sand and lay down their offerings. Such houses were once numerous.'

The transition from 'houses' to 'burying ground' and then again to 'houses' is incomprehensible unless we assume either that the houses were also burial places or that houses were erected over the graves.

(3) 'Souls of chiefs' who ranked as *matabule*, that is, 'counsellors, experts in native law, masters of arts, repositories of native customs', &c. 'They had no power of inspiring priests and no houses were dedicated to them.'

(4) 'Primitive attendants and servants of the gods': an extremely mysterious class 'who had no power in Tonga'. Thus they can be disregarded.

Mariner states neither on what grounds he makes the above classification nor how he distinguished (4) from (3). Cp. the classifications of Samoan *aitu* (n. 195).

(5) *hotooa pau* (*otua pau*), 'mischiefous gods', who plagued mankind. These are probably the *otua bauo* of whom Wilkes and Lawry speak. See n. 212.

(6) Maui, for whom see above.

Temples, *fale-tapu* or *fale-lotu*, were erected only to (1), so they were the only *otua* to whom I should apply the word 'god'. (2) and (3) were clearly 'ghosts'.

E. E. V. Collacott, 'Notes on Tongan Religion', *J. P. S.* xxx (1921), pp. 154 f., 159, speaks of 'a gradation in the divine hierarchy from gods of populous tribes down to deities who were the private possession of a few'. He states that 'there was nothing to prevent a man from setting up a tutelary deity of his own', and that 'the number of the gods was liable to constant augmentation by the deification of the illustrious and well-beloved dead'. Surely in these passages Collacott is representing Tongan conceptions in terms which no Tongan would have understood. 'God', 'tutelary deity', 'well-beloved dead', &c., are translations of *otua*, and we must not distinguish what the Tongans confused. Furthermore, when does a 'ghost' become a 'god'? What is the essential difference between them? Collacott does not define the words. My suggestion is that we can distinguish them only by the place in which a right relation was maintained with them.

According to W. Mariner, op. cit. ii. 106, 'the less important gods', i.e. 'ghosts', appeared as animals. S. Farmer, op. cit., p. 126, states the same fact in another way. She says that the 'spirits', i.e. 'ghosts', revisited the earth 'in the form of birds and fish'. I cannot estimate the amount of inference which these reports
contain. I suspect that the word *otua* was applied adjectively or adverbially to some animals as well as to some dead men, and that the application of the same word to different phenomena has caused our authorities to conclude that the phenomena were identified. This seems to be a common error in social anthropology.

J. E. Moulton, art. ‘Tonga’, *Enc. Rel. Eth.*, ed. J. Hastings, disagrees with the other authorities. He states that the ‘supernatural beings’ were *fa‘ahihikehe*, ‘other people’, ‘different people’. I have not been able to find the word in any other publication. But the Rev. J. E. Moulton’s object is to show the ‘development of spiritual ideas’ rather than to describe Tongan practices, which he may not have known very well (n. 211).

209. The reports, however, are not unanimous. R. W. Williamson, *The Social and Political Systems of Central Polynesia*, ii. 410, states most of the evidence and concludes that *taula* was a general name for a priest’. According to Le Père A. C., *Dictionnaire toga-français*, s.v. ‘prêtre’, the full title was *taula-otua*. The same writer mentions *motuatapu*. *Motuatapu*, however, literally meant ‘sacred old man’. Cp. the Maori *tohunga taua* (n. 192).

T. West, *Ten Years in South-central Polynesia*, p. 257, translates *taula* as ‘shrine of the god’. The word meant literally ‘vessel’ or ‘container’. Cp. the Samoan *taula-aitu* (n. 198), Maori *waka-otua* (n. 181), and Purari *imunu-vii* (n. 323).

Every *taula*, according to West, was assisted by a *feao*, whose duties included the care of the temple and the introduction of the suppliants. This assistant is mentioned also by S. Farmer, *Tonga and the Friendly Islands*, p. 128, who calls him ‘friend of the god’. She does not give the native term; but she calls the priest ‘shrine of the god’, *feao*, so she may have confused the *feao* and the *taula*. The dual personnel of a Tongan temple may be compared with that of a Uganda temple (n. 130) and of an Ila ghost-grove (n. 403).

W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, ii. 86, states that a priest was called *fahe-gehe*, from a root which meant ‘to separate from’. His idea is that the word signified ‘a man who has a peculiar or distinct sort of mind, or soul, differing from that of the generality of mankind, which disposes some god occasionally to inspire him’. Mariner does not state in what the peculiarity of the mind consisted, but doubtless we may conjecture the usual symptoms of ‘possession’. I do not find *fahe-gehe* mentioned elsewhere.

The word *taula* is not in Mariner’s vocabulary, nor is it mentioned by S. Rabone, *A Vocabulary of the Tongan Language*. Mariner’s omission is surprising.

210. W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, ii. 80, 86, 106-9, 145 (for ‘possession’), 146 (for lack of organization). E. E. V. Collacott, ‘Notes on ‘Tongan Religion’, *J.P.S.* xxx (1921), pp. 155, 157, states that the priests were consulted concerning hazardous undertakings and for deliverance or protection from the troubles of everyday life.

211. For *Aloalo*, ‘god of the weather’, see W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, ii. 115. He had two temples and two priests. Mariner adds that *Aloalo* was not a god of thunder and lightning, ‘of which indeed there is no god acknowledged among them, as this phenomenon is never recollected to have done any mischief of consequence’.


J. E. Moulton, art. ‘Tonga’, *Enc. Rel. Eth.*, ed. J. Hastings, states that when
the people wanted fair winds, good crops, or successful fishing, they sought the favour of a god through prayer and sacrifice. He does not give any details. Perhaps he did not witness any pagan practices.

The opinions of the Tongans in regard to the weather are well illustrated by the remark of a *tauda-otua* that the recent high winds and thunder had been occasioned by the heated arguments of the gods. See W. Mariner, op. cit. i. 369.

212. W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, ii. 167 (for the opinion that witchcraft was cowardly), 439 (for placing in god-houses the articles belonging to people who were to be bewitched); E. E. V. Collacott, 'Notes on Tongan Religion', *J.P.S. xxx* (1921), pp. 155, 158 (for disease caused by *otua*, which he renders 'divine disfavour', 'maleficent sprite', &c.).

W. Lawry, *Missionary Visit to the Friendly and the Feejee Islands*, p. 251, and C. Wilkes, *Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition, 1838–1842*, iii. 22, state that the 'mischievous gods' who caused illness were called *otua bau*. This seems to be the same as Mariner's *hotooa pow* (n. 207).

Sacrilege in the temples and the improper use of offerings were two of the crimes which the gods punished by inflicting madness. See W. Lawry, l.c.

Death was due to disrespect of the gods, *otua* (W. Mariner, op. cit. i. 387).

According to T. West, *Ten Years in South-central Polynesia*, p. 258, the native name for the ceremony of cursing was *tukitalai*. So great was the faith in its efficacy that when the victim heard of its performance he lay down and died.

For the Tongan practice of going to the temple at a time of affliction, see S. Farmer, *Tonga and the Friendly Islands*, pp. 127–8; W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, i. 110 f.; ii. 115, 241, 245 f. Human sacrifices, we are told, were offered sometimes, limbs amputated, and bleeding hands displayed, in an attempt to soften the hard heart of an *otua*.

Human sacrifices are mentioned also by E. E. V. Collacott, 'Notes on Tongan Religion', *J.P.S. xxx* (1921), p. 158, and G. Vason, *An Authentic Narrative of Four Years' Residence in Tongatabu*, p. 78. Vason says that on one occasion a son was killed when his father was dying 'in the delusive hope that his health and strength would be communicated to his dying father'. The idea of substitution, however, may not have been absent. It was the foundation of Finau's (Finow's) appeal to the gods when his daughter was ill.

In ordinary cases the vital point was that the priest should be satisfied with the value of the present, but if the suppliants did not receive a favourable answer at the first temple to which they applied, they visited a number of temples in turn until success attended their efforts. For instance, when Finau's (Finow's) daughter was ill, she was first taken to the sacred precincts of *Talitataboo*, where a hog was killed each morning. This was unavailing, and she was moved to the temple of *Toofooa Bulatu*, with no better result. The party then sailed to Hoonga, where lived the priest Toobota who was accustomed to be inspired by Finau's 'tutelary god', *Toobotatai*. But the girl became worse, and the party went to Ofo in order to consult *Alai Valoo*, the god of Finau's aunt.

In a similar manner, Finau's dying body was carried from temple to temple in the hope that he might be brought back to life by the removal of the curse of the *otua*. See W. Mariner, op. cit. i. 393–79, 379–81.

213. Assam is the only Indian province which has been surveyed in ethnographical detail. In addition to these four Naga tribes I discuss the Garos, Mikirs, and Khasis. See paras. 135–7.

The Naga tribes and the Khasis have been least affected by Hindu culture. The percentage of total population in 1891 is reported to have been: among the Nagas, Hindus 3.61, Mohammedans 0.17, Buddhists 0.29; in the Garo Hills, Hindus 9.37, Mohammedans 4.60, Buddhists 0.32; among the Khasis, Hindus
The large proportion of Hindus among the Meitihis or Manipuris makes it impossible for me to include them in my survey. They have been subject to Hindu influence since the beginning of the eighteenth century, perhaps since the middle of the fifteenth century. See T. C. Hodson, The Meitihis, pp. 5, 7, 47, 95–7. Professor Hodson has described the culture of other societies of the Manipur State in his The Naga Tribes of Manipur (London, 1911), but the limit of a single volume has not permitted the full treatment which is necessary for a detailed study.

Reluctantly I have passed over Col. J. Shakespear’s Lushei Kuki Clans (London, 1912) on account of the external influences which have affected their culture.


Before the white man administered the province, infanticide and abortion were usual among unmarried girls. A fatherless child could not be a member of any clan and therefore was stigmatized. Nowadays the man who is responsible for the pregnancy of an unmarried girl usually marries her. Ibid., pp. 212, 266–7.

In pagan times the father of a pre-nuptial child seems to have incurred no blame or responsibility.


A betrothed girl wore a plaited band of red cane and yellow orchid stem on her head. This suggests that she was marked down as the sexual property of her fiancé. We are not told whether he had access to her or not.

It is interesting to note that, whereas the head of a Sema girl was shaved until she was marriageable, the Angami girl did not let her hair grow until she was actually married. See J. H. Hutton, The Sema Nagas, p. 184; idem, The Angami Nagas, p. 172. This seems to suggest that the betrothal was regarded as of more consequence among the Semas than among the Angamis.

The use of the word 'adultery' to denote pre-nuptial sexual intercourse is confusing. The word is needed to denote illicit post-nuptial intercourse. Cp. n. 303.


Throughout this monograph Dr. Hutton has described sexual conduct rather than sexual regulations, and beliefs rather than rites; e.g. ‘Accurate information as to the precise degree of chastity observed by Angami girls is very difficult to obtain. When asked about it . . . ’ But a report concerning the sexual conduct of natives cannot be reliable if it is merely based on the answers given to the white man’s questions.

Among the Angamis, neither the father nor the mother of a pre-nuptial child seems to have been stigmatized. Usually such a child was killed at birth. Abortion was common. But customs seem to have varied, for though in some places a woman was forbidden to rear the child, in other places the child was allowed to live. Sometimes the father of the child seems to have acknowledged its parentage; he does not seem to have been compelled to marry the child’s mother. The reports, however, are vague.

Perhaps the hitherto customary infanticide has ceased in some districts as the result of white influence.

217. J. P. Mills, The Lhota Nagas, p. 19, merely says that ‘the state of morals varies in a curious way from village to village’. He seems to refer to post-nuptial conduct. But ‘the state of morals’ is a matter of opinion, not of fact. I have been unable to find any statement concerning pre-nuptial intercourse, pre-nuptial children, or pre-nuptial pregnancy.
Cp. the following passages: (i) concerning the Lhotas, 'There is no ceremony connected with divorce as there is among the Aos'; (ii) concerning the Aos, 'There is no ceremony connected with divorce'. See J. P. Mills, *The Lhota Nagas*, p. 156; idem, *The Ao Nagas*, p. 276.

Perhaps we are to understand that among the Lhotas there was no intricate division of the property such as was a prominent feature of an Ao separation; but it is only after a long and careful study of both the above-cited volumes that this possibly incorrect conjecture suggests itself. If the apparent contradiction is not to be explained in this manner, I am at a loss to understand it. The difficulty is that it is only in the latter work, in which we are told that there was no ceremony connected with divorce, that this 'ceremony' is described. Mr. Mills does not notice the contrary nature of his statements.


The word *tsungrem* has been variously rendered by 'deities', 'spirits', or by the singular of those words: 'They are everywhere—in the villages, in the fields, in the jungle, in trees and in huge boulders. . . . There is hardly a conspicuous boulder which escapes attention.' Yet if only conspicuous boulders were *tsungrem*, it may have been only conspicuous trees, &c., which were *tsungrem*, that is, *tsungrem* may have been manifest only in any supernormal natural feature. Thus the ubiquity implied in the word 'everywhere' may be a false inference, due to a knowledge of the animistic theory. See further para. 148.

It is interesting to note that in Dr. Hutton's opinion (in J. P. Mills, op. cit., p. 216, n. 1) the word *tsungrem* may have been applied 'originally' to the 'spirits of the dead'. In the light of this possibility the *tsungrem* mung ceremony (ibid., pp. 219–20) assumes a somewhat different significance from that which he attaches to it. The meaning of the word 'originally' is obscure.

In some contexts, *tsungrem* was qualified according to the place of manifestation; thus, *kimung tsungrem*, house-*tsungrem*, *anung tsungrem*, sky-*tsungrem*, &c.

I am unable to separate inference from fact in the descriptions of *lichaba*. The identity of 'the priest and his assistant' who led the *lichaba* ceremonies is not disclosed; no details are available concerning the participants. Is *Ningtangu* comparable to, e.g., the Tongan *Maui*? For Maui, see n. 208.

220. The Angami *terhoma*, which has been translated 'god', 'spirit', 'deities', &c., is one of the words which I have selected (para. 5) as an illustration of the claim that until the words 'god' and 'spirit' have been defined they cannot be used as the basis of a scientific classification.

In answer to a question, Dr. Hutton has been kind enough to write to me as follows (Pte. Com., 30/12/29): 'Terho-ma is either singular or plural as required by the context. It would be perfectly correct to say terho-ma puo, "a spirit", and equally so to say terho-ma peteko vimwe, "all spirits are bad". The termination -ma, "man", "men", takes no plural inflexion though pete, "all", "whole", is given one.'

The fact that the termination -ma meant 'man' is significant. It would be interesting to know if the Ao *tsungrem* and the Sema *teghami* can be so derived, and if there is an alternative interpretation of -ma.

Professor T. C. Hodson doubts if there is any satisfactory English equivalent of *terhoma*. He informs me (Pte. Com., 29/11/29) that the suffixes which indicate plurality in Tibeto-Burman dialects are used to mean 'crowd', 'mass', 'heap', and says 'probably a purist might regard them as a mode of classification'. A heap or
mass of terhoma is certainly a different thing from many terhoma, and since Dr. Hutton himself states (The Angami Nagas, p. 178) that ‘all terhoma are clothed with a hazy cloak of unity’, we may say that to the natives terhoma was a unity and that the plurality has been created by our translations.

We are told that ‘to terhoma generally most natural phenomena are ascribed’, but would it not be equally, and possibly more, accurate to say that in many phenomena terhoma was manifest? Was the causation definitely in the native mind? As it stands, the report seems to have been coloured by the Tylorian theory of ‘personified causes’. See further para. 148. The sun, we read, was ‘perhaps a terhoma’. Are we to understand that some men applied the word terhoma to the sun? ‘Perhaps’ is a curious word in that context.

Before attempting to understand the following ‘spirits’ I should require to know the full native context, to be told the area over which they were recognized, and to have an analysis of the words: maweno, ‘spirit of fruitfulness’; talepflu, ‘mischievous sprite’; ayepli, a ‘fairy’ who brought good luck, &c.

At first I was puzzled concerning the relation between kepenofpu and upekenofpu, but Dr. Hutton has been kind enough to inform me (Pte. Com., 30/12/29) that they were the same. The word, he says, was employed for a short time by the missionaries as the Naga equivalent of ‘God the Father’. He adds that now the children seem to be taught to use ‘Jehovah’, which had been adopted by the first missionaries to the Naga Hills.


In addition to teghami there was

(i) kungumi. Usually the word is spelt with a capital K and translated ‘sky-spirit’, but sometimes the lower case is employed (e.g. ibid., p. 331); ‘fairy’ is then the English equivalent. See further n. 223.

(ii) alhou or timilhou, ‘a usually beneficent but somewhat remote creator’. But I accept this ‘belief’ with reservations. On the rare occasions when alhou was maleficent, were there any rites in his honour?

222. See J. P. Mills, The Lhota Nagas, pp. 79, 113-17, &c. We are told that ‘the nearest equivalent to gods is an order of beings called Potso’, but surely if we must study uncivilized beliefs apart from the rites, it would be more profitable to inquire into the native opinion than to search native thought for some similarity to our thought.

Throughout his book Mr. Mills speaks of ‘Potsos’. The capital P and the anglicized plural are most undesirable.

J. H. Hutton, in J. P. Mills, op. cit., pp. 113, n. 1, 115, n. 1, compares potso with the Sema kungumi (n. 221) and states that potso ‘is commonly used as a form of address to highly respected persons such as sabibs’. Was potso, then, applied to anything supernormal?

A capital S is given to Sityingo, but sityingo seems to have been a power rather than a being; thus, okisityingo, house-sityingo, &c. We are told that ngazo, ‘a jungle-spirit’ is ‘practically identical with sityingo’; was the native term ngazosityingo?

More information is required concerning tsandramo, which may correspond to the Ao tsungrem (n. 219). Possibly the suffix -mo may bear the same significance as -ma in terhoma (n. 221). A similar suggestion might be made concerning nangkamo.


Sometimes Dr. Hutton queries his own translation ‘ghost’, but repeats it with confidence in other passages. He does not think that the Semas separated ‘soul’ and ‘ghost’ by any discrimination of thought and classification leading to the use of different names. How, then, can the separate translations be justified?
Dr. Hutton translates *kitimi*, 'dead men', 'spirits of the dead', and 'ghost', and speaks of 'the *Kitimi*' as well as of *kitimi*, 'a dead man'. He does not say in what other contexts the natives used the term.

224. J. H. Hutton, *The Angami Nagas*, p. 185. The Angami word for ghost seems to have been *temi*, which may be compared with the Sema *kitimi* (n. 223).

225. See J. H. Hutton, 'The Carved Monoliths at Jumuguri, Assam', *J.R.A.I.*, liii (1923), pp. 150–9. The comparisons which Dr. Hutton makes with certain customs referred to by Sir J. G. Frazer, in *The Golden Bough*, would have been happier if Dr. Hutton had consulted the authorities to which that author referred and had inquired into the meaning of the native terms which were being translated 'spirits of the dead', 'corn-spirit', &c.

Vague statements by J. P. Mills, *The Ao Nagas*, pp. 109 ('There is hardly a ceremony in Ao religion which does not have its bearing on the crops; spirits of the earth, dead ancestors, human heads, luck stones, all play their part'), 121 ('It is by favour of the dead that the crops are good') are not strengthened by the citation of definite facts; nor are the native terms for 'spirits of the earth', 'dead ancestors', 'the dead', quoted.

J. P. Mills, op. cit., p. 288, has written a single paragraph significantly entitled 'The Worship of the Dead'; these comments are appropriate to it:

(1) 'A description has already been given', Mr. Mills says (referring to op. cit., pp. 175–6) 'of the way in which presents were sent through a medicine-man to the departed.' From the context we should expect that the presents were an act of 'worship' to secure benefits; but this is far from being the case. The Aos thought that a quarrel brought bad luck; it was the duty of the younger to initiate a reconciliation. Sometimes the elder party died before this was done, and then a medicine-man was requested to meet the dead man in a dream; at the same time small presents were placed on the corpse platform. Thus the desired reconciliation took place. Such an action cannot be termed 'worship of the dead'.

(2) Mr. Mills proceeds: 'Occasionally the Chongli would go further, and a whole village would perform a ceremony to gain the favour of some great man.' The ceremony to which he refers took place 'one year when the crops were bad'. It is dismissed in four lines. We are not told whether it was an isolated incident or not. There is no other mention of it.

(3) So far as I can judge from a study of the small incidents which have been scraped together in this short paragraph, some of the Aos may have carried out a few rites of an indefinite character at harvest-time, but these rites have not been described in a manner which would warrant any definite conclusion concerning their character. The practices at the corpse platforms, apparently irregular, do not appear to have been tendance; but no definite conclusion can be drawn until the native terms have been quoted, and the native usage of these terms elucidated.

For the need of these things, see paras. 61, 65, 90, 102, 144.

(4) Dr. Hutton, not Mr. Mills, is responsible for the statements which appear in pp. 81, n. 2, 111, n. 1, 205, n. 1, 225, n. 2, and 257, n. 1. These notes must be studied in the light of the theories propounded by him after his visit to Jumuguri.

226. See J. P. Mills, *The Lhota Nagas*, p. 130: 'The rainfall in the Naga Hills is usually adequate.'

The reported rain-compelling ceremonies seem to have been isolated incidents; their connexion with *potso* (n. 222) is obscure. Likewise the ceremony which the Sema *lapu* (n. 228) carried out with the head of a huluk ape seems to have been a rare occurrence, not a regular practice. See J. H. Hutton, *The Sema Nagas*, pp. 214–15. We are not told who the 'rain-makers' were or whence they received their power.
Among the Angamis, we are told, rain-compelling ceremonies 'could never conceivably be needed'. See J. H. Hutton, *The Angami Nagas*, pp. 236, 238. If there was a drought, a ceremony was performed at which, we are told, no stranger could be present; and the ceremonies to stop the rain, Dr. Hutton says, may not have been 'fully revealed'. A certain sub-clan of a special clan seemed to have conducted some rites which were peculiar to themselves. The story of the origin of the private rite which is said to have been performed at a graveside suggests that it was the imitation of an impulsive action which once had been successful.

Among the Aos there were no professional rain-makers; and the descriptions of the rain-making ceremonies are not complete. See J. P. Mills, *The Ao Nagas*, pp. 131–2. An old man of the sun-clan seems to have claimed the power to control the sun; it is not clear whether this was his own peculiar fancy or not. Dr. Hutton seems to think that he acted as a member of the sun-clan, but does not say if the clan appointed him or how he was selected. Nor do we know if any other member of the sun-clan, or any member of any other clan, possessed the same sun-controlling power.

227. See J. P. Mills, *The Ao Nagas*, pp. 243–5, 247. The man whom Mr. Mills calls 'priest' seems to have been an elder, *putik*, whose qualifications were 'age, experience, and freedom from serious deformity'. He was not a magician and performed no cure. The native term for 'medicine-man' is said to have been *arasentur*, 'extractor of dirt'.

J. H. Hutton, in *J. P. Mills*, op. cit., p. 244, n. 1, compares the Sema *thumomi* (n. 228). May we conclude, then, that the man was also a wizard?

With *arasentur*, compare the Lhota *ratsen* (n. 230).

Concerning the source of magic power we read: 'The first sign that a person is endowed with the powers of a medicine-man is a tendency for him or her to talk incoherently and converse with spirits.' For *tsungrem*, 'spirits', see n. 219. When we are told that the man 'conversed' with *tsungrem*, are we to understand that he possessed or was possessed by *tsungrem*, or merely that he was *tsungrem* (adv.) because he spoke strangely? See further para. 148.

Most medicine-men in the Naga Hills seem to have had a 'familiar'. The subject is discussed by J. H. Hutton, 'The Leopard-Men of the Naga Hills', *J.R.A.I.* 1 (1920), pp. 41–51. See also Col. J. Shakespear's appended note to that paper.

Usually sickness was considered to be due to *tsungrem*, but few of the natives, if any, had thought the matter out as clearly as Mr. Mills, who confesses that they were puzzled by his questions. See *The Ao Nagas*, pp. 244, n. 2, 231 ff. Some of the causes of sickness which Mr. Mills reports seem to represent individual conjectures made in an attempt to answer those questions.

For comment on the danger of direct questioning, see para. 4.

228. J. H. Hutton, *The Sema Nagas*, pp. 213 f., 230–2, 247, translates *thumomi* as 'seer' and as 'witch'. He or she was also a medicine-man, 'a private practitioner, self-appointed, and independent', practising many different forms of magic cures and inventing new ones *ad hoc*. Since at times a *thumomi* seems to have become 'possessed', and then to have dreamt dreams, perhaps we may conclude that this possession was due to *teghami*; but Dr. Hutton states (op. cit., p. 199) that 'it seems to be the *aghau* which gives gifts of prophecy, cure, and witchcraft'. The *teghau* is called 'the ancestral familiar spirit' (ibid., p. 64), and 'personal familiar' (ibid., p. 193); but it is included also as *teghami*, and is said to have caused a man to run amok; so the native significance of the term may not have been known.

Some curative ceremonies seem to have been conducted by the *lapu*, the official burier of the dead (ibid., pp. 217–18). We are not told on what occasions he officiated.
229. See J. H. Hutton, *The Angami Nagas*, p. 242, n. 1: ‘Themuma are persons who are recognized more or less on the strength of their own assertions as possessed by a god, Terhoma.’ For *terhoma*, see para. 5, n. 226. The man seems to have acted as wizard, medicine-man, and diviner.

Usually sickness was considered to be due to either *terhoma* or witchcraft. There was also a particular kind of pebble which, if thrown at a man, caused him to become ill. It need not hit him. See J. H. Hutton, op. cit., p. 242. For further causes of sickness, see n. 230.

Possibly the magical rites reported in op. cit., pp. 98–100, 233–5, were invented ad hoc.

230. It is interesting to observe that among the Lhota and Ao Nagas, of whom Mr. Mills has written, some illnesses are said to have been due to ‘capture of the soul’ by *tsandram* or *tsungren*; this belief is not reported as having existed among the Angamis and Sema Nagas whose culture has been described by Dr. Hutton. On the other hand, ‘possession’ by *terhoma* or *teghami* is said to have necessitated a ceremony of transference or exorcism among the latter tribes; no such method of treatment is mentioned by Mr. Mills. It is a curious coincidence that the areas over which the ‘beliefs’ prevailed should have corresponded so exactly to the areas in which the two authors worked. See J. P. Mills, *The Lhota Nagas*, pp. 15, 79, 133; *idem*, *The Ao Nagas*, pp. 227, 232; J. H. Hutton, *The Angami Nagas*, p. 179; *idem*, *The Sema Nagas*, pp. 197, n. 3, 262, 412.

When J. P. Mills, *The Lhota Nagas*, p. 79, states that the medicine-man was called in ‘to extract from the body the bit of earth or wood or hair which the spirit has put there’, I suspect that the *ratsen* went through the extraction rite, and that the cause of the illness was *tsandram*. I doubt if the Nagas identified *tsandram* and the foreign body which the *ratsen* claimed to remove. See further para. 148, where I discuss the so-called intrusive theory of sickness.

Mr. Mills states that ‘potso hold converse with the village seer’ (op. cit., pp. 113–14). He made a similar remark concerning the Ao magician and *tsungren* (n. 227). I conclude that the man acted by *potso* power. Potsos, of course, is an anglicized plural. See n. 222.

A ceremony named *potsokam* seems to connect *potso* with affliction, but unfortunately details are lacking. See op. cit., p. 131.

I am not clear whether the *puthi* (*putik*, n. 227) was *ratsen*, but I presume he was not. For *puthi*, see op. cit., pp. 121–2.

231. The people are called ‘palaco-Asiatics’ by L. Steinberg, ‘The Turano-Ganowanian System and Nations of N.E. Asia’, *International Congress of Americanists* (1922), pp. 319 ff. The term ‘Palaco-Siberians’ is employed by M. A. Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia*, p. 16: ‘Under the heading Palaco-Siberians will be understood the unclassified tribes to the extreme N.E. of Asia, who differ in various respects from one another and differ still more from the other peoples of Siberia.’

According to W. Bogoras, ‘The Folk-Lore of N.E. Asia, as compared with that of N.W. America’, *American Anthropologist*, n.s. iv (1902), pp. 577–683, ‘Comparison of the folk-lore of N.E. Asia and N.W. America shows that the folk-lore of the Kamchadal, Chukchee and Koryak has little relationship in conception or expression with that of the interior of Siberia but possesses affinities east along the Bering Sea to N.W. America... While Chukchee folk-lore is closely related to the folk-lore of both the Eskimo and the Indians that of the West Bering tribes shows much greater similarity with the Indian than with the Eskimo tradition.’

The investigation into the problem of the relationship between the inhabitants of NE. Siberia and NW. America was one of the chief objects of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition.
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233. W. Jochelson, The Koryak, p. 24; M. A. Czaplicka, Aboriginal Siberia, p. 261. I have added some references to the latter work because it is the more readily accessible, but I rely exclusively on the former monograph. Miss Czaplicka consulted other authorities in addition to Jochelson, but the value of her compilation is reduced by a failure to assess the value of the statements she read.


W. Jochelson, op. cit., p. 736, emphasizes the fact that no illegitimate child was found among the Koryak during the census operations, but I am not sure that we can accept the fact as proof that no illegitimate child existed. I am ready to believe that in answer to Mr. Jochelson's questions a Koryak man or woman would deny that a child was born out of wedlock, but the peculiar attitude towards sexual intercourse which is part of the inherited tradition of the modern white man would not encourage the Siberians to speak to him on the subject with absolute frankness. Tact and politeness are outstanding characteristics of uncivilized peoples, and no 'savage' wittingly offends a white man's susceptibilities. Cp. my remarks in para. 4.

Mr. Jochelson adds that the 'chastity' of the Koryak girls was confirmed not only by the tales and assertions of the Koryak themselves and by the impressions which he himself gained in their homes, but also by the testimony of such 'experts in love affairs' as the Gishiya Cossacks. The same comments apply also to that statement. Many uncivilized peoples object to their women having intercourse with white men. Moreover, we cannot admit tales, assertions, and impressions as evidence. Sexual conduct is one thing, sexual regulations another. No expression of opinion concerning the former has any anthropological (i.e. scientific) value.

235. W. Bogoras, The Chukchee, pp. 571-2; M. A. Czaplicka, Aboriginal Siberia, p. 70. I rely exclusively on the former monograph. Miss Czaplicka consulted other authorities also, but she found that their descriptions of Chukchee social regulations were similar to, but not so exact as, those of Bogoras. For a comment on the value of her work, see n. 233.

236. W. Jochelson, The Yukaghir and the Yukaghirised Tungus, pp. 62-8. Mr. Jochelson considers that the 'co-existence of chastity and licence' had its origin 'in the dual nature of man'. The opinion has a high romantic interest, and illustrates Mr. Jochelson's vague phraseology. He does not define 'chastity', but considers that 'the idea of chastity does not include the conception of virginity'. He does not say what it does include; perhaps merely post-nuptial constancy.

237. W. Jochelson, The Koryak, pp. 23-4, 26, 59 f.; M. A. Czaplicka, Aboriginal Siberia, p. 261. Mr. Jochelson considers that 'some names of this deity, translated into civilised language, suggest abstract ideas', but I should require irrefragable evidence before I could be convinced that the ideas existed except in the translation. When Mr. Jochelson speaks of the 'invisible, organizing and destructive forces', I suspect that he is speaking in a manner which the Koryak would not have understood.

Miss Czaplicka aims this gentle shaft at those classifications which are based on 'beliefs': 'In contrast to the Chukchee, who have whole classes of Supreme Beings, vairgit, the Koryak, as Jochelson thinks, have a tendency to monotheism.' 'Whole classes of Supreme Beings' is a superb piece of irony, but the shaft is, I fear, too gentle to penetrate the thick wall of jargon by which the classifications according to 'beliefs' are surrounded.

For vairgit (sing. vairgin), see n. 240.
The manner in which crude biblicalities can be intertwined with native legends may be seen in the adjustment of the Big Raven myth to the new situation which was caused by the arrival of the Old Man in Koryak consciousness. See W. Jochelson, op. cit., pp. 24, 28.

For some comments on other 'Supreme Beings', see nn. 116, 122, 180, 246, 415, 451, 462, 471, 501, 585.

238. The fact that people are afraid of a corpse is no evidence of 'ancestor-worship'; yet this appears to be the opinion of W. Jochelson, The Koryak, pp. 103, 112, 114, and, following him, of M. A. Czaplicka, Aboriginal Siberia, p. 151.

The meals which our authorities call 'annual sacrifices' were not tendance or cult. The placing of antlers on the spot where a body had been burnt seems to have been an impulsive act, due to a fond memory of the dead man.

Mr. Jochelson states that after a successful hunt a dog was sometimes killed and placed before a kamak; this was gratitude, not propitiation, for, by the power inherent in the charms which had been sung over the kamak, the Koryak attracted the animals which constituted their food-supply. By the same power they warded off kala (pl. kalau). These so-called 'evil spirits' are interesting, for sometimes the plural form of the word was used. I should accept the descriptions of their activities with a greater readiness if the whole matter had not become so confused with the Old Man.

A kamak (kalak) was merely a wooden figure over which a charm had been recited. Other authorities would call it an 'amulet' or 'fetish'. See W. Jochelson, op. cit., pp. 30, 32 f., 36 ff., 47, 59. A wrong impression of this report is given by M. A. Czaplicka, op. cit., p. 267, who makes an extremely unhappy quotation.

With the offerings before a kamak, cp. the offerings before a wakan-stone by a Dakota Indian (n. 522).

The Koryak kala is clearly equivalent to the Chukchee kele. The latter was confused by the Chukchee with vairgin; was kala confused with one of the Koryak words which were applied to the Old Man? For the Chukchee kele, and also for other Koryak conceptions, see nn. 241, 246.

The fame of the professional magicians seems to have depended upon the results which they achieved; but apparently shamans were scarce, for Mr. Jochelson was acquainted with two only. Perhaps the man or woman who is called the 'family shaman' was merely the member of the family who had charge of the family kamak. The external symptoms of his or her power were the usual paroxysms; the power itself is said to have come from 'spirits'. The native term is not given. It may have been enen.

For shamans, see W. Jochelson, op. cit., pp. 49, 52-4; M. A. Czaplicka, op. cit., pp. 172, 179, 192, 208, 228. The latter passages should be read consecutively, or a wrong impression may be received. The Koryak shamans seem to have been 'magicians' in the popular as well as the anthropological sense of the word.

239. The word etin (n. 241) was used also by the Koryak.

240. W. Bogoras, The Chukchee, p. 303, but cp. op. cit., p. 290, where the word 'being' is offered as the English equivalent.

The Chukchee vairgin seems to be a conception of a similar character to the Tlingit yek, for which see paras. 5, 193. W. Bogoras, op. cit., compares vairgin to the Algonquian manitou and the Omaha wakanda, for which see paras. 113 and 118 respectively. For W. Jochelson's interpretation of vairgin, see n. 246.

For the relation between the Palaeo-Siberians and the inhabitants of NW. America, see n. 231.


I am not sure whether kele were distinguished from vairgin or not. When
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Mr. Bogoras says that an 'accurate speaker' would distinguish them, I suspect that most Chukchee confused them, and that the distinction was encouraged by the dichotomy into 'good' and 'evil' which was apparently present in the mind of the observer. Mr. Bogoras mentions the confusion and then describes the conceptions as if they were distinct. Perhaps he was puzzled by the confusion; on the other hand the terms may have been current in different areas. Unfortunately we are not told the areas from which the information was collected. No fewer than four separate Chukchee words (etin, vairgin, enen, kele) have been translated 'spirit'; and since in the text the native term is seldom quoted it is difficult to read the reports with intelligent understanding.

I notice that W. Jochelson, *The Yukaghir and the Yukaghirised Tungus*, p. 152, confuses *kala* and *kele*. It seems possible that the Koryak *kala* (= Chukchee *kele*) may have been confused by them with another Koryak word which is not quoted in the reports. Cp. n. 238.

According to Bogoras, *etin* was also *kele*, although he translates them by different English words. Since *kele* was also *vairgin*, what was the difference between the three conceptions? The word *etin* is reported to have been used also by the Koryak; did they confuse it with *kala*? Cp. n. 244.

An alternative word for *etin*, 'master', 'owner', seems to have been *aurralin*, pl. *aurralii*. This is the form of the word according to M. A. Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia*, p. 353, and if we judge by *vairgin*, pl. *vairgit*, she is right. Bogoras writes *aurralit*, pl. *aurralin*.

242. W. Bogoras, *The Chukchee*, pp. 300, 414, 470 ff. The word, which is translated 'spirits', was applied by the natives to the Christian God, the crucifix, the images of the saints, and other paraphernalia.


The *enen* of a shaman is said to have been derived from the *enen* of material objects and/or of animals, e.g. a wolf, reindeer, whale, plant, iceberg, household utensil, urine, excrement, &c. Some of these phenomena would be termed 'guardian spirits' by some anthropologists, but that term would not represent accurately the Chukchee idea of *enen*, the reports concerning which are confused.


244. See W. Bogoras, *The Chukchee*, pp. 516 ff., whose statements conflict. In former days a corpse was cut up and pieces of it were eaten by the surviving relatives; latterly, the relatives were content to take pieces of the clothing and to hang them on their amulet strings. Apparently the spasmodic funeral rites were conducted as a protection against malevolence. The Chukchee did not conduct post-funeral rites of any kind.

The dead, it seems, were *kele*. Since *kele* was also *vairgin* (n. 241), were the dead also *vairgin*? For *vairgin*, see n. 240.


246. W. Jochelson, *The Yukaghir and the Yukaghirised Tungus*, pp. 140 f., 150–1 (for *pogil*), 140, 235–6 (for *pon*).

The word *pon* seems to have meant 'something', and to have been used under those circumstances in which we use the word 'it'. When evening came, the Yukaghir said, *pontulec*, 'something got dark'; *ponemidec*, lit. 'something got black', i.e. 'night has come', 'it is night'; *pontiboi*, 'it rains', &c. On such evidence Mr. Jochelson calls *pon* 'Supreme Deity', 'creative principle, scarcely personified'.
He states (op. cit., p. 138) that he is a convert to Andrew Lang’s theory of High Gods, so he may have been influenced by this vague conception.

In op. cit., p. 234, Mr. Jochelson submits a rationalized Comparative Table of Supernatural Agents, as conceived by the Palaeo-Siberians. Some of his submissions are as follows:

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<td>Supernatural Ancestor</td>
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<td>yaqhieuan</td>
<td>vairgin</td>
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<td>Masters and Owners</td>
<td>quil</td>
<td>kutqu</td>
<td>kurkil</td>
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<td>Shaman’s Spirits</td>
<td>pogil</td>
<td>etin</td>
<td>etin</td>
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<td>Malevolent Spirits</td>
<td>ciji</td>
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<td>kukul</td>
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The following comments, which might be extended, are appropriate:

1. The Chukchee vairgin (nn. 240–1) is said to have meant ‘substance’, and had a qualitative significance. Mr. Jochelson stretches its meaning to ‘something existing’, then to ‘creative deity’, thus introducing the very personal element absent from the Chukchee use of the word. Moreover, he compares the Yakut ayi, and then says, ‘ayi is not a personal name’.

Among the Reindeer Koryak the equivalent of yaqhieuan was vahiynin, ‘substance’, the equivalent of vairgin. It is legitimate to suppose that a similar mental process is responsible for the personal element which has been introduced into that word.

For pon, see above.

2. The inquiring student will search the literature in vain for any fact which would justify the application of ‘Supernatural Ancestor’ to quil, kutqu, and kurkil. Moreover, what is a ‘Supernatural Ancestor’? I can find no definition of the term in Mr. Jochelson’s monograph.

3. I have already noted (n. 241) that vairgin, kele, and etin were confused by the Chukchee. How then can Mr. Jochelson submit the above table without pointing out the fact? Was he aware of it?

There seems to be a complete lack of objective evidence to justify these translations and classifications.

247. W. Jochelson, The Yukaghir and the Yukaghirisued Tungus, pp. 155, 162, 192, 221 (for shamans), 152 (for kukul and yuoye). If kukul was the equivalent of the Chukchee kele and the Koryak kala, was it confused with some other conception? Cp. nn. 241, 246.

If a word had a plural, Mr. Jochelson usually quotes it; thus, kukul, pl. kukube (op. cit., p. 152); moye, pl. moyepul (op. cit., p. 236). Thus we may conclude that yuoye was employed only in the singular. But sometimes a prefix was added denoting the place of manifestation: thus, neryuoye, ‘yuoye in the clothing’, &c.

The reported personifications are not acceptable, for they may exist only in our translations. Alternatively Christian influence (n. 243) may have been responsible. May not nanul bon yuoye, ‘one who leads into sin’, be Satan?

Of moye and pejul the reports are so vague as to be meaningless.

248. Cp. the following passages from P. A. Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, pp. 20–2, 46:

1. ‘Ndemm are male and female’: ‘Ndemm is uncreated, eternal’.
2. Mbiam ‘are perhaps the most feared’: mbiam ‘represents the Ahriman of Zoroaster; by his aid vengeance, swift and sure, may be wrought upon an enemy’: ‘through his priests alone may Mbiam be approached’.

In The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, ii. 117, Mr. Talbot says: ‘The cult of Mbiam holds an important place among all the Ibibio sub-tribes. By some they are
considered powerful in bringing fertility to women, but they are chiefly used as a court of appeal in criminal cases and serious disputes.'

The remarks are not helpful.

For obumo as 'First Cause', and ete abassi as 'Mother of God', see P. A. Talbot, *Life in Southern Nigeria*, pp. 7, 13. Yet in *The Peoples of Southern Nigeria*, ii. 61-3, ete abassi is not 'true head of the Ibibio pantheon' but 'mother-god', simply, while obumo is said to have been identical with obassi (abassi) which, according to C. Partridge, *Cross River Natives*, p. 281, was a common form of address to any human being.

For the Ibibio, see also para. 42.

249. See nn. 116-37.

250. E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, ii. 108. The same statement appears in ii. 184, and is foreshadowed in i. 427. Tylor's idea was that man first reflected on himself and concluded that he had a soul. He then considered the world, and concluded that everything in it had a soul.


257. See paras. 5, 49.

258. See n. 195.

259. See n. 207.


261. See paras. 32-4.


263. See paras. 49-51.

264. See para. 33, nn. 77, 79, 83, 86.

265. See paras. 34, 49-51.

266. See paras. 30-2.
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267. See para. 33.
268. See para. 34.
270. See n. 192 (for tohunga), para. 50 (for taula-aitu), and para. 51 (for taula-otua).

The references in the text are to How Natives Think, pp. 78, 361.

Professor Lévy-Bruhl’s suggestions are vitiated by two fallacies: (1) he classes all uncivilized societies as ‘primitive’; (2) he claims to have ‘proved’ a personal and individual theory by the citation of examples which he has lifted from their context and culled at random from the extant literature.

These criticisms apply to many other publications in comparative anthropology.

274. E. Hadfield, Among the Natives of the Loyalty Group, p. 29.
278. H. A. Junod, Life of a South African Tribe, i. 20 f. M. Junod’s astonishment at the lack of traditions is natural, but if we examine those tribes which, at some time or other, have reduced the sexual opportunity of their members, we find that they possessed traditions. See, e.g., Dr. Codrington’s remark in reference to the men of Sa’a, which I have quoted at the end of para. 33. A research on these lines might lead to illuminating results.
280. Duff MacDonald, Africana, i. 10. In quoting this remarkable passage, I have taken the liberty of correcting some grammatical errors.
282. W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 92, 94.
285. C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, Uganda and the Egyptian Sudan, i. 198; and n. 135 above.
286. W. Mariner, An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands, i. 380–7.


Sexual intercourse was forbidden between sogoi, which Dr. Codrington translates as 'kindred', but the reports as to sogoi are confused. Cp. R. H. Codrington, op. cit., pp. 25, 26, n. 1; W. H. R. Rivers, op. cit. i. 20, 23, 28; R. H. Codrington and J. Palmer, A Dictionary of the Mota Language, s.v. veve. Society is said to have been divided into two exogamous moieties, each called veve, and also into a number of smaller units, which also were called veve. Veve also meant 'mother, mother's sister, female sogoi of the same generation'. Thus the meaning of sogoi depends on the unit to which the classificatory terms of relationship were applied, i.e. whether they were applied to the members of the large or small veve. On this point Dr. Codrington and Dr. Rivers disagree.

If we examine such passages as W. H. R. Rivers, op. cit. i. 22, 24, 28; ii. 38, 43, 47, and R. H. Codrington, op. cit., pp. 36, 40, I think that we must conclude that the exogamy of the large veve is a false inference, for Dr. Rivers says that a man could transfer from one large veve to the other by simply crossing to the other end of the gamal. Would this have been possible if the large veve had been a strictly exogamous unit?

The idea that the large veve was exogamous may have arisen out of a confusion between tavala ima, 'of the other side of the house', and sogoi. Sexual intercourse between sogoi was condemned only by members of the other (large or small?) veve; the sogoi, i.e. members of the same veve, do not appear to have objected. The explanation may be that certain small veve used to obtain their wives from one another, and the members of one intermarrying unit objected to a course of action which might deprive them of a wife. We are told that such interchange was usual. If this was so, the small veve was exogamous, members of the same small veve being sogoi; but the large veve was not exogamous, the members of the other large veve being merely tavala ima. There seems to be some doubt whether a large veve was divided exhaustively into small veve or not.

Dr. Rivers states that the alleged exogamic regulations were not the only restrictions which were placed on sexual intercourse.

That there is something wrong with the reports seems to be corroborated by the fact that vevegae, 'father's sister', is said to have been 'not really veve' (R. H. Codrington and J. Palmer, op. cit., s.v.). Since she was definitely called veve, it seems probable that our ideas concerning what was 'really veve' are mistaken.


Dr. Codrington's actual words in the first passage are '... the presence of some haunting vui'; in the second passage the native cry is alluded to as 'a vui made it'. I have taken the liberty of separating the inference from the fact.

The extent of the inferential evidence can be judged from the rendering of me vui gai in the sentence which follows the quotation in Dr. Codrington's book. Instead of 'You exceeding fellow', the phrase is said to have meant 'He is a vui to be sure'. Cp. para. 5.

Having concluded that vui must be an entity and not a quality, Dr. Codrington seems to have tried to discover its character. The answers which the natives gave 'after considerable reflection', reveal the nature of his inquiries. I cannot be persuaded that a Banks Islander made the following declarations unassisted by promptings: 'A vui lives, thinks, has more intelligence than a man; knows things...
which are secret without seeing; is supernaturally powerful with mana; has no form to be seen; has no soul, because itself is like a soul'; 'Men have declared that they have seen something indistinct, with no definite outline, grey like dust, vanishing as soon as it was looked at, near a stone, and this must have been a spirit, vui.' See R. H. Codrington, op. cit., pp. 123, 151. We are not told what percentage of the population subscribed to this conception. Is it not possible that the sentence was written after the native or natives had given their answers to such questions as 'Have you ever seen a vui?' 'How did it look?' I cannot believe that their imaginations had not been stirred by the author's insistence.

I am not concerned with the conjectures of W. H. R. Rivers in Hist. Mel. Soc. ii. 415, 417-18, but I notice that he found the attention to vui 'less easy to fit in' with his scheme. 'When we pass to the cult of the vui or spirits,' he says, 'the matter becomes more difficult.' His suggestion that the belief in vui might have arisen through an animistic interpretation by the Kava-people' is grotesque. The 'animistic interpretation' is demonstrably false. How, then, can we discuss any hypothesis concerning the manner of its introduction?

A. M. Hocart, 'Chieftainship and Sister's Son in the Pacific', American Anthropologist, n.s. xvi (1915), pp. 632-5, tries to show that vui denoted the 'divine ancestors' to whom he wishes to attribute the fundamentals of Oceanic culture. The word vui, he maintains, was 'the exact philological equivalent of the Fijian vu.' He refers to R. H. Codrington and J. Palmer, A Dictionary of the Mota Language, p. xiv, who say that 'the terminations -i, -iu, or -ui show that the nouns to which they are suffixed were without dependence, in thought or grammar, upon things or persons'. How, then, can vui have any relation to any person or ancestor? Far from supporting Mr. Hocart's hypothesis the passage proves that vui was not a conception of the kind which he hypothesizes.

Mr. Hocart himself has shown ('On the meaning of kalou', J.R.A.I. xlii (1912), pp. 437-49) that the Fijians applied the word kalou to anything unusual. Dr. Codrington explicitly states that the Banks Islanders employed the term vui under similar circumstances. If, then, we wish to compare a Fijian word with a Banks Islands word, surely the equation must be kalou = vui.

The equation vui = vui has caused W. J. Perry, The Children of the Sun, p. 298, to make certain suggestions which not only misrepresent but actually conflict with the facts as they can be learnt in the available literature.

The Banks Islands vui was one of the examples which I selected to support my contention that many native terms cannot be translated into a civilized language. See para. 5.

That Dr. Codrington, after carefully inquiring into its native meaning, should have translated the word as 'spiritual being' shows how strong are the preconceived ideas with which the study of uncivilized 'beliefs' has been approached.

See further n. 622.


After the words 'something unusual' in the first passage, I have omitted the words 'and therefore connected with a spirit'. The phrase is an inference, not a fact. The magic power of a stone was due to its unusual shape: e.g. 'If a man came upon a large stone with a number of small ones beneath it, lying like a sow among her litter, he was sure that to offer money upon it would bring him pigs': 'A stone with little discs upon it was good to bring in money.' The presence of any unusual mark upon any stone, in fact, would result in credit being given to the stone for the possession of the power suggested by a fanciful interpretation of the mark. See R. H. Codrington, op. cit., pp. 181-2.


'Offering' is not a happy rendering of oloolo. The word was used to denote,
inter alia, the sum which changed hands in return for a charm, incantation, or any other display of magic power. W. H. R. Rivers, Hist. Mel. Soc. ii. 417, says: ‘The nature of the offerings in connexion with a vui gives no indication of a belief that the offerer comes into relation with a higher power, or even of a belief that the man to whom the offering is made comes into such relation. The whole proceeding seems to resemble that which is followed when a man pays the owner of a spell or other magical instrument.’ In other passages (e.g. op. cit. i. 156, 159–60) Dr. Rivers states that oloolo was ‘the name for the rites by which a magical effect was produced’, and that when the members of a parmal or magical fraternity drank the milk of a coco-nut together, they called this action oloolo.

I have already commented (n. 86) on Dr. Codrington’s vague use of the word ‘sacrifice’; thus the strict meaning of oloolo is important. Dr. Codrington himself says (op. cit., p. 140, n. 1): ‘A man is said to oloolo with the money to the man who knows the stone; the latter is said to oloolo on the stone on behalf of the former, the former to oloolo to the latter in regard to the stone; neither is said to oloolo to the vui.’ For an apparent contradiction of this statement, due to his uncertain use of the word ‘sacrifice’, see his note on ‘sacrifice’ (op. cit., p. 144).

In the SE. Solomon Islands, oloolo meant ‘to put or place’, and was used in reference to placing coco-nuts in a canoe. See W. G. Ivens, A Dictionary of the Language of Sa’a and Ulawa, South-East Solomon Islands, s.v.

I suppose that marana was the tapu area, and that the tano-oloolo was the particular spot where the money was placed. The latter could exist without the former, but not the former without the latter.


There is no definite report concerning the manner in which a man became gismana. It seems that a man was so known if he inherited a marana or a vui-stone. Sickness was due to

(1) Witchcraft. This was performed on clippings or refuse (garatai, lit. ‘fragment’) or by inducing an enemy to step over a buried bundle (talamatai, lit. ‘a bundle of things tied together’). There was a particular recipe for killing an adopted child who wanted to return to its real father. An epidemic was caused by a disappointed lover because his offer of marriage had been refused.

See F. Coome, Islands of Enchantment, pp. 64, 88; W. H. R. Rivers, op. cit. i. 158; R. H. Codrington and J. Palmer, A Dictionary of the Mota Language, ss.vv.

(2) Trespass on rongo ground. See n. 296.

(3) vui. This is probably equivalent to (2).


I doubt if the more literal interpretations which have been placed upon the alleged capture of the atai, ‘soul’, can be accepted without reservations. According to R. H. Codrington and J. Palmer, A Dictionary of the Mota Language, s.v., atai meant ‘something distinct from a man with which he thought himself peculiarly connected, in which his personality was reflected; it might be a snake or a stone’. Thus, to translate atai ‘soul’, and then to interpret the rites in its connexion as if the word ‘soul’ were being used in the sense which we attach to it, is likely to lead to confusion and misunderstanding.

The gismana treated all forms of affliction. The word mana is usually translated ‘magic power’, but it must be steadily borne in mind that a man whose vui-stone had proved to be efficacious possessed mana. Mana was applied to a man or stone manifesting power, not to the power itself. See also F. E. Maning’s dictum quoted in n. 191.

296. Since a tamate, ‘ghost’, which was afflicting a sick man, could be extracted
and driven away by the gismana (n. 295), we may conclude that the living could control the dead by magic.

R. H. Codrington, The Melanesians, p. 139 f., et saepe, insists that the Banks Islanders paid attention to 'spirits' rather than to ghosts: 'It is true', he adds, 'that fragments of food are thrown for the ghosts of the lately deceased, but not with the notion of a sacrifice.' But what is a 'sacrifice'? For a comment on Dr. Codrington's use of the word, see nn. 86, 294.

A certain form of words, tataro, is said to have been addressed only to the dead (R. H. Codrington, op. cit., pp. 146–7). According to R. H. Codrington and J. Palmer, A Dictionary of the Mota Language, s.v., tataro meant 'to pay for what is done with a form of words or spell; thus, tataro pei, to pay a person for magic medicine'. This seems to be identical with the meaning of oloolo (n. 294); but other facts suggest that tataro had another significance. Thus a man who became sick as the result of trespassing on a rongo place would ask its owner to tataro for him. Similarly, if a man who was on his way to oloolo on his stone encountered a rat or a lizard or some other animal, he would scatter money before it and say a tataro. In such contexts the word seems to refer rather to the incantation than to the payment which was made for it. Moreover, tataro was addressed to many things other than ghosts.

In the second above-quoted instance I suspect that the incantation was sung if the animal was vui; and I incline to think that oloolo was the payment, and tataro the formula.

Having stated that tataro was 'strictly an invocation of the dead', Dr. Codrington attempts to derive the word from the same root as ataro, which meant 'ghost' in San Cristoval; but, in the first place, the same word need not have a similar significance in the two areas; secondly, since ataro was equivalent to the akolo of Ulawa and Sa'a, it was probably used in reference to many things besides ghosts. Furthermore, Dr. Codrington was plainly puzzled by the connexion which he hypothesized between tataro and ghosts, for, though he is always careful to distinguish between 'spirits' and ghosts, he remarks that a tataro was 'a form of words which worked by the supernatural power residing in the words and in the name of the spirits mentioned'.

W. H. R. Rivers, Hist. Mel. Soc. ii. 413 f., calls tataro a 'true prayer', whatever that may be; but he is not an impartial witness, for he confesses that it is 'of special importance in relation to the scheme of his book' that tataro should be an appeal to the dead. There is, however, no certain evidence that this was the case. Indeed, Dr. Rivers's enthusiasm for his 'scheme' causes him to make a false reference to Dr. Codrington in op. cit. ii. 414. He quotes Dr. Codrington as his authority for saying that 'even when a man has been making an offering in connexion with a vui, he does not pray to the vui, but to the ghosts of his ancestors'. What Dr. Codrington says is: 'He may pray to the ghosts of his predecessors in this particular mystery', that is, he may mention in his incantation the name of the man who had possessed the vui stone or the rongo place in the past. By substituting 'ancestors' for 'predecessors' Dr. Rivers has loaded the dice in his own favour.

With tataro, cp. the Tahitian tarotaro (n. 590).

297. F. Coombe, Islands of Enchantment, p. 64. Rain-making is mentioned by W. H. R. Rivers, Hist. Mel. Soc. i. 156, but the rain-making rites are not described.

298. B. Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, p. 73.

Professor Malinowski adopts Sir James Frazer's terminology, and remarks: 'Frazer's definition suits the Kirwinian facts much better than any other one. Although I started my field work convinced that the theories of religion and magic expounded in the "Golden Bough" are inadequate, I was forced by all my observations in New Guinea to come over to Frazer's position.' Professor Malinowski
declares his discipleship also in 'Myth in Primitive Psychology', *Psyche General Miniatures*, no. 6.

Some notes on the Trobriand Islanders are to be found in C. G. Seligman, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, pp. 660–735.

**299.** B. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, pp. 73, 427. Similar pronouncements have been made by the same author in e.g. *Sexual Life of Savages*, p. 35; 'Baloma, or the Spirits of the Dead in the Trobriand Islands', *J.R.A.I. xlvi* (1916), pp. 388, 400.

**300.** B. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, pp. 102, 124 ff., 202–5, 345–9, 366–71. Professor Malinowski has described fishing magic in *Man*, 1918, no. 53, and war magic in *Man*, 1920, no. 5. Other names for particular forms of magic were *wawoyla*, love-magic, *vilam alya*, sung at harvest-time and over food stores, &c. The name of the *kula* magic was *mwasila*.

**301.** B. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, pp. 395 (for *balubwalata*), 73–6 (for *bwaga'u*). The latter was the generic term for a magician, one *bwaga'u* being employed to counteract the magic of another *bwaga'u*.

The opinions which the natives held in regard to *mulukwaisi* were varied and confused. This (or these) was held responsible for rapid and violent diseases and for sudden events such as storms at sea. The word is translated 'flying witches', 'malignant witches', and also by the singular of these terms. A witch (or female *bwaga'u*) was *yoyova*; *mulukwaisi* was a manifestation of a *yoyova*'s power, or her second self, or her double, or the projection of herself, or her disembodied self. Another word also, *kapuwana*, which literally meant a small coco-nut, was used in this connexion. The *kapuwana*, we are told, 'was believed to be the something which in the nightly flights leaves the body of the *yoyova* and assumes the various forms in which the *mulukwaisi* appears'. There was 'no exact definition in the mind of the native', and, as Professor Malinowski says, we must not introduce into the conceptions a precision which was absent from the native mind. See *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, pp. 76, 236–48; *Sexual Life of Savages*, p. 379; 'Baloma, or the Spirits of the Dead in the Trobriand Islands', *J.R.A.I. xlvi* (1916), pp. 351, 356 and n. 2.

With the Trobriand *mulukwaisi*, cp. the Mailu *karaveni* (para. 78, n. 336), Ronga *balot* (para. 93, n. 411), and the Suto *balo* (n. 423).

I am not clear about *tauva'u* and *tokway*. *Tauva'u* is translated both singular and plural; 'he' or 'they' came from the south and caused epidemics; a woman who had a 'familiar' *tauva'u* was a dangerous witch. See *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, pp. 77, 393; *Sexual Life of Savages*, pp. 40, 360. *Tokway* is said to have been a dangerous wood-sprite, which caused spasmodic pains and minor ailments; but the full significance of the term may not have been disclosed. See *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, pp. 77, 126–8, 293; *Sexual Life of Savages*, p. 293.

These islanders do not seem to have been afraid of witchcraft on body refuse or clippings. See *Sexual Life of Savages*, pp. 375–7. There was a pernicious influence called *bwaulo* (ibid., p. 128) which exuded from a corpse. No details are available.

**302.** The word *baloma* is translated as 'soul' and as 'spirits of the dead'. The term was applied also to the cause of a pre-nuptial child. Is it possible that it was used adjectively and/or adverbially as well as substantively? Was it applied to anything unusual or inexplicable?

A precarious existence seems to have been enjoyed by a dead man's soul near his old haunts; it was then called *kos or kosi*. See B. Malinowski, 'Baloma, or the Spirits of the Dead in the Trobriand Islands', *J.R.A.I. xlvi* (1916), pp. 353–5, &c.

The exact meanings of *baloma* and *kos* are obscure.
At harvest-time, mila-mila, a festival took place. Platforms were erected on which food was placed for baloma. The celebrations were held at different moons in different districts. After a period of general rejoicing, dancing, and feasting, baloma was (or were) driven away, either with or without ceremony. Ibid., pp. 370–80. This is not tendance. The rites imply a magical control of baloma.


There were three terms for sexual intercourse:

(1) *kayta*, copulation, which was allowed only in the bush, never at home;

(2) *imisiya*, cohabitation, a more or less permanent pre-nuptial attachment, also used to denote the union between husband and wife;

(3) *kaylasi*, implying an illicit element. See *Sexual Life of Savages*, pp. 48, 58.

But surely 'adultery' is preferable to 'fornication' as the English equivalent of *kaylasi*. Cp. n. 215.


Dr. Landtman says (op. cit., p. 229) that 'women who did not want a child' took steps to prevent conception or to procure abortion. The statement, however, may apply only to young married women. The context is not clear.

In op. cit., p. 283, we read: 'In Kiwai, so it is said, an unmarried girl once bore a child ...' Was pre-nuptial pregnancy, then, a strange and rare occurrence?


There were numerous intricate ceremonies of initiation into manhood and womanhood which played a prominent part in Kiwai life. They are not evidence of cultural condition in the sense in which I use the term, and do not come within the scope of this treatise, but a large collection of such data might enable us to make plausible conjectures in regard to the past history of some of the Papuans. Cp. n. 329.

In studying Kiwai culture we must take care to distinguish between the so-called 'mythical beings' and the so-called 'spirits'. Cp. nn. 310, 317.

309. Ibid., p. 304. Dr. Landtman considers that this suggests 'an animistic cause', and speaks of 'the ebihare'. The inference, however, is unjustified. The application of *ebihare* to 'anything mysterious' cannot suggest an animistic cause in the sense in which the word 'animistic' is usually understood, for 'animistic' implies ubiquity. It is the transition from 'something unusual' to 'spiritual beings' and 'personified causes' which renders 'animism' an unacceptable hypothesis. See paras. 62, 112, 148.

Dr. Landtman's excellent book contains many inferences which are due to the animistic theory: thus, instead of saying that 'any inexplicable noise is ebihare' he states, 'Any inexplicable noise on land may also be attributed to the *ebihare*.' Such inferences are not uncommon in post-Tylorian monographs.
310. Ibid., pp. 65, 306 ff.
That Dr. Landtman may have confused the ‘beings’ in Kiwai tales with the
‘spirits’ whose existence is due to his method of translating ebihare, etengena, &c.
(n. 309), is suggested by the fact that he entitles this chapter ‘Mythical Beings’
instead of the more usual ‘Spiritual Beings’. Cp. n. 317.

Etengena was a Masingle word. The Kiwai people, Dr. Landtman says, ‘had
only a vague notion’ of it.

Other ‘classes of beings’ were mamagarena, suguma, poo-poo, utumu, aromo-rubi
(who are said to have caused rain, but see the passages cited in n. 314), hiwai-abere,
&c. We are told that spiritual ideas varied from group to group and even from
individual to individual, so we may not conclude that every individual Kiwai
conceived of all these things. Some of the words may have had a different connotation
in different areas and to different people. In view of Dr. Landtman’s inference
in regard to ebihare (n. 309) we cannot accept ‘beings’ as a fair translation of the words.

In op. cit., p. 65, etengena is rendered ‘a group of sylvan beings’, but in op. cit.,
p. 306, we are told that they only ‘live in large trees’. Thus an unjustified inference
may have slipped unwares into the former passage, the words ‘a group of sylvan
beings’ implying a ubiquity as to trees which was not part of the native conception.

In the same way that Elsdon Best has applied the Maori word atua to heroes
who were not called atua by the Maori (n. 180), so when Dr. Landtman (op. cit.,
p. 301-4) speaks of ‘one of the etengena’, I am uncertain whether or not the creature
was a mythical hero to whom he has applied the word ‘being’, and so also the word etengena, or a personified Kiwai term which would have been reported differently if etengena had not been rendered ‘being’.

Perhaps some of the names were those of recently deceased men.

311. Ibid., p. 298.

312. Ibid., pp. 64-166, esp. p. 142.

313. G. Landtman, The Kiwai Papuans of New Guinea, pp. 257 (for urio as
‘ghost’), 290 ff. (for urio as ‘soul’), 280 (for oboro and markai); E. B. Riley, Among
Papuan Head-hunters, p. 290 (for urio). Riley mentions another word, uriona,
but the report is scant.

314. If the ghost of a newly deceased man hovered round the house and revealed
its presence by a tapping or scraping, the natives cast aside a little food, saying,
‘You go back; you no come; you belong dead’. Such words as ‘You no come back
this place; what road belong you, you go’ were sufficient to send any ghost away.
Some people placed small sticks in the ground across the path along which the
ghost was supposed to have gone away, in order to prevent its return.
The methods of weather magic or fishing magic were revealed in dreams by
men who had been skilled in those occupations when they were alive. The man
who wanted advice from his dead parents might dig up their skulls and sleep with
one under each arm: ‘Not infrequently he will provide himself with a stick and
threaten to break the skulls if the parents do not appear promptly.’ See G. Landt-

All these practices show that the natives thought they could control the dead by
magic. In their opinion tendance was unnecessary.

315. Ibid., p. 283. Cases were known also of temporary possession by ghosts,
and of ghosts becoming ‘familiars’. Ibid., pp. 293-4.
The attention to sibara-adiri was remarkable because as a rule the dead were
placed on platforms supported by four poles. When only the bones remained,
they were carried away and buried in a garden. ‘No objects were placed in the
ground nor on the ground above.’ Ibid., p. 253.
316. Ibid., pp. 220–5. It would be interesting to know the native terms translated ‘malevolent spirits’ on pp. 270–1.

For sorcerers, see esp. pp. 321–6.

317. Ibid., pp. 50, 53, 61, 298. Here also Dr. Landtman seems to have confused the content of mythical tales with actual practices. Cp. nn. 308, 310.


320. Ibid., pp. 272 (for residence of spirit), 244, 246, 266, 270 (for treatment of ghosts).

In regard to the ‘mysterious individual named tsidibe’, who was associated with ‘extraordinarily shaped stones and rocks’, and with the white man’s equipment, can it be that we have inferred from the paucity of Mafulu speech that ‘he’ was an individual? What was the native word for the strange quality in anything unusual? Tsidibe? If so, tsidibe may have been comparable to the terms discussed in para. 146.

A chief’s ghost seems to have been laid with more ceremony, if Mr. Williamson has interpreted correctly the object of the Great Feast. See op. cit., p. 125.

321. Ibid., pp. 187 f., 193 f. (for hunting and fishing magic), 240–1, 282 (for magical treatment of sickness), 276 (for magic power from ‘spirits’). The Mafulu did not consider that witchcraft on body refuse would be successful except in the case of a small child.

322. Ibid., p. 279.


The word kaieimunu (lit. sky-imunu or thunder-imunu) was applied to a number of ‘portentous wicker-work figures, with hollow semi-tubular bodies and widely extended jaws’, which were kept in the ravi-oru, the secret rear-compartment of the ravi, or men’s house. Mr. Williams insists (op. cit., p. 136) that kaieimunu were plural, but in other passages (e.g. op. cit., p. 152) he speaks of ‘its displeasure . . . it is the guardian . . . it can control’, &c. Is it not possible that the word was singular, and possibly adverbial, and seemed to be plural only because it was applied to a number of wicker figures, each of which was kaieimunu?

The association of kaieimunu and imunu-vii, ‘canoe of imunu’, is obscure. Both are said to have been associated with rivers. I do not understand how ‘canoe of kaieimunu’ can be a fair rendering of imunu-vii. I suspect that a thing which was kaieimunu was also imunu-vii, i.e. that the latter was a descriptive term applied to anything which possessed or manifested imunu. Cp. the Maori waka atua (n. 181), Samoan taula-aitu (n. 198), and Tongan taula-otua (n. 209).

Kaieimunu was regarded as an oracle and the rocking of a special canoe foretold good luck; kaieimunu was credited also with the power both of carrying disease and of revealing the method of its cure.

The wicker figures, kaieimunu, are said to have been kept well supplied with food, but since any food which was brought into the ravi was regarded as an offering for kaieimunu, whether it was placed near a wicker figure or not, it is possible that the association of the food with kaieimunu was a convenient method of inciting the lazy stay-at-home to bring food into the ravi.

Each social group, tarava, possessed its kaieimunu, and though in some cases there is said to have been a close relation between kaieimunu and ancestors, ‘this was not a common idea’. Ibid., pp. 131–53.

A bull roarer, upura imunu, possessed the imunu quality in the highest degree.

‘The older the specimen the greater would appear to be its magic power.’ Ibid., p. 166.
A hunting charm, *ke’upura*, worn round the neck, was also heavily charged with *imunu* (op. cit., p. 239). Another compound of *imunu* was *aiaimunu*. The term was applied to some highly decorated masks suspected from the roof. The meaning of *aia* is uncertain. See op. cit., pp. 191–204; cp. the Mailu *aiaigave* (n. 335).

The classification of phenomena into *imua*, dead, passive, and *dokoai*, living, active, which at first sight seems important, is said to have been neither definite nor consistent. See op. cit., p. 232.

324. Ibid., pp. 228–41.

325. Ibid., pp. 220–3. The Koriki funeral obsequies were more elaborate than those of the other tribes. The Koriki were also the only tribe which carried out the ‘very mysterious’ *gopi* ceremony, which was associated with head-hunting. See op. cit., pp. 171–81, 223.

326. Ibid., pp. 148–9, 234–8, 244.

327. Ibid., pp. 22, 237.

328. Ibid., pp. 52–4, 56, 62, 212.


No Koita man might have connexion with the sister of his *henamo* (ibid., p. 70). There were no initiation ceremonies among the Koita. Cp. n. 308.


A corpse was exposed on a *bisa*, death-chair, and then interred; a light was kept burning round the grave for four days; six months later the *ita* feast was held; after that no more attention was paid to the dead man. During those six months a member of the dead man’s clan who had had a successful hunt or harvest would bring a part of his food to the *bisa*, and hang it there. Any one was entitled to consume it on the spot. See op. cit., pp. 159 ff.

The custom is not tendance, but it is reminiscent of the offerings which were made to the exhumed skulls among the Koriki (Purari, para. 76).

As a rule, Professor Seligman translates *sua*, ‘soul’. In op. cit., p. 173, however, *sua* is ‘spirits of the dead’.

331. Ibid., pp. 131, 183–6 (for *tabu*), 175–81 (for magic charms and stones).

Magic stones were simply picked up anywhere. They were selected for one of these reasons: (a) because their shape was similar to that of the object to be influenced (cp. Banks Islanders, para. 72, n. 293), (b) because they were of an uncommon type, (c) because though of a common type they had an unusual shape. See op. cit., pp. 172–3.

332. Ibid., pp. 85, 133, 167–9, 185.

The term for a wizard may have been *vata*.

The treatment of a sickness was by no means rational. Thus, a sickness which was thought to be due to the presence of foreign bodies might be cured either by the extraction of these bodies or by an incantation which purported to restore the sick man’s *sua*. Such contradictions as these are typical of undeveloped minds, but they may exist only in our reports. See para. 148.


A favourite abortifacient was a plant *Derris elliptica*, which was known and used also in the Malay States. The details of the contraceptive recipe are unknown. Professor C. G. Seligman was puzzled by the small number of births which
followed the pre-nuptial licence. See his The Melanesians of British New Guinea, p. 500 and n. 2. 

Professor Malinowski spells vivi as vi'vi. Cp. boi (bo'i), uura (u'ura), &c.

334. B. Malinowski, ‘The Natives of Mailu’, Trans. R. Soc. South Aust. xxxix (1915), pp. 504 (for rain), 580–8 (for gorä and tora), 636, 655–63 (for white magic); W. J. V. Savile, In Unknown New Guinea, pp. 158–9, 169, 273, 295 (for white magic), 266 (for the ‘unknown’), 276–80 (for gorä and tora). The taboo which applied to individuals is called tora by Professor Malinowski and sora by Mr. Savile. On this subject Mr. Savile’s report is the more extensive.


According to Professor Malinowski, aiaigave was the soul or vital principle. Mr. Savile writes iau. Perhaps the difference lies in the Italianized and anglicized transliterations of the vowel-values. Mr. Savile also translates iau ‘ghost’.

With aiaigave, cp. the Purari aiaimunu (n. 323).

Can igave be the Mailu equivalent of Purari imunu? 

Boi is rendered ‘ghosts’ and ‘the spirit in the preserved skull’ (Malinowski). Mr. Savile speaks of bois, ‘spirits of the dead’. The anglicized plural is misleading.

For the burial feasts, see B. Malinowski, op. cit., pp. 691–6.


With kavaeni, cp. the Trobriand mulukwaisi (n. 301) and other words mentioned in that note.

Those individuals who had the power to visit the nether world are called baugene by Professor Malinowski and waresa by Mr. Savile.

337. See F. E. Williams, Orakaiva Magic, pp. 7–8, 148 (for baigona-cult), 9 ff. (for taro-cult), 57–9, 207 (for baigona men and sovai); idem, Orakaiva Society, pp. 292–3, 303 (for baigona men), 265–79 (for sovai).

For the other statements, see Orakaiva Magic, pp. 86, 106–7.


338. F. E. Williams, Orakaiva Society, pp. 211–14, 280.

339. F. E. Williams, Orakaiva Society, pp. 279 (for peni), 271, 285 (for harau).

I assume that the platforms which are mentioned on p. 285 were harau. The native term is not given.

The ‘act of placation’ is said to have been ‘constantly performed’, but the circumstances are not described. The ‘means of placation’ are said to have been ‘peculiarly off-hand’. Details are not given.

The words ‘in the main’ are vague. They may mean either that this is ‘on the whole’ Mr. Williams’s personal conclusion, or that the opinion was held by a majority of the people. Contrarily, some people may have thought that other dead men in addition to ‘the more recently deceased’ frequented their old homes.

A few sovai are said to have been remembered by name. The reference may be to such mythological figures as Totoina, Morarala, and Kokowaio. On the other hand, Mr. Williams may mean that a few men who had lived within living memory were remembered by name. He does not record the facts on which his conclusions are based.
§ 340. For weather magic, see F. E. Williams, *Orakaiva Magic*, pp. 62-4, 133, 177, 201. Weather control is said to have been ‘an old-time institution which the taro-men have adapted to their purpose’.

For garden magic, &c., see op. cit., pp. 146-50, 203-9, 216, 282.

White magic was *sito* or *kore*, black magic *kai, inja, or saruka*; the latter words were the names of a vine and a bark respectively. An anti-social magician was *kaiembo* or *injambo*. These words, clearly compounds of *kai* and *inja*, seem to have been descriptive terms, defining a man’s methods, not differentiating titles.

The word *sito* was applied to any substance which had a ‘mysterious potency for good’, to the ‘medicine’ which was placed in a taro garden, to the treatment which was applied to a sick man, and to the ‘medicine’ used by a magician to render his methods effective. A female practitioner took *sito* before treating a ‘natural’ sickness in a ‘natural’ manner. See F. E. Williams, *Orakaiva Society*, pp. 296, 300.

The following passage is noteworthy: ‘The phenomena of nature are largely taken for granted and when things are going well the native is content to ask no questions. But in the face of calamity or sickness, or any hitch in the course of nature, he may cast about for a cause, some one or something on which to fix the responsibility’ (ibid., p. 287). Such statements militate strongly against the Tylorian theory of ‘primitive’ thought.


It is difficult to separate the inferences from the facts in these passages.

The reports are not always clear; e.g. the placation of *sovai* is described as an ‘eleventh hour’ inspiration, but witchcraft, we are told, was ‘the native’s exegetical last card’, and ‘the stock explanation of a hopeless case’.

When *sovai* was placated, a set of feathers or ornaments was handed to the ‘doctor’, who hung them outside his house. Such an act may have been directed towards *sovai* as a vaguely conceived power or towards the particular *sovai* of a recently deceased relative. It depends on the native meaning of *sovai*; and that is obscure. The native term for such a ‘doctor’ is not given. Was he usually a *baigona* man?


343. I have the most sincere admiration for the learning, industry, and care which has been bestowed upon the compilation, but I have little sympathy with the definitions which have been adopted by H. Spencer in *Descriptive Sociology*, Div. I, Part 2 a, No. 4, which, after being originally edited by Professor David Duncan in 1875, has recently (November 1930) been republished. In spite of disagreements with the technique and translations, however, I consider this enormous encyclopaedia of much value. Our thanks are due to the editor, the late Mr. E. Torday, for his great labour.


In studying these passages, I am sometimes at a loss to understand the native terms which Sir James is rendering ‘spirit of the dead king’, ‘divine spirit’, &c. If the native terms are substituted for these phrases, the sense of the passages is not always the same as it is in Sir James’s musical prose.


Professor Westermann translates *adjwogo* as ‘witch-doctor or sorcerer’, and *jalyat* as ‘man of medicine, bad wizard’. The plural form of *jwok* was *jwuk*. The Oyler MS. ii. 1 distinguishes between the ‘good medicine-man’, *adjwogo* (pl. *adjwuh*), and the ‘witch-doctor’, *adjwok* (pl. *adjwuuh*); but I am reluctant to accept the existence of two separate words which had a common plural. I have adopted *ajwogo* as the
term for a magician, as a compromise between the various transliterative forms.
See further n. 358. Dr. Oyler calls the jalyat 'evil medicine-man'.

With ajwo go cp. the Lango ajoka (n. 358).

For the firm belief in witchcraft and further references to the magical profession, see D. S. Oyler, 'The Shilluk's Belief in the Evil Eye; the Evil Medicine Man', S.N.R. ii (1919), pp. 231; idem, 'The Shilluk's Belief in the Good Medicine Man', S.N.R. iii (1920), pp. 113, 116. In the last passage Dr. Oyler emphasizes that the Shilluk were 'dominated by medicine men'. The five classes into which he divided the magical profession are repeated in the Oyler MS. ii. 1, but I suspect that the nice distinctions did not exist in the mind of the Shilluk.

Professor Westermann obtained much of his information from Dr. Oyler; this must be remembered in comparing their reports. As the Editor of Sudan Notes and Records points out, if Dr. Oyler's report differs from that of Professor Westermann, it is probable that Dr. Oyler's description is to be preferred.


For ajwo go Professor Seligman writes ajuwago.


Although Professor Seligman uses the word as singular and plural, the plural form seems to have been ror. I have not hesitated, however, to retain the singular form in all contexts, in the hope that though less scholarly it may be more lucid.

Dead ret are said to have been manifest in certain animals. Should a bird in which a dead ret appeared alight on a tree, that tree was then sacred to that ret. I accept the report with reserve. I believe that more animals were called jwok, some 'kings' also, but I doubt the reincarnation unless I am assured that the identity of the bird and the ret has not been inferred by the application to them of the same adjective or adverb.

The name of the Shilluk hero is variously spelt Nyakang, Nyikang, Nikawng.


There was a particularly fine kengo at Fenikang, with painted walls. The enclosure contained five huts.

The contents of kengo varied. Few details are given.


Professor Seligman speaks merely of 'certain men and old women' whom he calls barit baeng. The bang ret is mentioned in the Oyler MS. ii, A 2, B 2, as bang rit, rit being another and more unusual form of ret.

For ajwo go, see n. 345.


Professor Seligman speaks as if the rain-ceremony was held whether the rain was late or whether it came as usual. This is not Dr. Oyler's view; he says that a sheep was sacrificed in times of drought. The Oyler MS. iii. 1–3 states that the people in some districts relied on Dinka rain-makers. There is no mention of
sacrifices to Nyakang in the answers to that section of the questionnaire which referred to rain-ceremonies.

351. The quotations are from the Oyler MS. iv. 5, 6.
According to D. Westermann, The Shilluk People, p. xlv, the part of a man which was seen or had experiences in dreams was *tipo*: 'the spirit of a deceased person was *aneko*.' No other authority mentions *aneko*, which meant 'one who kills'. With *tipo*, cp. the Dinka *attiep* (para. 85) and the Lango *tipo* (para. 86).

352. Oyler MS. i. 1. I can find no detailed report upon the subject in the published literature.

353. E. Torday (editor), H. Spencer, Descriptive Sociology, no. 4, p. 241, quoting W. Hoffmayr, Die Schilluk, p. 297 f. See also other passages quoted on the same page.

In one passage I have taken the liberty of altering 'the jok are' into 'jok is'. *Jok* was a singular word, the plural form of which was *jwuk* (Shilluk) and *jogi* (Lango). But Professor Seligman continually speaks of 'the jok know', 'the jok hear', &c.
Sometimes Professor Seligman uses the word 'spirit' as the equivalent of *jok*; thus, '... animal who is the spirit, *jok*, of the clan'. It is only when we substitute *jok* for 'spirit' and 'god' that his report can be intelligently understood.
The Tain word for 'ancestors' seems to have been *kwar*.
Capt. S. L. Cummins, 'Sub-Tribes of the Bahr-el-Ghazel Dinkas', J.A.I. xxxiv (1904), pp. 157–60, describes some of the religious ideas of the Nok-Dinka. We should have been better able to assess the value of his remarks on witchcraft if he had quoted the native words which he translated.
A monograph on the Dinka is sadly needed. They are of great anthropological importance.
With *tiet*, cp. Lango *atyet* (n. 358).


It is difficult to summarize Mr. Driberg's masterly monograph. A less penetrating scholar might have reported the Lango as believing in a vast number of powerful spirits, the worship of those spirits as being the foundation of all Lango practices. Adongo might well have been reported as being the spirit of trees, Lango as the spirit of disease, Orongo as the soul or spirit of a man, and Atida as the spirit of hunting. Furthermore these spirits might have been reported as being everywhere, in every natural feature, on every hill, and in every pool, in fact, in every nook and corner, lying in wait to heap misfortune and tribulation upon the helpless people.
It is clear that this erroneous description fits some of the facts. Its absurdity is due (1) to the translation of *jok* as 'spirit', (2) to the omission of those other contexts in which the word was used, (3) to the false inference that *jok* was *everywhere* because it was manifest in the *unusual* or in any other place upon which an *ajoka* might decide.
Upon such errors and upon such reports the hypothesis of 'animism' was founded. See further para. 148.
The following incident will illustrate the method of divination: a man's goats were sick; he was told to erect an *abila* to *jok* which was manifest in a reed on the
river bank; the reeds around the jok-reed were stationary whilst the jok-reed was waving to and fro (ibid., p. 232). Would Professor Lévy-Bruhl call this a 'prelogical' proceeding? For a comment on his suggestions, see para. 70.

An abila was also called ot jok, jok-house, house of jok. Cp. the ot abani of the diviner (n. 358).

Jok was manifest in fig-trees (ibid., p. 219). The same has been said about the Kikuyu ngai (n. 362), Kamba ngai or mulungu (para. 86), Ila mizhimo (n. 403), and Yao mulungu (n. 437). Cp. the 'mystery' (i.e. wakan) tree of the Dakota Indians (n. 522) and the manido (manedoo, mantou) trees of the Ojibwa (para. 113).


With tipo, cp. the Dinka atiwp (para. 83) and the Shilluk tipo (n. 351).

Certain large animals possessed tipo; a man who killed a tipo-animal had to take steps to protect himself against its malevolence; whatever else the ajoka advised, 'a black ram must be sacrificed at the door of the slayer's house'.

The tipo of twins were especially dangerous, for jok was manifest in the abnormal character of their birth.

A tipo was so closely associated with jok that Mr. Driberg speaks of it as 'an atom of jok'.

The laying of the ghost by inveigling it into a pot was practised also by the Bakitara. See para. 38.


An ajok was either ading, who bewitched a person by acting upon body refuse or excrement, or achudang, who possessed the evil eye, killed a man by looking at him, and disturbed the dead. In spite of the activities of the ading, no attempt was made to conceal body-clippings.

Rare alternative names for the ajoka were ajwoga, ajwoga. Cp. the Shilluk ajwogo (n. 345). The word atyet also (tyeto, 'to divine') was applied to ajoka (e.g. op. cit., pp. 57, 234). In his vocabulary Mr. Driberg gives datyet as an alternative form of atyet. Cp. the Dinka tiwp (para. 83).

An ajoka who had suffered a trance was called abanwe, the 'possession' being credited to jok nam. The word abanwe (pl. abani) seems to have indicated the powers which the 'possession' afforded, for bano meant 'prophecy', and bane, 'in a trance, possessed'. If jok nam demanded a special house, ot abani, it had to be built. It was larger than an ot jok (abila), and stood about four and a half feet high, but no offerings were made in it. It was used mostly for seances, as it were, and was empty except for a spear (tong jok). See op. cit., pp. 237–8.

Mr. Driberg is of the opinion that jok nam was an importation. With abanwe he compares the Bakitara kubandwa, 'to be possessed, to prophesy'. With abanwa, therefore, cp. the Bantu manwea (paras. 38–9, nn. 123, 139).

Every June there was a magical ceremony to drive away disease. Sickness could be washed away by ceremonially washing dirt from a spear; it could also be transferred to a goat. If all other methods failed with a sick child, they put it under a granary and pulled it out from the other side. Apparently the method was successful on one occasion; it might succeed again. Cp. the Kitara custom of drawing the sufferer through a hole made in an ant-hill (n. 126).

359. The observances varied; and Mr. Driberg considers that some of them were 'of extraneous origin'. See his 'Rain-making among the Lango', J.R.A.I. xlix (1919), pp. 52–73; and The Lango, pp. 243–62.

An aged woman named Angwech enjoyed a considerable reputation as a rain-consultant. Apparently she deserved her fame. Is it not possible that Atida who is called 'a manifestation of jok' was once a successful ajoka? Angwech is said to have been her 'priestess'. Cp. Atida with the Dinka Deng-dit. The attention to
the latter was more elaborate, but fundamentally the two appear to have been institutions of a similar character. Cp. also the Uganda Nagawonyi (n. 137).

360. J. H. Driberg, The Lango, pp. 155, n. 2, 160–1, 212. A non-sexual relationship with an unmarried woman was chodo. If illicit intercourse took place out of doors, jok was manifest in the spot where coitus had occurred.


The report of C. Dundas, 'The Organisation and Laws of some Bantu Tribes, J.R.A.I. xlvi (1915), pp. 273–4, must be read with care. 'In Kikuyu', Mr. Dundas says, 'no such indulgence [as free love] is permitted to any class of persons: the fact is that young men and girls may go to any extreme of intimacy short of actual sexual connection, and such intimacy (ngwiko) is generally practised.' It is possible that in this passage inference has coloured the fact. Mr. Dundas emphasizes the extraction of the fine for causing pre-nuptial pregnancy in a manner which suggests that he has inferred the illicit character of sexual intercourse from this fact alone. He says that 'sexual offences were very leniently dealt with'.

The meaning of ngwiko is obscure. May we compare it to the Zulu hlobo nga (para. 94)?

Mr. Dundas seems to think that Kikuyu sexual regulations were at one time much more stringent, but does not state the evidence on which the opinion is based.


For a comment on the reports concerning 'black' ngai and 'white' ngai, see nn. 377, 383.

Mr. Tate divides ngai into three parts, 'two good, one bad'. The report is inferential. The Akikuyu may have divided the phenomena in which ngai was manifest into those which were dangerous and those which were ultimately beneficial, but it is not apparent that the Akikuyu made any moral judgements concerning them. The word ngai was of Masai origin (cp. n. 369), and in later days became much confused in the native mind with the Christian God. See, e.g., W. S. and K. Routledge, op. cit., p. 226.

According to P. Cayzac, mulungu was an alternative term for ngai. P. Cayzac may be referring to the opinions of those Akikuyu who had adopted Kamba words; the two tribes converged in some places (n. 368). G. Lindblom, The Akamba, p. 247 f., also states that the Akikuyu used the words ngai and mulungu as alternatives; this supports the suggestion that P. Cayzac's remarks apply to the Akikuyu who had been influenced by the Akamba, for Mr. Lindblom, living among the Akamba, is likely to have come into contact only with those Akikuyu who lived near by.

Mr. Lindblom states that makai was 'a collective form of ngai' and that makai must be understood as synonymous with ngoma, their usual word for spirits. I do not understand how a power like ngai can have had a 'collective form', for to the natives ngai seems to have been a quality which was shared by many things; was makai used in similar contexts?

The confusion between ngai and ngoma, which is apparent in the above-quoted passage from Mr. Lindblom's monograph, is a common feature of the reports on the Akikuyu. After describing the sacrifices to ngoma, Mr. Routledge remarks: 'Whether all these last forms of sacrifice to ngoma are definitely connected in the native mind with the ghosts of the dead I am unable to say.' Again, ngoma are said to have been 'like ngai'. Ngai was manifest in fig-trees, mugumu; so were ngoma (W. S. and K. Routledge, II, op. cit., p. 242 f.); so were ngoma (H. R. Tate, op. cit., p. 258). Is it not a pity,
then, that *ngoma* should have been translated 'spirits of the dead'. Dr. Leakey asserts that *ngai* and *ngoma* were distinguished, yet there is an abundance of evidence that some people confused them.

Fig-trees were also a resort of the Lango *jok* (n. 356), Kamba *ngai* or *mulungu* (para. 86), Ila *mizimvo* (n. 403), and Yao *mulungu* (n. 437). Cp. the *wakan*-trees of the Dakota Indians (n. 522).

When P. Cayzac, op. cit., p. 310, and W. S. and K. Routledge, op. cit., pp. 239–43, state that *ngoma* 'wandered about', it is probable that they are making an inference from the fact that *ngoma* were in many places. There is no evidence that the *ngoma* in different places were identified.

C. W. Hobley, *Bantu Beliefs and Magic*, pp. 40–53, has described many forms of Kikuyu sacrifices. For *ngai* he writes *Engai*, for which see n. 383. I should accept Mr. Hobley's valuable data with a greater readiness if (1) he had used such words as 'worship', 'sacrifice', 'invoke', &c., in a less indefinite manner, (2) he had explained how he distinguished a 'sacrifice' to *Engai* from a 'sacrifice' to *ngoma*.


The 'snake-worship' reported by the Routledges (op. cit., pp. 237–8) is mentioned also by Mr. Dundas (op. cit., p. 255) and Mr. Hobley (op. cit., p. 93). Cp. J. G. Frazer, *G.B.*, *The Magic Art*, ii. 150. No doubt the *Aitwika* was extensive, but I am reluctant to accept the festival as a rain-making ceremony without further evidence. 'Worship' is a strange word to apply to the rites.

364. R. Crawshay, 'Kikuyu: Notes on the Country, Fauna and Flora', *Geographical Journal*, xx (1902), p. 37, states that 'they do not bury or mourn their dead . . . neither have they any great fear of the dead'. Later writers confirm the report. Mr. Tate says that a dead man was either thrown outside or left in the house, which was allowed to fall down; Mr. Routledge states that only the old and the rich were buried; according to Mr. Hobley, the honour of burial was paid to 'every elder who had circumcised children', and to 'married women with five or six children'. A man who belonged to the 'Masai circumcision guild', Mr. Hobley says, might or might not be buried; the elders decided. See W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People*, pp. 168 ff.; C. W. Hobley, *Bantu Beliefs and Magic*, pp. 98–101; H. R. Tate, 'Further Notes on the Kikuyu', *J.A.I.* xxxiv (1904), p. 256.

C. W. Hobley, op. cit., p. 50, says: 'An elder son usually sacrifices a ram every three months or so at the grave of his father'; but in view of the rarity of burial we must conclude that the rite was less common than the report leads us to believe. The same criticism applies to a report concerning the rites in connexion with the malignancy of a father's ghost which has been made by C. Dundas, 'The Organisation and Laws of some Bantu Tribes', *J.R.A.I.* xlv (1915), p. 277 f.


A *mundumugu* tree, where *ngai* was manifest, was *muti mugu*. Dr. R. R. Marett, who adds a note to the Routledge volume, considers that *mugu* 'has much the same sense as the Polynesian *mana*'. For *mana*, see para. 147, n. 191.


H. R. Tate, 'Further Notes on the Kikuyu', *J.A.I.* xxxiv (1904), pp. 262–3, translates *mundu mugu*, 'priest', and *murogi*, 'medicine-man'; but apparently he uses
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'priest' and 'medicine-man' as alternatives, for he adds that 'there are other medicine-men who do cure sick people', and that these 'other men' were *mundu mugu*.

The statements in regard to the causation of disease, and especially in regard to those diseases which are said to have been caused by 'spirits of the dead' and 'esprits', are complicated by the fact that our authorities distinguish what the Kikuyu are said to have confused, *ngai* and *ngoma*. For this confusion, see n. 362. In the reports on the causes of sickness the native terms are not always quoted.

For *thahu*, which was the equivalent of the Akamba *thahu* or *makeke* (n. 372), see C. W. Hobley, *Bantu Beliefs and Magic*, pp. 103 ff.; W. S. and K. Routledge, op. cit., pp. 256-9. Mr. Hobley gives sixty-eight examples of this defilement, which seems to have been incurred by any violation of social *tapu*: e.g. a man who married a blood relation was *thahu*.

366. I can find no adequate report concerning rain-making. The eight lines which are devoted to the subject by C. W. Hobley, *Bantu Beliefs and Magic*, p. 60, raise more questions than they answer. The sun, moon, lightning, thunder, and rain were *ngai* (W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People*, p. 226).


In op. cit., p. 106, Mr. Lindblom refers to a woman's ghost as *kiu*. This is the only reference to *kiu* as 'ghost' that I have found. See further n. 371.

For the convergence of the Akikuyu and Akamba, see C. Dundas, 'History of Kitui', *J.R.A.I.* xliii (1913), p. 483.


Those who sympathize with the classification of uncivilized societies according to their 'beliefs', and those who consider that we can describe those beliefs in terms of our own philosophy, are recommended to study and compare the following passages: C. W. Hobley, *Ethnology of Akamba and other East African Tribes*, pp. 85–9; idem, *Bantu Beliefs and Magic*, p. 62 f.; C. Dundas, 'History of Kitui', *J.R.A.I.* xliii (1913), p. 535; G. Lindblom, *The Akamba*, pp. 243–51. The subjective intrusion is intense: e.g.

(i) 'The Akamba will tell you that they have two gods, Engai or Mulungu and Aimu' (Hobley).

(ii) 'The Mkmamba uses three words to denote God, *muangu*, *ngai*, and *mulungu*.

When asked what God is the Mkmamba begins to speak of *aiimu*, spirits' (Dundas).

(iii) 'Kamba religion contains the conception of a high god' (Hobley).

Such declarations reveal the uncertainty, inaccuracy, and confusion which arise as soon as native terms are translated; furthermore, they lead the student to assume that the Akamba were a complicated people, whereas if we substitute the native terms, Akamba philosophy becomes simple. To speak of 'the plurality of the spiritual world' (Dundas) is bad scholarship; to translate a native term by 'the Absolute' (Lindblom) is a profanation of Hegel as well as a misrepresentation of Akamba beliefs. Admittedly Mr. Lindblom hesitates 'to ascribe to them too great a power of abstract thought'; he tells us also that 'to analyse an idea philosophically and make distinctions is beyond their capacity'; but he adds, 'At most a few realise that *mulungu* is the Absolute, as we use the word, who is superior to all natural and supernatural powers.' What does such a sentence mean?

Incredible though it may appear, a number of hypotheses have been submitted concerning the 'origin' of these conceptions which through our translations have
been credited to the Akamba. We are invited to believe that these conceptions developed either from an 'original monotheism' and/or from 'nature-spirits' and/or from 'ancestor-spirits', so greatly have our authorities been misled by the ideas which they associate with their various English equivalents of *mulungu* and *aimu*. It is therefore not surprising that the inferential reports should contradict one another: e.g. Mr. Hobley (i.c.) speaks of 'certain evil spirits which are the disembodied relics of people who have killed their neighbours by the help of black magic'; Mr. Lindblom (op. cit., p. 229) replies that he did not find 'a native or a missionary who knew anything about this sort of spirit'.

The word *ngai* was not common to all Akamba and was of Masai origin. See G. Lindblom, op. cit., pp. 247-8. Cp. n. 362.

370. See C. W. Hobley, *Bantu Beliefs and Magic*, pp. 62-3 (for *ngai* in high mountains and the sun, and in trees as the result of a dream of a prophetess); G. Lindblom, *The Akamba*, p. 218 (for *ngai* as ghost of caravan leader), 263 (for *ngai* as 'spirit' of diviner), 243, n. 3 (for *mulungu* as 'luck'), 209 ff. (for *mulungu* = 'aimu in mountains and solitary places').

The ubiquity mentioned by C. Dundas, 'History of Kitui', *J.R.A.I.* xliii (1913), p. 538, seems to be an inference from the fact that *mulungu or aimu* was manifest in many places.

371. For *ithembo* (fig-trees, mumbo, or any other place where *ngai* was manifest), see C. W. Hobley, *Akamba and other East African Tribes*, pp. 57, 86; idem, *Bantu Beliefs and Magic*, pp. 61-6. The following powers also were manifest in fig-trees, Lango *jok* (n. 356), Kikuyu *ngai* (n. 362), Ila *mizihimo* (n. 403), and Yao *mulungu* (n. 437).

There was 'an abundance of *ithembo*', according to G. Lindblom, *The Akamba*, p. 219, who says that 'the grave of some medicine-man or other prominent person' might be *ithembo*.

The large number of *ithembo* also impressed C. Dundas, 'History of Kitui', *J.R.A.I.* xliii (1913), p. 537. 'How they originated', he says, 'is more than I can say.' He adds: 'It seems that an *ithembo* is simply a place which, from its nature, is held to be an abode of the spirits as also a place which from a particular circumstance has become so.' Since 'spirits' must be a translation of *ngai*, this statement means that an *ithembo* was a place where *ngai* was manifest. How, then, is it difficult to understand how an *ithembo* 'originated'?

The descriptions of the alleged public and private 'sacrifices' by G. Lindblom, *The Akamba, passim*, are confused. Mr. Lindblom seems to have decided that the Akamba practices revealed 'a developed worship of their ancestors' (op. cit., p. 209), but he neither defines what he means by 'developed' nor adduces any evidence in support of the opinion. Cp. the following statements:

1. 'Mulungu is not worshipped at all, or at least extremely seldom, by offering of sacrifices, nor in any other way' (op. cit., p. 244).
2. 'A beer party is held with its accompanying sacrifices to *mulungu*, i.e. *aimu*, the ancestral spirits' (op. cit., p. 466).
3. 'Mulungu, i.e. *aimu* (op. cit., p. 277).
4. When an initiation hut was being built beer was poured on the ground 'as an offering to *mulungu* (op. cit., p. 46).

Under the conditions reported in (2) and (3), how can we say that any particular offering was made to *mulungu* or to *aimu*?

In his description of the 'family offerings' to the 'ancestral spirits' Mr. Lindblom says (op. cit., pp. 217-18) that the offerings consisted of 'a little food and drink placed on the floor of the hut'. I can see no difference between this sacrifice to 'ancestors' and (4). How did Mr. Lindblom decide that in the one case *mulungu* and in the other case *aimu* was the recipient?
§ 372

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Mr. Lindblom states:
(a) ‘When passing a place of sacrifice they usually throw a little food there’;
(b) ‘any one undertaking a long journey offers several sacrifices on the way.’

Since ‘a place of sacrifice’ was _ithembo_, a _ngai_-place, an ‘unusual’ place, we may conclude that the offerings mentioned in (b) were made at _ithembo_ which the traveller passed on his journey. Indeed, all such statements as (a) and (b) seem to be rhetorical paraphrases of the following statement: ‘At the sight of or on meeting anything unusual the Akamba offer sacrifices’ (op. cit., p. 224).

In _Akamba and other East African Tribes_, p. 85, Mr. Hobley seems to consider that each individual man possessed several _aimu_, for he says ‘When a person dies his _aimu_ go and live in a wild fig-tree’; but in _Bantu Beliefs and Magic_, pp. 30–1, he speaks of the _imu_ (sing.) of a man as if no man possessed more than one. On the other hand, G. Lindblom, _The Akamba_, p. 206, speaks of the ‘soul’, _aimu_ (sing.), of a dead man. In that passage Mr. Lindblom says that the soul of a living man was _kiu_, but in op. cit., p. 106, we are told that _kiu_ was applied exclusively to the ‘ghost’ of a dead woman.

Mr. Hobley’s statement that ‘_aimu_ go and live in a wild fig-tree’ seems to be an inference, and possibly a false one, from the fact that _ngai_ and/or _aimu_ was applied to fig-trees.

When we read that certain rites were conducted at the grave of a medicine-man ‘or other prominent person’, we must not conclude that the graves of other people were neglected. Ordinary people had no graves. Medicine-men were the only persons who were buried; the bodies of other people were thrown into the bush to be devoured by wild beasts. See C. W. Hobley, _Akamba and other East African Tribes_, p. 66; C. Dundas, ‘History of Kitui’, _J.R.A.I._ xliii (1913), p. 521; idem, ‘The Organisation and Laws of some Bantu Tribes’, _J.R.A.I._ xlv (1915), p. 241, n. 3; G. Lindblom, _The Akamba_, pp. 107, 209.

I cannot explain the apparent contradictions in these last passages. They may be due to the fact that the practices varied in different areas. This may also be the explanation of the contradictory character of the passage in C. W. Hobley, _Bantu Beliefs and Magic_, p. 101.

372. For _mundu mwoi_, see G. Lindblom, _The Akamba_, pp. 176, 254, 279, n. 2, 280–3; C. W. Hobley, _Akamba and other East African Tribes_, p. 93. Mr. Lindblom corrects Mr. Hobley’s _muoiion_ (muoi) to _mundu mwoi_.


For care of personal clippings, see C. W. Hobley, op. cit., p. 101; idem, _Bantu Beliefs and Magic_, p. 62.


Any one who broke a _tapu_ was _thahu_ or _makwa_, ‘accursed’, ‘unclean’. The condition also resulted from unwitting contact with _ngai_ (_mutungu_). The victim had to be purified. See C. W. Hobley, _Bantu Beliefs and Magic_, pp. 127 ff.; G. Lindblom, op. cit., pp. 298 ff.; C. Dundas, op. cit., p. 242. Cp. the Kikuyu _thahu_ (n. 365).

373. Cp. the following statements:
(1) ‘The Kamba have no medicine-men who specialize in rain-making, and in times of drought they pray and sacrifice at the _ithembo_.’
‘They are emphatic in stating that _ngai_ and not the _aimu_ brings the rain’ (C. W. Hobley, _Bantu Beliefs and Magic_, pp. 63, 192).
(2) ‘The author has neither seen nor heard any mention of a medicine-man using sympathetic magic to produce rain.’
‘These prayers’, i.e. at theinciple, ‘are really addressed to the aimu, even though they sometimes seem to be addressed to mulungu-ngai’ (G. Lindblom, *The Akamba*, pp. 245, 276).

For the confusion between ngai (mulungu) and aimu, see n. 371.

I am not sure whether ngai was applied (adverbially?) to rain in general or only to some rains. One thing is certain: the word did not mean ‘rain’, for such a translation would confuse the meaning of the word with the phenomena to which it was applied. This confusion seems to detract from the value of the arguments which are advanced by Dr. R. R. Maret and W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People*, pp. 360-1.

A Kamba word which is said to have meant ‘rain’ was mbua, but apparently the word was used infrequently. G. Lindblom, op. cit., p. 248, says that ‘sometimes for certain reasons the rain may not be mentioned by its ordinary name’. I can find no other reference to mbua.

Rain-magic, we are told, was ‘of a purely negative character and consisted in the avoidance of certain acts during the hour of rain or when rain was expected’. If a drought threatened to ruin the harvest, the women assembled and sang sexual songs in order to make the rain fall. Individual men took such steps to secure rain as they considered advisable and adequate: e.g. a man might place an inverted jar in a field. Certain charms were credited with the power of dispersing a raincloud. See G. Lindblom, op. cit., pp. 181, 275-6, 288.

374. The relation between sexual opportunity and human behaviour is so close that it would be possible to test the conclusions of this treatise. For example, if the questions tabulated in para. 23 could be answered by a perusal of the literature to which Mr. E. Torday has referred in H. Spencer, *Descriptive Sociology*, Div. I, Part 2 a, No. 4, pp. 43-4, the general pattern of Turkana, Didinga, and Dodoto behaviour could be predicted, and the accuracy of the prediction checked, from a description of the cultural details as and when they became known.


The word *asista* seems to have been derived from *asis*, ‘sun’, with the article suffix.

According to G. W. B. Huntingford, ‘Miscellaneous Records relating to the Nandi and Kony Tribes’, *J.R.A.I.* lvii (1927), p. 418, ‘a distinction is often made between *asis* meaning god and *asista* meaning the sun’. This distinction is not made by Sir Claud Hollis, who in such contexts spells the word ‘god’ with a capital G.

376. A. C. Hollis, *The Nandi*, pp. 22, 30, 35, 42, 65, 122 f. The cry to the sun is on p. 42, the cry to the moon on p. 122 f.; the ‘protect us’ cries are on p. 65.


The sun *asis* is reported to have been the totem of the kipasiso clan (*The Nandi*, pp. 5, 11). Hair was thrown to the rising sun (ibid., pp. 30, 51, 53, 62, 65); also teeth (ibid., p. 30); some people used to spit to the east (ibid., pp. 42, 46, 56, 60, 78). It would be interesting to know which, if any, of these actions were performed exclusively by the kipasiso clan.

We are told (ibid., p. 41) that there were ‘two other superhuman beings, iletememie and iletemeya’. The word *ilet* meant ‘thunder’. I suspect that the terms were descriptive of sky-activity. Cp. the black and red *ngai* of the Masai (n. 383). Cp. also the inferential and contradictory reports concerning ‘black’ *ngai* and ‘white’ *ngai* which are made by P. Cayzac, ‘La Religion des Kikuyu’, *Anthropos*, v (1910), p. 309, and W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People*, p. 226.
378. An ordinary Nandi corpse was taken out at nightfall, to be devoured by the hyenas. Perhaps this is the reason why hyenas were respected and feared. 'In the case of a very old man or woman or very young children, the body is buried in the dung-heap near the cattle-kraal.' See A. C. Hollis, The Nandi, pp. 7 (for fear of hyenas), 70, 72.

For *oiik* (sing. *oiindet*), and the attention which was paid to them, see A. C. Hollis, op. cit., pp. 41, 46, 70, 100; G. W. B. Huntingford, 'Miscellaneous Records relating to the Nandi and Kony Tribes', *J.R.A.I.* lvii (1927), pp. 418-19. Mr. Huntingford calls *oiik* 'good spirits'; Sir Claud Hollis calls them 'devils'. Mr. Huntingford calls *musambwamindet* (pl. *musambwanik*) 'bad spirits'; these are not mentioned by Sir Claud Hollis.

According to Mr. Huntingford, 'a person when collecting firewood by the river may hear a noise like a dry stick being broken and will know that it is a spirit, to which they say *tvoindennyo*, "you are my spirit"'. Was the 'spirit' that of the person who heard the noise? If so, the custom could not have been 'ancestor-cult' as it is reported to have been. If it was not the spirit of that person, what does the report mean? Again, if a person fell or tripped up, he was thought to have been caught by 'spirits': 'If this happens more than once, he knows that a spirit is angry, and offers milk to some ancestral spirit'. I do not know if this 'ancestral spirit' was supposed to be the 'spirit' who caused the man to fall. Apparently ghosts were pleased if corn was thrown into the fire. If, after dreaming of a 'spirit', a woman poured some milk on the floor of the hut, and said *iro cho cheko*, 'look at this milk', she would obtain the child which she desired.


Witchcraft was one of the ordinary risks of life; great care was taken of body-clippings.

If an illness was due to a ghost, a brother or near relation discovered its identity by a process of elimination carried out by means of stalks. The practitioner then cried, *kakosichin orkoiyo*, 'I have got thee, O medicine-man', and enticed the ghost away by offers of food. Must we conclude that the ghost of an *orkoiyot* was the only ghost which could cause sickness?

The *orkoiyot* (pl. *orkoiik*) acted as wizard, medicine-man, and diviner. Mr. Huntingford says that all *orkoiik* were members of the talai clan, but Sir Claud disagrees. Though the *kipakeiyot* was always a talai man, he says, the *kipungut* was not. The latter were strangers; if they were killed, no blood-money was payable. They are called 'lesser medicine-men'. We are not told the reason. Apparently the comparison implied by 'lesser' has been made by the white man, and was not recognized by the Nandi.


381. A. C. Hollis, The Nandi, pp. 16-17, 68, 76. J. G. Frazer, G.B., The Magic Art, ii. 112, quotes the prohibition of looking into a granary as an example of the opinions of uncivilized men concerning the blighting influence of sexual crime. The Nandi girl, however, was punished not for her sexual intercourse but for her pregnancy. The illustration is therefore inappropriate to Sir James's submissions.

Of the seventeen clans which are mentioned by A. C. Hollis, op. cit., pp. 8 ff., the members of five were forbidden to marry a girl who had conceived; the members of three were not allowed to take such a girl as a first wife. The *toiyoi* clan seem to
have been irregular in all their habits. Concerning the *kipvirgo* clan the reports are contradictory.

382. The most detailed description of Masai pre-nuptial sexual regulations has been given by L. S. B. Leakey, 'Some Notes on the Masai of Kenya Colony', *J.R.A.I.* lx (1930), pp. 192-4, 197-8.

The organized fornication of the girls and the warriors has been reported also by S. L. and H. Hinde, *The Last of the Masai*, pp. 72-4; by A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, pp. 122, 310-11; and by J. Thomson, *Through Masai-land*, p. 431.

None of these authorities mentions the imposition of a fine on the father of a pre-nuptial child. The Hindes state that a warrior had the option of marrying a girl whom he had caused to conceive. Sir Claud Hollis says that he usually married her. He also says that a warrior who wanted a certain woman to be his wife 'purposely seduced her'. That is a queer phrase to use in reference to the Masai.

Dr. Leakey reports that the girls used to abstain from intercourse during and just after a menstrual period. Apparently the Masai were of the opinion that it was during the few days directly following the menstrual period that conception was most likely to occur. The abortifacient of the Masai was crude.

R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, ii. 25, remarks that among the Masai pre-nuptial children are so strictly debarred that a girl incurs the severest punishment, and even death, if she brings up a pre-nuptial child. He cites A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, p. 261, as his authority, but neither on that nor on any other page of Sir Claud Hollis's book can I find any passage which can be so interpreted. The statement is contradicted by the above quotations. For further comments on the work of R. Briffault, see nn. 112, 155, 163, 172, 421, and 470.


Both the Hindes and Thomson translate *ngai* as 'god', with either a small or a capital G. A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, passim, writes *engai* for *ngai*. His translations are eclectic, and usually, but not invariably, he employs a capital G for 'god'. The following references are to his *The Masai*:

(a) On p. 254 he renders *engai* as 'the heaven' and 'the rain', purely from context.

(b) The word 'god' is given a capital G on pp. 290, 349, a small g on p. 270; 'the God' is the rendering of *engai* on p. 346; on p. 249 the phrase *na-ai* is translated 'O-the-God'.

(c) On p. 264, *ngai* is given in a plural form, *ngaitin*, thus: *Enneikuma ngaitin. Eti ngaitin are: eti engai narok, netii: emanyokye, 'The story of the gods. There are two gods, a black god, and a red god.'

In (a) Sir Claud seems to have confused the meaning of the word with the phenomena to which it was applied. This is also the case in *Transactions of the Third Congress of the History of Religions* (Oxford, 1908), i. 88. In that passage Sir Claud calls *engai* 'the Masai rain-god'.

The plural form *ngaitin* in (c) seems to indicate that the word 'god' as a translation of *engai* cannot be spelt with the capital G. The so-called 'gods' in (c) have been described also by S. L. and H. Hinde, op. cit., p. 99 f., who mention a black *ngai* which was very good, a white *ngai* which was good, a blue *ngai* which was neither good nor bad, and a red *ngai* which was bad. Since black *ngai* was associated with rain (A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, p. 204; Sir Charles Eliot, in A. C. Hollis, op. cit., Introd., p. xix) the so-called 'gods' appear to have been descriptive terms for various forms of sky-activity.

Sir Charles Eliot, in A. C. Hollis, op. cit., Introd., p. xviii, considers that the form of the word *ngai* which Sir Claud Hollis adopted, *engai*, was the word *qi* with the feminine article prefixed. Sir Charles Eliot thinks that *ngai* was used by the Masai 'indefinitely and impersonally of remarkable natural phenomena'.

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536 NOTES AND REFERENCES §382
When we consider, in the light of the above inconsistencies and inaccuracies, the lack of scholarship which Sir Claud Hollis displays in his discussion of Nandi culture (para. 87), it is surprising to find him correcting other observers. In support of certain submissions which he made concerning the nature of religious conceptions, Dr. R. R. Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, p. 12, quoted the passage from Thomson to which I have referred. Sir Claud Hollis protested; Dr. Marett then wrote: 'The statement about *engai* derived from Joseph Thomson appears to be incorrect. Mr. Hollis informs me that *ngai* is a thoroughly anthropomorphic god, of much the same character as was the sky-god Zeus for the ancient world. Thomson, he thinks, must have misunderstood the Masai. They would never have alluded to his lamp, or to himself, as *engai*. It is possible that they said *e*’*nga-ai* or *endoki e*’*ngai*, ‘It is of God, it is something supernatural’.

Concerning this protest by Sir Claud Hollis, the following comments are appropriate:

1. If Sir Claud denies that the Masai called Thomson's lamp *ngai*, does he deny also the Hindes' report that the Masai called a railway-engine *ngai*? If so, we must consider whether the joint testimony of the Hindes and Thomson is greater or less than his. If he does not deny the Hindes' report, then wherein lies the difficulty in believing Thomson's statement?

2. If the phrase 'of God' is equivalent to 'something supernatural', wherein lies Sir Claud's difference with Thomson? The word 'supernatural', of course, must be interpreted as being relative to the mind of the Masai.

3. To maintain that *ngai* was 'of much the same character as was the sky-god Zeus for the ancient world' is to make a meaningless, dangerous, and unscholarly comparison. In the first place, the Athenians had no settled conception of Zeus; sometimes and by some people Zeus was conceived as a thunderbolt-hurling creature in the sky; Phidias represented Zeus as a majestic, contemplative divinity. If, then, *ngai* is compared with Zeus, the reader will select his own conception of Zeus and thus gain his own opinion of *ngai*. Secondly, the differences between Zeus and *ngai* are so great that a comparison can be made only by calling them both 'gods'. Zeus was honoured by temples; *ngai* was not. Zeus was at the head of a great pantheon, all of whom had temples; *ngai* was manifest only in those things which appeared supernatural to the Masai.

On the whole, there seems to be no reason for disallowing Thomson's report. Sir Claud Hollis's protest lacks point.

384. 'With the exception of the medicine-men and rich people, who are buried in shallow trenches, burial is unknown among the Masai' (A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, p. 246).


J. Thomson, *Through Masai-land*, pp. 440, 444, says that to bury a corpse would be to poison the soil. The skulls of the dead were denuded of flesh by hyenas and vultures, the survivors kicking them from their path when they encountered them. S. L. and H. Hinde, *The Last of the Masai*, p. 51, confirm the lack of burial. For other reports, see H. H. Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, ii. 828.

According to S. L. and H. Hinde, op. cit., p. 99, death was regarded as complete annihilation. The same report is made by A. C. Hollis, op. cit., p. 307. J. Thomson, op. cit., p. 438, says that the men who died in battle were 'commemorated by a dance and then forgotten'. For some reason which he does not relate, Dr. Leakey (op. cit., p. 206) is not satisfied concerning this lack of belief in a 'spirit' life.

A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, pp. 306-7, states that ‘whenever anybody passes the spot [burial place], he throws a stone on the heap and this is done for all time’. This stone-throwing may be compared to a similar action on the part of the Mafulu, who threw things when they passed a ‘spirit’ place, i.e. an ‘unusual’ place. See para. 75.

The Masai are said to have believed that the souls of medicine-men and rich men (i.e. those who were buried) passed into snakes. Is this report an inference from the fact that the word ngai was applied both to outstanding men and to some snakes? Has the meaning of ngai been confused with the phenomena to which it was applied?

385. See (1) S. L. and H. Hinde, *The Last of the Masai*, p. 31: ‘Lenana’s [a noted magician] knowledge of events is supposed by his people to be due to magic, or, as they call it, ngai.’

(2) J. Thomson, *Through Masai-land*, p. 444 f.: ‘They have faith in witchcraft, though the power of the medicine-man lies not in any innate power, but in his power of intercession with ngai.’

(3) A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, p. 334 f.: ‘When a Masai falls ill, it is said to be ngai’s (God’s) sickness.’

Spitting was regarded as a protection against affliction. If a magician dreamed that the cattle or the people were to be visited by a disease, he summoned the people to dance while he made medicine. See S. L. and H. Hinde, op. cit., pp. 44, 45, 47.

386. The usual method of making rain seems to have been that of sending the children out to sing and dance; there was also a charm, olokora, which old men threw into the fire in order to influence black ngai. See S. L. and H. Hinde, *The Last of the Masai*, p. 102 (for rain-making through children); A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, pp. 345, n. 1, 347–8 (for rain-making through children and olokora).


For the freedom of royal females (daughters of the ruling ‘king’) among the Baganda, Bakitara, and Dahomans, see J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, p. 85; idem, *The Bakitara*, p. 171; A. B. Ellis, *The Expressive Peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa*, p. 204. I should have expected to find the same custom among the Banyankole, but in his monograph on that society Canon Roscoe does not mention it. In the reports on the Bakitara there are some apparent contradictions in regard to the bearing of children by the ‘princesses’. Cp. J. Roscoe, *The Bakitara*, pp. 136, 143, 171, and idem, *The Northern Bantu*, p. 136.

The extension of sexual freedom to the females of the ruling clan has been mentioned in a different context by Sir J. G. Frazer, in *G.B.*, *The Magic Art*, ii. 276 f., who gives examples from other parts of Africa.

It seems probable that the sexual freedom was the outcome of an injunction against marriage and that the latter was connected with disputes in regard to the succession to the kingship. This at any rate was the idea behind a similar prohibition in the Later Roman Empire, where in the seventh century the daughters of an emperor who had sons were not allowed to marry. After the time of Constantine IV the same rule was extended to younger sons of the emperor.


Mr. Sheane contrasts two forms of marriage, *chisungu* and *bwinga*; the former was a ‘temporary loan of a woman removeable at will by her clan’; *bwinga* implied her complete surrender to her husband. It seems possible that *chisungu* was matrilocal and *bwinga* patrilocal. Perhaps Mr. Sheane was prevented from making an explicit declaration to that effect because he compared *chisungu* and *bwinga* to the Roman *conubium* and *confarreatio*. The comparison is invalid. For Roman marriage customs, see para. 171.

Mr. Sheane states (op. cit., p. 141) that ‘chastity was an unknown quantity in young girls over fifteen years of age’. This means nothing more than that pre-nuptial chastity was not demanded. Mr. Sheane does not state what limitations were imposed on the pre-nuptial freedom, although it is clear that such limitations existed. He was much impressed by the lack of ‘morality’.


(2) C. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane, *The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia*, pp. 80–1: ‘The cult of Leza is outside their ordinary religion: there is no direct access to him by prayer or by sacrifices.’ How, then, can it be said that there was a ‘cult’ of Leza?


In the latter passage, the phrase: ‘*milungu* who approximate closely to “nature spirits” . . .’ is followed by the declaration: ‘*milungu* being nature spirits . . .’. In this manner many inferences have assumed the appearance of facts.

J. H. W. Sheane, in op. cit., p. 194, uses *milungu* in a plural context. This suggests that the plurality existed only in the mind of the white man.

392. The reports concerning Mulenga are scanty. He is said to have had the power to grant abundant rain and plenteous harvests. This may be an inference from the fact that sometimes the absence of rain and a failure of the crops were ascribed to his malevolence. In one passage *mulenga* has been called ‘the god of the Rinder pest’; in another, ‘the Azrael of the Wemba’. See J. H. W. Sheane, ‘Some Aspects of the Awamba Religion and Superstitious Observances’, *J.A.I.* xxxvi (1906), p. 151 f.; C. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane, *The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia*, pp. 81–2, 126–7. The statements are not helpful.


The native name for the hut is not given in the description of the burial ceremonies. It may have been *mafbua*, which is translated ‘little god-hut’ in op. cit., p. 26, and ‘ghost-hut’ in op. cit., p. 83.

Although all ‘departed chiefs’ seem to have been buried in *Mwarudi*, a literal acceptance of all the appropriate statements would make us conclude that the honour was paid only to ‘kings’. The employment of native terms would have avoided these uncertainties.

We are told (op. cit., p. 83) that ‘the aid of the departed chiefs was evoked (*sic*) in time of war, in periods of drought, and special offerings were made at their shrines at harvest time’. The rites which are described were all *do ut aebra*. The reports, however, are scanty. The public character of the rites is emphasized, but I can find no explicit case in which the chiefly *mipashi* were tended by any one who was not of chiefly descent.

Were the *ba muka benye*, ‘priestesses of the departed chiefs’ (op. cit., p. 23), the
women who remained to tend the hut? They are mentioned again in op. cit., p. 83, in a most remarkable passage.

A certain class of women, *mfumu ya mipashi*, became 'possessed' in the usual manner; their ecstatic ravings were interpreted by the *basinganya*, 'medicine-men' (n. 395). They are called 'Possessed Chieftainesses of the Spirit'. The translation is misleading, for apparently *mipashi* was a plural word. We are not told the identity of the 'spirit' by whom they were possessed. The fact of possession and not the identity of the possessing spirit seems to have been responsible for their divinatory power. The reports are scanty. See C. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane, op. cit., pp. 54, 83; J. H. W. Sheane, 'Some Aspects of the Awemba Religion and Superstitious Observances', *J.A.I*. xxxvi (1906), p. 152.

It will be noticed that in the former work *mfumu ya mipashi* is translated both masculine and feminine, 'chiefs' and 'chieftainesses', and that in the latter paper the Bantu form is *mfumu shya mipashi*.

394. The attenuated passage in C. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane, *The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia*, pp. 84-5, is the sum of our knowledge, but the following sentence is tucked away in op. cit., p. 114: 'If the ghost of a deceased relative proves obnoxious, they dig up and burn the body to cancel the power of the spirit.'

Clearly the 'short ejaculatory prayers', 'usually couched in a set formula', were incantations. It would be interesting to know if their content had any relation to the subject on hand. These incantations are submitted as evidence of 'ancestor-worship'; but it is inadmissible. See my comments (para. 81) on reports of 'ancestor-worship' in Africa. The 'ancestor-spirits' mentioned in op. cit., p. 59, seem to have been the ghosts of great men, or those of members of the 'royal' clans.


According to J. H. W. Sheane, op. cit., p. 155, 'most of the old people pretended to be *basinganga*'. There is no report of any exorcism or transference. The *nganga* divined the cause of affliction and applied simple remedies, which were reinforced by the use of amulets and charms. See also C. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane, op. cit., pp. 23, 54, 83-5, 119-20, 285, 306.

We are told that no one except a *nganga* could make fire. This may mean that only old people could do so, since most old people claimed to be *basinganga*.

The information concerning *waloshi* (*mlozi*, *walozi*) will be found in the above-mentioned passages.

396. The steps which may be taken to create rain must always be distinguished from the steps which are taken to conciliate a power which is withholding the rain. Only the latter have been reported of the Awemba. See the passages cited in n. 393.

The casual mention of rain in C. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane, *The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia*, p. 23, is misleading, unless it is read in conjunction with those passages.


But what happened if an initiated but unbetrothed girl became pregnant? Perhaps most of the girls were betrothed at an early age. 'In cases of inconvenient pregnancy', we are told, 'resort is often had to abortifacients.'

The Baila sexual regulations were remarkable for some post-nuptial arrangements which possibly are unique among Bantu tribes. There was a covenant of friendship, *mulongo*, whereby men voluntarily swore brotherhood and shared every-
thing which they possessed, including the sexual qualities of their wives. The arrangement was of a purely private character and was sealed sometimes by mutual blood-letting. Ibid. i. 368.

Another extra-matrimonial sexual relationship was lubambo, 'an arranged thing': all the married men and women seem to have entered into lubambo alliances; the partnerships were made publicly at a great annual festival. No Ila husband objected to these arrangements unless he had reason to think that his wife intended to leave him and to live permanently with another man. Ibid. ii. 67–9.

In addition to these customs, the habits of wife-lending and of wife-exchange prevailed; these were temporary accommodations rather than permanent alliances, and are not unique.

A man could live with an unmarried woman and eat her food, even though he had paid no price for her. In that case he could not leave her; he was her slave. Ibid. i. 403.

Messrs. Smith and Dale emphasize the great part which sex played in the life of a Baila. Doubtless the mulongo and lubambo customs were partly responsible for this 'pervasive element', for the Baila pre-nuptial regulations were more stringent than those of many other tribes. Their post-nuptial customs, however, afforded a post-nuptial sexual opportunity which could not have been easily extended.

See further n. 399.

398. Ibid. ii. 120 (for mabwabwa), 164–8 (for mizhimo), 173 (for 'sacred spots' in the family hut).


When I was studying Messrs. Smith and Dale's monograph, I was struck by the fact that in many details Baluba culture was higher than that of the Baila. I asked Mr. Smith whether the sexual regulations of the two societies were different. He replied: 'I do not know much about the Baluba, but I believe their regulation of sex relations was more strict than among the Baila. Whether the regulations among the Baila have become looser in course of time is, I think, impossible to say definitely. It is so difficult to ascertain what the state of things was fifty years ago.'

A reliable monograph on the Baluba would be a valuable addition to our knowledge.


Malumba is said to have been a great wonder-worker whose parents came from the east. Apparently Mungama was a powerful chief of a more mundane character; he created large cities. Shimunenga, whose position at Kasenga was shared by a female mizhimo, Nachilomwe, was their contemporary; he 'came from the north somewhere'.

401. Ibid. ii. 166, 169, 175–7.

The commonest offering was water; the person filled his mouth and then spat: 'A gentle expectoration, tsu, is an accompaniment of an offering, or an offering in itself, to the divinities' (ibid. ii. 174). This 'gentle expectoration' was a custom also among the Baronga. M. Junod calls it a 'famous sacramental rite'. See para. 93, n. 408.

If they were neglected on earth, old people might say: 'You people neglect me, you do not bring me water and food as you ought; when I am dead I will come back and trouble you.' See, e.g., op. cit. ii. 115 f.; and compare a similar threat by an Ashanti (n. 467), and by the Fijian kalou-vu, Ndengei (para. 34).


The kwanga was a mysterious institution. Messrs. Smith and Dale call it 'the
village altar'. Usually it consisted of a long many-pronged pole on which charms were hung. Cp. the Ronga sikonola (n. 408) and the Ashanti nyame dua (n. 462).

Another 'sacred spot' was the gateway through which the cattle were driven. Both the kwanga and the gateway are said to have been connected with mizhimo, but the appropriate facts have been reported scantily. The kwanga seems to have been connected also with the museliakae, 'namesake' (op. cit. ii. 156), and with a successful hunt (op. cit. ii. 172). It would be interesting to know whether it was associated also with leza or with musamo.

Some Ila 'chiefs' were buried in their huts. The huts were kept in repair for a little time and afterwards were replaced by others, smaller and flimsier (op. cit. ii. 171).

The Baila made no images of mizhimo, but in the north-eastern area, where the Baluba influence was considerable, a chief possessed in the middle of his village a hut which was sacred to his mizhimo; he kept his property there and the mizhimo guarded it for him. The hut was taboo to ordinary people; it contained two images about 10 inches high. Ibid. ii. 169 f.

403. Ibid. ii. 186–9.

Shimunenga is the only greater mizhimo concerning whom Messrs. Smith and Dale give any details. The manner in which the sacred grove was formed should be noticed by those who consider that the members of some historical societies connected such a place with sylvan 'spirits' or 'nature-spirits' of a similar character. See para. 148.

The dual character of the staff (custodian and medium) is noteworthy. Cp. the dual priesthood of the Baganda and of the Tongans (nn. 130, 209).

Shimunenga is called 'Giver of Virility to men' (op. cit. ii. 189), but I cannot find any rite which was 'cult'. The offerings of seeds prior to the sowing season (op. cit. ii. 188) may have been a method of anticipating anger by an early conciliation. We are told (op. cit. ii. 167) that a ghost had some power 'that a living man has not', but the remark is made in reference to the family dead. Clearly the attention which was paid to them was do ut ahea.

I notice (op. cit. ii. 184) that mizhimo were manifest also in large trees, especially in fig-trees. Cp. the application of jok, ngai and mulungu to fig-trees by the Lango (n. 356), Akikuyu (n. 362), Akamba (para. 86), and Wayao (n. 437). Cp. also the wakan-trees of the Dakota Indians (n. 522) and the manido-trees of the Ojibwa Indians (para. 113).

Bulongo is a subject on which Messrs. Smith and Dale express their doubts and uncertainties. Apparently he was connected only with rain. Ibid. ii. 192–6.

404. Ibid. ii. 197–212 (for leza, but inference must be subtracted from fact), 80, 88 (for the quotations).

For further comments on leza, see nn. 390, 405, 409.

With musamo Messrs. Smith and Dale compare electricity, but is this a valid comparison? Musamo may not have been all-pervasive; its alleged omnipresence may be an inference, and possibly a false one, from the fact that it was manifest in strange, unusual things. See para. 148.

Everything in which musamo appeared was tonda, 'dangerous'. See op. cit. i. 346 ff.

405. Sickness might be due to (1) witchcraft, (2) breaking a taboo, tonda, (3) ghost. (3) is an intricate subject, for no less than four native words of various meanings have been translated by the same English word; the evidence in their connexion is scanty: (1) bapuka, 'ghosts of the living men', seem to have been able to penetrate the ear, (2) chizea (pl. mazwa) was 'pressed' into the service of a mulozhi, wizard, even when its owner was alive, (3) kayobela (pl. tuyobela) seems
to have been a chizwa which chirped like a bird, (4) mutalu was applied to the ghost of a specially aggrieved person. See E. W. Smith and A. M. Dale, Ila-speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia, i. 244; ii. 132.

For the banganga, basozhi, and baloshi, see op. cit. i. 265–80; ii. 83. The banganga extracted properties which were contained in plants and other things, and put them to beneficient or maleficient purposes.

Concerning leza the following notes are appropriate:

(1) Virulent diseases or plagues were ascribed to leza (op. cit. ii. 232).
(2) Leza was associated with leprosy (op. cit. ii. 245).
(3) When offerings to the mizhimo did not procure the desired result ‘direct access was sought to leza’ (op. cit. ii. 210).
(4) Death was applied to leza (op. cit. i. 266).

If we were to tabulate the phenomena with which leza was associated or to which the term leza was applied, it is probable that we should be able to submit a hypothesis in regard to leza which would be more acceptable than those which have been submitted hitherto.

The offering to leza in op. cit. i. 168 may have been confused with the offerings which were made on the same occasion to mizhimo. The association of the two words in an incantation may have caused the confusion. This is the only recorded example of an offering to leza which I can find.

For further comments on leza, see nn. 390, 409.

If we may judge from op. cit. i. 222 ff., the Baita possessed a very considerable store of anatomical knowledge; or it may be that we know more about the Baita than we do about other societies and that if we knew as much about the others we might find that they were equipped in a similar manner.

406. Ibid. ii. 208.

There were charms to prevent rain, misamo ya leza (op. cit. i. 255). Cp. Ronga maringo ya tilo (para. 93).

There was a certain bush, kamwaya, with which rain could be dispersed if it came too much (op. cit. ii. 86).

‘The rain may be prevented from falling by those who have the proper medicine and released by others with more powerful stuff’ (op. cit. ii. 221).

All these rites imply a magical control of sky-activity.


M. Junod mentions a tribe, the Pedi, whose pre-nuptial regulations were different from those of the Baronga. Among the Pedi, he says, ‘girls are absolutely prohibited from having any sexual relation before their marriage. They must keep absolutely pure. In some clans they must even undergo a physical examination at the hands of the old female relatives of the husband to prove their virginity.’

Apparently the information was hearsay, perhaps also inferential, and this casual report must be confirmed before it can be accepted. Various references to Pedi customs are scattered throughout M. Junod’s book. Their culture appears to have differed in many ways from that of the Baronga. Most of the statements, however, are second-hand. We must remember that there is always a danger of a demand for pre-nuptial chastity being inferred from a condemnation of pre-nuptial pregnancy, but the report as to the tokens seems definite, though ‘some clans’ is vague.


Many questions arise from the study of these pages. The following comments, which might be extended, are appropriate:

(1) In op. cit. ii. 372, shikwembe (pl. psikwembe) seems to have been an entity which only came into existence when a man died; in op. cit. i. 140, however, we are told that a corpse was never tied up ‘because the shikwembe would not be able
to escape'. This not only conflicts with a passage in op. cit. ii. 172; it also suggests that the *shikwembu* was in the living body, escaping at death. Perhaps the second statement does not represent Aronga opinion; it may be an inference on the part of M. Junod.

(2) From a single photograph (op. cit. i. 141) I conclude that sometimes a round hut was erected over a grave. I can find no reference to these huts in the text of M. Junod's book. Yet they are (or would be) an important cultural item. In the case to which the illustration refers, the man was an exorcist. No huts were erected over the graves of chiefs in the forest *ntimu*, burial ground. See op. cit. ii. 377.

(3) The *psikwembu* which were especially feared were the *psikwembu* of persons killed in battle or by wild beasts, of drowned people, of suicides, and of pregnant women who had been buried with their unborn children in their wombs. According to M. Junod the great fear of them was due to the fact that they had not been buried in due form. M. Junod (op. cit. ii. 374–5) calls them 'gods of the assegais', 'gods of bitterness', 'gods of the bush', &c. Such exaggerated phraseology is misleading.

(4) We are told (op. cit. ii. 384) that the Baronga 'gods' 'revealed themselves in the form of animals, especially snakes.' The intention to appear, however, may not have been a part of the Ronga conception. It is more usual to say that ghosts were transferred to animals; possibly it would be more accurate to say that the same native term was applied to the dead and to some snakes. The same word *shikwembu* is translated both as 'ancestor' and as 'god' in op. cit. ii. 396.

(5) When M. Junod declares that the gods 'blessed' and 'cursed', he seems to mean that in some cases affliction was attributed to *psikwembu*. That *psikwembu* also conferred blessings seems to be an inference from the fact that sometimes they were alleged to have hindered the *balayi*, wizards, from spoiling the crops. See op. cit. ii. 386. But does the latter remark apply to any *shikwembu* except the *shikwembu* of a *mungoma*?

(6) M. Junod continually speaks of the 'priest'. Moreover, there is an entry 'Priest, Priesthood', in the index of his book. Yet in ii. 141, we read 'there was no sacerdotal caste; the right of officiating is strictly confined to the eldest brother'.

(7) Clearly the 'prayer', *bakutjela*, 'in which the officiant says the same thing over and over again' (op. cit. ii. 421) was an incantation. For M. Junod's phrase 'extremely liturgical' (e.g. op. cit. ii. 427), read 'magical'. More information is required concerning the contexts in which the words *khongota* and *bulabulela* were employed.

(8) The habit of spitting was indulged also by the Baila (n. 401), but Messrs. Smith and Dale do not call the action (*tsi*) a 'sacramental rite'. To them it was merely a 'gentle expectoration'.

The forked branch of the tree, *nkonola*, where a magician sometimes made his offerings, may be compared to the Ila *tevanga* (n. 402) and to the Ashanti *nyame duia* (n. 462). The place where an ordinary man made his offering was behind his hut, inside it, at the door, in a wood, in the bush, or in any other place which was indicated by the divinatory bones, *bula*. See op. cit. ii. 389–90.

I am not satisfied that all the 'sacrifices' which are mentioned in op. cit. ii. 393–5 were made to *psikwembu*, 'ghosts', and I am not convinced that the word *shikwembu* was not used in reference to other phenomena also.

The 'special family sacrifices' were made only in cases of sickness. The 'typical' examples in op. cit. ii. 396–7 show that these rites also were tendance, e.g. 'You are useless. You only give us trouble.' The so-called 'national' sacrifices, which appear to have been offerings which a chief made to his own ancestors, were of a similar character, e.g. if the harvest was threatened, the natives thought, 'perhaps the masters of the country are angry'. If the rain was normal and punctual, nothing was done; but if it was late, then *psikwembu* were tended (op. cit. ii. 405).
When a man cried, 'Here is some tobacco. Come all of you and take a pinch, and do not be angry with me when I sniff, nor say that I deprive you of your share,' he seems to confuse the one and the many (para. 67); but clearly the bones, *bula*, could reveal the identity of the ghost which was the cause of the trouble. See op. cit. ii. 389.

Part of the slaughtered animal was attached to the person on whose behalf it had been offered (op. cit. ii. 417). Presumably it was regarded as a charm.

409. See H. A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, ii. 395, 428-47, 519. These pages are a good example of romantic interpretation, the opinions of the natives being expressed in the terms of the white man's philosophy. Even when M. Junod stated that sickness and death were due to *tilo*, 'Heaven' (i.e. in Ronga opinion, the solid blue sky), it does not seem to have occurred to him that he was confusing the meaning of the word with one of the phenomena to which it was applied. See further n. 410. His essay in comparative anthropology in op. cit. ii. 446 is misleading.

There is some uncritical repetition of M. Junod's inferences in J. G. Frazer, *The Worship of Nature*, pp. 89-315. I am not clear what exact meanings are attached to the words 'worship' and 'god' in those pages. It is impossible to accept Sir James's descriptions as an accurate reflection of native thought. The native words have been translated by English equivalents which are used in many other senses than those which may have represented the native term in some of its contexts; then the natives have been credited with the 'beliefs' represented by these additional meanings. Inference has been piled upon inference, and the result has little relation to the opinions of the natives as they are described in the works to which Sir James refers his readers.

I have only mentioned the volume because there is a danger that the author's illustrious name might infuse with life the dead weight of its contents and thus promote the inferences into facts. In the tribes which I have studied I have found no trace of 'nature-worship' in any form, actual or implied.

See further n. 624.

The word *tilo* was used by the Baronga in many contexts in which the Baila use the word *leza*, for which see nn. 390, 405.

With the *maringo ya tilo*, cp. the Baila *misamo ya leza* (n. 406).

410. H. A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, ii. 195, 320. I suggest that the alleged 'connexion' between abnormal births of human beings and the rainfall was due to the fact that the Baronga applied the same word *tilo* to each of them. By translating *tilo* as 'Heaven', M. Junod has limited, even changed, its native meaning. The sky was only one of the many phenomena to which the word was applied.

The *psikweembali* are said (op. cit. ii. 316) to have been responsible for the rain. The opinion may be an inference from the fact that *psikweembali* of chiefs were tended if the rain was late. *Psikweembali* were not held responsible for the regular supply of rain, only for an interference with that supply. See also n. 408.

We are told that in time of drought the Baronga 'beat the graves with sticks'. It would be interesting to know whether these graves were the recognized graves of evil wizards or powerful rain-makers. Wizards, we are told, could prevent rain (op. cit. ii. 316).

A black ram, and even a human being, constituted the sacrifice, if a sacrifice was made (op. cit. ii. 316, 405, 415).

411. For the whole subject, see H. A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, i. 451-572. The criticisms made in n. 408 apply also to these pages.
NOTES AND REFERENCES §412

In op. cit. ii. 505, 516, M. Junod states that the power of the balotl was 'not essentially different' and 'at bottom of the same nature' as that of the mungoma. Are we to understand, then, that a mungoma indulged in anti-social practices?

I doubt if the word 'exorcism' can be used in reference to the Baronga practices. It is not permissible to apply the term to a rite which consisted of waving a palm-leaf in front of the sufferer and of washing him with a foamy liquid.

The nocturnal activities of the balotl may be compared to those of the Trobriand Islands mulikweasi and other wizards and witches, for whom see nn. 301, 336.

To a Muronga noti was manifest also in will-o'-the-wisps and shimmering lights in the marsh. This may be compared to the opinions of some New Guinea tribes (e.g. the Mafulu, para. 75).

M. Junod's consistent uncertainties in regard to psikwezhu render impossible an intelligent understanding of the Ronga rites. Cp. n. 408.

A man who became a recognized mungoma as the result of 'possession' was admitted into the magical fraternity: 'He starts new rites, discovers more powerful drugs and so attracts patients to himself from all parts' (op. cit. ii. 500). This explicit assurance of individual invention is important. The baigona- and taro-cults of Papua were also the spontaneous inventions of individuals. See paras. 79, 80, and n. 632.

The tabulated list of magical practitioners in op. cit. ii. 518 is misleading if I am right in thinking that both a shinusa, 'smeller-out', and a babula, 'bone-thrower', were also mungoma. According to a passage in op. cit. ii. 385, a diviner (babula?) claimed to have received his power from a dead relative.

It is interesting, and possibly important (but only a Bantu scholar could assess the value of the evidence), that the Ronga word for a magician, muu-ngoma, was a compound of the same word as the Akikuyu employed in reference to the dead and confused with ngai. See para. 85. Cp. also the Zulu angoma (n. 420).

The word mhambo is obscure. It was applied to (i) the twig which was placed in a dead man's hand when he was buried (op. cit. i. 142); (ii) the offerings of drink, &c., which were made to psikwezhu (op. cit. ii. 396); (iii) the equipment which was used in approaching psikwezhu (op. cit. ii. 412); (iv) the preserved nails and hair-clippings of deceased chiefs (op. cit. ii. 406).


The manner in which the father of a girl would beat off, and even kill, any young man who visited his daughter at night is related by J. Shooter, The Kaflrs of Natal and the Zulu Country, pp. 51-5.

When Chaka reorganized the Amazulu in order to create a more efficient military machine, he forbade the young warriors to marry. He is also said to have enforced celibacy, 'from an idea that sexual enjoyments relaxed the animal spirits'. See, e.g., N. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa, ii. 306. It is impossible to estimate the effect which these reforms exercised upon the sexual opportunity of the natives.

Mr. R. U. Sayce has drawn my attention to an anonymous letter in the South African Outlook, 1 May 1930, which says that it was customary among the Zulus to assemble all the young women and to examine them as to their chastity, and that the custom was abolished by the missionaries.

The writer does not state whether this virginity-test was one of Chaka's innovations.


Father Bryant translates each of these words as 'ancestral spirit'. Bishop
Callaway says that they were applied not to the living man but to ‘a new and distinct existence which comes out of the body when dead’. He includes isitunzi in this category, but according to Father Bryant isitunzi denoted the living principle in a man.

Apparently the natives used itongo only in reference to ghosts, idhlozi being applied also to certain snakes. Isituta seems to have been rare.

See also n. 414.

414. See J. Shooter, The Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country, p. 162; D. Leslie, Among the Zulus and the Amatongas, p. 47 (who calls the snake ehlose in an anglicized transliteration); H. Callaway, The Religious System of the Amazulu, pp. 135, 196, who says: ‘The snakes into which men turn are not many; they are distinct and well known.’

Clearly, in the former of the above-cited passages from Bishop Callaway’s book, the native informant was so confused by the Bishop’s questions that he made an attempt to rationalize the subject.

Dead chiefs and commoners were not manifest in the same kind of snake; dead chiefs were manifest in some species, dead commoners in other species. Bishop Callaway tells of the identity of these species.

D. Leslie, op. cit., pp. 48, 138, 147–8, speaks of an ehlose as a ‘guardian spirit’, and some contexts suggest that by ehlose the native was denoting something other than a snake or a ghost. Possibly the full purport of the word has not been fully understood. If we translate it as ‘ghost’, we may confuse the meaning of the word with one of the phenomena to which it was applied. The word mulungu (paras. 86, 92, 98) meant ‘good luck’ as well as being applied to ‘something unusual’ and ‘the dead’. The contexts in which, according to Leslie, the word idhlozi (ehlose) was used by the Amazulu seem to have been of a somewhat similar character.


Shooter gives examples of the words which accompanied a sacrifice: ‘Eat ye: here is your ox. Eat my father, my grandfather, all the spirits of my ancestors . . .’, &c. The ‘thank-offering for prosperity’ was, of course, a form of tendance.

If the animal made a noise when it was slaughtered, success was assured; if it died quietly, it was doubtful whether the sacrifice was accepted or not. Thus a goat was a favourite offering, for a goat was not silent; a sheep was not used because a sheep ‘is foolish and makes no noise’. See H. Callaway, op. cit., pp. 143, 177, n. 39.

The Amazulu do not appear to have taken themselves seriously, for sometimes a man would say that he had dreamt of an ancestor in order that he might have a good meal: ‘People are now very fond of meat, and a man says he has dreamed of the idhlozi, and forsooth he says so because he would eat meat’ (H. Callaway, op. cit., p. 173).

Scholars who attempt to derive all ‘gods’ from ‘nature-spirits’, and who emphasize the importance of so-called fertility cults, may be referred to J. Shooter, op. cit., pp. 245, 247, where the titles ‘Over-Ruling Spirit of Vegetation’, ‘Female Elephant with Small Breasts’, ‘Great Mother of Earth and Corn’ are quoted as having been applied to the mother of Chaka.

Scholars who concentrate their attention on beliefs rather than on rites have promoted into anthropological prominence the Zulu conception of an alleged ‘Supreme Being’, unkulunkulu. The subject has been discussed at length by H. Callaway, op. cit., pp. 1–104. Literally the term seems to have meant ‘Great great'.
The following comments are appropriate:

(1) When A. F. Gardiner, *Narrative of a Journey to the Zoolu Country*, p. 283, asked a native about the creation of the world, the following conversation took place:

Gardiner. Have you any knowledge of the power by whom the world was made?

When you see the sun rising and setting and the trees growing, do you know

who made them and who governs them?

Tpai. No. We see them, but cannot tell how they came. We suppose they come

of themselves.

Gardiner. To whom do you attribute your success or your failure in war?

Tpai. When we are unsuccessful and do not take cattle, we think that our father

has not looked on us.

Gardiner. Do you think that your father's spirit made the world?

Tpai. No.

Thus when Gardiner was in that part of Zululand to which this passage refers,

the conception of a 'Supreme Being' did not exist.

Parenthetically, the phrase 'We suppose they come of themselves' militates

strongly against the Tylorian theory of 'primitive' thought. Cp. the Suto phrase

quoted in n. 423. Tylor suggested that 'spirits' were 'personified causes' of natural

phenomena. See also paras. 62, 146.

(2) Concerning another group of Amazulu, Gardiner remarks (op. cit., p. 314):

'They acknowledged a traditional account of a Supreme Being called *Ookoolukoolu*,

but know nothing further respecting him.' D. Leslie, op. cit., p. 149, also says

that the ideas concerning the 'big one of all' were 'confused'.

H. Callaway, op. cit., p. 32, states that each household possessed its own *un-

kulunkulu*. Thus the application of the same word by different people to their

respective forefathers seems to have caused some of the early travellers to promote

a common descriptive term to the status of an entity. Later this entity was identified

with the Christian God.

(3) According to Bishop Callaway (i.e.), *unkulunkulu* denoted the oldest ancestor

who could be remembered. The natives said, 'The first of our family was *unk-

kulunkulu*, and referred to their great-grandfathers. Thus three generations

appears to have been the limit of Zulu memory.

(4) It was the custom among the early travellers to search for some knowledge

of 'the one true God'. Thus J. Shooter, op. cit., pp. 159–61, remarks: 'The great

tradition of the Great-great is not universally known among the people. War,

change, and the worship of false deities have gradually darkened their minds and

obscured their remembrance of the one true God.' In this case, however, the

expression 'the one true God' is definitely inapplicable. H. Callaway, op. cit.,

pp. 20–1, explicitly informs us that this was not the Zulu conception; the Amazulu

took pains to point out to him the heavenly king to whom he introduced them was

not their *unkulunkulu*. Thus Shooter's suggestion that the Zulu idea was the relic

of an original revelation of God to mankind in general is invalidated.

In later times the word *unkulunkulu* was used by the missionaries to denote the

Christian God. Father A. T. Bryant, *A Zulu-English Dictionary*, p. 758, says,

'Unkulunkulu'—The Great-great ancestor or ancestral spirit who is supposed to

have made most of the things round about' (cp. (1)) 'hence adopted by the mission-

aries to express God, Creator'.

Thus, even if we admit that (a) native 'beliefs' can be studied scientifically, (b)

the phrase 'Supreme Being' is sufficiently exact to be accepted as a category into

which some of those 'beliefs' can be classified, the alleged Zulu 'Supreme Being'

cannot be included in that category.

For comments on the 'Supreme Beings' of some other uncivilized societies,

According to Gibson MS. iv. 3, and H. Callaway, op. cit., pp. 69, 105, the (Ama-Xosa?) word *tixo* (*utikxo*) was used by some missionaries in the same sense as that in which *unkulunkulu* was employed by other Christians.

H. Callaway, op. cit., pp. 12–15, mentions an interesting word, *unsondo*, which I have been unable to find in Father Bryant’s dictionary. *Unsondo* was applied (1) to any man ‘who does a wonderful thing which other men cannot do’, (2) to the hardness of very stuborn soil, (3) to excessive rain, (4) to handsome men and women, (5) apparently to anything superlative or unusual.


417. The following passage is from Gibson MS. ii. 2:

‘I have understood that spiritual survival is restricted to chiefs and heads of families. Their place of dwelling is that at which the body was buried which contained them while it lived, but they are capable of being conveyed through the performance of certain rites to the place where a new home is established, and when this has been done the burial place loses its sacredness. This was done in the case of the Zulu king, Tshaka, in whose grave at the village of Shangar in Natal the people have ceased to be interested. His spirit was translated to the Dukuza Kraal on its re-establishment in the valley of the White Umfolozi more than a hundred miles distant.’

According to A. F. Gardiner, *Narrative of a Journey through the Zoolu Country*, p. 96, no altar was used when the king propitiated the *itongo* of his immediate ancestor: ‘No ceremony of any kind is observed. The bullock is killed within the cattle fold, contrary to the ordinary practice, and the flesh is cooked and partaken of in that very spot.’

The Amazulu did not bury all their dead. According to J. Macdonald, ‘Manners, Customs, Superstitions and Religions of South African Tribes’, *J.A.I.* xix (1890), p. 275, only chiefs were buried. J. Shooter, *The Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country*, pp. 240–1, says that every one was buried except dependents and those who had been executed by the king’s orders, chiefs being interred with their heads above ground.

The most complete statement concerning Zulu burial customs comes from N. Isaacs, *Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa*, ii. 315: ‘When a man dies the body is dragged on the ground by his wife or mother or nearest female relation to the thickets or jungles where it becomes a repast for wolves and other wild animals. When, however, a principal chief, or the king, dies, he is interred in the hut in which he breathes his last. A deep hole is dug, and the body put into it, standing erect, with the head out of the ground. The hut is fenced round and people are stationed day and night to guard it for twelve moons. These are the only funeral rites.’


Our authorities use the words ‘prophet’ and ‘seer’ very loosely, and I do not think that they have distinguished carefully between the *nyanga* and the *angoma*. Perhaps the *angoma* was *nyanga*. See further n. 420.

According to D. Leslie, op. cit., p. 120, a wizard could raise the dead; the newly raised ghost was called *esenhofu* and assisted the wizard in his anti-social practices.

Macdonald adds that 'anything unusual is an excuse for calling the magician'.

J. Shooter, op. cit., p. 353, states that the magic arts were hereditary. Even if a young son were taught the recipes, the eldest son would obtain the fees that his brother earned.

When we read (J. Y. Gibson, *The Story of the Zulus*, p. 91) that Sobuza cried to the dying Dingana, 'Dingana, are you still the rain-maker? Are you still the greatest of living men?' I do not think we may conclude that the Zulu kings were rain-makers. If men like Chaka and Dingana declared they could control the elements, they meant that they were lords of all the world. At any rate I think it would be rash to draw any further conclusion.

420. That people who were subject to fits were feared greatly is stated by J. Shooter, *The Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country*, p. 238. Shooter ascribes (e.g. op. cit., pp. 167, 191, 195) to such a 'seer' or 'prophet' all the powers which according to the authorities cited in n. 418 were possessed by a nyanga. On the other hand, A. T. Bryant, *A Zulu-English Dictionary*, s.v. angoma, seems to regard a 'possessed' man as distinct in practice and ability. So also the Gibson MS. ii. 2, in which the Zulu word is ngoma.

In his *The Story of the Zulus*, p. 80, Mr. Gibson translates izangoma 'witch-doctors'. Similarly Father Bryant calls the angoma 'necromancer, so-called witch-doctor'. Father Bryant adds that inyanga is 'another title' of the isangoma. The vague use of the English word 'witch-doctor' may be responsible for these confusions. Possibly nyanga was the general and angoma the particular term. Cp. n. 418.

Is the root of angoma the same as that from which the Ronga mungoma was derived? Is it related also to the Akikuya ngoma? Cp. n. 411.


R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, iii. 339, cites an obscure German authority for stating that 'among the Basutos so long as a girl is not pregnant, she is "in order"'. This seems to support the suggestion I have made in the text. R. Briffault, op. cit. ii. 5 n., also cites Mr. Mabille as his authority for stating that pre-nuptial sexual freedom prevailed among the Basutos. This citation is eclectic and misleading.

For other comments on the work of R. Briffault, see nn. 112, 155, 163, 172, 382, and 470.

An anonymous writer to the *South African Outlook*, 1 May 1930, to whose letter Mr. R. U. Sayce has drawn my attention, states that the lobola cattle were returned to the groom's people if it was found that the girl was not a virgin.

422. In the main I have relied on the Dutton MS., esp. iv. 3-6; v. 3.

According to E. Casalis, *The Basutos*, pp. 248-50, each family was under the influence of its own ancestors and the people sought only to avoid trouble. Casalis adds that 'the tribe, taken as a whole, acknowledges for its national gods the ancestors of the reigning sovereign'. But can we take the tribe 'as a whole'? Who was the 'reigning sovereign'? Casalis (l.c.) states that the object of the ancestral rites was 'to avoid trouble'; thus they come under the heading of tendance. Similarly, J. Macdonald, *Manners, Customs, Superstitions and Religions of South
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African Tribes', *J.A.I.* xix (1890), p. 276, states that war, peace, disease, drought, floods, cold, heat, pestilence, sterility, fecundity 'and almost every event and circumstance' were traced directly or indirectly to the ancestral spirits.

E. Casalis, op. cit., p. 248, tries to show that the word *molimo* 'is by no means of heathen origin': 'It is evidently composed', he says, 'of the prefix *mo*, which belongs to almost all those words representing intelligent beings, and of the word *holimo*, above, in the sky. *Moholimo*, or the abbreviation *molimo*, therefore, signifies 'He who is in the sky'.' Even if this were so, the argument is valueless, for the Basuto used the plural form of the word, *balimo*, rather than the singular form, *molimo*. It is not likely that the missionary, anxious to illustrate the original and universal revelation to mankind by producing a relic of its influence, would care to prove that the Basuto believed in many 'beings' in the sky.

*Limó* is an interesting root. According to the Dutton MS. v. 3, *holimo* meant 'up above', *leholimo* 'the sky', *lelimo* 'a cannibal'. 'The cannibal', Mr. Dutton says, 'comes into the list because he has eaten some one and by this has become a superman.' Did *limo*, then, denote superlative or supernormal quality?


Casalis mentions that sickness was sometimes intrusive; the *ngaka* sucked it out.

According to the Dutton MS. the belief was current that the *baloi* flew naked through the air by night and met on the veldt. This is another example of a common belief in regard to wizards and witches of which other instances are cited in nn. 301, 336, and 411.

According to J. Macdonald, op. cit., p. 275, formerly it was the custom to bury only chiefs; in later times sepulture was universal.

E. Casalis, op. cit., p. 238, is confident that it 'never entered their heads' that the world might have been created. Such statements as this are common in anthropological source-books; they show what every traveller must know, viz. that natives do not seek for the causes of things. Clearly the Tylorian hypothesis of 'spiritual beings' as 'personified causes' (paras. 62, 146) is untenable. See also n. 415.


Martin, Casalis, and Macdonald confine their statements to the *ngaka* and do not mention the ceremony. Mabille describes the ceremony, which is discussed at greater length in the Dutton MS. Mr. Dutton mentions other ceremonies also.

425. Dutton MS. ii. 2; v. 2.

426. Final note to Dutton MS.

427. In this connexion, the opinion of E. W. Smith and A. M. Dale, *The Ilala-speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia*, i. 345, is worth recording:

'Changes in traditions and the establishment of new customs are due largely and probably mostly not to ruling chiefs but to those who are mouth-pieces of the gods, the prophets.'

In this passage the word translated 'gods' is *mizhimo*; 'prophet' is a rendering of *nganga*. 

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Sir H. H. Johnston, *British Central Africa*, pp. 389-90, thinks that the Wayao were late-comers to this area. He states that the Nyanka stock comprised the Asenga, Amaranri, Achipeta, Amankanja, Vadema, Vanyunjur, Amanganja, Ambo, Anyanja, and Achura. I have adopted the inclusive term Anyanja to denote these tribes, but the information derived from other authorities may refer to social groups whose names are not included in this list. Our authorities do not always state the places where they obtained their information, so it is impossible to tell to what particular society a particular statement applies. D. C. Scott, *Cyclopaedic Dictionary of the Manganja Language*, prefice, uses the term Manganja in reference to the tribes which the Rev. A. Hetherwick speaks of as Nyanka, in an anglicized plural.

The Wayao were known to the Anyanja as the Ajawa, but the former name has become popular, so I have adopted it. It is less correct, however, than Ajawa.

Racially the Anyanja seem to have been more nearly related to the Amazulu and other coast tribes than to the Wayao.


Sometimes a marriage was negotiated by two mothers; but it was possible for a man to negotiate on his own behalf with a mother who had been delivered of a girl. In the latter case, the first applicant was usually successful; his sole obligation was to supply the young girl with loin-cloths, the child remaining with her mother. Sometimes, however, a man who betrothed himself to a newly born child brought his infant fiancée to live with one of his wives in her village.


Apparently customs were different in different areas. Mr. Hetherwick states that a man secured his wife by serving her mother, she in her turn taking the first-born child of the union to replace the daughter whom she had lost. According to Dr. Stannus, some of the chiefs removed their wives to their own villages. Dr. Stannus does not say whether they made any compensation to the woman’s people or not. Miss Werner says that all wives stayed in their own village, a polygamist visiting his wives in turn.


431. For these qualifications, see H. S. Stannus, ‘Notes on some tribes of British Central Africa’, *J.R.A.I.* xl (1910), pp. 290, 309, 312. I presume that the phrase ‘out of wedlock’ applies to pre-nuptial children.


I have conjectured (para. 89) that the Lango may have used their word *jok* in the sense of ‘God knows’.
In the above-quoted passage, Dr. Stannus observes: 'The vagueness concerning *mulungu* has given rise to some doubts in my mind as to how far he was a deity with an entity of his own in their religion of a little time ago.' The answer is contained in the passage which I have quoted in the text; *mulungu* is an entity only in our translations. The missionaries realized that they were guilty of many inferences concerning *mulungu*, but the authorities of the missionary societies discouraged their employees from writing of the native culture, so their publications do not contain a discussion of native usage.

See also Duff MacDonald’s declaration quoted in n. 433.


MacDonald is quite frank: ‘In all our translations of Scripture where we found the word God we used *Mulungu*, but this word is chiefly used by the natives as a general name for spirit.’


The same report is made by Duff MacDonald, *Africana*, i. 59–60, who adds: ‘Besides *lisoka* and *mulungu* there is another word for spirit, *msimu.*’ This is the only reference which MacDonald makes to *msimu*. Mr. Hetherwick does not mention the word in his writings on the Wayao. H. S. Stannus, ‘The Wayao of Nyasaland’, *Harvard African Studies*, iii (1922), pp. 311–12, 316, uses *msimu* to denote that part of a man which was absent from him when he was unconscious and which went to the spirit world when he was dead. The word *masoka*, he says, ‘though sometimes used as equivalent to *msimu*, usually seems to have rather a sinister significance’. C. H. Stigand, ‘Notes on the Natives of Nyasaland’, *J.R.A.I.* xxxvii (1907), p. 130, states that the *msimu* were ‘the people who come to us in dreams’.

I am not convinced that the pure Wayao used both *masoka* and *msimu*, that is, that in the Yao language there were two words for a single conception. Perhaps *masoka* was Yao, and *msimu* Nyanja. The two groups converged and sometimes it must have been difficult to distinguish them. Certainly the Nyanja *msiti*, witchcraft, has been confused with the Yao *msawi* (n. 449), so the convergence of the groups may have caused a similar confusion between *masoka* and *msimu*. If *msimu* had been a Yao term, I think that Mr. Hetherwick would have mentioned it. Those of the Wayao who lived nearest to the Anyanja (did the groups intermarry?) may have adopted the Nyanja term; and this may be the explanation of the confusion reported in the above-quoted passages.

Dr. Stannus remarks (op. cit., p. 320): ‘Their religion is not animistic. There are certain spirits of evil, demons, fairies, and supernatural beings and animals which, however, do not play any real part in their beliefs.’ I hold no brief for ‘animism’, but I should have said that the conception of ‘certain spirits of evil, demons, fairies, and supernatural beings’ was prima facie evidence of its existence. Dr. Stannus does not quote the native terms for these ‘beings’ and I do not know what he means when he says that they did not ‘play any real part’ in Yao belief.


The passage in Duff MacDonald, *Africana*, i. 106–10, must be read with care. The following points are noteworthy:

(1) The offerings which were made at the grave were not tendance because they were not post-funeral.

(2) We are told that the hut was erected ‘for the purpose of keeping away the
witch who caused the death and who now wishes to eat the flesh of her victim'. This statement seems to be an inference and an unlikely one.

(3) MacDonald does not distinguish between the burial of a headman and the burial of an ordinary man. He merely says that 'the man may be buried in his own dwelling'. Since the hut to which he refers was turned into a house of offering instead of being pulled down in accordance with the usual practice, I think we must conclude that only a chief would be buried in that manner.

Evidently customs varied; indeed, this is made clear by C. H. Stigand, 'Notes on the Natives of Nyasaland', J.R.A.I. xxxvii (1907), pp. 120–1, whose report agrees in general with but differs in detail from that of the above-cited authorities.


437. According to Duff MacDonald, Africana, i. 70–2, Kangomba was manifest on Mt. Sochi, Mtanga and Chitowe being associated by the Wayao with their original habitat, the former with Mt. Mangochi, the latter with famine: but A. Werner, The Natives of British Central Africa, p. 255, seems confident that Kangomba was a Nyanja chief. This seems to be the opinion also of A. Hetherwick, 'Some Animistic Beliefs among the Yaos', J.A.I. xxxii (1902), p. 93, who states that a Yao chief, Kapeno, ousted Kangomba from the position which the latter occupied in Yao culture. Cp. n. 446.

Ghosts (i.e. mulungu) were also in trees, especially fig-trees. See H. S. Stannus, 'The Wayao of Nyasaland', Harvard African Studies, iii (1922), p. 312; A. Werner, op. cit., p. 62 f. Cp. Duff MacDonald, Africana, i. 60, who seems to refer to the same conception.

For the residence of ngai, mulungu, jok, &c., in fig-trees, see nn. 356 (Lango), 364 (Akikuyu), 403 (Baila), and para. 86 (Akamba). Cp. the 'mystery' trees of some American Indians (para. 113, Ojibwa; n. 522, Dakota).

438. Duff MacDonald, Africana, i. 68, 70.


440. So, at any rate, Duff MacDonald, Africana, i. 87, but in op. cit., p. 207, MacDonald says that a witch-detective was called mavumbula.

A. Hetherwick, 'Some Animistic Beliefs among the Yaos', J.A.I. xxxii (1902), p. 90 f., seems to regard the 'witch-detective' as a person who was possessed by masoka. In that case the mchipango and mavumbula were the same person. Mr. Hetherwick does not quote the native terms. He says that epilepsy was ascribed to masoka.

Sickness in general was due to (1) mulungu, (2) violation of some taboo, (3) msawi, witchcraft. See H. S. Stannus, 'The Wayao of Nyasaland', Harvard African Studies, iii (1922), pp. 283, 293; Duff MacDonald, op. cit. i. 87, 207; H. H. Johnston, British Central Africa, pp. 439, 441, 443 ff. Some of these writers used the Nyanja word mfii instead of msawi. The confusion between the two words strengthens my suspicions that msimu was a Nyanja, not a Yao, word. See n. 434.

441. So Duff MacDonald, Africana, i. 99; but according to H. B. Barnes, Nyanja-English Vocabulary, s.v., the correct form was nganga, singanga being applied to a European doctor or his dispenser. See further n. 447.

In Manganja the meaning of tua was 'sun' (H. B. Barnes, op. cit., s.v.). No other authority seems to give the native term.

With nganga, cp. the words for magician mentioned in para. 96.

443. Duff MacDonald, *Africana*, i. 89. In reference to the whole area, Sir H. H. Johnston, *British Central Africa*, p. 451, remarks: 'A belief that certain persons have power over the atmosphere so that they can make rain fall or wind rise or drop is universal.'

444. The description of Nyanja culture by A. Werner, *The Natives of British Central Africa*, pp. 46–98, is based in a large measure on the writings of Duff MacDonald and Mr. Hetherwick.

L. T. Moggridge, 'The Nyasaland Tribes, their customs and their poison ordeal', *J.A.I*. xxxii (1902), pp. 467–72, includes the Ajawa (Wayao) in his survey.

The difficulties of separating the Yao and Nyanja elements are admitted by H. S. Stannus, 'Notes on some tribes of British Central Africa', *J.R.A.I.* xl (1910), p. 285, where he states, however, that he has made an attempt to distinguish between them. I notice that he uses the word *masoka* (op. cit., p. 301) in speaking of Nyanja culture. This seems to have been a Yao term. See nn. 434, 440.

In his article 'Nyanjas' in *Enc. Rel. Eth.*, ed. J. Hastings, ix. 419–22, Mr. Hetherwick has abandoned the careful methods which he adopted so successfully in his paper on the Wayao.

445. If every student of British Central Africa had read the pregnant passages in Duff MacDonald, *Africana*, i. 6–14, in which the author warns his successors of the danger of direct questioning, of the possibility of 'romantic information', and of the devastating effect which 'native politeness' produces if everything which the natives say is assumed to be true, then some of the more ingenuous declarations concerning *mulungu* would have been avoided. See, e.g., L. T. Moggridge, 'The Nyasaland Tribes, their customs and their poison ordeal', *J.A.I.* xxxii (1902), p. 469. Cp. my comments in para. 4.

The intensity of the subjective intrusion which is apparent in the reports concerning the Nyanja *mulungu* is tremendous. No observer has reported the native usage. A. Hetherwick, art. 'Nyanjas', *Enc. Rel. Eth.* ix. 420, is not content to identify *mulungu* with the Christian God; he calls *mpambi* 'the heavens', *mleni* 'the Creator', and *chauta* 'the Almighty'. A. Werner, *The Natives of British Central Africa*, pp. 55–7, merely states the opinions of other writers. R. S. Rattray, *Some Folklore Stories and Songs in Chinyanja*, p. 198, has his own views.

In his *Cyclopaedic Dictionary of the Manganja Language*, s.v. *mpampe*, D. C. Scott translates still another word, *mfumu*, 'God'. I notice, however, that in his new edition of Scott's vocabulary A. Hetherwick has omitted the entry.

'All that pertains to the spirit-world' is a paraphrase which has been submitted by A. Hetherwick (op. cit., p. 419). H. S. Stannus, 'Notes on some tribes of British Central Africa', *J.R.A.I.* xl (1910), p. 299, states that the word 'seems rather to mean the spirit-world'. The remarks are not helpful.

446. For the erection of the hut and the occasions of the offerings, see H. S. Stannus, 'Notes on some tribes of British Central Africa', *J.R.A.I.* xl (1910), pp. 314–15. Dr. Stannus says that 'in olden times the graves of Manganja chiefs only had a fence round them'. From the context I judge that 'only' should be read as referring to the chiefs, but I cannot be sure.

Dr. Stannus does not give the native word for the hut, which we learn from A. Hetherwick, art. 'Nyanjas', *Enc. Rel. Eth.* ix. 420; idem, *Dictionary of the Nyanga Language*, s.v. *kachisi*. In the latter passage, the *kachisi* is said to have been used for offerings 'to the spirits of the departed or to God', i.e. *mizimu* or *mulungu*.

In the former article we read that 'sacrifices to *mulungu* are offered in a small sacrificial hut, *kachisi*, built on the outskirts of the village or at the foot of any large
tree where there is shade'; 'sacrifices to the spirits of the dead may be offered near the hut where the deceased person lived or at the sacrificial hut where his spirit may be approached'. In this paper Mr. Hetherwick seems to have gone out of his way to associate the kachisi with mulungu, 'God', and so to give a bias to Nyanga culture. He makes no reference to the kachisi under 'Burial', where it properly belongs. In his reissue of D. C. Scott's Cyclopaedic Dictionary of the Manganja Language, to which I have referred above, Mr. Hetherwick omits the long note on kachisi which was included in Scott's original work and has curtailed all those entries which might have had an anthropological value. The translations which he retains are those which reveal the greatest subjective intrusion; and the lists of meanings attached to the most important words are remarkable not so much for what they include as for what they omit.

H. S. Stannus, op. cit., p. 300, says that the object of the offerings was 'to keep him quiet'. A. Hetherwick, Enc. Rel. Eth. ix. 420, states that offerings were made 'only in time of great local fear'. Thus the 'ancestor-worship' of the Nyanga was tendance.

Mr. Hetherwick mentions Kankhomba and Mpalele as 'the names of two chiefs' who were remembered and apparently in times of stress also tended. Cp. n. 437. A. Werner, The Natives of British Central Africa, p. 255, states that Kankhomba was living in 1861. She does not mention Mpalele.

The word msimu (mzimu, mizimu) is translated 'spirits of the dead'. When 'spirit' or 'spirits' are mentioned it is impossible to tell whether the reference is to mulungu or to msimu. Both the singular and plural are used to translate both words.

447. According to A. Hetherwick, art. 'Nyanga', Enc. Rel. Eth. ix. 421 f., disease, accidents, epidemics, and misfortunes of every description were due only to nziti. H. H. Johnston, British Central Africa, p. 443, n. 1, says that they were due also to 'act of God', i.e. mulungu. H. S. Stannus, 'Notes on some tribes of British Central Africa', J.R.A.I. xl (1910), p. 301, translates masoka as 'evil spirits'; but I believe masoka to have been a Yao word. See nn. 434, 440, 444.

Mr. Hetherwick, op. cit., p. 20, states that affliction was due to chiwanda, a disembodied soul. This is contrary to his other opinion to which I have already referred. In his Dictionary of the Nyanga Language, s.v., chiwanda is said to have been a form of madness which was supposed to afflict murderers. See also D. C. Scott, Cyclopaedic Dictionary of the Manganja Language, s.v., upon which doubtless Hetherwick was relying. A third opinion is expressed by H. B. Barnes, Nyanga-English Vocabulary, s.v., who states that chiwanda meant 'a corpse, large plain'; he refers to ctcwanda, which in its plural form chtcwanda was applied (by missionaries or by natives?) to 'wooden images used in Nkole'.

This confusion is characteristic of our reports on the Nyanga.

With chiwanda, cp. the Wemba viva(nda) (n. 395).

In Enc. Rel. Eth. ix. 420, Mr. Hetherwick mentions mbona 'seer' and mlauli 'prophet', but in his dictionary mboni is translated as 'a witness'. See also Barnes and Scott, op. cit., ss.vv., who do not mention the mbona.

According to Mr. Hetherwick, op. cit., p. 421, the 'witch-finder' was mabisalira (mabisalilla). So also Scott, who appends an example of a Yao 'witch-finder'. This shows how greatly the culture of the two tribes has been confused. I can find no other mention of this person.

According to H. S. Stannus, 'Notes on some tribes of British Central Africa', J.R.A.I. xl (1910), p. 303, a diver was munto wa ula, the ula man, the man with the divining sticks. H. H. Johnston, British Central Africa, p. 446, says that the medicine-man was sinanga, but this seems to have been the Yao word. See n. 441. In Mr. Hetherwick's dictionary nanga is said to mean 'breast, breast-bone'. D. C. Scott does not give it.
With nanga, cp. the Southern Bantu terms nanga, nyanga, &c., discussed in para. 96.


L. T. Moggridge, 'The Nyasaland Tribes, their customs and their poison ordeal', *J.A.I.* xxxii (1902), p. 469, says: 'On Cholo Mount there is a sacred stone; sometimes, after a severe drought, parties of natives go up to the stone and leave old tools there with an idea that rain may follow.'


An eighteenth-century French historian has stated that at Whydah a girl who had had many lovers was more in request than one who was continent. A. B. Ellis, op. cit., p. 206 f., considers that he was misinformed, for virginity was as highly prized at Whydah as elsewhere.

The history of Whydah is strange and comparatively unknown. In 1727 it was ruled by a 'young, weak, and indolent prince' whose territory was conquered by one Agajah, also called Guadia Trudo. Perhaps the early French historian based his report on evidence collected at the court of this prince.

Agajah is said to have been the originator of the Amazons. See A. Dalzel, *The History of Dahomey*, p. 16 f.; J. A. Skertchley, *Dahomey as it is*, pp. 449–50.


I do not know if the passage in W. Bosman, *The Coast of Guinea*, p. 494, is Burton's sole authority for the diffusion of Hu, Atinbodum, and Danhgbwé from Whydah. I find the passage unconvincing.

Some other points of difference between our authorities may be noted:

(1) Legba, who was also a Yoruba god (para. 42), is classed as a 'minor deity' by J. A. Skertchley. R. F. Burton also, op. cit. ii. 144, clearly regards him as unimportant.

(2) Aizan is reported by Ellis to have performed 'the functions of the multifarious local market gods' of the Gold Coast. Skertchley states that a large number of such local deities, of which he gives a list, existed also in Dahomey.

(3) According to W. Bosman, Huntin was a greater god before the conquest of Whydah than he was at a later date.

(4) Ellis regards Sapatan as the god of small-pox. Skertchley says she was a goddess under the immediate command of Atinbodum.

And so on.

The so-called 'sky-god', *mawu* (*mau*), was honoured neither by a temple nor by sacrifices. Skertchley calls *mawu* 'the moon fetiche'. According to Ellis the word indicated 'the firmament'. Burton seems to agree with Ellis.

Skertchley, Ellis, and Burton seem to have regarded *mawu* as a kind of otiose supreme being. The German missionaries had their own opinions which have been literally repeated by Sir J. G. Frazer, *The Worship of Nature*, pp. 166–15.

If *mawu* was a 'Supreme Being' and was conceived by the natives in the manner
which is described by Ellis, Skertchley, Burton, Frazer, and later writers, and if his 'worship' (whatever the word may mean in reference to mawu) was of such paramount importance as these writers appear to have believed, I should have expected the earlier writers to mention the fact. But they are strangely silent. I can find no reference to mawu in W. Bosman, The Coast of Guinea (1705), A. Dalzel, The History of Dahomey (1793); J. Duncan, Travels in Western Africa in 1845 and 1846 (1847), and F. E. Forbes, Dahomey and the Dahomans (1851); but mawu makes his appearance in R. F. Burton, Mission to Gelele, ii. 135-7 (1864); J. A. Skertchley, Dahomey as it is, pp. 461-2 (1874); and A. B. Ellis, The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast, pp. 31-7 (1890). Moreover, these writers give him an increasing importance. Furthermore, mawu has been identified, and possibly confused, with the Israelite Jehovah, as well as with the gods of other societies; and the Roman Catholic missionaries called themselves mawu-no, instead of vodu-no, the native term for 'priest'. The inference seems obvious.

Probably we shall never know the original native usage of the word mawu. Was it applied to any other phenomena in addition to the sky and the moon? For some comments on other 'Supreme Beings', see nn. 116, 122, 180, 237, 246, 415, 462, 471, 501, 585.

452. W. Bosman, The Coast of Guinea, p. 494 f.; R. F. Burton, Mission to Gelele, i. 93-9; J. A. Skertchley, Dahomey as it is, pp. 94, 466, 469; A. B. Ellis, The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast, p. 80 f.

453. A. B. Ellis, The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast, pp. 141-2, 148-9. According to J. A. Skertchley, Dahomey as it is, pp. 476-7, a layman could become a priest on payment of heavy fees, but usually priests were sons of priests. Apparently in some areas Yoruba influence was paramount, for at the birth of a child a priestess of Elegba was present, and the bukono, priest of Ifa, revealed the identity of the ancestral spirit which animated the body. Both Elegba and Ifa were Yoruba gods; perhaps their influence in Dahomey was due to the Yoruba conquest (n. 154). For the Yoruba, see para. 42.


Probably the kosio are the women to whom A. Dalzel refers in The History of Dahomey, p. 129. The priestesses of Danhgbí were called danlisio.

In the western districts, the word for 'god' was edro; dronu meant 'witchcraft', dronuola 'witch or wizard'; drowe 'dream', lit. 'place of edro'; kudro 'to dream', lit. 'to attain godlike, edro-like, condition'. The word edro-kosi was applied to all persons belonging to or connected with edro, a priest being called also nunola. See A. B. Ellis, ll.cc.

For the Tshi bohsum and Yoruba orisha, see para. 100 and n. 145 respectively.


It is Dalzel who states that the victim was first consecrated.

The Grand Customs which were held when the king died, and the Annual Customs which were held every autumn, are described at length by Forbes, Dalzel, Burton, and Skertchley. It is quite impossible to come to any conclusion about them. Their original significance is obscure. Perhaps they were a form of tendance.

With tansino, cp. the Ashanti barimfo, for whom see n. 466.

It would be interesting to know if the word which Ellis translates 'indwelling spirit' in op. cit., pp. 65-90, was noli or vodu.

With the attention to noli, cp. the attention which was paid by the Yoruba to exhumed skulls (n. 153).

457. See A. B. Ellis, The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast, pp. 103, 105, 107, 109 (for noli and abonsa), 50, 109-10 (for priestly cures), 91-3 (for amulets); J. A. Skertchly, Dahomey as it is, p. 464.

The priest of Ifa, bokuno, usually diagnosed. Ifa was a Yoruba god. Thus the influence of the bokuno may have been due to the Yoruba conquest (n. 154). Cp. n. 453.

W. Bosman, The Coast of Guinea, p. 483, states that sacrifices for the cure of sickness were more general in Dahomey than on the Gold Coast. F. E. Forbes, Dahomey and the Dahomans, i. 174 f., says that sickness was cured by sacrifices. He does not state to whom or in what place the sacrifices were made.

J. A. Skertchly, op. cit., p. 447, remarks: 'There is none of the barbarous cruelty which results from a belief in witchcraft. No man believes that any person can injure any other by any powers, incantations, or ceremonials.' A. B. Ellis, op. cit., pp. 94-5, however, refers to certain powders which were thrown on an enemy's foot-prints to make him mad; and A. Dalzel, The History of Dahoméy, p. 123, says that witchcraft was a crime. Thus Skertchly's statement seems exaggerated. But the evidence is scanty.

458. W. Bosman, The Coast of Guinea, p. 494. The connexion between mawu and rain was a 'belief' about the rain. The subject of mawu does not enter into the discussion concerning the steps which were taken when rain was required. For mawu, see n. 451.

459. I have not included J. Dupuis, Journal of a Residence in Ashantee (London, 824), in my list of authorities on Ashanti customs and culture. He remarks op. cit., p. ii): 'As to the negroes, I have reason to know that their fidelity as narrators or interpreters may be justly suspected. In fact, their intellectual faculties, like those of savages in general, although powerful in the emergencies of life, never rise from the usual routine of human pursuits to explore unprofitable mysteries; neither is it to be forgotten that a cautious scepticism is necessary, when the secret interests or affections of men are to be prized against the words to which their tongues give utterance.'

Two comments are appropriate:

(1) Dupuis must be added to the list of travellers who have discovered the answers of natives to the white man's questions cannot be trusted. Cp. para. 4, nn. 227, 234, 445.

(2) The fact that, according to Dupuis, the natives did not 'stray from the usual routine of human pursuits to explore unprofitable mysteries' militates strongly against the Tylorian hypothesis of 'spirits' as 'personified causes'. See also paras. 62, 146.


The statements of Capt. R. S. Rattray must be read with care. When he says Religion and Art in Ashanti, p. 76) that 'courtship in Ashanti runs a course not very different from that followed among ourselves', he appears to refer to genuine customs, but actually he is describing a modern tendency. That customs have changed is clear from another passage: 'Chastity before marriage is not now,
I am afraid, demanded to the extent it was in olden times' (R. S. Rattray, op. cit., p. 85 f.).

Capt. Rattray adds that in pagan times a bride was expected to be a virgin.

Thus it seems that in Ashanti, as elsewhere, the introduction of the white man's customs has resulted in an extension of pre-nuptial sexual opportunity.

Capt. Rattray states (op. cit., p. 78) that the semi-educated African 'supremely ignorant of and contemptuous of his own institutions' now calls the ase
d a tiri nsa 'head-wine'.

I cannot find the word asizea in J. G. Christaller, Dictionary of the Asante and Fante Languages. Christaller says that 'a young woman in a state of puberty' was obadun, and that a girl, married or unmarried, 'who had not borne a child' was ababa.

Both T. E. Bowdich, Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee, p. 252, and J. Beecham, Ashantee and the Gold Coast, p. 128, assert that husbands and fathers used to encourage their wives and daughters to have sexual intercourse with a stranger, in order to secure a 'palaver'. These tactics were adopted also by the Corinthians in historical times (see, e.g., W. A. Becker, Charicles, pp. 22-42, and Excursus). They have not been unknown in other historical societies, even in our own.

461. A. B. Ellis, The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast, p. 29; R. S. Rattray, Ashanti, p. 141. For a comment on nyame, which is discussed in these passages, see n. 462.

462. For the temple of Ntoa, see R. S. Rattray, Ashanti, fig. So. Cp. the temple of Ta Kora (Tano, Tando) in op. cit., figs. 74 and 75. The inscription on the wall of the latter building is written in English, the building itself being European both in character and design.

Capt. R. S. Rattray has reported (Ashanti, p. 142) that temples were erected to nyame (nyankupon), an alleged 'Sky-god' or 'Supreme Being', but it seems doubtful whether these were built before Christian and Mohammedan influence became paramount. I am not convinced by the evidence which has been submitted. The question has been complicated by the fact that Ashanti 'beliefs' have been recorded with a certain amount of subjective intrusion. The following comments on the reports are appropriate:

(1) When Sir A. B. Ellis wrote his first book on West African culture, he said that in his opinion the conception of this 'Supreme Being' was due to alien influence. In his second publication he retracted, and said: 'I now hold that Nyankupon is like Mawu, the sky-god, an indwelling spirit of the sky, and that, also like Mawu, he has been to a certain extent confused with Jehovah.' See A. B. Ellis, The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast, pp. 24, 28; idem, The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast, p. 30 f. For matu, see n. 451.

Capt. R. S. Rattray, in Ashanti Proverbs, pp. 17-19, and Ashanti, pp. 139-141, criticizes Ellis for having formed the first opinion, but he does not mention Ellis's subsequent retraction of that opinion. Yet it is manifestly unfair to quote the one and not the other, and it is reasonable to suppose that Capt. Rattray had a definite purpose in view, for we must assume that he would not criticize Ellis before making himself acquainted with his writings. Capt. Rattray's purpose is revealed in the second of the above-cited passages. He wishes to 'take a firm stand against a school of thought (the Ellis school) which denied that the conception of a Supreme Being in the West African mind was due to any cause deeper or more remote than the influence of Christian missionary teaching'. Capt. Rattray states that he can see no reason why 'the idea of a great God, who is the Firmament, upon Whom ultimately all life depends, should not have been the conception of a people living under the conditions of the Ashanti of old'. There is, he thinks, 'no just cause for attributing what we have come to regard as one of the noblest conceptions of man's mind to dwellers in cities and to writers'.

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Thus Capt. Rattray not only considers that 'the idea of a great God, who is the Firmament' is 'one of the noblest conceptions of man's mind'; he wishes to prove that this idea was present in the minds of the pagan Ashanti. Clearly his point would be proved more easily if he could show that the pagan Ashanti erected temples to nyankupon (nyame).

It behoves us, therefore, to examine the evidence with great care.

(2) Sir A. B. Ellis, The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast, p. 26, states that 'there were no priests of Nyankupon'. Ellis does not define the word 'priest'; nor does Capt. Rattray, who challenges this statement by maintaining that (i) indirectly every fetish priest was a priest of Onyankopon, (ii) direct service also was rendered to that 'god'. The evidence of this 'direct service' is stated thus: 'In every village in Ashanti may be seen a tree or stick terminating on three forks which form a stand on which a pot or gourd is set; the name of this stick is nyame dua; in the pot, dish or gourd, are placed offerings for onyame.' See R. S. Rattray, Ashanti Proverbs, pp. 19, 21–2.

In this early publication Capt. Rattray does not mention the erection of temples to nyame (nyankupon). The word nyame (nyankupon) is translated as 'High God', 'Supreme Being', 'God', 'Creator'. Moreover, eight different names (or titles or descriptive epithets) are given to nyame. Capt. Rattray considers that the northern tribes may have been influenced by 'the Allah of the Mohammedans', but in his opinion this hypothetical influence does not explain the fact that nyame (nyankupon) was a 'deeply rooted part, the very centre in fact of the religion of the Ashantis'.

In his next publication, Capt. Rattray again emphasizes the ubiquity of nyame dua, and remarks (Ashanti, p. 142): 'Beside these rude altars are to be found, hidden away in remote corners of the older palaces, beautifully designed temples to the Sky God. One such is shown in the frontispiece of this volume, with an altar and one of the priests beside it.' Here I am in difficulties: (a) I do not understand why the 'beautifully designed temples' to the god who was 'the very centre' of Ashanti religion should have been 'hidden away in remote corners'; (b) when I look at the frontispiece to which I am referred, I see a Europeanized edifice, two stories high, of such a size that it could not be 'hidden away' at all. It is very unlike such a native building as the temple of Ntoa. Moreover, there is no altar in the picture, but the priest is seated on the steps. This 'priest' appears to have been a lad of about ten years old, surely a very early age at which to have completed a three years' novitiate. I do not think I am wrong in considering Fig. 52 to be another photograph of the same lad outside the same building; the altar nyame dua is shown there. This nyame dua was not in the same position in the first photograph. We are not told where it was then nor why it was moved to its new position.

On the whole, the evidence for the existence of nyame (nyankupon) temples in pagan times is of a very poor quality.

With nyame dua, cp. the Ila kwanga (n. 402) and the Ronga nkonola (n. 408).

For a comment upon Capt. 'Rattray's remark that every fetish priest' was a 'priest of Nyame', see n. 464.

For some comments on other 'Supreme Beings', see nn. 116, 122, 180, 237, 246, 415, 451, 471, 501, 585.


464. The double meaning of bohsum is reported by A. B. Ellis, The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast, p. 19. The word is translated 'tutelar or guardian spirit of men and family' by J. C. Christaller, Dictionary of the Asante and Fante Languages, p. 42. R. S. Rattray, Ashanti, p. 90, applies it to the 'non-human spirit'
as well as to the brass pan which was 'the potential resting place' of this spirit. So *bohsam* (*obosom*) is said to have meant both 'god' and 'shrine'.

The difference between *obosom* and *suman* was the subject of some acute direct questioning by R. S. Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, pp. 22–3. The answers which he records have no greater anthropological value than an answer given by an English ploughboy to a question concerning the meaning of 'God' and 'spirit'. The conclusions founded upon them are unacceptable.

Apparently it was after such conversations as these that Capt. Rattray formulated his opinion that 'the main power of the most important Spirit in an *obosom* comes directly or indirectly from Nyame, the Supreme God'. The opinion is expressed also in *Ashanti Proverbs*, p. 30.

According to Ellis, *bohsam* was applied also to a lake and to the moon. In fact, he says it meant 'lake' and 'moon'. The latter is denied by R. S. Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 90, n. 2. Cp. 'moon fetiche' as a translation of the Dahoman *maawu* (n. 451).

R. S. Rattray, in *Ashanti*, p. 90, and *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, pp. 11 f., 23, would like to reserve the English word 'fetish' as a translation of *suman*; so also J. G. Christaller, op. cit., pp. 42, 462. Surely it is better to discard the word. Ellis (l.c.) translates *suman* (*suhman*) as 'tutelary deity of individuals'.


For Capt. Rattray as *okonfo* and *akonfo*, see R. S. Rattray, *Ashanti*, pp. 152, 171.

The native words for 'wizard', 'witch', and 'witchcraft' are uncertain. For 'wizard' or 'witch' R. S. Rattray, *Ashanti Proverbs*, p. 30, gives *bayifo*; J. G. Christaller, op. cit., p. 32, gives *bayifo* and *obonsam*. According to R. S. Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, p. 28, *bonsam* was masculine and *obayifo* feminine. Ellis (l.c.) translates *abonsam* 'witchcraft, magic, malignant spirit'.

The word which Capt. Rattray renders 'spirit' and 'devil' in *Ashanti Proverbs*, p. 42, is *sasa* (*sesa*), for which see n. 466.


466. The propitiation of the *sasa* (*sisa, sesa*) is described by R. S. Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, pp. 151 ff. Capt. Rattray says (op. cit., pp. 182 ff.) that similar rites were celebrated when trees were cut down. A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, pp. 150, 240, states that the object of the rites was the conciliation of the *sisa* and that 'food and wine were placed daily on the grave for some months'. This seems to have been *tendance*. The *baya* ceremony on 'sacred Monday' ('Spirits of our grandsires, come and eat rice, we invoke blessing for a good year') may have been *cult*. For the *baya* ceremony, see R. S. Rattray, *Ashanti*, pp. 136–7.

For the control of *sisa* 'by the spells of priests' and 'powerful *suman*', see A. B. Ellis, op. cit., p. 150; R. S. Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, p. 99.

There were three other ceremonies, *adae*, *affrahbi* (*afahye*), and *odwira* (*ojirrah*), which are said to have been connected with the dead; but the reports conflict. Moreover, the reports conflict in a manner which suggests that the same native word is being translated as both 'gods' and 'spirits of the dead'. Thus (1) according to Ellis, the *adae* ceremonies were in honour of the gods; Capt. Rattray says that they were in honour of the dead; (2) according to Ellis, the *affrahbi* (*afahye*) ceremony was a 'remembrance of the dead'; Capt. Rattray states that it was connected with both the gods and the dead; (3) according to Ellis, the *odwira* (*ojirrah*) ceremony was a thanksgiving to the gods; Capt. Rattray calls it a 'feast of the dead'. Unfortunately neither of these writers quotes the native terms, so we cannot tell whether their reports really contradict one another or whether the contradiction is only apparent, and due to the translations.
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The evidence is as follows:

(1) Adae ceremonies.
(a) A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, p. 228: ‘On the Adae festivals it is customary to offer sacrifices to the tribal and national deities.’
(b) R. S. Rattray, *Ashanti*, pp. 92, 99: ‘The first in order of importance of those customs dealing with the propitiation, solicitation, or worship of ancestral spirits’: ‘there is no apparent invocation or mention of any power or spirit other than those of human ancestors.’

(2) Affrahbi (afahye) ceremony.
(a) A. B. Ellis, op. cit., p. 227 f.: ‘Annual general remembrance of the dead’: ‘Each family proceeds to the place of burial of its dead; they sit down round the graves and laying upon them offerings of fowls, eggs, rum, and palm-wine, call upon the deceased to accept their offerings.’
(b) R. S. Rattray, *Ashanti*, pp. 203–12: ‘An annual custom is held in connexion with the eating of the first-fruits of each crop, in this case yams’: the ceremony ‘has two distinct aspects in connexion with (a) the spirits of ancestors, (b) the gods’.

(3) Odwira (ojirrah) ceremony.
(a) A. B. Ellis, op. cit., p. 229 f.: ‘Held for the purpose of returning thanks to the gods for having protected the crop.’
(b) R. S. Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, p. 127: ‘A feast of the dead very closely connected with the crops and first-fruits.’

The older authorities are not helpful. For instance, T. E. Bowdich, *Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee*, pp. 226–30, says that the *odwira* was merely a yam festival.

In addition to *sisa* (*sasa, sesa*) another word, *srahman* (*saman*), has been translated ‘spirit of the dead’, ‘departed spirit’. It is impossible to tell sometimes which of these two words the English phrase represents, for in the appropriate passages our authorities do not always quote the native terms. The *do ut abeas* rites seem to have been connected with *sisa* (*sasa, sesa*). Is *srahman* (*saman*) the word which has been translated ‘ancestral spirit’ in the descriptions of the above-mentioned ceremonies? The relation between the *sisa* (*sasa, sesa*) and the *srahman* (*saman*) is not clear. I conjecture that the ‘*Tshi kra*, *srahman* (*saman*)’, and *sisa* (*sasa, sesa*) corresponded to the Ewe *luwo*, *noli*, and *abonsa*. This seems to be the opinion of Sir A. B. Ellis. For these Ewe terms, see para. 99.


In the south the dead used to be buried in the floor of the huts (A. B. Ellis, op. cit., p. 239). This practice was forbidden on the coast. Perhaps in a like manner the use of burial grounds in the north was due to alien influence.

Members of the royal family used to be buried in special mausoleums, *barim dan*, which were like ordinary houses. A *barim dan* was cared for by certain attendants called *barimfo*. See A. B. Ellis, op. cit., p. 242; R. S. Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 133.

With *barimfo*, cp. the Ewe *tansino* (para. 99).

467. A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, pp. 119, 148, says: ‘All sickness is believed to be caused by superhuman agents who enter the body’; ‘every unusual or unfortunate event’ was attributed to ‘superhuman beings’. For some descriptions of the treatment of disease, see R. S. Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, pp. 38–40, 107, 147–8. Capt. Rattray devotes little space to the question. Probably the old ideas had disappeared before he arrived in the country.

According to R. S. Rattray, *Ashanti Law and Constitution*, pp. 16, 313 f., witch-
craft was a serious crime. A man who was ill treated would threaten to haunt his enemy after death. Cp. a similar report on the Bails (n. 491).

There appears to be more inference than fact in the descriptions of *sasabonsum* and *srhrmnatun*. See A. B. Ellis, op. cit., pp. 34-8; R. S. Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, p. 28. Both these words seem to refer to the dead, for they are compounds of *sasa* and *srhrmn* (n. 466). The capital S with which the names are spelt seems to be the result of inference.

468. This criticism applied especially to Dr. Radin’s essay, ‘Religion of the North American Indians’, *J.A.F.L.* xxvii (1914), pp. 335-73, and to his *Monotheism among Primitive Peoples* (London, 1924). I do not know what single precise meaning Dr. Radin attaches to the word ‘monotheism’, but I notice that on p. 24 of the latter book he says, ‘Among the Crow Indians the Sun is the Supreme Deity’. For the Crow Indians, and the application of *maxpe* to the sun, see 119.

I have commented on Dr. Radin’s other writings in para. 120. They have been the subject of some discussion by B. Aitken, ‘Temperament in Native American Religion’, *J.R.A.I.* lx (1939), pp. 363-87. Her title was happily chosen if it refers to the writers as well as to the subject of their writings.


The original authority for many of these statements seems to have been a Russian missionary, Father Veniamanoff. There is no doubt, I think, that R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, i. 575, has interpreted the evidence correctly. For other comments on his work, see nn. 112, 155, 163, 172, 282, 421.

At puberty a girl was secluded, but not in order to limit her sexual activities; her confinement took place on the first appearance of the menses, at such a time ‘her look might dismay the luck of a hunter, fisher, or gambler, turn objects into stone . . .’ The period of the seclusion is reported as two to three months (Swanton) and a year (Petroff). Dall says that a year was the usual period, which in some places had been reduced to three months.

For the reason of the fear of the menses, see para. 146.

F. Shotridge, *Univ. Pens. Mus. Journ. iv* (1913), p. 103, who had a great opportunity of stating the facts explicitly, says: ‘Until a few years ago the custom of seclusion of young girls for a prescribed period prior to entering upon the life of womanhood was strictly observed.’ The statement is too vague to be useful.

The Tlingits are called Thlinkits, Thlinkets, Thlinkeets, and (by the Russians) Koloshes.

471. The Tlingit yeek was one of the terms which I selected (para. 5) in order to illustrate the impossibility of translating the native terms. The ‘animistic’ view
was propounded by Dr. F. Boas, *Fifth Report of the Committee on the N.W. Tribes of Canada, 59th Rep. Brit. Ass. Adv. Sc.* (Newcastle, 1889), p. 848: 'All nature is animated and the spirit of any being can become the genius of a man who thus acquires supernatural powers. These spirits are called yek.' In the passage from which I have extracted the quotation in the text, J. R. Swanton, 'Social Conditions, Beliefs and Linguistic Relationships of the Tlingit Indians', *26th Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Eth.*, 1904-5, p. 451, n. 3, states that the alleged ubiquity of these 'spirits' is due to the 'European lineage' of the observer.

Our authorities have different forms of the word yek:

1. W. H. Dall, *Alaska and its Resources*, p. 422, says, 'There are immense numbers of minor spirits called yekh, who are invoked by shamans. Each shaman has his own familiar spirits. These spirits are divided into three classes: khiyekh, "the upper ones", takhi-yekh, "land-spirits", and tekhi-yekh "sea-spirits". The first are the spirits of the brave killed in war.'

2. A. Krause, *Die Tlingit Indianer*, pp. 291-2, gives the same three compounds of yek; but he calls the power jek, 'the spirits of the brave's being tu kinajek.

3. The report of I. Petroff, 'Report on the Population, Industries and Resources of Alaska', *Tenth Census of the United States, 1880*, p. 174, is as follows: 'The Thlinket have a great number of subordinate spirits called by them yekh (pl. yakh'h), whom the shamans (ibth) invoke during their performances. These are divided into khiyekh (or khinayekh), the spirits of the brave fallen in battle, takhiyekh, land-spirits, and tekhiyekh, water-spirits.'

Both Dall and Petroff seem to have been relying on a common source, probably Veniamanoff (n. 470) or Holmberg.

4. H. J. Holmberg, 'Ethnographische Skizzen über die Völker des russischen Amerika', *Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennicae*, iv (1856), pp. 343-4, calls the power jekh (pl. jekkhe), the shaman ichth, and the 'guardian spirit' both jekh and khinajekh. His use of the latter word is peculiar to himself.

A typically 'European lineage' interpretation which calls yek a 'Supreme Being' is quoted by I. Petroff, op. cit., p. 177.

For other reports on 'Supreme Beings', apparently due to 'European lineage', see nn. 116, 122, 180, 237, 246, 415, 451, 462, 501, 585.

The method of becoming a shaman is described by W. H. Dall, op. cit., p. 425; I. Petroff, op. cit., p. 176; H. J. Holmberg, op. cit., pp. 344 ff. Dall says that the yek animal was an otter. Such an otter was taboo, an otter skin being the trademark of a magician. In the tongue of the otter, Dall says, lay 'the whole secret power and force required in the profession of shamanism'. This is reported also by J. R. Swanton, op. cit., p. 464.

Perhaps a famous and successful magician had possessed 'medicine' of this character and all subsequent aspirants tried to emulate him.


For the mortuary-chest and grave-poles, see J. R. Swanton, 'Social Conditions, Beliefs and Linguistic Relationships of the Tlingit Indians', *26th Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Eth.*, 1904-5, pp. 431-4. He says that 'shamans' bodies were placed along the shore', the great fear of dead shamans being reported in op. cit., pp. 466-7. The ghost or spirit of the dead body was called sagi (J. R. Swanton, op. cit., p. 460). This statement seems to refer to a spook.

474. See esp. J. R. Swanton, Contributions to the Ethnology of the Haida, pp. 50–1; C. Harrison, Ancient Warriors of the North Pacific, pp. 70–7; F. Poole, Queen Charlotte Islands, p. 312.

G. M. Dawson, 'On the Haida Indians of Queen Charlotte Islands', Geological Survey of Canada, 1878–9, p. 130 b, observes: 'It is said that the Haidas were once distinguished by good morals. If so, they differed from most of the coast tribes. Female chastity is certainly not now prized.' It may be that morals have deteriorated since the white man arrived in the country; but what exactly do we mean when we say that the Haida 'were once distinguished by good morals'? On what evidence is the statement based? By what criterion do we judge?

475. E. S. Curtis, The North American Indian, xi. 136, 187, 210 (for skil), 128 (for drowned men); J. R. Swanton, Contributions to the Ethnology of the Haida, pp. 13–14, 29 (for sgana), 38 (for shaman). In a comparative table of Skidegate and Massett words, Mr. Curtis translates skanakadas or skil (S) and skil (M) as 'supernatural being', skanakwaí (S) and shanuwa (M) as 'supernatural power'. His skanakdas seems to correspond to Mr. Swanton's sganaqdas, sgana of the ocean, his skanakwai, 'supernatural power', to Mr. Swanton's sganagwai. Thus he seems to have mistaken a manifestation of sgana for sgana.

Mr. Swanton has been influenced by the 'animistic' theory. He speaks of the Haida 'spiritual theory' and of the world being 'alive with spirits'. In addition to the lapse which I have noticed in the text, the following passage is worthy of remark (J. R. Swanton, op. cit., p. 14): 'According to the legends, sun, moon, and stars are inanimate objects, yet the first two were each inhabited by a supernatural being who sometimes spoke through shamans.' The contradiction which is suggested by an 'inanimate' object being inhabited by a 'being' is only apparent; it is due to the use of the word 'supernatural being'. If we substitute the Haida word sgana or skil, it disappears: sgana (or skil) was manifest in the sun and moon, but not in the stars.

The words 'deity', 'worship', &c., have been loosely employed by C. Harrison, Ancient Warriors of the North Pacific, pp. 121 ff. I presume that 'god of the sea', 'god of the sun', &c., are translations of skil (sgana). The belief that there were two 'important gods' or 'great spirits', shanungitlagidas and hetgwaulana, seem to have been due to Christian influences. We read that 'the Haidas did not fear the two great spirits as much as the minor deities'. Is 'minor deities' a translation of sgana? G. M. Dawson, 'On the Haida Indians of Queen Charlotte Islands', Geological Survey of Canada, 1878–9, p. 121 ff., also mentions a 'lord of all things, whose dwelling was in some remote undefined region', suniatlaidus or shanungitlagidas, 'but it is difficult to ascertain exactly what his attributes are'.

In such passages the subjective intrusion is intense. It is probable that the contradictions which C. Harrison (op. cit., p. 130) notes in the alleged Haida 'beliefs' were due to the veneer of white influence which overlay the native culture.

476. C. Harrison, Ancient Warriors of the North Pacific, p. 115.

'Unusual customs' at the death of 'prominent men' are reported also by E. S. Curtis, The North American Indian, xi. 126–8.

J. R. Swanton, Contributions to the Ethnology of the Haida, pp. 52–4, seems to confuse a 'great chief' and a 'shaman', unless the Haida 'chiefs' were always magicians.

C. Harrison remarks that a dead saagga 'still remained an object of veneration'. Thus we may conclude that a dead magician was more respected than a dead layman. There is no report of any post-funeral rites; indeed C. Harrison (op. cit., p. 80) remarks that very little care was taken of the dead.

J. R. Swanton, op. cit., p. 53 ff., says that a man who was threatened with con-
sumption would take food to the place where a shaman's body sat, hang the food in front of the dead man's mouth for four nights and then eat it; if other dead shamans were seated in the neighbourhood, he placed a piece of food before each of them. The rite was not do ut abeas, for there is no evidence of affliction being caused by the dead. The latter part of the report appears to be the answer to a direct question. Perhaps the man thought he would be cured by some magic power which the food absorbed in its contact with the shaman's body.

477. For the causes of disease, see J. R. Swanton, Contributions to the Ethnology of the Haida, pp. 27, 40-2; E. S. Curtis, The North American Indian, xi. 136-8.


The source of magic power was sgana, according to all these authorities except Curtis, who remarks: 'Medicine-men obtained their power by purification of the body, not by personal contact with a supernatural being.'

According to G. M. Dawson, the magical profession was not hereditary. Any man could be a magician if he could dream and see visions. Mr. Swanton says that the profession was hereditary in the maternal line from uncle to nephew. When a form of the classificatory relationship prevails, a report concerning heredity must be accepted with reserve. Cp. n. 59.


479. For lack of post-funeral attention to the dead, see J. Teit, The Thompson Indians, p. 330.


481. Ibid., pp. 327-36.

482. Ibid., pp. 338, 354-5.

Mr. Teit's descriptions have been repeated almost verbatim by J. G. Frazer, Totemism and Exogamy, iii. 413-18.

483. Ibid., p. 360. The fact that the native words which Mr. Teit translates as 'spirits' are not given detracts much from the value of the report concerning sickness. The chief cause of affliction was witchcraft, body refuse and clippings being carefully destroyed.

484. Ibid., p. 345.

The missing word for 'supernatural power' may have been kwulus (swalus, qailus). Mr. Teit seems to have been puzzled by the native use of the word. Perhaps he approached the study of American Indian culture from a preconceived 'animistic' point of view. He remarks: '... the word qailus was repeated twice; this was perhaps a term of address, or the name of the earth or mountain deity, after the manner of the Indians praying in the sweat-house, who address the deity presiding over the act of sweat-bathing as kwulus or swalus.'


The word which Mr. Teit translates as 'mystery' was applied also to twins and a girl's first menses. It is not quoted. Abortion, we are told, was rare; but the report seems to apply only to married women. I can find no mention of pre-nuptial children. Was contraception the rule?

486. See esp. J. Teit, The Shuswap, pp. 598, 605-7, 618. The method by which the people secured their 'guardian spirits' has been related also by J. G. Frazer, Totemism and Exogamy, iii. 421-8, q.v.
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The distinction between the upper and lower tribes is made only by Mr. Hill-Tout.

As 'the marriage customs of the Lillooet were practically the same as those of the Thompson tribe' (J. Teit, op. cit., p. 267), we may ascribe the same pattern of sexual regulation to the Thompson, Shuswap, and Lillooet.


492. Various magical practices are reported by J. Teit, *The Lillooet Indians*, pp. 274, 276, 283, 286, but their discovery appears to be the result of industrious search; they do not appear to have been a general habit. Perhaps the Roman Catholic priests had discouraged the ancient practices.

493. C. Hill-Tout, *The Far West, The Home of the Salish and Dene*, p. 33, has divided the Salish into three sections: (1) interior, (2) delta, (3) coastal. Of the interior tribes, the Thompson, Shuswap, and Lillooet are the most important and the best known. The groups which lived on the lower Fraser River between the Lillooet and the coast have been discussed by F. Boas in *Ninth Report of the Committee on the N.W. Tribes, Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science* (Oxford, 1894), pp. 454–63. Some of the coastal groups are discussed by E. S. Curtis in *The North American Indian*, vol. ix (Cambridge, Mass., 1913).

Mr. Hill-Tout has dealt with some of the problems which arise in the study of the Salish in his 'Ethnological Survey of Canada', *Reports of the British Association for the Advancement of Science* (Dover, 1899, and Bradford, 1900). His remarks have been supplemented by F. Boas, 'Ethnological Problems in Canada', *J.R.A.I.* xl (1910), pp. 529–39. The standard of Salishan ethnology is not high.


494. For the social regulations and puberty rites, and for an emphasis on the extreme variety of the practices, see C. Hill-Tout, 'Some features of the Language and Culture of the Salish', *Amer. Anth.*, n.s., vii (1905), p. 670; idem, 'The Siciatl', *J.A.I.* xxxiv (1904), p. 32; idem, 'The Stocelis and Skaulits', *J.A.I.* xxxiv (1904), pp. 318–19.

495. See F. Boas, *The Lkungen*, pp. 574 (for supernatural power of twins), 580–1 (for native names of magicians). Among the Lkungen the term for 'guardian spirit' was *tlkayin*, which Dr. Boas compares to the Chinook *tamanawes*, for which see para. 109.

See also C. Hill-Tout, 'The Siciatl', *J.A.I.* xxxiv (1904), pp. 26 (for names of magicians), 26 f. (for *sulia*), 331 (for names of magicians). Among the Siciatl the term for 'guardian spirit' is said to have been *sulyu*; the word has been translated also as 'supernatural helpers' and as 'tutelary spirits'.

Such 'animistic' translations, though seemingly harmless, are actually extremely dangerous and misleading. See paras. 146–8.
For the equation \( \text{sulid} = \text{snam} = \text{manitou} = \text{wahabe} \), see C. Hill-Tout, ‘Some Features of the Language and Culture of the Salish’, Amer. Anth. N.S. vii (1905), p. 682.


Various phenomena to which the word \text{tamanous} was applied, and a number of mythological figures, have been called ‘gods’ and ‘deities’; see Erna Gunther, ‘Klallam Ethnography’, Univ. Wash. Publ. Anth. i, no. 5, pp. 234, 289; Myron Eells, op. cit., p. 672; idem, ‘The Religion of the Clallam and Twana Indians’, American Antiquarian, ii (1879–80), pp. 9–14.

Eells remarks: ‘Except the medicine-men there is no separate class of persons for religious service and their main business is sickness.’

Erna Gunther, op. cit., p. 297, says that black magicians were killed. This differentiation between beneficent and maleficient practices may have been a later development, the sense of Myron Eells’s reports demanding the assumption that witchcraft was one of the ordinary risks of life.

Although he states that ‘they \text{tamanous} for wind’, Myron Eells says that ‘there were no rain-makers’. Erna Gunther, op. cit., p. 295, however, states that the weather was considered to be under the control of those who had special guardian-spirits (i.e. \text{tamanous}).

498. Myron Eells, ‘Twana, Chemakum and Klallam Indians of Washington Territory’, Smith. Rep., 1887, p. 669; Erna Gunther, ‘Klallam Ethnography’, Univ. Wash. Publ. Anth. i, no. 5, p. 296. Miss Gunther says that a ghost was \text{snemur}, but H. Hale, The Chinook Jargon (vocab.), does not give the word; he translates \text{skookum}, lit. ‘strong’, as ‘demon, ghost’. Perhaps both \text{snemur} and \text{skookum} were applied to any spectre, spook, or apparition, their meaning having been confused with the phenomena to which they were applied adjectivally.


H. J. Spinden, op. cit., p. 258, says: ‘Their conception of the world was animistic.’ He does not quote the native word which he translates ‘spirits’. It may have been \text{tiwat}, for, according to E. Curtis, The North American Indian, viii. 161, 194, the terms for ‘medicine-man’, ‘medicine-woman’, and witchcraft were \text{tiwat}, \text{tiwatayat}, and \text{tietatitmas} respectively. (Mr. Curtis uses ‘medicine-man’ as a general term for magicians.) Mr. Curtis and Professor Spinden say that \text{tietatitmas} came from the sun, moon, fish-hawk, pelican, &c. I conjecture that these phenomena were magically powerful because they were \text{tiwat}. Cp. a similar report in reference to the Black-feet (n. 510).

The sun is reported to have been regarded as ‘the seat of wisdom’ (H. J. Spinden, op. cit., p. 259). This may be another way of saying that the sun was \text{tiwat}. Professor Spinden does not quote the native word.
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Various words, borrowed from other dialects, are applied to this ‘guardian spirit’ or ‘tutelary genius’, nagwal (nagual) and manitous being the most common. The latter was Algonquian; the former belonged to some Central American peoples who are not included in this treatise. We know very little about them.

In ‘The Canadian Dene’, Ann. Arch. Rep., 1905, pp. 203–4, a later publication which shows signs of an extensive study of comparative anthropology, Father Morice speaks of a ‘Supreme Being’; but the passage contradicts his early pronouncements. He does not quote the word which in the above-cited essays he translates ‘spirits’ and it is impossible to tell what native words are represented by the various English terms which he employs. It is easy to speak of ‘gentile, honorific and personal totems’, but such declarations have no single precise meaning unless the evidence is quoted on which their application to the Dene is based.

The danger of these translations cannot be over-emphasized.


The Dene are said to have wrestled and fought for their women in a manner which would delight popular writers on the ‘cave-man’.

In ‘The Great Dene Race’, Anthropos, v (1910), pp. 981–8, Father Morice seems to confuse a temporary sexual partner and a wife. Some sections of the tribe are said to have taken great care of their children; but no regulations that imposed a compulsory continence existed.

I do not know whether or not the report of cannibalism by A. G. Morice, ‘The Great Dene Race’, Anthropos, ii (1907), p. 192, can be accepted literally. The danger which is inherent in any translation of classificatory terms of relationship is great, because the parents, wives, and children may not have been kindred in the sense which we understand by those terms.

504. P. Jones, History of the Ojibway Indians, p. 78; W. H. Keating, Narrative of an Expedition to the Source of St. Peter’s River, ii. 166.


Jones says that the grave was three feet deep; according to Keating, its depth was six to eight feet.

Jones does not mention the burial of notable men.


When Peter Jones, who was a missionary, says that the Ojibway believed in a ‘Benevolent and Merciful Spirit’, heche-munedoo, and in the existence of an evil spirit, mahje-munedoo, I suspect that the statements were made as a result of answers to direct questions, those answers being given to please the inquirer. See my remarks in para. 4. These ‘beliefs’ are mentioned only once.

For W. J. Hoffman’s account of Ojibwa ‘beliefs’, see n. 507.


For the details of the causes and treatment of disease, see P. Jones, op. cit., pp. 145–6; W. H. Keating, Narrative of an Expedition to the Source of St. Peter’s River, ii. 158–9. The efficacy of the remedy lay in the spells and songs possessed

Elopement was common; the sexual intercourse which resulted was not a matter of concern. Although the girl's parents might object to the lad she had chosen, their anger is said to have been easily mollified. See G. B. Grinnell, Blackfoot Lodge Tales, p. 205; W. McClintock, The Old North Trail, pp. 184-91; idem, Old Indian Trails, pp. 88-4.

McClintock lays great stress on the 'sanctity of marriage', but his statements must be received with caution, and the following facts borne in mind:

1) McClintock uses the word 'chastity' in reference to post-nuptial conduct; in his opinion a woman was 'chaste' if she was a constant wife. We are told that before a woman could perform the Sun-Dance, she was compelled to take an oath, swearing that she was 'virtuous'. From the various contexts I judge that a 'virtuous' woman was a married woman who had not committed adultery. But McClintock's use of the words 'chastity', 'virtuous', &c., is neither uniform nor exact, and no definite conclusion can be drawn from his statements.

2) McClintock was anxious to present the Blackfoot character in the best possible light; thus it is natural that he should not have reported, even if he were acquainted with them, those native customs which might offend his readers. 'I have come to live among you', he said to his Blackfoot friends, 'that I might learn the truth about you and then tell the truth to the white people. The hearts of many of the white men feel warm towards their red brothers, and when they know the truth about you they may act more wisely' (W. McClintock, The Old North Trail, p. 508).

For 'chastity' in connexion with the Sun-Dance, see W. McClintock, Old Indian Trails, pp. 82, 246, 307.

When Professor Wissler (l.c.) refers to 'formal virginity tests' among the Sioux, I do not know to what he refers or what meaning he attaches to the words 'virginity' and 'test'. All these writers speak in exceedingly vague terms when they discuss sexual matters.

For the divisions of the Blackfoot tribe, see G. B. Grinnell, op. cit., pp. 208-9; G. Catlin, Illustrations of the Manners, Customs and Conditions of the N.A.I. i. 52; Handbook of the American Indians, s.v. sikiska.

509. See Clark Wissler, 'Social Organization and Ritualistic Ceremonies of the Blackfoot Indians', Anth. Pap., Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist. vii (1912), pp. 31 (for burial places, the information being less exactly stated on p. 287), 79 (for ghostly tampering with speech and face), 288 (for fear of the dead).
Their methods of burial (platforms in trees, platforms in lodges, and on the ground in lodges) are reported by G. B. Grinnell, Blackfoot Lodge Tales, p. 193, who says that a 'great chief' or 'noted warrior' was treated more carefully.

W. McClintock, The Old North Trail, p. 149, states that the dead were placed on scaffolds in trees, on a high hill, or laid in a lodge pitched in a thicket. He does not say how the question (as to which form of burial should be adopted) was decided. In his Old Indian Trails, pp. 155, 166, McClintock mentions an aged medicine-woman who was buried in a tree and a famous man who was buried on a hill; so it may be that magicians were buried more carefully than ordinary men and women. The manner of McClintock’s story implies that the living had a greater fear of the powerful dead than of the ordinary dead.

According to G. B. Grinnell, op. cit., pp. 273–4, the ghosts of enemies killed in battle shot invisible arrows into people, thus causing sickness and death. Such ghosts are also said to have caused insanity and paralysis. I can find no record of the manner in which such sickness was treated. The statements seem to be such as might result from direct questioning. The native words are not quoted. One man is reported to have conversed happily with the ghost of his wife. There was no tendance of the dead.


Professor Wissler says that it was necessary for a man who treated sickness to have gained his power through dreams and visions following on fasting, and in no other manner: ‘A medicine-man may have owned all the rituals and stand pre-eminent in ceremonial skill and yet not be a doctor.’

Fasting as a means of securing help from ‘supernatural beings’ is mentioned also by E. S. Curtis, The North American Indian, vi. 15 ff. Mr. Curtis does not quote the native word which he translates ‘supernatural being’. The treatment of sickness by songs is illustrated by W. McClintock, Old Indian Trails, pp. 261–72, who describes the ‘Weather-Makers’ in op. cit., pp. 310–11.

In Old North Trails, pp. 167–77, W. McClintock says that:

1. the sun, certain animals, and ‘supernatural beings’ were the source of magic power (cp. a similar report in reference to the Klallam, n. 509);
2. the ‘Great Spirit’ (‘Great Mystery’, ‘Good Power’) was ‘everywhere and in everything’ (the native term is not quoted);
3. ‘sun-worship’ was the ‘very centre’ of Blackfoot religion.

All these statements appear to be false inferences, the truth being that the sun was natosio, i.e. ‘unusual’, or ‘beyond comprehension’, so the natosio-quality was manifest in the sun, as well as in anything else which was unusual or beyond comprehension. The evidence is as follows:

E. S. Curtis, The North American Indian, vi. 64–5, 172, reports that (a) a medicine-man was natosio; (b) the sun was ‘invoked’ as Natosio (note the capital N); (c) the word natosio was applied ‘as an adjective to all sacred or supposedly supernatural creatures or objects’; (d) the ordinary word for sun was kyesum, the moon being kokokyesum, ‘night-sun’. In pagan times, Mr. Curtis thinks, kyesum was the only word which meant ‘sun’, but the continued application of natosio, ‘supernatural’, to the sun (would not ‘supernormal’ be a preferable term?) caused the natives to speak of the sun as Natosio.

Natosio was of the Piegan dialect; the remainder of the Blackfoot tribe used the word natoye. G. B. Grinnell, Blackfoot Lodge Tales, pp. 101, 258, says that natoye was applied to certain animals: ‘This word’, he adds, ‘may be translated “of the sun”, “having sun-power”, or more properly “something sacred”.’

Thus (1) if the word which McClintock renders ‘Great Spirit’, &c., be natosio
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(natoye), its ubiquity is a false inference from the fact that the word was applied adjectively to supernormal phenomena; (2) the sun was not worshipped qua sun, but because it was natosio (natoye).

We find that the report of ‘sun-worship’ among the Crows (para. 119) is founded on the same error, i.e. upon a confusion between the meaning of a word and the phenomena to which it was applied. Indeed, all reports of sun-worship among uncivilized societies must be examined with great care before they can be accepted.

The confusion between natosio and the phenomena to which it was applied is illustrated by this story: When J. W. Schultz was about to marry his charming Nat-ah-Ki, he said to her, in reference to a Minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church: ‘He out there is a sacred (more correctly sun) white man. I have asked him to sacredly marry us.’ See J. W. Schultz, My Life as an Indian, p. 225.

G. Catlin, Illustrations of the Manners, Customs and Conditions of the N.A.I. i. 36, tells us that he was a ‘medicine-man’ of the highest order among the Blackfeet. It is probable that the natives applied to him the word natosio (natoye) because his painting was a strange, unaccountable thing, and thus the greatest of ‘medicine’.

There appears to have been a similar confusion between the adjectival meaning of the word natosio (natoye) and the Old Man, a mythological trickster to whom it was applied. Thus the Old Man has been called a ‘god’, and we are told that he was ‘worshipped’; but no rites were conducted in his honour. For the Old Man as a ‘deity’, see Handbook of the American Indians, s.v. sikiska.

With these comments, cp. my remarks in reference to the reports on the Arapaho, n. 514.

For ninampskan, see G. B. Grinnell, op. cit., p. 271.


The Sun-Dance of the Arapaho is the subject of an extremely able paper by G. A. Dorsey, Field Columbian Museum, Anth. Ser. iv (1903), pp. 1-228, who states (op. cit., p. 9) that the main object of the ceremony was the prevention of sickness.

J. Mooney, op. cit., p. 954, says that the Arapaho were one of the westernmost of the Algonquian stock, and were associated so closely with the Cheyenne that ‘they have no recollection of the time when they were not allies’. On the other hand, E. S. Curtis, op. cit., pp. 137, 139-40, calls them the most southerly of the Algonquian people and considers that they were not closely related to the Cheyenne ‘except by association and customs’. I can do no more than record these conflicting reports. Perhaps their apparent contrariness is due to the use of such vague words as ‘allies’ and ‘related’.

Mr. Mooney gives a list of the names by which the Arapaho were known. He states also that the Gros Ventres (i.e. Hidatsa, for whom see para. 119) were a sub-tribe of the Arapaho.


If I have read aright the speeches reported by A. L. Kroeber, op. cit., pp. 315-16, marriage was usually matrilocal.


The poverty of our knowledge concerning the native terms which the Arapaho employed is illustrated by the fact that in his comparative vocabulary (op. cit., p. 172) Mr. Curtis omits the word which corresponds to the Blackfoot natosio (natoye), for which see n. 510. In that note I pointed out the confusion which has arisen between 'supernatural power' and the place of its manifestation. E. S. Curtis, op. cit., p. 144, says that 'the same tendency to confuse the mythical trickster with the supernatural power was exhibited among the Arapaho'. The 'mythological trickster' among the Blackfeet was Napi, 'Old Man', to whom they applied the term natosio; the corresponding figure in Arapaho folk-lore was niatha, spider. Cp. the Siouan iktomi, spider, and the Coyote of the Rocky Mountain tribes. The words applied to this 'wonder-working hero' were applied also to the 'miraculous white man'.

The Arapaho term for 'supernatural power' (unless it was baataana) is missing. Whatever term it was, it is translated 'spirit' by G. A. Dorsey, 'The Arapaho Sun Dance', Field Columbian Museum, Anth. Ser. iv (1903), p. 106.

Mr. Dorsey says that the word was applied to Grandfather, Light of the Earth, Old Woman Night, Four Old Men, and Morning Star. E. S. Curtis, op. cit., p. 144, reports that 'the principal spirits were Father, Four Old Men, the Sun, and the Earth'. Probably Mr. Curtis's 'Father' is Mr. Dorsey's 'Grandfather'. According to Mr. Curtis, 'Father' represented the same conception as the Great Mystery of the Sioux. 'The Four Old Men', he adds, 'are the four quarters of the semi-cardinal points.'

Thus (1) there was a word (baataana?) in the Arapaho language which was applied to (a) the miraculous figures in their folk-tales, (b) to the sun, earth, and cardinal points;

(2) the word corresponded to the Siouan wakan (para. 117, and esp. n. 520);

(3) the meaning of this word seems to have been confused with the phenomena to which it was applied.

515. For these dates and data, see H. Hale, The Iroquois Book of Rites, p. 9; H. R. Schoolcraft, Notes on the Iroquois, p. 185; L. H. Morgan, League of the Iroquois, pp. 226 ff.

516. The best summary is to be found in L. H. Morgan, League of the Iroquois, pp. 150-61, 170, 178, 183.

Morgan calls Havenneyoe 'Great Spirit'. Literally, he says, the word meant simply 'a ruler'. According to F. Parkman, The Jesuits in North America, p. lxxviii and n. 1, the translation of the word as 'God' was due to the Jesuits.

For a totally different version of the alleged 'Great Spirit' conception, see H. R. Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes, i. 316-17.


Morgan says that a magician was possessed by a 'spirit', but he does not quote the native word.


Mr. Hewitt has published another essay ('Iroquoian Cosmology', 21st Ann. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1899-1900, pp. 127-339) in which he speaks of 'primitive man', 'animate spirits', &c. I do not know if orenda is the word which he translates 'spirits'. 'The
significance', he says (op. cit., p. 135), 'of the Iroquois term usually rendered "god" is "disposer" or "controller".' It is possible that he also has confused a mythological trickster with a 'god'. This mistake is common in the literature on the American Indians; see, e.g., nn. 510 and 514. Mr. Hewitt would have been more helpful if he had quoted the native terms which he was translating. The Iroquoian word for 'malefic magic power' was otgon orenda (ibid., pp. 224, 339).

The comparison between wakan and orenda cannot be accepted while the difficulty stated in the text remains unsolved. If the terms are comparable, Mr. Hewitt's description of orenda is inaccurate; if his description of orenda is accurate, and not due to the intrusion of the white man's theories, the two conceptions were different.

The failure to recognize the difference between the reported meanings of the two words vitiates the interpretations placed upon them by Marett, Durkeim, Hubert and Mauss, and others, for whose submissions see n. 520.

E. S. Hartland also (Ritual and Belief, p. 90) has made certain submissions which are founded upon the legitimacy of the comparison.


The 'notoriously dissolute' character of the Hurons, and their practice of temporary or experimental marriages, are mentioned by F. Parkman, The Jesuits in North America, p. xxxiv.

The literature in reference to the pre-nuptial sexual conduct of the Iroquois has been discussed by R. Briffault, The Mothers, ii. 32–4.


For wakanda as 'Great Spirit', see, e.g., J. Carver, Travels through the Interior of North America, p. 379; W. H. Keating, Narrative of an Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's River, i. 407–9.

Keating was an accurate observer: for instance, he noticed that 'one spirit resides in the sun, another in the moon'. The fact which did not occur to him was that he was reading a white man's 'spiritual concept' (to employ Mr. McGee's phrase) into the red man's thoughts. On the whole, however, Keating is a reliable authority. Moreover, he realized that his information was not infallible. He says that he received most of it from a man called Renville, and himself warns us that 'all the information which he (i.e. Renville) has given us cannot be depended on'.


The Dakotan wakan has played a notable part in the submissions of R. R. Marett, The Threshold of Religion, passim; E. Durkeim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. J. W. Swain, p. 192; Messrs. Hubert and Mauss in L'Année sociologique, vii (1902–3). This literature is vitiated by the fact that certain native words of a totally different character are compared with one another. The confusions seem to have arisen from the fact that the English words 'magic power' have been used to translate each of those native terms; then it has been assumed that the words had an identical native meaning. A study of the native usage shows that this assumption is unjustified.

The Dakotans were first visited by the Jesuits in 1640 (McGee) or 1660 (Keating). See W. J. McGee, op. cit., p. 189; W. H. Keating, op. cit. i. 407. Another name of
the tribe was Naudowessies. Carver uses it. For a full list of the names by which the group was known, see Handbook of the American Indians, s.v.


According to the Rev. S. R. Riggs, 'Mythology of the Dakotas', American Antiquarian, v (1883), p. 149, 'they also pray to the spirits of their deceased relatives'. He does not quote the evidence on which the opinion was based, and describes no rites in honour of the dead. He obtained his information, he says, 'directly from the Dakota themselves, partly by direct inquiry of those most capable of giving the information sought'. Thus the statement, essentially meaningless, may be based on hearsay.

J. O. Dorsey, op. cit., p. 493, quotes a passage from Smet's Western Missions and Missionaries, p. 243, in reference to the treatment of ancestors. The food which here is reported as having been placed on the scaffolds by some members of the Assiniboine tribe was not tendance, for the attention was not post-funeral. The members of many zoistic societies placed food in a grave when they buried their dead.

The Assiniboine were a sub-tribe of the Dakota; they broke away from the main body of the tribe. According to W. H. Keating, Narrative of an Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's River, i. 404, the Dakota called them Hoha, 'the Revoluted'.


P. Prescott, in H. R. Schoolcraft, op. cit. iii. 229, reports an interesting custom which seems to place the practices of these Indians on the same plane as, e.g., the zoistic Melanesians. 'The Indian', he says, 'will pick up a round stone and paint it, and go a few rods from his lodge and clear away the grass, and there place his stone, or god, as he would term it, and make an offering of some tobacco and some feathers and pray to the stone to deliver him from some danger that he has probably dreamt of.' The word 'god' is a translation of wahan; possibly a wahan-stone was a stone of unusual character or shape. Cp. the haxe-stones of the Loyalty Islanders (para. 30), the uhngen-stones of the Tannese (para. 31), the w-uni-stones of the Banks Islanders (para. 72), the magic stones of the Koita (n. 331), and the 'medicine-rocks' of the Crow Indians (para. 119).

Certain articles, which are called 'guardian-spirits' or 'mystery rocks' by J. O. Dorsey, op. cit., p. 446, may be compared to the Arapaho 'bags' and the Blackfoot 'bundles', for which see paras. 114 and 115.

When P. Prescott, in H. R. Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes, iii. 227, says that 'the worship of the sun is caused by some one having dreamed of the sun', he is reporting what other observers would have expressed by saying that the sun was a 'god' or a 'guardian spirit'. It is clear from the statements of Mr. McGee (n. 520) that the attention to the sun was due to the fact that the sun was wahan. Cp. the meaning of the Blackfoot natosio (natoye) (n. 510), the Arapaho baataana (n. 514), and the Crow maxpe (para. 119).

Similarly, it is probable that the 'mystery tree' for the Sun-Dance was a tree in which wahan was manifest, i.e. an 'unusual' tree. Cp. the Ojibwa method of selecting a manido-tree for certain rites (para. 113). Cp. also the presence of the power in the universe in fig-trees (para. 86, nn. 356, 362, 403, 437).
For *wakan* (‘gods’) in trees ‘on the highest eminences’, see also S. Eastman in H. R. Schoolcraft, op. cit. iii. 486.


There is a strange report by S. Eastman in H. R. Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, iii. 238; it is not only worthy of notice for the facts which it records; it is also fairly representative of a certain type of anthropological literature:

‘Courtships can be carried on at almost any time, owing to their being huddled together and all the time meeting each other about the lodges. Some we may say make their visits regularly at the lodge; others do not; and some may not visit the lodge at all, or even have spoken to the woman, and the first thing she knows she is bought.’

It seems possible that some parts of this paragraph have been deleted by a careful editor. Perhaps we may understand that if they were so inclined the young men visited the girls in their lodges but that it was unusual for a girl to marry her lover, marriages being arranged by their elders between two young people who may not have been acquainted with one another. I doubt if ‘bought’ can be literally understood. There may have been a mere exchange of gifts.


In op. cit., p. 323, Fletcher and La Flesche state that ‘tribal custom favoured chastity’, but from subsequent passages I judge that the Omaha did not object to pre-nuptial sexual intercourse; they merely disapproved of a girl changing her lover constantly.

For some comments on the value of reports concerning sexual behaviour (as distinct from sexual regulation), see para. 15.


No post-funeral rites were conducted in honour of the dead. Concerning ghosts some ‘beliefs’ are reported which appear to be individual opinions expressed in answer to direct questions; e.g. some people thought that ghosts (the native term is not quoted) tampered with food, but a man could thwart them by placing a knife across the plate; a ghost might follow a man who travelled by night, but if the traveller jumped a stream, he was safe, for this was a feat which no ghost could perform. Such reports as these have no scientific value.


Fletcher and La Flesche attach an unusual meaning to the word ‘witchcraft’; cp. the following passages:

(1) ‘Although witches and witchcraft did not exist among the Omaha, disease was sometimes supposed to have its origin in the magical introduction into the human body of a worm or other object.’

(2) ‘Witchcraft such as is said to have existed in other tribes was not found among the Omaha. There was general fear and dread of magic, but no one who practised it was persecuted or punished for the acts; he might be avoided, but he would remain unmolested.’

According to this account, anti-social magic may be termed ‘witchcraft’ only when the practitioners are ‘persecuted or punished’. It is a strange use of a simple
word. Most writers apply the term to the magic which is feared and dreaded, whether the practitioner be persecuted or not. It is clear that such 'witchcraft' existed among the Omaha.

J. O. Dorsey states that when a man who had been bewitched died, the wizard who was responsible for his condition could be killed without trial.

526. For the application of wakonda (is this the substantival or the adjectival form?) to mysterious and inexplicable phenomena, see A. C. Fletcher and F. La Flesche, 'The Omaha Tribe', 27th Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Eth., 1905-6, p. 599.

From this use of the word Fletcher and La Flesche infer that wakonda denoted the 'idea of permeating life': e.g. 'Wakonda stands for the mysterious life power permeating all natural forms and forces and all forms of man's conscious life'. See A. C. Fletcher, 'A Study of the Omaha Tribe: the Import of the Totem', Smith. Rep., 1887, pp. 577–86.

The inference is unjustified. 'Permeating life' is a conception which has been formulated only by some members of some civilized societies. That wakonda was a conception of the usual kind is clear from the fact that the female menses, among other inexplicable things, was one of the phenomena to which it was applied. See J. O. Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology', 3rd Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Eth., 1881–2, p. 266 f.

As for the alleged personification of wakonda, it seems possible that there was no word in the Omaha language which corresponds to our word 'it', and that if the neuter gender was not used, the use of 'he' or 'she' in those contexts in which we use 'it' may have resulted in wakonda being reported as 'personified'. Cp. para 148.

For magical fraternities, see A. C. Fletcher and F. La Flesche, op. cit., p. 133; J. O. Dorsey, op. cit., p. 349.


'The 'modesty' of the women is reported by G. Catlin, Illustrations of the Manners, Customs and Condition of the N.A.I. i. 121. Cp. my comments in para. 15 and n. 524.


Another name for the Crow Indians was Aparoke; sometimes the Hidatsa are known as Minnetarees and Gros Ventres.


For the method of disposal of the dead, see G. F. Will and H. J. Spinden, 'The

G. Catlin, *Illustrations of the Manners, Customs and Condition of the N.A.I.* i. 90, reports a peculiar post-funeral rite which was carried out by the Mandans. Catlin's account raises more questions than it answers, and I doubt if his knowledge of the custom was exhaustive. The skulls of the dead, we are told, used to be arranged in circles on the prairie; specially prepared food was placed before a skull at night, the woman who had tended her relative returning for the dish in the morning. The following questions arise:

(1) Were the skulls of all dead persons treated in this manner, or were the skulls of certain men selected? If a selection was made, how and by whom was it made?

(2) Was the rite a regular custom or did Catlin observe an isolated incident?

Was the gift of food an act of placation, or was it inspired by mere affection?

(3) Who placed the skulls in a circle? For what reason was the circle made?

Since there is no report of affliction being ascribed to ghosts, the rite cannot have been *do ut absas*. I conjecture that the circle had been made in connexion with some ceremony of which Catlin did not know the nature and that the woman's action (Catlin mentions only a single instance) was a chance action on the part of a single individual.


Professor Lowie criticizes Dr. Radin for saying (*J.A.F.L.* xxvii (1904), pp. 344-51): 'Sacredness of *maxpa* persons or objects is ascribed solely to the connexion with spirits.' If Dr. Radin were to express this alleged Crow opinion in the Crow language, his statement would read: 'Sacredness of *maxpa* persons or objects is ascribed solely to the connexion with *maxpa*.' Does not this more accurate statement alter the sense?

E. S. Curtis, *The North American Indian*, iv. 53-4, says that *maxpe* meant 'that which is above'. He seems to have confused the meaning of the word with one of the phenomena to which it was applied.

The sun was *maxpe*; and one man regarded the sun as his special 'medicine' (R. H. Lowie, op. cit., p. 353). R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Religion*, p. 21, discussing the application of the English phrase 'supreme being' to the sun, says: 'Even the most trustworthy witnesses cannot agree as to whether he is identical with Old Man Coyote, the hero of Crow folk-lore.' Is it not possible that the confusion exists only because *maxpe* was applied both to the sun and to Old Man Coyote? Cp. n. 510. A similar confusion has arisen out of the application of the Blackfoot adjective *natosis* to the Old Man, the sun, and other phenomena. See also para. 120.

Offerings were made to any *maxpe* object (e.g. the sun); see R. H. Lowie, 'Religion of the Crow Indians', *Anth. Pap.*, *Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xxv (1922), pp. 426, 428.


These scholars also appear to have confused the meaning of *hopini* with the phenomena to which it was applied, for they identify the sun and the 'Lord of Life'. The identification seems to be an inference from the fact that the natives applied the word *hopini* to both phenomena. Cp. the identification of the sun and Old Man Coyote in (1).


The word *mahopa* is translated as a substantive, 'medicine, charm, spell'. The sun is reported to have been *hopa*, which apparently was the adjectival form of
mahopa. But the distinction is not always maintained in the appropriate literature.

Mr. Matthews does not report that the mythological hero Itakatetas, 'who made all things', was confused with other phenomena to which the word hopa was applied. He says that hopa was applied to Itakatetas. Probably his statement that the Hidatsa worshipped 'everything in nature' is an inference from the fact that the hopa-quality was manifest in incomprehensible things.


With the Crow medicine-rocks, cp. the Dakota stones and similar magical instruments (n. 522).

G. H. Pepper has described a Hidatsa shrine in 'An Indian Shrine', *Univ. Pen. Mus. Journ.* iv (1913), pp. 104-6. It was decorated by a bundle, a pipe, and two human skulls (of dead hopa-men?).


The Mandan visions have been described by E. S. Curtis, op. cit. v. 13, 16.

For Catlin as hopini owing to his painting, see n. 510.


Dr. Radin's essay contains many inferences and in some places is very difficult to understand, e.g. such phrases as 'old strata of Winnebago beliefs', 'the Winnebago pantheon', 'newer deities', &c., are not explained, and do not appear to be justified. Nor are the native terms for the latter phrases quoted.

Dr. Radin has concentrated on the study of Winnebago 'beliefs', and seems to have secured his information by direct questioning; e.g. he says: 'What is it that he (i.e. a member of the Winnebago tribe) means by wakan? From my experience he simply means that it is "sacred" and if pressed for a more definite answer he would probably say that it has the power of bestowing blessing upon him, in other words, of acting like a spirit.' It is surprising that such a sentence should appear in an essay which purports to be an authoritative description of uncivilized culture. Does Dr. Radin suggest that we should accept as irrefragable evidence the statements of a native who has been 'pressed for an answer'? Moreover, what is this 'spirit' that the phenomenon imitates? Does it exist apart from the animistic theory?

For a comment on direct questioning, see para. 4. For other comments on Dr. Radin's writings, see para. 102.

I sympathize with Dr. Radin's criticism of the writings of (1) J. N. B. Hewitt, 'Orenda and a Definition of Religion', *Amer. Anth. N.S.* iv (1902), pp. 33-46 f.; (2) W. Jones, 'The Algonkin Manitou', *J.A.F.L.* xviii (1905), pp. 183-90. For a comment on (1), see para. 116. In (2) the ubiquity of Manitou has been inferred from the fact that Manitou was manifest in 'unusual' phenomena. See para. 113.

532. For disposal of the dead, see J. E. Fletcher in H. R. Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, iv. 54-5. A fire was kindled at the grave for four nights.

For the cause and treatment of sickness, see P. Radin, op. cit., pp. 168, n. 9, 171, n. 17, 254 ff., 213; F. Andros in H. R. Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes, iii. 498.

In studying Dr. Radin’s report, we must make allowance for his use of the words ‘spirits’ and ‘deities’; see para. 102 and n. 531.


The Choctaw were one of the largest and earliest known tribes of the Creek Confederacy, but, as Mr. Swanton has said, ‘singularly few attempts were made to give a description of them’ (‘Aboriginal Culture of the South-East’, 42nd Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Eth., 1924–5, p. 680). Thus I have omitted them from my list.


In the second-named paper (p. 519) Mr. Fewkes emphasizes the variety of the practices, especially at Oraibi. This variety was represented by such ceremonies as the Oraibi Soyal Ceremony, Oraibi Oaquol Ceremony, Oraibi Marau Ceremony, &c. These are the subject of some learned papers by Messrs. G. A. Dorsey and H. R. Voth in Field Columbian Museum, Anth. Ser. iii (1901–3), pp. 1–358; vi (1903–5), pp. 1–113; xi (1912), pp. 1–88. The Oaquol and Marau were two of the women’s secret societies, the former being the largest and most recently formed. An even greater variety is reported by H. R. Voth, in ‘Drab Flute Society’, and ‘Blue Flute Society’, Field Columbian Museum, Anth. Ser. xi (1912), pp. 129 ff., 135 ff.

The resistance of the Oraibi inhabitants to the intrusion of the white man is emphasized by J. W. Fewkes, ‘The Oraibi Flute Altar’, J.A.F.L. viii, no. 31 (separate reprint), p. i, who states (n. 1) that H. R. Voth ‘is the only living white man who may be said to speak the Hopi language fluently’.

The kindling of fire was an important Hopi rite. ‘The Lesser New-Fire Ceremony at Walpi’ has been described by J. W. Fewkes in Amer. Anth. N.s. iii (1901), pp. 428–53.

A great part of the appropriate literature has been devoted to a separation of the various elements which constituted this complex ritual. Mr. Fewkes’s use of the term ‘supernatural being’ is confusing. He appears to use it not as a translation of any definite Hopi term but as a rough undefined category in which he can place the Corn-Maid, Katchinas, mythical heroes, ‘mystery’, &c. Moreover, when he says (‘Fire-worship of the Hopi Indians’, Smith. Rep., 1920, p. 609) that ‘fire-cult and that of the sun are survivals of two forms of element worship that we can trace back into the past and through archaeology know something of their prehistoric character’, it is clear that he is not describing Hopi culture as it was but speculations concerning its origin. The study of the native rites is not assisted thereby.

Mr. Fewkes says that ‘fire is directly concerned in the sociology and the evolution of society among the Hopi’; but can these ‘prehistoric phases of cultural develop-
ment’, as Mr. Fewkes calls them, be the subject of scientific inquiry if it is assumed a priori that ‘the nature and cause of life early became a subject of speculation’? The opinion would appear to be contradicted by all the available data about uncivilized life.


For some of Mr. Fewkes’s later publications, see n. 536.


In the last-named paper Mr. Fewkes equates the Hopi katchina with the Zuni koko.


540. Ibid., p. 498.


The dead were placed also in rock crevices, dead children being buried in this manner.

The Hopi thought the soul of a dead child went back to the mother’s house before being reincarnated in her next baby; until another babe was born, the soul hovered about: ‘When an unusual noise is heard in the house, for instance a cracking in the roof, they think the little soul is moving about, and the mother often secretly deposits a pinch of food on the floor in some parts of the house for her departed child’ (H. R. Voth, i.e.). I do not think that this action, apparently spasmodic and impulsive, can be called tendance.


544. For the causes and treatment of sickness, see E. S. Curtis, The North American Indian, xii. 52–3, 55; for priests, see T. Donaldson, The Moqui Pueblo Indians of Arizona, p. 17.

There was nothing very remarkable about the Hopi ‘altars’, but they were picturesque. The native term for ‘altar’ seems to have been pahori, a ‘prayer-stick’ being pahos. The latter may be an anglicized plural. The sacred badge of a priest was called tipsni.

It is impossible to tell what native words are represented by the English words 'fetishes', 'idols', 'wonder objects', &c. As written, the reports can hardly be intelligently understood.


According to Mr. Curtis, parents used to arrange marriages.

Unmarried girls wore their hair in two large whors above their ears; there does not seem to have been any connexion between these whors and virginity.

For sexual opportunity, see also the remarks on communal houses in para. 122.


548. The following references are to publications cited in n. 547:

for witchcraft, M. C. Stevenson, op. cit., pp. 329 ff.; E. S. Curtis, op. cit., p. 111;

for treatment, M. C. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 384 f.; E. S. Curtis, op. cit., p. 146;


The magicians were organized into societies according to the animal which was their 'fetich' or 'mystery'. F. H. Cushing, 'Zuni Fetiches', 2nd Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Eth., 1880–1, p. 39, states that the wearing of these 'fetiches' was 'almost as universal as the wearing of amulets and "medicines" among other nations and Indian tribes'.

The word ashivanni, usually translated 'rain-priest', is translated by E. S. Curtis (op. cit., pp. 112, 149, 194) as 'priest associated with world region' and 'chiefs', simply. Ashiwi was an alternative name for Zuni.

The beliefs about rain have been described by M. C. Stevenson, op. cit., pp. 20–1. Mrs. Stevenson also gives a list of Zuni 'gods'. She seems to use the word 'gods' in reference to mythological heroes, the subjects of carvings and paintings, wooden images, &c. Mr. Curtis also mentions 'gods'; he does not quote the native word. We hear also of 'ancestral gods' (M. C. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 62); this term also seems to have been applied to mythological heroes.

F. H. Cushing, op. cit., pp. 9, 11, says that worship of the Zuni 'while directed to the more mysterious and remote powers of Nature, or "existences", was directed more especially to animals'. Mr. Cushing does not quote the native term which he translates 'existences' nor does he say how the animals were selected, or if they also were 'existences'.

In her 'The Religious Life of a Zuni Child', 5th Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Eth., 1883–4, p. 546, Mrs. Stevenson remarks: 'The Zuni are polytheists, yet while they have a plurality of gods, many of whom are the spirits of their ancestors, these gods are but mediums through which to reach their one great father of all—the Sun'. The reference to the sun is repeated in 'The Zuni Indians', 23rd Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Eth., 1901–2, p. 22, where 'the Sun Father' is called 'the great god above all other anthropic and zoic gods'. Mrs. Stevenson does not quote the native term which she translates 'god'; was it the same word as that which Mr. Cushing translates 'existence'? If I have read correctly a passage in F. H. Cushing, op. cit., p. 9, the sun was merely one of the many natural phenomena which was an 'existence'. Thus it seems that there was a word in the Zuni language which
was applied to 'the more mysterious powers of nature', to certain animals and to the sun. Cp. the Blackfoot natosis (n. 510), Crow maxpe (para. 119, n. 529), &c.

The word kiiwisis seems to have been applied both to the secret societies and to the places where the societies met. See M. C. Stevenson, op. cit., pp. 62–7.

Some of the Zuni ceremonies have been described by E. S. Parsons, 'Notes on Zuni', *Mem. Amer. Anth. Ass.* iv (1917), pp. 151–225.


It would be interesting to know the native term which is translated 'people' in such phrases as 'cloud people', 'lightning people', &c. I suspect that there was a term which was applied to certain cloud formations, lightning, &c., and that this term represented the power which the rain ceremonies were designed to control.

550. For the close association of the two tribes, see E. S. Curtis, *The North American Indian*, vol. i, pp. xix, 3; L. Ostermann, 'The Navajo Indians of New Mexico and Arizona', *Anthropos*, iii (1908), p. 857. Mr. Ostermann cites A. F. Bandelier's opinion that the Apache were originally nothing else but outlying bands of Navaho.


Mr. Curtis says that elaborate precautions were taken to wipe out all footprints in order to deceive the ghost as to the movements of the survivors.

J. G. Bourke, 'Notes on the Religion of the Apache', *Folk-Lore*, ii (1891), p. 420, says: 'Ghost worship or ancestor-worship is the most widely recognized feature of American aboriginal religion.' I do not know what single precise meaning Capt. Bourke attaches to the term 'ancestor-worship'; he produces no evidence to justify his statement. He seems to translate the word chidin (chindi) as 'ghost' and as 'the spirit of the dead'. The alleged 'worship' among the Apache seems to have consisted in the appearance of chidin in dreams, or in 'sober reality' at night; in other words the chidin was a spook, apparition, or spectre. The medicine-man, izzenanant, could 'lay' chidin by dances and incantations.

E. S. Curtis, op. cit. i. 143–4, translates chidin (Navaho, tsindi) as 'spirits', and digin (Navaho, hatali) as 'medicine-man'. In his 'Medicine-men of the Apache', *9th Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Eth.*, 1887–8, p. 452, Capt. Bourke uses the word 'doctor' to denote a magician, the Apache word being diyi. See further n. 553.

553. See (1) for the Apache, E. S. Curtis, *The North American Indian*, i. 35, 132 (for medicine-men), 37, 39, 133 (for 'deities', esp. stenatlihan); J. G. Bourke, 'Notes on the Religion of the Apache', *Folk-Lore*, ii (1891), pp. 419, 426, 452, 462 (for the all-powerful medicine-man), 432 (for fear of witchcraft), 499 (for his difficulties with interpreters); idem, 'Medicine-men of the Apache', *9th Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Eth.*, 1887–8, pp. 451ff. The latter paper is an essay in comparative anthropology, not a description of Apache practices. Both Mr. Curtis and Capt. Bourke mention a certain powder, hoddentin, which was a favourite Apache 'medicine'.

The Navaho magicians carried out elaborate dances, ceremonies, songs, and chants in order to cure or to prevent sickness, to produce rain, to bring good fortune and to ward off bad fortune. Mr. Curtis says that there were so many of these ceremonies that their number has never been determined. The most important were the Mountain Chant and the Night Chant, which Washington Matthews has described respectively in 5th Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Eth., 1883–4, pp. 385 ff. and Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist. vi.

In the former essay the medicine-man is called qacali, 'medicine' being qacal. The word dsilyi seems to have been applied to high mountains; but the reports are difficult to understand. Indeed, Mr. Matthews confesses that he has rendered the same native term by many different English words.

In the latter essay the word hastebaka is translated 'gods': hastse was manifest in the dawn, eastern sky, and other places. In Mr. Matthews's posthumous essay, 'Navaho Myths, Prayers and Songs', Univ. Cal. Publ. Amer. Arch. Eth. v (1902), pp. 38, 44, 50, hastsehogan is called a 'house god' and 'personified deity'.

I suspect that both dsilyi and hastse were important words. The application of wakan, munedoo, and similar terms to the name natural phenomena among the Plains Indians suggests that either dsilyi or hastse was their Navaho equivalent.

A. M. Stephen, 'The Navaho', Amer. Anth. vi (1893), pp. 359–60, speaks of 'popular deities' being in the dawn, east, and west. E. Backus, in H. R. Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes, iv. 313, mentions a sacred spring which used to spurt out boiling water, the obvious conjecture being that it was sacred (hastse? dsilyi?) because it was incomprehensible.

According to Washington Matthews, 'Some deities and demons of the Navajo', American Naturalist, xx (1886), pp. 841 ff., the word gay denoted 'divinity'.


Both these writers use the word 'exorcism' in reference to the pronunciation of a counter-spell. For my use of the term, see para. 9.


Sodomy was common. Cp. the habits of the Chickasaws (n. 554).

The word 'deities' is applied to two 'beings' whose names were mentioned in certain incantations; no rites were conducted in their honour. They may have been mythological heroes.

According to Mr. Swanton the religion of the Creeks 'was seamed through and through with the idea that similarity of appearance means similarity of nature, and that association of any kind will result in communicating properties from one thing or person to another'. That is to say, the Creeks had complete faith in sympathetic magic.

See J. R. Swanton, op. cit., pp. 485 (for 'deities'), 517 (for faith in magic).


I have thought it better to confine my reference to this publication than to extend these notes by the citation of books which are not readily accessible. Mr. Swanton quotes freely from the writings of Penicault, Charlevoix, Gravier, du Pratz, &c. His essay is a valuable summary of the available information.

560. Ibid., p. 138 f.
561. Ibid., pp. 101–2, 169–70.
562. Ibid., pp. 101–3.
563. Ibid., pp. 158–72.

564. These buildings were scattered over a large part of the Lower Mississippi Valley. Specific references are made to those of the following tribes: Natchez, Taensa, Quinipissa, Mujulasha, Acolapissa, Pascagoula, Biloxi, Houma, Grigra, and Tunica. Ibid., p. 166. We do not know very much about these tribes.

565. Ibid., p. 167. Mr. Swanton makes a valiant attempt to reconstruct Natchez 'beliefs', but, since the native language is no longer spoken, we shall never know how the natives used their words. The word chill seems to have been important. Mr. Swanton says that 'it cannot be well rendered in our language'. He does not state in what contexts the word was used or to which phenomena it was applied.


If a man dreamt of or saw a spook, a medicine-man went to the grave of the offender and ordered him to be quiet. Spooks, we are told, 'always do as they are bid'. Cp. the Nez Percé belief (para. 110)—but there is no report that the Pimas held a ghost responsible for an illness.

The 'sacred places' reported in op. cit., pp. 254–6, seem to have been the graves of magicians.


I am not clear about the sickness which is said to have been caused by animals. I conjecture that a certain unknown word existed which was applied both to an unaccountable sickness and to certain animals.

The songs are said to have been selected according to the nature of the illness; thus we are told that a man would sing a bear song to cure a bear illness, a deer song to cure a deer illness, and so on.
Mr. Russell says that when a Pima boy was young he was taken in his father's arms at daybreak to hear the mysteries of the 'Great Sun-God'. Mr. Russell calls both the sun and the night 'deities'. He does not quote the native terms which he translates 'deities'; perhaps some unknown Pima word was applied to the sun, night, and other phenomena also. Many cases of alleged 'sun-worship', on being examined, are found to be a regard for a power which is manifest in many other places besides the sun. See, e.g., n. 510 (Blackfeet), para. 119 and n. 529 (Hidatsa, Mandan, Crow).

Mr. Russell mentions two other 'deities', tsau ou makai, 'Earth Magician', and siu, 'Elder Brother', but there was 'a puzzling mingling of the old and the new in the myths' due to 'recent adaptation of Earth Doctor and Elder Brother from the Christian Religion'. Since 'Earth Magician' was called Tciois and Dios (Spanish), it is doubtful if these conceptions were pagan.


569. Tahiti was discovered by Capt. Wallis 19 June 1767, and was called by him King George's Island. W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 7, maintains the old distinction between the Georgian and the Society Islands.

Subsequent visits by various Explorers were made in 1768 (de Bougainville), 1769 (Cook), 1772 (Boenechea), 1773 (Cook and Furneaux), 1774 (Cook), 1774–5 (Boenechea, Andia, Gayangos, and Langara), and 1777 (Cook and Clerke). The ship Duff arrived 5 March 1797.

Tahiti is said to have been the Maori Hawaiki, while the equation Fiji = Viti = Tahitian hiti has been suggested by S. Percy Smith, 'The Polynesian Sojourn in Fiji', J.P.S. iii (1894), p. 146.

J. Cook, A Voyage to the Southern Pacific, ii. 141–2, emphasizes the possibility of error in his descriptions of native customs: 'The truth is, our visits, though frequent, have been but transient; many of us had no inclination to make inquiries; more of us were unable to direct our inquiries properly; and we all laboured, though not to the same degree, under the disadvantages attending an imperfect knowledge of the language.' He states (op. cit. ii. 76, 250, 335) that the English and Spanish sailors visited Tahiti more than any other island. The Spaniards, he says, could not learn much about 'their idolatry'.


573. J. Hawkesworth, Voyages, ii. 187; G. Forster, A Voyage Round the World, i. 265, 284.

This striking diversity is mentioned also by L. de Bougainville, A Voyage Round the World, p. 249, but the theory is scorned by W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 82.

J. Wilson, A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific Ocean, p. 371, is careful to point out that the lewd conduct of the 'young and wanton' can no more be taken for the standard of manners in Tahiti than the behaviour of the harlots in an English port can be held to represent the manners of the English countryside.

574. W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 262.

For the alleged compulsory infanticide, 'moral degradation', 'brutal licentiousness', 'dissolute sensuality', and the 'revolting' and 'depraved' character of the
Arreoi Society, see J. Cook, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, ii. 159; J. Hawkesworth, Voyages, ii. 208; B. G. Corney, The Quest and Occupation of Tahiti, iii. 377-8; W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 248-50.

According to G. Forster, A Voyage Round the World, ii. 128-36, the male members of the society were warriors of chiefly rank. F. W. Christian, Eastern Pacific Islands, pp. 201-2, considers that the Arreoi were a band of strolling players of which only men and women of high rank might be members; they went from one island to another, 'giving their hivas or dramatic entertainments, pageants, and tableaux of varying degrees of grossness, similar to the more elaborate and polished productions of early Javanese and Peruvian drama'. He considers that the visits of Persian and Arab traders may have been responsible for their effeminate and shameful customs.

Mr. Christian also compares arioi (as he spells the name) with the Maori karioi, 'debauched', Marquesan ka'ioi, and submits that these words may be slightly worn down forms of the Russian kharabati. I am not convinced by his argument.

W. Ellis, op. cit. i. 234, 236, agrees with Christian that the Arreoi were 'strolling players'. Their activities, he says, had a 'histrionic character'.

The term 'free love' which Hawkesworth (l.c.) applies to the relations which existed between the members of the society cannot be interpreted literally. According to W. Ellis, op. cit. i. 239, each male member possessed a wife; improper conduct towards her on the part of any other member 'was sometimes punished with death'.

Hawkesworth also states that if a woman wanted to rear her child she persuaded one of the men to 'patronize' it. Then the child was permitted to live, the mother being called wahnono'onoa, 'bearer of children', which was a term of reproach.


576. W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 262 f., 270.
Perhaps Ari'itaimai refers to these girls when she mentions the platforms, paepae, which were placed outside the houses. Ari'itaimai is discussing the traditional customs of the Tahitians. See The Memoirs of Ari'itaimai, p. 18.

577. For the sexual regulations of the Maori, see para. 45.

578. For Ellis's use of the words fare and marae, see n. 582.

579. J. Hawkesworth, Voyages, ii. 234, who writes morai. The word is also spelt morai, marai, moray, immoray, immarae, imaray, imarae, malai. For the sake of uniformity I adopt marae. For a discussion of the evidence, see n. 582.

The word tupahoe must not be confused with tupapau, which was an embalmed corpse, the place where the dead were exposed, or a ghost, according as we follow J. Wilson, A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific, p. 304; J. Cook, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, ii. 166; or B. G. Corney, The Quest and Occupation of Tahiti, ii. 261, n. 1; iii. 255.

580. For the biers and the subsequent removal of the bones, see J. Hawkesworth, Voyages, ii. 96-7, 142-3, 235-6; L. de Bougainville, A Voyage Round the World, pp. 254-5; W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 400-4.

The following writers mention that 'chiefs' or 'persons of note' were embalmed: J. Cook, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, ii. 52-3; J. Wilson, A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific, p. 363; W. Ellis, l.c.

The Tahitian method of embalmment did not prevent the rapid decay of the corpse.
581. J. Hawkesworth, Voyages, ii. 236.

That the ordinary people kept the relics in the house seems to follow from a statement by W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 270 f. On the morning of a marriage-day, he says, 'a temporary altar was erected in the house of the bride; the relics of her ancestors, perhaps their skulls or bones, were placed upon it'. This custom may explain the collection of jaw-bones which puzzled J. Cook, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, ii. 52-3.

For *orometua* (*oromatua*), 'spirits of the family dead', see W. Ellis, op. cit. i. 334, who calls them 'demons' in op. cit. i. 357, employing an anglicized plural, oromatua.

For *fare*, 'house', see W. Ellis, op. cit. i. 170 f.

582. J. Hawkesworth, Voyages, ii. 167; G. Forster, A Voyage Round the World, i. 267; ii. 139-9; B. G. Corney, The Quest and Occupation of Tahiti, i. 269 and n. 2; ii. 85, 328.

For *marae* as 'open space', see nn. 174 (Maori), 196 (Samoan), 205 (Tongan).

William Ellis, the missionary, was responsible, at least in part, for the confusion between the open space and the stone structure which stood therein. He states that *marae* was the name for temple. . . . All were uncovered, and resembled oratories rather than temples (Polynesian Reminiscences, i. 340). Ellis was a close observer, but a bad scholar; we cannot be surprised at his lapse. Sometimes he transforms a descriptive term into a proper name. Thus he remarks (l.c.), 'The national places of worship were designated by district appellations. *Tabu-tabu-a-tea* was the name of several, especially of those belonging to the king: the word may mean widespread sacredness.' Surely the application of the phrase to several structures should have warned Ellis of his mistake, for apparently each structure was owned by a different family. I think that the error was a result of direct questioning. To his question as to what the stone structure was called, the Tahitians probably replied *tabu-tabu-a-tea* ('it is very sacred').

Sometimes Ellis uses the word 'temple' in reference to places which were not called *marae* by the Tahitians: 'Although they would not only kill but eat certain kinds of sharks, the large blue sharks, *Squalus glauces*, were deified by them, and rather than attempt to destroy them they would endeavour to propitiate their favour by prayers and offerings. Temples were erected, in which priests officiated, and offerings were presented to the deified monsters.' Plainly these temples were not *marae*; what native word, then, is being translated temple? It is impossible to say. Since, however, the native term for temple among the Samoans was *faletaitu* (para. 50) and among the Tongans *faletapu* (para. 51), I should expect the Tahitian word to be a compound of *atua* and *fare*, 'house'; but no such word is mentioned by any of our authorities. Indeed Ellis alone mentions these 'temples' and 'deified monsters'. Elsewhere (op. cit. i. 171) he says that *Afareaitu* was the name of a village. The capital letter may be the result of inference, the literal meaning of the word being 'house of *aitu*'. Perhaps it was used adjectively and denoted the place at which at one time had been the site of a *fare-aitu*. If we may interpret the word in this manner, it might follow that in a previous epoch the Tahitians were deistic. At any rate the use of *aitu* is interesting, for *aitu* was the Samoan word which corresponded to the Tongan *otua*, Maori *atua*, Tahitian *atua*. I have conjectured (n. 195) that both these words, *aitu* and *atua*, were at one time common to all Polynesian societies, that after the dispersion of the Polynesians some groups preserved *aitu*, others preserving *atua*, and that the alternative word in each case remained in the language as an archaic survival, this archaic survival being *aitu* among the Maori and *atua* among the Samoans. It is tempting to conclude that *aitu* was a similar survival among the Tahitians, who were closely related to the Maori. Thus the erection of a 'house of *aitu*' would belong to that period.
of Polynesian history which preceded the dispersion, or at any rate immediately succeeded it.

In another passage (op. cit. i. 286) Ellis refers to the *atau fare is Manaha, 'the building of the house of Manaha, or hosts of gods'. The literal meaning of the phrase appears to be 'the *atau-house of Manaha'. In other passages (e.g. op. cit. i. 103, 195) we read of family temples, ruins of a temple, &c. The native word for 'temple' is not quoted, however. I suspect that it was *marae, which meant open space. But it is impossible to be sure, for Ellis often translates several different native words by the same English word. The qualifying epithet 'family', of course, cannot be literally accepted. Cp. my remarks in regard to the alleged Samoan 'family' gods (n. 195).

Mr. R. W. Williamson's discussion in *The Social and Political Systems of Central Polynesia*, ii. 60–86, is vitiated by his uncritical acceptance of Ellis's statements.

The lack of scholarship which characterizes Tahitian ethnography is illustrated by T. Henry who translates *tapu-tapu-a-tea* as 'sacrifices from abroad' (J.P.S. xxi (1912), pp. 77–8).

The word *raa*, 'taboo', seems to have been promoted to the status of a 'god' in a similar manner to that in which *tabu-tabu-a-tea* was promoted from a descriptive phrase into a proper name (n. 585).

It is evident that J. Cook, *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean*, ii. 40, was uncertain whether *marae* denoted the stone structure or the open space in which it stood; first, he states that after a battle the bodies of slain chiefs were buried in the great pile of stones 'which compose the most conspicuous part of the *marae*'; then he says, 'the *marae*, which is a place of worship, sacrifice, and burial at the same time, is that where the supreme chief of the whole island is always buried. It differs little from the common ones except in extent. Its principal part is a large, oblong pile of stones, lying loosely on each other, about 12–14 feet high, contracted towards the top, with a square area on each side, loosely paved with pebble stones, under which the bones of chiefs are buried.' A similar account is given by J. Wilson, *A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific*, pp. 327–8.

The identity of the person or persons whose bones were deposited in the stone structure is uncertain. Capt. Cook mentions the 'supreme chief' in this connexion; one of the Spanish explorers makes a similar report; but according to other accounts the honour was accorded to the whole family, to any *ari'i*, to 'those offered in sacrifice or slain in battle', and to 'children of chiefs strangled at birth'. See B. G. Corney, op. cit. ii. 209, 251, 260; J. Wilson, op. cit., p. 304. Can it be that the bones of a corpse were deposited there if *atau* had been manifest in the nature of the person's life or death?

Native writers state that the possession of a *marae* (they refer to the stone structure) was vital to a chief. See e.g. *The Memoirs of Ari'itaimai*, p. 15; T. Henry, 'The Oldest Tahitian *Marae*', J.P.S. xiii (1913), pp. 25–7. The aphorism 'no *marae*, no chief' may have had a two-fold significance: (1) the possession of a *marae* of a previous ruler proved descent, actual or fictitious, from the *ari'i* whose bones had been deposited there; (2) the erection of a stone structure proved that a man was *ari'i*, whether or not he was *ari'i* by blood.

The word *marae*, like *tupapaup* (n. 579) and *oromata* (n. 581), has been translated in many different ways. The Spaniards call it 'temple', 'burial place', 'cemetery' (B. G. Corney, op. cit. ii. 41, 209, 259; iii. 15, 44). Some writers prefer 'sanctuary' (e.g. J. Wilson, op. cit., p. 351). In other reports 'temple' is the usual English equivalent (e.g. W. Ellis, in the above-cited passages; Tati Salmon, 'On Ari'is in Tahiti', J.P.S. xix (1910), pp. 39–46). But 'temple' is misleading, for, as one of the Spaniards says (B. G. Corney, op. cit. ii. 85), 'they certainly had no house of worship'.

According to Mr. Corney (op. cit. i. 269, n. 2), a modern Tahitian calls the stone
structure *menema*, from Gk. *μνημα*; this word was introduced by the missionaries. The ancient Tahitians used also the phrase *vahi moa* in reference to the 'memorial sanctuary of departed ancestors'.


Is *tii* (Ellis) the same as *tii*? The former appears to be an anglicized plural. With *tii*, cp. Maori *tahi* (n. 177).


585. The preconceptions which were in the minds of the explorers are apparent from such passages as:

1. L. de Bougainville, *A Voyage Round the World*, pp. 255, 267, who speaks of a 'Supreme Being', 'inferior divinities', 'a superior being';
2. J. Hawkesworth, *Voyages*, ii. 238–9, who seems to have confused mythological figures with 'gods';
4. J. Wilson, *A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific*, p. 343, who thinks that the conception of 'Jehovah in triune existence' had become rather obscured;
5. B. G. Corney, *The Quest and Occupation of Tahiti*, ii. 268 et saephe, who spells *te atua* with a capital T, thus transforming a commonplace word into a proper name;
6. W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, i. 322, who is confident that 'there was no one who was regarded as a supreme intelligence' and could find no trace of 'the doctrine of the Trinity'.

For some comments on reports of other 'Supreme Beings', see nn. 116, 122, 180, 237, 246, 415, 451, 462, 471, 501.

Often, indeed usually, our authorities employ an anglicized plural form of *atua* (*aatua, eatooa, eatoua*).

With the Tahitian *atua*, cp. the Maori *atua* (nn. 180–2), Samoan *aitu* (n. 195), and Tongan *otua* (n. 207).

Some animals, e.g. the heron and kingfisher, were held 'in peculiar regard', i.e. were *atua*; the natives refrained from killing them, but they neither addressed petitions to them nor 'approached them with adoration'. See J. Hawkesworth, op. cit. ii. 242; W. Ellis, op. cit. i. 336.

The legends concerning Taaroa, Maui, Tane, Oro, are numerous and contradictory. It is impossible to tell which, if any, of these 'beings' was honoured by definite rites. The conflicting nature of the stories seems to be due to the fact that they were collected from different islands. I do not understand why R. W. Williamson, *The Social and Political Systems of Central Polynesia*, i. 249, hypothesizes 'two distinct cults' in order to explain certain details of Tahitian culture, nor do I know what single precise meaning he attaches to the word 'cult'.

For notes on some mythological heroes, see nn. 180 (Maori), 195 (Samoan), 207 (Tongan).

Would it be permissible to argue that since Taaroa had a *tii* figure, possibly he was a Tahitian?

The 'great god', *fwehanow po*, seems to be either an invention or a mistake on the part of J. Wilson, op. cit., p. 343. The phrase meant 'born of night'; it was applied in the legends to the first men (i.e. the first Tahitians) who arrived on the
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earth (i.e. in Tahiti). Titi Salmon, ‘On Ari’is in Tahiti’, J.P.S. xix (1910), p. 49, says that *fanau po*, ‘born of night’, was the term for ‘creatures of the gods and therefore priests’.

W. Ellis, op. cit. i. 325, states that ‘Raa ranked among the principal deities’; but the word *raa* meant taboo simply, and I suspect that *raa* became the name of a ‘god’ in much the same way as *tabu-tabu-a-tea* became the name of a temple (n. 582).

Ellis’s use of the word ‘god’, which he applies to *tii* as well as to *ataua*, is as confusing as his use of ‘temple’.


J. Hawkesworth, *Voyages*, ii. 142–4, makes a quaint mistake which illustrates forcibly how our translations can mislead us. He says that all the visitors supposed that the food around the bier on which a corpse was placed was intended for the ‘spirit of the deceased’; but, he adds, ‘upon our applying for further information, we were told that the food was an offering to the gods’, i.e. *ataua*, i.e. the ‘spirit of the deceased’.

I have culled the names of the following ‘gods’ from W. Ellis, op. cit.:

1. *To-toro-potaa*, god of the hair-dressers, ‘who was invoked at the toilet’ (i. 136);
2. *Matahu-fenua*, god of agriculture (i. 138);
3. gods of fishermen were numerous: *Tamai* is said to have been such a god; elsewhere *tamai* is said to have been a general term for war (cp. i. 140 and i. 284);
4. *Matatine*, god of fishing-net makers (i. 140, 329);
5. *Ruaifusa-atua*, god of cock-fighting, a favourite Tahitian sport (i. 223);

We are not to tell what rites, if any, were celebrated in honour of these alleged divinities.


The Spaniards say that there was a different god in each locality for every occupation. See B. G. Corney, *The Quest and Occupation of Tahiti*, ii. 259, &c., and n. 585.

The lists of ‘gods’ have no greater or lesser evidential value than the lists of Samoan and Tongan gods, for which see nn. 195 and 208 respectively. See also my remarks in para. 99.


The descriptions of the illness of Vehiatau in B. G. Corney, op. cit. ii. 328–47, afford a good illustration of Tahitian methods.

The word *vehiatau* (which was a title, not a proper name) suggests that *ataua* was applied to living as well as to dead chiefs.


590. J. Hawkesworth, *Voyages*, ii. 240 (for *tahowa* as ‘skilled person’); G. Forster, *A Voyage Round the World*, ii. 154 (for *tata-o-rerro*); B. G. Corney, *The Quest and Occupation of Tahiti*, i. 335; ii. 328 (for *tahua pure*); W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, i. 369 (for *faatere*).
As a rule tahua (tahowa) is translated 'priest'. W. Ellis is inconsistent: in one passage (op. cit. i. 258) he mentions paia, 'priest', in another passage (op. cit. i. 371) taura or tairoiro is 'priest'. Ellis neither explains the difference between the men nor elucidates the native terms.

Similarly, Ellis translates ubu, pure, and tarotaro as 'prayer'. Cp., e.g., op. cit. i. 234, 255, 342–3.

With tarotaro, cp. the Banks Islands tataro (n. 296).

According to Tati Salmon, fanau po meant 'priest', but see n. 585.

On returning to his native land, a Tahitian who had been taken away by Capt. Cook on his second voyage was called 'Priest of the Sun'. See G. Forster, op. cit. i. 388.

With tahua, cp. the Maori tohunga, for whom see nn. 188, 192.


The Tahitians seem to have had a great knowledge of surgery, but not of physic. See J. Cook and G. Forster, l.c.; J. Hawkesworth, Voyages, i. 485.

592. For wizards, see W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 363–4; J. Wilson, A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific, p. 348. Body-clippings were burnt.

For the absence of tahua from weddings, see J. Hawkesworth, Voyages, ii. 241.

593. See, e.g., W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 27–8.

594. The Gilbert Islands were visited in 1765 by Commodore Byron, who found the water too deep for anchorage. They were rediscovered in 1788 by Captains Gilbert and Marshall, who were in the employ of the East India Company. See C. M. Woodford, 'The Gilbert Islands', The Geographical Journal, vi (1895), pp. 325–42; A. Grimble, 'From Birth to Death in the Gilbert Islands', J.R.A.I. li (1921), pp. 29 f., 49; G. Turner, Samoa, pp. 294, 297; H. Hale, Ethnography and Philology of the U.S. Exploring Expedition, pp. 187–90.

The Gilbert Islands are known also as Kingsmill or Line Islands. Sometimes the inhabitants are called Tarawas.

The population of the Gilbert Islands was mixed. A Samoan immigration may have taken place about seven hundred years ago; there is also a tradition which suggests a Melanesian immigration; and the drifting of canoes may have increased his admixture of peoples. The inhabitants of Makin (Pitt Island) seem to have differed from those of the other islands.

Many Samoan words existed in the language of the southern islands. Our most reliable information seems to apply to these islands, and more particularly to Aroa (Hurd Island) and Peru (Francis Island).


C. Wilkes, Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition, v. 83, may be referring other islands of the group; his description of the social classes differs from that of Tutuila.

I do not place a high value on Commander Wilkes's evidence. Most of his information concerning the Gilbert Islands was obtained from a certain John Kirby, who had lived as a native on Kuria (Woodle Island) for three years, and from Robert Wood (alias Grey) who lived in Makin. The inhabitants of these islands cannot have been closely in touch with one another, for neither of these men was aware of the other's existence. See C. Wilkes, op. cit. v. 65, 72; H. Hale, Ethnography and Philology of the U.S. Exploring Expedition, p. 90.
For other comments on the writings of Commander Wilkes, see nn. 195, 208, and 597.

596. A. Grimble, 'From Birth to Death in the Gilbert Islands', J.R.A.I. li (1921), pp. 31-3. The details of the ceremony differed on different islands.

The demand for the tokens is reported also by Tutuila, 'The Line Islanders', J.P.S.i (1892), p. 271. R. Parkinson, Beitrage zur Ethnologie der Gilbertinsulaner, Intern. Archiv für Ethnographie, ii (1889), pp. 38-9 does not mention them. Among the people of whom Parkinson speaks a newly married pair seem to have lived with their adoptive father and to have possessed no hut of their own. Perhaps these were the customs of the raui.

597. C. Wilkes, Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition, v. 91. The imperfect character of Commander Wilkes's knowledge is emphasized by A. Grimble, 'From Birth to Death in the Gilbert Islands', J.R.A.I. li (1921), p. 33, n. 1. It is dangerous to rely upon the uncorroborated evidence of a sailor in reference to native sexual regulations.

For the source of Commander Wilkes's information, see n. 595.


I doubt if the hand-washing can be regarded as indigenous.


It seems possible that tapu-ariki was a descriptive term which was applied to Wanigain, an illustrious chief. Cp. W. Ellis's error (n. 582) in calling tabu-tabu-a-tea the name of a Tahitian 'temple'. If tapu-ariki was a descriptive term, then we should expect (as Commander Wilkes states) that the 'tutelary genius' of every family would be the same 'god'. See further n. 625.

Tutuila, 'The Line Islands', J.P.S. i (1892), pp. 269, 272, confesses that it was difficult to ascertain the nature of the old practices.

The word which is translated 'god' is atua. In view of the possible Samoan origin of some of the immigrants (n. 594) this is important. The Samoan word was aitu, but the Samoans also used atua. For some comments on the relation between atiu and atua, see nn. 195, 582.


Hale conjectures that (t)ibonga can be equated with tufunga, but admits the uncertainty.

601. This is reported by C. Wilkes, Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition, v. 105, and possibly it is a matter on which we can confidently rely on the testimony of Kirby and Wood, for whom see n. 595.


The word arnam is said to have been 'a common form of address to human beings'. Apparently the author refers to white men when he says 'human beings'.
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Some Hindu and Khasi influence is evident; e.g. one ‘spirit’ which caused illness was a Khasi importation; another ‘spirit’ caused cholera, which was regarded as a British disease (ibid., p. 32).


604. A. Playfair, The Garos, pp. 87, 105-6, 113.

605. A. Playfair, The Garos, pp. 74 f., 92, 96-8, 100, 115 f. (for treatment), 116-17 (for witchcraft); E. T. Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal, pp. 60-1 (for treatment).

The native word which is translated ‘spirits’ is not given.

The Garos erected certain bamboo ‘altars’ on which sacrifices were placed.

I do not know how much the facts have been coloured by inferences in the reports concerning ‘the spirits of the seasons’. Apparently the ‘spirits’ who did harm to crops were easily outwitted. See A. Playfair, op. cit., pp. 87-96.


By ‘monandrous’ I mean that she confined herself to one man at one time. Divorce was by mutual consent.


Col. Gurdon considers that the ‘household deities’, ka lei iing and ka ksaw ka jirngam, were ka iawbei in another form.

In op. cit., p. 83, we are told that it was the duty of the youngest daughter ‘to perform the family ceremonies and propitiate the family ancestors’. In op. cit., p. 120, we read: ‘The Khasis have no purohit or priest to perform the family ceremonies; such duties fall to the lot of the head of the family or clan, who carries them out generally through the agency of the kmı̂ or maternal uncle.’ The contradiction is not explained.

609. The nongkhan was a diviner, who took the omens, e.g. when a new house was built, and when a man went on a journey; we are not told whether he was also lyngdoh or sohblei (ibid., pp. 117-19).

The men who were lyngdoh belonged to one clan and seem to have been in charge of the communal ceremonies; their influence varied in different areas: e.g. in some places they were the residuary legatees of all persons who died without heirs; but their position in society does not become clearer when we read that the people ‘live in constant dread lest they should offend these avaricious men and so bring on themselves the wrath of the demons’ (ibid., pp. 120-3).

In op. cit., p. 120, 155, the sohblei is reputed to have been (1) the chief ‘priestess’ whose deputy was the lyngdoh, (2) ‘high priest’ who assisted the head of the community in performing a ceremony in reference to the crops, the lyngdoh being called ‘priest’, simply.

The relation of the lyngdoh to the jingbih, ‘an evil spirit’, is mentioned only in one passage (op. cit., p. 123). Was jingbih another term for the kataroh, ‘she-devil’, of the Jaintia Hills (op. cit., p. 107)?

The tilen practices (op. cit., pp. 99-100) seem to have been witchcraft of a decorative kind.

It is difficult to separate inference from fact in the reports. The use of the same English words (e.g. ‘spirits’, ‘gods’, ‘godlings’) to denote a number of different native words has complicated them, it being impossible to know what native word is being translated in any particular passage.

For blei, see op. cit., pp. 105-6, 114-16, 118 et saepe.
610. Ibid., p. 9, n. 1.

I rely exclusively on this valuable monograph. The information applies more especially to the so-called Great Andaman Group, consisting of North, Middle, and part of South Andaman. Our knowledge of the Little Andaman Group (including the Jarawa tribe of South Andaman and the inhabitants of Little Andaman and North Sentinel Island) is less extensive.

For these divisions, see A. R. Brown, op. cit., pp. 11-13.

The same methods of disposal have been reported by E. H. Man, On the Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands, pp. 76-7; M. V. Portman, A History of our Relations with the Andamanese, i. 43.

Alternative terms for lau were in North and Middle Andaman dialects lao and yau, in the South Andaman dialect, cauga. Sea-lau were jurua, 'beings of the same nature as the timik-lau'. In the Aka-bea dialect the oko-jumu was called oko-paiad, which meant also 'dreamer'. The reputation of an oko-jumu depended on results. Sometimes a dead magician was bilik, 'not an ordinary lau' (ibid., p. 169).

Bilik 'beliefs' have been complicated by the methods which have been adopted in translating the native word. Other forms of bilik were biliku and puluga. Professor Radcliffe Brown discusses the subject at length in op. cit., pp. 147 ff.

614. See A. R. Brown, The Andaman Islanders, pp. 137-8 and 138, n. 1, who remarks: 'To these aliens they gave the name of Lau, apparently regarding them as visitors from the only other world they knew of, the world of spirits.' Professor Radcliffe Brown adds that 'a similar custom is found in many savage tribes; thus, in many parts of Australia the aborigines call white men by the same name that they apply to the spirits of the dead'.

The inference is unacceptable. When the same word is applied to two different phenomena, the only conclusion which we may draw is that the same quality or power was manifest in each case. All the assertions about white men being 'ghosts' seem to me to be false inferences due to our word 'spirits'. It would be interesting to know if the word which some Australian aborigines applied to the dead and to white men was applied also to anything unusual or beyond comprehension. Did the Andamanese employ the word lau (or its equivalent) in that sense?


616. H. Low, Sarawak, p. 195; H. Ling Roth, The Natives of Sarawak and British North Borneo, i. 109-10; E. H. Gomes, The Sea-Dyaks of Borneo, p. 3.
J. Perham, 'Petara or Sea-Dyak Gods', J. Str. Br. R.A.S., no. 8 (1881), p. 150, says that 'immorality among the unmarried is supposed to bring a plague of rain upon the earth as a punishment from Petara'. If we omit the inference, we may conclude that petara was manifest in places where sexual intercourse took place.
Cp. the Lango idea (n. 360) that jok was manifest in similar places.

The passage in Archdeacon Perham's paper is reprinted in H. Ling Roth, op. cit. i. 180.

The description of the gawe antu by E. H. Gomes, The Sea-Dyaks of Borneo,

C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, do not devote much space to the Sea-Dyaks, whom they call Ibans. They doubt if the tribe had any 'religion'. According to their account, petara was 'a conception of the god having many manifestations and functions, each special function being conceived vaguely as an anthropomorphic deity'. See op. cit. ii. 26, 85. They are not very helpful.

H. Low, *Sarawak*, p. 174, merely states that 'the chief deity' was batara.


The power of petara was put into a child at the besant ceremony. See H. Ling Roth, op. cit. i. 170.


622. For an example of a speculative theory which is based not on facts but on inferences, see W. G. Ivens, 'The Place of Vui and Tamate in the Religion of Mota', *J.R.A.I.* lxi (1931), pp. 157–66. Dr. Ivens seems to appreciate that the translation of *vui* as 'a spirit' is misleading, yet it is upon this English equivalent that he bases his conclusions. For his purpose it is important that Kwat should be a *vui*, but the fact appears to have been that just as among the Crow Indians (n. 529) Old Man Coyote was *maxpe*, so among the Banks Islanders Kwat was *vui*, 'exceeding', i.e. 'a great fellow'. It is no more legitimate to speak of Kwat as *vui* than to speak of Old Man Coyote as a *maxpe*.

The similarity between the meanings of such words as *maxpe*, *wakan*, and *vui* has been obscured (1) by the translation of *wakan* as 'Great Spirit' and of *vui* as 'a spirit', (2) by the equation of *wakan* and *mana*, for which see n. 520. Dr. Ivens has failed to perceive these errors. He has based his suggestions not upon the native meaning of native words but upon the white man's interpretations of the white man's translations of those words.

With Dr. Ivens's comments on *vui*, *oololo*, and *tataro* in the above-quoted essay, op. para. 72, and nn. 293–6.

623. I am inclined to think that the description of Purari 'beliefs' by J. H. Holmes, which Sir J. G. Frazer has quoted in *The Worship of Nature*, pp. 7–8, may contain this error. Possibly the native, who seems to have been in the employ of white men, was repeating in his own language something which he had gleaned from the white man's conversation or sermons.

For Bishop Callaway's warning against this danger, see para. 4.

The absurdity of translating *imunu* as 'soul' will be apparent from a perusal of para. 76, in which I have quoted Mr. Williams's description of its native meaning.

624. In *The Worship of Nature*, pp. 154–6, Sir J. G. Frazer has repeated many of M. Junod's inferences in regard to *tilo*. If the reader of that passage will remem-
ber that the word *tilo* was applied to strange, uncomprehended things, the fantastic character of those inferences will be apparent. A man whose manner of birth was abnormal was credited with the possession of magic power. Apparently that is why the Baronga thought that twins possessed special powers over rain. See also n. 409.

625. For an uncritical acceptance of the reports in regard to the alleged 'god' *tapu-ariki*, see J. G. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, iii. 55–7.

626. An excellent example of the manner in which some observers have read their thoughts into the native minds is afforded by a comparison of the reports on the Tannese. According to the Rev. W. Gray, the souls of the Tannese dead went to Ipai, Hades. The more careful Mrs. Watt tells us that the word *ipai* meant 'far off'. It is probable that the missionary asked a Tanna man whither the souls of the dead went, and that the native answered *ipai*, 'far off'. The missionary, accustomed to thinking in terms of heaven and hell, concluded that *ipai* was the Tannese Hades.


627. Maybe the reports in regard to personification have sometimes been based on the native application of proper names to certain districts or phenomena, such as rocks; but in my view these names were those of dead men.

628. Sometimes the attempt to express in the native language the conception of the Christian God has produced the most ludicrous situations. I will quote one example.

As their name for God the earliest missionaries among the Loyalty Islanders adopted *cahaze*, ca 'one', *haze* 'spirit'. Not unnaturally this word was soon dropped, for it must have been incomprehensible to the natives, to whom *haze* represented not a 'spirit' but the quality manifest in stones of peculiar shape or of uncommon type. Then the Roman Catholic priests used *haze*, simply, while the Protestants employed *akotesi*, the equivalent of *haze* in the chiefly language. See E. Hadfield, *Among the Natives of the Loyalty Group*, pp. 38, 143; S. H. Ray, 'The People and Language of Lifu, Loyalty Islands', *J.R.A.I.* xlvi (1917), pp. 291, 295.

A separate language for addressing 'chiefs' was not uncommon in Oceania. For some notes on the subject, see J. E. Newell and S. H. Ray, 'Chief's Language in Samoa', *Transactions of the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists*, ii (1892) pp. 800–1.

629. I am not satisfied, however, that the Trobriand Islanders were not at a dead level of conception. I am inclined to suspect that the word *baloma* may have been applied to anything supernormal or incomprehensible.

Cp. n. 302.


631. In such a context the word 'remember' should include not only the memory of a past event but also the placing of that event in time, but I doubt if the evidence is sufficiently reliable to justify our using it in that sense.

A sense of the past, of course, was one of the phenomena which distinguished the SE. Solomon Islanders from the Banks Islanders. Dr. Codrington noticed and emphasized the fact. See para. 33.
632. All the evidence is in favour of the supposition that such changes are introduced by individual men, particular instances being the inauguration of the hagiona-cult and of its successor the tara-cult in Papua (para. 79), and of the Kairi ceremony among the Purari (para. 76). The fanaticism of individual men was responsible for the revivals which took place among the American Indians after the arrival of the white man, Ganeodiyo, the Iroquois, and Naydaklinni, the Apache, being outstanding examples (para. 102). Messrs. Smith and Dale (n. 427) have expressed the opinion that the establishment of new customs was due to individual effort; the magicians, they think, were 'largely and probably mostly' responsible. M. Junod (n. 411) says that the Ronga magicians attracted new patients by the invention of new rites and by the discovery of new drugs.

Dr. W. G. Ivens (n. 84) considers it 'beyond belief' that an individual man should start a new rite. He does not state his reasons.

633. The theory of humility and disillusion is favoured by Sir J. G. Frazer and Professor A. B. Cook. I note with satisfaction that both these scholars attribute to the working of the power of reason such cultural advances as they hypothesize.

According to Sir J. G. Frazer, upon the awkwardness of whose terminology I have commented in n. 4, the reliance on outside power is the line of demarcation between religion and magic, religion being defined as the propitiation and conciliation of powers superior to man. See his G.B., The Magic Art, i. 223 ff. Sir James has stated his views more succinctly in The Early History of the Kingship, p. 127: 'As time goes on, the fallacy [of magic] becomes more and more apparent to the acuter minds and is slowly replaced by religion. The magician gives way to the priest who renouncing the attempt to control directly the processes of nature seeks to attain the same end indirectly by appealing to the gods to do for him what he no longer fancies that he can do himself.'

One of many objections to this statement is that by confining the word 'religion' to the culture of those who conceive of powers superior to man, and by using the word 'god' to denote those powers, Sir James has not only introduced the idea that religion consists of the worship of 'gods' but also implied that it cannot consist in the worship of ghosts. Thus according to his terminology an ancestral-cult must be 'religion', but he cannot include it as such because it does not consist of the worship of 'gods'.

Professor A. B. Cook, while considering that 'the transition was the result of conscious reflection upon the modus operandi of primitive magic', dissociates himself from Sir James Frazer's opinions. Professor Cook is speaking more particularly of the Greek god Zeus, whom he regards as a heavenly Salmoneus: 'With the growth of intelligence it gradually dawned upon men that the magician, when he caused a storm, did not actually make it himself by virtue of his own will-power but rather imitated it and coaxed it into coming. If, then, the magician or king imitated a storm made by Zeus, how did Zeus make it? Zeus must be a Master Image, a King supreme, beyond the clouds. The change was not made by any despair of magic but rather by the discovery that magic, whether effective or not, was a matter of imitation.' See A. B. Cook, Zeus, i. 12-13.


Sir Basil Thomson speaks of Ndengei as a 'symbol of Creation and Eternity'; Williams calls Ndengei 'an impersonation of the abstract idea of eternal existence'. Mr. Hocart is right in pouring scorn upon these 'impossible statements' which, as he says, would not be intelligible to the natives, far less conceived by them.
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According to Sir A. B. Ellis, in *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast*, p. 50, the tradition of Shango as an earthly king is a later addition. Sir Arthur does not state the evidence on which he relies. The opinion is contrary to those expressed in the above-cited passages. The Johnsons are native writers. Probably Mr. Talbot is repeating literally the native tradition.


Recently (July 1933) this case of claustrophobia has received considerable attention and has been publicly discussed. For some comments on the correspondence in which it figured, see A. S. Russell in *The Listener*, x, no. 238 (2 August 1933), p. 162.


The first few chapters of this useful little volume contain a simple summary of psycho-analytical origins.


I accept the existence of the Uncertainty Principle merely for the sake of argument. I am not yet persuaded that the experimental evidence has been correctly interpreted, and am not impressed by the arguments used by Sir James Jeans in his *The New Background of Science*, pp. 212 ff., 220, 231 ff. Nor can I see that the conclusion of Sir Arthur Eddington (in *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 220) necessarily follows from the experimental premise. The Uncertainty Principle seems to be deduced from our inability to measure exactly the velocity of an electron and at the same time to locate its position exactly. The conclusions drawn from this fact seem to be supported by the appearance of the electron sometimes as a particle, sometimes as a wave. I myself do not feel competent, even if it were advisable, to discuss those conclusions in detail, but I shall contemplate a more extended defence of determinism (as I understand it) if in the opinion of competent critics the Uncertainty Principle vitiates my conclusions in regard to the behaviour of human societies. At present my point is that although we cannot prophesy the future behaviour of a single electron, the behaviour of a mass of electrons can be prophesied with assurance. In a similar manner the future behaviour of a single individual man is uncertain, but the behaviour of a mass of individuals, that is, of a human society, is determined. See also para. 175.
By determinism I mean simply that the behaviour of any event is dependent on its inherent nature. Such determinism is not necessarily mechanical, in the sense in which our Victorian forefathers used the word, but we cannot say that it is not mechanical, because we do not know what we mean by mechanics. As Professor A. N. Whitehead has said (Science and the Modern World, p. 21), 'What is the sense of talking about a mechanical explanation when you do not know the meaning of mechanics?' It seems quite possible that when wave-mechanics have been perfected, the universe will once again be called mechanical, but in the meantime the word cannot be used, for it means nothing. Determinism, however, remains, its doctrine denoting that in behaving in the observed manner the event cannot help itself. Thus two molecules of hydrogen, when combined with one molecule of oxygen, must produce water, and have no choice in the matter. Similarly water, when heated to the requisite degree, cannot help becoming steam. In each case the behaviour, and therefore the result, is determined. And it cannot be too greatly emphasized that the final argument in favour of determinism is the demonstrable truth of scientific predictions, based on observation and experiment. An inability to predict, however, is not necessarily an argument in favour of indeterminism; it may merely be proof of our ignorance or incapacity. In the case of the electron the latter appears to be the case.

We do not know what an electron is; nor do we know what forces maintain it as an entity. All we know is that it is a vital, important, perhaps ultimate, constituent of matter, and that it has a different appearance under different conditions. To ask, concerning an electron, where in the wave the particle is, to conclude that it may be anywhere, to call it 'a wave of probability', and then to credit it with free-will and spontaneity, and then to treat this conclusion as a reason for dismissing inevitability from the physical world—such arguments seem to me a betrayal of the human reason.

Mathematics, once the handmaid of science, seems to have become its mistress, and to be disturbing the whole scientific household. The question seems to arise whether the electron, being known to exist, but incapable of direct or even indirect measurement, and being smaller than the wave-length of light, comes within the domain of physical science. Physics is the study of behaviour in the physical world, but our very study of the electron alters its behaviour. How, then, can we discover what that behaviour is?

Some of the arguments of the indeterminists, as well as their methods of reasoning, have been well criticized by Professor H. Levy in his The Universe of Science (London, 1932). Professor Levy's remarks on the use of mathematical symbols, and on the dangers of 'false isolates', seem to deserve greater attention than they have yet received. But it is pleasant to know that some mathematical physicists, notably Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington, having had the temerity to pass from physics to metaphysics, from the study of Process to speculations about Purpose and Reality, have been roughly handled not only in the philosophical journals but also by C. E. M. Joad in his Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science (London, 1932), and W. R. Inge in his God and the Astronomers (London, 1933).

I take it that when writing for laymen the physicists do not feel bound, and are perhaps unable, to confine their phraseology within the limits of accuracy and precision demanded by their fellow workers, so they think they can use with impunity, may even think they are compelled to use, such phrases as 'the atom chooses', 'the electron knows', &c. Yet I cannot help regarding such language as a danger to clear thinking. Am I wrong when I mentally rewrite the first phrase, and say, 'It is part of the inherent nature of the atom to . . . ?

My suggestion, then, is that a deterministic conclusion in regard to the behaviour of a human society is as valid as a deterministic conclusion in regard to a chemical element (a comparison between them is by no means fanciful) and that the relation
between an individual and the society of which it is a member is similar to the
relation between an electron and the element of which it forms a part. And
I believe that students of human affairs have overlooked the truth of the matter
because hitherto they have tended to study individuals instead of societies. The
result is that social science has made little headway. But where would physicists
be if they had begun to study the electron? Surely they would have concluded
that there could be no such thing as physical science. At any rate they would
never have begun to conquer the physical world. It is the same, I submit, in
human affairs. Having begun by studying the individual we have either refused
to acknowledge the existence of social science or failed to take a single step in the
road that leads to the control of our cultural destiny. The correct method is the
converse of the one that is usually adopted. We must first study human societies
as organized units, and disregard the caprice of the individuals composing them.
In this manner we may hope to obtain some knowledge of, and then to be able to
control, some of the forces that are continually acting upon and within us.

It is necessary to add that my remarks in regard to the Uncertainty Principle
should not be understood as referring either to the Law of Entropy, which seems
to be a valid induction, or to the doctrine of emergence, which, so far as science is
concerned, is a convenient way of denoting a collection of observed data. Neither
of these affects the doctrine of determinism as stated above.

For entropy, see n. 712.

647. W. H. R. Rivers, Instinct and the Unconscious, pp. 38, 156–7; S. Freud,

For regression, see W. H. R. Rivers, op. cit., pp. 65, 148, 155; S. Freud, op. cit.,

Dr. Rivers employs the word ‘suppression’ in addition to ‘repression’, denoting
thereby the state which an act of repression produces. The distinction is nice, but
Dr. Rivers is not uniform in his use of the terms; e.g. he employs ‘suppression’ to
denote the act of repression in op. cit., p. 38, &c.

Dr. Freud’s suggestions have been mentioned, apparently with approval, by


650. See C. G. Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 145, 150; J. H. Van der
Hoop, Character and the Unconscious, pp. 102–3 et saepe.

Cp. C. Lloyd Morgan, Instinct and Experience, pp. 50–1. Professor Lloyd Morgan
defines instinct as congenital and intelligence as acquired behaviour. He considers
that intelligence is not operative unless there is some modification of instinctive
tendencies.

651. W. James, Pragmatism, p. 6.

652. In saying this I am relying not only upon the coincident facts presented
symbolically in the Chart of Evidence (Appendix I), but also upon the historical
evidence, some of which is summarized in paras. 160–73.

I have discussed some of the historical facts from two different points of view in
my ‘Monogamy as a Condition of Social Energy’, Hibbert Journal, xxv (1927),
pp. 662–77, and in my ‘Marriage in Cultural History’, Hibbert Journal, xxvi (1928),
pp. 695–706. There is much that I should like to alter in these youthful essays,
but to their main theses I adhere. In some passages of the former essay I expressed
some opinions concerning the customs of uncivilized peoples. To these opinions
I can no longer subscribe. They were based upon a study of comparative social
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anthropology, not upon the original sources. Subsequent research has persuaded me that most of the conclusions reached by comparative methods are unsound.

653. Some students have maintained that climatic conditions, economic opportunity, and geographical situation are factors which exert a controlling influence on any display of social energy. Thus Mr. Ellsworth Huntingdon, in *Climate and Civilisation*, p. 387, considers that 'climate ranks with social inheritance and cultural development as one of the three great factors in determining the conditions of civilisation'. The passage is not notable for the precise character of its meaning, and I do not know the definitions which Mr. Huntingdon attaches to such phrases as 'cultural development' and 'conditions of civilisation'. If by the latter phrase he refers to the variety within the cultural pattern (in my sense of the term) no one would gainsay him; but he may have intended to maintain that social energy can be displayed only under certain climatic conditions. This opinion is untenable. The geographical areas in which outbursts of social energy have taken place include the valley of the Nile and that of the Euphrates, northern India, eastern China, Mexico, northern Africa, Asia Minor, Persia, North America, and southern and western Europe. In most of these areas social energy has been displayed in varying degrees of intensity as century has succeeded century. There is no evidence that the climate has undergone corresponding changes. Moreover, within the society separate groups have displayed unequal energy, that of some groups increasing at the time when that of other groups was decreasing. Furthermore, societies which within living memory have lived in the same geographical area have exhibited various degrees of social energy.


655. Dr. F. Galton, applying to the cultural process a conclusion based on the study of the biological process, published a study in *Hereditary Genius*. The numerous exceptions to his vague generalizations reveal the unreliable character of his conclusions. My suggestion is that it may have been the character and behaviour of the mother which decided whether or not a male child would be as productively energetic as his father.

The preconceived notions of nineteenth-century students are especially apparent in eugenist arguments, most of which are vitiated by a confusion between the biological and cultural processes. Moreover, few eugenists have defined what they mean by such phrases as 'good stock', 'fine man', 'genius', &c. They have never inquired into the influence which a mother has upon the character of her children, their outlook on the problem being limited by their apparent acceptance of the feudal custom of primogeniture as a factor in the cultural process. If the facts which Galton studied were considered from the point of view that I have suggested, much that is puzzling might become clearer. The trouble is that, since most of our social history has been written by men whose minds were soaked with the idea of patrilineal heredity, the information is probably scanty. We may see, however, some of the influence of the female if we examine the character of the sons of an energetic man who, being a member of a monogamous society, married twice. In these cases the quality of the sons seems to have varied according to the character of their mothers. I will mention a few cases which come within my knowledge. They occurred in the dominant Roman families of the fourth century A.D.

Constantius Chlorus married, first, Helena, who is said to have been the daughter of an inn-keeper. At the bidding of Diocletian he divorced Helena, and married Theodosia, the step-daughter of Maximian. Helena's son was the mighty Constantine the Great; none of Theodosia's sons by Constantius Chlorus possessed any strength of character. Constantine the Great also married twice, his first wife, Minervina, being of lowly birth. His second wife, Fausta, was the youngest daughter
of Maximian and half-sister of his own step-mother, Theodosia. Minervina’s son was Crispus, who in his short life revealed himself as a man of exceptional ability; the character of Fausta’s sons was very different from that of their father. A similar result ensued from a similar situation in the next generation. The son whom Galla bore to Julius Constantius was the incapable Gallus; his son from Basilina was the eminent, poetry-loving, yet warlike Julian, the great lover of Hellas and enemy of Christianity. Again, the colourless Flacilla bore two incapable sons to Theodosius the Great; Galla gave him the energetic, able Galla Placidia.

Attention has been drawn to these facts by G. F. Young, East and West through Fifteen Centuries, i. 463–4, ii. 57, but too much stress should not be laid upon them.

The explanation which occurs to my mind is this. When a woman has been brought up in an atmosphere of sexual continence and compelled to check her early sexual desires, her unsatisfied impulses are expressed in another way, first, in cultured occupations, secondly, in her care for her children, who represent to her one of the few things that her life has afforded to her. There is no reason to think that in a state of nature a woman retains any but an economic interest in her sons after she has weaned them; indeed the evidence points the other way. If, however, her natural instincts have been checked by her cultural environment, her innate desires are ‘sublimated’ (para. 155), chief among these sublimatory methods of expression being an attention to her sons after they are weaned. Usually any limitation in the satisfaction of innate desires is imposed by the marriage laws, so usually in the past fine men have been the sons of closely confined married women, whose adolescent impulses were sternly checked. There is no virtue, however, in any marriage law, as such. So far as the production of an energetic generation is concerned, the marriage law is only important because it reduces sexual opportunity. For this reason many fine men have been bastards. In these cases, I believe, the mothers have been reared in an atmosphere of intense compulsory continence, have broken loose on one occasion, and upon their sons, being born, they have spent their sublimated energies. If these women had been members of a sexually free society, their energies would have been expressed in a direct sexual manner. Bastards are able and energetic only when their mothers are members of a social group which suffers intense compulsory continence. Bastard sons of women reared in an atmosphere of sexual freedom do not excel.

An extended inquiry on these lines would be valuable. Abundant evidence, anthropological and historical, is readily accessible.


659. This is dangerous ground, yet it would be cowardly to shirk the issue. Usually the physical attributes of a man are regarded as material for biology and biochemistry. I accept the implication that there is a close relation between the chemical structure of any human organism and its culture; but the cultural evidence conflicts with the idea that its mental energy is controlled by the chemical constitution.

A good example of alleged ‘racial’ characteristics being modified by cultural influences is afforded by comparing two modern societies, those of the French and Germans. By some scholars they are regarded as belonging to different races, the Latin and Teutonic respectively. This supposed racial difference is accepted as the ‘explanation’ of their cultural differences. (The cultural differences, of course,
The Franks, however, were early converts to Christianity, and preserved the Catholic tradition in western Europe while the remainder of their Teutonic brethren either remained pagan or assumed Arian Christianity. Thus for 1,500 years the Teutonic Franks have been subjected to a Roman or Latin tradition. Now they appear not as Teutons but as 'Latinos'. The same is true of the Teutonic Lombards. Cp. the excellent remarks of O. Spengler, The Decline of the West, ii. 113 ff., esp. 124.

Sometimes it is hard to resist the conclusion that sexual regulations influence the physical type. Thus it is usual to regard the Baganda and the Bakitara as a product of an intermixture between a negro race and the Bahima (n. 110). Yet under the same climatic conditions the racial admixture has had diverse results. Among the Baganda the more delicate features of Bahima have been preserved; among the Bakitara a shorter and coarser type has appeared. The sexual regulations of the Baganda were strict, and probably at one time more strict than they were at the time to which our information applies (para. 166); among the Bakitara post-nuptial sexual regulations were loose.

Other cases of such coincident divergence could be quoted. Thus among the Maori the physical type varied between a refined lighter type and a coarser darker type. The Maori sexual regulations appear to have become more lax in the years which immediately preceded the white man's arrival in their country (para. 166), and it is tempting to suggest that the refined physical types were produced by those families which preserved the old tradition. Just as among the Bakitara (n. 110) there were still to be found some specimens akin to the Muhima type, so some Maori clans may have continued to breed those types which were common before the lax sexual regulations became part of the inherited tradition of the other clans.

660. In any discussion of incestuous relations, all reports of an alleged brother-sister marriage must be received with caution.

In the first place, the words which are translated 'brother' and 'sister' may have been classificatory, not descriptive. Thus a report that brother-sister marriage was permissible may be due to a mistranslation of terms which were applied not only to blood-brothers and blood-sisters but also to those whom we call first cousins.

Secondly, even if a brother-sister marriage, in our sense of those words, existed, usually it was permitted only between children of the same father and different mothers. This was the case among the ruling families of Ankole, Kitara, and Uganda (nn. 117, 126, 131).

It seems possible that in all these cases the 'king' married his half-sister for political reasons only. It is even possible that at one time they did not have sexual relations. Even in recent times the courts of the Uganda kabaka and lubungu had to be separated by a running stream. The 'queen' does not seem to have been the king's wife in our sense of the term.

We are careless in our use of such words as 'wife' and 'married'. We translate a native word by these English equivalents and then we credit the native words with the meaning which we attach to them. Yet often the native terms conveyed an idea which we cannot express. Thus among the Baganda (para. 39) a female medium, manidwa, when she was first possessed by the ghost, was said to be kivosa. This is said to have meant 'married to the god', but we cannot credit kivosa with the meaning which we attach to its alleged English equivalent.

I believe that many reports of women being the 'wives' of gods are vitiated by similar errors. Often they have been interpreted as implying that the women were prostitutes.
661. The geometrical method of presenting these divergences was suggested to me by a perusal of R. H. Towner, *Philosophy of Civilisation*, ii. 266–7. The second volume of Mr. Towner’s book contains many suggestive passages. The quality of the first volume is uneven.


662. This applies to the African and Melanesian societies but not to all the Polynesian societies. See Appendix IV. It is possible to suggest many reasons for this difference between African and Polynesian culture, but they would have only a conjectural value.


668. See J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, pp. 83 (for ritualistic duties), 86–7 (for early limitation to three wives and later extension of the number of wives).


The behaviour of the Uganda women is reminiscent of that of the Athenian native-born women in the fifth century B.C. (para. 176). In each case the closely confined wives, lacking satisfaction, broke bounds; in each case their husbands received their satisfaction from other women.

670. In this connexion it is worth noting a few of the many explicit reports concerning the loss of mental energy after puberty:

‘A certain degree of precocity is apparent in young boys and is noticeably lost when they arrive at the age of puberty when sexual excess seems to reduce them to a state of, in many cases, senile imbecility. From this they may recover, or on the other hand they may remain certainly not so bright as when they were boys’ (H. S. Stannus, ‘Notes on some Tribes of British Central Africa’, *J.R.A.I.* xl (1910), p. 295).

‘Up to the age of puberty black children educated with white show much the same intelligence’ (C. Gouldsberry and H. Sheane, *The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia*, p. 132).


‘Maori children show quite remarkable intelligence and aptitude at school, until at a certain period of development their aptitude or application seems to decrease’ (E. Best, ‘Maori Religion and Mythology’, *N.Z. Dom. Mus. Bull.*, No. 10, p. 17).

Best quotes Mr. A. H. Keane’s suggestion that ‘the growth of the brain is arrested by the premature closing of the cranial sutures and lateral pressure of the frontal bones’. This statement is typical of those who confuse the biological and the cultural processes. In the first place, there is no evidence that the size of the brain bears any relation to the mental energy of the organism. Secondly, before we can even consider Keane’s suggestion, we must be supplied with evidence that aptitude and application depend upon the cranial structure and that the physiological phenomena referred to have been observed among undeveloped societies and have been absent among the cultivated members of advanced societies. No such evidence has yet been forthcoming.
Keane's opinion is cited also by Messrs. Gouldsbury and Sheane, who express their distrust of it, stating that in their opinion the 'strongest bar' to the continued development of mental power is sexual indulgence.

671. For the effect of Christian teaching on the sexual regulations of uncivilized peoples, see paras. 20, 29, 91, nn. 163, 460.

The closely confined nature of life among the lower classes during the so-called Middle Ages is emphasized by G. M. Trevelyan in *History of England*, pp. 106-7. But in spite of Professor Trevelyan's liberal manner of presenting the evidence, the fact remains that, when one group of men dominates another, it is because the first displays a greater energy than the second. Its dominion comes to an end when either its own energy decreases or that of its subjects increases. The villeins were victimized because they had less energy than their masters; they continued to submit for so long as a more energetic group imposed itself upon them. There are two parties to every contract and in every relationship.


For the conduct of the ladies at the tournaments, see J. R. Green, *A Short History of the English People*, p. 238.

The question of what constituted a valid Christian marriage was a matter of debate. At first the Christians in Rome adopted later Roman usage: *Nuptias non concubinamus sed consensus factit* (Ulpian). Yet they could not admit that a union created by mutual consent could be broken in the same way. When the rough Teutons were converted, a new problem arose as to whether or not an unconsumated marriage could be dissolved. If so, marriage was not indissoluble; if not, mutual consent was not the sole criterion. The dilemma seems to have been solved by the provision that an unconsumated marriage was null and void. See O. D. Watkins, *Holy Matrimony*, pp. 117-19.


According to G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England*, p. 307, n. 2, 'there were never more than about 2,000 nuns in mediaeval England'. These nuns, he says, 'were to a large extent aristocratic and well to do in their origin and connections'. We have no information concerning the number of such families, but I venture to think that the estimate of 2,000 represents a large proportion of their womenfolk. For further comments on this question, see my *Sexual Regulations and Human Behaviour*, p. 104.


The early Babylonians regarded their laws as the word of their god, the ruler
of the city being the mouthpiece of the god. Thus no law could be annulled; it
could merely be modified by later enactments which were of the same divine origin.
The idea is a familiar one throughout history.

673. See M. Jastrow, 'The Older and Later Elements in the Hammurabi Code',
C. H. W. Johns, Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts and Letters, pp. 41-2,
134, 148; L. Delaporte, Mesopotamia, pp. 76, 80.

674. Code of Hammurabi, sections 117, 151 (for limitation and cancellation of
marital power), 141 (for prosecution by husband), 142, 143 (for wife's power to
withhold conjugal rights).

I have used the translation of C. H. W. Johns in Babylonian and Assyrian Laws,
Contracts and Letters, pp. 44-68.

By Neo-Babylonian times seriktu and mudunnu had exchanged meanings. See

675. Code of Hammurabi, sections 168-9; M. Jastrow, 'The Older and Later

676. Code of Hammurabi, sections 138-40, 148-9, 171-2, 177. We cannot always
tell if every divorced woman was allowed to remarry. In early days the husband's
permission may have been necessary, as in the case of Shamash-rabi, quoted in
The Cambridge Ancient History, i. 525. Later remarriage seems to have been taken
for granted, as in the example given by S. A. Cook, The Law of Moses and the Code
of Hammurabi, p. 123, where a woman remarried during the lifetime of her former
husband.

The situation brought about by a childless marriage was met by a custom
whereby a barren wife gave her husband a handmaid whose children, having been
acknowledged by him, were his legal heirs. Their mother was still a slave, however;
she was not allowed to place herself on a level with her mistress. If a barren wife
refused to give her husband a handmaid, he was permitted to bring another woman
into the house. This second but inferior 'wife' was a free woman. No husband could
introduce a second woman if his wife gave him a handmaid.

There is some confusion in the translation of the Code between the 'concupine'
and the 'handmaid', and between the 'wife' and the 'votary'. Votaries were women
who were attached to the temple. There seem to have been various grades within
the order; the votaries in some of the grades were not allowed to bear children.
For a discussion of their status and duties, see D. D. Luckenbill, 'The Temple-
Women of the Code of Hammurabi', A.J.S.L. xxxvi (1917), pp. 1-12; D. G.
of Religion Presented to C. H. Toy, pp. 341 ff. It is impossible to say how far the
regulations in regard to 'concupinage' applied only to men who married votaries.
Nor can an exact opinion concerning concubinage be expressed by any one
unfamiliar with the subtleties of cuneiform. Two things are certain; first, in their
early days the Babylonians were absolutely monogamous; secondly, in later days
a second marriage invalidated the first.

See also A. H. Sayce, Babylonian and Assyrian Life and Customs, p. 27; E. Wester-
marck, The History of Human Marriage, iii. 41. Both these writers emphasize the
monogamous character of Babylonian marriage.

The case of bigamy mentioned in n. 25 was unique. Sir James Frazer's inter-
pretation of it is inadmissible.

The contract is quoted in The Cambridge Ancient History, i. 524. It is the custom
among historians to translate these contracts very literally. The result is a somewhat archaic rendering of what was a civilized document. I have presumed to simplify the English.


(3) for a case in which a son departed of his own will, taking his share of the estate, S. A. Cook, The Law of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi, p. 135, the incident taking place in the time of Rim-sin.

(4) for social conditions in Ur, F. Pelagaud, 'Jurisdiction in the days of the Kings of Ur', Babyloniaca, iii. 83 ff.

The Sumerians seem to have dealt with the situation created by a childless marriage in the same way as the Babylonians. Here also difficulties (referred to in n. 676) arise in connexion with the words translated 'wife', &c.

Sections 12, 13, and 15 of Professor Langdon's translation appear to correspond to sections 167, 171, and 175 of the Hammurabi Code.


680. E. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, iii. 318.


682. See (1) for Agarista, Herodotus, vi. 126–30.

(2) for the dowry, G. Glotz, La Solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce, p. 35; L. Beuchet, Histoire du droit privé dans la république athénienne, i. 127–8, 289, 317, 331.


Sometimes some authors tend to confuse the bride-price and the dowry. Perhaps the confusion is due to the fact that ἐξων was used in both senses. I rely chiefly on Beuchet.


The facts about the wives and mistresses of Pisistratus can be gleaned from Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, xvii; Thucydides, i. 20; Herodotus, i. 61.

Our comparative ignorance of Athenian law compels us to search for odd scraps of evidence in the native writings. None of the more detailed histories of Greece is an indisputable authority concerning the social conditions prevailing in any class of society. Either it reveals a political bias or the author makes a moral judgement. Thus both Gillies and Mitford rail against the evils of democracy, while the erudite Grote wrote his voluminous work with the express intention of dispelling these impressions and of upholding the blessings of that form of government. In presenting their ideas these historians were reflecting, in an undue measure, the cultural episodes of their own time. Similarly a twentieth-century writer who adopted the same technique would lay less emphasis on the social and more emphasis on the economic conditions, for now economic considerations are uppermost in our minds.

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The miserable picture of the fourth century painted by Curtius (History of Greece, trans. A. W. Ward, iv. 69 ff., v. 115 ff.) is criticized by Holm (History of Greece, trans. F. Clarke, iv. 57, 156, &c.), but the controversy seems forced. It is a matter of opinion, not of fact, whether or not one decade is more immoral than another, for all moral judgements are relative to the standards of the judge. See further para. 159.


685. For divorce, see L. Beauchet, Histoire du droit privé dans la république athénienne, i. 378, 381, 387; G. E. Howard, History of Matrimonial Institutions, i. 239.

We do not know the exact formalities in the case of an application on the part of the wife. It seems that she took her case to the Ἀρχιτέκτων, who judged the adequacy of the plea; but it is not clear whether the wife pleaded on her own behalf or whether her κυρίος pleaded for her. Apparently she could secure a divorce if her husband lost his civic rights, or brought a harlot into the house. A successful action for δίκη κακωσανως also enabled her to file her petition. See L. Beauchet, op. cit. i. 227-32. There is reason to believe that a wife could obtain a separation from a homo- sexual husband, but the date of the first legal decision to that effect is uncertain.

It is possible that divorce was by mutual consent. For two special cases see Plutarch, Pericles, xxxiv; idem, Aleibiares, viii.

For some comments on and summaries of the general conditions, see J. P. Mahaffy, Social Life in Greece, 141-2; E. Bulwer, Athens, Its Rise and Fall, ii. 377; H. Blunmer, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, trans. A. E. Zimmern, p. 173.

686. For the decree see A. E. Zimmern, Greek Commonwealth, pp. 336-7. The decree was repealed in 411 B.C. and re-enacted in 403 B.C.

Translations of the speeches of Demosthenes in which the family data can be found have been published by G. W. Botsford and E. H. Sihler in Hellenic Civilization, pp. 510 ff.

687. G. Glotz, La Solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce, p. 336; L. Beauchet, Histoire du droit privé dans la république athénienne, i. 393; R. C. Jebb, Attic Orators, ii. 318.

688. Some extracts have been translated by G. W. Botsford and E. H. Sihler, Hellenic Civilization, pp. 471 ff. The quotations have been culled from E. F. M. Benecke, Women in Greek Poetry, pp. 224-40.

The Middle Comedy was erotic in flavour.


These references are representative, not exhaustive. Most of the legal commentaries contain all the necessary information.

Potestas was the power over males and females; manus related to property and to females. Probably in earliest times there was no difference between potestas and
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absolute proprietorship, but by the fifth century the law of *potestas* had been humanized and modified.

Gaius, i. 108, claims that *manus* was peculiar to Roman citizens. So far as a wife was concerned this may have been the case, but W. E. Hearn, op. cit., pp. 143 ff., seems to disagree. Gaius, i. 155, also maintains that *potestas* was peculiar to the Romans, but this must be false, for the marital and parental power which it entailed is a common feature of absolute monogamy. Nor was the exercise of *potestas* by the *paterfamilias* peculiar to Rome. Hearn considers that the same conditions prevailed among all 'Aryan' peoples.

Apparently at one time it was common to sell a son, but a check seems to have been placed on this practice by the XII Tables, wherein it was enacted that a father lost his *potestas* if he sold his son into bondage three times. See R. Sohm, op. cit., p. 482. The language in which the commentators discuss this subject is obscure.

For a later reference to ancient practice, see Tacitus, *Annals*, 13, 32.

Within any period reached by historical documents a patrician husband does not seem to have possessed over his wife the same power as over his slaves and children. A fictitious sale may have been a means of relieving a woman of *manus*, but from the Roman evidence alone it is impossible to say if the fiction represented an ancient fact. This, however, is suggested by the comparative evidence.

Adultery and wine-drinking on the part of a wife were the least pardonable of all offences. It seems that among the patricians a woman's relations had a voice in her punishment. Perhaps we are to understand that the social position of women had risen, but the commentators and historians are not helpful. First, they tend to confuse the social position of a woman with her legal status. Secondly, they assume that the conditions which prevailed in one century (concerning which we possess evidence) were characteristic of the preceding or of the succeeding century (of which there may be no direct evidence). Thirdly, they are inclined to take it for granted that the evidence concerning the habits of one social stratum applies to the whole society. Both these assumptions are false, the truth being that in those days social conditions were changing as they are changing here now, the habits of the various social strata being diverse at any particular period. *Cp. para. 170 and nn. 701, 702.*

Adultery, use of false keys, and attempted poisoning were regarded as grounds for repudiation. Plutarch credits the regulations to Romulus.


Sohm seems to think that marriage by *usus* introduced marriage without *manus*. Doubtless Lord Bryce, in *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, ii. 388 (and, following him, L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 208), based his conclusions on a passage of this commentator. I am unable to agree, for the argument implies the identification of marriage by *usus* with the 'free' marriage of the *ius gentium*. These two forms of union were of a totally different character. Fundamentally *usus* was not a form of marriage but a method of obtaining, or incurring, *manus*. Under the marriage regulations of the *ius gentium*, *manus* did not exist. The idea that the patricians of the fifth century were prepared to sanction marriage without *manus* is preposterous.

My description of the manner in which *usus*, as applied to a sexual union, came to be included in the XII Tables, is the one which seems to suit the facts best. The important point, however, is not the manner of its appearance but that *usus* was once in operation as a means of incurring *manus* and then became defunct. It is the latter fact which Sohm, Bryce, and their followers have disregarded.

W. Ihne, *History of Early Rome*, pp. 167-8, supports the view of B. G. Niebuhr,
History of Rome, ii. 332, in regard to the ius comibium, and gives a convincing explanation of the structure of the XII Tables. The reported delay in, and controversy which attended, the work of the Decemvirate, and the later addition of the last two Tables, can be explained only by the supposition that the Decemvirs tried to introduce intermarriage between the orders and were prevented from doing so by the patricians.

G. C. Lewis, On the Credibility of Early Roman History, ii. 202, puts forward a most remarkable theory that the prohibition of intermarriage was introduced by the XII Tables. He makes specious but unhappy references to Cicero (de Rep. ii. 36-7) and to Livy (iv. 6).

691. If I were asked to cite the evidence, I should point to:

(1) The story of Virginia, as told by Livy, iii. 44-6, and, in a slightly different form, by Dionysius, xi. 28 ff. Niebuhr (History, i. 208, ii. 348) accepts it as it stands; Arnold (History, i. 295) considers it 'in the main sufficiently worthy of belief'; Mommsen (History of Rome, i. 283) includes it in a recital of fact; Ihne (History of Rome, iv. 239) considers the father's action to have been 'characteristic' of the times, and compares the similar cases of Maenius and Pontius. Even G. C. Lewis, On the Credibility of Early Roman History, ii. 242, maintains that the basis of the story is real.

(2) The statements concerning the divorce of L. Antonius in 308 B.C. as described by Niebuhr (op. cit. iii. 354) and Ihne (op. cit. iv. 229). The point is that, if the case of L. Antonius was as stated, it was the first known example of a repudiation by a husband without reference to the family council. He merely did as his fancy dictated. Lord Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, ii. 413, has a rational explanation in regard to the native statements concerning the divorce of Sp. Carvilius Ruga, 231 B.C., which is traditionally reputed to have been the first which occurred in Rome. L. T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, p. 209, follows Lord Bryce without comment. He does the same in regard to usus (n. 690).

(3) The story of the poisoning by the matrons in 331 B.C., as told by Livy, viii. 18. Cases of poisoning occurred also at the beginning of the second century, and W. Warde Fowler, Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero, p. 149, considers that the women may have murdered their husbands because they were tired of their habitual infidelity. I do not see why the same cause should not have been in operation in 331 B.C.

I do not place a high value on this evidence, and for that reason have excluded it from the text.

692. Livy, x. 23, 31; B. G. Niebuhr, History of Rome, iii. 10-11; W. Ihne, History of Rome, iv. 239.

For a reference to, and description of, the manner in which young children were reared, see Tacitus, Dialogue on Oratory, xxviii.


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Under the Lex Julia, the husband of an adulteress could retain one-sixth of the dowry, the wife of an adulterer retaining the dos in its entirety.

The whole subject of the dos is very obscure, and I have avoided all reference to it. We do not know how and when it was introduced. If and when Sp. Carvilius Ruga repudiated his wife, a law seems to have been mooted, perhaps enacted, that collateral security should be given by the husband, so that in the event of a dissolution of the marriage the dos remained the property of the wife’s people. Augustus made the provision of a dos a compulsory item for a well-to-do parent. In the early Empire the husband was merely a trustee for the property, enjoying its usufruct while his marriage lasted. A donatio ante nuptias was common after the reign of Constantine. Unlike the Babylonian nudumnu (para. 169) the donatio seems to have retained the husband’s property. Justinian ordered that if the wife brought dos the husband must provide donatio, any increase or decrease in the one being accompanied by a corresponding increase or decrease in the other. See J. H. Muirhead, op. cit., pp. 106, n. 4, 223, n. 1, &c.; W. A. Hunter, op. cit., pp. 295-7, 308-9.

697. S. Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius, p. 39.

A full discussion of the social and economic conditions which prevailed in the second and third centuries A.D. is to be found in M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, pp. 180 ff. The rise of the provincial bourgeoisie is well stated in such passages as op. cit., pp. 99, 176-9, 330, 332-3, 343-4, &c.

It is hard to dismiss Dr. Rostovtzeff’s mighty volume in such a short note as this.


According to Tacitus, some of the Teutonic kings possessed more than one wife, not from sexual motives (non libidine) but as the result of political marriages. When pre-nuptial chastity has been introduced into any society concerning which we have full information, monogamy (or a limited polygamy) seems to have been usual at first, the possession of more than one wife being a later custom. Cp. the original monogamy of the Bakitara and the later increase of polygamy among the Baganda (para. 166).

Most authorities agree that at one time capture was a favourite method of obtaining a wife, and that marriage by purchase succeeded it. For an example of the blood-feud which followed the capture of a woman, see Tacitus, Annals, i. 55.

In historical times the person of a woman was not purchased, only the rights (mund) over her. The distinction is nice, and to a modern white man important; but I doubt if there was any difference in the minds of the fifth-century Teutons. If a man possesses the right of life and death over a woman, he would seem to possess her person.


For the method of obtaining a wife and for the sale of the mund, see also F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, History of English Law, ii. 364, 444; J. C. Jeaffreson, Brides and Bridals, i. 12 ff.; J. Thrupp, The Anglo-Saxon Home, p. 22; T. Wright, History of Domestic Manners and Sentiments, p. 54; A. R. Cleveland, Women under English

For the rights of kindred, see F. Seebohm, *Tribal Custom in Anglo-Saxon Law*, pp. 69-72; E. Young, op. cit., pp. 124-6, 139, 144, 149; F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, op. cit. ii. 242.

The law of Ine (Ine 31) is translated by B. Thorpe in *Ancient Laws and Institutes of England*, i. 11.


The custom of *morgen-gifu* was practised by the Jutes in the sixth century, but among them at that time a widow only retained her *morgen-gifu* if she had borne a child. Similarly a barren wife had no claim on the estate of her deceased husband. See Ethelberht 78, 81 in B. Thorpe, op. cit. i. 23, 25.

In the study of Anglo-Saxon law the same difficulty arises as in the study of Hellenic institutions (para. 170) and Roman law (n. 689). The legal commentators seem to take it for granted that a law which was in operation in the eighth century was operative also in the sixth century. Sometimes an author will speak of Ine (seventh century) and Cnut (eleventh century) as if they were contemporaries; and throughout the literature there is an underlying assumption that in the so-called Dark Ages everything was static and primitive. J. Thrupp, *The Anglo-Saxon Home*, p. 2, rightly criticizes these methods. Speaking of the social conditions under which the Anglo-Saxons lived, he says: 'To describe them generally, without reference to any particular period, is to portray a social state which, existing partly in one age and partly in another, had as a whole no existence at all.'

See further n. 702.


For an alternative reading of Cnut's law, in reference to the sale of the *mund*, see E. Young, *Essays on Anglo-Saxon Law*, p. 174. For a comment on the translations, see B. Thorpe, op. cit. i. 416.


A husband enjoyed the usufruct of his wife's property. In some places, or at some time, a husband could limit his wife's enjoyment of her *morgen-gifu* and of her *veotuma* to a life-interest. His power of alienation also seems to have varied. It is impossible to state in what century these powers were possessed or cancelled, for the legal historians seldom give the date of any particular ordinance. In all probability the slight discrepancies which are apparent in their accounts arise from the fact that they are speaking of different centuries. Messrs. Pollock and Maitland (op. cit. ii. 399) say that the law 'amazes and bewilders', but at least some of the bewilderment is due, I think, to the assumption that the law never changed, the truth being that it was changing constantly.

Cp. para. 170, and nn. 689, 701.

703. For the Anglo-Saxon terminology, see J. Thrupp, *The Anglo-Saxon Home*, p. 43 f. If we may judge from O. D. Watkins, *Holy Matrimony*, p. 108, n. 1, the offending words were not immediately excised.

705. Even if the records were complete, a full discussion of these complicated problems would be impossible here.

For the pagan regulations, see F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, History of English Law, ii. 306; G. E. Howard, History of Matrimonial Institutions, i. 291, ii. 34, 39; J. Thrupp, The Anglo-Saxon Home, pp. 62, 64; A. R. Cleveland, Women under English Law, p. 143.

The law of Cnut (Cnut 54) is translated by B. Thorpe in Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, i. 407.

In the matter of post-nuptial regulations, as well as in that of the position of women (n. 701), the Jutes seem to have modified their absolute monogamy at an earlier date than did the Anglo-Saxons. Thus Ethelberht ordained that 'if a wife wish to go away with her children, let her have half the property; if the husband wish to have them, let her portion be as one child'. This seems to imply a divorce (or separation?) by mutual consent. We do not know for how long or over what area the law prevailed. In the following century the men of Kent were converted to Christianity. Howard thinks that the financial penalties prevented many divorces. See G. E. Howard, op. cit. ii. 39.


706. For the state of affairs in the last half of the sixteenth century, and for the 'licentious' opinions of the advanced Reformers, see G. E. Howard, History of Matrimonial Institutions, ii. 71 ff.; W. E. H. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, ii. 200; J. C. Jeaffreson, Brides and Bridals, ii. 315 ff.; and authorities cited in n. 671.

For the recommendation of the Commission appointed by Henry VIII to prepare a new ecclesiastical, and therefore also matrimonial, code, see also H. D. Morgan, The Doctrine and Law of Marriage, Adultery and Divorce, ii. 227–9; H. M. Luckock, History of Marriage, p. 175. Among its recommendations the Commission suggested that an adulterous husband should surrender one half of his property.

The Reformers defended their extreme views by citing and re-translationing appropriate passages in the Bible, by recalling the laws of the Christian Roman Emperors, and by reverting to the principle of self-divorce, which, they maintained, did not contravene the teaching of the Galilean. They rendered Malachi ii. 15–16 as follows: 'Take heed to your spirit, and let none deal injuriously with the wife of his youth. If he hate, let him put her away, saith the Lord God of Israel.'

707. See A. R. Cleveland, Women under English Law, pp. 75, 77, 117, 135–40, 169.


Morgan speaks of the 'accelerated ratio of increase' in the number of divorces.
He emphasizes the 'strength of the prejudices' against divorce, and the 'facility with which parliamentary divorces were sought and obtained when those prejudices were relaxed and overcome'. After the institution of parliamentary divorces, he says, there were eight divorces in the first forty-five years, fifty in the next sixty years, and seventy-four in the next twenty-five years. Between 1796 and 1800 twenty-nine bills were passed, and five rejected. In 1799 ten were passed, two rejected.

According to Jeaffreson, seventy divorces were granted between 1800 and 1837. Geary says that there were sixty between 1715 and 1775, fourteen between 1775 and 1780, and one hundred and ten between 1800 and 1852.

In every case, of course, the divorces were granted only to nobles or to landed gentry. No one else could afford the necessary expenditure.

711. These well-known facts have been well summarized by A. R. Cleveland in *Women under English Law*, pp. 219–20, 277, 281, &c.

712. By derivation (Gk. τροπή) entropy denotes a change, transformation, or turning-point. The word is used by physicists in reference to an important item in the universal process, revealed by the second law of thermodynamics. This law appears to give Direction to the Universal Process, and this fact has persuaded me to use the term human entropy to denote an item which appears to show the Direction of the Cultural Process. If I have read the evidence correctly, this Direction is towards refinement and elegance. A change of cultural condition, of course, may be in or away from that Direction. See para. 175.

Hitherto the refinement, or transformation, of a cultural condition (together with many other details of the cultural process) has been called 'evolution'. The vague use of this word has severely handicapped the study of human affairs and, for the sake of lucidity and exactitude, it is better avoided. If it had never been applied in a pseudo-technical manner to the cultural process, the cultural process could never have been confused with the biological process. For this confusion, noted in para. 149, Herbert Spencer and his followers cannot escape some responsibility. Each process, of course, is an evolving one, but that only means that changes continually occur in them.

Herbert Spencer's conclusion in regard to the cultural process, which is still extant in many ideas about 'progress', has been well criticized by W. R. Inge, *God and the Astronomers*, pp. 23, 133 ff.

For other comments on the confusion between the biological and cultural processes, see nn. 655, 670.


714. Sometimes it is said that the leaders of the Russian revolution have banished religion by force. In all such statements there is a confusion between religion and a form of religion. If the new Russian oligarchy has compelled some of its subjects to refrain from certain public religious observances, it may safely be prophesied that the men and women of Russia will still manifest their inherent nature in a manner appropriate to their case. If they are prevented from doing so in public temples, they will conduct their rites in the privacy of their homes or in other secret places, the nature of those rites depending on their cultural condition.

For the importance of distinguishing between religion and a form of religion, see n. 4.

715. For Mohammed's advice in regard to wives and women, see *Koran*, Sura iv. I quote from the Rev. J. M. Rodwell's translation (Everyman's Library). Mohammed did not place a limit on the number of wives that a man could possess;
a man’s course of action was left to his own sense of what was equitable. Until a 
late period of his career, Mohammed himself had only one wife (Chadijah). In 
taking other wives at a later date he seems to have been actuated by a desire for 
male offspring.

The events alluded to in Sura iv fall between the third and fifth years after the 
Flight to Medina, i.e. c. 625-7. Presumably, therefore, Mohammed’s advice in 
regard to wives was given at that time.

For the replacement of mot’a marriage by ba’al marriage, and for the introduction 
of ‘a doctrine of chastity’ among the Semites of Arabia, see W. Robertson Smith, 

Professor Robertson Smith states that just before the time of Mohammed ‘a 
Meccan woman of good birth piqued herself on her chastity; the restraint which was 
originally imposed on women by their lords had come to be accepted by the wife 
herself as a point of honour’. This is the manner, of course, in which chastity has 
always come to be regarded as a virtue. See also para. 168.
## APPENDIX I

### CHART OF EVIDENCE

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<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Cultural condition</th>
<th>Treatment of affliction</th>
<th>Method of weather control</th>
<th>Treatment of ghosts</th>
<th>Pre-nuptial chastity</th>
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APPENDIX II

The Cultural Scale
(paras. 143)

Here the Eighty Uncivilized Societies have been arranged on a Cultural Scale according to the pattern of their Cultural Behaviour.

For definitions of deistic, monistic, and zoistic, see paras. 7-8.

There was an intense variety within these patterns.

With the entries on this Cultural Scale, compare the entries on the Scale of the Limitation of Sexual Opportunity (Appendix III).

APPENDIX III

The Scale of the Limitation of Sexual Opportunity
(paras. 143)

Here the Eighty Uncivilized Societies have been arranged on a Scale according to their Pre-nuptial Sexual Opportunity.

For definitions of Pre-nuptial Freedom, Irregular or Occasional Continence, and Pre-nuptial Chastity, see paras. 16-19.

There was some variety within the pattern 'Irregular or Occasional Continence'.

Definite evidence exists that the regulations of No. 4, SE. Solomon Islanders (Ulawa and Sa's), and No. 14, Shilluk, afforded a more limited pre-nuptial sexual opportunity than those of their neighbours, but there is no basis on which the sexual opportunity of these two societies may be compared.

The 'Pre-nuptial Chastity' Societies enjoyed a varied Post-nuptial Sexual Opportunity.

With the entries on this Scale, compare the entries on the Cultural Scale (Appendix II).
APPENDIX IV
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF NATIVE TERMS

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<th>Society</th>
<th>The power or powers in the universe</th>
<th>Word denoting something unusual or beyond comprehension</th>
<th>Word translated as or applied to 'ghost' or 'the dead'</th>
<th>Source of magical and priestly power</th>
<th>Paragraph nos.</th>
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<td>3. New Britons</td>
<td>tebaran</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>tebaran</td>
<td>tebaran</td>
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<td>? akalo</td>
<td>akalo (l'oa)</td>
<td>akalo</td>
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<td>5. Banks Islanders</td>
<td>vui</td>
<td>vui</td>
<td>tamate</td>
<td>vui</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Fijians</td>
<td>kalou</td>
<td>kalou</td>
<td>baloma; kosi</td>
<td>kalou</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Trobriand Islanders</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>Knowledge of spells</td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW GUINEA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Kiwai Papuans</td>
<td>ebihare</td>
<td>ebihare</td>
<td>oboro</td>
<td>Knowledge usually revealed in dreams 'spirits'</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Mafulu</td>
<td>Not given; applied only to</td>
<td>Not given, but translated 'spirit'</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>something unusual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Purari</td>
<td>imunu</td>
<td>imunu</td>
<td>a'avaia</td>
<td>imunu</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Mailu</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Possession of spells</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Shilluk</td>
<td>jwok</td>
<td>jwok</td>
<td>tipo; jwok?</td>
<td>jwok</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Dinka</td>
<td>jok</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>atiep; jok</td>
<td>jok (of tiet)</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Lango</td>
<td>jok</td>
<td>jok</td>
<td>tipo; jok</td>
<td>jok</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Bakitara</td>
<td>muchwezi</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>mizimu (pl.)</td>
<td>Possession of mayembe or by muzimu or by muchwezi</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Baganda</td>
<td>lubare</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>mizimu (pl.)</td>
<td>Possession by lubare</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Akikuyu</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngoma (= ngai)</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Akamba</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>aimu (= ngai-mulungu)</td>
<td>ngai (mulungu)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mulungu</td>
<td>mulungu</td>
<td>oit (pl. oitindet)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Nandi</td>
<td>asita, 'the sun'</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td></td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>The power or powers in the universe</td>
<td>Word denoting something unusual or beyond comprehension</td>
<td>Word translated as or applied to 'ghost' or 'the dead'</td>
<td>Source of magical and priestly power</td>
<td>Paragraph nos.</td>
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<td>------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICA (cont.)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Masai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>menengai</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>No report; 'Medicine' associated with the unusual No report; sometimes 'possession'</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Wayao (Ajawa)</td>
<td>mulungu</td>
<td>mulungu lisoka (pl. masoka)</td>
<td>mulungu mizimu (pl.)</td>
<td>No report; 'Medicine' associated with the unusual No report; sometimes 'possession'</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Anyanja</td>
<td>mulungu</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Awemba</td>
<td>mulungu</td>
<td>mipashi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Baila</td>
<td>leza musamo shikwembu tilo</td>
<td>muzhimo (pl. nizhimo) shikwembu (pl. pizk-wembu)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inherited; tilo</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Baronga</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>itongo (pl. amatongo) idholozi (pl. amadhlozi)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inherited; revealed in dreams; possession by idholozi</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Amazulu</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Basuto</td>
<td>molimo</td>
<td>balimo (sing. molimo)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Learnt from other practitioners</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Ibibio</td>
<td>ndemmn</td>
<td>orisha</td>
<td>orisha</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Yoruba</td>
<td>obishna</td>
<td>vodu</td>
<td>noli (abonsa)</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Dahomans</td>
<td>vodu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Ashanti</td>
<td>oboasum (boshum)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMERICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Tlingit</td>
<td>yek</td>
<td>kinayek = dead 'braves'</td>
<td>yek</td>
<td></td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Haida</td>
<td>sgana skil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Thompson</td>
<td>kwalus kwalus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Shuswap</td>
<td>Native terms not quoted: culture same as that of Thompson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Lillooet</td>
<td>snam</td>
<td></td>
<td>snam</td>
<td></td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Coast Salish</td>
<td>sulia</td>
<td></td>
<td>sulia</td>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Klallam</td>
<td>tamanous tamanous</td>
<td></td>
<td>tamanous</td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Nez Percés</td>
<td>The native terms are not quoted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Dene</td>
<td>munedoo</td>
<td></td>
<td>munedoo</td>
<td></td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Ojibwa</td>
<td>munedoo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Blackfeet</td>
<td>The reports are confused. See n. 510</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>The power or powers in the universe</td>
<td>Word denoting something unusual or beyond comprehension</td>
<td>Word translated as or applied to 'ghost' or 'the dead'</td>
<td>Source of magical and priestly power</td>
<td>Paragraph nos.</td>
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<td><strong>AMERICA (cont.)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Arapaho</td>
<td></td>
<td>The reports are confused. See n. 514</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Iroquois</td>
<td></td>
<td>The native terms are not quoted. The word <em>orenda</em> has been translated 'magic power'. The source of magic power is not given</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Dakota</td>
<td><em>wakan</em></td>
<td><em>wakan</em></td>
<td><em>wagi?</em></td>
<td><em>wakan</em></td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Omaha</td>
<td><em>wakonda</em></td>
<td><em>wakonda</em></td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td><em>wakonda</em></td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Hidatsa</td>
<td><em>mahopa</em></td>
<td><em>mahopa</em></td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td><em>hopa</em></td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Mandan</td>
<td><em>mahopini</em></td>
<td><em>mahopini</em></td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td><em>hopini</em></td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Crow</td>
<td><em>maxpe</em></td>
<td><em>maxpe</em></td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td><em>maxpe</em></td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Winnebago</td>
<td>Winnebago <em>opine</em> (xopini) = Hidatsa <em>hopa</em> = Mandan <em>hopini</em> = Crow <em>maxpe.</em> But see para. 120.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. Hopi</td>
<td></td>
<td>The native terms are not quoted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>55. Zuni</td>
<td></td>
<td>The native terms are not quoted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>56. Sia</td>
<td></td>
<td>The native terms are not quoted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>57. Navaho</td>
<td></td>
<td>The native terms are confusing. See n. 553</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58. Apache</td>
<td></td>
<td>The native terms are not quoted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59. Chickasaw</td>
<td></td>
<td>The native terms are not quoted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60. Creek</td>
<td></td>
<td>The native terms are not quoted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61. Natchez</td>
<td></td>
<td>The native terms are not quoted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62. Pima</td>
<td></td>
<td>The native terms are not quoted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63. Aztecs</td>
<td></td>
<td>The native terms are not quoted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OCEANIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64. Maori</td>
<td><em>atu</em></td>
<td><em>atu</em></td>
<td><em>atu</em></td>
<td><em>atu</em></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65. Tongans</td>
<td><em>atu</em></td>
<td><em>atu</em></td>
<td><em>atu</em></td>
<td><em>atu</em></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66. Samoans</td>
<td><em>aitu</em></td>
<td><em>aitu</em></td>
<td><em>aitu</em></td>
<td><em>aitu</em></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67. Tahitians</td>
<td><em>atu</em></td>
<td>No report</td>
<td><em>atu</em>; <em>iii</em></td>
<td><em>atu</em> (of diviner)</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68. Gilbert Islanders</td>
<td><em>atu</em></td>
<td>No report</td>
<td><em>ani</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASSAM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69. Ao Nagas</td>
<td><em>tsungrem</em> (Ao), <em>terhoma</em> (Angami), <em>teghami</em> (Sema), and <em>tsandramo</em> (and others, e.g. <em>potso</em>, <em>Lhota</em>) have been translated 'spirits'; these were the source of magic power. Further elucidation is impossible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70. Angami Nagas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71. Lhota Nagas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72. Sema Nagas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73. Mikirs</td>
<td><em>arnam</em></td>
<td><em>arnam</em></td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>Instruction; experience; 'spirits' (arnam?)</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74. Garos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75. Khasi</td>
<td><em>blei</em></td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>Knowledge of spells</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MISCELLANEOUS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76. Andaman Islanders</td>
<td><em>lau</em></td>
<td><em>lau</em></td>
<td><em>lau</em></td>
<td>One class of magician was <em>soblei</em></td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77. Sea-Dyaks</td>
<td><em>petara</em></td>
<td><em>petara</em></td>
<td><em>petara</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78. Chukchee</td>
<td><em>antu</em></td>
<td><em>antu</em></td>
<td><em>antu</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79. Koryak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>80. Yukaghir</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

This Bibliography is not an exhaustive list of the publications to which reference has been made in the Notes or from which appropriate passages have been quoted. It is simply a list of the original authorities on which I have relied in my study of the Eighty Uncivilized Societies. Studies in comparative social anthropology, critical commentaries, and all similar publications, as well as the authorities cited in connexion with the customs of the civilized societies, have been excluded.

The Eighty Uncivilized Societies are arranged in the same order as that in which they appear in Appendixes I–IV.

1. LOYALTY ISLANDERS

A. Cheyne. A Description of Islands in the Western Pacific Ocean. London, 1852.

2. TANNSEE

A. Cheyne. A Description of Islands in the Western Pacific Ocean. London, 1852.
F. Speiser. Two Years with the Natives in the Western Pacific. London, 1913.
A. C. P. Watt. Twenty-five Years on Tanna. Paisley, 1896.

3. NEW BRITONS

(Bismarck Archipelago)


4. SE. SOLOMON ISLANDERS

(Ulawa and Sa’a)

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(ii) A Dictionary of the Language of Sa'a and Ulawa, S.E. Solomon Islands.
Oxford, 1929.

5. BANKS ISLANDERS


6. FIJIANS

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to conception, pregnancy and parturition’, Glasgow Medical Journal, xxviii
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Institute, x (1881), pp. 137–49.
(ii) ‘Land Tenure in Fiji’, Journal of the Anthropological Institute, x (1881),
pp. 332–52.
(iii) ‘The Nanga, or Sacred Stone Enclosure of Wainimala, Fiji’, Journal of the
Anthropological Institute, xiv (1885), pp. 14–39.
Institute, xxiv (1895), pp. 360–71.
A. M. Hocart. (i) ‘On the meaning of kalou, and the Origin of Fijian Temples’,
(ii) ‘The Fijian Custom of Tauvu’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute,
(iii) ‘On the meaning of the Fijian word turanga’, Man, 1913, No. 80.
(vii) ‘Ethnographical Sketch of Fiji’, Man, 1918, No. 43.
(viii) ‘Chieftainship and Sister’s Son in the Pacific’, American Anthropologist,
(ix) ‘Early Fijians’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, xlix (1915),
pp. 42–51.
(xii) ‘Limitations of the Sister’s Son Right in Fiji”, Man, 1926, No. 134.
A. B. Joske. ‘The Nanga of Viti-Levu’, Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie, ii
P. Rougier. ‘Maladies et médecins à Fiji, autrefois et aujourd’hui’, Anthropos, ii
(1907), pp. 68–79, 994–1008.
(ii) ‘Concubinacy in the Classificatory System of Relationship’, Journal of the
(iii) Art. ‘Ancestor-worship (Fijian)’, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited
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SS
7. TROBRIAND ISLANDERS


8. KIWAI PAPUANS


9. MAFULU


10. PURARI


11. MAILU


12. KOITA


13. ORAKAIVA


14. SHILLUK

P. W. Hoffmeyr. ‘Religion der Schilluk’, *Anthropos*, vi (1911), pp. 120–32.
(ii) ‘Nikawg’s Place in the Shilluk Religion’, *Sudan Notes and Records*, i (1918), pp. 283–92.
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(v) 'Shilluk Notes', Sudan Notes and Records, ix (1926), pp. 57–68.
My thanks are due to the Rev. Dr. D. S. Oyler for sending me a large typewritten manuscript in answer to a small questionnaire. The document is referred to as 'Oyler MS.', followed by the number of the section and the subsection of the questionnaire in answer to which the statements were made. Dr. Oyler's covering letters are dated 20/6/30 and 25/6/30.

15. DINKA

16. LANGO

17. BAKITARA

18. BAGANDA
(ii) 'Immigrants and their Influence in the Lake Region of Central Africa', Fraser Lecture, 1923. Cambridge, 1924.

19. BANYANKOLE
J. Roscoe. (i) 'The Bahima', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, xxxvi (1907), pp. 93–118.

20. AKIKUYU
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21. AKAMBA


22. NANDI


Sir A. C. Hollis has published also a paper on ‘The Religion of the Nandi’ in Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions (Oxford, 1908), vol. i, pp. 87–91. The contents of this paper, so far as they concern the Nandi, are reprinted almost verbatim in The Nandi, pp. 15, 35, 37, 40–8, 65. I have not thought it worth while to give the double reference.

23. MASAI


24. WAYAO


25. ANYANJA

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26. AWEMBA

27. BAILA

28. BARONGA

29. AMAZULU
D. Leslie. Among the Zulus and Amatongas. Edinburgh, 1875.

My thanks are due to Mr. J. Y. Gibson, of Pietermaritzburg, for supplying me with a holographic manuscript in answer to a small questionnaire which, through the kind offices of Mr. R. U. Sayce, I was privileged to send him. The manuscript is dated 13 December 1929, and is referred to as ‘Gibson MS.’, followed by the number of the section and subsection of the questionnaire in answer to which the statements were made.

30. BASUTO
My thanks are due to Mr. F. H. Dutton, of Maseru, Director of Education for Basutoland, BechuanaLand, and Swaziland, for supplying me with a large typewritten manuscript in answer to a small questionnaire which, through the kind offices of Mr. R. U. Sayce, I was privileged to send him. The manuscript is dated 13 February 1930, and is referred to as 'Dutton MS.', followed by the number of the section and subsection of the questionnaire in reply to which the statements were made.

31. IBIBIO

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33. DAHOMANS
A. B. Ellis. The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa. London, 1890.
J. A. Skertchley. Dahomey as it is. London, 1874.

34. ASHANTI

35. TLINGIT


36. HAIDA


F. Poole. *Queen Charlotte Islands.* London, 1872.


37. THOMPSON


38. SHUSWAP


39. LILLOOET


40. COAST SALISH


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61. NATCHEZ


Mr. Swanton’s valuable paper consists of copious extracts from the old chroniclers. I have thought it better to confine my references to his collection of material than to cite those books which are less readily accessible. See further n. 558.

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63. AZTECS


64. MAORI


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(x) 'Maori Genius for Personification', Transactions of the New Zealand Institute, liii (1921), pp. 1–13.

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78. CHUKCHEE


79. KORYAK


80. YUKAGHIR


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